#Indo-Pacific-diplomacy

[kesarijournal]

Unraveling the Diplomatic Intrigue: India, Australia, and the Khalistan Conundrum

In a world where geopolitical dynamics are as intricate as they are impactful, a recent series of high-level discussions between India and Australia have caught the eye of international observers. At the heart of these talks is a complex web involving the Khalistan movement, strained Indo-Canadian relations, and Australia’s role in this multifaceted narrative.#### The Delhi Dialogue: A…

[trendynewsnow]

G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Italy: Key Issues and Global Challenges

G7 Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Italy: A Diplomatic Showcase The picturesque Italian towns of Fiuggi and Anagni are poised to become the epicenter of international diplomacy as they host the G7 meeting of foreign ministers. This significant event marks the second G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting to take place in Italy in 2024 and is particularly noteworthy as it is the first summit since Donald…

[newspatron]

India's Strategic Neutrality: Is It the Next Switzerland?

What do you think about India's evolving foreign policy? Share your thoughts and comments below!

India: Playing Switzerland in a World Gone Wild? 🤔 Ever wonder how Switzerland stays so chill while the world around it seems to be constantly losing its cool? 🧘 Turns out, there’s a method to their “neutrality” madness. And guess what? India seems to be taking notes! 📝 In this post, we’re going to explore how India is quietly mastering the art of strategic neutrality, juggling friendships with…

[tmarshconnors]

Abe Shinzo: A Great Leader Two Years On

Two years have passed since the state funeral of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, an event that marked the end of a remarkable era for Japan and the world. As we reflect on his legacy, it’s clear that Abe was not only a transformative figure in Japan’s modern history but also a significant player on the global stage. His death in July 2022 was a tragedy that shook the nation and left an indelible mark on the international community.

Abe Shinzo: A Visionary Leader

Abe Shinzo served as Japan's longest-serving Prime Minister, holding office from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020. His second term, in particular, was marked by a strong vision for Japan's future, rooted in a philosophy that combined economic revitalization with a more assertive global presence. Abe's economic policy, commonly referred to as "Abenomics," sought to pull Japan out of decades of stagnation through bold monetary policies, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms. Although controversial at times, Abenomics reshaped Japan's economy, focusing on growth and international competitiveness.

Abe was also a leader with a strategic vision for Japan’s place in the world. His efforts to strengthen Japan’s military and revise its pacifist post-war constitution reflected his deep understanding of the evolving security dynamics in East Asia. He recognized the growing threats from North Korea and China, and his leadership ensured that Japan became a more active and respected player in international diplomacy. His work in cementing the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of regional stability is perhaps one of his greatest foreign policy achievements.

The State Funeral: A Nation’s Farewell

Abe's state funeral, held on September 27, 2022, was a sombre and grand affair, attended by dignitaries and leaders from around the world. The ceremony, held at the Nippon Budokan in Tokyo, was a moment for Japan to bid farewell to one of its most significant post-war leaders. The funeral sparked intense public debate in Japan, with some questioning the cost and the very idea of holding a state funeral for Abe. Yet, the outpouring of grief and respect from world leaders underscored the global impact of Abe’s legacy.

For many Japanese citizens, the state funeral was an opportunity to reflect on the stability and prosperity that Abe’s leadership had brought to the country. His tenure was far from uncontroversial, yet there was a recognition that Abe had brought Japan through difficult times with a steady hand, leaving behind a legacy that will be remembered for generations.

A Missing Presence on the World Stage

As we look back two years after his death, one cannot help but feel that Abe Shinzo’s absence is still felt on the global stage. In a world increasingly marked by geopolitical tensions, his diplomatic expertise and strategic thinking are sorely missed. Abe was a bridge-builder, known for fostering strong relationships with the West while maintaining open lines of communication with countries like Russia and China. He understood the delicate balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and navigated these waters with skill.

One of Abe’s most lasting achievements was the creation of the Quad, a strategic security dialogue between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. This alliance, aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, is now a cornerstone of regional security and a testament to Abe’s foresight.

Remembering a Giant

As the world continues to face new challenges, from the rise of authoritarianism to the shifting global economy, the kind of leadership that Abe exemplified is sorely needed. His commitment to democracy, his respect for Japan’s rich history and culture, and his willingness to stand firm in the face of global challenges set him apart as a leader for the ages.

In remembering Abe Shinzo, we must not only reflect on what he accomplished but also on the values he stood for. He believed in a strong, independent Japan that was an active and engaged member of the global community. His leadership inspired both admiration and criticism, but there is no denying the lasting impact he had on Japan and the world.

Two years after his death, we miss Abe Shinzo not just as a leader but as a voice of reason and stability in a world that desperately needs both. His legacy lives on, not only in the policies he enacted but in the continued importance of Japan on the world stage. Abe’s Japan was a country that could look forward with pride and confidence, and that is the legacy we must carry forward.

