#1979 peace accord

[agentfascinateur]

Israel violating 1979 Peace Accord and slanders now Egypt

The corridor is part of a larger demilitarized zone along the entire Israel-Egypt border. Under the peace accord, each side is allowed to deploy only a small number of troops or border guards in the zone, though those numbers can be modified by mutual agreement. At the time of the accord, Israeli troops controlled Gaza, until Israel withdrew its forces and settlers in 2005.

Tunnels! Like the non-existing ones of Al Shifa Hospital where instead very real mass graves were found once Israeli forces evacuated...

[luc1ferian]

okay so Ford Prefect is an oingo boingo listener right.

[girlactionfigure]

Jimmy Carter destabilized Iran and helped overthrow the Shah, resulting in the Islamic Revolution and the loss of one of the most important allies of the US in the Middle East. 

In 2016, the BBC published a report that exposed the Carter admin’s extensive contact with Khomeini prior to 1979. 

According to the report, Khomeini went to great lengths to convince the US not to jeopardize his plan to rule Iran:

“It is advisable that you recommend to the army not to follow [Shah’s prime minister Shapour] Bakhtiar,” Khomeini said in one message, according to the BBC. 

"You will see we are not in any particular animosity with the Americans," said Khomeini in another message, pledging his Islamic Republic will be "a humanitarian one, which will benefit the cause of peace and tranquillity for all mankind".

In another message sent via a US emissary, Khomeini assured the Carter admin that their economic interests would not be impacted if he was granted power in Iran: “There should be no fear about oil. It is not true that we wouldn’t sell to the US.”

According to the report, in turn, Carter helped Khomeini and made sure that the Imperial Iranian army would not launch a military coup.

Khomeini returned to Tehran on February 1, 1979, just two weeks after Carter convinced the Shah to take a “vacation” and leave Iran. 

The Iranian military, which was under US influence, surrendered, and within months Khomenei was declared the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Regime was born.

Link. Link

[doctoremrys]

So, like any other girl who reads fanfiction, and has so many n/m ships, I too, was exposed to Heartstopper, one day, and became obsessed with it. Yeah, and not only the show, ALL THE NOVElS, I read all of them at least 3 times, watched the show a lot, I even read fics about it beacause I can't wait fir season 3 to come out this year on October...

I fully support the LGBTQ+ community, I might not be a part of it, but, as my dear Imogen said on the show "I'n an ally".

I had lots of respect to tge author and illustraitor of this fantastic novel series, Alice Oseman, but today I found out that she had stated her support for Palestine.

I don't tend to comment about anything on social media, not at all, but after finding out about this, I became too upset and had to write my thought out, so yeah, this post will probably get deleted, and it's not like I have many people who follow me, or people that will read this.

Look, I have nothing against people who want to have peace on this world, besides the war between Israel and Hanas, there are lots and lots of wars happening around the world, having said that, lots of pro palestiniabs, simply don't know the basic facts, so let me starts stating a few of them. Israel became an independent state on 1948. Between 1947 to 1949 Israel had its' first war, what they call in"the independence war". The war started after the UN had agreed on Resolution 181, a UN plan thar divided the state between the jews and the arabs, and had Jerusalem as the capital city for jews and arabs. The jews agreed to this plan immediately, it was barley 2 years after WW2 had ended, the one wherein 6 Million jews were murdered beacause of hate. The arabs however, did npt agree on that plan, a UN plan, and started attacking the jewish citzens on 30th of November 1947. After Israel got its' independent,on May 14th 1948, the neighboring Arab coubtrues had joined the arabs in Israel in their fight against the new country. Israel won. Egupt gor conrol of Gaza. On 1967, Israel won another war, one we call, the "6 days war", and got Gaza. On 1969 Israel gave the people in Gaza Electricity from Israel's Electricity Connector.

In 1971, the Israeli government decided to rehabilitate the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. Israel did not annex the Gaza Strip to its territory, Israel didn't know what to do with it. On Marah 1979, Egypt and Israel had signed a peace agreement between them. Egyot didn't want Gaza back, so Israel got kind of "stuck" with it, and even after that Israel still did not annex the Gaza Strip to its territory. On December 1987, the first intifada broke out by the palestinians, . At its beginning, it was characterized mainly by mass riots that included demonstrations, stone throwing, roadblocks, and in some cases Molotov cocktails,

Subsequently, the intifada changed its character, and from 1989 terrorist attacks began to be carried out. Kidnapping people, stabbing them to death, shootings, and more, 164 Israelis were murdered. It officially ended in 1993, with the signing of the Oslo Accords, but the attacks continued. The oslo Accords were signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and were meant to give peace, and end to the terror attacks agaibst Israel.

On 1994, as a result of the Oslo Accords, the IDF, left Gaza, and Control of the city passed to the Palestinian Authority. On 2005, all the Israelis who lived on Gaza were evacuated, as a part of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza. After that, Gaza started firing more Qassam rocket and missile fire at southern Israel than before. On 2006, Hanas, a terrorist organization, won the elections in Gaza, and started ruling Gaza.

On October 7th Hamas and The Islamic Jihad murdered more than 1200 people, kidnapped 240 people. Many women and men were raped, bodies were violated, organs were cut from victims, babies were murdered, entire families were burned to death. Even to this day, according to Palestinian Statistics, more than 85% of palestinans on Gaza still support Hamas' actions on October 7th. Palestinian citizens had helped Hamas, and there are even released hostages that said that palestinians families had held them captive. Lots of palestinian citizens had helped Hamas, they robbed houses, and killed innocent people as well.

Israel did not want this war, all it want is for her hostages o be released, and be back home with their families. This war is not against thr palestininans, it's war against Hamas. There are still 132 hostages held captive by Hamas, Israel and the world don't know for sure which of them is alive, and which one is not, but it needs all of them back home with. Women, Mean, Children, babies, elderly were kidnapped on this day. How is a one year old baby, your enemy? How is a Holocaust survivor your enemy?

And for those of you that say, that there is a genocide in Gaza. , on 1948, there were 710,000 palestinians ib Gaza, now there are more than 2.2 Million palestinians.

Secondly, Israel supplies the palestininans with food, water, and medicine every single day. I don't think that the US army gave Japan aid on WW2, but you know what they did do? Detonated atomic bombs on her. I don't see people call this genocide, so why is it different when it's Israel?

You don't know what it's like, to fear fron rockets, to fear leaving the house beacause Hanas can shoot at you whebever he wants. You don't live in fear.

But the people of Israel know what it's like, beacause ti them it's their nornal routine of life.

And again, while I'm against violence in general, remember, that this conflict did not start by Israel, no, Israel got attacked first by the palestininns thenselves.

Dear Aloce, I am dissapoined to find out that another jew supports Paelestine. Yon live on the UK, you write about LGBTQ+ characters on your novels. You identufy as a she/her and they/them, you are aroace. The people in Gaza, hate people fron the LGBTQ+ community, they murder every one of them, they do not care for your support, and all your money will go tk Hanas, a terririst organization, because guess what? Hamas controls everything in Gaza, including all the money the people like you, the UN, and other counries give to Gaza, and they use thus money for terror, and for murderm

Why did you have to start being politucal? Why do you support sonething that you dob't fully undestand.

And by the way, Hamas murdered and kidbapped muslims, arabs, and Israelies, they did not care for who you are, which country are you a citizen of, and what are your poltic views, if you were in the wrong place on the wrong tine, they simply did not care, they killed everyone, and kidnapped arabs and Israelies alike.

