#Shiites in Saudi Arabia | Explore Tumblr Posts and Blogs

deadpresidents · 9 months

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You said you read a lot about Arabia and Islam and I have a random question that you might be able to help with. I know that for centuries there was a caliph who was like the leader of muslims and I always wondered why if the king of saudi arabia is in charge of the holy sites why isn't he considered the caliph or declared himself as the caliph?

It's a good question and there are a number of complex reasons why that didn't/doesn't happen which require a much deeper dive, but I'll try to give a simplified answer. First of all, the caliph was the spiritual leader of the entire Muslim world and while the caliphs also had a political role as successors to Muhammad, that role changed dramatically through the centuries as the Muslim world grew, Islamic empires rose and fell, and Islam itself branched into different sects. The last widely-recognized caliphs were the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, but even in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, there were disagreements throughout the Muslim world about the legitimacy of anyone's claim on the caliphate. The two main branches of Islam -- Sunni and Shia -- have entirely different ideas on how a caliph should be chosen and who the caliph is chosen by.

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the end of World War I, the Sharif of Mecca -- Hussein, a direct descendant of Muhammad as the leader of Hashemite dynasty (and great-great grandfather of the current Jordanian King Abdullah II) -- attempted to declare himself the new caliph, but was not accepted. In many ways, it was like a modern European monarch suddenly declaring himself the Pope; that's just not how most Muslims believed the spiritual leader of the Islamic faith should be determined. Plus, Hussein only had a tenuous hold on Islam's holiest sites (Mecca, Medina, and, at the time, Jerusalem) following World War I, and Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud was in the process of taking control of what is now Saudi Arabia. Once Ibn Saud became King of Saudi Arabia, he took over as "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques" (Mecca and Medina), but the idea of declaring himself caliph was out of the question. Ibn Saud and the vast majority of his supporters were members of the deeply conservative, puritanical Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam and they believed that the caliph was chosen by all Muslims, not declared by one person. As the guardian of Islam's two holiest sites, the King of Saudi Arabia is responsible for ensuring that all Muslims capable of making the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca (and the lesser pilgrimage to Medina) can do so. Unilaterally declaring himself the caliph would undoubtedly have alienated many Muslims, particularly those from countries outside of Saudi Arabia and especially Shiites. In other words, it's not within the power of the King of Saudi Arabia to give himself (or any other individual) the title of caliph, and he'd probably get just as much resistance from his fellow Saudis if he tried to do so. There's no way that the Ikhwan -- the ascetic tribes and Bedouins who largely acted as Ibn Saud's military forces as he conquered most of the Arabian Peninsula in the first half of the 20th Century -- would have remained loyal to the first Saudi King if he had unilaterally proclaimed himself the caliph.

The Muslim people around the world -- the ummah -- haven't been united since the death of Muhammad, which is when the divide between Shia and Sunnis began over the true successor of the Prophet, so any caliph is going to be seen as illegitimate by a significant percentage of the population. And in the modern world, any political aspects of a potential caliph are going to be superseded by the temporal responsibilities of the heads of state or heads of government in every country, no matter how large or devout their Islamic population might be. So, a modern caliph would really have to be a spiritual leader, not a political one -- very similar to the Pope. But the Pope also has the unique position of being the head of state (and, really, an absolute monarch) of a sovereign nation. The Islamic world is too fragmented and divided by opposing theologies to allow a modern-day caliph to govern, command military forces, and provide religious guidance in the same manner as Muhammad's immediate successors or even during the 600+ years of Ottoman Sultans. A caliph would effectively have the same standing today as a modern-day Doge of Venice or Japanese Shogun; it's an anachronistic position of leadership and somewhat outdated concept in the world we currently live in -- you know, like the Iowa Caucus or Electoral College.

#History #Politics #Political Leaders #Caliph #Caliphate #Islam #Muslims #Islamic world #Ummah #Saudi Arabia #Muhammad #Sunni-Shia Split #Shiites #Sunnis #Ottoman Empire #Ottoman Sultans #King of Saudi Arabia #Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

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argyrocratie · 8 months

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(...)

"What is the Houthi movement?

The Houthi insurgency is a Zaydi Shiite Islamist political movement established in 1992 to challenge Yemen’s longtime, and increasingly corrupt, leader Ali Abdullah Saleh. Following massive street protests, Saleh resigned his post in 2011. After the resignation, a national unity dialogue was held in Yemen’s capital Sana’a to try to resolve a host of Yemeni political conflicts. However, those talks eventually broke down, prompting the Houthis to advance on Sana’a with the goal of taking power. This sparked Saudi Arabia’s deadly US-backed air, ground, and naval invasion of Yemen, which lasted for seven years and killed an estimated 9,000 civilians, as well as significant numbers of Houthi forces, in repeated airstrikes. Despite the overwhelming force used by Saudi Arabia, however, the Houthis gained control over roughly a third of Yemen’s land—and two-thirds of its population—over the course of the war.

In April 2022, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis negotiated a truce that has nearly eliminated the fighting in Yemen. The truce halted offensive military operations, allowed fuel ships to enter Yemeni ports, and restarted commercial flights from Sana’a airport. However, it did not offer a comprehensive political settlement, leaving open the threat of renewed hostilities.

How have the Houthis become involved in the war?

After Israel began bombing Gaza on October 7th, the Houthi movement—which has long held what Yemen expert Helen Lackner called a “fundamentalist foreign policy position against the US and Israel”—announced that it was ready to intervene in solidarity with Palestinians. “There are red lines in the situation related to Gaza, and we are coordinating with our brothers in the jihad axis and are ready to intervene with all we can,” the Houthis’ leader said. As part of this effort, the movement has carried out 27 attacks in the Red Sea between November 19th and January 11th, most of them on commercial ships linked to Israel (although some of the attacks have targeted ships without a clear connection to Israel). The movement has also tried to fire on American warships and on Israel itself.

In the attacks on commercial ships, the Houthis have mostly fired missiles at them, though on November 20th, the group’s fighters seized a cargo ship and detained the crew members onboard. These attacks have discouraged shipping companies from traversing the Red Sea, the fastest route from Asia to Europe; many are instead sailing around the Horn of Africa, which adds $1 million to the typical cost of a roundtrip. On January 11th, the White House cited this trade disruption as a key motivating factor for the US’s bombings in Yemen, noting that “more than 2,000 ships have been forced to divert thousands of miles to avoid the Red Sea—which can cause weeks of delays in product shipping times.”

The Houthi movement’s attacks in the Red Sea, as well as the retaliation the attacks have generated, have revitalized the group’s power within Yemen. Prior to October 7th, the Houthis were facing discontent due to their authoritarian rule, their failure to pay salaries, and their control of aid in the face of spiraling poverty. Their confrontation with Israel, however, has seen “their popularity suddenly skyrocket, including in areas in Yemen where they don’t rule and in stark contrast to other Arab [states] who are at best being silent, or at worse, helping the enemy,” Yemen expert Helen Lackner told Jewish Currents. After incurring significant losses in their conflict with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the Houthis’ firm opposition to Israel has also helped them to recruit more young men to their military who believe they will have the opportunity to fight in Palestine, according to Lackner.

In this context, experts say it is unlikely the spate of Western bombings will end the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea—and such attacks could even contribute to the group’s bolstered popularity. “They’re willing to live with some level of retaliation because they can then position themselves as having been targeted by this Western alliance that is serving the interests of Israel,” said Mohamad Bazzi, director of New York University’s Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies. Other experts have also warned that the US strikes risk provoking further escalations: For instance, the Houthis could decide to attack Saudi Arabia in a bid to up the pressure on American allies.

(...)

What is Iran’s role in the regional escalation?

While the groups responding to Israel’s bombing of Gaza—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Iraqi and Syrian paramilitaries—are spread out across the region, they are all supported by Iran, which has armed and financed them as part of an overall strategy to contest US and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. This Iran-supported network is often called the “axis of resistance,” and the alliance’s close collaboration reflects an approach developed by Qassem Soleimani, who was a key Iranian military leader until he was assassinated by the US in January 2020. “A big part of his strategy in the region was for the groups to get to know each other, and to share training and expertise—and that continued after the assassination in Baghdad,” said Bazzi.

Experts emphasize that Iran does not have full control over the groups it funds and arms, which often pursue their own agendas. For example, the relationship between the Houthis and Iran, according to Lackner, “is a bit like Netanyahu’s relationship to Biden. If they agree, and they want to do the same thing, then they do it. But they are not afraid to diverge either,” said Lackner. For instance, the Houthis ignored Iran’s orders to halt their advance on Sana’a in 2014, which sparked the years-long civil war and the conflict with Saudi Arabia. In the current conflagration, Bazzi said, Iran is unlikely to be directing the various forces to pursue “specific attacks,” but Iranian military leadership is “probably involved in larger-scale conversations about the division of responsibilities of different parts of the axis of resistance.”

According to Bazzi, at this moment Iran is carefully calculating how to maintain regional credibility by showing support for Hamas, while not going far enough to provoke a war with powerful foes like the US and Israel. “The primary Iranian calculation is about regime survival, and they don’t want to do anything that seriously jeopardizes their survival,” said Bazzi. Parsi said that so far, Iran has benefited from avoiding risky moves—in contrast to Israel, which has diminished its own “global standing” with its operations in Gaza. “Israel’s pariah status globally—at least outside of the West—is something that the Iranians are drawing benefits from. But that only works to the point that this doesn’t escalate into a larger conflict,” he said.