[saxafimedianetwork]

Strategic Diplomacy Beyond Recognition: Taiwan and Somaliland’s People-Centered Relations in the Global Arena

Exploring the power of 'people-to-people' #Diplomacy: #Taiwan & #Somaliland's strategic partnership redefines global relations, pushing beyond traditional recognition & statehood boundaries. What can we learn from their innovative approach?

Continue reading Strategic Diplomacy Beyond Recognition: Taiwan and Somaliland’s People-Centered Relations in the Global Arena

[xtruss]

World: The West Isn't Buying Into China's Year of Diplomacy

Chinese President Xi Jinping at a press conference in Shaanxi, on May 19, 2023. A new poll indicates that the West does not believe that China is contributing to Global Security. Florence Lo/Pool/AFP Via Getty Images

Western nations increasingly see China as an interventionist power that is not improving global security, according to recent polling, as Beijing struggles to square its desired peacemaker image with the political realities of its expanding global influence.

The Pew Research Center conducted a 30,000-person survey across 24 nations between February and May and found that people living in European, North American and Indo-Pacific democracies are particularly wary of China's influence. The sentiment was less strong, though still present, among African and South American respondents.

A median of 71 percent of the 30,000 people polled felt that China does not contribute either much or at all to international peace and stability, versus 23 percent who felt China does. Americans (80 percent), Dutch (86 percent), British (80 percent), Germans (80 percent), and French (75 percent) were among those who felt most strongly that Beijing is a negative influence on global affairs.

Democratic Indo-Pacific nations emphatically agreed, with 87 percent of South Koreans, 85 percent of Australians, and 85 percent of Japanese feeling the same.

The list of nations—the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland and South Africa, and Australia—is dominated by Western liberal democracies, with inherent ideological tensions likely somewhat explaining the negative views of Chinese foreign influence.

But only in Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria did a majority of respondents say Beijing contributes either a fair amount or a great deal to international peace and stability.

Newsweek reached out to the Chinese Foreign Ministry via email for comment.

China—already considered by many an economic and technological superpower—is still shaping its military and diplomatic clout abroad. Major decades-long investment in the former is openly intended to eventually challenge American hegemony, but on the diplomatic battlefield, Beijing is following a less publicly combative path.

Among the salient diplomatic issues that have helped shape global opinions of China this year are one striking success and one ongoing failure.

The former was the landmark Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization deal signed in April, in which China unexpectedly brokered a détente few thought likely given the deep and historic animosity between the Middle East's power players.

But China's unconvincing neutrality regarding Russia's war on Ukraine has somewhat eroded global trust in Beijing, particularly among the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific nations rallying to Kyiv's cause. China's de facto backing for Russia has undermined its continued calls for peace and the anemic peace plan it proposed in March.

North vs. South

Larger issues involving China—among them the fate of Taiwan, the situation in the South China Sea, lingering frustrations about the pandemic, the brewing showdown with the U.S., human rights, and concerns about political interference—have "completely dwarfed" Beijing's diplomatic efforts, Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, told Newsweek.

"Publics have evidently not seen either the Saudi-Iranian deal as particularly significant or the Chinese efforts on Ukraine as particularly credible," Small said.

Small noted Beijing will not necessarily be too concerned with continued Western skepticism.

"In one sense, the argument for what China has been trying to do on Ukraine and in some of these other efforts was positioning in the 'Global South,'" he said. "The view on their side had been that no one in Europe is going to take this seriously, but they are able to position themselves through this in the Global South as an actor that approaches these issues in a neutral way."

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and China's President Xi Jinping deliver a joint statement in Moscow, on March 21, 2023. China's de facto support of Russia's war on Ukraine has angered Western nations. Mikhail Tereshchenko/Sputnik/AFP Via Getty Images

But the poll's findings also suggest that Beijing's self-framing might not be playing out as it hoped. A median of 57 percent of those surveyed said they felt China interferes in other countries affairs either a fair amount or a great deal.

The sentiment was most notable in Europe, where a majority of national respondents excluding Hungarians agreed, as well as in North America. A majority of all those in Indo-Pacific nations apart from Indonesia saw Beijing as interventionist.

Even in the four of the six African and South American nations surveyed a majority said China intervened at least somewhat in other countries' affairs. Fifty percent of South Africans and 46 percent of Argentinians also agreed.

"It's such a mantra in Chinese foreign policy, so foundational in the way that they frame things that this is not what they do, and it is the antithesis of the Western approach," Small said.

Against this backdrop, Small added, it is "striking" to see so many nations feeling that China is indeed intervening abroad. The data suggests, he said, that the perception of Chinese anti-interventionism is being "shredded."

Recent months have seen a renewed China-U.S. effort to thaw chilly bilateral relations. In June, Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping. And earlier this week, Blinken told CNN the U.S. wants to "put some stability into the relationship."

But the long-term disputes show no signs of easing. While visiting Tonga this week, Blinken hit out at what he called China's "increasingly problematic behavior" in the Indo-Pacific.

