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theculturedmarxist · 1 month ago

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By Roger D. Harris – Sep 30, 2024

Left-liberals plea every four years that this really is the most important election ever and time to hold our noses and send a Democrat to the White House. The manifest destiny of US world leadership, we are told, is at stake, as is our precious democracy which we have so generously been exporting abroad.

Let’s leave aside the existential threats of climate change or nuclear war. However important, these issues are not on the November 5 ballot. Nor are they addressed in even minimally meaningful ways by the platforms of either of the major parties.

The USA, with its first-strike policy and upgrading its nuclear war fighting capacity, bears responsibility for Armageddon risk. And, in fact, the land-of-the-free has contributed more greenhouse gases to the world’s stockpile than any other country.

But the US electorate never voted these conditions in, so is it realistic to think that we can vote them out? The electoral arena has its limits. Nevertheless, we are admonished, our vote is very important.

But do the two major parties offer meaningful choices? Apparently, the 700 national security apparatchiks who signed a letter endorsing Kamala Harris think so. They fear that Trump is too soft on world domination. They find a comforting succor in Harris’s promise “to preserve the American military’s status as the most ��lethal’ force in the world.” And oddly so do some left-liberals who welcome the security state, largely because they too don’t trust Trump with guiding the US empire.

Although a major left-liberal talking point is the imminent threat of fascism, their fear is focused on Trump’s dysfunctionality and his “deplorable” working class minions; not on the security apparatus of the state, which they have learned to love.

But fascism is not a personality disorder. The ruling class – whether its nominal head wears a red or blue hat – has no reason to impose a fascist dictatorship as long as left-liberals and their confederates embrace rather than oppose the security state.

Not only were the left-liberals enamored with the FBI’s “Saint” Robert Mueller, but they have welcomed the likes of George W. Bush and now Dick Cheney, because these war criminals also see the danger of Trump.

The Democratic Party has been captured by the foreign policy neoconservatives, who are jumping the red ship for the blue one. It’s not that Donald Trump is in any way an anti-imperialist, but Kamala Harris is seen as a more effective imperialist and defender of elite rule.

The ruling class is united in supporting US imperial hegemony, but needs to work out how best to achieve it. The blue team is confident that the empire has the capability to aim the canons full blast at both Russia and China at the same time. And they tend to take a more multilateral approach to empire building.

The red team is a little more circumspect, concerned with imperial overreach. They advocate a staged strategy of China as the primary target and only secondarily against Russia. This suggests why Ukraine’s president-for-life, who is at war with Russia, in effect campaigned for Kamala in the swing state of Pennsylvania.

The inauthenticity of the left-liberals While some left-liberals support a decisive Russian defeat in Ukraine, their overall concern is beating Trump.

The Democratic Party was transformed some time ago by the Clintons’ now defunct but successful Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), which advocated abandonment of its progressive constituencies in order to more effectively attract corporate support. While both parties vie to serve the wealthy class, the Democrats are now by a significant margin the ones favored by big money.

The triumph of the DLC signaled the demise of liberalism and the ascendancy of neoliberalism. Much more could be said about that transition (viz the Democratic Party has always been capitalist, with neoliberalism being its most recent expression), but suffice it to say the Democratic Party is the graveyard of progressive movements.

Liberals no longer even pretend to have an agenda other than defeating Trump. Their neglect of economic issues that benefit working people has created a vacuum, which opens the political arena for faux populists like Trump.

The now moribund liberal movement is thus relegated to two functions: (1) providing a bogus progressive patina to reactionary politics (2) and attacking those who still hold leftist principles. “Progressive Democrat,” sociologist James Petras argues, is an oxymoron.

Left-liberals have the habit of prefacing their capitulations with a recitation of their former leftist credentials. But what makes them inauthentic is their abandonment of principles. No transgression by the Democrats, absolutely none – not even genocide – deters this inauthentic left from supporting the Democratic presidential candidate.

We can respect, though disagree, with the right-wing for having principled red lines, such as abortion. In contrast, left-liberals not only find themselves bedfellows with Cheney, but they swallow anything and everything that the Democratic wing of the two-party duopoly feeds them.

Consequences of supporting the lesser of the two evils Although today the Democratic Party is arguably the leading war party, we would have cold comfort with the Republicans in power. And domestically the Democrats talk a better line on some social wedge issues that don’t threaten elite rule, such as women’s reproductive rights, although – as will be argued – their walk is not as good as their talk.

Getting back to “this year more than ever we have to support the Democratic presidential candidate,” the plea contains two truths. First, the “more than ever” part exposes a tendency to cry wolf in the past.

Remember that the world did not fall apart with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968. No lesser an authority than Noam Chomsky is nostalgic for Tricky Dick, who is now viewed as the last true liberal president. Nor did the planet stop spinning in 1980 when Ronald Reagan ascended to the Oval Office. Barack Obama now boasts that his policies differed little from the Gipper’s.

Which brings us to the second truth revealed in the plea. The entire body politic has been staggering to the right regardless of which wing of the duopoly is in power. This is in spite of the fact that the voting public is well to the left of them on almost every issue, from universal public healthcare to opposition to endless war.

Moreover, the left-liberals’ lesser-evil voting strategy itself bears some degree of responsibility for this reactionary tide.

The genius of the Clintons’ DLC was that the progressive New Deal coalition of labor and minority groups that supported the Democratic Party could be thrown under the bus with impunity, while the party courts the right. As long as purported progressives support the Democrats no matter what, the party has an incentive to sell out its left-leaning “captured constituents.”

Thus, we witnessed what passed for a presidential debate, with both contestants competing to prove who was more in favor of genocide for Palestinians and an ever expanding military.

The campaign for reproductive rights aborted But one may protest, let’s not let squeamishness about genocide blind us to the hope that the Democrats are better than the Republicans on at least the key issue of abortion.

However, this is the exception that proves the rule. As Margaret Kimberley of the Black Agenda Report noted, after the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade, there were protests everywhere but at Barack Obama’s house, “the person who could have acted to protect the Roe decision.”

When Obama ran in 2008, he made passage of a ‘Freedom of Choice’ Act the centerpiece of his campaign. Once elected with majorities in Congress, he could have enshrined abortion rights into law and out of the purview of the Supreme Court. Instead, he never followed through on his promise.

This was a direct outcome of the logic of lesser evil in a two-party system. The folks who supported abortion rights had nowhere to go, so they were betrayed. Why embarrass Blue Dog Democrats and antagonize pro-lifers when the progressive dupes will always give the Democrats a pass?

Angst is not a substitute for action The Republican and Democratic parties are part of the same corporate duopoly, both of which support the US empire. Given there are two wings, there will inevitably be a lesser and greater evil on every issue and even in every election.

However, we need a less myopic view and to look beyond a given election to see the bigger picture of the historical reactionary trend exacerbated by lesser-evil voting. That is, to understand that the function of lesser-evil voting in the overarching two-party system is to allow the narrative to shift rightward.

If one’s game plan for system change includes electoral engagement, which both Marx and Lenin advocated (through an independent working class party, not by supporting a bourgeois party), the pressure needs to be applied when it counts. And that might mean taking a tip from the Tea Party by withholding the vote if your candidate crosses a red line. But that requires principles, which left-liberals have failed to evidence. Angst, however heartfelt, is not a substitute for action.

The left-liberals’ lesser-evil voting, which disregards third-parties with genuinely progressive politics, contributes to the rightward trajectory of US politics. It is not the only factor, but it is a step in the wrong direction. As for November 5th, we already know who will win…the ruling class.

#2024 us presidential election #class war #democrats #republicans #kamala harris #donald trump #lesser evil #lesser evilism #us politics

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imaginefinneganswake · 1 month ago

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Of the first was he to bare arms and a name Wassaily Booslaeugh of Riesengeborg.

Finnegan’s Wake - James Joyce

ChatGPT40 literary report:

This line from Finnegans Wake—“Of the first was he to bare arms and a name Wassaily Booslaeugh of Riesengeborg”—is a rich example of Joyce’s densely packed allusions, wordplay, and mythopoetic layering. Let's break it down, engaging with some critical interpretations.

1. The Mythic and Heroic Layering

The phrase "Of the first was he to bare arms and a name" recalls the primordial act of assuming a name and taking up arms, themes common in heroic epics and foundational myths. This suggests an archetypal figure, someone representing a "first man" or original patriarch, much like Adam in the Bible or some culture's founding hero. Joyce’s use of the word "bare" instead of "bear" introduces multiple meanings—such as "exposing" or "revealing," possibly hinting at the dualities of creation and conflict, honor and violence.

Critical Insight: The character suggested by "Wassaily Booslaeugh" is often interpreted as a stand-in for HCE (Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker), the central figure of Finnegans Wake. HCE represents both an individual and a type—the everyman, the father figure, a symbolic Adamic being. The taking of a name—an essential act of identity formation��echoes the broader theme of historical cycles in Finnegans Wake, where individuals continuously reinvent themselves in various historical and mythic contexts.

2. Wassaily Booslaeugh and the Russian Allusion

The name “Wassaily” immediately evokes the Russian name Vasily (Василий), suggesting an Eastern European connection. Some critics have drawn parallels between this name and Russian historical or literary figures. Vasily may point toward the Russian czars (such as Vasily II) or even literary figures like Dostoevsky’s "Prince Myshkin" in The Idiot, though this is a more speculative connection.

"Booslaeugh" could be seen as an approximation of "Buzlay," hinting at various interpretations, including echoes of Russian or Slavic roots. Additionally, "boos" hints at ��boo,” a sound of disapproval, tying into the fall from grace or disgrace motif that haunts HCE throughout the novel. The act of being "booed" might reference both public shaming and comic degradation, as HCE is often ridiculed and disgraced.

Critical Insight: This name reflects Joyce's interest in collapsing the boundaries between cultures and histories. HCE (through his many avatars, including Wassaily Booslaeugh) is not just a Dublin pubkeeper but a figure whose story incorporates all of human history, including Eastern Europe. This reflects Joyce's "transnational" vision of human culture, where figures and motifs transcend their origins and become universal.

