#EU accession negotiations

[demiurgeua]

Єврокомісія оприлюднила ключові висновки звіту щодо України на шляху до ЄС

Єврокомісія оприлюднила огляд висновків, які увійшли у щорічну доповідь 2023 року, щодо розширення ЄС у контексті подання Україною заявки на членство в Європейському Союзі. Європейська комісія рекомендувала державам ЄС розпочати переговори про вступ з Україною, але Київ повинен виконати частину ще не втілених реформ. Україна виконала понад 90% рекомендацій, висунутих ЄК разом із наданням Україні…

[harri-etvane]

The contrast in these pictures just rly got me today. 🥹💙💛

[mostlysignssomeportents]

“If buying isn’t owning, piracy isn’t stealing”

20 years ago, I got in a (friendly) public spat with Chris Anderson, who was then the editor in chief of Wired. I'd publicly noted my disappointment with glowing Wired reviews of DRM-encumbered digital devices, prompting Anderson to call me unrealistic for expecting the magazine to condemn gadgets for their DRM:

https://longtail.typepad.com/the_long_tail/2004/12/is_drm_evil.html

I replied in public, telling him that he'd misunderstood. This wasn't an issue of ideological purity – it was about good reviewing practice. Wired was telling readers to buy a product because it had features x, y and z, but at any time in the future, without warning, without recourse, the vendor could switch off any of those features:

https://memex.craphound.com/2004/12/29/cory-responds-to-wired-editor-on-drm/

I proposed that all Wired endorsements for DRM-encumbered products should come with this disclaimer:

WARNING: THIS DEVICE’S FEATURES ARE SUBJECT TO REVOCATION WITHOUT NOTICE, ACCORDING TO TERMS SET OUT IN SECRET NEGOTIATIONS. YOUR INVESTMENT IS CONTINGENT ON THE GOODWILL OF THE WORLD’S MOST PARANOID, TECHNOPHOBIC ENTERTAINMENT EXECS. THIS DEVICE AND DEVICES LIKE IT ARE TYPICALLY USED TO CHARGE YOU FOR THINGS YOU USED TO GET FOR FREE — BE SURE TO FACTOR IN THE PRICE OF BUYING ALL YOUR MEDIA OVER AND OVER AGAIN. AT NO TIME IN HISTORY HAS ANY ENTERTAINMENT COMPANY GOTTEN A SWEET DEAL LIKE THIS FROM THE ELECTRONICS PEOPLE, BUT THIS TIME THEY’RE GETTING A TOTAL WALK. HERE, PUT THIS IN YOUR MOUTH, IT’LL MUFFLE YOUR WHIMPERS.

Wired didn't take me up on this suggestion.

But I was right. The ability to change features, prices, and availability of things you've already paid for is a powerful temptation to corporations. Inkjet printers were always a sleazy business, but once these printers got directly connected to the internet, companies like HP started pushing out "security updates" that modified your printer to make it reject the third-party ink you'd paid for:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11/ink-stained-wretches-battle-soul-digital-freedom-taking-place-inside-your-printer

Now, this scam wouldn't work if you could just put things back the way they were before the "update," which is where the DRM comes in. A thicket of IP laws make reverse-engineering DRM-encumbered products into a felony. Combine always-on network access with indiscriminate criminalization of user modification, and the enshittification will follow, as surely as night follows day.

This is the root of all the right to repair shenanigans. Sure, companies withhold access to diagnostic codes and parts, but codes can be extracted and parts can be cloned. The real teeth in blocking repair comes from the law, not the tech. The company that makes McDonald's wildly unreliable McFlurry machines makes a fortune charging franchisees to fix these eternally broken appliances. When a third party threatened this racket by reverse-engineering the DRM that blocked independent repair, they got buried in legal threats:

https://pluralistic.net/2021/04/20/euthanize-rentier-enablers/#cold-war

Everybody loves this racket. In Poland, a team of security researchers at the OhMyHack conference just presented their teardown of the anti-repair features in NEWAG Impuls locomotives. NEWAG boobytrapped their trains to try and detect if they've been independently serviced, and to respond to any unauthorized repairs by bricking themselves:

https://mamot.fr/@q3k@hackerspace.pl/111528162905209453

Poland is part of the EU, meaning that they are required to uphold the provisions of the 2001 EU Copyright Directive, including Article 6, which bans this kind of reverse-engineering. The researchers are planning to present their work again at the Chaos Communications Congress in Hamburg this month – Germany is also a party to the EUCD. The threat to researchers from presenting this work is real – but so is the threat to conferences that host them:

https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/researchers-face-legal-threats-over-sdmi-hack/

20 years ago, Chris Anderson told me that it was unrealistic to expect tech companies to refuse demands for DRM from the entertainment companies whose media they hoped to play. My argument – then and now – was that any tech company that sells you a gadget that can have its features revoked is defrauding you. You're paying for x, y and z – and if they are contractually required to remove x and y on demand, they are selling you something that you can't rely on, without making that clear to you.

But it's worse than that. When a tech company designs a device for remote, irreversible, nonconsensual downgrades, they invite both external and internal parties to demand those downgrades. Like Pavel Chekov says, a phaser on the bridge in Act I is going to go off by Act III. Selling a product that can be remotely, irreversibly, nonconsensually downgraded inevitably results in the worst person at the product-planning meeting proposing to do so. The fact that there are no penalties for doing so makes it impossible for the better people in that meeting to win the ensuing argument, leading to the moral injury of seeing a product you care about reduced to a pile of shit:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/11/25/moral-injury/#enshittification

But even if everyone at that table is a swell egg who wouldn't dream of enshittifying the product, the existence of a remote, irreversible, nonconsensual downgrade feature makes the product vulnerable to external actors who will demand that it be used. Back in 2022, Adobe informed its customers that it had lost its deal to include Pantone colors in Photoshop, Illustrator and other "software as a service" packages. As a result, users would now have to start paying a monthly fee to see their own, completed images. Fail to pay the fee and all the Pantone-coded pixels in your artwork would just show up as black:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/10/28/fade-to-black/#trust-the-process

Adobe blamed this on Pantone, and there was lots of speculation about what had happened. Had Pantone jacked up its price to Adobe, so Adobe passed the price on to its users in the hopes of embarrassing Pantone? Who knows? Who can know? That's the point: you invested in Photoshop, you spent money and time creating images with it, but you have no way to know whether or how you'll be able to access those images in the future. Those terms can change at any time, and if you don't like it, you can go fuck yourself.

These companies are all run by CEOs who got their MBAs at Darth Vader University, where the first lesson is "I have altered the deal, pray I don't alter it further." Adobe chose to design its software so it would be vulnerable to this kind of demand, and then its customers paid for that choice. Sure, Pantone are dicks, but this is Adobe's fault. They stuck a KICK ME sign to your back, and Pantone obliged.