I still love Heartstopper, but it'a dissapoing to find out that another jewish person supports something that they do not understand. Alice, you will not see this post, but "thank you".

[kingmabry]

Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India (March 1977 to July 1979), was President of Ramana Kendra, Delhi, 1968-70.

I had the privilege of seeing Ramana Maharshi in August 1935 in the hall in which he usually sat. He was sitting on a sofa and wore only a loincloth. I could see an aura on his face, which was glowing with peace and joy. I sat opposite to him but did not ask him anything. He too did not say anything to me. I sat just over an hour and just looked at his face. Till today I have not seen that aura, that joy or peace on anybody else’s face. That hour of perfect stillness in that silent presence has been a precious memory ever since.

While I sat there, no questions arose in my mind, nor did I feel any desire to ask anything. I was at complete peace with myself. It was this experience that convinced me that Ramana Maharshi had realized God or Truth. Some of his disciples who were present asked him some questions, which he answered. He, however, said nothing of his own accord.

I had to leave the place next day by train at about twelve. About an hour-and-a half before the time of departure, I approached Ramana Maharshi for permission to leave. He told me that I should go after I had eaten. We sat down for lunch along with the Maharshi, at about eleven O’clock. After lunch, I bowed down to him and left.

The visit left an abiding impression on me and convinced me that Ramana Maharshi was a realized soul and that the ideal of ‘action in inaction’ as propounded in the Gita is really attainable.

Presiding over the 99th Jayanti celebrations of Ramana Maharshi at Ramana Kendra, New Delhi, on 13th January 1979, Morarji Desai as Prime Minister, said:

The Maharshi seemed to know everything. He knew the language of the animals. He listened to their complaints. He treated every being in the same way, whether it was a cow or a dog, a crow or a monkey. All were equal in his eyes, the beggar and the millionaire. He never went out of Tiruvannamalai. He refused to go out and preach. He said, “If I am a jnani, I consider everybody else a jnani too. What is there to give?” He regarded everybody as himself. He made no attempt to convert anybody. One got transformed by his very presence.

Many civilizations have flourished and then disappeared. But in this country, you find our old culture and the ancient religion still alive. And it is this that keeps the country alive. It is persons like the Maharshi who keep it alive...All learning should come from within. That is the way the Maharshi showed. He did not criticize others way of life. He said, “Stick to your own religion and follow it properly.” Ramana Maharshi taught that one could do sadhana in one’s chosen way and reach the goal.

- Face to Face

[arbitrarygreay]

I keep referencing this scene from 1x8, so might as well make it easier for my self.

1692 Salem Witch Trials

1735 War for Independence (Our world: 1775-1783. The Molasses Act was passed in 1733, but was apparently routinely ignored before the end of the French and Indian War in 1763, and the resulting tensions ramped up until the riots began in 1772.)

1800 First Mexican War, 1810-1812 Second Mexican War (Our world: 1846-1848, after the Texas Revolution in 1836 and Mexico's own independence from Spain 1810-1821. In our world, the Louisiana Purchase was in 1803, leading to the Lewis And Clark and Pike Expeditions that decade. The UK supported Tecumseh's War in Indiana in 1811, rolling into the War of 1812, but which was the tail end of the Sixty Years' War era 1754-1813 of struggle between the UK, France, US, and Natives over the Great Lakes area.)

According to non-canon After The Storm, the Cession was created in the 1830s.

American Civil War 1840-1842 (Our world: 1861-65. As said above, in our world the 1840s was when the Mexican–American War took place.)

1908-1911 World War (Our world: WW1 1914-1918, Roaring 20s, Great Depression 1929-1939, WW2 1939-1945)

1940 The Hague (Our world: Notably, Geneva is not listed in this timeline, indicating that if Geneva was still a site of political importance, it wasn't to relevant witches. There were, however, also Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The 1899 conference led to creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and its housing, the Peace Palace, opened in 1913, also hosting many of the international organizations The Hague is known for today.)

1961-64 Chinese Civil War (Our world: 1927-49, with the US only making some minor moves about the Taiwan Strait.)

1960-present Proxy Wars (Our world: Cold War 1946-1991, NATO 1949, Korean War 1950-53, Vietnam War 1959-1975, Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, Moon landing 1969, Iranian Revolution 1979, Panama Invasion 1989, Gulf War 1990, Somalia and Bosnia/Herzegonia 1992, Haiti Invasion 1994, Kosovo 1996)

No mention of a Cold War or War on Terror (the latter not being surprising, given that it was replaced by the Spree)

Alder mentions the following locations as a part of "the early days" in 1x1:

Gibraltar (Great Siege 1779-83 stemming from Spain supporting the US in the Revolutionary War)

Tripoli (based on needing to have lifespan proximity to Gibraltar, this is about the Barbary Wars in the early 1800s between Ottoman Tripolitania and the US/Sweden)

Solomon Islands (rediscovered by Britain in 1767, Christian missionary work in the mid-1800s)

Alder's reminiscing from 2x9:

Bay of Bengal "running red with British blood", could be colonial or World War era.

Anatolian Plateau, probably about the Turkish War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire 1919-1923 after WWI, with Ankara becoming the new capital. Ankara is too far inland to be practical for the sea-based conflicts in the Barbary Wars and Aegean Sea conflicts. But there was also the Turkish "low-level civil war" 1976-1980.

Vienna, one summer, uhhhhhhhh probably World War events

Some other timeline notes:

1992 the Martyrdom in Liberia (Our world: immigration from the US with intent to colonize beginning in 1822, republic established 1847, coup in 1980, new republic in 1985, first Civil War 1989-1997, during which Greenville was destroyed.)

1994 Batan's bottles show up in Sudan (Our world: Sudan independence from Britain and UK in 1956, coup by al-Bashir in 1989, US sanctions in 1993)

1995 Batan's bottles show up in "in Minsk during the Belarus partition" (Belarus declared independence from the USSR in 1990, Lukashenko in 1994)

1997 First confirmed Spree attack

Some point in the 2000/10s: Bridey and her unit were in the Andes

Seven years ago (2012), per 1x6, Petra was in Belarus and encountered "The Balkan Composition".

The Balkan Composition was first deployed in "the Battle of the Urals", per 2x3

Willa and Quinn were stationed in Norilsk (a Russian city, west of the Urals) as a part of a siege at some point.

So what we see is that up to the World War, Alder's witch military mostly sped things up by a few decades (with the weird exception of the late 1700s/early 1800s, including Thomas Jefferson's presidency). Then, it seems that American hegemony would then delay/reduce much of the "modern" conflicts, or shift things around. Certainly, it seems that there was likely a large shift in the history of Eastern Europe and repercussions in East Asia.

[cantsayidont]

Summer (?) 1992. The final game supplement for the Mayfair Games DC HEROES ROLE-PLAYING GAME was a loose-leaf WHO'S WHO supplement, intended to complement DC's loose-leaf WHO'S WHO update. Only three of the four planned volumes were released before Mayfair lost the DC license. The first volume includes this entry for Legionnaire Brainiac 5, also covered in 2995: THE LEGION OF SUPER-HEROES SOURCEBOOK, which came out months later.