3. Riesengeborg: Place of Giants

"Riesengeborg" combines "Riesen," the German word for “giant,” with “Borg,” meaning castle or fortress. The name thus evokes an image of a stronghold of giants, possibly recalling mythic places like the Norse Jotunheim, home of the giants in Scandinavian mythology, or the fortress of some legendary figure. The reference to giants ties into Joyce’s recurring theme of the fallen, overreaching figure—paralleling HCE's role as a giant in his own right, a man of hubris who falls into disgrace.

Critical Insight: Riesengeborg likely refers to more than just a specific mythical or historical place. Joyce often blends the mythic with the historical, creating locales that represent multiple ideas at once. Riesengeborg could also be seen as the symbolic site of a fall—a "castle" from which HCE, as a giant figure, will inevitably be toppled, recalling the fall of great civilizations or mythic figures. Joyce’s giants often represent flawed heroes, beings of great power whose stature is as much a liability as a strength.

4. Joyce’s Wordplay and Themes of History

Critics frequently discuss Joyce’s linguistic play as reflecting his exploration of history's cyclicality. The phrase "to bare arms" might refer both to the literal act of carrying weapons and the figurative exposure of one's identity or vulnerabilities. "Bare arms" echoes heroic traditions where warriors must "prove" themselves, yet the phrase can also signal shame or humiliation. In this light, the act of baring arms takes on a tragicomic tone, as HCE is as much a victim of history’s cycles as he is a heroic figure.

Critical Insight: Joyce’s engagement with historical cycles and mythological figures means that HCE, in his various incarnations (including Wassaily Booslaeugh), serves as both a representative of universal patriarchal authority and as a flawed figure doomed to fall and repeat the cycle. His taking up of arms and names might symbolize the continual reconstruction of history’s heroes—only to expose them as vulnerable to disgrace, much like HCE himself.

5. Multicultural and Polyglot Layers

The blend of Russian, Germanic, and English elements in the names suggests Joyce’s interest in the polyglot nature of language and history. Just as no single culture dominates Joyce’s text, no single interpretation of these names can be definitive. Joyce’s use of multilingual puns and etymological richness makes Finnegans Wake a testament to the interconnectedness of global history and myth, reflecting the interplay between language, identity, and history.

In sum, this line is a typical example of Finnegans Wake’s ability to compress layers of myth, history, and language into a single phrase. "Wassaily Booslaeugh of Riesengeborg" serves as one of many avatars for HCE, representing a mythic everyman figure doomed to repeat cycles of heroism, disgrace, and reinvention across history. Critics often highlight the line’s evocation of heroic beginnings, the vulnerability of patriarchal figures, and Joyce’s engagement with the interplay between language, myth, and identity.

#ai art #finnegans wake #midjourney #james joyce #artists on tumblr #art

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i-gwarth · 3 months ago

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it is ASTONISHING how easily people on this site fall for Russian propaganda. All one has to do is gesture shallowly towards "EU imperialism" or "NATO overreach" and people without a thought in their head will nod sagely and give their consent to be led by the nose into the Ruski Mir

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mightyflamethrower · 10 months ago

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e should dispense with the tired narrative that four conscientious state and federal prosecutors—independently and without contact with the Biden White House or the radical Democrats in Congress—all came to the same disinterested conclusions that Donald Trump should be indicted for various crimes and put on trial during the campaign season of 2024.

The prosecutors began accelerating their indictments only once Trump started to lead incumbent Joe Biden by sizable margins in head-to-head polls. Moreover, had Trump not run for the presidency, or had he been of the same party as most of the four prosecutors, he would have never been indicted by any of them.

Yet now they are in a doom loop of discovering that the more they seek to rush to judgment before the election and gag Trump from speaking publicly about these star-chamber proceedings, the more he rises in the polls.

In truth, each succeeding cycle of corrupt leftwing lawfare that ends in failure—the Russian collusion hoax, the weaponized first impeachment, trying ex-president Trump in the Senate as a private citizen, the laptop disinformation set-up, the Alfa bank ping caper, the pathetic attempt to erase Trump from state ballots, and the unfolding Fani Willis moral debacle—does not return things to zero.

Rather, they serve as force multipliers for each other. Each overreach geometrically increases the dangers to democracy, ever more turns the public off, and ironically cascades sympathy and poll numbers for the very target of their paranoias.

Some of the prosecutors have colluded with White House lawyers and congressional liaisons. Some had run for office, offering campaign promises to get Trump convicted for something or other.

Now, after years of delays and deadends, all four are rushing to synchronize their trial dates to ensure that the front-running Trump is on the docket daily and not out on the 2024 campaign trail.

Do we recall when leftist legal eagles claimed that of all the iffy Trump indictments, Georgia prosecutor Fani Willis had the best case against Trump?

The phone call, we were told, was proof of “election interference.” It was Willis who got the first Trump “mug shot.” It was Willis, we were assured, who got Trump with the goods on tape, begging election officials to “find” the requisite missing votes that would prove his victory (note that he did not say “invent” the votes but to look for a supposedly existing trove of them).

And now Willis’s signature case is in shambles.

We learn, allegedly, that 1) Willis hired her stealth boyfriend Nathan Wade as a special counsel, the day before he filed for divorce (whose records were then mysteriously sealed by the court); 2) that Wade so far has received over $650,000 as special counsel, reportedly including a miraculous ability to charge for 24 hours of continuous legal service in a single day; 3) that Willis and Wade allegedly have used her greenlighted windfall to him to go on a number of pricey junkets and cruises; 4) that to try an ex-president and the leading candidate in the 2024 presidential election, Willis picked Wade who had never tried a single felony case and was previously a “personal injury/accident” lawyer; 5) that the supposedly apolitical Willis had consulted with the January 6 partisan congressional special committee, while Wade had met for marathon meetings with the Biden White House legal counsel (and apparently billed Georgia taxpayers for receiving such federal tutorials).

The legal community’s initial dismissal of this sordid prosecutor’s office is reminiscent of the immediate efforts to downplay Claudine Gay’s plagiarism. But the charade will eventually end the same way, in this case with the resignation and likely indictment of the prosecutor, along with her boyfriend, who concocted quite a scheme at the expense of the taxpayers. Both have made a mockery of their indictment of an ex-president and, if the allegations are true, will be disbarred and prosecuted.

The other three indictments are even weaker. Alvin Bragg claims that Donald Trump’s efforts a near decade ago to enact nondisclosure agreements and payments to remain silent about embarrassing behavior constituted “campaign finance violations.”

If so, what then defines campaign violations when Ms. Clinton brazenly destroyed nearly 30,000 subpoenaed campaign-era emails, ordered subpoenaed communication devices smashed, illegally hired a foreign national to find dirt on a campaign rival, and used three paywalls to hide her hush payments to British subject Steele to concoct a smear dossier—with help from Russian sources—to destroy her 2016 rival?

Letitia James, apparently for the first time in New York history, believes a bank was somehow wronged when its seasoned auditors viewed Trump’s assets, approved a loan to him, profited from his timely payments of interest and principles, and lodged no complaints against Trump or his company.

James apparently believes that Donald Trump is the first and most egregious real estate baron in New York history who inflated the value of his holdings. Her indictments thus supposedly have nothing to do with a left-wing political activist who ran for attorney general on promises to get Trump.

As far as Jack Smith, he supposedly was to be focused on Trump’s removal of classified presidential files to an insecure location at his Mar-a-Lago home and Trump’s “insurrectionary” actions on January 6. But he seems way beyond that now and is trying to put a gag order on the presidential frontrunner and to ensure Trump is in court during the 2024 campaign—challenging the very administration that appointed Smith in the first place.

In truth, Trump was the first ex-president in history to be indicted for a dispute with archivists over the status and security of removed classified files. Such disagreements were historically adjudicated bureaucratically rather than criminally, and certainly not with performance-art FBI swat raids into an ex-presidential residence.

Moreover, true insurrectionists do not instruct protestors to assemble peacefully and patriotically. Insurrectionists themselves do not try to overthrow governments while unarmed and accompanied by bare-chested buffoons with cow horns and slow-moving septuagenarians draped in American flags. And during an “insurrection,” unarmed “rebels” are usually not invited into the government quarters by supposed government doormen, among them perhaps 150-200 FBI informants. They are usually not shot and killed for the crime of entering a broken window while unarmed. And governments need not lie about the violence of insurrectionaries if they are truly insurrectionists.

Jack Smith’s problem—aside from his similar previous effort as special counsel to bankrupt and destroy the life and career of former Virginia governor Bob McDonald, a conviction overturned 9-0 by the Supreme Court—is that his indictments are so asymmetrical as to be surreal.

If the Department of Justice really wishes to prosecute insurrection, then it should concentrate on 120 days of arson, looting, killing, and violent protests that destroyed $2 billion in property, led to over 35 deaths, injured 1,500 law enforcement officers, and saw a federal courthouse, a police precinct, and a historic church torched by protestors, months of violent chaos planned and orchestrated by Antifa and Black Lives Matter, and enabled by leftwing inert mayors and governors.

The future Vice President of the United States, Kamala Harris, sought to organize bail for violent rioters. She boasted on television that the protests would not stop, should not stop, and would continue beyond the 2020 elections. Could she have at least suggested to the rioters to protest “peacefully and patriotically?” And just last week, President Biden praised that months-long violent summer of looting, violence, arson, and destruction, calling it “the historic movement for justice in the summer of 2020.”

Or Smith could investigate the well-orchestrated and increasingly violent pro-Hamas rallies. These are “insurrections” that have stormed the California legislature, occupied the Capitol rotunda, defaced and defiled iconic federal monuments and cemeteries, shut down key bridges and freeways, attacked law enforcement, and led to violence and assaults.

If Trump is guilty of removing files that he had the statutory right as president to formally declassify, then what was senator and subsequent Vice President Joe Biden guilty of when he stealthily and unlawfully removed hundreds of files, kept the removals secret (until his administration went after Trump for the same offense), and sloppily stored them in his insecure garage?

At each juncture of these extra-legal efforts, past precedents, former customs, and accepted traditions are being destroyed by the Left, whose endless miscarriages of justice are the real threats to constitutional government. And the more impotent these serial and unending gambits become, the more strident and desperate they appear.