This keeps happening and it's gonna keep happening. Last week, Playstation owners who'd bought (or "bought") Warner TV shows got messages telling them that Warner had walked away from its deal to sell videos through the Playstation store, and so all the videos they'd paid for were going to be deleted forever. They wouldn't even get refunds (to be clear, refunds would also be bullshit – when I was a bookseller, I didn't get to break into your house and steal the books I'd sold you, not even if I left some cash on your kitchen table).

Sure, Warner is an unbelievably shitty company run by the single most guillotineable executive in all of Southern California, the loathsome David Zaslav, who oversaw the merger of Warner with Discovery. Zaslav is the creep who figured out that he could make more money cancelling completed movies and TV shows and taking a tax writeoff than he stood to make by releasing them:

https://aftermath.site/there-is-no-piracy-without-ownership

Imagine putting years of your life into making a program – showing up on set at 5AM and leaving your kids to get their own breakfast, performing stunts that could maim or kill you, working 16-hour days during the acute phase of the covid pandemic and driving home in the night, only to have this absolute turd of a man delete the program before anyone could see it, forever, to get a minor tax advantage. Talk about moral injury!

But without Sony's complicity in designing a remote, irreversible, nonconsensual downgrade feature into the Playstation, Zaslav's war on art and creative workers would be limited to material that hadn't been released yet. Thanks to Sony's awful choices, David Zaslav can break into your house, steal your movies – and he doesn't even have to leave a twenty on your kitchen table.

The point here – the point I made 20 years ago to Chris Anderson – is that this is the foreseeable, inevitable result of designing devices for remote, irreversible, nonconsensual downgrades. Anyone who was paying attention should have figured that out in the GW Bush administration. Anyone who does this today? Absolute flaming garbage.

Sure, Zaslav deserves to be staked out over an anthill and slathered in high-fructose corn syrup. But save the next anthill for the Sony exec who shipped a product that would let Zaslav come into your home and rob you. That piece of shit knew what they were doing and they did it anyway. Fuck them. Sideways. With a brick.

Meanwhile, the studios keep making the case for stealing movies rather than paying for them. As Tyler James Hill wrote: "If buying isn't owning, piracy isn't stealing":

https://bsky.app/profile/tylerjameshill.bsky.social/post/3kflw2lvam42n

If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/12/08/playstationed/#tyler-james-hill

Image: Alan Levine (modified) https://pxhere.com/en/photo/218986

CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

[gracklegirlie]

One thing I get asked a lot is "Why is always Ukraine with you?" and I'd like to answer that as best as can now.

For context I'm not Ukrainian. I'm American. But I have been closing following this war ever since the full scale invasion in 2022. People in my life have noticed it's a big thing for me know and my support for Ukriane has caused more than one... disagreement.

It's actually very simple. I don't have any high minded ideas about NATO or the EU.

I care because a nation and a culture are being destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people are dying and being injured because Russia won't fuck off.

Because in 2014 Russia waltzed in and annexed a piece of land roughly the size of BELGIUM, and they were sent night vision goggles and blankets by Obama.

Because Ukrainian children are being abducted, given Russian names, moved to Russian families and forced to speak Russian.

I care because there's a nation of people bleeding in the fields of their homeland RIGHT NOW in order to try and stop that madness. Trying to forge a better life for themselves and their children.

I don't care about Russia crying about NATO expansion, or their access to warm water ports or any of that bullshit because it's not Russias decision what happens to Ukriane and for that matter it's not the west's choice either. It's up to UKRIANE if they want to join NATO, or the EU. It's up to UKRIANE to negotiate UKRAINIAN Foreign and domestic policy without worrying what some tinpot dictator in Moscow thinks.

So people can sit there and ask "why is it always Ukraine with you" but then they turn around and talk about " america bad, something something Iraq war" but when ACTAUL IMPERIALIST AGRESSION happens right in front of you.... you don't give a shit because war and politics are messy and this situation doesn't give you the chance to feel good and "own the libs" or whatever side of the political bullshit spectrum you identify with.

Thanks for reading this vent post I guess.

Slava Ukraini

[mapsontheweb]

European Union, EEA and candidate states in July 2024

by DrNeutrino 

European Union (EU) contains 27 member states. There are 9 candidate states: Turkey (1999), North Macedonia (2005), Montenegro (2010), Serbia (2012), Albania (2014), Ukraine (2022), Moldova (2022), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2022) and Georgia (2023).

About states aspiring to join EU:

Kosovo is an applicant and recognised as potential candidate.

While Armenia is not officially neither an applicant nor a potential candidate, I have included it in the category, as the Armenian PM has stated that the country will apply to by fall 2024 and in 12 March vote at European Union it was confirmed that Armenia meets the requirements for applying.

Turkey’s accession negotiations were frozen in 2019 due to democratic backsliding. In 2023 EU rejected Turkey’s proposal to unfreeze the accession negotiations in exchange of letting Sweden accede to NATO.

The application of Ukraine and Moldova is in screening phase which is prerequisite to opening 35 acquis chapters.

North Macedonian application will proceed to opening acquis chapters once the country approves a constitutional amendment related to Bulgarian minority. Albanian application is tied to North Macedonia.

Georgia passed a foreign agent law on 14 May, which is viewed anti-democratic and contradicts the conditions for EU candidacy. Due to this, the accession process was suspended on 9 July and the money for accession assistance was frozen.

About states which are not aspiring to join:

Norway rejected membership in 1972 and 1994 referenda.

Iceland applied in 2009 and was on fast track for membership, but the application process was frozen after 2013 election and withdrawn in 2015. There has been discussion of referendum to resume application.

Switzerland applied to EU and EEA in 1992 but joining was rejected in a referendum on the same year. Instead Switzerland has bilateral treaties with EU.

United Kingdom joined EU in 1973 but membership was rejected in 2016 referendum, and UK withdrew in 2020.

EU has plans to reform before the next enlargement, which has a target year 2030.

[ayeforscotland]

Is it weird to say I think your grievances are correct but your solutions aren't?

Like agreed the UK is a shithole and getting shitholier by the day in a menagerie of ways but I don't think independence would fix any of that? For Scotland anyway.

Like Scotland is probably one of the best places to be in the UK rn but once it's out of the UK it won't be able to keep doing the things that achieve that (currency trade fiscal deficit etc). Plus you have the Maastricht issue.

Its a weird place to be. Objectively better than the UK at large but only so far as it's a part of it.

Idk why I'm sending this to a Scottish independence blog like this is going to radically shift your perception of the world but eh.