How is the US responding to the regional conflict?

Since October 7th, the US has repeatedly said that it wants to prevent more fighting in the region. Early on, the US dispatched warships and fighter jets to the Mediterranean to deter Hezbollah from entering the fray. Biden administration officials have also ramped up diplomatic efforts to halt a regional conflagration: The president sent envoy Amos Hochstein to Lebanon to try to negotiate a solution to the fighting around the blue line, and reportedly warned Israel against escalation with Hezbollah in private conversations. In October, when Israel had made plans to pre-emptively strike Lebanon, President Biden called Netanyahu to tell him to “stand down” on the attack plans, and ultimately, Israel did not launch a wide scale attack, according to a December Wall Street Journal report. “The priority for the Biden administration is to limit or prevent the broadening of the conflict,” said Schenker.

At the same time, the US has carried out repeated bombings in Iraq, Syria, and now Yemen, even as officials continue to talk about de-escalation. “We’re not looking for conflict with Iran. We’re not looking to escalate and there’s no reason for it to escalate beyond what happened over the last few days,” National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said last Friday, after the first US bombings of Yemen. But yesterday, the US military again bombed Houthi targets for the third time in a week, and then designated the Houthis as a terror organization, blocking the group’s access to the global financial system. By targeting Yemen, experts say the US is significantly expanding the regional war—“escalating regional tensions and adding fuel to a conflict,” as Bazzi wrote in a recent column published in The Guardian. “The conflagration could spiral out of control, perhaps more by accident than design,” he noted.

Many Middle East analysts say the Biden administration’s attempt to avert regional war is failing for one main reason: its refusal to couple a plea for de-escalation with advocacy for a ceasefire in Gaza. “Seeing the wider regional conflict as something that can be managed separately from Gaza is the source of the dissonance [in the administration’s strategy],” Bazzi told Jewish Currents. “You can’t prevent the wider regional war effectively without addressing the core immediate issue, which is the Israeli assault on Gaza. It’s just wishful thinking in the Biden administration that somehow it can separate the two.”

#the houthis #yemen #iran #israel hamas war

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girlactionfigure · 8 months

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*ISRAEL REALTIME* - "Connecting the World to Israel in Realtime"

🔹No rockets from Gaza yesterday.

▪️Wall Street Journal: Israel informed the US of its intention to establish a buffer zone one kilometer deep in the Gaza Strip.

▪️Shiite militias of Iraq (Iran supported and weapon supplied) state they have shut down Israel’s Haifa and Ashdod ports via suicide drone attack. “The Islamic resistance in Iraq began the second phase of the naval blockade of the Zionist entity, which includes: a naval blockade in the Mediterranean Sea and the shutdown of its seaports. The siege on it will continue until the blockade of Gaza is lifted and the massacres in the Gaza Strip stop.” This is called believing your own propaganda and assuming that your enemy failing to report on it is enemy lies.

▪️Flood alert: Normal Negev and Dead Sea sites for seasonal rain flow are flooding or expected to flood and must be avoided. Hiking and nature trips should be suspended. The National Center for Flood Prediction: a flow has been detected down Nahal Ergot, it is expected to reach Highway 90 soon.

▪️The compound and neighborhood where 21 soldiers fell was destroyed yesterday afternoon.

🔶 GAZA-HAMAS Front

▪️Heavy fighting continues in Khan Yunis, including airstrikes on enemy terror squads.

▪️Enemy action reports: Violent bombardment in various parts of the Gaza Strip now. Israeli aircraft bombed a group of people (fighters - but we report they were children) on the shore of the sea near Rafah, south of the Gaza Strip. Heavy concentration of IDF forces southwest of Gaza City. IDF tanks firing at buildings next to Nasser Hospital in Khan Yunis, south Gaza.

▪️Gaza Now reports that somehow, nobody knows why (sarcasm), the HUNDREDS of trucks of food aid entering Gaza and sent to north Gaza keep not arriving or arriving mostly empty. Where is the aid going?

🔶 RED SEA-Houthis Front

▪️The Pentagon: Since the 11th of this month, we have destroyed 25 missile launch facilities and more than 20 missiles, drones and radars in Yemen.

▪️Due to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the German shipping company Hapag Lloyd announced the launch of an overland corridor from the shores of the Persian Gulf in the UAE and Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea - bypasses the "Houthi problem" and also significantly shortens shipping time - truck shipping the containers across Saudi Arabia and loading them on ships in the northern Red Sea closer to the Suez Canal.

🔶 REGIONAL War

▪️Iraq: A wave of American attacks in southwestern Iraq and on the way to Qaim (against Iranian backed Shiite militias that have been attacking US bases). The area under attack is Jarp al-Nasr, an area that was taken over by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (yes, Iran operating in Iraq). Iraqi Hezbollah battalions were also attacked. American planes carried out 5 airstrikes.

🔶 JUDEA-SAMARIA Front

▪️The village of Urif: our forces blew up the house of the terrorist who carried out the deadly shooting attack near the settlement of Eli on June 20 of last year.

#Israel #October 7 #Hamas Massacre #Iron Sword #Realtime Updates

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mariacallous · 1 year

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No one in Lebanon wants a war, but they may still get one.

The country has been on tenterhooks since Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7 and Israel amassed hundreds of thousands of troops—stationing many along its northern border with Lebanon. The scale of the Israeli response in Gaza may define Lebanon’s future as Hezbollah, a powerful Lebanese militia backed by Iran, may feel compelled to join in, despite its instinct for self-preservation. The Lebanese are fully aware the conflict might spill over and push the country, long teetering on the edge, into an irretrievable abyss.

It will be “catastrophic, a final blow to Lebanese resilience,” said Nizar Ghanem, the director of research and a co-founder of Triangle, a Lebanese think tank. “Israel can destroy Lebanon,” Sami Nader, a political analyst, told Foreign Policy. During the 2006 war with Israel, “it cost Lebanon billions of dollars.”

Yet, at a time when the country is grappling with myriad crises, caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati has failed to get assurances from Hezbollah that Lebanon will not be engulfed in yet another conflict with Israel. “I could not get assurances about the developments from any party because the situation is constantly changing,” he said on Lebanese TV.

Lebanon has been reeling over the last few years under its worst-ever economic crisis; since mass protests erupted in 2019 over a cost of living crisis, Lebanon has faced rising unemployment and among the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world. As the economy went into a tailspin, the local currency devalued by 90 percent, inflation skyrocketed, and pushed 80 percent of people below the poverty line.

Living standards dropped substantially, and power blackouts for 22 hours per day became routine. A sense of injustice prevailed as no one was held accountable for the catastrophic explosion in Beirut’s port on Aug. 4, 2020.

The country’s parliament has repeatedly failed to elect a president; there is only a caretaker prime minister and a temporary central bank chief. The foreign reserves have depleted from $30 billion back before the 2019 crisis to $8.6 billion today—which, incidentally, is just a billion more than the $7.6 billion raised by the international community to help Lebanon rebuild the infrastructure destroyed in the 2006 war.

If there’s another war, experts believe Lebanon may not get a chance to recover. They say an already bankrupt Lebanese state won’t be handed any loans by the international community and the wealthy Arab monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may not want to flush Lebanon with money that could easily end up in the hands of Hezbollah, which they see as an Iranian militia training other militias in the region that present a threat to their security. “It could lead to a complete meltdown of the state,” Ghanem added. “And this time, Lebanon does not have the chance to borrow from international markets.”

In case of war, the chassis of basic infrastructure sustaining daily life may get bombed and demolished, forcing another generation of Lebanese to flee the country. There are chances of civil unrest, too. If Israel limits its operations to Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon, Bekaa, and Dahieh, where Shiites predominately live—many of whom support Hezbollah or are beholden to it—the people in those communities will likely flee to other parts of the country. That will further burden the civic services already under strain from the presence of Syrian refugees and could even exacerbate sectarian differences.

Khaled Zeidan, a restaurateur in a posh Christian neighborhood in Beirut, said his biggest concern is displacement—and the social tensions that could lead to: “The biggest risk is displacement from the south towards Beirut and other areas, particularly with the overwhelming problems we are currently facing.”

Even after decades of war, the country is still divided, and often members of a specific sect dominate a specific neighborhood or an entire city. There are palpable tensions in the country, with many opposing Iran’s influence through Hezbollah and long demanding the group disarm. Hezbollah’s weapons, ostensibly stockpiled to protect Lebanon from Israel, give it the power it exudes in domestic politics.

Mark Daou, a Lebanese member of parliament who taught media studies at the American University of Beirut, said the impact of the Israel-Hamas war is already being felt in Lebanon as the German airline Lufthansa has stopped flights and not all shipping lanes are open, causing shortages.

“We are starting to get tight on supplies. Lanes are not all open. It’s a struggle to get ships to send stuff to Lebanon,” he told Foreign Policy over the phone from Beirut. “This is just on the risk of war, not even an ongoing war.” (Lebanon is heavily dependent on imports—even for some basic food items.) Daou said Hezbollah has “no excuse” to go to a war that “will destroy the country.”

