#maritime arbitration

[aiolegalservices]

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[disastrous-aries]

Just had to catch a bitchass cold on the day of taeyong's first solo album release I hate myself for it!!

[johnypage95]

Arbitration lawyers in UAE:-

Mayed Advocates & Legal Consultants offers a wide range of legal services in the United Arab Emirates, including corporate law, real estate law, family law, and more. With a team of experienced lawyers, the firm provides expert legal advice and representation to individuals and businesses. https://mayedadv.ae/en/arbitration/

[vslawoffice]

[celestiarambles]

Hi this may divert from my usual content, but as someone with a platform like this I need to speak up about this.

The Philippines-China maritime dispute has been going on for years now, but lately the tensions had been getting more and more worse to the point it’s super concerning now.

Here’s a bit of a history lesson: China claims that the West Philippine Sea is theirs because of the nine-dash line, but the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled in 2016 that that had no basis under international law. Other than that, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) said that China’s historic rights on the territory no longer exists. So basically, the West Philippine Sea belongs to the Philippines.

However, China rejects that decision. They have harassed, intimidated, and even used armed conflict on our vessels. China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels had even used a water cannon against our ships TWICE, in which one incident resulted to getting seven Navy personnel wounded.

Worse, there are also allegations of a spy being planted here. Alice Guo, one of the mayors in Tarlac (a city in the Philippines) had mysteriously risen to power despite having no prior experience or connections whatsoever. Literally no one even knew her in her town. She just claims to live in a simple farm. However, she owns a luxury sports car and a helicopter. And somehow, everything regarding her past is inconsistent; she doesn’t know what her mother’s name was, who she grew up with, no school documents, hell she didn’t even have a birth certificate up until she was 17 years old. This was all brought up because she was involved in the criminal activities (like human trafficking, scams, etc.) of the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) which also has the Chinese involved.

The US has also been taking advantage of the situation by deploying 9 EDCA sites (military bases) for a supposed military pact, but former US Marine Intelligence Officer Scott Ritter has admitted to using the Philippines as a tool to gain leverage over the Chinese.

What has our government done regarding this dispute? They’re too busy infighting to focus on the bigger picture and on how to settle on an agreement with China.

I just want to take the time to speak up and make people more aware about the ongoing dispute. I know that this has been going on for several years now, but my memory and knowledge about the topic may be a bit wonky so I apologize in advance if I had said anything wrong. You can add more information regarding this or correct the information that I've given if I phrased things wrong.

Regardless, I do know one thing: the West Philippine Sea is ours.

Sources:

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-china-sea-why-are-china-philippines-tensions-heating-up-2024-04-11/

https://www.youtube.com/live/aOrmFJXyAVI?si=P9rPJkJM6BF0NIbW (check 1:57:00)

[cinnamonnangel]

ASTRO 101 - THE HOUSES (PART II)

SEVENTH HOUSE - I BALANCE

(The Seventh House is ruled by Libra and Venus.)

House of marriage, personality and character of our partner, partner’s job

Civil partnership, bilateral relations, long and committed relationship, close friends, closely associated with, opposite side, associations, union, consultancy

Terms of relationship and behavior

Joint ventures, hostilities, adversary, rivals, competition

Traits we feel lacking in ourselves, the parts of us that are in us but have not been revealed and that we have difficulty in accepting

Lower back, skin, external sexual organs, bladder, ovaries, blood

International relations, military or civil wars, treatises, arbitrators, illegal criminals, marriage and divorce rates, foreign trade, public relations

EIGHTH HOUSE - I DESIRE

(The Eighth House is ruled by Scorpio, Mars and Pluto.)

House of death - natural or unnatural, accident, suicide, fire, drowning, diseases, corruption, crises, surgery

Sex, sexuality, erotism, desire, fantasies, fetishes, sexual life

Alteration and transformations, sharing

Heritage, money that comes to us beyond of our control, money that comes to us from others, inheritance from husband

Tax, alimony, debt, heritage, loan, lottery, gambling

Robbery, fighting, theft, slaughter, butchers, coroners, harassment, rape

The fears, privacy, feel rage towards, abomination

Psychology, occultism, parapsychology, subconscious, spiritual psychology

Genitals, groin area, colon, sex organs, gall bladder, rectum, urogenital system

International debts, international financial agreements, charges, stock certificates, interest rates, foreign exchanges, credits, fuses, mortgages, pension funds, legacies, mortality, life-critical, suicide

Surgery, morgue, surgeons, laboratories, nuclear forces, sewage, organized crimes, terrorists, detective, demimonde, arms, underground sources, cabalistic subjects

NINTH HOUSE - I ASPIRE

(The Ninth House is ruled by Sagittarius and Jupiter.)

