#International Trade Agreements

[mostlysignssomeportents]

How tech does regulatory capture

If you want to know which industries have the most influence in DC, study the trade deals struck by the US Trade Representative, whose activities are the most obvious manifestation of American corporate power over state. Take the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). As David Dayen notes, this treaty is a kind of Big Tech wishlist:

https://prospect.org/power/2023-04-18-big-tech-lobbyists-took-over-washington/

If you’d like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here’s a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/04/18/cursed-are-the-sausagemakers/#how-the-parties-get-to-yes

The USTR’s playbook has changed over the years, reflecting the degree of control over the US government exerted by different sectors of the US economy. Today, with Big Tech in the driver’s seat, US trade deals embody something called the “digital trade agenda,” a mix of policies ranging from limiting liability, privacy protection, competition law, and data locatization.

The Digital Trade Agenda is a relatively new phenomenon. A decade ago, when the USTR went abroad to twist the arms of America’s trading partners, the only “digital” part of the agenda was obligations to spy on users and to swiftly remove materials claimed to have violated US media monopolies’ copyright. But as the tech sector grew more concentrated, they were able to seize a greater share America’s trade priorities.

One person who had a front-row seat for this transformation was Wendy Li, a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Wisconsin, who served in the USTR’s office from 2015–17, and who leveraged her contacts among officials and lobbyists (and ex-lobbyists turned officials and vice-versa) to produce a fascinating, ethnographic account of a very specific form of regulatory capture. That account appears in “Regulatory Capture’s Third Face of Power,” in Socio-Economic Review. The article is paywalled, but if you access it via this link, you can bypass the paywall:

https://pluralistic.net/wendi-li-reg-capture

Li’s paper starts with a taxonomy of types of regulatory capture, drawn from the literature. The first kind — the “first face of power” — is when an industry wins some battle over a given policy, triumphing over the public interest. Li notes that defining “public interest” is sometimes tricky, which is true, but still, there are some obvious examples of this kind of capture.

My “favorite” example of horrible regulatory capture is from 2019, when Dow Chemical — working through the West Virginia Manufacturers Association — convinced the state of West Virginia to relax the limits on how much toxic runoff from chemical processing could be present in the state’s drinking water. Dow argued that the national safe levels reflected a different kind of person from the typical West Virginian. Specifically, Dow argued, the people of West Virginia were much fatter than other Americans, so their bodies could absorb more poison without sickening. And besides, Dow concluded, West Virginians drink beer, not water, so poisoning their drinking water wouldn’t affect them:

https://washingtonmonthly.com/2019/03/14/the-real-elitists-looking-down-on-trump-voters/

This isn’t even a little ambiguous. Dow’s pleading wasn’t just absurd on its face — it was also scientifically bankrupt — there’s no evidence that being overweight makes you less susceptible to carcinogens. And yet, the state regulator bought it. Why? Well, maybe because chemical processing is WV’s largest industry, and Dow is the largest chemical company in the state. Regulatory capture, in other words.

The second kind of regulatory capture is the “revolving door”: when an executive from industry rotates into a role in government, where they are expected to guard the public interest from their former employers. There’s some of this in every presidential administration — think of Obama’s ex-Morganstanley and ex-Goldmansachs finance officials.

But while Obama and other “normal” pols sketched their corruption with a fine-tipped pen, making the overall shape hard to discern, Trump scrawled large, crude, unmissable figures with a fisted Sharpie. Remember Scott Pruitt, the disgraced Trump EPA who wanted to abolish the EPA? Pruitt was was such a colossal asshole that even the lobbyists who’d been bribing him with free housing actually evicted him:

https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/politics/pruitt-trump/index.html

After Pruitt resigned in the midst of chaotic scandal, he was succeeded by his deputy, Andrew Wheeler — a former coal lobbyist:

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruitt-epa-trump.html

That’s the “second face of power.” What’s the third? It’s taking over the shape of the debate, getting to define its axioms. Think of the reflexive idea that government projects are “wasteful” and “inefficient.” Once all players internalize this idea, the debate shifts from “what should the public sector do?” to “which private-sector entity should the government pay to do this?” Anyone who says, “Wait, why doesn’t the government just do this?” just gets blank stares.

We can see this in the cramped and inadequate debate over the SVB bailout; apologists for the bailout insist that it was necessary because if SVB’s depositors had been forced to take a haircut, every large depositor in America would pile into Morganstanley, making it so “too big to fail” that it could tank the nation.

This is probably true — but only if you discount the possibility of establishing a public bank. Public banks are hardly a radical idea: America had nationwide public banking through the postal service until 1966:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/04/15/socialism-for-the-rich/#rugged-individualism-for-the-poor

Li summarizes: “the first face of power is measured through the winner of the game, and the second face of power can be understood as the referee. The third face of power is the field, the rulebook, and agreement that there is even a game at all.”

It’s the creation of this third face that Li’s paper dissects — the creation of “Type I” ideas that form the unquestioned assumptions for all other debate. Sociologist call these ideas “schemas.” Li describes two ways that the tech industry changed the schemas used in trade negotiations. First, schemas are changed through “knowledge production” — creating reports and data.

Second, schemas are embedded through “recursive institutional reproduction” — a bit of unfortunately opaque academic jargon that is roughly equivalent to what activists call “policy laundering.” That’s when an industry can’t get its way in its home country, so it leans on trade reps to include that policy in a treaty or trade deal, which transforms it into an obligation at home.

In tech policy, the Ur-example of this is the DMCA, a 1998 digital copyright law that has profoundly changed the way we relate to everything from online services to our coffee makers. The origins of the DMCA are wild. In 1991, Al Gore kicked off the National Information Infrastructure hearings — AKA the “Information Superhighway” project. One of the most prominent proposals for the future of the internet came from Bruce Lehman, Bill Clinton’s Copyrigh tCzar. Lehman had been the head of IP enforcement for Microsoft, and he had some genuinely batshit ideas for the internet, like requiring a separate, negotiated copyright license for every transitory copy made by RAM, or a network buffer, or drive cache:

https://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-paper/

Gore laughed Lehman out of the room and told him to hit the road. So Lehman did, scurrying over to Geneva, where he turned his batshit ideas into the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Then he raced back to DC where he told Congress that they had to get on board with those UN treaties. In 1998, Congress passed the DMCA, turning a failed regulatory policy into a federal law that endures to this day.