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beardedmrbean · 2 years ago

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Meta, the company formerly known as Facebook, recently threatened to boycott U.S. news outlets on its platform if Congress passes a law giving said outlets "greater power" to acquire a larger share of the platform’s ad revenue.

Media companies in favor of the law claim that Meta generates massive income from their news articles, while the social media platform pushed back by saying that Meta drives viewership to news sites.

BBC News reported on this brewing feud between the social media giant and news outlets, pending the passage of the Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (JCPA).

MARK ZUCKERBERG TELLS JOE ROGAN FBI WARNED FACEBOOK OF 'RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA' BEFORE HUNTER BIDEN LAPTOP STORY

The piece opened, stating, "Meta has threatened to remove news content from Facebook in the US. It objects to a new law that would give news organizations greater power to negotiate fees for content shared on Facebook."

The bill has yet to be enacted by Congress, however BBC News indicated that it has bipartisan support. It was first introduced by Sen. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., with the intention of "tackling the dominance of Big Tech," BBC News claimed.

As the outlet reported, "It would give publishers and broadcasters greater powers to collectively bargain with social media companies for a larger share of ad revenue."

Media companies that support the bill claim that "Meta generates huge sums of money from news articles shared on the platform," while many outlets, especially local news, have "struggled during the pandemic."

FBI MET WEEKLY WITH BIG TECH AHEAD OF THE 2020 ELECTION, AGENT TESTIFIES

American Economic Liberties Project research director Matt Stoller claimed that media outlets have been "eaten alive" by Meta, and slammed the tech company for coming out against the bill. He added, "Meta's efforts to blackmail Congress prove again why this monopoly is a threat to democracies worldwide."

In a recent statement, Meta communications director Andy Stone blasted the bill, calling it "ill-considered," and characterizing it as government overreach.

He stated, "If Congress passes an ill-considered journalism bill as part of national security legislation, we will be forced to consider removing news from our platform altogether rather than submit to government-mandated negotiations that unfairly disregard any value we provide to news outlets through increased traffic and subscription."

He added, "The Journalism Competition and Preservation Act fails to recognize the key fact: publishers and broadcasters put their content on our platform themselves because it benefits their bottom line — not the other way around."

Stone claimed that the bill would be turning Meta into a "cartel-like entity which requires one private company to subsidize other private companies."

The BBC News report noted that in 2021, Meta – back when it was still called Facebook – suspended Australian news outlets because of a similar law passed in that country. It added, "The company quickly reversed the decision after wide-ranging criticism - brokering a deal with the Australian government."

#nunyas news #you want me to pay you to host your content

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mariacallous · 9 months ago

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We’re not out of the woods yet, though there’s good news in markets: Most economists are forecasting a soft landing in 2024. But a geopolitical hard landing could get in the way.

There are tools and processes to handle macroeconomic challenges. When inflation is too high, the Federal Reserve calibrates monetary policy and interest rates, often coordinating with peer institutions like the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. The results aren’t guaranteed or uniform—economists, investors, and policymakers debate policies and their consequences. However, if higher interest rates slow the economy and reduce inflation without causing a recession, we get a soft landing. That looks like the outcome we’ll ultimately achieve, with inflation down from its peak (though still above the 2 percent target), 353,000 new American jobs in January, and the International Monetary Fund revising its global growth forecast up to 3.1 percent.

The playbook in geopolitics is not as clear, and geopolitics has become a much more pessimistic field than the dismal science. There are wars in the Middle East and Europe, tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and deeper questions about what else the “end of the post-Cold War era” will bring. A geopolitical hard landing would entail multiple, connected, and expanding conflicts and crises that could overwhelm U.S.-led international system. The results could shift the balance of power and upend global markets.

What happens in geopolitics matters for global markets and for the way we live. Today’s geopolitical challenges aren’t transitory, they’re here to stay. They require timely interventions that consider realities of politics and resources, as well as factors like fear, honor, and interest, and the priorities and interests of sovereign nation-states. Too hawkish an approach can lead to overreach and blowback, while too much dovishness invites aggression and escalation. In fact, if the United States and its partners don’t get the trade-offs right in 2024, a geopolitical hard landing looks increasingly plausible.

Today, the world faces cascading conflicts of the type we haven’t seen in decades. After a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, deterrence failed to prevent Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2023, deterrence also failed to prevent Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel and Iranian-backed regional proxy attacks across the Middle East. Could deterrence one day fail in the Indo-Pacific, the world’s most populous and dynamic region? Where will the cascades stop?

Across Eurasia, the picture is not improving. Two years into a full-scale war defending themselves against Russia, Ukrainians now control more than 80 percent of their territory. But the situation on the ground remains fragile and political gridlock in Washington could result in a reversal of those gains—just recently, the Ukrainian-held town of Avdiivka fell to Russian advances. The Senate just passed by a vote of 70-29 a $95 billion aid package to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan—much of which would be spent in the United States restocking depleted weapons supplies—but the bill’s fate is uncertain in the House, and the United States has done its last drawdowns for Kyiv under existing authorities. And while the 27 members of the European Union agreed to a $54 billion package, they don’t have a robust industrial base and can’t produce enough artillery shells to meet their pledge of 1 million rounds by March. Meanwhile, Ukraine is rationing ammunition, and after Russia’s presidential election later this year—no surprises expected there—Vladimir Putin might be emboldened to order a larger mobilization.

Markets have largely priced in the current Russia-Ukraine war. But they may not have accounted for its long-term significance or what the war could mean for Europe. With Russia probing Finland and Estonia, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius gave a sobering speech detailing what that could mean, saying that Germany needs to take into account that Moscow could “even attack a NATO country” in the next five to eight years.

In the Middle East, the conflicts after Hamas’s terrorist attacks on Israel on Oct. 7 represent the region’s greatest geopolitical test since the Global War on Terror. Israel continues operations to destroy Hamas while Iranian-backed proxies are escalating across at least six different theaters. The global economy and the U.S. Navy—which has been protecting international commerce since the days of the Barbary pirates—are under fire from the Houthis in Yemen. A full-scale regional war is likely not in the cards, although any escalation that brings the United States and Iran into direct confrontation could quickly change that. It’s not hard to see how it could happen, and if Iran—dominated by an 85-year-old Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the region’s longest-ruling leader—were to succeed in building a nuclear weapon, it could accelerate the chaos.

What has Washington, Wall Street, and global political and financial capitals around the world most worried, though, is the Indo-Pacific. For geopolitical reasons, China is pushing a “dual circulation” economic model and greater self-reliance at home, combined with economic embargoes against not only the United States but also countries such as Australia, Japan, Lithuania, and South Korea. At the same time, most of the tariffs that began under the Trump administration have continued under President Joe Biden, and U.S.-led restrictions have reduced semiconductor exports to China by billions of dollars. The focus on national security-sensitive supply-chain chokepoints in everything from microelectronics, to pharmaceuticals, to critical minerals and rare earths is adding friction to the global economy in ways that create risks and opportunities in other theaters.

The worst-case scenario—a military confrontation between China and neighbors such as Taiwan or the Philippines, backed by the United States—could lead to untold human losses and the greatest economic shock in generations. Bloomberg Economics recently estimated a cost of $10 trillion in the event of a war with the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan.

Historically, shocks like the 1973 Arab oil embargo and Russia’s war on Ukraine have disrupted but not upended global commerce. Today’s dynamic could be different, with acute and connected challenges across all three major regions of Eurasia, not to mention crises not in the headlines every day, such as a belligerent North Korea and contentious Venezuela-Guyana border.

The world as we have known it has assumed the leadership of a credible great power: the United States. Working with its allies and partners, the United States has built and supported the international security and economic architecture that benefits not only Americans but populations around the world. Another assumption was that no other country would have the intention and the capacity to reshape this U.S.-led international order. With challenges to U.S. leadership and a growing closeness amongst China, Iran, Russia, and even North Korea, neither assumption can be taken for granted.

The assumptions may have changed, but as with economics, nothing is inevitable in geopolitics. Last year, some forecasters said there was a 100 percent chance of a recession in 2023. They were wrong. However, soft landings don’t happen on their own—they require leadership across domains.

The war in Europe isn’t what it was a year ago. Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive didn’t succeed. Kyiv’s on the defensive, unlikely to take back significant territory in 2024. Russia is pushing forward and now spends 6 percent of its GDP on its military, up from 2.7 percent in 2021, and bolstered by munitions from Iran and North Korea. Meanwhile, as former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned, Moscow has “caught up in the innovation contest” with Kyiv, domestically producing drones like the Orlan-10 and the Lancet. And after pivoting to Asian markets, Moscow has mitigated Western sanctions, while the IMF recently upped its forecast for Russia’s economic growth to 2.6 percent.

Despite setbacks, several factors still favor Ukraine even if the prospects of victory seem elusive at best. Without a single American in the fight, and at a cost of 5 percent of annual U.S. defense spending, U.S. intelligence now estimates that Moscow has lost as much as 90 percent of its 2022 invasion force. Ukraine is winning the battle of the Black Sea, and the grain corridor out of Odessa was open to over 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs in the first six months of last year, two-thirds of which went to the developing world. Ukraine is targeting Russian-controlled infrastructure, including around Crimea. Kyiv is also expanding its defense industrial base, launching a Defense Industries Forum with 252 companies from 30 countries.

While Europe has been slow to bolster its own defense infrastructure, there’s momentum. European defense spending was up 6 percent in 2022, led by front-line democracies like Finland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Poland. Still, most of the NATO alliance’s members fail to meet their 2014 Wales Pledge to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense, and even U.S. defense spending as a percent of GDP is projected to decline over the next 10 years, from 3.1 percent in 2023 to 2.8 percent in 2033. Ukraine cannot hold back a country 28 times its size, and with a population more than three times larger, without Western assistance. Likewise, European—let alone global—security can’t be sustained by diminishing deterrence capabilities.