House of wisdom, mastership, higher education, academic trainings

Cults and thoughts, abstract reasoning, moral evidence, philosophizing, religious cult, reflection, abstract thoughts

The house where we deepen the information we get from the 3rd house

Distant relatives

Society's mindset, social law rules, social and moral rules, harmony with society

Expedition, long trips, distant travels, foreign countries, foreigners, exterior, crew, communication instruments, media, broadcast

Hips, thighs, sciatic nerves, lower spine, liver, autonomic nervous system

Foreign relations and trade, courts, laws, judges, minorities, companies, advertising portfolios, religion and clergy, the country's philosophical and religious tendencies, migrations, long-distance communications, fast-moving news, broadcasting, popular culture, foreigners

Universities, airlines and transport, maritime transport, ministry of foreign affairs, flight attendants

TENTH HOUSE - I USE

(The Tenth House is ruled by Capricorn and Saturn.)

House of profession, honor, social status, public esteem, dignity, business, character, reputation and career

Glory, name, fame, recognition, way of life, purpose and power

Social roles, status in society, the part of society that sees us, social identity, prestige and title

Marital status, our partner's family, parents, father, authoritarian leaders

Skin, hair, knees, teeth, bones, joints, skeletal system, reputation

Government, the state's reputation by foreign countries, heads of state, powers, executives, leaders, celebrities, notable personages, public figures, uplands

ELEVENTH HOUSE - I KNOW

(The Eleventh House is ruled by Aquarius, Saturn and Uranus.)

House of friends, groups, associations, endowments, a circle of friends, people around us, hives, social environments and organizations

Goals, future plans, hopes, goals of life, wishes, happy news, wealth, fortune, expectations from life and dreams

Income from career, colleagues, international friendships, audiences we offer ideas, incoming wealth, gains, profits, writings

Social media, mass media and virtual communities

Endowments associations, politics, parties, establishment, the masses

Lower leg, calves, ankles, electrical impulsive of the nerves, circulatory system, elimination

Allied countries, social institutions and administrations, legislative changes, national mobilizations, revolts, revolutions, organizations, erosions

TWELFTH HOUSE - I BELIEVE

(The Twelfth House is ruled by Pisces, Jupiter and Neptune.)

House of tribulations, secret matters, troubles, subconscious, covert and covered topics, privacy, loneliness, ermitage, place of isolation

Thoughts, anxieties, and fears underlying repressed consciousness, spiritual life

The things we hide from others and are afraid to tell, our shadow sides, psychological problems

Karmic transmissions, burdens and problems we brought from the past

Secret enemy, backfriend

What kind of pregnancy our mother had, our condition in the mother’s womb and the emotions transferred to us in the mother’s womb

Fantasies and fetishes

Feet, all bodily fluids, the lymphatic system

Secret enemies, secret organizations, private affairs, spies, psychics, fortune-tellers, wizards, deep and secret affairs, criminals, thefts, assassinations, drugs, addicts, dark business people, unemployment and strikes

Hospitals, prisons, rehabilitation centers, mental hospitals, faith houses, orphanages, clinics, charities, overseas

[marcksnow]

The South China Sea Dispute: Unraveling the Nine-Dash Line

The South China Sea dispute has been a long-standing issue, marked by conflicting territorial claims and geopolitical tensions. Central to this dispute is China's contentious "Nine-Dash Line," which purports to assert Beijing's sovereignty over nearly the entire West Philippine Sea, encompassing the Kalayaan Group of Islands. This essay delves into the historical and legal aspects of China's Nine-Dash Line and highlights the Philippines' counterclaims, particularly drawing attention to the 1734 Murillo Velarde map.

The Origin and Legitimacy of China's Nine-Dash Line:

China's Nine-Dash Line first appeared on Chinese maps in 1947, with Beijing using it as a basis for asserting historical claims to vast maritime areas in the South China Sea. However, the international community has consistently questioned the legitimacy of this demarcation. In a significant development, an international tribunal ruled on July 12, 2016, that the Nine-Dash Line had "no legal basis" for making maritime claims. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague delivered this verdict, effectively challenging China's historical claims over the South China Sea.

The Philippines' Historical and Legal Claims:

Contrary to China's assertions, the Philippines has put forth both historical and legal claims to the disputed territories, backed by compelling evidence. A key piece of evidence in the Philippines' favor is the 1734 Murillo Velarde map. This historic map played a pivotal role in the Philippines' victory against China's ownership claims in the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The Murillo Velarde map, originally printed in the 18th century, resided in the basement of Alnwick Castle for two centuries, part of the Duke of Northumberland's collection. This map serves as a testament to the Philippines' long-standing presence and historical connection to the South China Sea, particularly the West Philippine Sea.

The Problematic Nature of China's Claims:

China's assertion of sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea remains problematic on multiple fronts. Firstly, it lacks historical and legal basis, as affirmed by the international tribunal's ruling. Secondly, the unilateral drawing of the Nine-Dash Line by Chinese authorities raises concerns about its validity and its impact on regional stability.