Brainy's game statistics are mostly the same (although this entry gives him 20 more Hero Points), but the special Psychological Instability rules are unique to this version. This wasn't really a problem anymore in the period when this supplement was published, since it really refers to one particular story from 1979 (a guy loses his shit and creates a universe-destroying super-monster ONE TIME and nobody ever lets him live it down …), but it's an interesting mechanic, so I can see why it was included. The reverse side also has a handy checklist of Brainiac 5 appearances, for completists:

The Personality/Role-playing section on the front side makes some dubious assertions. The first paragraph says:

He might be incredibly intelligent, but Brainiac 5 has a great deal of difficulty when it comes to expressing his emotions. When he first joined the Legion, he tried to concentrate on his feelings to fit in with his teammates, none of whom was Coluan. He even fell in love with Laurel Gand and spent a number of peaceful years with her. But inevitably, he became so overwhelmed with leading the team and protecting the universe that he was forced to forgo the luxury of emotion so that he could use his intelligence to its capacity.

While the 2995 sourcebook was written by Legion scripters Tom and Mary Bierbaum, this supplement was not, and I'm not sure what Winninger was talking about in the final sentence. What had happened in the latter third of the 1984–1989 Levitz series was that Brainy had fomented a conspiracy to avenge the death of Superboy by destroying the Time Trapper, one of the Legion's most powerful enemies, a plan that involved sacrificing Brainy's old friend Jaxon Rugarth. The other Legionnaires then put Brainy on trial for violating the Legion code, and although he was exonerated, he was so annoyed by their attitude that he resigned in a fit of pique and went back to Colu. He returned during the Magic Wars and sort of mended fences, although the team subsequently collapsed and he went on to other things during the five-year gap (principally trying to find a cure for the "Validus plague" afflicting Saturn Girl's kids). Some of the specific circumstances were subsequently retconned in ways not reflected in the actual comics, but that was still basically the gist at the time this supplement was published. It was messy, but it was certainly NOT a matter of his forgoing "the luxury of emotion."

The second paragraph says:

As a Brainiac, Dox has an affinity for pure logic. As time goes on, he seems less and less interested in establishing normal relationships with his teammates in the reformed Legion.

This was not at all true. Indeed, one of the charming aspects of the "Five Years Later" period was that Brainy had actually mellowed quite a bit. He was still a little awkward, and there was unresolved baggage between him and Laurel (who in the interim had had a baby with his best friend!), but he was more at peace with himself, and more patient with the people around him, than he'd ever been in past Legion stories. According to the Bierbaums' sourcebook, he was even writing sweet little haiku about his former teammates in his spare time — hardly the action of a cold-blooded logician.

[thoughtportal]

Attorney Mark Gold has an oriental rug in his western Massachusetts home that most people call “nice-looking” until he tells them to inspect it more closely. Then they’re enthralled, because this is no run-of-the-mill textile—it’s what is called an Afghan war rug, and what it depicts is somber and stunning: cleverly mixed with age-old botanical and geometric designs are tanks, hand grenades and helicopters. “It’s a beautiful piece in its own right,” says Gold, “but I also think telling a cultural story in that traditional medium is fascinating.”

The cultural story Gold’s rug tells is only the beginning. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the country’s war rugs have featured not only images of the instruments of war, but also maps detailing the Soviet defeat and, more recently, depictions of the World Trade Center attacks.

It was women from Afghanistan’s Baluchi culture who, soon after the arrival of the Soviets, began to weave the violence they encountered in their daily lives into sturdy, knotted pile wool rugs that had previously featured peaceful, ordinary symbols, such as flowers and birds. The first of these rugs were much like Gold’s, in that the aggressive imagery was rather hidden. In those early years, brokers and merchants refused to buy war rugs with overt designs for fear they would put off buyers. But with time and with the rugs’ increasing popularity, the images became so prominent that one can even distinguish particular guns, such as AK-47s, Kalashnikov rifles, and automatic pistols.

A decade later, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, and rugs celebrating their exodus appeared. Typical imagery includes a large map with Soviet tanks leaving from the north. These rugs, principally woven by women of the Turkman culture, often include red or yellow hues and are peppered with large weapons, military vehicles and English phrases such as “Hand Bom [Bomb],” “Rooket [Rocket]” and “Made in Afghanistan.”

To many, this script is a firm indication of the rugs’ intended audience: Westerners, and in particular, Americans, who funded the Afghan resistance—the Mujahadeen—during the Soviet occupation. “The rugs are geared for a tourist market,” says Margaret Mills, a folklorist at Ohio State University who has conducted research in Afghanistan since 1974. “And they verbally address this market.” Sediq Omar, a rug merchant from Herat who dealt in war rugs during and after the Soviet occupation, agrees. “Afghanis don’t want to buy these,” he says. “They’re expensive for them. It’s the Westerners who are interested.”

While this may be true, it’s likely that the first “hidden” war rugs from the early 1980s were meant for fellow Afghanis, according to Hanifa Tokhi, an Afghan immigrant who fled Kabul after the Soviet invasion and now lives in northern California. “Later on, they made it commercialized when they found out that people were interested,” she says. “But at the beginning, it was to show their hatred of the invasion. I know the Afghan people, and this was their way to fight.”

Kevin Sudeith, a New York City artist, sells war rugs online and in local flea markets for prices ranging from $60 to $25,000. He includes the World Trade Center rugs in his market displays, and finds that many passersby are disturbed by them and read them as a glorification of the event. “Plus, New Yorkers have had our share of 9/11 stuff,” he says. “We all don’t need to be reminded of it.” Gold, a state away in Massachusetts, concurs. “I appreciate their storytelling aspect,” he says. “But I’m not there yet. It’s not something I’d want to put out.”

Yet others find World Trade Center rugs collectable. According to Omar, American servicemen and women frequently buy them in Afghanistan, and Afghani rug traders even get special permits to sell them at military bases. Some New Yorkers find them fit for display, too. “You might think it’s a ghoulish thing to own, but I look upon it in a different way,” says Barbara Jakobson, a trustee at Manhattan’s Museum of Modern Art and a longtime art collector. “It’s a kind of history painting. Battles have always been depicted in art.” Jakobson placed hers in a small hallway in her brownstone.

In an intriguing twist, it turns out the World Trade Center rugs portray imagery taken from U.S. propaganda leaflets dropped from the air by the thousands to explain to Afghanis the reason for the 2001 American invasion. “They saw these,” says Jakobson, “and they were extremely adept at translating them into new forms.” And Nigel Lendon, one of the leading scholars on Afghan war rugs, noted in a recent exhibition catalog that war rug depictions—both from the Soviet and post-9/11 era—can be “understood as a mirror of the West’s own representations of itself.”

If Afghanis are showing how Americans view themselves via World Trade Center war rugs, Americans also project their views of Afghan culture onto these textiles. In particular, the idea of the oppressed Muslim woman comes up again and again when Americans are asked to consider the rugs. “Women in that part of the world have a limited ability to speak out,” says Barry O’Connell, a Washington D.C.-based oriental rug enthusiast. “These rugs may be their only chance to gain a voice in their adult life.” Columbia University anthropology professor Lila Abu-Lughod takes issue with this view in a post-9/11 article “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” She notes the importance of challenging such generalizations, which she sees as “reinforcing a sense of superiority in Westerners.”

Whether in agreement with Abu-Lughod or O’Connell, most conclude that the women who weave Afghan war rugs have a tough job. “It’s very hard work,” says Omar. “Weavers experience loss of eyesight and back pain—and it’s the dealers who get the money.”