In Europe too, major nations are increasingly concerned about Chinese espionage and influence, even if leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz are still courting investment.

Worsening Euro-Atlantic ties with Beijing, Small said, might accelerate a brewing confrontation.

"To a certain extent, this will validate an analysis on the Chinese side that starts to write off the West," he said, and instead focus on a "winnable" public opinion battle in the developing world.

— Newsweek Magazine | By David Brennan | July 27th, 2023

[zvaigzdelasas]

With a history of short-term governments in Nepal’s 15 years of democratic progression, the current reconfiguration is no surprise, and it will be no surprise if the Maoists get back again with the Nepali Congress in months and years to come.

Power sharing, political discontent, ideological differences, underperformance, and pressure to restore Nepal to a Hindu state – a long list of reasons reportedly forced the Maoists to sever ties with the Nepali Congress. While the Nepali Congress expected the Maoist leader and current prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (also known by his nom de guerre, Prachanda) to leave the alliance, it did not expect an overnight turnaround. [...]

Dahal reportedly conveyed to the Nepali Congress chair, former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, that external pressure forced him to join hands with CPN-UML and form a new government.

If this assertion is true, China emerges as a plausible factor, given its historical inclination toward forging alliances with leftist parties in Nepal. This notion gains credence in light of China’s past efforts, such as its unsuccessful attempt in 2020 to mediate the conflict between Oli and Dahal.

On the other hand, India has enjoyed a comfortable working relationship with the Nepali Congress and the Maoists. Although Maoists were a challenging party for New Delhi to get along with when Dahal first gained the prime minister’s seat in 2008, the two have come a long way in working together. However, the CPN-UML has advocated closer ties with the northern neighbor China; Beijing suits both their ideological requirements and their ultra-nationalistic outlook – which is primarily anti-India. [...]

India faces challenges in aligning with the Left Alliance for two key reasons. First, the energy trade between Nepal and India has grown crucial over the past couple of years. However, India strictly purchases power generated through its own investments in Nepal, refusing any power produced with Chinese involvement. With the CPN-UML now in government, Nepal may seek alterations in this arrangement despite the benefits of power trade in reducing its trade deficit with India.

Second, India stands to lose the smooth cooperation it enjoyed with the recently dissolved Maoist-Congress coalition. During the dissolved government, the Nepali Congress held the Foreign Ministry, fostering a favorable equation for India. Just last month, Foreign Minister N.P. Saud visited India for the 9th Raisina Dialogue, engaging with top Indian officials, including his counterpart, S. Jaishankar.

As concerns arise for India regarding the Left Alliance, there is also potential for shifts in the partnership between Nepal and the United States, a significant development ally. Particularly, there may be a slowdown in the implementation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects. Despite facing domestic and Chinese opposition, the Nepali Parliament finally approved a $500 million MCC grant from the United States in 2022, following a five-year delay.

China perceives the MCC as a component of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy, countering its BRI. Hence Beijing aims to increase Chinese loans and subsidies to Nepal to enhance its influence.

To conclude, the re-emergence of Nepal’s Left Alliance signals a shift in power dynamics, impacting domestic politics and regional geopolitics. With China’s influence growing, Nepal’s foreign policy may tilt further toward Beijing, challenging India’s interests. This shift poses challenges for India, particularly in trade and diplomatic relations, while also affecting Nepal’s partnerships with other key players like the United States.

[[The Author,] Dr. Rishi Gupta is the assistant director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi]

6 Mar 24

[simply-ivanka]

Trump Was Good for America’s Alliances

He pushed NATO to spend more on defense, expanded the Quad and facilitated the Abraham Accords.

By Alexander B. Gray Wall Street Journal April 3, 2024

Foreign-policy experts are predictably fretting over Donald Trump’s re-election campaign. They fear that the former president threatens the alliances and partnerships that have sustained global peace since 1945. Should Mr. Trump return to the White House, the thinking goes, he will be unconstrained by the guardrails that prevented him from torpedoing America’s alliances in his first term and will permanently damage both U.S. security and the international order.

This narrative concedes a point that undermines its premise: The U.S. alliance system didn’t crumble during Mr. Trump’s first term. On the contrary, the Trump administration strengthened relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and the Mideast. Anyone who believes that Mr. Trump was once bound by conventional wisdom but won’t be again—and will wreak havoc on the global order he ostensibly detests—hasn’t been paying attention.

To understand Mr. Trump’s record, recall what he inherited. The Obama administration’s disastrous “red line” in Syria, its ill-conceived Iranian nuclear deal, its failure to deter or respond adequately to Russia’s 2014 aggression against Ukraine, its toleration of Chinese malign activity in the South and East China seas, and its promise of a “new model of great-power relations” with Beijing had brought U.S. relations with allies and partners like Japan, Taiwan, Israel, the Gulf Arab states and much of Eastern Europe to a historic low point. Much of Mr. Trump’s tenure was spent not simply repairing those relationships but expanding them in innovative ways.

