#Japanese Military Policy

[tmarshconnors]

Abe Shinzo: A Great Leader Two Years On

Two years have passed since the state funeral of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, an event that marked the end of a remarkable era for Japan and the world. As we reflect on his legacy, it’s clear that Abe was not only a transformative figure in Japan’s modern history but also a significant player on the global stage. His death in July 2022 was a tragedy that shook the nation and left an indelible mark on the international community.

Abe Shinzo: A Visionary Leader

Abe Shinzo served as Japan's longest-serving Prime Minister, holding office from 2006 to 2007 and again from 2012 to 2020. His second term, in particular, was marked by a strong vision for Japan's future, rooted in a philosophy that combined economic revitalization with a more assertive global presence. Abe's economic policy, commonly referred to as "Abenomics," sought to pull Japan out of decades of stagnation through bold monetary policies, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms. Although controversial at times, Abenomics reshaped Japan's economy, focusing on growth and international competitiveness.

Abe was also a leader with a strategic vision for Japan’s place in the world. His efforts to strengthen Japan’s military and revise its pacifist post-war constitution reflected his deep understanding of the evolving security dynamics in East Asia. He recognized the growing threats from North Korea and China, and his leadership ensured that Japan became a more active and respected player in international diplomacy. His work in cementing the U.S.-Japan alliance as a cornerstone of regional stability is perhaps one of his greatest foreign policy achievements.

The State Funeral: A Nation’s Farewell

Abe's state funeral, held on September 27, 2022, was a sombre and grand affair, attended by dignitaries and leaders from around the world. The ceremony, held at the Nippon Budokan in Tokyo, was a moment for Japan to bid farewell to one of its most significant post-war leaders. The funeral sparked intense public debate in Japan, with some questioning the cost and the very idea of holding a state funeral for Abe. Yet, the outpouring of grief and respect from world leaders underscored the global impact of Abe’s legacy.

For many Japanese citizens, the state funeral was an opportunity to reflect on the stability and prosperity that Abe’s leadership had brought to the country. His tenure was far from uncontroversial, yet there was a recognition that Abe had brought Japan through difficult times with a steady hand, leaving behind a legacy that will be remembered for generations.

A Missing Presence on the World Stage

As we look back two years after his death, one cannot help but feel that Abe Shinzo’s absence is still felt on the global stage. In a world increasingly marked by geopolitical tensions, his diplomatic expertise and strategic thinking are sorely missed. Abe was a bridge-builder, known for fostering strong relationships with the West while maintaining open lines of communication with countries like Russia and China. He understood the delicate balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and navigated these waters with skill.

One of Abe’s most lasting achievements was the creation of the Quad, a strategic security dialogue between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. This alliance, aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, is now a cornerstone of regional security and a testament to Abe’s foresight.

Remembering a Giant

As the world continues to face new challenges, from the rise of authoritarianism to the shifting global economy, the kind of leadership that Abe exemplified is sorely needed. His commitment to democracy, his respect for Japan’s rich history and culture, and his willingness to stand firm in the face of global challenges set him apart as a leader for the ages.

In remembering Abe Shinzo, we must not only reflect on what he accomplished but also on the values he stood for. He believed in a strong, independent Japan that was an active and engaged member of the global community. His leadership inspired both admiration and criticism, but there is no denying the lasting impact he had on Japan and the world.

Two years after his death, we miss Abe Shinzo not just as a leader but as a voice of reason and stability in a world that desperately needs both. His legacy lives on, not only in the policies he enacted but in the continued importance of Japan on the world stage. Abe’s Japan was a country that could look forward with pride and confidence, and that is the legacy we must carry forward.