In the Middle East, the main questions being asked today are about the “day after” in Gaza, or when and how the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Iranian-back proxy attacks in Iraq will stop. Tehran has created a new normal of instability and chaos and has little incentive to see a ceasefire hold. The Houthis—once a relatively obscure Shi’a proxy group in Yemen—are now the heroes of much of the Arab street.

Iran’s strategic advantage in the short term has been enhanced by a radically changed information environment, where the “social-mediafication” of war means there are more hours of footage uploaded across all the popular social media platforms than there are seconds of the war. The ramifications are unpredictable—after all, many of the al Qaeda terrorists behind 9/11 were radicalized by pre-algorithmic content they saw coming out of war in Bosnia in the 1990s. Today’s AI-powered algorithms supercharge the risk.

The return to the bad old days, made worse by hyper-targeted online radicalization, needn’t happen, however. The Abraham Accords are holding. The Sunni Gulf countries are focused on transformation projects like Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, as they work to ensure that their economic progress is impacted as little as possible by geopolitics. Despite what’s happening in the Red Sea, their engagement with the international business community is largely uninterrupted. The same is true with Qatar.

The two factors that would bring the region back from the brink are restored deterrence against Iran and integration between Israel and the Gulf States. That means recognizing that Iran and its “axis of resistance” are the cause of today’s chaos. It requires working with partners like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which has relaunched defense talks with Washington and whose senior officials have said repeatedly that they are “absolutely” still interested in normalization with Israel.

The South China Sea and Taiwan Strait are dangerous but, thankfully, at peace. There was good news out of San Francisco from the November meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Biden. China’s responses to Taiwan’s election on Jan. 13 were more restrained than many expected. Now, much depends on how Beijing reacts to William Lai’s inaugural statements when he becomes Taiwan’s president in May.

But while Taiwan occupies our strategic focus today, it’s not the only potential hot spot. China borders 14 countries, giving it more land neighbors than any other state. Beijing has territorial disputes with nearly every country with which it shares a border; each of those disputes presents risks.

Still, maintaining an acceptable peace in the Indo-Pacific is possible. China’s more aggressive posture has driven significant changes in Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, leading to minilateral coalitions for stability. The Quad, AUKUS, summits with South Korea and Japan, and basing agreements with the Philippines are a few such examples of how these countries are tightening cooperation with each other, and with the United States, Japan has committed to a sea change in defense policy that could turn the Japanese military into the world’s third largest by 2027.

In all this, however, there’s a missing link: Washington doesn’t yet have a strategy for economic engagement in the region. While agreements like the Beijing-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership expand, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) is stalled, and IPEF—which the White House has described as “not a trade agreement”—is not a replacement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Washington’s economic policy should communicate that it is not a distant power but a reliable economic partner. As the NATO alliance nears its 75th anniversary, leaders need to be committed both rhetorically and in practice to sustaining peace and prosperity wherever it is challenged.

These geoeconomic forces are of concern to publics around the world. They aren’t, however, the domain of the public sector alone. Many of the same market dynamics bringing us in for an economic soft landing can be assets in global affairs. Global companies cannot succeed in a world at war, and the United States and its allies and partners can’t keep the peace without the growth and innovation made possible by the private sector.

The two sectors where this dynamic is clearest are in energy and emerging technologies. Developing new and sustainable energy sources is one of the best geopolitical and economic moves possible, and it’s largely due to private sector-led innovations that the United States has been the world’s top crude oil producer since 2018 and top liquid natural gas exporter since last year. In the coming years, technologies such as generative artificial intelligence—where the United States is leading—will be wildcards and lifelines in geopolitics, and technology companies will become greater geopolitical stakeholders. Such domains are where democratic societies—with deep and open capital markets, the rule of law, and property rights—have advantages that are sources of legitimacy, stability, and growth.

Building on those advantages this year, when 60 percent of the world’s population is heading to the polls, is a necessity. Billions of people voting for their leaders is welcome news after years of democratic decline globally documented by organizations such as Freedom House. But the coming changes in governments around the world could also make the end of this year very different from its beginning.

In particular, the 2024 U.S. presidential contest may be the most consequential in decades, not to mention one of the most significant geopolitical issues for other countries. Foreign policy is rarely top of mind for voters, but the people’s choice may have even greater ramifications for global affairs than for the economy. Trade and industrial policies adopted by either administration may bolster some sectors at home but elicit pushback abroad, including from partners. New approaches to America’s role in the world can reassure friends or embolden adversaries. And every leader is preparing by hedging their bets for either a Biden or Trump outcome.

In 2023, we understood what an economic hard landing might mean and took timely, prudent actions to prevent it. In 2024, it’s time to recognize that a geopolitical hard landing is possible and for every sector of society to meet this moment with the seriousness it demands.

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tomorrowusa · 2 years ago

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This video is a quick overview of the stupid, self-defeating things Russian forces have done which resulted in them usually getting owned by Ukraine.

It covers mostly military operations and omits the equally stupid political and diplomatic things.

Today’s word/acronym: OPSEC

We can’t rely entirely rely on Kremlin haplessness. Putin has made it his goal to restore the decrepit old USSR in all but name. He doesn’t care how many Russian lives his goal will cost. He will keep pushing large numbers of poorly armed and poorly trained conscripts into Ukraine in the hope that just a few tens of thousands of additional fatalities will somehow let him declare victory.

Ukraine has a smaller population and lacks Russia’s large fossil fuel reserves which the latter uses to finance its military and to bribe amoral countries.

So Ukraine needs a little help from its friends whether that means real HIMARS or decoys that look like HIMARS which fool Russians. Friendly and ingenious Czechs are mass producing such decoys.

WATCH: How Czechs are giving inflatable HIMARS decoys to Ukraine forcing Russians to waste precious missiles

The Czechs were invaded by Putin’s Soviet predecessors back in 1968. As the Czechs might be tempted to say: Revenge is a dish best served decoyed. 🇨🇿

People outside the region need to understand that oppressive Russian imperialism has created 300 years worth of bad karma in Eastern Europe. The invasion has made Russia’s neighbors stand up and say: Enough is enough!

Peace will reign only when Russia starts acting like a normal country.

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aoawarfare · 1 year ago

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The Struggle for Kazakh Autonomy in 1919

Last time we were with the Alash Orda, they were in Siberia, fighting alongside the White Siberian forces against the Bolsheviks. Supporters of Admiral Kolchak launched a coup and named him Supreme Commander of all White Forces. Kolchak dismantled all non-white sanctioned governments including the Alash Orda. This may not have been such a problem if the Alash Orda hadn’t burnt its bridge with the Bolsheviks. Oops.

It’s now 1919 and Kolchak is planning a new offensive.

The Unraveling of Kolchak

When Kolchak took over, his staff was optimistic that they would easily defeat the Bolsheviks, and at first it looked like they were right? Kolchak launched his spring offensive in March 1919 and despite not properly coordinating his offensive with Denikin’s forces in the south, he enjoyed considerable success.

Admiral Kolchak

[Image Description: A black and white photo of a man with short, receding hair, and no facial hair. He is staring at the camera. He is wearing a grew wool coat with large lapels.]

His battle plan was to launch an assault along his entire front with forces concentrated on the center through Ufa toward the middle of the Volga with a direct route to the Moscow. His forces considered of three armies: Gajda’s Siberian army of 45,000 men plus the Siberian Flotilla, General Khanzhin’s Western Army of 42,000 men, and the Dutov’s Orenburg and Urals forces consisting of 20,000 Cossacks.

He was facing the 2nd, 5th, 1st, and 4th armies consisting of 120,000 men plus the Volga-Kama military flotilla. Additionally, the Red Armies were able to receive reinforcements and supplies easier and faster than the White Armies.

Kolchak’s opening offensive pushed the Red armies to the Volga and Orenburg, but ran into supply and communication issues with the spring thaw. Additionally, their forces were spread across a 180,000 square mile territory that they now had to manage. The Red Armies received reinforcements in April and launched a new offensive in May. General Mikhail Frunze took advance of the White overreach and attacked the Western army, pushing it back to Ufa and exposing the Siberian Army’s flank. Frunze pushed his advantage and by Kolchak’s forces had been pushed beyond their point of departure by July.

The intrigue going on within Kolchak’s staff is beyond this podcast, but these defeats were made worse by a revolving door of generals and staff members plus mass desertion within the ranks. Kolchak reorganized his army in mid-summer and tried to engulf the Red army in a pincer move, but it failed because of poor coordination. This defeat was the final nail in the coffin for the allies who convinced Kolchak to be a lost cause. Despite this, Kolchak launched another failed offense in September.

By November Kolchak lost his headquarters in Omsk and was completely cut off from the Urals and Orenburg (where most of the Alash Orda were). Hundreds of men and generals fled, some heading towards the Caspian and then Persia and others fleeing towards Semirech’e and then Xinjiang. Those who remained with Kolchak undertook the Great Siberian Ice March heading towards Chita to unite with the Far Eastern (White) Army led by Ataman Semenov, who was known to be a tyrant and brute but supported by the Japanese. Those who disapproved of Semenov went into Manchuria. They used the Trans-Siberian Railroad as a guide, but were sometimes denied the use of the railroad by the Czechoslovak Legion. Again, this march is beyond this podcast, but as one can imagine, it was a nightmare for anyone who took part as they had to deal with Siberian winter, lack of supplies, and Red forces and various insurgents snapping at their heels. And they also had to cross the frozen Lake Baikal in sub-zero temperatures. Not fun.

Kolchak handing out medals

[Image Description: A black and white photo of uniformed soldiers gathered around long, wool coat wearing officers. They are mostly young man wearing furry hats or military covers. They are standing in a field of grass and the sky is clear.]

Kolchak, himself, stepped down from command on January 4th, 1920, giving command of South Russia to General Denikin and command of the Far East to Ataman Semenov. He was promised safe passage to the British military mission in Irkutsk, but was betrayed to the Bolsheviks by the Czech Legion. He was executed by a Cheka (precursor to the KGB) firing squad on the morning of Feb 7th, 1920, and dumped into the frozen Angara River.

Up a Creek Without a Paddle

Where did this leave the Alash Orda? Well, they were up a creek without a paddle.