I hope you know how weird you sound claiming that Scotland is uniquely incapable of being an independent country when there are successfully countries out there with less population and less resources.

You can’t just rhyme off ‘Currency, trade, fiscal deficit’ as if those problems aren’t what every other country faces.

Will we have a currency? Yes. We’ll need an independent currency. Whether or not we join the Euro will be dictated by whether or not we choose to meet the requirements of ERM II. If we want to delay joining the Euro we can simply fail to meet the requirements.

Will we trade? Yes. Rejoining the EU will give us access to the largest trading bloc on the planet. Our ability to trade is currently hampered in the UK.

Will we have a huge fiscal deficit? The UK government would certainly like to think that, but this really all comes down to negotiation. Currently, Scotland is *assigned* a proportion of debt the UK Government borrows. It’s not an indication of the economic decisions of an independent Scottish government.

If the UK does want to Scotland to take on its share of UK national debt, then Scotland will be entitled to its share of UK national assets.

I’ve been doing this a long time. Your points aren’t new, it’s what unionists were saying back in 2014 and since then the UK government has committed economic and social vandalism on communities with Scotland spending hundreds of millions to mitigate bad UK government policy like the Bedroom Tax.

Yes, there’s a lot of facets to independence but the most important thing for me is having the responsibility to make decisions for ourselves.

[mariacallous]

In this 2024 “super election year,” a common concern across Europe and the United States has been the growing popularity and electoral successes of far-right movements and narratives. Though right-wing parties exhibit clear distinctions in different countries, they echo each other strongly in their nationalist orientation, their softness on Russia—and skepticism toward support for Ukraine—and their harsh anti-immigration stance. In the European Union (EU), one election after another has demonstrated the centrality of irregular migration and border security in public discussions and forced mainstream parties to take more restrictive approaches to calm fear and anxiety fueled by xenophobic, far-right rhetoric. The conflation between regular and irregular migration has also severely distorted the debate.

The results of the European Parliament election, France’s snap election, three German state elections, and the Austrian election all showed a strong rightward drift and signaled voters’ distrust in their national governments, confirming the notable shift in tone on migration in Europe toward a more securitized, hardline approach, even among mainstream parties. A look at the numbers indeed reveals a challenging situation as the European Union faces its highest number of asylum applications since 2016, which is straining resources for processing, accommodation, service provision, and thus integration.

In the aftermath of Europe’s so-called “refugee crisis” or “migrant crisis,” which began in 2015, EU member states tried and failed repeatedly to rethink and renew the union’s common policy, until a breakthrough this summer concluded the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. In the interim years, however, national governments made separate plans, implementing ad hoc measures to fortify their borders, restricting access to their asylum systems, and negotiating deals with non-EU states to limit movement.

This patchwork of policies did little to deter an increasing number of displaced persons worldwide from heading toward Europe in search of safety. It did, however, create divisions within and between member states, thus impeding progress on effective EU-wide responses. This political incoherence, together with fluctuating irregular arrivals, has since been exploited by populist parties, who propagate the sense that governments have lost control over their sovereignty and can no longer protect their populations.

To provide a better understanding of the complex situation Europe finds itself in today, this explainer aims to clarify the EU’s role in migration and asylum policy, why the issue became so controversial, how to understand recent developments in the migration space, and what opportunities the new pact offers.

How does migration and asylum policy in Europe work?

The free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons has been a fundamental pillar of the European idea, as enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome that founded the political and economic community that today constitutes the European Union. Within the EU, national borders became almost fully invisible with the creation of the Schengen Area in 1995, which today includes 25 EU member states and four non-EU countries, collectively home to more than 450 million people.

When it comes to regular migration, the law stipulates that the EU has the authority to establish the conditions for entry and legal residence in member states, “including for family-reunification purposes, applicable to nationals of non-EU countries. Member States retain the right to set quotas for admitting individuals from non-EU countries seeking employment.” The fight against irregular immigration requires the EU to implement “an effective returns policy, in a manner consistent with fundamental rights.”

The EU’s Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was established in 1999 to enhance coordination across member states and streamline systems for processing asylum claims and supporting refugees granted protection. More specifically, the “Dublin Regulation” governs relations among member states and manifests that the country of an individual’s first arrival in the EU is responsible for asylum processing and refugee reception. For years, the Schengen regulation of free movement has made the Dublin system difficult to administer, as it unintentionally permitted asylum seekers to self-select destination countries—often based on linguistic abilities, families, perceived hospitality, and benefits. It has also placed disproportionate obligations on EU border countries at the forefront of irregular movements to Europe, particularly in the Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, and Spain) and the Balkans (Hungary, Croatia, and Bulgaria). Finally, a lack of enforcement to relocate applicants in instances of violation has sustained pressure on more “popular” destination countries and undermined authorities’ credibility.

Before this year’s overhaul of common EU policy, as reflected in the agreement on the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum—more on that below—member states at the national level and EU leadership implemented incremental measures to deter irregular arrivals. While some actions temporarily led to decreases in arrivals in certain member states, however, they failed to address the underlying drivers of displacement.

Most notable have been a series of EU deals with third countries in Europe’s neighborhood to improve border management and halt irregular departures toward the EU, in exchange for the provision of financial support. A 2016 agreement with Turkey became a model for future EU deals with North African and Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon, Egypt, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Italy, on its own, concluded a memorandum of understanding with Libya in 2017, which pledged millions of euros in assistance to enhance the maritime surveillance capacities of the Libyan Coast Guard. In exchange, Libyan authorities would prevent people from departing the Northern African country and intercept irregular migrants at sea to return and detain them in Libya. Yet these “migration partnerships” have been severely criticized by humanitarian groups and lawmakers alike, who express concerns about how the policy legitimizes and increases Europe’s dependency on autocratic regimes, disregards human rights, and threatens migrants’ physical safety. A recent investigative report by The Washington Post and Lighthouse Reports further revealed that local authorities, aided by EU funding and equipment, have violated human rights and asylum law. Several research studies have further criticized the migration deals’ lack of effectiveness.

Why is migration so controversial?

When over 1.2 million people entered the EU in 2015 to claim asylum under international law, most of whom were Syrian refugees fleeing civil war, the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation quickly proved dysfunctional and ineffective in absorbing the shock to European processing and integration systems. The situation sparked tensions among frontline countries—which were challenged by the arrival of 1,216,860 and 1,166,815 asylum seekers at their borders in 2015 and 2016, respectively—and countries further inward, which in many cases resisted migrant transfers to share responsibility and restricted access to their asylum systems under fear of adverse domestic consequences. Municipalities in major destination countries were overwhelmed by the speed and scale of arrivals and faced difficulties mustering enough resources for housing, financial support, and integration of newcomers in their local communities.