But as long as there’s a market, war rugs will continue to be produced. And in the U.S., this compelling textile certainly has its fans. “These rugs continue to amaze me,” says dealer Sudeith. When I get a beautiful one, I get a lot of pleasure out of it.” And Gold, who owns five war rugs in addition to the hidden one he points out to visitors, simply says, “They’re on our floors. And we appreciate them underfoot.”

Mimi Kirk is an editor and writer in Washington, D.C. {read]

[capybaracorn]

Egypt says it will join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at ICJ

Cairo says the move is due to Israel’s worsening attacks against civilians in Gaza.

(12th of May 2024)

[See article for the embedded videos]

Egypt says it will formally join the case filed by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which accuses Israel of violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention in its war on the Gaza Strip.

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Sunday that Cairo intended to join the case due to escalating Israeli aggression against Palestinian civilians.

“The submission … comes in light of the worsening severity and scope of Israeli attacks against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip, and the continued perpetration of systematic practices against the Palestinian people, including direct targeting of civilians and the destruction of infrastructure in the Strip, and pushing Palestinians to flee,” the ministry said in a statement.

South Africa brought its case against Israel in January, accusing the country of committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. The death toll from Israel’s war on Gaza, which began in October, has surpassed 35,000, and most of the dead are women and children, according to Palestinian authorities.

Israel launched the assault after Hamas led an attack on southern Israel, killing at least 1,139 people, mostly civilians, according to an Al Jazeera tally based on Israeli statistics.

The top United Nations court issued an interim ruling in January that found there was a plausible risk of genocide in the enclave and ordered Israel to take a series of provisional measures, including preventing any genocidal acts from taking place.

The court, which sits in The Hague, rejected a second South African application for emergency measures made in March over Israel’s threat to attack Rafah.

Egypt will join Turkey and Colombia in formally requesting to join the case against Israel. This month, Turkey said it would seek to join the case after the South American country asked the ICJ last month to allow it to join to ensure “the safety and, indeed, the very existence of the Palestinian people”.

Egypt said it is calling on Israel “to comply with its obligations as the occupying power and to implement the provisional measures issued by the ICJ, which require ensuring access to humanitarian and relief aid in a manner that meets the needs of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip”.

It also demands that Israeli forces do not commit any violations against the Palestinian people.

It will likely take years before the court will rule on the merits of the genocide case. While the ICJ’s rulings are binding and without appeal, the court has no way to enforce them.

Israel has repeatedly said it is acting in accordance with international law in Gaza. It has called South Africa’s genocide case baseless and accused Pretoria of acting as “the legal arm of Hamas”.

‘Diplomatic blow’

Alon Liel, former director of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Al Jazeera that Egypt’s move was an “unbelievable diplomatic blow to Israel”.

“Egypt is the cornerstone of our standing in the Middle East,” he said. The connections that Israel has in the Middle East and North Africa today, including with Jordan, the UAE and Morocco, are all “a result of what Egypt did 40 years ago”, he said, referring to the 1979 peace treaty between the two countries.

“With Egypt joining South Africa now in The Hague, it’s a real diplomatic punch. Israel would have to take it very seriously.

“Israel has to … listen to the world – not only to the Israeli public opinion asking now for revenge.

“We have to look overall in the wider picture, in the long-term security of Israel, not only in the next few weeks in Gaza.”

The latest legal development comes as Israel engaged in new battles with Hamas in northern Gaza and ordered tens of thousands more people to evacuate from the southern city of Rafah, which lies close to Gaza’s border with Egypt.

Israeli forces seized the Palestinian side of the Rafah border crossing on Tuesday, a day after Hamas said it had accepted an Egyptian-Qatari mediated ceasefire proposal, which Israel quickly rejected. The crossing had been the main entry point for aid into Gaza, but it has been closed since Israel took control of it.

Tanks and planes pounded several areas and at least four houses in Rafah overnight, killing 20 Palestinians and wounding several others, according to Palestinian health officials.

The city is crammed with more than one million displaced Palestinians living in dire conditions, and the international community has warned Israel that a full-scale Israeli ground assault would trigger a humanitarian catastrophe for civilians.

But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the Rafah offensive was needed to defeat Hamas.

About 110,000 Palestinians have fled Rafah in recent days, according to the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA).

[mariacallous]

The temptation to see the Hamas attack of Oct. 7 as a profoundly transformational event in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East is irresistible, and it’s easy to see why.

The attack—including the killing of 1,200 Israeli civilians and soldiers, the reported rape and torture of women and girls, and the taking of some 250 hostages, many of whom have been abused or died in captivity—demonstrated the group’s brutal sadism. Israel’s response—a siege of Gaza depriving an already impoverished population of basic necessities followed by weeks of airstrikes and months of ground combat—has killed nearly 30,000 Palestinians, around two-thirds of them women and children; Israel estimates that it has killed some 10,000 Hamas fighters.

As if these events weren’t potentially transformational enough, escalation by Hezbollah along the Israeli-Lebanese border; attacks by Houthis against international shipping in the Red Sea; and pro-Iranian militia strikes against U.S. forces in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan has raised the specter of something the modern Middle East has never experienced—a truly regional war. Apart from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Israel-Hamas war is already the longest ever fought.

The transformative character of what Oct. 7 set in motion seemed to many brutally clear. “There’s no going back to the status quo as it stood on Oct. 6,” U.S. President Joe Biden said on Oct. 25. “Israel was one country on Oct. 6 and another on Oct. 7,” Michael Herzog, Israel’s ambassador to the United States, said in late October. Jordan’s King Abdullah warned darkly that the “whole region is on the brink of falling into the abyss.”

These predictions may or may not prove to be true. Six months into this crisis, we do not even know where we are on the conflict’s trajectory or where it’s headed. CIA Director Bill Burns, a friend and colleague of one of the authors, who’s not prone to exaggeration, deemed this the most dangerous and tangled conflict he’d witnessed in decades.

Yet the Middle East has often proved to be unpredictably predictable. It is true that crisis can scramble the playing field, often with horrific consequences—but sometimes with positive outcomes. Almost every breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli arena was preceded by intense violence. The 1973 war led to Egyptian-Israeli peace; Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait produced the Madrid peace conference; and the First Intifada resulted in the Oslo Accords.

But we may not be as fortunate this time around. Two deeply traumatized communities will emerge from this crisis, and at the moment both are lacking the kinds of leaders essential to transformational change. It’s worth asking whether the region’s legendary resistance to change and the absence of leaders willing to take real risks, including those in Washington, will yield a new status quo that’s much like the one so many hoped to leave behind.

Much remains to be sorted. But several looming factors suggest that the new, post-crisis Middle East may look strikingly like the old one.

Every State Department decision memo begins: “The United States has three broad options.” The joke, of course, is that these are “nuke them,” “surrender,” or whatever the drafter’s favored alternative was, aka “my option.” The poor addressee is inevitably herded toward that one. The first two have the virtues of finality; the third is just an uninspiring nudge to muddle through. ‘Twas ever thus, at least regarding Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Attempts to break the mold by Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama ended in scandal or swift reversal.

The options menu doesn’t look very different now, as Iran has seized on the Gaza crisis to use its axis of resistance—a jumble of groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen—to stir up trouble for Israel and the United States. The notable feature of the current confrontation, however, is the relative restraint exercised by these parties, except for the Houthis. The main players have too much to lose by an all-out fight and have signaled publicly and privately that they wish to avoid one. Instead, they have contented themselves with a sustained level of violence just below the threshold of escalation. But the threshold is in the eye of the beholder—hence the persistent risk of inadvertent escalation.