Mr. Trump appalled many foreign-policy veterans, who thought his rhetoric threatened the world order. In one sense, that fear was absurd: Nearly every American administration has publicly scolded North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries for shirking their defense-spending commitments. Mr. Trump did likewise—and, perhaps unlike his predecessors, was seen as willing to take decisive action to secure change. Through public and private cajoling—also known as diplomacy—he secured a commitment from NATO members to beef up their contributions. From 2017 through 2021, nearly every signatory raised defense spending, contributing substantially to the alliance’s ability to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

These efforts resulted in a significant redistribution of U.S. forces from legacy bases in Germany to facilities in Poland and the Baltic states, where they are far better positioned to deter Moscow. Along with NATO allies, Mr. Trump provided long-sought Javelin antitank missiles to Ukraine, imposed sanctions against malign Russian actors, and worked with partners to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have increased European allies’ energy dependence on Russia. These weren’t the acts of a retrograde isolationist; they were the work of a pragmatist seeking novel solutions to 21st-century challenges.

The administration’s goal of strengthening America’s standing in the world bore fruit, including the Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab states, a significant upgrade to the Quad alliance among the U.S., India, Australia and Japan, stronger diplomatic relations with Taiwan thanks to unprecedented cabinet-level visits and record arms sales, and an unexpected deal between Serbia and Kosovo.

At each step, Mr. Trump asked his staff to think of creative ways to resolve issues that had bedeviled their predecessors for decades. Doing the same things over and over and expecting different results rightly struck the president as insane.

After three years of press adulation over America’s supposed return to the world stage under President Biden, one might ask: What have Americans and the world gotten from a supposedly more alliance-friendly U.S. president? So far, a catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan, the failure of American deterrence in Ukraine, an Iranian nuclear breakout inching ever closer, and an accelerating Chinese threat toward Taiwan. Allies in the Mideast, Eastern Europe, and Asia have begun to chart their own course in the face of an uncertain U.S. trumpet.

The global foreign-policy elite is sowing needless fear around the world by willfully misrepresenting Mr. Trump’s first term and scare-mongering about a second. Should Mr. Trump return to the White House, there will doubtless be sighs of relief among officials in friendly capitals who remember his time in office. It isn’t difficult to understand why: Mr. Trump’s language may make diplomats uncomfortable, but his actions strike fear among those who matter most to American security: our adversaries.

Mr. Gray is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. He served as chief of staff of the White House National Security Council, 2019-21.

[misfitwashere]

On February 4, 2021, in a speech at the State Department, President Joe Biden talked about the importance of diplomacy and the different actions he had taken in the two weeks since taking office. Then he said: “There’s no longer a bright line between foreign and domestic policy. Every action we take in our conduct abroad, we must take with American working families in mind.  Advancing a foreign policy for the middle class demands urgent focus on our domestic…economic renewal.”

The speech made me sit up and take notice. The popular division of foreign policy and domestic policy is relatively recent, and the president seemed to be at least nodding to a more traditional vision. At the same time, it was not clear to me exactly what the underlying theory behind his statement might be and how that theory might translate to policy.

I began to pay close attention to the State Department—especially its focus on the Indo-Pacific region and Africa—and to watch Vice President Kamala Harris’s many trips to those regions and to Latin America. As she and others met with their counterparts in other countries, it was possible to see a new kind of U.S. foreign policy taking shape based primarily on creating communities centered around a shared interest, but I still was not clear on what the administration meant by integrating foreign and domestic affairs. 

Then, on September 13, 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered remarks to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. In his speech, titled “The Power and Purpose of American Diplomacy in a New Era,” Blinken argued that the world is witnessing the end of the Cold War era and must find a new approach to foreign policy.

The end of the Cold War, he said, had promised greater peace and stability, international cooperation, economic trade, political liberalization and human rights. Some of that had happened, but the era had also, unexpectedly, seen the rise of authoritarianism.  

The huge scale of modern problems like the climate crisis, mass human displacement and migration, and food insecurity had made international cooperation more complex, while people were losing faith in the post–World War II international order in which institutions like the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided a framework of rules through which countries could work out differences without resorting to war. 

That order had systematic flaws that exacerbated wealth inequality, Blinken said, noting that in the forty years between 1980 and 2020 the richest .1 percent accumulated the same amount of wealth as the poorest fifty percent. That disparity fueled distrust of international systems and political polarization. 

Those tensions, in turn, threaten the survival of democracies. They are “[c]hallenged from the inside by elected leaders who exploit resentments and stoke fears; erode independent judiciaries and the media; enrich cronies; crack down on civil society and political opposition. And,” Blinken said, they are “challenged from the outside, by autocrats who spread disinformation, who weaponize corruption, who meddle in elections.”