That’s “policy laundering.” Lehman couldn’t get his ideas though the US government, so he rammed them through a UN agency, converting his proposal into an obligation, which Congress duly assumed.

The Digital Trade Agenda triumphed by both knowledge production and recursive institutional reproduction (AKA policy laundering). Under Obama, trade officials created the Digital Trade Working Group in consultation with industry, through the US Chamber of Commerce. This group worked with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) — a quasi-governmental research body — to produce copious reports, testimony and data in support of a focus on “digital trade.”

In particular, they inflated the value of digital trade to US officials, convincing them that getting wins for the digital industry would have an outsized impact on the US economy. This is reflected in the terms of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that was negotiated in the utmost secrecy, in hotels all over the world surrounded by armed guards, where neither the press nor activists were welcome.

TPP represented a kind of farcical wishlist for America’s corporate giants, including the tech sector, and it looked like a done deal — until Trump. Trump unilaterally withdrew from TPP, so the tech industry’s reps simply tacked around TPP. They took everything they’d wanted to get out of TPP and crammed it into the USMCA, Trump’s rewrite of NAFTA. This makes perfect sense — corporate America’s priority was TPP’s policies, not TPP itself.

Li’s paper doesn’t just document this shift, she also gives us interviews with (anonymized) officials and lobbyists who speak frankly about how this happened behind the scenes. For example, a former Commerce official turned tech lobbyist describes how he lobbies his former coworkers: “Sometimes, [meetings are like] hey, let’s grab lunch, let’s grab coffee, and catch up. And half of it is about our kids, and half of it is about this [work related issue]. We’ll have a formal meeting [with government officials], but obviously we chitchat before and after. Because we’re human. So, a lot of it is just normal human interaction, right?”

This social coziness lets lobbyists position themselves as “stakeholders,” which legitimizes — and even requires — their participation in policymaking. As a trade negotiator says, “So to get your handle on a problem, you’ve got to pull the right people together, and you’ve got to sift through all the various ideas, so we obviously have a lot of regular interaction with companies [. . .] I spend a lot of time with the companies trying to understand their business model, try ing to understand how they interact with the governments in different countries, and then of course, socializing it within the building.”

Once lobbyists are “stakeholders,” they get to define not just what position the US takes — they get to define which positions can even be considered. As a trade negotiator says, “[Lobbyists aren’t] coming in and spouting talking points. They’re not giving us draft text because we haven’t gotten to the text phase yet. The way these meetings go is, generally we provide an update on what is happening and what approach we’re taking. The remainder is usually devoted to companies talking about their particular interests, and inquiring as to whether and how their issues are being addressed in that forum.”

That’s not just winning the game — it’s defining the rules.

Li’s paper is a fascinating tour of the sausage-factory and a close examination of the gunk that litters the factory floor. That said, I think there are areas where she drops policies and fights into neat categories that are much messier. For example, Li contrasts the rules in TPP with the rules in ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, a failed international treaty from 2010.

Li characterizes ACTA as being an anti-tech proposal because it imposed copyright liability on tech companies, which would have raised their costs by forcing them to police their users’ speech, items for sale and uploads for copyright infringement. But that’s not quite right: ACTA was much broader. First, because “counterfeiting” doesn’t mean what you think it does: in an international trade agreement, counterfeiting concerns itself with all kinds of totally legitimate activities.

For example, Apple engraves microscopic Apple logos on every part in an iPhone; no user ever sees these parts. But Apple uses the presence of an Apple trademark on these tiny components to lodge trademark claims with US border officials in order to block the importation of parts harvested from dead iPhones, as part of the company’s war on repair:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/05/30/80-lbs/#malicious-compliance

Likewise, companies like Rolex and Cartier have national subsidiaries in countries all over the world with the exclusive license to sell their goods in each country. These companies then claim that, say, an official Mexican Rolex watch becomes a counterfeit Rolex the minute it crosses the US border, because Rolex Mexico doesn’t have the right to use Rolex International’s trademarks outside of Mexico.

Asking tech companies to police “counterfeits” isn’t just about stopping knockoffs — it’s about letting multinational corporations control all secondary markets for their goods, giving them total control over repair and used goods.

Beyond that: creating an affirmative duty for platforms to police their users’ uploads and speech for copyright infringement is one of those things that not only won’t prevent copyright infringement (beating filters is easy for dedicated copyright infringers), but it will also compromise users’ speech (because filters are rife with false positives) — and it will hand eternal dominance to the largest tech firms (both Youtube and Facebook support mandatory filters, because they’ve spent hundreds of millions on them, and know that their small rivals can’t).

ACTA wasn’t a way to “punish” tech to make life better for media companies — it was a way to shift some of the oligarchic control of both tech and media around, while shoring up its dominance. Yes, parts of the tech sector hated ACTA, but it died because millions of people campaigned against it.

And of course, ACTA got policy-laundered into law in 2019, when the EU adopted the Digital Single Market Directive and created a filtering mandate, ignoring the largest petition in EU history and the people who marched in 50 cities. That was recursive institutional reproduction in action all right.

Likewise, TPP can’t be understood as the tech sector sidelining the entertainment companies — because both of them rallied for the parts of TPP that feathered all their nests. For example, the entertainment sector and the tech sector both love rules against reverse-engineers (like Section 1201 of the DMCA), which make it a felony to unlock your books, music, games and videos from the store that sold them to you and take them with you to another player.

Tech loves this because it gets them lock-in — if you break up with Amazon, you have to kiss your Kindle and Audible books goodbye. Media loves it because it gives them control — DRM stops you from recording Christmas movies between Feb and Dec, when they come free with your streaming service, and that means you have to pay-per-view them in December, when you want to watch them.

In other words, the Big Tech and Big Content’s policy fights aren’t so much about which policies we get — they’re about who gets to profit from them. They both want the same stuff — no taxes, no unions, no minimum wage, no consumer rights, no privacy — but they each want to hoard the benefits from that stuff.