Since the crisis began, diplomatic efforts by the United States and France have laid the basis for a more durable, formal arrangement on the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon. The deal would trade a withdrawal of Hezbollah’s Radwan storm troops from the line for territorial adjustments that favor Lebanese claims. Lebanese Army units would deploy to the south in lieu of Hezbollah forces. These talks have stalled but will likely resume.

In Iraq, the main Iran-aligned militia proposed a truce, and a mini-groundswell for the expulsion of U.S. forces has receded. Persian Gulf waters have been relatively calm. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have indicated that a U.S. war with Iran would be unwelcome. In Syria, Israeli air power continues to thwart Iranian maneuvering; Iran has withdrawn senior Revolutionary Guard personnel because it cannot protect them. In the Bab el-Mandeb strait, U.S. and U.K. strikes and the interdiction of Iranian resupply efforts are slowly chipping away at the Houthis’ coastal infrastructure, if not their stockpiles, and will eventually drive an end to the mayhem in the Red Sea, if an Israel-Hamas cease-fire doesn’t do so first.

Bottom line: An escalatory spiral that fundamentally alters pre-Oct. 7 geopolitical dynamics does not seem to be in the cards—though a new hand can always be dealt.

Even in Gaza, where Israel continues its grinding military campaign, a political change is hardly guaranteed. Perhaps the most candid assessment of the fate of Hamas comes from an Israeli intelligence document, widely circulated among the political echelon. The bottom line: “Hamas will survive this [Israel Defense Forces] campaign as a terror group and a guerrilla group.”

There’s no doubt that Hamas has been profoundly weakened as a military organization, and its capacity to pull off another Oct. 7 is greatly impaired. And while polls suggest that its popularity has surged in the West Bank, its standing in Gaza was compromised well before Oct. 7 as a result of its bad governance—but saw a minor surge afterward. Hamas benefits from being the only organized alternative to a bankrupt and sclerotic Palestinian Authority. Should its top leadership inside Gaza be eliminated, its viability will suffer.

None of this should suggest that Hamas’s capacity to influence Palestinian politics inside and outside Gaza has been fundamentally eroded and that it won’t be a factor in the proverbial day after. The most recent authoritative poll revealed that a majority of Palestinians in Gaza believe Hamas will win the war and resume its rule.

Why is Hamas still relevant when its policies have brought such suffering to Palestinians? First, Palestinians are more likely to blame Israel for their misfortunes rather than their own leadership. Polls show clearly that a majority of Palestinians believed the Hamas attack was justified by the Israeli occupation. Second, Hamas’s resilience is linked to the dysfunction of the PA and a sense that any post-conflict government must be based on a national consensus that would include all factions, including Hamas.

The awkward reality is that under current circumstances, there’s little chance of the PA—revitalized or otherwise—returning to govern Gaza without Hamas consent.

Then there’s the Israeli factor. It’s hard to imagine a better recruiting agency for Hamas’s extremism than the current Israeli government. Hamas is the organizational embodiment of an idea—the end of Israel and its replacement with an Islamic state. The majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza do not subscribe to this goal. But the fecklessness of the PA, combined with Israel’s annexationist policies, offers Hamas a pathway to dominion over the Palestinian national movement.

Throughout, one inconvenient truth remains: Without a Palestinian national movement committed to functional governance and in control of the West Bank and Gaza with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, sovereignty and statehood are pretty much inconceivable.

It’s understandable that many would assume that the days of an Israeli leader who presided over the worst attack in the nation’s history and the bloodiest day for Jews since the Holocaust would be numbered. That assessment may well prove correct. But even if and when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leaves office, his successor may have less leeway to make key decisions. That a majority of Israelis are tired of Netanyahu does not mean they are drifting leftward, oppose his approach toward Hamas, or support Palestinian statehood. More than 90 percent of Israeli Jews believe that the government is using the right amount of force against Hamas or should use more. Nor is there any viable mechanism for removing Netanyahu from power. His right-wing government isn’t about to end itself, and his main rival, Benny Gantz, remains seated at Netanyahu’s side in the war cabinet. For the foreseeable future, Netanyahu remains in charge.

Indeed, if the past is prologue in Israeli politics, the trend lines after a major crisis suggest a strong tendency to move to the right. Israel is already a right-wing or right-center country. After almost every military and security crisis, rightist parties have gained support.

In some case, crises can produce surprises. Few would have predicted that in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt’s Anwar Sadat would make a bid for peace or that Israel’s Menachem Begin would grasp it. But compared with the 1970s, today’s environment would not appear to favor bold decision-making on the Israeli side, Palestinian, or U.S. side. More than 100 hostages remain in Hamas hands; more than 200,000 Israelis have been temporarily relocated from the northern and southern border communities with little prospect of returning anytime soon. The threat of war with Hezbollah remains a constant concern—and for some Israelis, a necessity—and there’s little doubt that Israel will be operating in Gaza for months to come, as will Hamas insurgents. Even in the relatively quiet West Bank, attacks by Hamas and other groups, settler violence and vigilantism, and expanding Israeli settlements conspire to make any change of the situation unlikely.

Some point to the promise of a Saudi peace offer and with it reconciliation with the entire Arab world as a salve for the collective PTSD among Israelis induced by Oct. 7. But grand plans don’t necessarily produce grand results. The Biden administration’s scheme to transform the Middle East—a mix of low-income, high-population states and high-income, low-population states—by uniting the region’s richest country and its most technologically advanced one in a quest for intraregional trade, labor mobility, and infrastructure investment is certainly ambitious. But it’s also untethered from the realities of Middle Eastern governance and environmental conditions. That this vision is predicated on an enduring resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is in turn premised on unlikely developments in Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics, confers a surreal quality to claims about transformation.

Not that it would be a bad thing for Saudi Arabia and Israel to make peace and money together, but given foreseeable realities, normalization is most likely to reinforce Netanyahu’s political position and deal yet another blow to Palestinian aspirations. Whether it makes sense for the United States to offer a binding security guarantee to Saudi Arabia depends entirely on the reliability of a mercurial Saudi leader like Mohammed bin Salman to radically shift the direction of Saudi policy. He would be expected to abandon Saudi support for Russia within OPEC+, moderate production cuts with U.S. economic needs in mind, and distance the country from China, its largest energy market. Given the crown prince’s track record, his willingness to abide by these obligations even in the short term seems unlikely.

All in all, if you’re anticipating transformation, an old Spanish proverb comes to mind: “Best to wait sitting down.”

If the Gaza crisis and its aftermath do represent a horrific glitch in an otherwise immutable matrix, there is not a great deal the United States can do. As always, the belligerents have a lot more agency than outside powers. For the most part, the Biden administration understands this, but the results have been, at best, bittersweet. Some of Biden’s measures have worked to avoid making an extremely dangerous situation worse. They include the swift deployment of naval power and its subsequent redeployment; patience in the face of attacks followed by a measured response; not increasing the U.S. ground presence in the region in response to provocation; creative diplomacy to reduce the risk of escalation in the north; avoiding a drastic response to Houthi shipping attacks while trying to keep communication going; and maintaining constant, if largely ineffectual, pressure on Israel to shift its operational approach in Gaza, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and not try to push Palestinians to Egyptian territory. The fact that a relatively coherent response could be fashioned given the state of party politics in the United States is in itself remarkable. Yet the ghastly reality of tens of thousands of Palestinians dead and a shattered landscape cannot in any sense be described as a ringing foreign-policy success. It will haunt us.