A few weeks ago, I got the chance to sit down with Secretary of State Blinken and ask him to explain both the theory and the details of what the administration means when they set out to protect democracy both at home and abroad through a new foreign policy.

I’ll be posting the video from that interview in two sections. Here is the first. 

[mariacallous]

The U.S. Defense Department’s latest Arctic strategy, issued in July, clearly states that China is not an Arctic nation, yet it identifies China as the main challenge to U.S. interests in the region. This is the first time the Pentagon officially placed China front and center of its approach to the Arctic. China was not even mentioned in its 2013 Arctic strategy and only once in the 2016 version. In the 2019 version, under the first Trump administration, China was given a more prominent position—but not as a primary emphasis. The 2024 strategy thus reflects China’s status as the pacing challenge to U.S. national security worldwide. With the second Trump administration expected to double down on the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, this reframing of Arctic policy will likely be continued or even accelerated.

In the context of the U.S.-China superpower rivalry, it is natural and understandable that China features prominently in U.S. strategic thinking and policies on various topics and regions around the world. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that global and regional power balances may differ. This means that even though China is now the pacing challenge for U.S. national security at large, its power and ability to threaten U.S. interests varies from one region to another. And indeed, the Arctic power structure differs from the global one, not least due to Russia’s dominant position.

At its core, the United States’ new Arctic strategy prioritizes Alaska as a strategic flank in its rivalry with China. Alaska has played an important role in U.S. national security since the start of the Cold War. It hosts aerospace warning and control systems important to U.S. homeland defense, and, in recent years, the state has become integral to the execution of U.S. operations in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Nevertheless, the Pentagon’s strong focus on the U.S.-China rivalry in its Arctic strategy has two potential pitfalls.

First, by identifying China as the main threat to U.S. interests in the Arctic, the Pentagon’s new strategy contributes to enhancing a somewhat skewed narrative of the threat China actually poses there. While some commentators portray China as a “polar great power” attempting to push its way into the Arctic—and as Beijing runs highly visible Arctic diplomacy—the reality is that China currently has very limited political, economic, and military influence there.

Whereas the U.S. strategy observes that China “seeks to promote the Arctic region as a ‘global commons,’” the Arctic is neither unclaimed nor ungoverned. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) constitutes not only the legal basis on which the Arctic littoral states can claim sovereign rights to most of the Arctic Ocean (this includes the United States, despite its failure to ratify the treaty), but also a core of the governance regime covering the region.

Beijing’s ability to use bilateral channels to enhance its influence is also limited because four of the five are strong democracies and NATO members—and that number increases to seven out of eight if the entire Arctic Council (made up the five littoral states plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) is included. It is difficult to see any Arctic nation beyond Russia being keen on enabling China to gain a strong foothold in the region. Indeed, evidence suggests that the Arctic democracies have all become increasingly aware and wary of Chinese overtures. For instance, when rumors surfaced in September that local Norwegian authorities welcomed Chinese investors in the Arctic port of Kirkenes, Norwegian Minister of Justice and Public Security Enger Mehl quickly clarified that Oslo will not allow such an investment if it runs counter to national security interests. Similarly, China has failed to entice Iceland and Greenland—both of which are often seen as particularly vulnerable to the lure of large Chinese investments.

In fact, most of China’s attempts at investing in Arctic resources outside Russia have been put on hold or have failed altogether. Even in the Russian Arctic, China’s economic footprint is relatively limited beyond its engagement in the Yamal liquefied natural gas project. Moreover, China’s ambition for a so-called Polar Silk Road through the Arctic Ocean has yet to result in any substantial shipment of goods through Arctic waters.

Regarding military activities, which is the Pentagon’s main concern, China has no military presence in the Arctic beyond brief visits. Chinese icebreaking research vessels occasionally operate in the Arctic Ocean, and some of their research activities may indeed have military value. In early October, Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailed into the Arctic Ocean for the first time on a joint patrol with two Russian Border Service ships. It will take more than a couple of icebreakers and coast guard vessels to make China a military player in the Arctic.

Wider research activity by China in the Arctic, which members of the U.S. Congress drew attention to recently, clearly may have a dual-use or purely military purpose. Yet this should also be kept in perspective. While the Chinese Polar Research Institute has a presence in Ny Alesund on Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago, and on Iceland, this is a minor engagement compared to its five independent research stations in Antarctica. Moreover, China’s lack of military presence and activity in the Arctic obviously reduces the military value of any dual-use research. This is clearly the case for the land and sea domains, but perhaps less clear-cut with regard to aerospace activities.

China is increasing its military activity off the coast of Alaska, though. In July, four Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea. During the same month, China and Russia conducted their first joint bomber patrol over the North Pacific and Bering Strait, near the coast of Alaska. While these planes might have briefly crossed the Arctic Circle, such activities should be interpreted not as Arctic maneuvers but as Chinese flank operations in the U.S.-China East Asian maritime theater.