Conclusion:

The South China Sea dispute, epitomized by China's Nine-Dash Line, continues to be a source of contention in international politics. While China insists on its historical claims, the Philippines has presented compelling historical and legal evidence to challenge these assertions. The 1734 Murillo Velarde map stands as a symbol of the Philippines' enduring connection to the region. Ultimately, a resolution to this dispute should be sought through diplomacy and adherence to international law, fostering peace and stability in the South China Sea.

References:

[pannaginip]

Philstar: Foreign military 'intervention' warned in upcoming West Philippine Sea naval drill

A progressive fisherfolk group warned that the upcoming Philippines-Japan-Australia-US joint naval drills could increase tensions in the West Philippine Sea at the "further expense" of Filipino fisherfolk.

"It is the Filipino fisherfolk all over again who will bear the brunt of China’s retaliation against these provocative naval drills with other countries," said PAMALAKAYA national chairperson Fernando Hicap on Saturday.

"It has been proven that foreign military exercises did not dispel Chinese Coast Guard vessels from our territorial waters. On the contrary, Chinese forces have increased rapidly in response to the successive joint maritime exercises conducted by the Philippines and the US," he added.

"So why does the Marcos Jr. administration keep on joining military exercises with other countries in our seas?"

While PAMALAKAYA understands that the Philippines needs support from the international community to pressure China to leave Manila's territorial waters, Hicap said that the country needs to be wary of other superpowers that take advantage of the dispute in advancing their economic and geopolitical interests.

Beijing continues to maintain its presence within the West Philippine Sea even after the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 invalidated the former's claim to almost the entire South China Sea.

The group said that they would continue to assert that the Philippines should stand on its own feet at fight for its national sovereignty peacefully and diplomatically using international laws that recognizes its EEZ.

2024 Apr. 6

[racefortheironthrone]

I was rereading some of your old union questions and I was wondering if there was some reason why hiring halls wasn't more common.

So I discuss hiring halls a bit here, but just to explain to new readers, a hiring hall is a particular mode of labor relations whereby the union takes over the power to hire and fire workers from management while agreeing to provide workers to a given job site upon request from a business that has a contract with the union. One way to think of it is that the union has essentially put the HR department under worker control.

The union then undertakes to match requests for a certain number of workers to the same number of union members (in the case of a closed shop) or dues-paying workers (in the case of an agency shop) who have applied to the hiring hall for work. In order to prevent corruption and favoritism, the union assigns or refers workers on the basis of some non-discriminatory rule. To quote from IATSE (the theater worker's union) Local #18's rules for referrals:

"Referrals are to be based upon such recognized factors as ability to perform specific services requested by said Employer, availability for employment at the time of such request, and seniority as defined by the length of service in the industry or for a specific employer."

Finally, the hiring hall also undertakes a responsibility that the labor that it's providing to employers is of high quality. At a minimum, this involves keeping detailed records on union members' "good conduct" on the job site. Most hiring halls tend to require, in addition to union membership and/or dues, that a worker has completed an apprenticeship or other form of licensing or certification process in a trade, and has a minimum amount of experience as a trainee. Finally, some hiring halls even attempted to regulate personal behavior standards when it came to alcohol, on the grounds that workers who are habitual alcoholics are likely to drink on the job, which compromises the quality of their labor.

Hiring halls tend to be confined to a fairly narrow set of industries - you see them in construction, longshoring and warehousing, maritime, theater, agriculture. So why aren't they more common?

Well, one major factor is that employers tend to be highly resistant to allowing unions to take over something that they consider to be a core role of management - and thus it's kind of the last thing they'd agree to in a union contract. Thus, the relative balance of power between labor and capital becomes pivotal: where employers are strong and unions are weak, you don't see hiring halls; but where employers are weak and unions are strong, you're more likely to see hiring halls.

Another factor is labor law - the hiring hall tended to be associated with closed shops, and a lot of countries ban closed shops. (The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 banned the closed shop but left hiring halls alone, so hiring halls had to shift to agency shops.) Moreover, historically the NLRB has been rather suspicious of hiring halls, in part because the NRLB had pioneered the model of union shops associated with the then-new CIO unions and wanted to steer unions towards that model rather than the hiring hall, which was associated with older craft unions. As a result, NRLB bureaucrats tended to discourage the formation of hiring halls when they made labor law decisions or conducted arbitration and mediation during collective bargaining.

A third factor is the union's capacity - as you can see from above, operating a hiring hall takes a lot of work (and financial resources to pay for that work). A lot of unions find that degree of extra effort to be more than they're willing or able to muster. The United Farm Workers, for example (and this is a topic that I'd welcome further asks about, because it's a fascinating story of the rise and fall of a social movement), ran into a good deal of difficulty trying to set up a system of hiring halls in the wake of their first breakthrough victory in the grape-growing industry in California in 1970.