The Alash Orda rejected the Bolshevik overtures in 1918 because they refused to recognize Alash Autonomy and here they were, not even a year later, supporting an ally that just dissolved their own government. There were different opinions on what to do next. Some, like Baitursynov, traveled to Moscow to meet with Lenin and joined the Kirghiz Military-Revolutionary Committee with Stalin writing:

“I did not and do not consider him a revolutionary-communist or a sympathizer; nevertheless, his presence in the Revolutionary committee is necessary” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 90

Others, like Bukeikhanov, stuck with the White Army, writing in February 1919 expressing a desire:

"of the Kirghiz, together with the valiant Siberian troops, to wage battle with the Bolsheviks, from whom the Kirghiz population suffered greatly in Semirech’e Oblast being completely destroyed by them.” He argued that the Kazakhs were “completely reliable, hardy material for the army, unsusceptible to the Bolshevik infection” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 68

He went ahead and formed cavalry units of Kazakh soldiers, similar to the Cossacks, who answered to Russian and Kazakh cadres. These soldiers would take part in all of Kolchak’s offenses in the Urals and were even praised for their efforts, one White officer writing:

“Dressed in our uniforms, with an orderly line of .375-caliber rifles thrown over their shoulder, in proper files they move, as if on parade, and give the impression of a genuine dashing cavalry.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 70

They were involved with some of the few victories the White Army experience during the summer such as the taking of the small Cherkasskoe garrison in August, but they could not stem the Red tide.

Instead, Kazakh forces in the Urals reached out the Red First Army in November, offering their services against the White Army. The Bolsheviks sensed an opportunity since the soldiers themselves “had no desire to bear the material and personal sacrifices, either for White Generals or for the Alash Orda leaders from the Kirghiz.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 50

From November 1919 onward, the Alash Orda army units in the Urals pursued a policy that “consisted on the one hand of formal agreements on paper with the Cossacks and on the other in showing them as much passive resistance as was feasible” - (Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 51). They offered to supply information and to support offensives against the White army. They wrote:

“The rapid destruction of the Urals front, in addition to liberating the Kirghiz from the violence of the Cossacks, has the vital significance that it opens up access to oil fields and therefore oil products, for which there is acute need in Soviet Russia. The liquidation of the Urals front, in addition, liberates the Astrakhan group, currently surrounded by the foe of all sides.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 53

The Red army, wanting to avoid violence at all costs, but wanted to neutralize all threatens in the region-even indigenous ones-demanded the:

“complete and total surrender of all weapons and other military property ought to be categorically demanded and, in the event of the surrender, must be immediately directed to the Dzhurun station for subsequent headquarters turnover.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 52

The Soviets wanted the Alash Orda to march their forces to the city of Uil and surrender there. The Alash refused since that march would leave their forces exposed to White retaliation. They wrote back:

“…the Urals front is not yet liquidated, and dozens of Kirghiz volosts still remain in the region of deployment of the Cossack troops. The Cossacks, embittered by our coming out on the side of Soviet power, have already begun to butcher our peaceful population. In addition to the southern volosts remaining within the confines of the deployment of Cossack units, as we have today received reliable information, individual Cossack detachments are lurking in the rear among us, perpetrating indescribable violence…We would consider it a crime to leave the population to the mercy of fate at such a moment and to set out with military units to Uil. We began and will continue the struggle against the Cossacks right on up until our oblast is finally cleansed of them. Upon finishing this operation, we can travel anywhere at all. We earnestly ask you to take all subsequent measures toward the most rapid liquidation of the Urals front…We likewise ask that the trophies acquired exclusively by the labors of our units be placed at the disposal of the Kirghiz revolutionary committee of Orenburg as items necessary for the Red Units formed.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 63

Frunze left the negotiations to the First Army, but provided a general program on how the surrender should be handled.

“In view of the intention expressed by the Western Sections of the Kirghiz government “Alash Orda” to surrender to the mercy and will of the Soviet government with all stocks of weapons and military supplies I order:

First. The Revolutionary council of the first or fourth army is to take on the leadership of the negotiations, depending on the location of detachments of Alash-Orda and their delegates Second. In the basis of the negotiations are to be laid (1) the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on the Urals Cossacks of 7 December (2) Order of the Turkestan Front to the Urals Cossacks of 9 December and the Order of the Turkestan Front to the Orenberg Cossacks. Third. Negotiations are not to be dragged out, having appointed the shortest period possible for the surrender. Fourth. The dzhigits, upon disarmament, are to be deployed in the nearest army rear, subjects to political processing, and subsequently used in the capacity of reinforcements for troops active in the region of the Kirghiz Steppes initially only in detachments of auxiliary designation Fifth. Members of the government and command team are to be deployed in Ural’sk or Orenburg environs to isolate communication with the Kirghiz Steppe Sixth. The Right is to be given to elect a delegation composed of no more than five people for a journey to staff headquarters, and subsequently to Moscow. Seventh. Observance of the precise fulfillment of all of our terms of surrender” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 55

Frunze reported to Lenin on the same day, “the military significance of Alash-Orda is insignificant, but politically and economically their surrender is important, securing for us the entire steppe region to the shores of the Caspian” - (Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 55)

The Alash Orda rejected these demands, writing back:

“We believe that friends should meet one another with a salute, and not with the somber image…of the weak one bowing his head before the strong one. True democrats cannot and should not allow and permit themselves to humiliate others. If you nourish distrust toward us, we will prove to you the sincerity of our declaration in our actions, participating together with you in active struggle with common enemies-the Cossacks. For our population, the quickest possible expulsion of the Cossacks from the Kirghiz territories is of unquestionable and pressing interest, because every extra day that they stay here causes the population incalculable harm…After a brief welcome, your leaders will pass through the front of our troops, exchanging greetings with them, and we will pass through yours; after this unification from each side, two rank-and-file soldiers will move towards one another and greet and embrace one another, after which we can bring the units closer together and put them into whatever formation will be convenient, say a brief welcome, after which the troops will go wherever necessary…it would be appropriate to organize more ceremonially to make an impression on the morale of the population and of the fighters themselves. We await your help as soon as possible.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 56

Frunze wasn’t having any of it. He wrote back to the First Army:

“First. It is permitted, in conformity with the situation, not to insist on the immediate directing of all members of the Alash Orda government and of the command to Orenburg, having taken these several of the most authoritative persons only for communications and as hostages. Second. It is permitted to use immediately armed units of Alash Orda, having transformed them at your discretion and having secured hostages in the event of treachery. Third. Use the existing situation for the quickest possible fulfillment of this task of taking control of the oil fields region and cutting off paths of retreat to the East of the foe’s Ural Army units. Fourth. Impose as a duty on the former Kirghiz government the immediate formation in the region of Uil foodstuffs bases of transport necessary for the movement of units” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 59

Back in Semipalatinsk, the Alash Orda faced pressure from local non-Alash allied organizations and movements to ally with the Bolshevik to remain relevant. Frunze added to that pressure by taking Semipalatinsk on December 1st after the local organizations led a local uprising.

On December 21st, the Alash Orda published an official decree:

“In view of the fact that the rights of the peoples of Russia are most fully ensured by Soviet power, that the well-known declaration of the rights of peoples issued by the Council for People’s Commissars has been implemented with respect to many of the peoples of Soviet Russia and has been confirmed once again during the entry of Soviet troops onto the territory of Siberia in the Declaration of the chairmen of the Central Committee, the Council of People’s Commissars, the Oblast committee of Alash Orda resolves:

(1) to support Soviet power with all means and efforts, bearing freedom, equality, brotherhood, and light into all the unfortunate dark corners of many-language Russia, to welcome the appearance on Alash territory (the Kirghiz autonomy) of Soviet troops, as liberators from the tyranny of the reaction monarchistic dictatorship." - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 74

By end of December the Bolsheviks informed the Alash Orda that their proposal was unacceptable rejected and that:

“We do not know and do not recognize any Alash Orda government whatsoever and cannot enter into treaty agreements with them as such…the government is to be dissolved. The decree on amnesty remains in full force.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 60

The Alash Orda held on hope that by demonstrating their value as military allies, they could remain political equals. So, on December 27th, the Alash Orda launched an attack against Kyzyl-Kuga, capturing it and the Iletsk Corps staff HQ. The Cossacks tried to liberate Kyzyl-Kuga but were repulsed. The Alash Orda took prisoner the entire corps staff HQ, 500 Cossacks and officers, one artillery piece, fifteen machine guns, and many rifles. The First Army sent a reconnaissance detachment to Kyzyl-Kuga on December 29th. The Alash Orda sent word of their victory to the Bolsheviks on January 5th, 1920, claiming that “In such a manner, having participated actively in the struggle with the enemies of Soviet power in fact.” They argued that a merger of forces was natural “for in one krai, there cannot be two masters” (Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 62)

The problem was the Bolsheviks didn’t know what to do with the Alash Orda. On the one hand they were local intelligentsia who could be put to good use in furthering the Bolshevik cause but on the other hand they were a nationalistic political movement that created its own government, rebuffed the Bolsheviks, and allied themselves with the White. In January, the Alash Orda and Bolsheviks met and agreed that until an All-Kirghiz Council could be convened to determine the future of the Kazakh people, the government of the Steppe would fall to the Revolutionary-Military Committee, which contains members of the Alash Orda such as Baitursynov and the military units would merge with the Third Tatar Strelets Regiment. On January 21st this agreement was issued in a formal declaration:

“…only one resolution is possible. Until the All-Kirghiz Congress, to be convened this June and being the only body that can elect a lawful Soviet government of all of Kirghizia, the Kirghiz oblasts shall be administered by a Military Revolutionary Committee appointed by the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR. For this reason, a merger of Alash Orda with the Revolutionary Committee is possible only when the Council of Peoples’ Commissars includes certain Alash Orda members in the composition of the Military-Revolutionary Committee of Kirghizia.” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 65

And yet the Military-Revolutionary Committee decided not to appoint Alash Orda members to the committee because of their bourgeois backgrounds and distrust and dislike from other soviet Kazakhs. Instead, a commission was created to deal with property and trophies and by the spring and summer of 1920, the property, arms, and units of the Alash Orda were transferred into the disposition of the Kirghiz Military-revolutionary committee and army.