The second potential pitfall of overemphasizing China in the U.S. Arctic strategy is the risk of underemphasizing the core challenge to Arctic stability: Russia. Geography allows Russia to claim nearly half of the Arctic under UNCLOS, making it the biggest Arctic state, and China’s ability to enhance its position in the region fully depends on Moscow’s willingness to open its door. From this, it follows that the best way to understand China’s influence in the Arctic is to examine Russia’s position, policies, and interests in the region.

The European Arctic is clearly the most important part of the region in terms of population, as well as economic and military activity. The Kola Peninsula is home to Russia’s Northern Fleet, which operates most of Russia’s nuclear-armed strategic submarines. The missiles on these submarines constitute the only substantial threat against the United States that originates in the Arctic, making the Northern Fleet a prime intelligence interest. Moreover, while it is only a faint shadow of its Soviet predecessor, the Northern Fleet does pose a potential threat to the Atlantic sea lines of communications. Its  In the past, the latter concern was mainly related to transatlantic fiber-optic cables, but the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022 made it a broader issue. While there is limited undersea infrastructure in the Arctic, it is a concern there, too.

Furthermore, the strategy understates the fact that short of a nuclear exchange with Russia or any other country, the European Arctic is the part of the region where U.S. forces are most likely to be engaged in a conflict and where U.S. forces are already the most active. The U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines have all been actively engaged in exercises and other activities in the European Arctic in recent years as part of a wider European engagement to deter Russia and support allies. Relatedly, it is hard to envision that the recently reestablished 11th Airborne Division, based in Alaska, has any role in defending Arctic territory in the Indo-Pacific; the division’s exercises suggest that any Arctic role for it will likely be in Northern Europe. This pattern is reflected at the political and strategic military levels, where the United States regularly discusses Arctic issues with Canada and European allies, all  of whom are primarily concerned about Russia.

In July, Lt. Gen. Thomas Carden, deputy commander of the U.S. Northern Command, said of the Pentagon’s new Arctic strategy: “If this is not the best, clearly written strategy that I’ve ever seen, then it’s got to be in the top two or three.”  Indeed, we concur that the document is a fine strategy in many ways, notably in clearly stating a desired end state and then outlining the ways and (more implicitly) means by which Washington aims to achieve this. In its admirable clarity, the strategy highlights that China is the pacing threat to U.S. security and interests worldwide, and that the United States seeks to counter Chinese activity and influence in the Arctic, too.

It is evident, therefore, that the strategy is not really about the Arctic, but about China in the Arctic—and about Alaska’s role as a flank in the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific strategic theater. With the newest iteration of its Arctic strategy, the United States runs the risk of overemphasizing China and the Pacific-adjacent part of the Arctic to the detriment of much more pressing security issues relating to Russia and the European Arctic.

[kesarijournal]

India's Space Ambitions: A Celestial Tango

In a move that’s less about stepping on toes and more about moonwalking in zero gravity, India has declared its space sector a free-for-all cosmic playground. With the announcement of 100% foreign direct investment in satellite component manufacturing, India is not just opening its doors; it’s removing them entirely. The message is loud and clear: “Welcome to the Grand Indian Space Bazaar, Elon…

[head-post]

Le Pen to clash with Macron on Ukraine, defence issues

No matter how unfortunate the upcoming snap parliamentary elections turn out for Emmanuel Macron, he has always had to take comfort in the fact that he will remain president until 2027 – with all the sacrosanct foreign policy and military powers that entails, POLITICO reports.

However, his right-wing opponent Marine Le Pen is signalling that if her National Rally party wins the prime minister’s post, she will not be content to let Macron set the country’s strategic course through the presidential prerogative, which traditionally covers hot topics such as Ukraine, defence, diplomacy and the choice of EU commissioner.

This struggle for core powers is sparking fierce debate within France and terrifying France’s EU and NATO partners as the 68-million-strong nuclear-armed country looks set for a period of instability. Assumptions from the US to the Indo-Pacific that the president’s powers will simply be unchecked on the international stage after the election may prove unfounded.

France has experienced periods of co-rule before – when the president and prime minister belonged to different parties – but it was always a fairly straightforward co-operation between parties with similar worldviews. This time, a right-wing prime minister – perhaps Jordan Bardella of the Rassemblement Nationale, ahead in the polls – will blow up the political order.

On Wednesday, Le Pen gave the clearest indication yet that she intends to snatch any shred of power she can from Macron if her party wins a strong enough majority in parliamentary elections.

In explosive remarks, Le Pen dismissed the title of France’s commander-in-chief as an “honourable title” and said the real power, particularly over the budget, lies with the prime minister’s government. Le Pen told daily Le Télégramme:

“Jordan [Bardella] has no intention of picking a quarrel with Macron, but he has set red lines. On Ukraine, the president will not be able to send troops.” 

Macron said earlier this month he was “finalising” plans to send military trainers to Ukraine, and tensions with Russia are likely to take centre stage in the debate over France’s strategic direction.