As detailed in the excellent history From the Jaws of Victory by Matthew Garcia, Cesar Chavez was more interested in the UFW as a social movement than in doing the work to ensure that contracts were signed in a timely fashion, that hiring halls (which had to be set up on far-flung farms all over the state of California) were operational in time to handle the seasonal hiring rush in the fields, that they were adequately staffed by competent people (Cesar Chavez had a rooted ideological objection to paying union staffers more than a poverty wage), that they kept adequate records and matched workers to referrals efficiently, and that they were operating in a non-discriminatory and efficient manner. As a result, a lot of UFW hiring halls developed a reputation for being shady or slow and inefficient or favoring Mexican workers over Filipinos - which became something of a hindrance in maintaining existing membership and organizing new workers.

[terrantechnocrat]

The Taynifi of Iiser are a race of spiny-backed, fat-bellied mammals that emerged from savage animality on the fertile plains of Iiser, a far-orbiting satellite of a gas giant. Taynifi worlds are among the most proactive Sympolity members in interstellar exploration and economic and cultural exchange, driven by their quiet, passionate precursor veneration, the blocks of whose immense cyclopean ruins—difficult for early taynifi to explore—always loomed large on their continent's coasts, sinking into the bogs and the sea. Wanderers of the plain first and foremost, nearly every taynifi retains a rich oral and osseous musical tradition, informing a notably symphonic mode of intellection and abstraction.

In the eons since the Seeding, the taynifi laid roads, erected small towns of turf and stone, or dug out from the hillsides and reinforced them with bone. Gradually, a simple yet comprehensive medieval civilization coalesced using only the wind that constantly blew through their treeless world to generate mechanical power. It spread out over the rocky hills and grassy plains of the supercontinent that emerged from Iiser's ocean, but, at the coasts, it stopped. They began to burn peat to smelt iron into tools, and brickwork replaced the turf of their communal buildings and temples. Beyond that, the continental period's patchwork of social structures, customs, and kin relations would have more closely resembled the intricacies of aboriginal Australia, with innumerable, complex spiritual traditions and the ritualization of most warfare.

Contact with the worlds of the early Sympolity brought tree plantations and shipbuilding, and coastal clans quickly explored and settled their world's two heavily forested subcontinents and peripheral islands, where only animals and the much-mystified Ancients had walked before. Taynifi mariners seized the opportunity to harvest their oceans' bounty for the benefit of the Yikarans and other off-world carnivorous races in return for machinery and, later, curvature-drive schematics. Taynifi cannot ingest fish without significant bloating, having evolved from grazing herbivores, but found that Iiser's previously invisible bounty gave them power. The new maritime economy nearly wrought social chaos upon Iiser, but Sympolity intervention helped mediate the forces that resulted from the new surplus.

From the coasts, the new mariner clans forged ties with the inlanders, gathering iron in exchange for refined materials and new technology. From exchanges organically emerged a continental confederacy with improvisational systems of arbitration; the ancient world was meeting the new, transforming both. Inevitable economic schisms that resulted from these modes of relations were met with Sympolity pressure to rationalize, computerize, and network the entire tribal system of patronage and distribution under a world council of representatives chosen from the various taynifi clan-communes.

In modern times, taynifi—neither natural foresters nor mariners yet passionate about both as a learned foundation for prosperity—maintain autonomous colonies across a score of worlds and several fleets of freighters, seeker scouts, and other fast, lightly armored craft. On their native Iiser, the spread of non-native plantation forests across the supercontinent proved to be a significant ecological disruption for the pattern of grazers and surviving predators and were thus deliberately reduced in area by taynifi stewards; shifting the cultivation and felling of trees to the offshore and outlying lands, where indigenous forest ecologies still flourish. Taynifi builders now primarily source lumber from other planets, and their sprawling cities of brick and bio-composites rise from the rolling hills of Iiser. Their walls and narrow streets are specially fortified, not against invaders, but against the battering winds, with some equatorial storms sustaining wind speeds as high as 200 kph.

[sharpened--edges]

Again and again [in the 1950s], the oil companies acted as indistinguishable agents of their home states or as sovereigns over the oil. The maritime boundaries between states were decided in conversations between competing oil officials in the US or UK rather than between the rulers of those states. For example, to decide the seabed frontiers between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, British and US diplomats mobilised the officials of BAPCO and Aramco to speak to one another. In many of the contracts allocating Gulf subsea resources in the 1950s, British oil companies called for arbitration of disputes to take place in English forums. A prominent clause of their contracts stipulated that the arbitrators for any dispute be chosen by ‘His Majesty’s Government and the Company’ and for British commercial laws to be sovereign in these cases. British Petroleum, its antecedent Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and their subsidiaries acted as an arm of the British state because they were.

Laleh Khalili, Sinews of War and Trade: Shipping and Capitalism in the Arabian Peninsula (Verso, 2021), p. 103.