The key question is if Hezbollah—armed with 150,000 precision-guided missiles—including hundreds of long-range rockets that can hit anywhere inside Israel—will heed the call of Hamas, its ally in the axis of resistance against Israel. Or will Israel’s leadership, with troops already mobilized and global sympathy onside, see an opportunity in opening another front to destroy Hezbollah’s armory?

Hezbollah does not have the consent of the Lebanese people to wage a war on Israel. It also isn’t suicidal and won’t enter a conflict without gaming out an exit. Yet it is an ideological organization with thousands of fighters and reservists who were enrolled and brainwashed with anti-Israel rhetoric.

Even though the United States has sent two aircraft carriers to the Eastern Mediterranean to deter Hezbollah and Iran from expanding the conflict, the opening of another front in Lebanon cannot be ruled out. Hezbollah may enter the war with all its might in three situations: extreme bloodshed in Gaza; if Israel starts bombing Hezbollah’s stockpiles, hidden all over Lebanon; or if Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei deems it the path to be.

Elias Farhat, a retired Lebanese Army general, said the Lebanese armed forces and Hezbollah are at a high degree of readiness. He said Hezbollah is likely to intervene in the current conflict if “Israel escalates its attacks on Lebanon and targets deep in Lebanon”—presumably Hezbollah’s rockets or leadership or Lebanese cities—or if “Israel storms in[to] Gaza and commit[s] more massacres.”

Hezbollah may opt for limited involvement to assuage Hamas and save face in front of its devoted and determined cadre while still preserving itself. The group may intensify rocket shelling and send its elite Radwan commando unit to carry out raids of varying magnitude—depending on the state of affairs in Gaza—across the blue line.

Nader, the political analyst, said that in the end, the decision would be made in Tehran, depending on Iran’s calculus. “Hamas is a strategic asset for Iran and a huge instrument of pressure. It offered Iran clout inside Israel,” he said. “If they feel they are about to lose this strategic asset that they have been investing in for years, they will push Hezbollah to open another front.”

As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken went on a six-nation tour of the Middle East to prevent a regional conflict last week, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Beirut and Baghdad and met Hamas’s leadership in Doha to firm up the alliance among Iran’s proxies. “In light of the continued aggression, war crimes, and siege on Gaza, opening other fronts is a real possibility,” Amir-Abdollahian said in Beirut.

Hezbollah is heavily armed and a much more serious adversary for Israel. It has devoted fighters, a loyal support base, and thousands of reservists, who on any given day express a desire to move to Europe or the United States to build a better life but are still unwavering in their support to Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah.

Both Israel and Hezbollah have warned of bombing each other back to the “stone age,” and military experts agree that it would be a destructive war for both sides.

Israel can destroy Lebanon, but Hezbollah, too, can cause a huge amount of damage and attack critical installations and population centers. It can fire volleys of rockets to overwhelm the Iron Dome air defense system and open a third front in southern Syria against the Israel-held Golan Heights. “The Syrian front will open if the situation deteriorates to a dangerous extent,” Farhat said.

In August, Nasrallah warned that it would take a “few high-precision missiles” to destroy Israel airports “civilian and military” and other targets including “the Dimona [nuclear] power station.”

The last war with Israel definitely hurt Lebanon, but it catapulted Hezbollah from a rookie militia to a “savior.” Hezbollah built a huge museum in the mountains to celebrate its performance. Tales of how it emerged from under the ground, via tunnels, and fought Israelis are the stuff of legend in villages on the border. These villages are now tense, and so are Lebanese elsewhere in the country.

So far, the exchange of fire between Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces has been frequent but calibrated so as not to escalate. But that’s no comfort for people who are far too acquainted with how quickly skirmishes can turn into full-blown conflicts.

“Another collapsed Middle Eastern nation, it’s not a joke,” says Ghanem. “We hope it doesn’t happen [in Lebanon].”

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bu1410 · 7 months

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Good morning TUMBLR - March 7th - 2024

''Mr. Plant has owed me a shoe since July 5, 1971."

Ch. VIII - 1985- 1989 - Bahrain - Part 1

The 25 km King Fahd causeway that links Saudi Arabia to Bahrain.

Manama, the modern capital of Bahrain.

Bahrain desert - the Tree of Life

Bahrain life

GPIC - Gulf Petrochemical Complex - Sitra Island, Bahrain

The winter between December 1984 and January 1985 was particularly harsh in Italy, characterized by increasingly lower temperatures. Between 13 and 17 January 1985, a depression centered on the Corsican Sea caused what is still remembered in Milan today as the snowfall of the century or the snowfall of '85, constituting the heaviest snowfall recorded in Milan in the 20th century. The snowfall caused serious damage. After four days of real storm, January 17th 1985 the Sports Hall collapsed in Milan due to the excessive weight of the snow that had accumulated on the roof. In this certainly not festive atmosphere, I received a call from an engineering company in Milan, INTECH, an already a supplier of services to SNAMPROGETTI, with whom I soon agreed to leave for Bahrain.

From the SNAMPROGETTI office in San Donato, the Head of HR office Mr. Cincotta reassured me:  ''It's a temporary destination, just a few months, waiting that construction of new Agadir International Airport will start … don't worry…'' I stayed there for 4 years…….

Mind you, not that I minded: Bahrain was a liveable place (drinkable, in the language of shipbuilders) especially because it also allowed families to reach the employees involved in the project. I then left at the beginning of March 1984, with a flight via Kuwait. I arrived at Manama airport and believe it or not there was someone waiting for me! A local guy holding a board with my name written on it almost correctly: Brino Sirino….

Bahrain is a small Emirate in the Persian Gulf (Kaleejj el Arabi) made up of a main island and a myriad of uninhabited islets. It is the ''poorest'' Gulf state, relative to its surrounding neighbors. Above all, Saudi Arabia provides the Emirate with considerable economic aid as the ruling house of Bahrain, like the Al Saud, is of the Sunni faith, in spite to a majority Shiite population The Saudis would never allow a Shiite regime to be established 25 km from the Saudi coast with the approval of the ''Great Enemy'' Iran. And then Bahrain was a sort of ''playground'' for Saudis looking for entertainment just outside their front door. This therefore explains the reason for the economic support to Bahrain by the Saudis. For instance, one of the largest oil well in Saudi waters has always been exploited for free by the Bahraini oil industry. The construction of the 23 km long bridge that connects Saudi Arabia to the island of Bahrain was financed by the Saudis. The free sale of alcohol in Manama by shops managed by a company belonging to the ruling Bahraini family is another concession aimed at helping the Emir Al Khalifa's coffers. In 1986, shortly before the opening of the Dahran – Manama bridge to traffic, King Fahad proposed to the Emir Sheik Eissa the prohibition of alcohol sale, promising to compensate the Emir for the lost earnings: an offer returned to the sender. On top of all this, about 50% of the Southern territory of the island of Bahrain is off limits, due to the largest naval base leased to the US in the Gulf. However, Manama has since then been a modern city, full of skyscrapers, luxury hotels and shopping centres.

AWALI I was housed in Awali, a village of wooden houses built by the Americans of Caltex in 1939, when the first refinery in Bahrain (and the entire Persian Gulf) was built. Someone later told me that around 1942 some Italian planes departing from a base in Egypt tried to bomb the refinery, which produced fuel for the English army. Not having enough fuel to guarantee the return, the planes dropped their bombs into the sea just before the island of Bahrain, and aborted the mission. The village of Awali is located almost in the center of the main island of Bahrain, and its wooden houses are reminiscent of those from the Lassie TV series in every way, including anti-mosquito doors. The houses are 2 and 4 bedrooms, with a large living-dining room, kitchen and two bathrooms. I was assigned to a small 4 bedroom house, but when I got there I was the only occupant. The village also had a club with a partially covered swimming pool (to prevent the summer sun from making the water too hot) and tennis courts, to which we had free access.

RONCI ATHOS A few days after my arrival, around 3.00 AM, I heard some noises: the sound of a car stopping, doors slamming, and than someone throwing something (I than saw that it was suitcases…) inside the house. , on the wooden floor. Then the door of my room suddenly open, and someone said:  Are you asleep?  Before you arrived I was asleep…….  However...... - says the guy - I'm not going to stay here…….tomorrow I'll talk to the HR and then I'll see .....  Okay…. I say…. do as you like but let me sleep now….

For the record, Mr. Ronci Athos – Umbrian from Narni – was still there in 1993, in the place that 8 years earlier he had said he would leave as soon as possible….

THE PROJECT Our client was called GPIC - Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company - a mixed Bahraini, Saudi and Kuwaiti capital company - and was part of the economic aid package from the rich Gulf countries to the ''poor'' relative of Bahrain. Later, at the time of the commissioning and start up of the plants - we would have transformed the acronym into Gruppo Pensionati Italiani Comerint, given the average age of the people that the then company 'ENI had sent to proceed with the commissioning of the plants. The project was in its final phase, and was directed by none other than the P.I. Manoli Benito Italo. Bahrain would be his last construction site personally managing, before becoming Director of the CSO Service of SNAMPROGETTI. The works were even ahead of schedule, so SNAMPROGETTI enjoyed a lot of credit with the Client. Upon delivery of the plant, the Client gifted an extra bonus of 4 million dollars to SNAMPROGETTI for its performance. The credit was than canceled in 1990, during the first Gulf War. GPIC invited SNAMPROGETTI, BECHTEL and UHUDE to provide an initial feasibility study for a urea plant to be built alongside the existing ammonia and methanol plants. BECHTEL replied that she was not interested, SNAMPROGETTI sent a fax requesting an advance of 11,000 USD for the preliminary study. The Germans from HUDE, sensing the deal, in the midst of the Gulf War, sent a representative to Bahrain to discuss the possibility of building the urea plant. In 1992 the belated SANMPROGETTI envoy to Manama was detained at the entrance gate of the plant for a couple of hours, only to be informed that GPIC had officially commissioned UHUDE with the preliminary study.