Despite agreements by the European Council to relocate up to 160,000 asylum seekers from frontline countries Italy and Greece to other member states to reduce pressures on the Italian and Greek asylum systems, fewer than 12,000 relocations were realized by the end of 2016. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, for instance, refused orders from Brussels to take in 1,294 asylum seekers and instead organized a national referendum on whether the EU should have the authority to “mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary,” which he used to validate his harsh domestic anti-immigrant approach. Stoking fears of a Muslim “invasion” and claiming his country was the “last Christian-conservative bastion of the Western world,” Orbán’s approach also included the construction of fences at Hungary’s southern borders, changing asylum laws to speed up processing and reduce protections, and introducing “transit zones” at Hungary’s border with Serbia, which have been condemned as “container prisons” surrounded by barbed wires.

In stark contrast, German Chancellor Angela Merkel valiantly declared “Wir schaffen das!” (“We can do it!”) and decided to keep her country’s borders open, leading to the arrival of around 1.2 million asylum seekers in Germany between 2015 and 2016. The real pressure on municipalities and the sense of chaos and disorder, however, benefitted the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD), which entered the federal parliament for the first time in 2017 and became the largest opposition party.

Over the years, asylum seekers have become convenient scapegoats for disillusioned and frustrated Europeans who have seen their societies change and economies tumble because of successive external shocks, from climate change and a global health crisis to rapid technological change and a disruption of Europe’s decades-old security order. In this time of great uncertainty, a rights-based vision of migration and asylum has become a perceived political vulnerability, replaced with a security approach stressing law and order.

In a 2021 effort led by Marine Le Pen, the head of France’s National Rally party, 16 right-wing parties from across Europe—including the governing parties of Hungary, Italy, and Poland at the time—declared their opposition to a “European Superstate” allegedly being created by “radical forces” within the EU. They objected to a perceived “cultural, religious transformation and ultimately nationless construction of Europe” and instead pressed for “respect for the culture and history of European states” and “respect for Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage.” Uniting diverse national political actors, their communique demonstrates the focus on national identity and Christian values that the far right has portrayed as being under threat because of the EU’s migration policy. Hence, the EU finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place: its policy is weaponized by right-wing populists as too weak, and it is denounced by nongovernmental organizations and observers as not respecting its own values.

How does the new Pact on Migration and Asylum address prior shortcomings?

A sound European policy that attempts to better manage the drivers of irregular migration in countries of origin and centers on the collaboration of all EU member states is needed to handle rising global displacement trends. The passage of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024 offers a chance to transform the EU’s current governing framework if implemented effectively by the time the new legislation takes force in 2026. It represents the first major agreement on migration and asylum policy in over a decade, intended to accelerate procedures and enhance cooperation and solidarity between member states.

Framed by the European Commission as a “fair and firm” approach, the new legislation consists of 10 major reform proposals that cement Europe’s policy shift to fortify borders, enhance scrutiny in asylum processing, double down on deporting rejected applicants, and partner with non-EU states of origin and transit to limit irregular arrivals. A key aspect is a new accelerated procedure for asylum applicants from countries with a low recognition rate, whose probability of getting their asylum application request granted is low. The mechanism will take a maximum of 12 weeks (about three months) and permits fast-track processing at EU external borders, during which migrants, including families and children, will stay in collective detention-like facilities. Further, the pact aims to correct the failures of the Dublin Regulation through a new solidarity system, which obliges all member states to share responsibility, either by receiving up to 30,000 asylum applicants per year, paying a fee of 20,000 euros per asylum applicant to assist hosting countries or contributing other resources.

Critics have pointed out, however, that the focus on securitizing EU borders as opposed to addressing humanitarian implications is unlikely to reduce arrival numbers and increases the risks of human rights violations. The European Union must satisfy its obligations under international law to ensure fast-track processing facilities satisfy human rights standards and that all asylum claims are evaluated fairly, as required by the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. These principles should apply equally to EU-funded migration management projects in Europe’s neighborhood.

As the European Union enters a new governing cycle—following the European Parliament election in June and with a new college of commissioners later this fall—it has an opportunity to prioritize a new common migration and asylum policy and take functional steps to achieve a more balanced and orderly system among member states, which provides for the dignity, safety, and rights of those seeking international protection. The number of displaced people globally has increased consistently over the past 12 years and is expected to have exceeded 120 million persons in 2024. However, it is imperative to remember that 75% of displaced persons remain in low- and middle-income countries in the “Global South,” which often struggle with political, economic, and social insecurity themselves. As war continues in Ukraine, conflicts escalate in the Middle East, political instability grows across sub-Saharan Africa, and the secondary effects of climate change jeopardize people’s lives and livelihoods, the EU will be forced to grapple with irregular migration for the foreseeable future.

The nationalities of first-time asylum applicants in the European Union in recent years demonstrate the global nature of migration today. In 2023, for instance, Syrians (183,250), Afghans (100,985), Turks (89,985), Venezuelans (67,085), and Colombians (62,015) represented the five largest nationalities among first-time asylum applicants in the EU. Certainly, contemporary migration flows to Europe are mixed and not all persons applying for asylum fall into the protected categories of the Geneva Convention.

It is also true, however, that many EU countries are changing demographically as birth rates fall across developed economies and are experiencing severe shortages of workers across professional and blue-collar sectors, threatening future social and economic vitality and stability. Immigration, therefore, offers an enormous benefit for Europe to counteract downward demographic and economic trends. Beyond the pact, leaders should dedicate greater efforts to expand legal pathways at the national level for people not considered refugees under international law, but who desperately seek greater economic opportunity and are eager to contribute meaningfully to host societies.

Recent political developments in the European migration space

The yearslong EU effort to agree to a set of clear, cohesive policies as represented by the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, however, appears to be undercut by a recent shift in tone on migration across the bloc. National, xenophobic rhetoric is no longer contained to the fringes of the political spectrum across the European Union. Anti-immigrant sentiment today features dominantly in public debates, after years of far-right populists amplifying cultural anxieties and accusing governments of having lost control of their sovereign borders. Right-wing leaders, from Hungary’s “illiberal democrat” Viktor Orbán to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party has its roots in a 20th-century fascist movement, have increasingly shaped the direction at the EU level toward a more restrictive approach focused on border security and a defense of European culture and values.  