Both tech and media love “IP” — not in the sense of “copyright” or “trademark,” but in the sense of “any law that lets me control the conduct of my competitors, critics and customers”:

https://locusmag.com/2020/09/cory-doctorow-ip/

In USMCA, it wasn’t just the “Digital Trade Agenda” that made it into the final agreement — it was mandatory DRM laws, massive copyright extensions, and the evisceration of fair use and its equivalents in Mexico and Canada:

https://pluralistic.net/2020/08/01/set-healthy-boundaries/#la-ley

There’s another important factor missing from Li’s analysis of the rise of the Digital Trade Agenda: monopoly. Tech used to be composed of hundreds of competing firms that hated each other’s guts and were incapable of working together. The entertainment industry, by contrast, was already hugely consolidated and able to lobby effectively as a body.

That was hugely important in the Napster Wars, when international copyright proposals like the Database Right and the Broadcast Treaty were popping up at the UN and in country-to-country trade deals. While the tech industry was competing to give users a better deal, Big Content was able to solve the collective action problem and come up with a common lobbying position, getting nearly identical (and absolutely ghastly) tech bills introduced in dozens of state legislatures at once:

https://web.archive.org/web/20030425210736/https://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/states/200304_sdmca_eff_analysis.php

The rise of the Digital Trade Agenda is downstream of tech industry consolidation, the orgy of mergers that saw the internet transformed into “five giant websites, each filled with screenshots of text from the other four”:

https://twitter.com/tveastman/status/1069674780826071040

Li’s taxonomy of regulatory capture is useful and important, and it’s complimented by an analysis of failures in antitrust enforcement. Market consolidation has produced firms that are more powerful than the governments that are supposed to keep them honest. When the teams have more power than the ref, the game will never be fair:

https://doctorow.medium.com/small-government-fd5870a9462e

The tech industry aren’t really adverse to the entertainment industry, at least not where it counts. They are all part of the business lobby, whose regulatory priorities are broadly shared, even if they disagree at the margins. Dayen describes how the Digital Trade Agenda is playing out in IPEF, the treaty with more than a dozen Pacific Rim countries: “It would prohibit governments from reviewing or prescreening algorithms for violations of labor law, competition policy, or nondiscrimination statutes. It would bar limitations on data flows or storage. And it would treat policies that have greater impacts on the large tech firms as illegal trade barriers. These terms could block signatory countries from writing laws that take on any of these issues.”

Those aren’t tech priorities — those are corporate priorities. The success of the “Digital Trade Agenda” isn’t just because tech grew up and started lobbying — it’s because the things they lobby for are the things every business wants: no labor protection, no antitrust, no privacy.

That’s the “schema” that matters: the bedrock assumption that job of US trade policy is to make sure that workers and residents abroad have no rights, with the obligation on America to dismantle the few rights that remain intact in its borders to satisfy the “obligation” it actually insisted on.

Later this week (Apr 20/21), I’m speaking in Chicago at the Stigler Center’s Antitrust and Competition Conference.

This weekend (Apr 22/23), I’m at the LA Times Festival of Books.

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[hagueapostilleservicesblog]

Get Your Germany Business Certificate Apostille Online

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[pickleking8]

Hey! I had a question for any non-USAmericans. If you guys didn't know, I'm from the US (though I did spend four years of my childhood in a different country), and the general narrative for children in the US is that America is a very powerful/influential country. I was thinking about this, and wondering how true it really is, because of course this is the narrative my own country told me. Are we really all that influential?

So, my question is, for any non-USAmericans, what's your perception of how powerful the US is? How much do the actions of the US or trends within the US really affect your lives? I'd appreciate any response!

[growmorebusinessptyltd]

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[southsouthcooperationday]

(16th meeting) First Session Ad Hoc Committee to Draft Terms of Reference for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.

First Session Ad Hoc Committee to Draft Terms of Reference for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation will be held from 26 April – 8 May 2024.

Dialogue on developing country priorities for capacity building to support their effective participation in the negotiation of the Framework Convention.

Watch the (16th meeting) First Session Ad Hoc Committee to Draft Terms of Reference for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation!

[xtruss]

Where Global Governance Went Wrong—And How To Fix It

International Agreements Have Not Balanced Our Freedoms In The Way That They Should.

— April 28, 2024 | Foreign Policy | By Joseph E. Stiglitz

Matt Chase Illustration For Foreign Policy

Global Governance, Never Really Settled, has recently been having an especially hard time. Everyone believes in a rules-based system, but everyone wants to make the rules and dislikes it when the rules work against them, saying that they infringe on their sovereignty and their freedom. There are deep asymmetries, with the powerful countries not only making the rules but also breaking them almost at will, which raises the question: Do we even have a rules-based system, or is it just a facade? Of course, in such circumstances, those who break the rules say they only do so because others are, too.

The current moment is a good illustration. It is the product of longstanding beliefs and power relations. Under this system, industrial subsidies were a no-no, forbidden (so it was thought) not just by World Trade Organization rules, but also by the dictates of what was considered sound economics. “Sound economics” was that set of doctrines known as neoliberal economics, which promised growth and prosperity through, mostly, supposedly freeing the economy by allowing so-called free enterprise to flourish. The “liberal” in neoliberalism stood for freedom and “neo” for new, suggesting that it was a different and updated version of 19th-century liberalism.

In fact, it was neither really new nor really liberating. True, it gave firms more rights to pollute, but in doing so, it took away the freedom to breathe clean air—or in the case of those with asthma, sometimes even the most fundamental of all freedoms, the freedom to live.

“Freedom” meant freedom for the monopolists to exploit consumers, for the monopsonists (the large number of firms that have market power over labor) to exploit workers, and freedom for the banks to exploit all of us—engineering the most massive financial crisis in history, which required taxpayers to fork out trillions of dollars in bailouts, often hidden, to ensure that the so-called free enterprise system could survive

This essay is adapted from the book The Road to Freedom: Economics and the Good Society by Joseph E. Stiglitz, W.W. Norton, April 2024

The promise that this liberalization would lead to faster growth from which all would benefit never materialized. Under these doctrines that have prevailed for more than four decades, growth has actually slowed in most advanced countries. For instance, real growth in GDP per capita (average percent increase per annum) according to data compiled by the St. Louis Fed, was 2.5% from 1960 to 1990, but slowed to 1.5% from 1990 to 2018. Instead of trickle-down economics, where everyone would benefit, we had trickle-up economics, where the top 1 percent and especially the top 0.1 percent, got a larger and larger slice of the pie.

These are illustrations of British political theorist Isaiah Berlin’s dictum that “total liberty for wolves is death to the lambs”; or, as I have sometimes put it less gracefully, freedom for some has meant the unfreedom of others—their loss of freedom.