COMMISSIONING & START UP The long phase of pre-commissioning, commissioning and start-up of the plants soon began. Which were built on a so-called reclaimed land (an artificial island) created by dredging the shallow seabed, characteristic of the Bahraini island. The artificial island - equipped for safety reasons with an outer gate and an inner gate - was connected to the mainland by a causeaway approximately 3 kilometers long, and a second causeaway joined the island to the loading arms of the products, 10 kilometers further into the sea. This is to allow ships to carry out loading operations in complete safety, without the risk of running aground in the shallow seabed. There were many wrecks of ships stranded along the channel dug by the open sea up to the port of Manama - this much to the happiness of the divers, given that the wrecks had been transformed into sanctuaries of Persian Gulf tropical fish. However, I must say a word to describe the characters who are part of the commissioning – start up. These particular people, who believe they are a sort of ''NASA scientists'' intent on launching the SPACE SHUTTLE into space. As soon as they arrived at site their aim was: ''Okay, get rid of Construction people, we're here now''. The fact is that, apart from 3 or 4 of them who really knew what they were doing and were experts in the difficult process of putting the plants into operation (very dangerous indeed) all the others followed suit: ''they claimed to know'' and the less they knew, the more they pretended they were knewing. I met someone who, as soon as they heard someone approaching, started to talk about chemical formulas, operating pressures, and so on, just to put on airs. In any case, within 3 months the start up team had managed to get the two plants up and running, even if the (rhetorical) question that was circulating was - Did you make the methanol?'' ''no…I didn't…So who did it?? No one knows.... ''

Tawfeeq Mohammed Rasul Almansoor - GPIC President The President of GPIC, however, did not seem entirely satisfied, and he demonstrated it with a series of actions that were surprising to say the least. One day Mr. Tawfiq arrived at high speed at the outer gate driving his metallic blue Rolls Royce. The presence of smat guy on the guard post prevented him from ending up against the bars at the outer check point.

Mr Tawfiq continued on the causeway at full speed and the inner gate guard, warned by radio by his colleague at the outer gate, promptly raised the bars. The President's Rolls entered the area of the Administrative offices, where he finally stopped. Tawfiq got out of the car in a rage, and ordered the Security Chief who met him to organize a meeting within 15 minutes. Participants in addition to him were the Security Chef, the Director of COMERINT and the Security Advisor. We mortals later learned that the Security Chef – an British guy, former officer in Hes Majesty's army, had been fired on the spot – Reason given by Mr. Tawifiq:

''Two gates were opened for me and I was able to drive my car into the plant – and this was because at the sight of my Rolls Royce the guards thought I was driving the car. What if he was a terrorist? What if I suddenly went crazy and wanted to attack the plant? What if I had been kidnapped by terrorists who were hiding in the car filled with explosives??'' (I remember that the Rolls Royce was equipped with tinted mirror windows which did not allow anyone to see who was driving the car.) A few days later, a second episode, again with Mr. Tawifiq as absolute protagonist. He had gone between the Main Control Room and Plant Laboratory, in a fairly hidden corner of the plant, and had broken the glass of one of the fire alarms that send a signal to the Fire Department control room. He than set off the stopwatch on his Rolex Platinum Diamond Pearlmaster to see how long it would take for the firefighters to arrive. After 11 interminable minutes - I would like to point out that the Fire Station was about 700 meters from the place where Mr. Tawfiq was stationed - the firefighters arrived to find that it was a false alarm. Again an urgent meeting was called, where this time the HSE manager lost his job. The reason for such a delay – which according to Tawfiq could have led to a disaster in the event of a real fire – was that on the synoptic panel of the fire brigade control room it was not possible to identify precisely where the alarm had went off. Just a week after the episode of the false fire, the start-up of the plants had been successfuly done. The plant was even proding more ammonia and methanol than expected, around 1,200 tons per day per product, instead of the 1,000 tons expected. But many of the ''COMERINT Pensioners'' who had participated in the commissioning were still circulating in the plant. As they say in Southern Italy, ''they were mugging''. Obviously COMERINT was looking for all the plausible excuses to keep them in service, given the daily rates with which they were invoiced to the Customer. (an average of $1,200/day per person). The situation between COMERINT and GPIC had become very tense, with daily requests from the latter to demobilize the technicians. One day Tawfiq lost patience, and went to the Main Control Room - still dressed in the traditional white disdasha, ghutra on his head, he surprised a swarm of Italians having coffee, talking about football, playing on the computer. Tawfiq, who had been taken like an ordinary local, turned to the bystanders waving his arms in the Arab manner and said:  ''What is this? Coffee shop''?  The shift manager, at that moment sitting on the desk with a cup of coffee in his hand and his legs dangling, stood up and in a benevolent manner, took Tawfiq by the arm (a very serious mistake as per Arab habits) pointed to a door at the end of the corridor and told him :  Shouff (look) coffee shop for Arab is there, at the end of corridor – accompanying it all with a laugh. Tawifiq, according to bystanders, didn't show any sign of upset - he left the Control Room, called the Italian Director on the phone. Mr Fiorentino, COMERINT top manager. Mr Tawfiq ordered that all those present at the unfortunate episode were boarded on the first plane to Italy. The offices in the North wing of the Control Room were closed until further notice. But where the President of GPIC gave his best was at the final meeting with Construction Director Benito Italo Manoli and the entire SAMPROGETTI staff present. During the meeting, numbers of questions were raised which mainly concerned the safety of the systems. At a certain point Mr. Tawfiq turned directly to the Italian Doctor Mr. Busonero asking :  Doctor, in case of explosion of one or more tanks of ammonia or methanol, either due to a terrorist attack, or due to an accident, what could be the consequences?

Dead silence in the meeting room… gazes of all those present frantically crossing each other… Mr. Manoli trying to communicate via brain waves with Doct. Busonero, while coughs and noises of chairs moving rang out in the room…. ..and finally the Doctor, red in the face and with drops of sweat running down his forehead (despite the air conditioning being set to 19 degrees C – Tawfiq's favorite temperature) Doct. Busonero replied: - Well…Mr. Tawifiq…with a prevailing wind from the South-East to the North-West, the inhabitants of Manama would have from 7 to 10 minutes to recommend each one's soul to God…''

It was freezing in the meeting room, no one said a word, everyone was waiting for the President's counter-reply. Tawfiq stood up and nodded to Mr. Manoli who followed him into President's private office. The next day there was no trace of Doct. Busonero. We learned that he had been put on a plane to Rome before midnight, the deadline that Tawfiq had indicated to Mr. Manoli. Contrary, Doct. Busonero would have been arrested for telling the truth.

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cultml · 2 years

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partisan-by-default · 9 months

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The Houthis’ most recent strike, on Tuesday, had been a coordinated salvo of 21 drones and missiles at commercial and military ships. U.S. Navy crews were able to shoot down all the weapons, but some came close. In any case, protecting navigation of the seas is an age-old, legitimate military mission. Before Tuesday’s strike, the U.S. and 13 other countries had formally warned the Houthis they would face “consequences” if they continued attacking ships. The U.N. Security Council also condemned the Houthi attacks.

Yet at the same time, the Biden-led attack—which involved ships, submarines, and aircraft firing more than 100 highly accurate missiles at more than 60 Houthi targets across at least 16 locations in Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa—could escalate and widen the ongoing conflicts in the region. At the very least, it will further embroil the United States in the war and complicate the prospects of a peace.

The strikes—which officials say were aimed at radars, missile factories and depots, command-control facilities, and drone launch sites—were meant to “degrade” Houthi capabilities to attack more ships. The officials did not claim that the strikes would “destroy” all of their capabilities; they said it was likely that the Houthis would retaliate in some form, in which case the U.S. would respond accordingly. It is not yet known how effective the strike was—it takes hours, sometimes days, for military intelligence to conduct “bomb-damage assessment.” Houthi officials claimed the attack killed five militiamen and injured six. They said nothing about civilian casualties, which suggests there were probably few, if any.

The Houthis are a Shiite sect that overthrew the Yemeni government in 2014 and have been waging a civil war ever since, with steadily increasing support from Iran and against steadily diminishing resistance from Saudi Arabia. The support from Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah—in weapons, training, and intelligence—has made Houthi fighters, which were once a ragtag militia just loosely allied with Iran, quite skillful and sophisticated, a full partner in the Iran-led “axis of resistance.” It has also made the Houthis’ leaders more radical and ambitious.