Recent electoral outcomes across the EU revealing strong support for far-right parties have sent shockwaves across the continent. Following June’s European Parliament election, parties to the right of the European People’s Party—the center-right Christian Democrats—now hold over one-quarter of seats in the EU’s lower legislature (187 out of 720). The vote produced a snap election in France, from which a center-left coalition barely emerged ahead of the far right. In Germany, the extremist AfD emerged from the European vote as the second strongest party, ahead of all three governing coalition parties. In three recent regional elections in eastern Germany, the AfD and the Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht—a new party on the extreme left founded in January 2024 that has also adopted a harsh anti-immigration stance—fanned the flames of fear and xenophobia and soared to a combined 42%-49%, both landing among the top three strongest parties in each state. Finally, Austria’s September election saw the far-right Freedom Party become as the strongest new parliamentary grouping, whose campaign included promises of “remigration” as part of a larger theme to create a “Fortress Austria.”

In response to these volatile political trends, member states—including many led by centrist governments—are once again turning to reactive, unilateral measures to contain the far right by way of a more restrictive stance on migration and asylum.

Most notably, Germany’s center-left government has drastically shifted its tone on combating irregular migration and enhancing domestic security after two fatal knife assaults occurred in Germany this summer, whose perpetrators turned out to be foreign nationals. In a stark break with Merkel’s hopeful and humanitarian spirit, the government expanded temporary controls to include all German borders—defying the Schengen regulation—imposed stricter rules on benefits and protected status for asylum seekers, and even began deportations of convicted Afghans to Afghanistan. Not only are these actions inconsistent with the principle of EU solidarity and grounds for heightened tensions with Germany’s neighbors, but the German police union has deemed the border checks largely ineffective, particularly as people claiming asylum can still enter.

Emboldened by the German turn on the issue, Orbán most recently threatened to send buses of migrants to Brussels—copying his conservative MAGA friends in the United States. The new French government, led by Prime Minister Michel Barnier, has also vowed to crack down on irregular entries and strengthen controls at France’s borders. In Poland, Prime Minister and former President of the European Council Donald Tusk announced a temporary suspension of the right to seek asylum for irregular migrants entering through the Polish-Belarusian border, claiming that Russia and Belarus were “weaponizing” migrants in attempts to destabilize the EU. The policy could violate the right to non-refoulement—which protects individuals from being returned to a country under international human rights law—and set a perilous precedent for other member states trying to restrict irregular entries.

In a novel move, Meloni concluded a new “partnership” with Albania—a non-EU country—under which Italy will send up to 36,000 asylum applicants per year to process their claims externally. Though the policy only applies to adult male individuals intercepted in international waters prior to arrival at Italian shores, several attempted transfers of migrants to Albanian processing centers have already been invalidated by an Italian court. Together with six other EU countries, Meloni has also tried to advance normalization with the Assad regime in Syria, in part to reconsider the possibility of returning Syrian refugees to the war-torn country.

At the October 2024 European Council summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, and leaders of EU member states gathered to discuss a full agenda of topics in which migration featured prominently. In a letter setting the tone for the summit, von der Leyen stressed to European leaders the centrality of expanding third-country partnerships like those concluded with Turkey and countries in North Africa and the Middle East, to improve processes of return and counter the “weaponization” of migrants by Russia, Belarus, and others attempting to instigate political instability in Europe. During the meetings, the agreement between Italy and Albania was lauded as a model for the EU to emulate, confirming the shift toward externalization that has gained traction in Europe.

Notably absent from the summit communique was any mention of the new common EU Pact on Migration and Asylum or strategies for its timely and comprehensive implementation. The recent uncoordinated measures by EU members and their preoccupation with “weaponization,” third-country deals, and “return hubs” at the EU level are unlikely to provide the sense of reassurance, cohesion, and opportunity that people expect of their national and European leaders.

[dostoyevsky-official]

Zelensky’s ‘victory plan’ is unlikely to impress Europe

After confidentially briefing it around various Western capitals, President Zelelsnky has unveiled – to a degree – his much-trailed ‘victory plan’ to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. Along with three additional secret codicils shared only with certain partners, the plan has five main points. In and of themselves, none of them are implausible, and all would certainly strengthen Ukraine’s security. However, they also embody certain assumptions that likely make them unworkable, simply because they are asking from Nato, the EU and the West in general a great deal more than they seem willing to offer. The first is an immediate and unconditional invitation to join Nato. Zelensky is realistic enough to appreciate that actual membership will have to come later, but feels this would be a mark of resolve that would somehow change the situation. But how? Even if one assumes Ukraine already meets all the accession criteria (which some question) and that all existing Nato members agree (which is even more dubious), how does the promise of membership deter Putin? After all, he already believes Ukraine is essentially Nato’s proxy. [...] Zelensky presents this as a ‘bridge’ to peace negotiations, but peace through strength by ensuring ‘that the madmen in the Kremlin will lose the ability to continue the war’. There is a flat rejection of the kind of deal trading territory for peace that, behind closed doors, is increasingly being discussed in the West. Instead, frankly, it is a challenge – not to Moscow but to Ukraine’s own allies. ‘This plan can be implemented,’ Zelensky told the Ukrainian parliament. ‘It depends on the partners… it certainly does not depend on Russia.’ Well, maybe, although in war the enemy always gets a vote in practice. (And if, as Zelensky claims, ‘Putin is insane and only wants war,’ then the corollary of that rather sweeping statement would seem to be that no deterrence can ever be enough.) More to the point, it does indeed depend on the partners. Zelensky wants unconditional guarantees of Nato and EU membership, he wants more and better weapons without any constraints on their use, he wants investment in Ukraine’s defence industries and national resources, and he wants a ‘strategic deterrent package’ – whatever that may be – that would presumably be largely delivered by Nato and would thus be considered by Putin as the expansion of hostile Western security architecture. This may well be what Ukraine needs, and Zelensky certainly doesn’t lack for chutzpah in presenting such an extensive shopping list. It is hard to see that Ukraine will get it, though. Expect warm words, ringing declarations, token one-off weapons deliveries, and promises of detailed consultations instead.

[tomorrowusa]

Russia started its unprovoked full scale invasion of Ukraine 864 days ago. Putin knows he cannot win the war but he continues it despite enormous losses of Russian military personnel and equipment. And he certainly hasn't done anything for Russia's reputation as a competent military power.

If these sorts of losses don't do anything to make Russia change course, it's time to seize Russian assets and use them to defend and rebuild Ukraine. But there's some reluctance to do so in some countries.

The biggest slice of the pie is Russian state assets (reserves of the Russian Central Bank, Russia’s central financial institution) – approximately $300 billion. They’ve been frozen in banking institutions across the G7 countries. So why are these assets parked there in the first place? At the time of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia kept some assets in money and securities abroad in reliable banks, scooping up foreign currency. The lion’s share of these assets, €192 billion, is held in Euroclear, a financial institution headquartered in Brussels specializing in the safekeeping and settlement of securities. The rest of the assets’ exact size and location are a bit of a mystery since that information is classified, but it’s a safe bet that a hefty chunk is in the USA.