In February 1920, they arrested several Alash Orda members, sparking outrage from 800,000 people of the Kazakh oblast, the Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee, and the chair of the Bashkir Military-Revolutionary Committee, Z. Validov, who went all the way to Stalin and Lenin, begging them to issue a clear decree on the fates of the Alash Orda.

On March 9th, 1920, the Kirghiz Military-Revolutionary Committee issued the following statement:

“1. Alash Orda calling itself a government, and the zemstvo institutions subordinated to it, shall be liquidated as not being prescribed by the Constitution of the RSFSR. All laws, instructions, and orders issued by it during its existence shall be considered invalid. All property and currency, arms, military munitions and equipment shall be subject to transfer to the corresponding commissariats and departments of the krai, oblast, and uezd revolutionary committees by ownership.

All employees shall fall under disposition of the corresponding commissariats and mobilized by their specialization and shall be maintained on special account of the commissariat of internal affairs.

2. The Spiritual Administration existing in Ural’sk Oblast (the Commission for the administration of spiritual affairs attached to the Western section of Alash Orda) with all subordinated spiritual bodies shall be eliminated, the files and property transferred to the jurisdiction of the suitable uezd and volost soviets. Moreover, spiritual authorities selected by their respective societies shall be prohibited from fulfilling religious needs of the citizens” - Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 78

By the end of March, former members of the Alash Orda were no longer persecuted, but, except for a handful such as Baitursynov, could not participate in government work. Frunze defeated the White Army in March and rehabilitated the Kazakhs and Cossacks who once fought for the Whites. In late spring of 1920, the restrictions against the former Alash Orda members were lifted and some were allowed to work in different government bodies.

The Alash Orda started 1919 allied with a monarchist movement that refused to acknowledge their right to autonomous government. They started 1920 with their government disbanded and all power in the hands of the Bolshevik government. And yet, they held out hope that they could work with the Bolsheviks to enact their reforms.

References

Central Asia: a New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present by Adeeb Khalid

Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement by Dina A. Amanzholova

The “Russian” Civil Wars: 1916-1916 by Jonathan D. Smele

#queer historian #central asia #central asian history #history blog #alash orda #kazakhstan #admiral kolchak #siberian white army #russian civil war #central asian civil wars #red army #Russian red army #russian white army #Spotify

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timesofinnovation · 15 days ago

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In a notable development, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has placed the responsibility for Pavel Durov’s recent arrest squarely on Durov’s perceived ‘freedom’ in managing the social media platform, Telegram. The arrest of Durov, who has gained prominence not only as the founder of Telegram but also as an outspoken advocate for privacy and freedom of expression, raises significant questions about the intersection of technology, regulation, and personal accountability. Durov, a tech entrepreneur originally from Russia, found himself in hot water when a French judge laid formal charges against him for allegedly enabling a variety of illicit activities through Telegram. These charges include serious offenses such as the distribution of child sex abuse images, drug trafficking, and fraud. Telegram has amassed a user base nearing one billion globally, with a significant following in Russia and other former Soviet states. This widespread usage positions Telegram not only as a communication tool but also as a platform with profound implications for law enforcement and regulatory oversight. Lavrov’s remarks were delivered at MGIMO University in Moscow, where he suggested that Durov’s reluctance to conform to Western calls for increased moderation on his platform paved the way for his current predicament. He insinuated that this incident is indicative of a larger Western tactic aimed at exerting control over Russia and stifling its technological advancements. Lavrov stated, “Durov did not heed Western advice, which has manifested in this current situation where he faces scrutiny and legal challenges.” The minister's comments reflect a consistent narrative from the Kremlin that frames Western actions against Russian nationals as politically motivated. However, Durov’s legal counsel has retorted that the accusations against him are not only unfounded but grotesque. His lawyer argued that it is unreasonable to hold Durov accountable for the activities of users on a platform designed for communication. This defense highlights a central debate in digital policy: the responsibilities of platform creators versus users. Durov’s position that he cannot be held liable for user actions touches on the broader issue of intermediary liability, where the extent of responsibility should be scrutinized within the context of existing laws and regulations. Despite facing pressure from Russian authorities, Durov has seen a surge of support following his arrest. Citizens and tech enthusiasts alike express a growing concern regarding government overreach and the preservation of digital freedoms. The sentiment in favor of Durov underscores a pivotal moment in Russia’s digital landscape, where a clash between individual rights and state control is increasingly pronounced. The implications of Durov’s arrest extend beyond his personal circumstances. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov raised alarms about the potential for Durov’s case to evolve into what he termed ‘political persecution,’ drawing attention to the inherently volatile dynamics of international relations. Peskov emphasized that negotiations between Durov and the Kremlin have yet to materialize, suggesting that both parties are currently at a stalemate. French President Emmanuel Macron, for his part, denied any political motives behind Durov’s detention, further complicating the narrative. Lavrov’s assertion that this incident represents a new low in Moscow-Paris relations mirrors the growing tension between the Russian government and Western nations over digital governance and individual freedoms. Durov’s situation forces stakeholders—governments, corporations, and advice-driven users—to reassess prevailing frameworks around digital expression. The arrest of a CEO as prominent as Durov introduces a new dimension to the discourse on corporate accountability and the dynamics of censorship in the online space. As this situation unfolds, it serves as a stark reminder of the complexities

involved in balancing freedom of speech with the necessary precautions against misuse of digital platforms. Durov’s predicament exemplifies the trials faced by modern tech entrepreneurs acting in an era defined by rapid digital transformation and contentious regulatory landscapes. Ultimately, Durov’s case is emblematic of larger global discussions around technology, governance, and the freedom of expression. It exemplifies the ongoing battle between innovation in the digital age and the often stringent regulations that seek to govern behavior online. As societies grapple with these issues, the outcome of Durov’s legal struggles may send ripples through the tech industry, potentially reshaping how platforms are operated, moderated, and held accountable in the future.

#News #DigitalFreedom #RegulatoryChallenges #TechInnovation #TelegramFreeSpeechPavelDurovDigitalGovernanceTechRegulation

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fooledthecat · 28 days ago

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The distinct social stakes for an independent young woman of the late nineteenth century are made very clear in the eight volumes of the diaries of Marie Bashkirtseff (abridged and published in English under the incredible title I Am the Most Interesting Book of All), which recount her transformation from cosseted young Russian aristocrat to successful artist, showing her work at the Paris Salon a mere two and a half years after she started seriously studying painting, until her death from tuberculosis at the age of twenty-five. In January 1879 she wrote in her journal:

I long for the freedom to go out alone: to go, to come, to sit on a bench in the Jardin des Tuileries, and especially to go to the Luxembourg, to look at the decorated store windows, to enter churches and museums, and to stroll in the old streets in the evenings. This is what I envy. Without this freedom one cannot become a great artist.

Marie had relatively little to lose; she knew she was condemned to an early death – why not walk alone? But she nurtured a hope she would get well until the month before she died; and while she would have happily embarrassed her family, she had also internalised her culture’s objection to a young woman of good family going out alone to such an extent that she would chastise herself for even wanting to, writing in her journal that even if she did defy social strictures, she ‘would only be half free, because a woman who prowls is unwise’.

Though she trailed an entourage behind her, she did spend days walking the slums of Paris with her notebook in hand, sketching everything she saw, research which would produce numerous paintings, including 1884’s A Meeting, which now hangs in the Musée d’Orsay in Paris, and depicts a group of young street urchins gathered on a street corner. One of them holds a bird’s nest, and shows it off to the others, who lean in with that boyish interest that tries to disguise itself as total indifference.

But she found a way to include herself in the streetscape. To the right of the group of boys, leading down another street, we can see in the background a young girl from behind, braid down her back, walking away, possibly on her own, though it’s difficult to know for sure because the frame cuts off there; we can’t even see her right arm. This, for me, is the most wonderful part of the painting: Marie’s signature is placed below the young girl, in the bottom right-hand corner. I don’t think it’s overreaching to surmise that Marie has painted herself into the canvas, in the figure of the possibly solitary young girl on her way off, leaving the boys to it.

Lauren Elkin, Flâneuse: Women Walk the City in Paris, New York, Venice, and London

#currently reading #marie bashkirtseff #art history

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theculturedmarxist · 1 year ago

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U.S. foreign policy has set the country on a course destined to lead to a world of rivalry, strife and conflict into the foreseeable future. Washington has declared “war” on China, on Russia, on whomever partners with them.

That “war” is comprehensive — diplomatic, financial, commercial, technological, cultural, ideological. It implicitly fuses a presumed great power rivalry for dominance with a clash of civilizations: the U.S.-led West against the civilizational states of China, Russia and potentially India.

Direct military action is not explicitly included but armed clashes are not absolutely precluded. They can occur via proxies as in Ukraine. They can be sparked by Washington’s dedication to bolster Taiwan as an independent country.

A series of formal defense reviews confirm statements by the most senior U.S. officials and military commanders that such a conflict is likely within the decade. Plans for warfighting are well advanced. This feckless approach implicitly casts the Chinese foe as a modern-day Imperial Japan despite the catastrophic risks intrinsic to a war between nuclear powers.

The extremity of Washington’s overreaching, militarized strategy intended to solidify and extend its global dominance is evinced by the latest pronouncement of required war-fighting capabilities.

Recommendations just promulgated by the congressional bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission include developing and fielding “homeland integrated air and missile defenses that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China, and determine the capabilities needed to stay ahead of the North Korean threat.”

They were endorsed by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley in his post-retirement interview where he proposed adding up to $1 trillion to the current defense budget in order to create the requisite capabilities.

President Joe Biden, in his weekend interview on 60 Minutes, reiterated the dominating outlook with buoyant optimism:

“We’re the United States of America, for God’s sake!; the most powerful nation in the history of the world.”

This is the same country whose war-fighting record since 1975 is one win, two draws and four losses — or five losses if we include Ukraine. (That tabulation excludes Granada which was a sort of scrimmage). Moreover, the U.S. stock of 155mm artillery ammunition is totally exhausted – as is that of its allies.