[mesetacadre]

In February, 1945, when the USSR agreed at Yalta to join the Allies in the war on Japan, it was decided to divide Korea into two zones for purposes of military action. The Russians took the north, the Americans the south. The following July, at Potsdam, the 38th parallel was chosen as the “great divide.” Korea was a victim of Japanese aggression, not an enemy. We would come as liberators, not as conquerors. The military occupation was to end within a year of victory, followed by about five years of civilian trusteeship in which all the Big Four Powers, America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China, should help Korea to her feet. That was the plan. The reality proved otherwise. The growing cold war against the Soviet Union made Korea also a base. The two zones solidified into two areas of military occupation. Friction continues to grow. When American troops landed in South Korea, September 7, 1945, thousands of Koreans danced and cheered and shouted: “Mansai,” or “Live a Thousand Years.” Within six months surly Koreans were demanding how soon the Americans would go home. Within a year great uprisings took place in eighty cities and in hundreds of farming villages against the “police state” that the American armed forces kept in power. When the Americans landed in Korea, the Koreans had already a de facto government. A “People’s Republic” had been declared a day earlier by a congress of Koreans themselves. General John R. Hodge, commander of the U. S. armed forces, dissolved this “People’s Republic,” and drove most of its members underground. Two days after landing, Hodge announced to the Koreans – who had waited a quarter of a century for liberation – that Japanese officials would temporarily continue to run Korea. Korean delegations waiting to greet Americans were fired on – by Japanese police! The Russians pursued an opposite policy. They recognized the “People’s Committees” that the Americans were suppressing. They encouraged Korean initiative when it took the form of ousting the Japanese-appointed puppets, dividing the landlords’ lands, and nationalizing the Japanese-owned industry as the “property of the Korean people.” They especially looked with favor on what they called “mass organizations,” – farmers’ unions, labor unions, women’s associations and unions of youth. The Russian zone in the north fairly blossomed with such organizations energetically building their country after their own desire. From time to time the Americans and Russians held conferences to determine Korea’s future. Nothing came of these talks but increasing bitterness for two years. The Americans insisted on including pro-Japanese quislings and returned exiles in the provisional government. The Russians refused. The Russians insisted on including representatives of the trade unions, the farmers’ union and other similar organizations. The USA would not hear of this.

In North Korea: First Eye-Witness Reports, Anna Louise Strong, 1949

[city-of-ladies]

Genmei (661-721) was Japan's fourth empress regnant. She was Empress Jitō's half-sister and her match in terms of ambition and political skills. Her rule was characterized by a development of culture and innovations. 

Ruling after her son

Like Jitō (645-703), Genmei was the daughter of Emperor Tenji but was born from a different mother. Jitō was both her half-sister and mother-in-law since Genmei had married the empress’ son, Prince Kusakabe (662-689). She had a son with him, Emperor Monmu (683-707). 

Kusakabe died early and never reigned, which led to Jitō's enthronement. The empress was then succeeded by her grandson Monmu. The latter’s reign was short. In his last will, he called for his mother to succeed him in accordance with the “immutable law” of her father Tenji. Genmei accepted. 

Steadfast and ambitious 

Genmei was made from the same mold as her half-sister. She proved to be a fearless sovereign, undeterred by military crises. 

She pursued Jitō's policies, strengthening the central administration and keeping the power in imperial hands. Among her decisions were the proscription of runaway peasants and the restriction of private ownership of mountain and field properties by the nobility and Buddhist temples. 

Another of her achievements was transferring the capital at Heijō-kyō (Nara) in 710, turning it into an unprecedented cultural and political center. Her rule saw many innovations. Among them were the first attempt to replace the barter system with the Wadō copper coins, new techniques for making brocade twills and dyeing and the settlement of experimental dairy farmers.

A protector of culture

Genmei sponsored many cultural projects. The first was the Kojiki, written in 712 it told Japan’s history from mythological origins to the current rulers. In its preface, the editor Ō no Yasumaro praised the empress:

“Her Imperial Majesty…illumines the univers…Ruling in the Purple Pavillion, her virtue extends to the limit of the horses’ hoof-prints…It must be saif that her fame is greater than that of Emperor Yü and her virtue surpasses that of Emperor Tang (legendary emperors of China)”.