[mariacallous]

The moment has been long in coming, but India is turning into a strategic actor in Southeast Asia. Amid a flurry of regional diplomacy, India has sealed an arms deal with Vietnam, sided with the Philippines over China on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, and enhanced defense cooperation with Indonesia. It is balance-of-power politics worthy of an international relations textbook: Even though most Southeast Asian governments have long made it their mantra not to choose geopolitical sides, China’s aggressive posture in and around the South China Sea is driving India and its partners in the region together. As yet, none of these relationships are on the level of alliances or include a serious force deployment component, but the trend is clear. And even though the United States and its Asian treaty allies are not involved, India’s moves raise the tantalizing possibility that it will increasingly complement the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China in the coming years.

India’s strategic outreach had its humble beginnings in 1991, when New Delhi announced the Look East policy—a recognition of the geostrategic significance of Southeast Asia to Indian security. More a vision than a concrete set of measures, Look East was followed by the Act East policy in 2014, when India began to proactively engage with the region to prevent it from succumbing to Chinese domination. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who first announced Act East, India in recent years has steadily strengthened key partnerships across Southeast Asia, particularly with countries along the maritime rim of the Indo-Pacific. These moves are clearly designed to cooperate with Southeast Asian partners who also seek to maintain the rules-based international order and norms of behavior in the face of rising Chinese assertiveness in the region.

Last month, Vietnamese Defense Minister Phan Van Giang visited his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, in New Delhi and announced that India would transfer a missile corvette to the Vietnamese Navy to enhance maritime security. The two sides also reportedly discussed stepped-up training for Vietnamese military personnel operating submarines and fighter jets, as well as cooperation on cybersecurity and electronic warfare. There is also ongoing speculation that Vietnam may soon purchase India’s BrahMos cruise missile, which is co-produced with Russia and could complicate Chinese military operations in disputed seas. To strengthen relations further, Hanoi and New Delhi have also been considering a potential trade deal.

These recent moves reinforce the “comprehensive strategic partnership” India and Vietnam have maintained since Modi’s 2016 visit to Vietnam. Hanoi maintains just four partnerships at this highest of levels—with China, India, Russia, and most recently South Korea. That underscores the high strategic value Hanoi places on New Delhi. By comparison, the United States is only a “comprehensive partner” for Vietnam, two levels below India’s status. Washington has struggled to raise the partnership.

The Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, is steadily expanding and deepening its security partnership with India as well. Late last month, Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo visited New Delhi and met with his Indian counterpart, S. Jaishankar. For the first time, India recognized the legitimacy of the 2016 arbitration ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in favor of Philippine sovereignty claims over China in the South China Sea. During the meeting, Jaishankar reiterated India’s call on China to respect this ruling. Both sides further vowed to enhance their defense partnership through increased interactions between defense agencies and by sending an Indian defense attaché to Manila. India also offered a concessional line of credit to the Philippines to buy Indian defense equipment. According to a diplomatic source close to the negotiations, “We are both maritime nations and there is great scope where we could identify various cooperative activities including, in the future, joint sales and joint patrols and exchanging information, best practices and anything to enhance [maritime domain awareness].”

Both nations have closely collaborated on security matters in recent years. In 2019, for example, India participated in a joint naval drill in the South China Sea with Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. In 2021, the Indian Navy conducted bilateral drills with the Philippines. In addition, a fourth round of high-level defense dialogue between India and the Philippines concluded in April, with the two sides pledging to deepen defense cooperation further. In 2022, the Philippines inked a major deal to purchase India’s BrahMos missiles. According to the Indian ambassador in Manila, India is exploring a preferential trade deal with the Philippines to boost their relationship, similar to what it is discussing with Vietnam.

Meanwhile, India’s security partnership with Indonesia has quietly been evolving in ways that also support the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. In February, an Indian Kilo-class conventional submarine made a first-ever port call to Indonesia, underscoring that New Delhi’s undersea assets could have access to Indonesian ports sitting astride the strategic waterways traversing the vast archipelagic nation. Beijing already faces a major strategic headache in the form of the so-called Malacca dilemma—China’s vulnerability to having its most important trade route cut off by the United States and its allies in the narrow waters between Singapore and Malaysia. Add potential blockades of Indonesia’s Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait—two other strategic narrows—and China might have to rethink future military operations entirely.

Indo-Indonesian defense relations truly kicked off in 2018, when Modi visited Jakarta and elevated relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. As part of this, the two nations signed a new defense cooperation agreement. That same year, India and Indonesia launched a new naval exercise, Samudra Shakti, that incorporated a warfighting component. Since then, the two navies have conducted four rounds, the last of which was in May and prioritized anti-submarine operations. The Indian Navy has further supported Indonesia with humanitarian and disaster relief operations, particularly following the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami that hit Palu in 2018. New Delhi and Jakarta are exploring potential air force cooperation as well. Indonesia may also follow in the footsteps of the Philippines by purchasing BrahMos missiles.