No Discussion

This historic strategic judgment is heavily freighted with the gravest implications for the security and well-being of the United States — and will shape global affairs in the 21st century.

Yet, it has been made in the total absence of serious debate in the country-at-large, in Congress, within the foreign policy community, in the media and — most astonishing — at the highest levels of the government as well.

The last lapse is evinced by the superficiality of the statements issued by Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Milley and their associates.

We have heard nothing in the way of a sober, rigorous explication of why and how China or Russian poses so manifest a threat as to dictate committing ourselves to an all-out confrontation.

Nor do we hear mention of alternative strategies, their pluses and minuses, nor are there candid expositions of the costs that will be incurred in their implementation. Most certainly, silence reigns as to what happens if this audacious, all-or-nothing strategy fails — in whole or in part.

The stunning rise of China along with the reemergence of Russia as a formidable power are developments apparent to attentive observers for quite some time.

For Russia, the landmark dates can be identified.

Russian Milestones

The first was Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in 2007. There, he made clear his rejection of the Western script that relegated Russia to a subordinate position in a world system organized according to principles and interests defined largely by the United States.

Whether fashioned as neo-liberal globalization or, practically speaking, American hegemony, it was unacceptable. Instead, Putin set forth the twin concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism. While emphasizing the sovereign status and legitimate interest of all states, his vision did not foresee conflict or implacable rivalry. Rather, it was envisaged demarcating international dealings as a collective enterprise that aimed at mutual gain based on mutual respect for each other’s identity and core interests.

Washington, though, interpreted it otherwise. In their minds, Putin had thrown a monkey wrench into the project of fashioning a globalized world overseen by the United States and its partners.

President George W. Bush’s administration made the judgment that an irksome Russia should be fenced-in and its influence curbed. That objective animated the campaign to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, the sponsorship of the doomed Georgian attack on disputed South Ossetia, on the attempt to block the building of a new gas pipeline from Russia to Germany and on setting strict terms for commercial exchanges.

It culminated in the 2014 Maidan coup in Kiev and the bolstering of Ukraine as a power that could keep Russia in its place. The rest of that story we know.

Then, the image of Putin as a diabolical Machiavellian who works relentlessly to cripple the U.S. was given a thick layer of varnish by the Russiagate charade — a scheme concocted by presidential aspirant Hillary Clinton and her allies in order to explain how she could lose an election against somebody who started the fall campaign with a personal unfavorable poll rating of 67 percent.

The Chinese Challenge

The confrontation with China is not marked by equally clear events or decision points. Designation of China as the challenger to the U.S. position as global supremo crystallized more gradually.

It was the Middle Kingdom’s growing strength in every dimension of national power and capacity that stirred first anxiety and then fear. This challenging rival had become a threat to the foundational belief in U.S. exceptionalism and superiority. Hence, an existential threat in the truest sense.

(“This town ain’t big enough for both of us!” is a familiar line to Americans for the way it punctuates showdowns in hundreds of Westerns. Now it has spilled into foreign policy as a neat summation of Washington’s attitude toward Beijing. Instead, how about inviting the other guy for a drink at the Long Branch and a long talk? Dutch treat.)

The string of disputes over this or that issue were symptoms rather than the cause of the antagonism mixed with dread that has led the U.S. to treat China as a mortal foe. When we look at the chronology of events, it becomes evident that the U.S. bill of indictment does not come close to justifying that conclusion.

The fashionable — now official — view is that it’s all China’s fault.

President Xi Jinping & Co supposedly spurned the opportunity to join the outward-looking community of liberal nations; they have grown increasingly repressive at home — thereby, disqualifying themselves from partnership with the democracies; they have been aggressive in pushing their territorial claims in the South China Sea; they have not composed their differences with neighbors, most importantly Japan; and they have deviated from the Western (i.e. American line) toward Iran while mediating a modus vivendi with Saudi Arabia.

Closer to home, China is accused of operating extensive spying networks in the United States designed to purloin valuable high technology; of systematically manipulating commercial dealings to their advantage; and they are extending their cultural influence in a porous American society.

In this bill of indictment no reference is made to dubious actions by the United States. Washington’s record as a global citizen is less than impeccable. Specifically in reference to China, it is Washington that made what are by far the most provocative moves.

Let’s recall the jailing of Huawei’s CFO in Vancouver at the Trump White House’s insistence on specious grounds (violation of Washington’s own illegal sanctions campaign against Iran) in order to thwart the company’s success in becoming a dominant player in the IT field. Former President Donald Trump himself admitted as much in stating that the United States might refrain from pursuing her prosecution were China ready to concede to his demands in the bilateral trade negotiations.

The ultimate provocation has been the series of steps in regard to Taiwan that signaled clearly Washington’s intention to prevent its integration into the PRC. Thereby, it crossed the most indelible of red lines — one that the United States itself had helped draw and had observed for half a century. It is tantamount to an Old Europe aristocrat slapping another in the face with his gloves in public. An unmistakable invitation to a duel that precludes negotiation, mediation or compromise.

Not Just a Rival

The United States finds it far easier to deal with manifest enemies, e.g. the U.S.S.R., than sharing the international stage with countries that match it in strength whatever degree of threat it poses to American national security.

The latter is far harder for Americans to handle — emotionally, intellectually, diplomatically.

Hence, the growing tendency to characterize China as not just a rival for global influence but as a menace. That results in a caricature of China’s ambitions and a downplaying of prospects for fostering a working relationship among rough equals.

An enormous amount of energy is being put into this delusional enterprise. The target is America itself. The project is a bizarre form of conversion therapy designed to substitute a confected version of reality for the irksome real thing.

Stunning evidence of this self-administered treatment is available on a routine basis in the pages of The New York Times. Every day we are treated to two or three long stories about what’s wrong with China, its trials and tribulations. No occurrence is too recondite or distant to be exempt from being used in an exaggerated diagnosis of social or political illness. The extremes to which the editors go in this re-education program is pathological.

The threat China presents is to an exalted self-image more than to any tangible interests. At its root, the problem is psychological.

By time that the Biden administration arrived in office, the scene had been set for the declaration of war and the taking of concrete steps in that direction. But it’s odd that such a momentous commitment should be made by such a lackluster team of individuals with a diminished, distracted president as its nominal head. That can be attributed to two factors.

First is the dogmatic worldview of the principals. Their outlook represents an absorption of Paul Wolfowitz’s notorious memo of 1992 laying out a manifold strategy for consolidating and extending U.S. world dominance in perpetuity.

Second is the neocon passion to shape other countries in the U.S. image. That blend was laced with a dash of old-fashioned Wilsonian idealism along with a drizzle of humanitarianism from the Responsibility to Protect movement (R2P).

[Related: Chris Hedges: R2P Caused Libya’s Nightmare]

This potent brew had become orthodoxy for nearly all of the U.S. foreign policy community. In addition, a rudimentary version has gained the adherence of the political class and has shaped the thinking of Congress to whatever extent its members do any thinking about external relations beyond habitual resort to convenient hackneyed slogans.

Alternative No. 1

Objectively speaking, alternatives did exist.

The first we might call inertial ad-hocism. Its features would have been the continued segmentation of the country’s external dealings into more-or-less discrete packets — geographical and functional.

The Middle East’s two sub-categories: Israel and the Gulf; the desultory “War On Terror” wherever; the aggressive promotion of neo-liberal globalization featuring the ensconcing of a heteroclite corporate/technocratic/political elite as guides and overseers; bilateral relations with new economic powers like India and Brazil to bring them into the neo-liberal orbit; business-as-usual with the rest of the Global South.

As for China and Russia, one would be treated as a formidable rival and the other as an overreaching nuisance to be stymied in places in Syria and Central Asia. Concrete steps to counteract the Chinese commercial and technological challenge would have been taken either unilaterally or in hard-nosed direct bargaining. Support for Taiwan would have increased but stopped short of ruffling Beijing’s feathers by calling into question the One-China Principle.

The foundational premise of this approach is that an ever-deepening neo-liberal system would pull China into its field as a politico-economic centrifugal magnet. Hence, by an incremental process a potential challenge to American-Western hegemony would be gradually neutralized, avoiding a direct confrontation.

Russia, for its part, could be treated more roughly: the post-2014 sanctions tightened, its approaches in Syria and on other matters rebuffed and the quiet build-up of Ukraine continued. This, in essence, was the tack taken by former President Barack Obama and Trump.

Today’s uniform assumption that a momentous battle with the Chinese is written in the stars, the culmination of a zero-sum rivalry for global dominance, is of relatively recent vintage.

Not so long ago, the consensus was that the most sensible strategy composed two elements.

The first was peaceful engagement emphasizing economic interdependence leading to China’s participation in a more-or-less orderly world system whose rules-of-the-road might have to undergo some modification but where power politics was restrained and contained.

(Regarding the restructuring of existing international organizations, the IMF stands out. Since its post-war founding, the United States has held veto power over any or all of its actions. It adamantly refuses to relinquish it despite the drastic shifts in the constellation of global financial and monetary power. Hence, the IMF serves as a de facto subsidiary of the State Department. This state of affairs soon will prove absolutely unacceptable to China and the BRICs.)

The second was a measure of military balancing to remove any temptation as might exist in Beijing for empire-building while reassuring neighbors. The open question focused on exactly where and how the balance should be struck.

That was the prevailing perspective until roughly the second Obama administration. These days, that approach has lost its place in the mainstream of foreign policy discourse. There is no fixed day or event, though, that marks the abrupt and sharp change of course.

This disjointed incremental line of approach has its advantages despite its leaning toward conflict. Paramount is that it avoids locking the United States into a position of implacable hostility vis a vis China. There is no embedded logic propelling us toward armed conflict. It implicitly leaves open the possibility of U.S. thinking moving in a more positive direction.

Whatever the odds of such an evolution occurring, and on the arrival in the White House of a president with the bold vision of a true statesman, such a development would not be excluded as it is by the current mobilization for generational “war.”