In 713, she ordered the local governments to collect local legends and oral traditions as well as information about the soil, weather, products and geological and zoological features. Those local gazetteers (Fudoki) were an invaluable source of Japan’s ancient tradition.

Several of Genmei’s poems are included in the Man'yōshū anthology, including a reply by one of the court ladies. 

Listen to the sounds of the warriors' elbow-guards;

Our captain must be ranging the shields to drill the troops.

– Genmei Tennō

Reply:

Be not concerned, O my Sovereign;

Am I not here,

I, whom the ancestral gods endowed with life,

Next of kin to yourself

– Minabe-hime

From mother to daughter 

Genmei abdicated in 715 and passed the throne to her daughter, empress Genshō (680-748) instead of her sickly grandson prince Obito. This was an unprecedented situation, making the Nara period the pinnacle of female monarchy in Japan. 

Genmei would oversee state affairs until she died in 721. Before her death, she shaved her head and became a nun, becoming the first Japanese monarch to take Buddhist vows and establishing a long tradition.

Feel free to check out my Ko-Fi if you like what I do! Your support would be greatly appreciated.

Further reading

Shillony Ben-Ami, Enigma of the Emperors Sacred Subservience in Japanese History

Tsurumi Patricia E., “Japan’s early female emperors”

Aoki Michiko Y., "Jitō Tennō, the female sovereign",in: Mulhern Chieko Irie (ed.), Heroic with grace legendary women of Japan

[literary-illuminati]

2024 Book Review #41 – Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta

Almost everything I know about World War 2, I learned against my will through a poorly spent adolescence and reading people argue about it online. Living in Canada, Japan’s role in it is even more obscure, with the wars in the Pacific and China getting a fraction of a fraction of the official commemoration and pop culture interest of events in Europe. So I went into this book with a knowledge of only the vague generalities of Japanese politics in the ‘30s and ‘40s – from that baseline, this was a tremendously interesting and educational book, if at times more than a bit dry.

The book is a very finely detailed narrative of the internal deliberations within the Japanese government and the diplomatic negotiations with the USA through late 1940 and 1941, which ultimately culminate in the decision to attack Pearl Harbour and invade European colonies across the Pacific. It charts the (deeply dysfunctional) decision-making systems of the Imperial Japanese government and how bureaucratic politics, factional intrigue and positioning, and an endemic unwillingness to be the one to back down and eat your words, made a war with the USA first possible, then plausible, then seemingly inevitable. Throughout this, the book wears its thesis on its sleeve – that the war in the Pacific only ever seemed inevitable, that until the very last hour there was widespread understanding that the war would be near-unwinnable across the imperial government and military, but a broken political culture, the career suicide of being the one to endorse accepting American demands,, and a simple lack of courage or will among the doves, prevented anything from ever coming of it.

So I did know that Imperial Japan’s government had, let’s say, fundamental structural issues when I opened the book, but I really wasn’t aware of just how confused and byzantine the upper echelons of it were. Like if Brazil was about the executive committee – the army and navy ministries had entirely separate planning infrastructures from the actual general staffs, and all of them were basically silo’d off from the actual economic and industrial planning bureaucracy (despite the fact that the head of the Cabinet Planning Board was a retired general). All of which is important, because the real decisions of war and peace were made in liaison meetings with the prime minister, foreign minister, and both ministry and general staff of each branch – meetings which were often as not just opportunities for grandstanding and fighting over the budget. The surprise is less that they talked themselves into an unwinnable war and more that they decided on anything at all.

The issue, as Hotta frames it, is that there really wasn’t a single place the buck stopped – officially speaking, the civilian government and both branches of the military served the pleasure of the Emperor – whose theoretically absolute authority was contained by both his temperament and both custom and a whole court bureaucracy dedicated to making sure the prestige of the throne didn’t get mired in and discredited by the muck of politics. The entire Meiji Constitution was built around the presence of a clique of ‘imperial advisers’ who could borrow the emperor’s authority without being so restrained – but as your Ito Hirobumis and Yamagata Aritomos died off, no one with the same energy, authority and vision ever seems to have replaced them.