In the past year, they have tried to cast themselves as not only rebels against Yemen’s Saudi-backed regime (which, though deposed, is still recognized by most countries as the legitimate government) but also as a leader of jihad, a “Southern Hezbollah,” as Michael Knights of the Washington institute has put it. Their slogan: “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam!”

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usafphantom2 · 2 years

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Exactly 30 years ago, a US F-16 recorded his first kill and also the first using an AIM-120 AMRAAM

Fernando Valduga By Fernando Valduga 12/27/2022 - 22:33 in Military, War Zones

General Gary North poses for a photo in front of the F-16 he was piloting when he shot down an Iraqi MiG-25.

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On December 27, 1992, four U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gary North, found an Iraqi MiG 25 that crossed the air exclusion zone in southern Iraq. The F-16 held the Iraqi aircraft in the air exclusion zone, preventing it from escaping north. One of the F-16s, arriving from the north, fired an AIM-120A against the Soviet-building fighter. Find out how this fight was.

In April 1991, shortly after the U.S. and its coalition allies expelled Iraqi military forces from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. established an air exclusion zone in northern Iraq. This was soon followed by the establishment of a similar zone over southern Iraq to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 688.

This resolution guided the protection of Shiite Muslims against attacks by military forces under the control of Saddam Hussein, the Sunni Muslim dictator of Iraq, and a series of other sanctions. To support the resolution and protect the Shiites, the southern air exclusion zone covered the entire south of Iraq, from the 32-degree latitude line to the south to the borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The air exclusion zone applied to fixed and rotating wing aircraft, but in October 1991, the southern air exclusion zone also became a "d driving ban" zone and the U.S. Central Command Joint Task Force for Southeast Asia (JTF-SWA) was entrusted with the execution.

Lieutenant Colonel Gary North, commander of the 33rd FS; SSgt. Roy Murray, team chief; SA Steven Ely, assistant to the chief of the crew, pose with the F-16D #90-0778 that Lieutenant Colonel North was piloting when he shot down an Iraqi MiG-25 over the "No Fly Zone" on December 27, 1992. Mounted on the tips of the wings are the advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles AIM-120A. The location of this photo is at Shaw Air Base, on April 1, 1993.

Generally, most Southern Watch missions consisted of fighter scans and patrols, suppression of enemy air defenses, aerial reconnaissance and air command and control using AWACS E-3 Sentry aircraft.

However, the air operations conducted by Saddam Hussein's air force during 91-92 showed that he had no intention of complying with resolution 688. In fact, as explained by Donald J. McCarthy, Jr. in his book "The Raptors All F-15 and F-16 aerial combat victories", countless military combats between coalition forces and Iraqi command and control systems, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) sites, radar sites and land-to-air missile sites (SAM) occurred since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

One of the most famous clashes took place on Sunday, December 27, 1992, when an Iraqi MiG-25 fighter (NATO name "Foxbat") violated the air exclusion zone and entered airspace south of the 33rd parallel.

U.S. Air Force Colonel Gary North undergoes pre-flight checks on F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft before flying on a training mission at Luke Air Base in Arizona. The green star on the aircraft represents the Iraqi Mig-25 he shot down.

On that day, at approximately 10:42 a.m. local time, then captain Gary "Nordo" North (who piloted the F-16D "90-0778", indicative Benji 41) led a flight of four F-16s on a routine OSW Mission. While the Viper pilots were refueling from a KC-135, they heard urgent transmissions between a formation of four F-15s in the air exclusion zone and AWACS controllers. An Iraqi fighter (that F-15, having been close enough to obtain a visual acquisition, confirmed it as a "Foxbat") crossed the border to the air exclusion zone and was now accelerating north safely with the F-15 in pursuit. The Foxbat quickly reached the north of the 30th parallel and the F-15, now with little fuel, left the area.

As told by Craig Brown in his book "Debrief: a complete history of U.S. air engagements 1981 to the present", North and his wing refueled only enough fuel to allow them to cover the designated time at the station in the no-fly zone and crossed the border with southern Iraq while the third and fourth aircraft of their group continued to refuel. In a few minutes, the AWACS controllers ordered the two F-16s to head to an Iraqi aircraft heading south towards the thirty-two parallel to ensure that the Bogey did not cross to the air exclusion zone. A few minutes later, the AWACS controllers directed the Vipers to intercept another high-speed contact that originated in the north and crossed to the air exclusion zone approximately thirty miles west of the F-16 formation. The Iraqi fighter was forced to turn north safely before the F-16, armed with two advanced mid-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) AIM-120A and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, could attack him.

MiG-25 of the Iraqi Air Force.

The AWACS radar monitored another aircraft, northeast of the F-16, flying south towards the air exclusion zone, but this time, while the F-16s flew to intercept the fighter, an Iraqi SAM radar began to track the Vipers. At this point, North ordered the third and fourth aircraft in his group, now fully charged with fuel, to fly north at their best speed. Again the AWACS radar reported a radar contact entering the air exclusion zone west of the Northern formation at high speed at 30,000 feet.

Bogey was flying directly to them from the east.

Nordo asked for a tactical displacement to the north to "fit" the F-16 between the MiG and parallel 30, creating a blocking maneuver and trapping the Iraqi fighter in prohibited airspace. The MiG could not escape back to Iraqi territory without fighting. "Someone would die in the next two minutes, and it wouldn't be me or my wing," North said.

North requested authorization to shoot by visually identifying the aircraft - a MiG-25 Foxbat armed with radar-guided AA-6 "Acrid" missiles. He instructed his ward to employ his electronic interference pod and again requested authorization to shoot. He finally heard "BANDIT-BANDIT-BANDIT, CLEARED TO KILL" about his headset. Approximately three nautical miles, fifteen degrees high from the nose and fifteen degrees from the right bank to the north, he blocked the MiG-25 and fired an AMRAAM, which led to the impact and totally destroyed the Foxbat built in Russia.

It took less than 15 minutes from the moment North left the KC-135 to shoot down the MiG. The video below is the original footage of the slaughter described in this article.

youtube

On October 28, 1998, Colonel Paul "PK" White interviewed North for an article of his own, "Nordos' MiG Kill", where North described the moment of the missile's impact: "I saw three separate detonations, the nose and left wing broke instantly and the tail continued in the main body of the jet and, finally, a huge fireball."

Noteworthy, this fight marked not only the first aerial victory won by an American F-16, but also the first shooting of an AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Tags: Military AviationF-16 Fighting FalconHISTORYIqAF - Iraqi Air Force / Iraqi Air ForceUSAF - United States Air Force / US Air ForceWar Zones - Iraq

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Fernando Valduga

Aviation photographer and pilot since 1992, he has participated in several events and air operations, such as Cruzex, AirVenture, Dayton Airshow and FIDAE. He has works published in specialized aviation magazines in Brazil and abroad. Uses Canon equipment during his photographic work in the world of aviation.

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ahlulbaytnetworks · 5 months

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IMAM JAFFAR AS-SADIQ (AS)

Father : Muhammad al-Baqir

Mother: Umm Farwah daughter of Qasim

Birth: 17 Rabi'al Awwal, Medina, Saudi Arabia

Imam: 6th Imam for 28 years

Title: As-Sadiq (the truth)

Children: Moussa al-Kazim, Ismail ben Jafar, Ali al-Uraidhi ibn Ja'far al-Sadiq, Abdullah al-Aftah

Martyrs: 25 Shawwal, Medina, Saudi Arabia

Burial: Al Baqi Cemetery, Medina, Saudi Arabia

Founder of the Shiite Law School called Ja'fariya (School of Ahl al-Bayt), first Islamic school for interpreting the fiqh of the Shia-inspired Quran.

Apart from Fiqh, Hadith and Tafsir, Imam (as) also gave mathematics and chemistry classes to some of his disciples.

More than four thousand scholars have benefited from his teaching, knowledge and wisdom.

_Hadiths de l'Imam Jafar As-sadiq_

"He who keeps the Qur'an and acts according to it will be with the noble angels who are devoted on the Day of Judgment." "

(Usul-ul-Kafi, vol. 2, p. 603)

"The heart is the sanctuary of God; don't allow any other person to enter the sanctuary of God" (i.e. the heart is for God; so remove attachment to this low world from your heart).

(Bihar ul Anwar / flight. 70/p. 25)

"Indeed, a modest good deed (performed) with piety is better than an important good deed (achieved) without piety." "

(Al-Kafi/the flight. 2/p. 76)

"No invocation is answered by God unless it contains the formula "God bless the Prophet and his Family." ”

(Al-Kafi/the flight. 2/p. 493)

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mariacallous · 2 months

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Israel’s strikes on Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran signal that no leader within Iran’s “axis of resistance” is beyond reach. But what exactly is this alliance, how tight is Iran’s grip, and what are the stakes for the region and the United States if Israel goes to all-out war with it?

The “axis of resistance” refers to a longstanding and evolving coalition of states and groups, originally fostered in the 1950s by Arab nationalist regimes like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which used proxies to challenge Western and Israeli influence in the Middle East. Today Iran leads the axis, fostering and supporting groups like Hezbollah and various Shiite militias across the region.

In a recent panel organized by the Quincy Institute, a speaker with long experience in Iraq and a contact point there for American diplomats, recalled a U.S. official asking her what exactly the “axis of resistance” was resisting? The answer is the United States and all its works, because they share a view of the United States as opposed to them and all their works. Resistance is driven by a mutually reinforcing set of ideological and geostrategic imperatives.