Just as individuals rightly cherish their freedom, countries do, too, often under the name “sovereignty.” But while these words are easily uttered, there is too little thought about their deeper meanings. Economics has weighed into the debate about what freedom and sovereignty mean, with John Stuart Mill’s contribution in the 19th century (On Liberty), and Milton Friedman’s and Friedrich Hayek’s works in the mid-20th (Capitalism and Freedom and The Road to Serfdom).

But contrary to what Hayek and Friedman asserted, free and unfettered markets do not lead to efficiency and the well-being of society; that should be obvious to anyone looking around. Just think of the inequality crisis, the climate crisis, the opioid crisis, the childhood diabetes crisis, or the 2008 financial crisis. These are crises created by the market, exacerbated by the market, and/or crises which the market hasn’t been able to deal with adequately.

Economic theorists (including me) have shown that whenever there is imperfect information or imperfect markets (that is to say, always), there is a presumption that markets are not efficient. Even a very little bit of imperfection can have big effects.

The problem is that much of the global economic architecture designed over recent decades has been based on neoliberalism—the kinds of ideas that Hayek and Friedman put forward. The system of rules that evolved from there must be fundamentally rethought.

U.S. President Donald Trump arrives at the G-20 economic summit in Hamburg, Germany, on July 8, 2017. Sean Gallup/Getty Images

From An Economist’s Perspective, Freedom Is The “Freedom To Do,” meaning the size of the opportunity set of what a person can do, or the range of the choices that are available.

Someone on the verge of starvation has no real freedom—she does what she must to survive. A rich person obviously has more freedom to choose. “Freedom to do” is also constrained when an individual is harmed. Obviously, if an individual is killed by a gunman or a virus, or even hospitalized by COVID-19, he has lost freedom in a meaningful sense, and we then have a dramatic illustration of Berlin’s dictum: Freedom for some—the freedom to carry guns, or to not be masked, or to be unvaccinated—may entail a large loss of freedom for others.

The same principle applies to the international arena. The rules-based trade system consists of a set of rules intended to expand the freedoms of all in a meaningful way by imposing constraints. The idea that constraints can be freeing, while seemingly self-contradictory, is obvious: Stoplights force us to take turns going through intersections, but without this seeming constraint, there would be gridlock and no one would be able to move.

All contracts are agreements about constraints—with one party agreeing to do or not do something in return for another person making other promises—with the belief that in doing so, all parties will be better off. Of course, if one party cheats and doesn’t deliver on its promise, then that party gains at the expense of others. And there is always the temptation to do so, which is why we require governments to enforce contracts, so that promises mean something. No government could enforce all contracts, and the so-called free market would crash if all participants were grifters.

But while there are similarities between discussions of freedom at the individual level and the country level, there are also a couple of big differences. Most importantly, there is no global government to ensure that the powerful countries obey an agreement, as we are seeing today in the case of U.S. industrial subsidies. The World Trade Organization (WTO) generally forbids such subsidies and especially disapproves of some of the provisions—such as requiring domestic manufacturing (“Made in America”)—in legislation passed recently by the U.S. Congress, including the CHIPS and Science Act.

Moreover, within democratic countries, the role of power in the making and enforcement of the rules is often obscure; we know that inequalities in wealth and income get translated into inequalities in political power, which determines who gets to design the rules and how they are enforced. An imbalance of power means that the powerful within a country determine the rules in ways that benefit them, often at the expense of the weak.

Still, the democratic context means that every once in a while, power is checked—as it was when the antitrust laws were passed in the United States in the latter part of the 19th century, or the Wagner Act was passed during the New Deal of the 1930s, giving workers more power.

In an international setting, power is even more concentrated, and democratic forces are even weaker. What has happened in the past few years illustrates this. The United States was at the center in constructing the rules-based system, in both designing the rules and how they were to be enforced, including dispute resolutions through the WTO’s Appellate Body. But when the rules—such as those concerning industrial subsidies—were inconvenient, it decided to ignore them, knowing that there was little, if anything, that any country could or would do about it. So much for the rules-based system.

And the United States’ confidence that nothing could or would be done was reinforced by the fact that it had effectively defenestrated the Appellate Body, because that Body had made decisions it didn’t like, and the U.S. thought that the Body was guilty of overreaching, going beyond what it was entitled to do. But rather than going back to the WTO and clarifying what the Body’s role should be, the U.S. simply hamstrung any adjudication within the WTO. The situation would be like suspending the U.S. Supreme Court while figuring out how to bring the justices back to a reasonable theory of jurisprudence.

This imbalance of power has played out repeatedly in recent years. When developed countries attempted to implement industrial policies—even mild policies, such as Brazil’s effort to provide capital to aerospace corporation Embraer at reasonable interest rates through that country’s development bank (as opposed to the outlandishly high rates then prevailing in its financial markets)—they were attacked. When Indonesia tried to ensure that more of the added value associated with its rich nickel deposits remained in Indonesia, it was attacked.

People line up to receive the Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccination at a local hospital in in Harare, Zimbabwe, on March 29, 2021. Tafazwa Ufumeli/Getty Images

Even worse, when more than 100 countries proposed a waiver of intellectual property related to COVID-19—in the spirit of the compulsory licenses already seemingly part of the WTO framework, but given the urgency of the moment, a less bureaucratic process was of the essence—they were denied. The result: vaccine apartheid, where the advanced countries had all the vaccines they wanted, and the developing countries had almost zero access. This almost surely resulted in thousands of unnecessary deaths and tens of thousands of unnecessary hospitalizations in the poorer countries.

These are obviously no small matters in the well-being of citizens around the world, especially not for developing countries and emerging markets. Nor are they small matters in geoeconomics and geopolitics. The neoliberal rules forbidding subsidies effectively meant that developing countries couldn’t catch up to the advanced countries; the rules condemned them to being commodity producers, reserving the higher value-added production for the advanced countries.

This tariff structure has been rightly criticized as a crucial tool in the preservation of colonial trade patterns—aided and abetted by other unfair aspects of the trade regime, such as escalating tariffs. As economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it, the advanced countries “kicked away the ladder” from which they themselves had used.