The USA, you say? Now that the US Supreme Court has given presidents immunity, Biden should just scoop up all that Russian loot and put it into an account which Ukraine could draw from for its national security and reconstruction. 😉

Our G7 partners are a bit more skittish about seizing Russian assets. This is what happens when certain countries become too dependent on Russian fossil fuels and other trade with Russia.

One big step forward to the confiscation of these funds was the US passing the REPO (Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians) Act on 23 April 2024. While successfully implementing it depends on further actions and certifications, the REPO Act lays out a legal mechanism for asset confiscation, gives the President the power to start the confiscation process, and allows for coordination with G7 countries, the EU, and other partners. It could potentially give Ukraine access to several billions of Russian sovereign assets located in the US. However, the G7 did not follow the US’s lead. Instead, on 3 May 2024, the Financial Times reported that the G7 was no longer considering a full confiscation of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine, with an official saying that these assets could be used as leverage in potential peace negotiations with Russia. This stance fails to recognize Russia’s true objectives and the pointlessness of using these assets as a bargaining chip, given Russia’s continued escalation of aggression and substantial revenues from fossil fuel exports.

On a slightly different note, the change in government in the UK will make no difference regarding support for Ukraine. It's one area where Labour and the Conservatives see eye to eye. Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited President Zelenskyy in Kyiv last year.

Sir Keir spoke with President Zelenskyy on Friday – his first day in office.

Zelenskyy had a conversation with the new British Prime Minister: an unprecedented agreement was discussed

[coochiequeens]

About time that forced marriage, illegal adoption and surrogacy is recognized for what it is, human trafficking

by Matthew Vella 24 January 2024

MEP negotiators and the Council have reached a provisional agreement to add forced marriage, illegal adoption and surrogacy as types of exploitation covered by the EU’s anti-trafficking law.

The update of the directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings will now require EU countries to make sure that people knowingly using services provided by victims of trafficking, can face sanctions.

In 2011, the EU adopted a directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting the victims of this crime, setting minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions.

According to European Commission data, sexual and labour exploitation are the main purposes of trafficking in human beings. However, begging or organ removal – already explicitly mentioned in the 2011 directive – and forced marriage and illegal adoption – which are not explicitly mentioned – now represent 11% of all victims in the EU in 2020.

The provisional agreement will be submitted to member state representatives in the Council for confirmation, and be formally adopted by both the Council and the EP.

The agreement foresees that member states must make it a criminal offence if a person who uses the service provided by a trafficking victim knows that the person is a victim of trafficking. In such cases, member states need to ensure that this offence is punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.

Under the current law member states should only consider making the use of services of persons exploited by human traffickers a criminal offence.

Council and European Parliament negotiators agreed to explicitly mention in the directive that the exploitation of surrogacy, forced marriage and illegal adoption are types of exploitation which fall under the scope of the definition of trafficking. The trafficking for the exploitation of surrogacy, which is when a woman agrees to deliver a child on behalf of another person or couple to become the child’s parent(s) after birth, will target those who coerce or deceive women into acting as surrogate mothers.

Including these forms of trafficking in the EU anti-trafficking law will take into account the prevalence and the relevance of these forms of exploitation.

As is the case in the current directive, the new types of exploitation – forced marriage, illegal adoption and surrogacy – will be punishable by a maximum penalty of at least five years of imprisonment, or of at least ten years of imprisonment in case of aggravated offences.

A new aggravating circumstance in the law will take into account the amplifying effect that information and communication technologies (ICT) can have as regards trafficking. This includes the fact that the perpetrator facilitated or committed the dissemination, by means of ICT, of images, videos or similar material of a sexual nature involving the victim.

Sanctions on legal persons, such as companies, held accountable for trafficking offences will also be beefed up. They will from now on cover the exclusion from access to public funding, including tender procedures, grants, concessions and licences, and the withdrawal of permits and authorisations to pursue activities which have resulted in committing the offence.

“I’m happy with this agreement. It strengthens the protection of victims of trafficking, with a special focus on the most vulnerable victims including persons in need of international protection, women and girls and children,” Swedish MEP Malin Björk (Left) said.

“It requires the member states step up their response to trafficking in human beings including mandating national anti-trafficking coordinators. We have agreed to tackle exploitation of trafficking victims in its most obvious forms. Even though I would have liked to have a more extensive ban on exploitation including sexual exploitation, this is already an improvement on current legislation. It can never be okay to take advantage of trafficking victims.”

[monigeko]

What Cellbit wrote/read at the end of stream 5/25 English translations

Court is on Wednesday, 5/24. Cucurucho has no interest in creative blocks and revealed this when he didn't even think twice about Bobby's negotiation.

He won't accept giving the blocks for the armor, and any information we try to extract in exchange for the blocks will be processed and mitigated in a way that means nothing to us.

But if we have a new surprise, which even our side expects, maybe things will change. Cucurucho made a mistake in the midst of chaos and bullshit. Maybe that's the secret.

The plan is to try to use Forever's rule breaking as a bargaining chip to create a direct conflict between FOREVER and EU, surprising both Forever and Cucurucho in the negotiation, and asking for Richarlyson's paternity as a form of "betrayal", showing that I'm willing to join the Federation and I have no problem antagonizing my friends to protect Richariyson enca from sé para mico

But if we have a new surprise, which even our side expects, maybe things will change. Cucurucho made a mistake in the midst of chaos and bullshit. Maybe that's the secret.

The plan is to try to use Forever's rule breaking as a bargaining chip to create a direct conflict between FOREVER and EU, surprising both Forever and Cucurucho in the negotiation, and asking for Richarlyson's paternity as a form of "betrayal", showing that I'm willing to join the Federation and have no problem antagonizing my friends to protect Richarlyson and have him all to myself

Then the idea is to purposefully get away from everyone for a day, create something like a dark castle of evil away from everyone just to see the reaction of Cucurucho/Federation, the codes and any possible imposter among us.

If anyone decides to ally with me they can

be a possible suspect or someone who would not be trusted in the Order.

TUPDATE - DIA DO COURTS

Things went a little differently than planned, but the master plan worked out. Instead of being surprised by the betrayal during the court, I used as an excuse the fact that they lied to me and tried to blackmail me with the Vivo meme to make a scene.

I took the opportunity to change the defense attorney skin to the prosecutor skin to add to the drama

It's a plus point because it makes it seem like I genuinely have a motive/grudge towards my friends and lessens the Federation/Cucurucho's suspicion of mine

intentions, it didn't look like I betrayed them "out of the blue"

Considering that maybe the Federation watches the streams canonically to get the information, I think it was the best scam to do a whole narrative arc to have a big twist later.

As proof that the plan was not a lie, I left only a signed book for Richarlyson revealing the plan. and I didn't risk showing it on the stream.