Going beyond these moves, however, won’t be possible without Israeli and Palestinian commitments. And that seems scarcely likely at this juncture or indeed in the absence of a sea change in Israel’s state and society. If there was a sea change, it happened on Oct. 7. A reversal of the tide seems unlikely given the massacre of Israelis. It will be used by the Israeli right to validate its worldview of beleaguerment and its message that the world is roiled by hypocrisy and antisemitism. And there are no regional Arab powers, especially Saudi Arabia, willing and able to serve as the deus ex machina on this bleak stage.

Finally, there is the question of U.S. domestic politics. The Gaza crisis has divided Democrats and unified Republicans in the face of a consequential election. In the region, Israel and the Gulf states would welcome a Trump presidency. Thus far, the Biden administration has been preoccupied by the region’s turmoil, while the Trump campaign has not yet focused on the crisis. The campaign season, however, will undoubtedly make its presence felt as the United States and regional parties plot their next moves.

[angwlita]

Holy hieromartyr Philoumenos of Cyprus (1913-1979) †

"Saint Philoumenos was born on October 15th, 1913 in the parish of Saint Savvas in Nicosia, along with his twin brother Archimandrite Elpidios.

At the age of 14, the two brothers left for the ancient Monastery of Stavrovouni, and stayed there for five years. Later, the saint joined the monastic brotherhood of the holy sepulchre. In 1979, he was appointed guardian of the monastery of Saint Jacob´s Well.

In the afternoon of November 29th, 1979 - “strangers”, according to the police report, trespassed on the premises of Jacob’s Well. They found the opportunity to hide and remain in the monastery after 4:00 p.m. when the guard had already left. Possibly while the Saint was performing vespers, they attacked him with an axe, and having fiercely abused him, they killed him.

The body of the Saint was handed over to the Orthodox 6 days after his massacre, but retained its flexibility and was buried in the cemetery of Mount Zion.

૮ ◞ ﻌ ◟ ა 3 things were most remarkable about the blessed martyr. The first might have been partly from nature: this was his soft sweet voice. The second was a meticulous fidelity to small things, but specifically to the Divine Service. Third, and as unobtrusive, almost secret, was his humility.

૮ ◞ ﻌ ◟ ა St Philoumenos however only knew his monastic cell and his reading. He studied ecclesiastical books

After four years his body was exhumed.  It was found to be substantially incorrupt and had the smell of a beautiful scent. His memory is honored on November 29. May his soul rest in peace.

( x x x x x) actually theres other version abt his death but idk its kinda weird t me but im sharing it just in case x

[girlactionfigure]

How many times did we get an offer to split the land with the Jews?

1. Peel Commission (1937): This was the first major proposal for partition by the British, recommending a division of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The plan proposed a small Jewish state in> 

parts of the north and coastal areas, with the remainder of the land going to the Arabs. The Jewish leadership accepted it in principle but wanted modifications, while the Arabs outright rejected it.

2. United Nations Partition Plan (1947): Known as UN Resolution 181, this> was the most significant partition plan prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. The plan proposed the creation of independent Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem as an international city. The Jewish community accepted the plan, but the Arab leadership rejected it,> leading to the 1947–1948 Civil War and the subsequent Arab-Israeli War of 1948.

3. Armistice Agreements (1949): After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, armistice agreements were signed between Israel and its neighboring Arab states, but these did not constitute a formal partition plan> 

Instead, they established ceasefire lines, known as the Green Line, without official recognition of borders.

4. Rogers Plan (1969): Proposed by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, the Rogers Plan aimed at resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict after the 1967 Six-Day War.> 

The plan called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the war (including the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem) in exchange for peace and recognition by Arab states.

Impact: The plan was rejected by both Israel and the Arab states, as Israel was unwilling to> 

the pre-1967 borders, and the Arab states refused to recognize Israel or negotiate at that time.

5. Camp David Accords (1978): The Camp David Accords were brokered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.> 

Two frameworks were agreed upon: A. Framework for Peace in the Middle East B. Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979) Impact: The accords improved relations between Israel and Egypt but did not resolve the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor did they lead to immediate Palestinian> autonomy.

6. Madrid Conference (1991): After the Gulf War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union co-sponsored the Madrid Peace Conference, bringing Israel and Arab states (including Palestinian representatives) to the negotiating table for the first time.

Impact: The conference> initiated direct, face-to-face negotiations but did not result in a final agreement. However, it paved the way for later agreements, including the Oslo Accords.

7. Oslo Accords (1993-1995): The Oslo Accords were the first direct agreement between Israel and the Palestine>

Liberation Organization (PLO). The accords outlined a framework for Palestinian self-governance in parts of the West Bank and Gaza and a five-year timeline for further negotiations on issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. Impact: The Oslo Accords led to the establishment> 

of the Palestinian Authority and the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, each with varying levels of Palestinian and Israeli control. However, final status issues were left unresolved, and subsequent violence, including the Second Intifada (2000-2005), disrupted> the peace process.

8. Camp David Summit (2000): U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at Camp David to negotiate a final status agreement. Barak offered a two-state solution, proposing that Israel would> 

withdraw from most of the West Bank and Gaza, while retaining some settlement blocs and offering a shared Jerusalem. Arafat rejected the offer.

Impact: The failure of the summit, combined with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, led to a collapse in the peace process.> 

9. Taba Summit (2001): Following the Camp David failure, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Taba, Egypt, to try to salvage the peace process. The talks made significant progress, with Israel offering a near-complete withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and compromises> 

on Jerusalem. However, the negotiations were interrupted by Israeli elections and the Second Intifada.

Impact: While progress was made, the talks ended without a final agreement, and violence escalated soon after.> 

10. Annapolis Conference (2007): The Annapolis Conference, held in November 2007 in Annapolis, Maryland, was a peace summit aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and promoting the two-state solution. It was initiated by U.S. President George W. Bush and attended by> 

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and representatives from several other nations. The conference sought to revive peace negotiations based on previous agreements, with the goal of establishing an independent Palestinian state> 

alongside Israel. During the negotiations, Olmert made a far-reaching peace proposal to Abbas, offering a near-total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, a territorial link to Gaza, and international control of Jerusalem's Old City. Abbas, however, rejected the offer.> 

11. Trump Administration Peace Plan ("Deal of the Century") (2020): The Trump administration proposed a peace plan in January 2020, which envisioned a two-state solution, with Israel retaining large portions of the West Bank, including settlement blocs, while offering the> 

Palestinians limited autonomy over a non-contiguous state. Jerusalem would remain Israel's capital, and the Palestinians would receive some compensation for land losses.

Impact: The plan was welcomed by Israel but rejected outright by the Palestinian leadership. 

Ahmed Al-Khalidi

[torpublishinggroup]

Showdown in the Skies: Aliens Vs. Dragons!

Strange lights fill the skies. So too does the beating of giant wings.

Shadows of an ominous future meet legends of a mythic past, and do battle. We do not come in peace, for here be dragons.

We’ve assembled a panel of experts to weigh in on the potential victors of each fight.

Check it.

The Xenomorph Vs. Toothless

Proposed Victor: Toothless Expert: Tessa Villanueva, Editorial Assistant

“What chance does anything even have against the Alpha of All Dragons? The unholy offspring of lightning and death itself? Yes, Toothless may look cute and adorable, but his intelligence is unparalleled–he’s been known to show smart and strategic thinking. He can fly over 100 mph and is agile and strong enough to dive-bomb giant dragons and knock them to the ground. He also has plasma blasts, unerring accuracy, and an indomitable fighting spirit that won’t quit–and he fights for his friends? Does the Xenomorph have friends? (Yes, she has a hive, but are they really friends?)”