Alternative No. 2

There is another, radical alternative grounded on the belief that it is feasible to fashion a long-term strategy of nurturing ties of cooperation with Russia and China. Taking some form of partnership, it would be grounded on a mutual commitment to the maintenance of political stability and fashioning mechanisms for conflict avoidance. This is by no means as far fetched as first glance might suggest — in concept.

The idea of a great power concert comes to mind. However, we should envisage an arrangement quite different from the historic Concert of Europe that emerged at the Conference of Vienna in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.

One, the objective would not be a buttressing of the status quo by the dual strategy of refraining from armed conflict among the underwriting states and suppressing revolutionary movements that could endanger existing monarchies. Its attendant features were the concentration of custodial power in the Big 5 co-managers of the system; the stifling of political reform across Europe; and the disregard of forces appearing outside their purview.

By contrast, a contemporary partnership among the major powers would presume a responsibility for taking the lead in designing a global system based on the mutually reinforcing tenets of openness, sovereign equality and the promotion of policies that deliver plus-sum outcomes.

Rather than rule by a directorate, international affairs would be structured by international institutions modified in terms of philosophy, multilateral decision-making and a measure of devolution that empowers regional bodies. There would be an established pattern of consultation among those governments whose economic weight and military capacity quite naturally should be expected to play an informal role in performing system maintenance functions and facilitating the involvement of other states. Legitimacy would be established through conduct and performance.

The drastic fall in respect for U.S. world leadership will facilitate that process — as the BRICs’ successes already demonstrate.

The crucial starting point for such a project is a meeting of the minds among Washington, Beijing and Moscow — accompanied by dialogue with New Delhi, Brasilia et al.

There is reason to believe that conditions, objectively speaking, have been conducive to an undertaking of this order for several years. However, it was never recognized in the West, much less seriously considered — an historic opportunity lost.

“The threat China presents is to an exalted self-image more than to any tangible interests. At its root, the problem is psychological.”

The most significant sufficient factor is the temper of Chinese and Russian leadership. Xi and Putin are rare leaders. They are sober, rational, intelligent, very well informed and capable of broad vision.

(China’s traditional goal always has been to exact deference from other countries while bolstering their own strength — not to impose an imperium on them. Much less do they share the American impulse to arrange the affairs of the entire world according to a universalization of their own unique civilization. Therein lies an opportunity to avoid a “war of transition.”

However, there is no American leader on the horizon who recognizes this overarching reality and who seems prepared to grasp the opportunity to “bend the arc of history.” Obama briefly toyed with the idea — before relapsing into the stale rhetoric of American exceptionalism: “We’re number One — you better believe it. Nobody else is even close!”)

While dedicated to securing their national interests, above all the well-being of their peoples, neither Xi nor Putin harbor imperial ambitions. And both have long tenures as heads of state. They have the political capital to invest in a project of this magnitude and prospective. Washington, unfortunately, has not had leaders of similar character and talents.

As for U.S. allies, no counsel of restraint can be expected from that quarter. Those loyal vassals have moved from being craven irrelevancies to active, if junior, partners in crime.

An Odious Spectacle

It is stomach-churning to observe the leaders of Europe lining up for slap-on-the-back meetings with Bibi Netanyahu in Tel Aviv while he inflicts atrocities on Gazans. Barely a word of concern for 2 million civilians, just the hurried dispatch of more weapons diverted from the Ukrainian killing fields. This odious spectacle was eclipsed by Biden’s disgraceful performance this week in Jerusalem.

Summit meetings by Bush, Obama, Trump or Biden always have concentrated on either small-bore issues or instruction on what their opposite number should be doing so as to conform to the U.S. view of the world. Both are wastes of precious time insofar as the imperative to foster a long-term, common global perspective is concerned.

The sensible approach to inaugurate a serious dialogue might be a president with statesmanlike qualities who sits down alone with Putin and Xi for an open-ended session and asks such questions as: “What do you want, President Putin/President XI? How do you see the world 20 years from now and your country’s place in it?”

Would they be prepared to expound an articulate response? Putin certainly would. That is exactly what he has been proposing since 2007 — on numerous occasions vocally or in his writings. Instead, he was stonewalled, and — since 2014 — treated as a menacing pariah to be defamed and personally insulted.

Here is Barack Obama’s take:

“The Russian President is a ‘physically unremarkable’ man, likened to ‘the tough, street-smart ward bosses who used to run the Chicago machine.”

This comment from Obama’s first volume of his published memoirs, The Promised Land, says more about his own inflated yet vulnerable ego than Putin’s character.

In fact, it was the Chicago machine along with money and encouragement from the Pritzker network that made Obama what he became.

Contrast: when Bismarck met Disraeli at the 1878 Berlin Conference — going so far as to invite him, a Jew, home twice for meals — he did not nag the British prime minister about trade restrictions on German exports of textiles and metallurgical goods or the systematic British abuse of tea plantation workers in Assam.

Nor did he comment on the man’s physique. Bismarck was a serious statesman, unlike the people in whose custody we place the security and well-being of our nations.

The upshot is that Putin and Xi seem puzzled by feckless Western counterparts who disregard the elementary precepts of diplomacy. That should be a concern as well — except by those who intend to conduct the U.S. “war” in a linear manner that pays little attention to the thinking of other parties.

The vitriol that is thrown at Putin with such vehemence by his Western counterparts is something of a puzzle. It is manifestly disproportionate to anything that he has done or said by any reasonable measure — even if one distorts the underlying story of Ukraine.

Obama’s condescension suggests an answer. At its core, their attitude reflects envy. Envy in the sense that he is subconsciously recognized as clearly superior in attributes of intelligence, knowledge of contemporary issues and history, articulateness, political savvy and – most certainly – diplomatic skill.

Try to imagine any U.S. leader emulating Putin’s performance in holding three-hour open Q & A sessions with citizens of all stripes — responding directly, in detail, coherently and with good grace. Biden? Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau? German Chancellor Olaf Scholz? British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak? French President Emmanual Macron? Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU Commission? Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallis?

Even Obama, from whom we’d get canned sermons cast in high-minded language that distills into very little. That’s why the West’s political class assiduously avoids paying attention to Putin’s speeches and press conferences — out of sight, out of mind.

Act in reference to the make-believe cartoon instead of the real man.

The Ukraine Era

These days, in the Ukraine era, the rigid Washington consensus is that Vladimir Putin is the quintessential brutal dictator — power mad, ruthless and with only a tenuous grip on reality.

Indeed, it has become commonplace to equate him with Hitler — as done by such leading lights of the U.S. power elite as Hillary Clinton and former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi along with “opinion makers” galore. Even 203 noble Nobels lend their collective brains and celebrity credentials to an “open letter” whose second sentence pairs Russia’s attack on Ukraine with Hitler’s assault on Poland in September 1939.

Sadly, the idea that those who make those decisions should bother to know what they are talking about is widely deemed as radical if not subversive.

In regard to Putin, there is absolutely no excuse for such painful ignorance. He has presented his views on how Russia visualizes its place in the world, relations with the West and the contours/rules of a desired international system more comprehensively, historically informed and coherently than has any national leader I know of. Shouted declarations “we’re No. 1 and always will be – you better believe it” (Obama) are not his style.

The point is that you may be troubled by his conclusions, question his sincerity, suspect hidden strands of thought, or denounce certain actions. However, doing so has no credibility unless one has engaged the man based on what is available — not on cartoon caricatures. So, too, should we recognize that Russia is not a one-man show, that it behooves us to consider the more complex reality that is Russian governance and politics.

President Xi of China has escaped the personal vilification thrown at Putin — so far. But Washington has made no greater effort to engage him in the sort of discourse about the future shape of Sino-American relations and the world system for which they are destined to be primary joint custodians.

Xi is more elusive than Putin. He is far less forthright, more guarded and embodies a political culture very different from that of the United States or Europe. Still, he is no dogmatic ideologue or power-mad imperialist. Cultural differences too easily can become an excuse for avoiding the study, the pondering and the exercise in strategic imagination that is called for.

Shaping the World Structure

The approach outlined above is worth the effort – and low costs that it entails. For it is the understandings among the three leaders (and their senior colleagues) that are of the utmost importance.

That is to say, agreed understandings as to how they view the shape and structure of world affairs, where their interests clash or converge, and how to meet the dual challenge of 1) handling those points of friction that may arise, and 2) working together to perform ‘system maintenance’ functions in both the economic and security realms.

At the moment, there is no chance that American leaders can muster the gumption, or have the vision, to set out on this course. Neither Biden and his team, nor their Republican rivals are up to it.

In truth, American leaders are psychologically and intellectually not capable of thinking seriously about the terms for sharing power with China, with Russia or with anybody else – and developing mechanisms for doing so over different timeframes.

Washington is too preoccupied with parsing the naval balance in East Asia to reflect on broad strategies. Its leaders are too complacent about the deep faults in our economic structures, and too wasteful in dissipating trillions on chimerical ventures aimed at exorcising a mythical enemy to position ourselves for a diplomatic undertaking of the sort that a self-centered America never before has faced.

A drive to revalidate its presumed virtue and singularity now impels what the U.S. does in the world. Hence, the calculated stress placed on slogans like “democracy versus autocracy.” That is a neat metaphor for the uneasy position in which Uncle Sam finds himself these days, proudly pronouncing enduring greatness from every lectern and altar in the land, pledging to uphold a standing as global No. 1 forever and ever.

But the U.S. is also constantly bumping its head against an unaccommodating reality. Instead of downsizing the monumental juggernaut or applying itself to a delicate raising of the arch, it makes repeated attempts to fit through in a vain effort to bend the world to fit its mythology. Invocation of the Concussion Protocol is in order — but nobody wants to admit that sobering truth.

This is close to a condition that approximates what the psychologists call “dissociation.” It is marked by an inability to see and to accept actualities as they are for deep-seated emotional reasons.

The tension generated for a nation so constituted when encountering objective reality does not force heightened self-awareness or a change in behavior if the dominant feature of that reality is the attitudes and expressed opinions of others who share the underlying delusions.

Michael Brenner is a professor of international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. [email protected]

#us imperialism #us foreign policy #xi jinping #vladimir putin #russia #china #brics #american exceptionalism #multipolarity

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