The revolutionary regime in Iran, for example, remembers Washington as Britain’s partner-in-crime in staging the coup that brought the Shah to power in 1953 and, among other things, helping Saddam Hussein try to throttle the revolution in its crib in the 1980s, and imposing severe economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic ever since. The U.S. has also been a steadfast supporter of Israel, which for ideological and more recently strategic reasons, Tehran seeks to weaken, and if possible, destroy. Since 1979, and especially following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iran has been the uneasy leader of the axis of resistance, expanding its influence in regional conflicts, including in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—but its allies are troublesome ones.

Many states see alliances as power-maximizing mechanisms, and Iran is no exception. This is true even of powerful countries like the United States. Iran, unlike the U.S., is stuck with regional allies that don’t qualify as states and are easy prey for their enemies. They are also allies prone to “chain ganging,” that is dragging their patron into potential wars it doesn’t want to fight, through actions like Kataib Hezbollah’s January attack on Tower 22 that killed three U.S. soldiers, the Houthi drone strike on central Tel Aviv in July, and Hamas’s Oct. 7 terrorist attack on Israel, which Tehran claimed it was not informed about. Iran has expended a great deal of effort to keep its axis of resistance from starting things it can’t finish.

The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, resent the United States because it supported both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in their joint effort to block a Houthi drive to seize control of the Yemeni state. This grievance was compounded by U.S. support for Israel’s campaign in Gaza. Although Houthi attacks against international shipping might have been encouraged by Iran, which has stocked Houthi stockpiles over the years on the grounds that any enemy of the al-Saud was a friend of Tehran’s, the Houthis were sufficiently motivated to act. “Curse on the Jews” has long been a feature of their rhetoric and an official slogan.

As an Iranian proxy, the Houthis’ success in choking off shipping lanes in the Red Sea has not been terribly useful. Iran is trying to reduce its isolation and hurt Israel—appearing to be the mastermind of capers to impose increased cost on global shipping does not advance either goal.

Houthis are enjoying the domestic and regional high of resistance against world powers, however, and will continue to do so as long as the war in Gaza grinds on. In effect, the Houthis have found a way to sanction the international community, ineffective as it may be. What the Houthis lack in financial muscle, they make up for with Yemen’s geography. Resistance in the Red Sea has also proved a helpful distraction from discontents at home over economic hardship and a good recruitment tool for boosting the ranks. They have even resisted various Saudi inducements to stop firing. But the war in Gaza will not grind on forever and countries paying the price for Houthi shenanigans will begin to push back.

Lebanese Hezbollah is the elder brother within the axis of resistance. As a political party it is embedded in a broader political structure that has cannibalized the Lebanese state and, for that matter, Lebanese society by maintaining an armed wing more powerful than the Lebanese military, paralyzing the country’s political processes, exploiting Lebanon’s economic issues like the fuel crisis to boost its popularity, and entangling Lebanon in regional conflicts ranging from Syria’s civil war to tensions with Israel. This in turn provides ample political cover for the group’s control of southern Lebanon and its presence along the Blue Line which serves as a provisional border between Israel and Lebanon. It also constrains Hezbollah’s freedom of action.

Unlike Iran, Hezbollah is deployed right on Israel’s border. Iran has therefore invested billions of dollars in keeping the group supplied with a wide range of missiles and rockets, while working closely with Hezbollah’s intelligence apparatus. The strategic dimension of the relationship lies in the presumed deterrent effect of a full-scale Hezbollah missile and rocket attack against Israel on any plans Israelis might have to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure or leadership.

Until last weekend deterrence seemed to be mutual. Tensions escalated on Saturday when Israel reported a Hezbollah missile strike on the Golan Heights that killed 12 children and teenagers, prompting an Israeli response on Tuesday with an airstrike on a building in Beirut, targeting Fuad Shukr, the Hezbollah commander they hold responsible. This was followed with the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in a highly securitized area of Tehran.

The threshold for Hezbollah’s use of its vast missile inventory is correspondingly high. The problem for Israel, Hezbollah and their respective patrons is that no one really knows where the threshold lies. A full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah would devastate Lebanon and northern Israel, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths while most likely failing to destroy Hezbollah.

While Lebanese Hezbollah remains a significant force on Israel’s border, Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and operating in Syria pose a different but equally concerning threat due to their proximity to U.S. troops. The idea that they can somehow be dismantled or sidelined ignores how deeply entrenched these groups are in Iraq and how their rise was intertwined with U.S. intervention in the first place. The three most problematic groups for U.S. interests in Iraq are Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat al-Nujaba.

Kataib Hezbollah was founded during the brutal civil war in Iraq in the mid-2000s, as was Asaib Ahl al-Haq. The latter was created as a breakaway from Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, which at the time was the most feared Shiite militant group in Iraq for Washington. Harakat al-Nujaba was formed later in 2013 by Akram Abbas al-Kabi, who himself had deep roots in the Sadrist movement and Mahdi Army.

It was the U.S. intervention in 2003 that helped create a groundswell of anti-U.S. Shiite militancy primarily channeled through Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, which eventually led to the formation of even more militant groups with closer ties to Iran. Ironically, al-Sadr is now viewed by some in Washington circles as a maverick—uncontrollable by any party, including Iran. Others think of him as an Iraqi patriot.

From a U.S. perspective, dismantling these groups would amount to going to war against Iraq, since they are so deeply rooted in Iraqi society and politics. The Trump administration saw Iraq as an enemy because in its view, Baghdad had sold out to Iran and the government’s tolerance of militias aligned with Iran was evidence of its defection. The Obama and Biden administrations took a different view, which did not disregard the hazard posed by these militias but understood that as part of Iraqi society there was no easy way to uproot them.

Sanctions on the other hand made it impossible to communicate with them. The middle course of working around them within the U.S.-Iraqi relationship was therefore the only feasible option. The Iran-aligned militias in Iraq recently rebranded as the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq in response to the war in Gaza. These groups have demonstrated a boldness that puts U.S. troops at risk, as demonstrated by Kataib Hezbollah’s drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan, which killed three U.S. soldiers.

Washington can temporarily restore deterrence against these types of attacks through targeted strikes on leaders and facilities, as it did after the attack on Tower 22. There are Shiite elites and Iraqi stakeholders who do not want their country caught in the crossfire of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions. But this deterrence is often restored temporarily, and these militias have already begun targeting U.S. troops again after roughly six months of calm.

Hamas, meanwhile, is a tragic example of an ally that exposes its patrons to great dangers by starting fights it can’t win. Yahya Sinwar and Muhammad Dief have evidently confused themselves with Vietnamese revolutionary leaders Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Giáp. The North Vietnamese population in 1968 was 18 million, dwarfing the population in South Vietnam. It had powerful, if problematic friends. It was also immune from invasion, if not intensive aerial bombardment. It had supply routes carved out in neighboring states and for years commanded an insurgency in U.S. controlled territory. North Vietnam was a sovereign state with impressive administrative capacity and ability to mobilize its resources. And it was able to impose just enough pain on the U.S. to destabilize American politics and undermine support for the war.

Under those conditions, North Vietnam’s readiness to tolerate unimaginable levels of violence directed at its civilian population to weaken U.S. domestic and international support for Washington’s war and destroy its reputation made gruesome sense. Yet this is Sinwar’s strategy vis-a-vis Israel, in his own words. Gaza, however, is not a sovereign state, Hamas never developed any administrative capacity except in the internal security sphere, has no powerful friends, no strategic depth at all and ten per cent of North Vietnam’s population at the time of the Vietnam War. Gaza’s population of just over 2 million is also a fraction of Israel’s 9 million. The regime in Tehran must be tearing its hair out.

Lastly, there is poor Syria, the only state to enjoy ex officio status as a member of the Axis of Resistance. With friends like this, though, who needs enemies? The real power player in Syria is Russia, which does not want to see its client, Bashar al-Assad, be devoured by a war with Israel triggered by Iran’s seeming reflexive efforts to establish a second front against Israel in the Golan or further fortify Lebanese Hezbollah.

The strategic implications of the axis of resistance for the United States seem limited. If geopolitics were poker, you really would not want to be dealt Iran’s hand. But there are dangers, principally on the Lebanese-Israeli border, which could spin out of control.

Washington is aware of these risks and, not incidentally, White House envoy Amos Hochstein is regularly commuting between Washington and Beirut and, interestingly, Baalbek in the care of Hezbollah. But it seems increasingly unclear where Israel’s leadership understands the risks of starting something it cannot finish.

If Israel or any member of Iran’s axis of resistance crosses one another’s opaque thresholds, the region could plunge into a catastrophic war with tens of thousands of people dead. The Biden administration must bluntly remind Israel that promises of restraint lack credibility after the devastation in Gaza, and work with countries that have influence over Tehran to urge restraint on all sides.

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bu1410 · 7 months

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March 3rd 2024 - Good morning TUMBLR.

Here I go again with another chapter of my memoirs of my life in These are memories of travel and work experiences around the world, over a period of approximately 40 years.

The title is':

''Mr. Plant has owed me a shoe since July 5, 1971."

Ch. I - DAHRAN - SAUDI ARABIA - 1980 – FEAL SpA

What kind of Saudi Arabia did I find in May 1980?