So you had momentous policy decisions presented as suggestions to the emperor who could agree and thus turn them into inviolable commands, and understood by the emperor as settled policy who would provide an apolitical rubber-stamp on. Which, combined with institutional cultures that strongly encouraged being a good soldier and not undercutting or hurting the image of your faction, led to a lot of people quietly waiting for someone else to stand up and make a scene for them (or just staying silent and wishing them well when they actually did).

Now, this is all perhaps a bit too convenient for many of the people involved – doubtless anyone sitting down and writing their memoirs in 1946 would feel like exaggerating their qualms about the war as much as they could possibly get away with. I feel like Hotta probably takes those post-war memoirs and interviews too much at face value in terms of people’s unstated inner feeling – but on the other hand, the bureaucratic records and participants’ notes preserved from the pivotal meetings themselves do seem to show a great deal of hesitation and factional doubletalk. Most surprisingly to me was the fact that Tojo (who I had the very vague impression was the closest thing to a Japanese Hitler/Mussolini there was) was actually chosen to lead a peace cabinet and find some 11th hour way to avert the war. Which in retrospect was an obviously terrible decision, but it was one he at least initially tried to follow through on.

If the book has a singular villain, it’s actually no Tojo (who is portrayed as, roughly, replacement-rate bad) but Prince Konoe, the prime minister who actually presided over Japan’s invasion of China abroad and slide into a militarized police state at home, who led the empire to the very brink of war with the United States before getting cold feet and resigning at the last possible moment to avoid the responsibility of either starting the war or of infuriating the military and destroying his own credibility by backing down and acceding to America’s demands. He’s portrayed as, not causing, but exacerbating

every one of Japan’s structural political issues through a mixture of cowardice and excellent survival instincts – he carefully avoided fights he might lose, even when that meant letting his foreign minister continue to sabotage negotiations he supported while he arranged support to cleanly remove him (let alone really pushing back on the army). At the same time, the initiatives he did commit were all things inspired by his deep fascination with Nazi Germany – the dissolution of partisan political parties and creation of an (aspirationally, anyway) totalitarian Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the creation of a real militarized police state, the heavy-handed efforts to create a more pure and patriotic culture. He’s hardly to blame for all of that, of course, but given that he was a civilian politician initially elected to curb military influence, his governments sure as hell didn’t help anything (and it is I suppose just memorably ironic that he’s the guy on the spot for many of the most military-dictatorship-e aspects of Japanese government).

One of the most striking things about the book is actually not even part of the main narrative but just the background context of how badly off Japan was even before they attacked the United States. I knew the invasion of China hadn’t exactly been going great, but ‘widespread rationing in major cities, tearing up wrought iron fencing in the nicest districts of the capital to use in war industry’ goes so much further than I had any sense of. The second Sino-Japanese War was the quintessential imperial adventure and war of choice, and also just literally beyond the material abilities of the state of Japan to sustain in conjunction with normal civilian life. You see how the American embargo on scrap metal and petroleum was seen as nearly an act of war in its own right. You also wonder even more how anyone could possibly have convinced themselves that an army that was already struggling to keep its soldiers fed could possibly win an entirely new war with the greatest industrial power on earth. Explaining which is of course the whole point of the book (they didn’t, in large part, but convinced themselves the Americans wouldn’t have the stomach for it and agree to a favourable peace quickly, or that Germany would conquer the UK and USSR and impose mediation on Japan’s terms, or-).