On the economic side, the two nations are considering a preferential trade agreement, similar to what India is discussing with Vietnam and the Philippines. Other plans include enhancing links between Indonesia’s Aceh province and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These parts of the two countries are separated by just over 500 miles of sea, and Jakarta and New Delhi have been cooperating to boost trade and travel between them. India and Indonesia are also cooperating on developing infrastructure, such as a port at Sabang in Aceh, which could be viewed as India’s rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

India is also cooperating with Malaysia, another counterclaimant against China in the South China Sea, on the basis of an enhanced strategic partnership signed in 2015. In 2022, both Jaishankar and Singh met their Malaysian counterparts and expressed interest in deepening their partnership. After his meeting with Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin bin Hussein, Singh described the engagement as “wonderful.” Although Kuala Lumpur’s decision earlier this year to cancel a deal to purchase Indian-made Tejas fighter aircraft may have dampened the partnership somewhat, the intent clearly remains to strengthen ties in line with upholding the mutual goal of maintaining the rules-based international order in the region—especially internationally recognized maritime borders and freedom of navigation, neither of which Beijing accepts. When Jaishankar met then-Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah, the latter emphasized that India is a friend who shares the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” using the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Brunei is another emerging partner for India along the South China Sea. In 2021, the two nations renewed their defense agreement for five years, and they regularly engage in joint exercises, port visits by navy and coast guard ships, and official defense exchanges.

India’s strategic partnerships with Singapore and Thailand—a key partner and ally of the United States, respectively—are also close and long-standing. Singapore regularly engages in bilateral exercises, high-level dialogues, visits, and professional training with India. Modi visited Singapore twice in 2018, and on the first trip, he signed 35 memoranda of understanding agreements on a range of security and economic issues. For example, he signed a logistical agreement to boost bilateral naval cooperation and multiple agreements pertaining to investment in human capital. On his second trip, Modi attended the India-ASEAN summit, underscoring New Delhi’s emphasis on the region’s significance.

In 2022, Thailand and India took stock of their partnership and pledged to elevate defense engagements further, to include cybersecurity. Perhaps of greater importance is the economic side of their relationship. In a nod to New Delhi’s original Look East policy, Bangkok implemented its own Look West policy in 1997, in part to tap into the enormous Indian market. Moreover, Thailand and India are partnering with Myanmar to construct the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway that will significantly upgrade transport links between Southeast Asia and South Asia. Once the highway is completed, Modi and his government also want to add connections to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—another clear rival to China’s BRI.

India further has good relations with both Cambodia and Laos. In May, Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni visited India, and the two sides reaffirmed “the strong civilizational bond between us.” Phnom Penh and New Delhi cooperate on a range of socioeconomic projects, de-mining, water conservation, and heritage protection. India’s engagement with Laos is less robust, but nevertheless, New Delhi and Vientiane are likely discussing ways to boost economic ties. This is all the more remarkable as both Phnom Penh and Vientiane are widely considered to be firmly in China’s camp.

Not all Indian engagements in the region are necessarily positive for the United States and its Indo-Pacific strategy, however. One notable example is India’s relationship with the military junta in Myanmar, which has plans to enhance its partnership with Beijing. New Delhi has yet to condemn the 2021 coup that brought it to power, and India refuses to join Washington in putting political pressure on the junta in the form of sanctions or through other means. To be sure, India is in a difficult spot as chaos in Myanmar has caused concerns that instability could spill over the border, where the Indian states of Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland have ethnic and kinship ties with Myanmar. New Delhi hopes that its continued cooperation with the Burmese junta will contribute to greater stability in the border region.

But even in Myanmar, India is doing some things that are in Washington’s interest. Modi’s joint statement with U.S. President Joe Biden last month, for example, mentions Myanmar and notes the importance of the junta releasing all political prisoners and returning to constructive dialogue. While this is hardly the condemnation of the regime Washington has been seeking, it is a start. Additionally, New Delhi in recent months confronted the junta on how it is apparently allowing Chinese workers to build a listening post to spy on India in the Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal.

From a multilateral perspective, India has been active as well. Within the existing India-ASEAN framework, the two parties in May held their inaugural group military exercise, known as ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise, in the South China Sea. The exercise reportedly attracted the attention of China’s maritime militia, which was operating within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and approached the exercise participants.

Overall, India’s Act East policy is a net positive for the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering China. Washington should welcome and gently encourage New Delhi to do even more. For example, additional joint patrols in the South China Sea among India, the United States, and other nations—including those in the region—could bolster deterrence. Additional Indian infrastructure and development projects, as well as trade deals, could help lessen Beijing’s economic dominance of Southeast Asia.

Realistically, however, New Delhi rightly worries first and foremost about its own neighborhood, and its time and resources are inevitably constrained. China also maintains the inside track in Southeast Asia due to its growing power and proximity to the region. That said, New Delhi’s policy of outreach to Southeast Asia—even if it is sustained only at current levels—will help further undermine Beijing. That, in and of itself, is a big win for Washington and its Asian allies.