It should be clear, too, that there are geopolitical consequences in refusing to play by the rules. The United States and the advanced countries are losing support for some of the most important issues requiring global cooperation, including climate change, global health, and the support needed to resolve the conflict in Ukraine as well as Washington’s apparent battle for democracy and hegemony with China.

The global south may yet steer the ship of international rules back on course. When the United States was the hegemon, it could do as it wanted, but its influence is now being challenged. China has provided more infrastructure than the United States has; early on in the pandemic, both China and Russia seemed more generous in providing vaccines.

Washington told the developing countries to open their doors to its multinationals, but when those countries asked that the rich corporations pay the taxes they owed, the United States was not supportive—reforms under an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development initiative called BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) generated sparse revenues for the poorer countries, and in return, the developing countries were asked to forego digital taxation. When, accordingly, the African Union asked for a change in venue of the discussions of global tax reform to the United Nations, the United States not only opposed it, but also tried to strong-arm others to do so. Last November, the United States lost the vote overwhelmingly at the U.N.

So whither goes global governance? In the absence of rules, the law of the jungle prevails. While the United States might win that fight, it would simultaneously lose the cooperation it needs so badly in a host of arenas. Overall, it would lose.

It is in the interests of the United States to abandon the corporate-driven rules-based system and work instead to create a set of at least basic rules that would reflect common interests. For instance, instead of the comprehensive so-called free trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that were really managed trade agreements (and managed specifically in the interests of Big Pharma and some of the big polluters), the United States should have narrow agreements—say, a green agreement to share knowledge and technology, promote sustainable forests, and work together to save the planet.

We need agreements that do more to constrain the large countries—whose actions can hurt the global economy—and do less to constrain the small, whose actions have little global consequences.

For instance, we need rules that would constrain the European Union and the United States from using monetary policy in ways that benefit their economies at the expense of others, as the United States has repeatedly done. Today, even the United States recognizes that investment agreements (such as NAFTA’s infamous Chapter 11) that allow corporations to sue states actually exert constraints on sovereignty without commensurate benefits. A key difference between NAFTA and the trade agreement that succeeded it is the effective dropping of Chapter 11. But the United States should go further, strengthening the ability of any government party to an agreement to sue corporations when terms of the agreement have been violated.

To win the hearts and minds in the new cold war brewing between the United States and China, the United States needs to do more. Washington needs to use the money it has to provide assistance to the poor, and the power that it possesses to construct rules that are fair. Nowhere is that more evident than in response to the debt crisis that the United States faces today and the recent pandemic, another of which the world will almost surely face in the future.

An aerial view shows open graves, left, near recent burials at a cemetery in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 22, 2021, during a surge of deaths from the COVID-19 pandemic. Mario Tama/Getty Images

With most sovereign debt contracts written in the United States, Washington has the power to change the legal framework governing these contracts in ways that make the resolution of crises—where countries can’t pay back what they owe—faster and better. This approach would address the “too little, too late” problem by which one crisis is followed by another, which has plagued the world for so long. With more creditors entering the field, debt resolution is becoming ever more difficult. There are important proposals currently before the New York legislature (where most of the money is raised), but support from the Biden administration would be enormously helpful.

The world has just gone through a terrible pandemic, and the recognition that there will be another has spurred work on a proposed pandemic preparedness treaty. Unfortunately, under the influence of Big Pharma, there are no provisions in the treaty for the kind of intellectual property waiver that the world so badly needs, let alone the technology transfer that would allow the production of all the products—protective gear, vaccines, and therapeutics—necessary to fight the next disease that strikes.

The freedom to live is the most important freedom that we have. Our global agreements have not balanced our freedoms in the way they should. Better global agreements can benefit all countries, though not necessarily all people within them: Such agreements would constrain the power of the exploiters to exploit the rest of us, thereby making a dent on their bottom line, but they would benefit society more generally.

Striving to create global agreements that are fair and generous to the poor would, I believe, be in the United States’ self-interest—in its “enlightened” self-interest, taking into account the new geoeconomics and geopolitics. It was never in the United States’ self-interest to pursue a corporatist global agenda, even when it was the hegemon. But it is especially not so today.

— Joseph E. Stiglitz is a Nobel Laureate in Economics and a Professor at Columbia University.

[kesarijournal]

The Grand WTO's Food, Fishing, and Farming Fiasco

The Grand WTO's Food, Fishing, and Farming Fiasco

Welcome to the latest drama that’s more tangled than your earphones in a pocket – the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) ongoing saga involving a cast of nations with India and South Africa in leading roles, and a contentious plot over food, fishing, and farming subsidies. Set against the backdrop of Abu Dhabi’s Ministerial Conference, our story unfolds with India and South Africa uniting to…

[reasonsforhope]

On her fingers, Chicago’s Chief Sustainability Officer Angela Tovar counted the city buildings that will soon source all of their power from renewable energy: O’Hare International Airport, Midway International Airport, City Hall.

[Note: This is an even huger deal than it sounds like. Chicago O'Hare International Airport is, as of 2023, the 9th busiest airport in the world.]

Chicago’s real estate portfolio is massive. It includes 98 fire stations, 81 library locations, 25 police stations and two of the largest water treatment plants on the planet — in all, more than 400 municipal buildings.

It takes approximately 700,000 megawatt hours per year to keep the wheels turning in the third largest city in the country. Beginning Jan. 1, every single one of them will come solely from clean, renewable energy, mostly sourced from Illinois’ newest and largest solar farm. The move is projected to cut the Windy City’s carbon footprint by approximately 290,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide each year, the equivalent of taking 62,000 cars off the road, the city said.

Chicago is one of several cities across the country that are not only shaking up their energy mix but also taking advantage of their bulk-buying power to spur new clean energy development.

The city — and much of Illinois — already has one of the cleanest energy mixes in the country, with over 50% of the state’s electricity coming from nuclear power. But while nuclear energy is considered “clean,” carbon-free energy, it is not considered renewable.

Chicago’s move toward renewable energy has been years in the making. The goal of sourcing the city’s energy purely from renewable sources was first established by Mayor Rahm Emanuel in 2017. In 2022, Mayor Lori Lightfoot struck a deal with electricity supplier Constellation to purchase renewable energy from developer Swift Current Energy for the city, beginning in 2025.