When trying to understand the decision-making process, I’m honestly reminded of nothing so much as the obsession with ‘credibility’ you see among many American foreign policy hands in the modern day. The idea that once something had been committed to – the (largely only extant on paper) alliance with Nazi Germany, the creation of a collaborator government in China to ‘negotiate’ with, the occupation of southern Vietnam – then, even if you agreed it hadn’t worked out and had probably been a terrible decision to begin with, reversing course without some sort of face-saving agreement or concession on the other side would shatter any image of strength and invite everyone else the world over to grab at what you have. The same applies just as much to internal politics, where admitting that your branch couldn’t see a way to victory in the proposed war was seen as basically surrendering the viciously fought over budget, no matter the actual opinions of your experts – the book includes anecdotes about both fleet admirals and the senior field marshal China privately tearing their respective superiors in Tokyo a (polite) new one for the bellicosity they did not believe themselves capable of following through on, but of course none of these sentiments were ever shared with anyone who might use them against the army/navy.

The book is very much a narrative of the highest levels of government, idea of mass sentiment and popular opinion are only really incidentally addressed. Which does make it come as a shock every time it’s mentioned that a particular negotiation was carried out in secret because someone got spooked by an ultranationalist assassination attempt the day before. I entirely believe that no one wanted to say as much, but I can’t help but feel that people’s unwillingness to forthrightly oppose further war owed something to all the radical actors floating around in the junior ranks of the officer corps who more than willing to take ‘decisive, heroic action’ against anyone in government trying to stab the war effort in the back. Which is something that the ever-increasing number of war dead in China (with attendant patriotic unwillingness to let them die ‘for nothing) and the way everyone kept trying to rally the public to the war effort with ever-more militaristic public rhetoric assuredly only made worse.

That same rhetoric also played its part in destroying the possibility of negotiations with the United States. The story of those negotiations runs throughout the book, and is basically one misunderstanding and failure to communicate after another. It at times verges on comedy. Just complete failure to model the political situation and diplomatic logic of the other party, on both sides (combined with a great and increasing degree of wishful thinking that e.g. letting the military occupy southern French Indochina as a concession for their buy-in on further negotiations would be fine with the Americans. A belief held on exactly zero evidence whatsoever). The United States government was actually quite keen to avoid a war in the pacific if possible, as FDR did his best to get entangled in Europe and effectively start an undeclared naval war with Germany – but the negotiating stance hardened as Japan seemed more and more aggressive and unreliable, which coincided exactly with Japan’s government taking the possibility of war seriously enough to actually try to negotiate. It’s the same old story of offering concessions and understanding that might have been agreed to a few months beforehand, but were now totally unacceptable. In the end, everyone pinned their hopes on a face-to-face diplomatic summit with FDR in Juneau, where sweeping concessions could be agreed to and the government’s credibility staked on somewhere the hardliners could not physically interfere with. The Americans, meanwhile, wanted some solid framework for what the agreement would be before the summit occurred, and so it never did.

After the war, it was apparently the general sentiment that the whole nation was responsible for the war with the United States – which is to say that no individual person deserved any special or specific blame. Hotta’s stated aim with the book is to show how that’s bullshit, how war was entirely avoidable, and it was only do to these small cliques of specific, named individuals that it began. The hardliners like Osami Nagano, but just as much the cowards, careerists and factional partisans like Konoe, Tojo, and (keeper of the Privy Seal) Kido. Having read it I, at least, am convinced.

[signalburst]

Shōgun Historical Shallow-Dive: the Final Part - The Samurai Were Assholes, When 'Accuracy' Isn't Accurate, Beautiful Art, and Where to From Here

Final part. There is an enormous cancer attached to the samurai mythos and James Clavell's orientalism that I need to address. Well, I want to, anyway. In acknowledging how great the 2024 adaptation of Shōgun is, it's important to engage with the fact that it's fiction, and that much of its marketed authenticity is fake. That doesn't take away from it being an excellent work of fiction, but it is a very important distinction to me.