Proposed Victor: The Xenomorph Expert: a cat, Assistant Marketing Manager

“The Xenomorph is an acid-blooded, highly adaptive social hunter who has proven time and time again that in space we can hear you scream when it bursts out your chest. She’s a star terror of cinema and has torn through the armor of the Predator, and she frequently carries me to victory royales in Fortnite. Fans of Alien (1979), Aliens (1986), Alien 3 (1992), Alien: Resurrection (1997), Prometheus (2012), and Alien: Covenant (2017) understand that Toothless, who is domesticated and trained, will be ruined, ribboned, and folded into a scary xeno-cocoon.”

Stitch Vs. Melanchthon

Proposed Victor: Melancthon Expert: Mal Frazier, Editorial Assistant

“So, you might think Stitch is going to win. Sure, there’s no way that the cutest character could ever defeat the scariest character, but we’ll give him a fair crack. Dragon #7332 (no, not your buddy’s discord username) from The Iron Dragon’s Daughter by Michael Swanwick is rusting in a heap in the disgusting child labor factory for years when he finally finds an appropriately malleable pilot and steals Jane. He’s a giant metal dragon war machine built by fairies who eat death magic and [spoilers for a book older than me] kills the entire world. Yes, the whole thing. I think he’s neat. Also he’s named after a dead philosopher which has to give you a stats boost if some kind.”

Proposed Victor: Stitch Expert: Lizzy Hosty, Publishing Strategy Assistant

“Experiment 626 was created to cause chaos across an entire galaxy. According to the mad scientist who created Stitch, he’s bulletproof, fireproof, can think faster than a computer, can see in the dark, and move objects 3,000 times his size. His first instinct is literally destruction. It’s like he was created to not only survive a fight against a dragon, but absolutely destroy them; change my mind.”

Zanj Vs. Tairn

Proposed Victor: Zanj Expert: a cat, Assistant Marketing Manager

“Okay before anything else, if space-pirate-werewolf-queen Zanj asked me to join her in (un)holy matrimony, I would ascend to her side instantly, madly, and without hesitation. By that metric at least she’s the most powerful combatant of this whole bracket, and I think we should take that into account. Max Gladstone’s phenomenal Empress of Forever chronicles the second conflict between Zanj and her allies against the omnipotent Jade Empress, who can destroy planets with her thoughts. Yeah. Zanj is back for round two. But Tairn won’t be.”

Proposed Victor: Tairn Expert: Lizzy Hosty, Publishing Strategy Assistant

“I just read Fourth Wing (I’m late to the party, I know), and when I tell you Tairn could literally destroy a whole fleet, I’m so serious. This dragon took on multiple [redacted] and didn’t even flinch. His only weakness would be keeping his rider alive, but for the purposes of this, Tairn has claimed no rider, so he’s practically invincible and nothing could change my mind. He can shoot fire, his teeth are as big as humans, his wing span could crush dozens just accidentally. Need I say more.”

Deoxys Vs. Chronormu

Proposed Victor: Chronormu Expert: a cat, Assistant Marketing Manager

“Look Deoxys might come from space, but Chronormu helped stave off the invasion of the Burning Legion. Twice. She isn’t afraid. She’s cute, she’s trans, she’s a guardian of the timeways, and when she glances at this silly triangle-island (remember that puzzle? It was awful) and chooses FIGHT, it’ll be a OHKO. Plus Deoxys has base 50 HP, no matter what form it’s in. Flop.”

Proposed Victor: Deoxys Expert: Tessa Villanueva, Editorial Assistant

“First of all, Deoxys came from outer space from INSIDE A METEOR. You cannot get more metal than that. It was on its way to destroy the world, but it stopped just to have this little battle. It’s capable of using any of its Formes to gain an advantage in battle, whether it’s Normal, Attack, Defense, or Speed. It’s also able to regenerate any part of its body! Not to mention its ultimate signature attack, Psycho Boost–sure, the recoil will lower its special attack, but no one’s going to survive that…”

[linkfortune138]

History of cambodia

The history of Cambodia is rich and complex, spanning thousands of years and marked by periods of great prosperity, cultural achievements, and political upheaval. Here is an overview of key periods and events in Cambodian history:

Ancient Civilizations: The earliest known civilization in Cambodia dates back to the Funan Kingdom in the 1st century CE. Funan was succeeded by the Chenla Kingdom in the 6th century, which eventually split into two rival states: Chenla Land to the north and Chenla Water to the south.

Angkor Empire: The Khmer Empire, centered around the city of Angkor, rose to prominence in the 9th century under King Jayavarman II. Angkor became one of the most powerful and prosperous empires in Southeast Asia, known for its impressive architecture, including the iconic Angkor Wat temple complex. The empire reached its zenith during the reign of King Jayavarman VII in the 12th century.

Thai and Vietnamese Incursions: The decline of the Khmer Empire began in the 13th century due to invasions by the Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms. Angkor was sacked by the Ayutthaya Kingdom in 1431, leading to the eventual abandonment of the city.

Colonial Rule: Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863 after King Norodom signed a treaty with the French colonial authorities. Under French rule, Cambodia was governed as part of French Indochina along with Vietnam and Laos.

Independence and Turmoil: Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953 under King Norodom Sihanouk. However, political instability and internal conflict plagued the country in the following decades, exacerbated by the Vietnam War and the rise of the Khmer Rouge insurgency.

Khmer Rouge Regime: The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, seized power in Cambodia in 1975 after the fall of Phnom Penh. The Khmer Rouge regime implemented radical communist policies, resulting in widespread atrocities, forced labor, and the deaths of an estimated 1.7 to 2 million people during the Cambodian genocide.

Vietnamese Occupation: In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime. Cambodia became a Vietnamese-backed socialist state known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea, leading to years of conflict and instability.

Peace Accords and Reconstruction: In the 1990s, Cambodia transitioned to a constitutional monarchy and began the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction. The Paris Peace Accords in 1991 laid the groundwork for democratic elections and the establishment of a multiparty system.

Modern Cambodia: Cambodia has made significant progress in the decades since the end of the civil war, experiencing economic growth, infrastructure development, and improvements in living standards. However, challenges remain, including political corruption, human rights abuses, and social inequality.

Despite its tumultuous history, Cambodia continues to be home to a rich cultural heritage, vibrant traditions, and resilient people who are working towards a brighter future for their country.

[mightyflamethrower]

Lame-duck presidencies, especially in the last six months of their final term, in general can offer opportunities for America’s enemies to take advantage of a perceived vacuum as one government transitions to the next.

But these normal changeover months are especially dangerous when a perceived weak or appeasing lame-duck president is likely to be replaced by a strong deterrent successor that will likely serve as a corrective to his disastrous policies.

James Buchannan (1857-1861), a northern but pro-South president, was a particularly anemic chief executive. He had done little if anything to try to deal with the growing rift between North and South, especially the furor over the Dred Scott decision and Bloody Kansas. Even when warned, Buchannan did little to beef up the U.S. Army or increase its weapon stockpiles to deter any potential secessionist state.

After Buchannan declined to run for a second term, the South understood that the abolitionist and anti-slavery Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln might well be elected in 1860—given the North/South split within the Democratic Party. And they understood that President Lincoln might well use force to stop secession.