A very different country from today. Sitting on the throne is King Kaled, who succeeded his half-brother Faysal on March 25, 1975, following the assassination of the latter by a nephew.

The country is preparing to become a major industrial and oil power, and must guard against internal and external enemies. The Al Saud family is seen by numerous enemies as ''usurper and illegitimate'' in power, and therefore must proceed in forced stages to modernize the country through the construction of oil plants, infrastructures and even new cities. All this reaffirming in the eyes of the global Muslim community, his role as ''Custodian of the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina''. The pact between the Al Saud royal family and the Wahhabi clergy seems to be working, and the country is under the strict control of the National Guard loyal to the King.

This enormous effort is taken care of, with the approval of the Sovereign, by Fahd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Saʿūd, the King's brother and his designated successor, in his capacity as Minister of Defence.

The projects that FEAL, the company I work for, are implementing are part of the new infrastructures that are emerging in the country: a series of military hospitals and clinics equipped with all the most modern technologies that Italy and the USA can offer.

Saudi Arabia in those years was a very safe country for foreigners, the only social problems were limited to the eternal struggles between Sunnis (who govern the country) and Shiites who are the majority of the population in the so-called Eastern provinces.

This is inevitably reflected in the areas around Mecca and Medina, the two most important holy cities of Islam, where every year millions of pilgrims from all over the world converge to carry out the so-called Hajj (pilgrimage), one of the obligatory pillars of the Muslim religion .

These areas are periodically subject to terrorist attacks, and therefore the Saudi authorities maintain a strong contingent of security forces in the Holy Places, to guarantee order and peace.

A ''different'' country, where I saw a man park his pick up in front of a bank, with plastic bags full of money in the back, and he patiently carried 4 or 5 at a time into the bank, each time leaving an unattended ''treasure'' outside - but where no one remotely dreamed of touching something owned by someone else.

I arrive in Riyadh, where a stop over is scheduled, and going out onto the plane's ladder, I notice that due to inertia the jet engine is still spinning, and I say to myself ''Wow, what heat these engines generate…''

After taking a few steps to reach the terminal, I realize that it wasn't the plane's engine that was producing the heat: the air is literally boiling hot!! And it's only May!!

I left for Daharan, just a 45 minute flight away, overlooking what is internationally called the Persian Gulf, but the Saudis and Arabs call El Kalij el Arabi (The Gulf of the Arabs)

The arrival in Dahran is one of the most promising: no one waiting for me!!! And it's not like I spoke fluent English in 1980!

But we know, sometimes using the old ''Help yourself, heaven helps you'' technique, in the end, by pure chance, I found, among the crowd waiting inside the airport, a Somali boy, one of those who, in addition to speaking fluent English and Arabic, spoke some words in Italian also stand out (colonial reminiscences)

The guy tells me that yes, not far from the airport there is a construction site for a hospital, managed by an Italian company – and that he, with his pick up, will take me to there.

We go out into the infernal heat of the evening - it is now 11.00 PM - and in a few minutes we arrive at the entrance to the construction site.

Awakened by a few honks, the guard comes out of a shack and confirms to us that it is indeed the "Italians'" construction site, "my" construction site.

At this point I heartily thank the Somali boy, and enter the shack, where the guard is busy with the telephone (we are in 1980, cell phones were yet to come). He calls the campound where the Italians live, and assures me that they will send someone to get me there. Which happens after half an hour: another Somali drives the wehicle that came to pick me up (I will learn that this ethnic group has very important functions of service and connection between us ''Western Expats'' and the locals/Asians)

Finally, after a short journey, I ''triumphantly'' enter the Company's compound, a small village made up of prefabricated buildings like those of earthquake victims in Italy, which will be my ''home'' in the coming months.

Thus I began to work on the construction site, with mixed success - in the sense that the project very complex, made up of a thousand difficulties - but with a big difference compared to just a few years later.

There were many Italians who work there and of all categories. There were technicians and supervisors, but also carpenters, bricklayers, electricians, plumbers, floor and carpet installers, installers of plasterboard walls and false ceilings, structures and external coverings in travertine marble. Of course there were a lot of Indian and Pakistani manpower, but the presence of many Italians makes things easier, both in terms of mutual understanding and in carrying out the various phases, all in a workmanlike manner. Only a few years later (to cut costs, said the Top Management…) the Italians will disappear as construction personnel, increasingly replaced by Asians, giving rise to significant problems, both of a technical and economic nature.

In the meantime, the company I worked for decided to participate in tenders for new projects, again in Saudi. For this purpose, I was sent on a mission to various parts of the country, to carry out preliminary surveys on the places and lands where the construction of new hospitals were planned.

One day I left by plane for Riyahd, from where, in a car driven by a local driver, I headed to Buraydah, a town in the An Nafud desert (the desert of Lawrence of Arabia). A very monotonous journey, of about 300 km, surrounded by a desert landscape, ''cheered up'' by the exact same music that flowed from the car's stereo cassette, turned over and over again - traditional Saudi music, which always repeats the same : din of drums and tambourines, interspersed with shouts and vocal modulations. After about 2 hours, I ask the driver if we can hear something different, maybe western music – his answer:

''Western music is a sin, it is also sung by women, and leads to bad thoughts - and then you are here, in Saudi Arabia, our guest, and therefore you must listen to our music.

Buraidah is the capital of the Al-Qassim region in north-central Saudi Arabia, in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula. The city is located equidistant from the Red Sea to the west and the Persian Gulf to the east. It has a population of 619,739 inhabitants (2010 census).

Buraydah is located on the edge of Wadi Al-Rummah, and has a typical desert climate, with hot summers, mild winters and low humidity.

In Buraydah, agriculture is still the cornerstone of the economy. Traditional oasis products such as dates, lemon, orange and other fruits are still important. The modern introduction of grain production has been so successful that Buraydah is one of the Kingdom's largest producers, important in making Saudi Arabia a net exporter of grains. Intensive cultivations are carried out in circular fields, to facilitate irrigation with the ''pivot'' system.

At that time, 1980, the city was underdeveloped – so we visited the local hospital, to get an idea of the current standards of hospital care. What I saw was disconcerting: an old and dilapidated structure, the patients crowded into narrow rooms, sometimes without windows - the beds old and dirty, in many rooms the floor was made up of gravel and sand. The hospital housed around 400 patients, I honestly don't know how many of them, after their stay, walked out of that facility. The new hospital would have to be built next to the existing one, given that there was absolutely nothing around it.

We returned to Riyadh the next day, after sleeping in a local hotel, a building of much pretention but no merit (like so many others in Saudi at the time, it was the product of Egyptian and Syrian architects). The hotel had a swimming pool, which was of course empty.

The next day I had a flight to Abha, from which I would then continue to Khamis Mushayt, where FEAL was building the new local hospital. From there, thanks to the logistical support provided by my colleagues, I would continue to Sharoura, a desert location in southern Saudi Arabia, on the border with Yemen.

Abha is the capital of the Asir region in the east of the country, not far from the Red Sea - It is located 2,270 meters above sea level on the slopes of the fertile mountains that divide the desert area of southwestern Saudi Arabia from the Red Sea . Abha's mild climate makes it a popular tourist destination for Saudis.

The air journey from Riyadh was somewhat troubled, as it approached landing the plane began to vibrate and suddenly lose altitude, in frightening gaps in the air - this caused quite a bit of fear among the local passengers, to the point that some of them they undid their seat belts and began to pray to Allah, prostrating themselves in the aisle of the plane. The on-board staff in vain exhorted the passengers to sit back down and fasten their seat belts, little by little the latter were joined by other Saudis. Until suddenly the turbulence stopped and finally the Commander's voice told everyone to sit down, because in a few minutes we would land!!!

Once I left the airport, I immediately realized that the surrounding landscape was very different from the rest of Saudi Arabia. Abha was sitting on a plateau surrounded by rather bizarrely shaped peaks. After about 40 minutes by car, I arrived at the Company's compound, in Khamis Mushait.

The usual prefabricated buildings, here with a minimum of vegetation and a surprise: a couple of baboons live in the field, free to roam around!

One night in the prefab and then off the next day, very early towards Sharourah.

Sharourah is a city in Najran province, southern Saudi Arabia, about 550 km east of Khamis Mushait. It is located in the Rub Al Khali Desert near the Yemeni border and functions primarily as a border town. Sharourah had a population of 85,000 at the time.

A long and very boring journey, with terrifying heat, and with absolutely nothing to see, except an endless expanse of sand and red dunes.

The day after our arrival, we set out to look for the place where the new hospital will one day be built. With the help of a representative of the local municipality, we go out 20 km from the city and then with the GPS we locate the site - meanwhile we ask ourselves why the hospital should be built in the middle of nowhere, but the best was yet to come: after a few minutes, during which we are proceeding with the instrumental survey of the terrain, a Yemeni Arab approaches on the back of his camel. Once off the animal's back, he speaks animatedly with my driver and the municipality representative – after 10 minutes of discussion the meaning of the dispute is translated to me:

 Yemeni: What are you doing here?

 Us: this is the place chosen for the construction of the new hospital

 Yemeni: And why here?

 We: we didn't choose it, but the local administration

 Yemeni: which local administration?