Swift Current began construction on the 3,800-acre, 593-megawatt solar farm in central Illinois as part of the same five-year, $422 million agreement. Straddling two counties in central Illinois, the Double Black Diamond Solar project is now the largest solar installation east of the Mississippi River. It can produce enough electricity to power more than 100,000 homes, according to Swift Current’s vice president of origination, Caroline Mann.

Chicago alone has agreed to purchase approximately half the installation’s total output, which will cover about 70 percent of its municipal electricity needs. City officials plan to cover the remaining 30 percent through the purchase of renewable energy credits.

���That’s really a feature and not a bug of our plan,” said deputy chief sustainability officer Jared Policicchio. He added that he hopes the built-in market will help encourage additional clean energy development locally, albeit on a much smaller scale: “Our goal over the next several years is that we reach a point where we’re not buying renewable energy credits.”

Los Angeles, Houston, Seattle, Orlando, Florida, and more than 700 other U.S. cities and towns have signed similar purchasing agreements since 2015, according to a 2022 study from World Resources Institute, but none of their plans mandate nearly as much new renewable energy production as Chicago’s.

“Part of Chicago’s goal was what’s called additionality, bringing new resources into the market and onto the grid here,” said Popkin. “They were the largest municipal deal to do this.”

Chicago also secured a $400,000 annual commitment from Constellation and Swift Current for clean energy workforce training, including training via Chicago Women in Trades, a nonprofit aiming to increase the number of women in union construction and manufacturing jobs.

The economic benefits extend past the city’s limits: According to Swift Current, approximately $100 million in new tax revenue is projected to flow into Sangamon County and Morgan County, which are home to the Double Black Diamond Solar site, over the project’s operational life.

“Cities and other local governments just don’t appreciate their ability to not just support their residents but also shape markets,” said Popkin. “Chicago is demonstrating directly how cities can lead by example, implement ambitious goals amidst evolving state and federal policy changes, and leverage their purchasing power to support a more equitable renewable energy future.” ...

Chicago will meet its goal of transitioning all its municipal buildings to renewable energy by 2025, the first step in a broader goal to source energy for all buildings in the city from renewables by 2035 — making it the largest city in the country to do so, according to the Sierra Club.

With the incoming Trump administration promising to decrease federal support for decarbonizing the economy, Dane says it will be increasingly important for cities, towns and states to drive their own efforts to reduce emissions, build greener economies and meet local climate goals. He says moves like Chicago’s prove that they are capable.

“That is an imperative thing to know, that state, city, county action is a durable pathway, even under the next administration, and [it] needs to happen,” said Dane. “The juice is definitely still worth the squeeze.”

-via WBEZ, December 24, 2024

[worldwatcher3072]

The Need for a Global Standard:

Achieving True Globalization

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the concept of globalization has become more important than ever. But is our current approach to globalization really working? The reality is that without a global standard, there will always be a power struggle between nations, and the most vulnerable populations will continue to suffer.

One of the main issues with globalization is that there is no universal standard for labor rights and environmental protections. As a result, multinational corporations are able to exploit cheap labor and disregard environmental regulations in countries with weak protections. This leads to a race to the bottom, where countries compete to attract foreign investment by offering the lowest labor and environmental standards. The result is that workers and the environment suffer, while multinational corporations reap the profits.

The solution to this problem is clear: we need a global standard for labor rights and environmental protections. This would ensure that all workers are treated fairly and that the environment is protected, regardless of where in the world they live. It would also level the playing field for businesses, as all companies would be subject to the same standards. This would encourage businesses to compete on innovation and quality, rather than on the exploitation of workers and the environment.

Of course, achieving a global standard will not be easy. It will require cooperation between nations and a willingness to put the needs of people and the planet above the interests of corporations. But it is a necessary step if we are to achieve true globalization that benefits everyone.

In the meantime, there are steps that can be taken to move us in the right direction. This includes supporting fair trade agreements that prioritize labor rights and environmental protections, as well as pressuring corporations to uphold ethical standards in their operations.

Ultimately, the success of globalization will depend on our ability to work together to create a more just and equitable world. By adopting a global standard for labor rights and environmental protections, we can ensure that the benefits of globalization are shared by all, rather than just a select few.

[axioscreditbank]

Letter of credit (LC) & Standby Letter of credit (SBLC) are both the most popular, & reliable trade finance instruments used by global importers & exporters in international trade to reduce the risk of payment failure & to ensure financial stability.

A Letter of credit is a primary method of payment, while Standby LC is used when there’s a risk of buyer’s non-performance during a transaction. So, what is the difference between an LC and SBLC? Let’s check out:

Letter of Credit Vs Standby Letter of Credit

Both the letter of credit (LC), and the Standby letter of credit (SBLC) are payment guarantee instruments used in international trade. In this article, we’ve discussed the key differences and usage between LC and SBLC. Take a look:

What is a Letter of Credit?

Under a letter of credit service, the issuing bank guarantees an on-time & full-fledged payment to an exporter on behalf of its client ie. importer for the ordered goods or services. But in the event, if the importer defaults in payment or is unable to fulfill the terms & conditions of the LC contract, then, the issuing bank will compensate the beneficiary ie. the exporter.

The role of the issuing bank is to make sure that the buyer pays on time and the agreement goes as planned catering to all the T&Cs being followed by both parties.

What is a Standby Letter of Credit?

On the other hand, a Standby letter of credit is a secondary payment method where the issuing bank acts as a guarantor for an on-time payment to the exporter. But the payment under SBLC will be made only when a buyer defaults in making the payment.

In other words, a Standby LC comes into action when the buyer doesn’t make the payment to the seller. As long as the seller meets the terms & conditions of the Standby LC agreement, they’re entitled to receive compensation from the issuing bank.

Standby LC V/s Letter of Credit

Both Letters of Credit and Standby LCs are issued by a legal institution like a Bank or private financial institution at the request of their applicant ie. buyer to ensure on-time payment to the exporters for the ordered goods & services.

Take a look at the key differences between LC and SBLC:

1. Definition

A letter of credit provides a legal guarantee to the exporters that they will be paid by the importers on time. On the other hand, a Standby Letter of credit assures sellers of timely payments only if the buyer defaults or is unable to fulfill the T&C of the contract.

2. Requirements of Issuing Bank

Under a letter of credit service, the issuing bank verifies the credibility and credit scores of the buyer to ensure their payment capabilities before granting them an LC. Moreover, there are usually cases when a buyer requests an LC from his bank in exchange for which the bank charges a certain fee. As such, the buyer may present his inability to pay which leads to insecurities in LC.