It's still risky considering the Federation might have access to the egg items but it honestly broke my heart to see him so sad and disappointed. I hope I don't regret it.

I also blocked access to Sofia for others to see how Max reacts. I don't want to suspect him, but everything about her is very strange.

I will avoid mentioning its existence* to the Federation, and if they raise this matter, I will try to circumvent it.

IMPORTS

CODES

THE CODES attacked me shortly after I "joined the Federation.

A code made exclusively to kill me? He practically ignored Richarlyson. Strengthens the theory that codes kill teles that seek to keep others on the island.

WHEN THEY ATTACK

FINAL PLAN

With luck, the Federation will also wake me up in the hospital that Max woke up.

I will try to persuade as much as I can to acquire new information.

Continuing the conflict with the Qrdem' members and trying to please the other members of the island with explanations how I realized that the island's life and people are better than what I had before, and I don't want to lose that. They don't need to get involved in this.)

Using Richarlyson's courtroom event, where everyone will likely be present and watching, to reveal all the information I can get from the Federation in front of everyone.

So if they kill/arrest me I will become a martyr and everyone present will realize the truth about the Federation.

[ncs-swiss]

Formal Communiqué From: European Union To: Swiss National Council Subject: Switzerland’s Approach to EU Accession and Adherence to EU Legal Frameworks

Date: December 11, 2024

Honourable Members of the National Council of Switzerland,

The European Union (EU) recognizes Switzerland as a valued partner and close neighbor with a long-standing tradition of collaboration, mutual respect, and shared values. Your continued interest in closer association with the EU is a testament to our intertwined histories and economic interdependence.

However, the European Union wishes to express its unequivocal position regarding the foundational principles that underpin accession and integration into our union. The EU’s legal and regulatory framework, including cornerstone legislation such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), reflects a unified vision of governance, economic cooperation, and respect for fundamental rights that all member states adhere to without reservation.

The EU has observed certain discussions and proposals from Swiss policymakers suggesting an intent to selectively adopt or alter key elements of EU law to accommodate domestic preferences. While the EU appreciates the unique characteristics of each member state and recognizes the importance of national contexts, selective application or “cherry-picking” of laws undermines the integrity and coherence of our Union.

Accession to the EU necessitates full alignment with the EU acquis—the body of rights and obligations binding all member states. Laws such as the GDPR are not merely administrative or sectoral policies but are essential to the single market, ensuring trust, security, and competitiveness in an increasingly digital world. Unilateral deviations from such laws would compromise the principles of equality and fairness that underpin the Union.

In light of this, the European Union wishes to make clear that: 1. Priority for Accession: Switzerland will not be afforded priority or accelerated pathways for EU accession if it seeks to adopt a selective or modified approach to EU laws. The EU’s legal framework must be embraced in its entirety, ensuring a level playing field for all member states. 2. Negotiation Preconditions: Any discussions on accession or deeper integration will be contingent on Switzerland’s demonstrated commitment to aligning fully with EU legislation, including GDPR, without unilateral alterations. 3. Institutional Framework: Switzerland must accept the jurisdiction of EU bodies, including the European Court of Justice, in matters of legal interpretation and dispute resolution relating to EU law.

The EU remains open to dialogue and is committed to fostering a constructive partnership. However, we urge the Swiss National Council to align its approach with the principles of mutual trust and shared responsibility that define EU membership.

We look forward to continued cooperation and hope for meaningful progress in discussions that honor the spirit of unity and collective purpose.

Yours sincerely,

Mr. Petros Mavromichalis Ambassador of the European Union to Switzerland European Union Headquarters

[the-jam-to-the-unicorn]

President Zelenskyy published a special video address to celebrate the start of Ukraine's accession talks for EU membership 🇺🇦🇪🇺

Dear Ukrainians!

Today is the day we have all worked for long and hard – the entire team of Ukraine. Today marks the official, actual, and real opening of negotiations for Ukraine's accession to the European Union. Our Ukrainian delegation – representatives from the Verkhovna Rada, the government, and the Office of the President – have already held the first intergovernmental conference of Ukraine and the EU. Until today, we were a country that had gained candidate status for membership, but there was not yet complete certainty about realizing this status. As of today, we have full confidence – Ukraine will definitely become a full member of the European Union. Now, the focus is on the technical work between Ukraine and the EU, adapting our system to the EU, and Europe's political will to make the European project truly complete. This can only be achieved with Ukraine as part of a united Europe – a Europe of values, a Europe without splits, ideological walls and "gray zones," a Europe of peace – real peace. I thank everyone who supports Ukraine on this path, who helps, and who fights for Ukraine – for our common Ukrainian home, for our state, just as they would for their own. When we signed the application for EU membership together on the fifth day of the full-scale war, many said it was nothing but a dream. But we made this dream a reality. We attained this, persuaded, and dispelled every doubt. In June 2022, Ukraine's candidate status was approved despite opposition. In December 2023, European leaders supported the political decision to start negotiations with Ukraine. Today, the negotiations begin. Between these steps, there have been thousands of meetings and calls. Conditions Ukraine has fully met. Laws that have been enacted and implemented. And most importantly, the determination of our people, our nation. The determination that has worked, that has not failed Ukraine and all of Europe, and that proves that all Ukrainians together, all Europeans together, are capable of realizing even the biggest dreams – capable of winning.

Prime Minister of Ukraine Denys Shmyhal:

The intergovernmental conferences – the format that has started today – involve working between our state and representatives of all EU states on parts of the future agreement on Ukraine's accession. According to the approved negotiating framework, we will go through all the sections of our relations and reach an agreement on each of them. We will definitely achieve this – just as we will achieve all other Ukrainian goals.

Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Ruslan Stefanchuk:

Every country that has become an EU member has gone through a similar format of negotiations. Ukraine will aim to do this faster than others, but invariably in the common interests of our country and the whole of Europe. We have adopted, are adopting and will continue to adopt all the necessary laws to ensure that Ukraine never separates from the European home again. We thank everyone who stands with Ukraine, everyone who believes in our people, who works with Ukraine, thus ensuring a stable future for the whole of Europe, secure from aggression.

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy:

Ukraine is changing everything – exactly as needed to preserve Europe.

Glory to Ukraine!

[head-post]

Brexit cost UK £27bn of trade losses in its first two years

Despite the decline in trade volumes, London School of Economics (LSE) research shows that the overall effect has been more limited than originally predicted by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). The damage from Brexit to trade links with the EU totalled £27bn for the UK in the first two years, but the overall effect was more limited than analysts originally predicted, according to the most comprehensive review of the issue since Britain’s full exit from the bloc in early 2021.