[upismediacenter]

OPINION: SoberANYARE?: Ang Patuloy na Alitan sa West Philippine Sea

Photo credit: Sulat Nadera at Anna Dalet

Hindi na bagong isyu ang kaguluhan sa pagitan ng Pilipinas at Tsina hinggil sa West Philippine Sea (WPS). Maraming taon na ang nakalipas ngunit nabubuhay pa rin ang banta sa kabuhayan at kaligtasan ng ating mga lokal na mangingisda. Kaya kasabay ng mga bagong insidente ng karahasan nitong nakaraang buwan, bakit hindi kinikilala at pinapakinggan ang hinaing ng mga Pilipino? At bakit hindi magawa-gawang ipaglaban ng gobyerno ang ating soberanya?

Kamakailan lang nitong Pebrero 6, ibinalita ang pagtutok ng isang China Coast Guard (CCG) na barko ng military-grade laser sa Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel sa Ayungin Shoal. Kasabay nito ay pinalayas ng iba pang Tsinong barko ang mga mangingisdang Pilipino sa bahagi ng karagatan kung saan sila kadalasang nangingisda. Kinumpirma ang pangyayari sa isang seminar na pinangunahan ng People’s Development Institute kung saan ibinahagi ng grupo ng mangingisda ang kanilang mga saloobin sa naganap na pagpapaalis. Bago ang nasabing insidente, ilang pag-uusap pa ang naganap upang talakayin ang isyu ng hidwaan sa WPS sa pamamagitan ng bilateral talks nang maiwasan ang paggamit ng pwersa’t pagbabanta. Gayunpaman, pagkatapos lamang ng isang buwan, muling nasaksihan ang pangha-harass ng mga naglalakihang barko ng Tsina sa mga mangingisdang Pilipino. Ilang insidente na rin ng pangha-harass ang ginawa noon gaya ng paggamit ng water cannon noong 2014, pagkumpiska sa mga huling isda noong 2018, at pagtaboy sa isang team ng ABS-CBN news noong 2021. Sa napakatagal na panahong nabubuhay ang isyu, bakit imbes na maayos ay tila lumalala lamang ang kalagayan nito?

Sa madaling salita, ito ay dahil sa kawalan ng aksyon at tugon ng pamahalaan sa isyu. Kung susuriin ang nagdaang administrasyong Duterte, minsan na nating narinig ang mga argumentong “wala tayong laban” at “ayaw natin makipag-away sa Tsina dahil sa dulo, tayo rin ang talo” pero hindi ito sapat na mga rason sapagkat makatuwiran ang paglaban sa kanilang pang-aapi. Ayon kay dating Associate Justice Antonio Carpio sa isang ANC interview, ang paggamit ng laser at iba pang armas ng Tsina ay lumalabag sa dati pang nakatakdang batas ng UN Charter na nagbabawal sa paggamit ng pwersa upang mamahala sa maritime issues. Iyon pa lamang ay sapat na rason upang ipaglaban ang karapatan ng bansa sa WPS pero sa matagal na panahong namamahala ang administrasyong Duterte ay mas pinili nilang manahimik at maging pasibo.

Kung babalikan, dalawang taon matapos maupo sa pwesto ay pinirmahan ni dating pangulo Benigno Aquino III ang Administrative Order No. 29 kung saan nakasaad dito na ang kanlurang bahagi at ang nakapaloob sa EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) ng Pilipinas ay papangalanang West Philippine Sea kasama na dito ang karagatan na nakapalibot sa Kalayaan Group of Island at Bajo de Masinloc o Scarborough Shoal. Ginamit ang pagpapalit ng pangalan ng WPS upang mas lalong maigiit ang ating soberanya at masanay ang mga tao na gamitin ang terminong ito. Subalit, ayon sa isang Filipino Political Scientist na si Rommel Banlaoi, mananatiling mahina at hindi kikilalanin ng ibang bansa ang terminong West Philippine Sea hangga’t walang napapasa na Maritime Law ang Pilipinas. Kaya matapos pirmahan ang Administrative Order ay ilang insidente pa rin ng pang-aapi ang lumipas hanggang sa sumunod na taon ay nagsampa na ng arbitral case ang Pilipinas laban sa Tsina.

Ilang taon din ang itinagal ng mga hearings at trials upang maipresenta ang mga argumento ng dalawang bansa, ngunit kailanman ay hindi dumalo sa mga ito ang Tsina. Iginigiit nilang sakop ng South China Sea ang West Philippine Sea dahil sa itinutulak nilang “nine-dash-line” na ayon sa Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ay walang legal na basehan. Nilalabag din nito ang kasunduan sa ilalim ng United Nations Convention of the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) na ang 200 nautical miles na karagatan mula sa dalampasigan ng isang bansa ang bumubuo sa EEZ nito. Noong 2016, pinarangalan ng International Arbitral Tribunal ang Pilipinas sa arbitration case laban sa Tsina kung saan nangingibabaw ang desisyon ng kaso pabor sa ating bansa.