Macron pushing for Thierry Breton

Ahead of the first round of voting on Sunday, Le Pen is also raising the stakes on EU policy after her party challenged Macron’s right to appoint France’s next European commissioner, a role traditionally seen as a gift from the president.

The European commissioner is a hugely important role for France, and Macron wants his candidate to be given a large economic portfolio that would allow Paris to put its priorities – such as strengthening European industrial champions – at the top of the EU agenda.

According to five officials, Macron is pushing for Thierry Breton, who has promoted Macron’s vision for defence and industry, to continue as French commissioner.

Bardella, however, insists it will be his government that will choose France’s commissioner in Brussels, saying this week that the appointment will be one of the “first decisions” they will make.

If the Rassemblement Nationale does not win enough seats to form a government, it will still be the largest group in parliament and will be well placed to reject government laws it does not like.

Strong constitution

On Thursday, Macron’s allies invoked legendary World War II leader Charles de Gaulle, former president and founder of the Fifth Republic, to hit back at Le Pen.

Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu said “the constitution is not ceremonious” and quoted de Gaulle as saying the president was “responsible for France” and “responsible for the Republic.” François Bayrou, leader of the French centrist party MoDem, allied to Macron, said:

“You are profoundly challenging the Constitution.”

Naturally, the devil is in the details. According to the French constitution, the president is the head of the armed forces and in charge of French foreign policy, while the prime minister runs the government and thus domestic policy. But a closer look at the division of powers between the president and the prime minister turns out to be a much more complicated picture. The budget, as Le Pen pointed out, is indeed the most important leverage over many policy areas in the National Assembly. Eric Landot, public law specialist, said:

“It’s super complicated, there is no clear boundary. The president is the chief of the armed forces, but Article 21 says the prime minister is responsible for national defence.”

According to Landot, Le Pen is wrong when she says the president’s role is only “ceremonial” – but there are many ways the prime minister can clip the president’s wings. He also said:

“If the president wanted to send soldiers to Ukraine on support missions, a government that disagrees with that policy, could block the government decrees and say: ‘No, I’m not signing that. The constitutional ambiguity would block decision-making.”

Read more HERE

[beardedmrbean]

North Korea said a second attempt to put a spy satellite into orbit failed early Thursday, but the reclusive country vowed to launch another in the coming months.

The Malligyeong-1 reconnaissance satellite was mounted on a new type of carrier rocket called the Chollima-1 and launched from a station in North Pyongan province in the early morning hours, according to the state-run Korea Central News Agency (KCNA). The first and second stages "all flew normally, but failed due to an error in the emergency explosion system during the flight of the third stage," KCNA said in a statement.

North Korea's National Aerospace Development Administration is investigating the cause of the accident and plans to attempt a third launch in October, according to KCNA.

North Korea attempted to launch its first spy satellite on May 31, but it crashed into the West Sea after an "abnormal starting" of the second-stage engine, KCNA said at the time.

MORE: North Korea satellite launch fails, with another promised as 'soon as possible'

In 2018, North Korea claimed to have put a satellite into space but international analysts later said that wasn't true.

Thursday's second attempt coincided with joint military drills between South Korea and the United States, which North Korea has long denounced.

The U.S., South Korea and Japan all issued statements "strongly" condemning North Korea's use of ballistic missile technology for its launch, which despite its failure they said is in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The three allies also reaffirmed their commitment to work closely together to achieve "complete denuclearization" of North Korea in line with the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

"This space launch involved technologies that are directly related to the DPRK intercontinental ballistic missile program," Adrienne Watson, spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council, said in a statement, using the acronym for North Korea's official name. "The President’s national security team is assessing the situation in close coordination with our allies and partners."

"The door has not closed on diplomacy but Pyongyang must immediately cease its provocative actions and instead choose engagement," Watson added. "The United States will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the American homeland and the defense of our Republic of Korea and Japanese allies."MORE: US, Japan and South Korea's leaders hold historic meeting as threats from China, North Korea loom large

The incident was assessed as not posting "an immediate threat to U.S. personnel, territory, or that of our allies," according to a statement from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which noted that it would "continue to monitor the situation."

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement the military "was prepared in advance through identifying signs of an imminent launch."

The office for Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi confirmed that he held a telephone call with his South Korean and U.S. counterparts on Thursday morning to discuss North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch. The three officials agreed that the launches are happening "in an unprecedented frequency and in new manners" and that they "constitute a grave and imminent threat to the regional security and pose a clear and serious challenge to the international community," according to a statement from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Group of Seven, an intergovernmental political forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the U.S., also released a statement condemning "in the strongest terms" North Korea's launch.

[werindialive]

India's Minister of External Affairs Sounds Alarm on Global Geopolitical 'Storm' and Advocates for Cooperative Solution

In a poignant address to the international community, India's Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, delivered a stark warning about the brewing geopolitical tensions across the globe. Speaking at a prestigious diplomatic forum, Jaishankar outlined India's stance and role amidst the turbulent geopolitical landscape, emphasizing the need for cooperation and strategic foresight to navigate the storm ahead.