On the other hand, a Standby letter of credit brings an obligation for the bank, therefore the bank asks for collateral in the form of security before issuing an SBLC.

3. Mode of Transaction

A letter of credit is a primary mode of payment transaction while a Standby letter of credit acts as a secondary mode of payment.

The ultimate goal of a letter of credit is to complete the transactions by following all the T&Cs of the LC contract. In contrast, a Standby LC is a secondary mode of payment which makes sure that the buyer pays the seller.

5. Nature of Instrument

A letter of credit is an instrument of payment while a Standby letter of credit is used as a backup method to ensure that the buyer pays on time.

6. Time Period

A letter of credit is a short-time instrument where the expiry depends on the goods received by the buyer (LC at Sight) or generally 90 days (Usance LC). On the other hand, a Standby LC is a long-term instrument where the validity is usually one year or mentioned within the terms of the instruments.

7. Geographical Scope

A letter of credit service is generally used by global traders in international transactions to mitigate payment risks. In contrast, an SBLC is often used in international trade but it is also frequently used in domestic transactions.

Apart from the bank’s charges, a Standby letter of credit is more expensive than a letter of credit. The fees for getting an SBLC issued range from 1% to 10% of the amount covered while in the case of LC, it ranges from 0.75% to 1.50% of the amount covered.

Now you know that both LCs and SBLCs are the most extensive trade finance instruments used in international transactions as well as domestic ones. Their issuance depends on the nature of the transaction and the requirements of the parties to the contract.

Originally published at https://www.axioscreditbank.com.

[communist-ojou-sama]

Given the preponderance of annoying interactions I'm having on this website lately I guess I will have to be the one to write a short note on the basics of Marxism that "Marxists" on this website do not understand.

The real world is not a puzzle-box, it is not a morality play, revolutionary or otherwise, it is not a supplement to a textbook.

Contrary to what your conservative parents told you, Marxism is not simply taking certain ideas, like the LTV or DotP or surplus-value extortion and extolling them as a catechism and demanding that the whole world conform to your one-size-fits-all theory of socialist development and revolution.

In fact, this impulse is called "dogmatism" by Lenin and Mao, and is thoroughly critiqued by them in many lengthy polemics.

Marxism is a social science that applies the framework of dialectical materialism to macroscopic social bodies, such as entire nations or international relations, in order to analyze the primary and secondary conditions that characterize the situation facing ones entire nation, or the world at large. If you lack basic historical and declarative knowledge about the a specific relationship within a society, or about a specific relationship between one country and several others, you Can Not apply the writings of Marx or Lenin in a general sense, to what that relationship Looks Like to you, and then write it off without further investigation. This kind of lazy behavior is EXACTLY what Mao is describing as "speaking nonsense" in the famous passage from Oppose Book Worship

You read Marx, Lenin, and Mao? Good for you. Now you can start really studying. Now read Nkrumah. Read Césaire. Read the analyses of actual 20th global south academics about neocolonialism and neoimperialism, and above all read actual analyses and text of the trade agreements youre getting worked up about, and develop the basic competency in economics to really understand the specific economic character of neo-imperialist extraction.

If you fail to do these things, if you fail to learn about the specifics, then all you will ever be able to do is talk nonsense.

[sayruq]

Al Jazeera has obtained a copy of the Gaza ceasefire proposal that Hamas said it accepted on Monday. The deal, which was put forward by Egypt and Qatar, would come in three stages that would see an initial halt in the fighting leading to lasting calm and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Palestinian territory. The proposed agreement would also ensure the release of Israeli captives in Gaza as well as an unspecified number of Palestinians held in Israeli jails. Israel has said that it does not agree to the proposal but that it will engage in further talks to secure an agreement – all while pushing on with its assault on Gaza. Meanwhile, the United States, which is also involved in the negotiations, said it is reviewing the Hamas response. The basic principles for an agreement between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side in Gaza on the exchange of captives and prisoners between them and the return of sustainable calm. The framework agreement aims at: The release of all Israeli captives in the Gaza Strip, civilians or military, alive or otherwise, from all periods, in exchange for a number of prisoners held by Israel as agreed upon, and a return to a sustainable calm that leads to a permanent ceasefire and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip, its reconstruction and the lifting of the siege. The framework agreement consists of three related and interconnected stages, which are as follows: The first stage (42 days) [Herein] a temporary cessation of military operations between the two parties, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces eastward and away from densely populated areas to a defined area along the border all along the Gaza Strip (including Wadi Gaza, known as the Netzarim Corridor, and Kuwait Roundabout, as below). All aviation (military and reconnaissance) in the Gaza Strip shall cease for 10 hours a day, and for 12 hours on the days when captives and prisoners are being exchanged. Internally displaced people in Gaza shall return to their areas of residence and Israel shall withdraw from Wadi Gaza, the Netzarim corridor, and the Kuwait Roundabout: On the third day (after the release of three captives), Israeli forces are to withdraw completely from al-Rashid Street in the east to Salah al-Din Street, and dismantle military sites and installations in this area. Displaced persons (unarmed) shall return to their areas of residence and all residents of Gaza shall be allowed freedom of movement in all parts of the Strip. Humanitarian aid shall be allowed in via al-Rashid Street from the first day without any obstacles. On the 22nd day (after the release of half the living civilian captives in Gaza, including female soldiers), Israeli forces are to withdraw from the centre of the Gaza Strip (especially the Netzarim/Martyrs Corridor and the Kuwait Roundabout axis), from the east of Salah al-Din Street to a zone along the border, and all military sites and installations are to be completely dismantled. Displaced people shall be allowed to return to their places of residence in the north of Gaza, and all residents to have freedom of movement in all parts of the Gaza Strip. Humanitarian aid, relief materials and fuel (600 trucks a day, including 50 fuel trucks, and 300 trucks for the north) shall be allowed into Gaza in an intensive manner and in sufficient quantities from the first day. This is to include the fuel needed to operate the power station, restart trade, rehabilitate and operate hospitals, health centres and bakeries in all parts of the Gaza Strip, and operate equipment needed to remove rubble. This shall continue throughout all stages.