 Us: Sharoura's

 Yemeni: why has the Sharoura Administration determined that the new hospital must be built in Yemeni territory?

 Us: …….????????

 Us: are you sure of what you say?

 Yemeni: I'm sure

 Us: good, we will do the surveys and then we will go to the municipality of Sharoura to report.

 Yemeni: report that no Saudi hospital will be built in Yemeni territory.

 Us: Okay, Mashallah

Afterwards, having completed the findings, we returned to Sharourah and went straight to the municipality, to report the strange encounter.

The local leaders were not too surprised by our story. They simply told us that ''by the time the hospital is built, the land will certainly be in Saudi territory''.

TRANSFER TO TABUK

I returned to Dahran but didn't stay there long time – Mr. Spazzini, Area Manager for the Middle East for the Feal Group, had arrived to visit the construction site. An ''old-fashioned, self-made'' type of man. Tall, big, his glass eye as a result of a car accident gave him a sinister appearance which ultimately did not reflect his character at all. He was the classic gruff-good guy, Juventus fan. Once on site, the carpentry assembly supervisor, following a complaint from Spazzini regarding the verticality of the structure of the emergency stairs, blurted out ''oh well' Mr. Spazzini…turn off a blind eye.'' Spazzini got really angry and condemned him to go for a week in his office to clean a giant Juventus poster.

As soon as Spazzini saw me he said:

Bruuunoooo……pack up your suitcase…….Where should I go Mr. Spazzini?You'll come with me to Tabouk, we need to give help overthere.

So it was that I left with him for Tabouk (in Arabic = brick) a city in north-western Saudi Arabia. To the east of An Nafud, near the border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Tabuk is home to a large Saudi air force base. The hospital that was being built was at the service of the soldiers stationed on the base. In fact the construction site was much less organized than that of Daharan, with an Italian - Mr. Riva - as Site manager, who cared more about his affairs than the works. One day he disappeared without telling anyone, and returned a week later with a brand new Alfa 164: ''I bought it in Jeddah - he said - it costs very little compared to Italy'' We proceeded blindly, with personal initiatives , without following a real work schedule. Mr. Riva and I went once to visit a Korean construction site, and we had noticed outside the hangar that served as offices that the scooters used by the staff were parked in a ''herringbone'' pattern in an incredibly perfect alignment. Inside, the office was organized like a large classroom in a school: the boss sat on a raised desk. The clerks were spread across 12 rows of desks, and none of them raised their heads when we entered. An absurd silence reigned in the hangar. A few words with the office manager, and we made arrangements for him to come to our camp to inspect our cranes he said he was interested in. After the inspection, the business was quickly concluded, and payement settled in cash, as it was normal those days in Saudi.

CEMENT SHORTAGE

One day we suddenly realized ''that the cement had run out''! The construction accountant called me into the office and gave me 75,000 Saudi Rials ($20,000 in local currency) and sent me to get the cement. As I saaid, those were the times when almost all trades in Saudi were settled in cash. Accompanied by Hamed, a Jordan's driver, with a trailer in tow, we went to a building materials dealer. After a brief negotiation on the quantity and relative price, the usual Pakistanis immediately began to load the trailer with bags of cement. Meanwhile, the old Saudi was counting the money - and once the counting was finished, he put aside a packet of banknotes and putting them in my hand he said to me:

Barak Allah Feekum!

I didn't understand, or rather: I understood that he hoped Allah would bless me, but I didn't understand the connection with the money. Then Hamed explained to me: ''he thanks you for choosing him to purchase the cement, and the ''bakshish'' he gave to you is with the hope that you will return to him again''.

Ahh…good…understood!! So I thanked the man and assured him that I would not betray him to any other dealer. Then I shared the bakshish with Hamed, who was surprised that a Westerner was sharing the money with him.

EL HAQL - RED SEA

One Friday - to break the monotony - we decided to go to El Haql, a town on the Gulf of Aqaba, Red Sea, about 270 km from Tabouk. There were three of us: in addition to myself, a young architect from Genoa, and another guy from Castiglione delle Stiviere, Italy. A decision devoid of any logic, to be honest, given the distance, the state of the roads, and the absolute lack of any assistance in the event of a breakdown of the car - an old Toyota Corolla. In hindsight, it was a stupid risk we took – in these cases, we should travel with at least two cars. Be that as it may, all went almost well. After leaving very early, we arrived in El Haql (in Arabic = the field) a small town with a beautiful uncontaminated sea coral reef populated by incredible flora and fauna. The coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba in this region are steep and overlooking the sea. At that time, Sinai was occupied by Israeli troops and the warships could be easily seen, as the Gulf of Aqaba here is about as wide as lake. The city presented nothing of interest, and was just a place to get something to eat and drink. Just outside the town, beaches abound, and it was shocking to dive into the Red Sea due to the quantity of fish of every shape and colour. The water was absolutely transparent, and it was a memorable day.

The distance from Tabouk suggested we leave El Haql early. The Genoese architect was driving, a dry and lanky boy, not very inclined to advice (of any kind). This is how we arrived nearby a village and like everywhere in Saudi Arabia, before and after the town there were the usual huge humps, to slow down the speed of the vehicles. The stretch was slightly downhill, I saw them first, painted in reflective yellow, and I said softly to the architect: ''Slow down, there are humps'' - to which he, who was also a bit of a stutterer, said turning his head towards me: Wha...wwhaattt?

By that time we were on top of the humps, and we hit the first one at full speed, but the architect had his own theory, and that is when you hit one of the humps, to avoid the second and third you have to accelerate… it was like that we ended up on the third with the front axle of the Toyota, a terrible crash!! I hit my head on the ceiling of the car, and suddenly very hot air hit us full on: the windshield had disappeared!! We heard it two seconds later crashing behind us! The blow had actually detached it entirely from its frame and made it fly backwards!! Finally the guy stopped the Toyota at the side of the road – we retraced our steps only to find that the windshield was useless, smashed into 1000 pieces, and we removed it from the road.Are you happy IDIOT!???!! With your fucking theories!!! - I shouted.But I…I thought…Let's go… the road is still long… In fact they were still missing more than 200 km to Tabouk, and we traveled them as if we were on a motorbike, with towels wrapped around our face like Tuareg turbans in a desperate attempt to avoid the boiling air that was entering the car. We arrived at the camp distraught, to endure the teasing of our colleagues when they saw us, with our faces distorted and covered up as if we were veterans of the Paris - Dakar.

TRANSFER TO TAIF

After our arrival in Tabouk - there were 5 of us from Dahran - the construction site had changed a lot, and for the better. But Mr. Spazzini had another surprise in store for me: he came just before Christmas and as soon as he saw me he said:

Brunooooo……pack your suitcase…….we need to go! Where to this time Mr. Spazzini? Company had taken over from Genghini (the famous Roman building developer, expelled from Saudi Arabia with ignominy after the towers under construction in Jeddah sank into the sand, but this is another story that should be told) and FEAL was called to taken up the work for the expansion of the Taif general hospital.Well - I said - when are we leaving?Tomorrow early morning!

This was Spazzini, a man who never stopped working, EVER.

We then left for Taif, the summer capital of Saudi Arabia – located in the mountains of the Asir region, 200 km north-east of Jeddah, about 1,800 meters above sea level. The city enjoys an excellent climate, and is an agricultural center of some importance and for almost centuries the vine and grapes called zibibbo (from the Arabic zabīb, meaning "dried grapes") have been cultivated there as well as roses and flowers in general .

TAIF

There were a few days left before Christmas, the construction site had not yet started and we were only 5 people - so we temporarily settled in a rented house in Al Hada, the area further upstream from Taif, surrounded by acacia trees and the compounds of the Royal family members. There was the enormous villa entirely covered in white Carrara marble of the then Crown Prince Fahd, Minister of Defense and ultimately ''Head of our Client'', given that we worked for the same Ministry. And then further away the compound of a very influential family, which will be talked about a lot in the years to come: the Bin Laden family.

On the other side of the valley, leaning against the mountain, stood the military hospital, surrounded by the villas of the mostly American healthcare personnel. The hospital was already very large, it could have had around 400 beds, but its expansion envisaged bringing the capacity to 1000 beds, with an entire wing dedicated to the rehabilitation of patients with serious pathologies.

Our Company organized a charter flight for the Christmas return to Italy of the staff from the various construction sites. So we all met in Dahran – about 220 people – and flew first to Rome and then to various destinations in Italy. With us was a strange guy from Viterbo, a certain Piselli, who had grown a Saudi fundamentalist beard, an unkempt beard but no moustache. During the flight I went to the bathroom, and came back dressed in the traditional jallabah, saying that he wanted to prank his wife at the airport. Upon arrival at Rome's Fiumicino we went through passport control with some difficulty - then we left the baggage area and a lady with a little girl of about 3 years old came towards us, trying to identify her husband. She recognized Piselli despite the disguise, and urged the little girl to "go and hug that idiot of your father." But the little girl, frightened by the appearance of that bearded man dressed in white who was trying to hug her, burst into desperate tears, taking refuge in the arms of her mother.

From the series: ''how to ruin a return to Italy after the family hasn't seen you for 4 months''.

Dahran - Saudi Arabia - June 1980

Taif - Saudi Arabia - Jan 1981

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