If you want to engage with the cool 'honourable men with swords' trope without thinking any deeper, navigate away now. Beyond here, there are monsters - literal and figurative. If you're interested in how different forms of media are used to manufacture consent and shape national identity, please bear with me.

I think the makers of 2024's Shōgun have done a fantastic job. But there is one underlying problem they never fully wrestled with. It's one that Hiroyuki Sanada, the leading man and face of the production team, is enthusiastically supportive of. And with the recent announcement of Season 2, it's likely to return. You may disagree, but to me, ignoring this dishonours the millions of people who were killed or brutalised by either the samurai class, or people in the 20th century inspired by a constructed idea of them.

Why are we drawn to the samurai?

A pretty badly sourced, but wildly popular history podcast contends that 'The Japanese are just like everybody else, only more so.' I saw a post on here that tried to make the assertion that the show's John Blackthorne would have been exposed to as much violence as he saw in Japan, and wouldn't have found it abnormal.

This is incorrect. Obviously 16th and 17th century Europe were violent places, but they contained violence familiar to Europeans through their cultural lens. Why am I confidently asserting this? We have hundreds of letters, journals and reports from Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch and English expressing absolute horror about what they encountered. Testing swords on peasants was becoming so common that it would eventually become the law of the land. Crucifixion was enacted as a punishment for Christians - first by the Taiko, then by the Tokugawa shogunate - for irony's sake.

Before the end of the feudal period, battles would end with the taking of heads for washing and display. Depending on who was viewing them, this was either to honour them, or to gloat: 'I'm alive, you're dead.' These things were ritualised to the point of being codified when real-life Toranaga took control. Seppuku started as a cultural meme and ended up being the enforced punishment for any minor mistake for the 260 years the ruling samurai class acted as the nation's bureaucracy. It got more and more ritualised and flowery the more it got divorced from its origin: men being ordered by other men to kill themselves during a period of chaotic warfare. I've read accounts of samurai 'warriors' during the Edo period committing seppuku for being late for work. Not life-and-death warrior work - after Sekigahara, they were just book-keepers. They had desk jobs.

Since Europe's contact with Japan, the samurai myth has fascinated and appalled in equal measure. As time has gone on, the fascination has gone up and the horror has been dialled down. This is not an accident. This isn't just a change in the rest of the world's perception of the samurai. This is the result of approximately 120 years of Japanese government policies. Successive governments - nationalist, military authoritarian, and post-war democratic - began to lionize the samurai as the perfect warrior ideal, and sanitize the history of their origin and their heydey (the period Shōgun covers). It erases the fact that almost all of the fighting of the glorious samurai Sengoku Jidai was done by peasant ashigaru (levies), who had no choice.

It is important to never forget why this was done initially: to form an imagined-historical ideal of a fighting culture. An imagined fighting culture that Japanese invasion forces could emulate to take colonies and subdue foreign populations in WWI, and, much more brutally, in WWII. James Clavell came into contact with it as a Japanese Prisoner of War.

He just didn't have access to the long view, or he didn't care.

The Original Novel - How One Ayn Rand Fan Introduced Japan to America

There's a reason why 1975's Shogun novel contains so many historical anachronisms. James Clavell bought into a bunch of state-sanctioned lies, unachored in history, about the warring states period, the concept of bushido (manufactured after the samurai had stopped fighting), and the samurai class's role in Japanese history.

For the novel, I could go into great depth, but there are three things that stand out.

Never let the truth get in the way of a good story. He's a novelist, and he did what he liked. But Clavell's novel was groundbreaking in the 70's because it was sold as a lightly-fictionalised history of Japan. The unfortunate fact is the official version that was being taught at the time (and now) is horseshit, and used for far-right wing authoritarian/nationalist political projects. The Three Unifiers and the 'honour of the samurai' magnates at the time is a neat package to tell kids and adults, but it was manufactured by an early-20th century Japanese Imperial Government trying to harness nationalism for building up a war-ready population. Any slightly critical reading of the primary sources shows the samurai to be just like any ruling class - brutal, venal, self-interested, and horrifically cruel. Even to their contemporary warrior elites in Korea and China.