Kitang-kita na maraming ipinatupad na kasunduan upang suportahan ang karapatan ng Pilipinas sa WPS, pero bakit nahihirapan pa rin ang mga mangingisdang Pilipino na ipagpatuloy ang kanilang kabuhayan? Isang dahilan na madalas gamitin ay ang posibilidad na magsimula ng giyera kung lalaban pabalik ang Pilipinas, ngunit mas makakabuti ba na hayaan na lamang ang Tsina na patuloy na gambalahin ang mga Pilipino kahit na tayo ang nasa tama? Mas makakaiwas ba ang Pilipinas sa giyera kung simula’t sapul ay dahas na ang ipinapakita sa atin ng kabilang panig? Binigyang-diin ni Carpio na kung susundin ng kasalukuyan at susunod pang mga administrasyon ang pamamaraan ng nagdaang administrasyon, mas lalo lang mahihikayat ang Tsina na ipagpatuloy ang pangha-harass dahil nakikita nilang hindi naman aaksyon ang gobyerno upang depensahan ang kanilang mga kababayan.

Isa lamang ang alitan sa West Philippine Sea sa mga malalaking isyu na dapat ay binibigyang pansin at prayoridad ng administrasyon, ngunit ipinipikit nila ang kanilang mga mata sa hinaing ng mga mangingisdang Pilipino. Kung ang mismong mga eksperto ng international law na ang naglalahad na maaari nating ipaglaban ang ating karapatan at soberanya, mas lalo na dapat ang sarili nating gobyerno. Kinakailangan nilang ipaalala sa Tsina na ang mga kasunduang naitatag ay may saysay at nasaksihan ito ng buong mundo. Makatarungan lang na tumindig sila laban sa pang-aapi na natatanggap ng mga Pilipino dahil kung patuloy na hahayaan ng gobyerno ang panggigipit at karahasan na ginagawa ng Tsina, lalong malalagay sa peligro ang mga karapatan at kabuhayan ng bawat mamamayan. //nina Jessiemae Cadiz, Kiel Beldia, at Kairyn Cruz

Mga Sanggunian:

Administrative Order No. 29, s. 2012 | GOVPH. (2012, September 5). Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/09/05/administrative-order-no-29-s-2012/

Bolledo, J. (2021, August 13). At least 3 Chinese vessels spotted in West Ph sea in August – US expert. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/nation/chinese-vessels-spotted-west-philippine-sea-august-2021/

DS Law. (n.d.). Philippines vs. China: What you need to know about the territory dispute. https://www.duranschulze.com/philippines-vs-china-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-territory-dispute/#:~:text=The%20conflict%20between%20China%20and,have%20claimed%20as%20their%20own

Fernandez, D. (2023, February 14). Ph protests Chinese Coast Guard's harassment using laser. Inquirer.net. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/210958/ph-protests-chinese-coast-guards-harassment-using-laser

Jackson, A., & France-Presse, A. (2022, October 5). In photos: Filipinos fishing on the frontline of the west philippine sea. GMA News Online. Retrieved March 2, 2023, from https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/847077/filipinos-fishing-on-the-frontline-of-the-west-philippine-sea/story/

Lee-Brago, P. (2022, September 5). 'Philippines should proceed with West Philippine Sea exploration without China'. Philstar.com. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/09/05/2207482/philippines-should-proceed-west-philippine-sea-exploration-without-china

Mangosing, F., & Santos, T. G. (2023, February 20). DFA chief: China harassment a 'daily situation' for ph. Inquirer.net. https://globalnation.inquirer.net/211222/dfa-chief-china-harassment-a-daily-situation-for-ph

Rappler. (2019, June 12). Timeline: Skirmishes, standoffs, harassment in West Philippine Sea. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/232906-timeline-skirmishes-standoffs-harassment-west-philippine-sea/

Sanchez, R. (2016, July 12). Timeline: The Philippines-China maritime dispute. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/world/139392-timeline-west-philippine-sea-dispute/

Santos, M. (2016, July 13). Key points of arbitral tribunal’s verdict on PH-China dispute | Global News. INQUIRER.net.  https://globalnation.inquirer.net/140947/key-points-arbitral-tribunal-decision-verdict-award-philippines-china-maritime-dispute-unclos-arbitration-spratly-islands-scarborough

Tomacruz, S. (2021, July 15). Duterte and the West Philippine Sea: A strategy of failed compromises. RAPPLER. Retrieved March 2, 2023, from https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/duterte-west-philippine-sea-strategy-failed-comprises/

Tomacruz, S. (2023, March 1). After Duterte, Marcos plays catch up in fight for West Philippine Sea. RAPPLER.  From  https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/ferdinand-marcos-jr-plays-catch-up-fight-west-philippine-sea-after-duterte-administration/

Rappler. (2012, September 12). ‘West PH Sea’ now official: so what? https://www.rappler.com/nation/12277-west-ph-sea-now-official-so-what

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