Against a backdrop of escalating conflicts, trade disputes, and technological rivalries, Jaishankar cautioned that the world is on the brink of a profound geopolitical "storm." He underscored the interconnectedness of nations in today's complex geopolitical ecosystem, where disruptions in one region can reverberate globally, impacting economies, security, and stability.

Highlighting India's historical commitment to peace, stability, and multilateralism, Jaishankar articulated India's vision for a rules-based international order that fosters inclusive growth and development. He stressed the importance of respecting sovereignty, upholding international law, and resolving disputes through dialogue and diplomacy rather than coercion or unilateral actions.

Jaishankar outlined India's role as a responsible global actor, advocating for inclusive development, sustainable practices, and equitable partnerships. He reaffirmed India's commitment to fostering regional cooperation, particularly in South Asia, to address common challenges such as terrorism, poverty, and climate change.

Addressing the evolving dynamics of great power competition, Jaishankar emphasized the need for strategic autonomy and diversification of partnerships. He acknowledged India's strategic engagements with multiple stakeholders, including traditional allies, emerging powers, and multilateral institutions, to safeguard its national interests and contribute to global stability.

In the realm of economic diplomacy, Jaishankar highlighted India's efforts to enhance connectivity, trade, and investment across regions through initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. He underscored India's commitment to promoting an open, inclusive, and rules-based trading system that benefits all nations.

Regarding technological advancements and digital governance, Jaishankar stressed the importance of harnessing innovation for societal progress while addressing concerns related to data privacy, cybersecurity, and digital sovereignty. He called for greater cooperation among nations to develop norms and standards for the responsible use of emerging technologies.

Jaishankar's address served as a clarion call for collective action and strategic foresight to navigate the turbulent waters of global geopolitics. He reiterated India's commitment to playing a constructive role in shaping a more stable, prosperous, and peaceful world order, where nations cooperate for the common good while safeguarding their sovereign interests. As the storm clouds gather on the horizon, Jaishankar's message resonates as a beacon of hope for a more resilient and inclusive global community.

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[surypalyadav80]

Asia Rising: The Geopolitical Implications of New Power Center

Asia, a continent long recognized for its cultural, historical, and economic significance, is undergoing a profound transformation in the 21st century. With its burgeoning economies, rising political influence, and strategic importance, Asia is increasingly at the heart of global geopolitics. This shift has far-reaching implications for international relations, economic power dynamics, and security frameworks.Economic PowerhouseThe economic rise of Asia is the cornerstone of its geopolitical ascent. China, the world's second-largest economy, plays a pivotal role, with initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) redefining global trade routes and fostering economic interdependence. India, with its rapidly growing economy and youthful population, is emerging as another key player. Southeast Asian nations, organized under ASEAN, are also making their mark as a collective economic bloc. These developments are shifting the global economic center of gravity from the West to the East, challenging established powers like the United States and the European Union.Strategic CompetitionAsia's rise is accompanied by intensified strategic competition, particularly between China and the United States. The Indo-Pacific region has become a theater of geopolitical rivalry, with both powers vying for influence through military alliances, trade agreements, and soft power initiatives. The South China Sea disputes, Taiwan's status, and North Korea's nuclear ambitions further underscore the region's strategic volatility. These flashpoints highlight the need for robust diplomacy to prevent escalation and ensure regional stability.Multilateralism and Regional CooperationAs Asia rises, regional organizations are becoming more influential. ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) exemplify Asia's commitment to multilateralism. These frameworks enable Asian nations to address shared challenges, such as climate change, economic inequality, and security threats, while reducing dependence on Western institutions.However, regional cooperation is not without its challenges. Historical tensions, such as those between India and Pakistan, or Japan and South Korea, complicate the path to unity. National interests often clash with collective goals, making it imperative for Asian nations to balance competition with collaboration.Implications for Global OrderAsia's geopolitical ascent is reshaping the global order. Traditional power structures are being recalibrated as Western dominance wanes. This transition has sparked debates about the future of liberal democracy, human rights, and global governance, particularly as China's model of state-led capitalism gains traction. The shift also compels other regions to reevaluate their policies toward Asia, recognizing its growing importance in global decision-making.Challenges AheadDespite its potential, Asia faces significant hurdles. Economic disparities within and between nations, environmental degradation, and governance issues remain pressing concerns. Additionally, managing the strategic rivalry between major powers like China, India, and the United States will be critical to maintaining peace and fostering sustainable growth.ConclusionAsia's rise as a new power center is reshaping the geopolitical landscape. The continent's economic dynamism, strategic significance, and cultural influence are undeniable. However, navigating this transformation will require careful management of competing interests and collaborative efforts to address shared challenges. As Asia continues its ascent, the world must adapt to a new era where the East plays a central role in shaping the future of global politics.