Researchers from the London School of Economics found that trade barriers have been a “disaster” for small businesses and have forced thousands of companies to stop trading with EU countries.

Academics from the Centre for Economic Performance looked at evidence from more than 100,000 companies and found that by the end of 2022, two years after signing the Joint Trade and Co-operation Agreement (JTA) with Brussels, total exports of UK goods had fallen by 6.4 per cent and imports by 3.1 per cent.

The OBR estimate predicts that in the long term the UK will face a 15 per cent fall in trade, leading to a 4 per cent drop in national income. Despite this, researchers at the Centre for Economic Performance said the UK could experience a fall of the magnitude predicted by the OBR if trade relations with its largest trading partner deteriorate further.

Thomas Sampson, one of the report’s authors, said that by the end of 2022, the JTA had reduced trade in goods by less than half of what the OBR had predicted. However, the OBR figures are long-term projections and only the first two years of the JTA were studied. Further reductions in trade would be required to match OBR’s projections.

Rachel Reeves is likely to welcome the findings, which show the resilience of the economy in the face of a major trade shock. However, it will also create pressure on the finance minister to support efforts to reduce trade barriers over the next few years to prevent the situation from getting worse.

The UK plans to start negotiations next year on the next phase of the JTA. Ministers are expected to resist demands to open up agricultural markets to competition from EU farmers and fishing vessels in return for greater market access for British goods in the bloc.

Trade continued at the same level

The study’s authors noted that in the first two years of the JTA, large companies largely continued to trade with their EU counterparts at the same level. However, smaller exporters, those companies with fewer than 100 employees, suffered significantly. More than 14,000 of the 100,000 companies studied stopped trading with the EU completely, and almost all of them were small businesses.

Imports showed resilience compared to exports as large companies found ways to buy components and raw materials from outside the EU. Thomas Sampson also emphasised that the JTA was a disaster for small exporters, many of whom simply stopped exporting to the EU. However, large companies have adapted well to the new trade barriers and consequently overall exports have so far fallen less than expected.

The study was the first to analyse the impact of Brexit on trade using customs data collected by HMRC. The researchers said the data allowed them to look at individual business relationships and “highlight how large companies adapted better to the new trade regime than SMEs.”

The JTA did not include tariffs, but did introduce barriers to trade such as customs checks and paperwork, origin requirements, excise duties, sanitary and phytosanitary checks on the movement of animals and plants, and the need for exporters to prove that products meet the requirements of the target market. However, many of these checks have been repeatedly postponed and further measures are still due to come into force next year.

The study only looked at trade in goods and did not cover imports and exports of services, which largely fall outside the single market and customs union. Kalina Manova, co-author of the study and professor of economics at UCL, said the long-term productivity of firms will depend on their ability to maintain supply networks and diversify export demand in the face of higher and uncertain non-tariff barriers to trade with the EU.

The report shows that the UK’s exit from the EU’s single market and customs union in early 2021 resulted in an immediate decline in exports and imports with the EU. However, it also shows that companies responded to this shock in a way that mitigated the fall in overall trade.

Large companies did not experience a decline in exports, while importers partly compensated for the decline in imports from the EU by purchasing from other countries. Thus, at least in the short term, aggregate trade proved moderately resilient to the disintegration.

Read more HERE

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

How does the Mercosur-EU trade agreement impact Ag markets?

The free trade agreement between Mercosur and the European Union (EU), concluded recently after 25 years of negotiations, is set to significantly impact the export of grains and meats from South American countries.

The treaty stipulates zero tariffs on 82% of agricultural imports from Mercosur by the EU’s market and preferential access with reduced tariffs for 97% of products. While tariffs on products such as orange juice, fruits, soluble coffee, fish, crustaceans, and vegetable oils will be eliminated, others will be subject to specific tariffs, with initial volumes that will be progressively increased within 12 years. This model applies to beef, poultry, pork, corn, sorghum, meal, rice, honey, sugar, and ethanol.

Although the agreement presents an opportunity to expand South American agricultural exports, producers will be required to meet the sanitary, phytosanitary, and environmental standards imposed by the EU. Compliance with these regulations will be crucial to running the treaty.

Continue reading.

[beardedmrbean]

Dec. 2 (UPI) -- Demonstrators in the Georgian capital Tbilisi clashed with police for a fourth successive night amid signs the protests sparked by the ruling pro-Russia Georgia Dream Party's decision to suspend the country's bid to join the European Union are spreading.

EU and Georgia flag-waving protesters gathered on central Rusaveli Avenue near parliament on Sunday night were hit with tear gas and water cannon after they launched fireworks at police.

Georgia's interior ministry said 21 police officers were injured, but President Salome Zourabichvili, who backs the Coalition for Change opposition, said protesters had been beaten by police in custody, citing lawyers claiming the most of them had been badly injured.

At least 44 people -- 27 protesters, 16 police officers and one representative of the media -- were hospitalized in violent clashes Saturday night, according to the Interior Ministry.

That came after 32 police were injured and 43 protesters were arrested overnight Thursday when people came onto the streets to express their opposition to an announcement by Georgia Dream Party Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze to push back EU-accession negotiations to the end of 2028.

Kobakhidzecut took the decision in response to what he termed EU "blackmail" after it put Georgia's candidate status on hold and cut financial support in response to the passage of a controversial GDP "foreign influence" law in May, forcing NGOs and media that receive more than 20% of their funding from overseas to register as foreign agents.

Thursday's decision triggered resignations by administration officials, the most recent of which was the country's ambassador to the United States, David Zalkaliani, amid denials from Kobakhidze that talks with the EU had been suspended.

The United States suspended a key partnership with Tbilisi on Saturday, condemning "excessive police violence" against ordinary Georgians and saying Georgia Dream's "various anti-democratic actions have violated the core tenets of our U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership, which was based on shared values and commitments to democracy, rule of law, civil society, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and anti-corruption efforts."

"By suspending Georgia's EU accession process, Georgian Dream has rejected the opportunity for closer ties with Europe and made Georgia more vulnerable to the Kremlin," the State Department said in a statement.

It said integration with Europe had overwhelming support among the people of Georgia and called on the Georgian government to "return to its Euro-Atlantic path, transparently investigate all parliamentary election irregularities, and repeal anti-democratic laws that limit freedoms of assembly and expression."

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said Sunday the actions of Kobakhidze's government would "have direct consequences from the EU side."

The GDP won a parliamentary election in October that was marred by allegations of rigging and which is contested by opposing parties and Zourabichvili, who are calling for the election to be rerun.

Parliament in turn elected a new president to replace Zourabichvili who was elected to a six-year term by popular vote in 2018.

Zourabichvili is due to leave office Dec. 29, but has pledged she will not step down until a successor is elected "legitimately."