Exchange of captives and prisoners between the two sides: During the first phase, Hamas shall release 33 Israeli captives (alive or dead), including women (civilians and soldiers), children (under the age of 19 who are not soldiers), those over the age of 50, and the sick, in exchange for a number of prisoners in Israeli prisons and detention centres, according to the following [criteria]: Hamas shall release all living Israeli captives, including civilian women and children (under the age of 19 who are not soldiers). In return, Israel shall release 30 children and women for every Israeli detainee released, based on lists provided by Hamas, in order of detention. Hamas shall release all living Israeli captives (over the age of 50), the sick, and wounded civilians. In return, Israel shall release 30 elderly (over 50) and sick prisoners for every Israeli captive, based on lists provided by Hamas, in order of detention. Hamas shall release all living Israeli female soldiers. In return, Israel shall release 50 prisoners (30 serving life sentences, 20 sentenced) for every Israeli female soldier, based on lists provided by Hamas.

The United Nations and its agencies, including UNRWA, and other international organisations, are to continue providing humanitarian services across the Gaza Strip. This shall continue throughout all stages of the agreement. Infrastructure (electricity, water, sewage, communications and roads) across the Gaza Strip shall be rehabilitated, and the equipment needed for civil defence allowed into Gaza to clear rubble and debris. This shall continue throughout all stages of the agreement. All necessary supplies and equipment to shelter displaced people who lost their homes during the war (a minimum of 60,000 temporary homes – caravans – and 200,000 tents) shall be allowed into Gaza. Throughout this phase, an agreed-upon number (not fewer than 50) of wounded military personnel will be allowed to travel through the Rafah crossing to receive medical treatment, and an increased number of travellers, sick and wounded, shall be allowed to leave through the Rafah crossing as restrictions on travellers are lifted. The movement of goods and trade will return without restrictions.

And that's just phase one. Read the rest of the article for the rest of the ceasefire proposal approved by Hamas.

[mesetacadre]

this might be a silly question, but. ive recently learned more about the devastating effects of sanctions on countries like cuba, dprk, or venezuela, and how much unnecessary suffering they cause among the population, especially when it comes to food or medicine shortages. but then bds also calls for sanctions against israel, and im wondering, is there any meaningful difference between that and the sanctions already imposed by the US on other countries? i feel a bit hypocritical when i argue against sanctions while at the same time supporting bds, i feel like they are very different situations with different outcomes but i lack the understanding to really grasp how they are different, if that makes any sense

Sanctions are the systematic blockade of all or certain sectors of trade under military or economic threat by the sanctioner (mostly just the USA in recent history) to any potential agents who might try to ignore the sanction. These sanctions typically include things like medical supplies, food if the country is dependent on imports (like most countries who get sanctioned), electricity, fuel, both light and heavy industry, agricultural products and machines, the global financial system, and other such key sectors. These sanctions, overwhelmingly, only serve to impoverish the country, create undue suffering and political strife. This political strife/instability is usually the main goal of sanctions, to destabilize the target government. However, this political instability more often than not does not result in a magical restoration of "democracy" or "human rights", it usually leads the country down a path of further isolationism and political violence that only worsens its general situation. It also makes it much easier for factions like ISIS to gain popularity and support, since people are desperate. Sanctions are inhumane measures which only makes a country suffer for no good reason. The sanctioners know this, they don't care, and I'd wager that suffering is often the actual point of these sanctions. What has the 60 year old blockade achieved in Cuba? It has only caused pointless poverty, and the stated goal of the sanctions, which is to ultimately remove the communist government, has failed, is failing, and Cuba is managing to make due with what they have.

BDS call for sanctions mostly in regards to military equipment and related products/services, for NATO to stop aiding the genocide, or the banning of Israel from international events such as the olympics. No Israeli will ever go hungry because they no longer get European-made ordinance or because they don't get to participate in Eurovision. This is what BDS says in their Sanctions and governments campaign (which is behind two menus, this is also not the main focus of BDS, by far):

The BDS movement calls for sanctions against Israel, similar to the sanctions that were imposed against apartheid South Africa. These sanctions could include a military embargo, an end to economic links and the cutting of diplomatic ties. In the meantime, the BDS movement is calling for states to take steps to meet their legal obligations not to be complicit in the commission of particular Israeli crimes and not to provide recognition, aid or assistance that help Israel maintain its regime of settler colonialism, apartheid.. This includes, for example, the obligation for states to immediately end to all trade that sustains illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the suspension of free trade agreements and other bilateral agreements with Israel.

Notice the greater emphasis on military and diplomatic ties, and how economic/trade sanctions are only called for when it «sustains illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory». Sure, this will (if it is ever adopted by Israel's significant trade partners) cause some suffering for the poor illegal settlers who had just moved into their shiny new apartment blocks built atop acres of land that sustained the surrounding Palestinian villages. The mere existence of these settlements cause more suffering than any sanction could ever cause.

Calling for these sanctions against Israel, which again, don't even come from comparable agents, are both less harmful towards the total population of Israel, and occur in a completely different context. I'm not going to pretend I care about the wellbeing of settlers whose houses didn't even exist 10 years ago. If these sanctions ever do occur in a significant enough scale (dubious), and those settlers don't want to find themselves in a food desert because Carrefour closed all their stores in the west bank, they shouldn't have moved into land stolen from a people facing genocide in the first place. We're also wagering hypothetical and non-global suffering against the now more than 100,000 dead Palestinians in Gaza in the past year, not even counting those who died ever since the first Nakba.

Like BDS points out, these types of grassroots and targeted boycotts/sanctions worked in South Africa, and the white South Africans didn't even suffer that much. Wager these short-lived and targeted sanctions against these other half-century long sanctions sustained by the US' strongarm policy that have prevented basically anything from getting into Cuba or the DPRK.

While those two things are both called sanctions, they have radically different objectives, methods, range, timescale, and character. I can't reiterate this enough, the North Korean collective farmer and the Israeli settler in the west bank have nothing in common when it comes to their position. Only one of them is complicit in genocide through their own actions, only one of them has any degree of blame, and only one of their governments is actually doing anything that warrants any kind of international action. And again, the BDS strategy focuses much more on military sanctions. Let's also be practical for a second, and acknowledge that the US is never going to withdraw their support for Israel, and especially will never sanction Israel. Israel is simply never going to face the same kind of sanctions that Venezuela or Cuba are facing, nor with the same severity, nor with the same restrictions on products essential for life.