Fake history as propraganda. Clavell swallowed and regurgitated the 'death before dishonour', 'loyalty to the cause above all else', 'it's all for the Realm' messages that were deployed to justify Imperial Japanese Army Class-A war crimes during the war in the Pacific and the Creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Properity Sphere. This retroactive samurai ethos was used in the late Meiji restoration and early 20th century nationalist-military governments to radicalise young Japanese men into being willing to die for nothing, and kill without restraint. The best book on this is An Introduction to Japanese Society by Sugimoto Yoshio, but there is a vast corpus of scholarship to back it up.

Clavell's orientalism strays into outright racism. Despite the novel Shōgun undercutting John Blackthorne as a white savior in its final pages - showing him as just a pawn in the game - Clavell's politics come into play in every Asia Saga novel. A white man dominates an Asian culture through the power of capitalism. This is orthagonal to points 1 and 2, but Clavell was a devotee of Ayn Rand. There's a reason his protagonists all appear cut from the same cloth. They thrust their way into an unfamiliar society, they use their knowledge of trade and mercantilism to heroically save the day, they are remarked upon by the Asian characters as braver and stronger, and they are irresistible to the - mostly simpering, extremely submissive - caricatures of Asian women in his novels. Call it a product of its times or a product of Clavell's beliefs, I still find it repulsive. Clavell invents (nearly from whole cloth, actually) the idea that samurai find money repulsive and distasteful, and his Blackthorne shows them the power of commerce and markets. Plus there are numerous other stereotypes (Blackthorne's massive dick! Japanese men have tiny penises! Everyone gets naked and bathes together because they're so sexually free! White guys are automatically cool over there!) that have fuelled the fantasies of generations of non-Japanese men, usually white: Clavell's primary audience of 'dad history' buffs.

2024's Shōgun, as a television adaptation, did a far better job in almost every respect

But the show did much better, right? Yes. Unquestionably. It was an incredible achievement in bringing forward a tired, stereotypical story to add new themes of cultural encounter, questioning one's place in the broader world, and killing your ego. In many ways, the show was the antithesis to Clavell's thesis.

It drastically reigned in the anachronistic, ahistorical referencees to 'bushido' and 'samurai honor', and showed the ruling class of Japan in 1600 much more accurately. John Blackthorne (William Adams) was shown to be an extraordinary person, but he wasn't central to the outcome of the Eastern Army-Western Army civil war. There aren't scenes of him being the best lover every woman he encounters in Japan has ever had (if you haven't read the book, this is not an exaggeration). He doesn't teach Japanese warriors how to use matchlock rifles, which they had been doing for two hundred years. He doesn't change the outcome of enormous events with his thrusting, self-confident individualism. In 2024's Shōgun, Blackthorne is much like his historical counterpart. He was there for fascinating events, but not central. He wasn't teaching Japanese people basic concepts like how to make money or how to make war.

On fake history - the manufactured samurai mythos - it improved on the novel, but didn't overcome the central problems. In many ways, I can't blame the showrunners. Many of the central lies (and they are deliberate lies) constructed around the concept of samurai are hallmarks of the genre. But it's still important to me to notice when it's happening - even while enjoying some of the tropes - without passively accepting it.

'Authenticity' to a precisely manufactured story, not to history

There's a core problem surrounding the promotion and manufactured discussion surrounding 2024's Shōgun. I think it's a disconnect between the creative and marketing teams, but it came up again and again in advertising and promotion for the show: 'It's authentic. It's as real as possible.'

I've only seen this brought up in one article, Shōgun Has a Japanese-Superiority Complex, by Ryu Spaeth:

'The show also valorizes a supreme military power that is tempered by the pursuit of beauty and the highest of cultures, as if that might be a formula for peace. Shōgun displays these two extremes of the Japanese self, the savagery and the refinement, but seems wholly unaware that there may be a connection between them, that the exquisite sensibility Japan is famous for may flow from, and be a mask for, its many uses of atrocious domination.'