Therefore, in the waning days of the Buchannan administration, after Lincoln’s victory, seven southern states seceded during the presidential transition, a confused North reacted little, more would follow, and a terrible Civil War became inevitable.

During the waning days of the crippled second term of Richard Nixon in summer 1974, communist North Vietnam saw a once deterrent president fatally weakened by Watergate. It was encouraged by a renewed antiwar movement, a likely soon anti-war Congress, and the next president, Gerald Ford—a probable caretaker soon to be replaced by an anti-war Democrat. And so in late 1974 and 1975, the communists renounced ignored peace accords, judged correctly that the directionless US would not help South Vietnam stop a massive invasion from the North, and thereby won the 12-year-long war.

As the Jimmy Carter administration began to wind down and as it was increasingly judged as weak abroad, the new theocratic revolutionary government in Iran stormed the U.S. embassy and took hostages in November 1979. Throughout the next year, Tehran systematically humiliated the U.S., mocked an impotent Carter administration, and rebuffed all U.S. efforts to secure the return of the hostages.

The Soviet Union as well saw the dying and still inert Carter term as ripe for exploitation and so invaded Afghanistan a month later, in December 1979. It too concluded that there would be a year of continued timidity in Washington before a likely remedy from a Republican president—in this case, Ronald Reagan, who had declared his candidacy a little over a week after Iran took hostages with clear promises to restore U.S. deterrence abroad.

We are now once again entering one of these dangerous moments, compounded by a weakening of the armed forces. During Biden’s tenure, the U.S. military has suffered historic shortfalls in recruitment, the disastrous humiliation in Afghanistan, a new DEI commissariat that wars on meritocratic promotions and assignments, the politicization of generals and admirals, the hyped but otherwise inane effort to root out mythical white supremacists and “domestic terrorist” bogeymen from the ranks, and the expulsion of some of our best soldiers for their reluctance to be vaccinated, many of them having developed natural immunity from prior infection.

The Pentagon is short on ships and planes. U.S. weapons stocks are dangerously low, drained by the abandonment of billions of dollars of equipment to the Taliban, the resupply efforts to Ukraine and Israel, the failure of the Biden administration to fund the restocking of our munitions and to ramp up resupply production—and a $35 billion national debt fed by $2 trillion annual deficits.

Add eight million illegal aliens who pranced over a nonexistent southern border, nearly uninhabitable big-city downtowns, an epidemic of violent crime, and a president who resuscitates mostly to blast half the country as “semi-fascists” and “ultra-MAGA” extremists.

Add it all up, and the world abroad agrees America is in a strange, self-inflicted decline and will not or cannot defend its interests, or for that matter itself.

In particular, both enemies and neutrals have accordingly drawn a number of self-interested conclusions about the waning Biden administration and what may follow:

That Joe Biden, to their apparent delight, has in the last three years reversed the Trump deterrence policies and thus has green-lit their aggressions.

That given the ensuing chaos, they have further agreed that Biden’s growing unpopularity with the American people makes it likely that both he and his appeasement policies will be gone by January 2024.

That Donald Trump may well return to office. That would mean a much worse deal for Russia, China, Iran, and its terrorist satellites, and thus recognition that 2024 is a brief window of opportunity for aggression.

Putin remembers that Trump blasted 200 Russian mercenaries in Syria, got out of a bad missile deal with Moscow, upped sanctions on Russian oligarchs, flooded the world with cheap oil, destroying Russian oil export profits, sold once-canceled offensive weapons to Ukraine, and warned what would happen if Putin invaded Ukraine. Of the last four administrations, Trump’s was the only one that saw no Russian cross-border invasions.

China remembers that Trump slapped tariffs on its mercantilist market economy, accused China of birthing the COVID virus at its Wuhan virology lab, increased military spending, forced NATO to spend another $100 billion on munitions, and jawboned more alliance members into upping their military contributions. Beijing knew that to send a spy balloon across the continental United States between 2017-21 would have meant its destruction the minute it entered U.S. airspace. China did not serially threaten Taiwan during the Trump era—and may believe that this year could be the last chance in a decade to confront Taiwan.

Iran has concluded two things about 2024: 1) they do not wish to see another Trump presidency on the horizon that took out its top-ranking terrorist-general Qasem Soleimani, slapped sanctions on its oil, yanked the U.S. out of the flawed Iran Deal, declared the Iranian Houthi satellites a foreign terrorist organization, cut off all aid to the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, moved the U.S. closer to Israel, and warned Hezbollah of consequences should it start a war with Israel; and 2) that the present Biden abdication will likely be short-lived and thus now may be the time to take advantage of a currently directionless global superpower that either will not or cannot deter Iranian aggression.

So what should we expect in 2024? Lacking a strong U.S. patron and sponsor, Israel will be subject to more international calls to leave Gaza, to negotiate with Hamas, and to give up the idea it can “destroy” Hamas.

Hezbollah will likely up its daily barrage of missiles into Israel.

Iran will become more overt in supplying Russia, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis with weapons.

China will increase its threats to Taiwan and weigh carefully the costs-to-benefits of attacking the island.

The common denominator? All our enemies are right now calculating how best to use their gift of the next 12 months from a non-compos-mentis president and his neo-socialist team that either believes the U.S. is at fault for much of the world’s pathologies or is too terrified to do anything about them.

In sum, adversaries believe there is a rare window of opportunity in which the U.S. uncharacteristically does nothing to deter its enemies, back its allies, or win over neutrals. And over the next year, we can only pray they are mistaken.

[neitan-earl]

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Longstanding Struggle for Peace

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a deeply entrenched and highly contentious dispute that has spanned decades. Rooted in historical, political, and religious factors, this ongoing struggle has left a lasting impact on the Middle East and the world.The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back more than a century, with flashpoints building from the United Nations’ 1947 initial Partition Plan to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to the recent escalation of conflict sparked in October 2023.

Despite continued efforts at brokering peace—including the 1979 Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, and the 2020 Abraham Accords—conflict has persisted

The British Mandate for Palestine:

After World War I, the United Nations granted Britain a mandate to govern Palestine. The British Mandate period (1920-1948) further exacerbated tensions between Jews and Arabs. The Arab population opposed increasing Jewish immigration, leading to intermittent violent clashes.

The United Nations Partition Plan:

Nov 29, 1947

UN Partition Plan of Palestine

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) passes Resolution 181 calling for the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab.Palestine had been under the military and administrative control of the United Kingdom (known as a mandate) since the 1917 defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Civil strife and violence between the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine intensifies.The United Nations proposed a partition plan to create separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. The plan was accepted by Jewish leaders but rejected by Arab leaders, setting the stage for conflict.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War:

The rejection of the partition plan and the subsequent declaration of the State of Israel in May 1948 led to a war between the newly established Israel and its Arab neighbors. This war resulted in significant displacement of Palestinian Arabs and established the borders of Israel as we know them today.

The Six-Day War:

In 1967, the Six-Day War occurred, with Israel gaining control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. This event further complicated the conflict and intensified Palestinian resistance.

The Oslo Accords:

In the early 1990s, the Oslo Accords marked a significant development. The accords provided for limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but a comprehensive peace agreement remained elusive.

This conflict have continued through various negotiations, peace initiatives, and international involvement. However, many issues remain unresolved, including the status of Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and security concerns.

References:

https://world101.cfr.org/understanding-international-system/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict-timeline