Here we come to authenticity.

'The publicity surrounding the series has focused on its fidelity to authenticity: multiple rounds of translation to give the dialogue a “classical” feel; fastidious attention to how katana swords should be slung, how women of the nobility should fold their knees when they sit, how kimonos should be colored and styled; and, crucially, a decentralization of the narrative so that it’s not dominated by the character John Blackthorne.'

It's undeniable that the 2024 production spent enormous amounts of energy on authenticity. But authenticity to what? To traditional depictions of samurai in Japanese media, not to history itself. The experts hired for gestures, movement, costumes, buildings, and every other aspect of the show were experts with decades in experience making Japanese historical dramas 'look right', not experts in Japanese history. But this appeal to 'Japanese authenticity' was made in almost every piece of promotional material.

The show had only one historical advisor on staff, and he was Dutch. The numerous Japanese consultants, experts and specialists brought on board (talked about at length in the show's marketing and behind the scenes) were there to assist with making an accurate Japanese jidaigeki. It's the difference between hiring an experienced BBC period drama consultant, and a historian specialising in the Regency. One knows how to make things look 'right' to a British audience. The other knows what actually happened.

That's fine, but a critical viewing of the show needs to engage with this. It's a stylistically accurate Japanese period drama. It is not an accurate telling of Japanese history around the unification of Japan. If it was, the horses would be the size of ponies, there would be far more malnourished and brutalised peasants, the word samurai would have far less importance as it wasn't yet a rigidly enforced caste, seppuku wouldn't yet be ritualised and performed with as much frequency, and Toranaga - Tokugawa - would be a famously corpulently obese man, pounding the saddle of his horse in frustration at minor setbacks, as he was in history.

The noble picture of restraint, patience, refinement and honour presented by Hiroyuki Sanada as Toranaga/Tokugawa is historical sanitation at its most extreme. Despite being Sanada's personal hero, Tokugawa Ieyasu was a brutal warlord (even for the standards of the time), and he committed acts of horrific cruelty. He ordered many more after gaining ultimate power. Think a miniseries about the Founding Fathers of the United States that doesn't touch upon slavery - I'm sure there have been plenty.

The final myth that 2024's Shōgun leaves us with is that it took a man like Toranaga - Tokugawa Ieyasu - to bring peace to a land ripped assunder by chaos. This plays into 19th century notions of Great Man History, and is a neat story, but the consensus amongst historians is if it wasn't Tokugawa, it would have been some other cunt. In many cases, it very nearly was. His success was historical contingency, not 5D chess.

So how did this image get manufactured, to the point where the Japanese populace - by and large - believes it to be true? Very long story short: after a period of rapid modernisation, Japan embraced nationalism in the late 19th century. It was all the rage. Nationalism depends on a glorified past. The samurai (recently the pariahs of Japanese history) were repurposed as Japan's unique warrior heroes, and woven into state education. This was especially heated in the 1920s and 30s in the lead up to the invasion of Manchuria and Japan's war of aggression in the Pacific. Nationalism + militarism = the modern Japanese samurai myth, to prepare men to obey orders unquestioningly from a military dictatorship.

This persists in the postwar period. Every year since 1963, Japan's state broadcaster NHK commissions a historical drama - a Taiga Drama, where many of this show's actors got their starts - that manufactures and re-enforces the idea of samurai as noble, artful, honourable people. Read a book - read a Wikipedia article! - and you'll see that most of it stems from Tokugawa-shogunate era self-propaganda. It's much like the European re-interpretation of chivalry. In Europe's case, chivalry in actual history was a set of guidelines that allowed for the sanctioned mass-rape and murder of civilians, with a side of rules regarding the ransoming of nobles in scorched-earth military campaigns. In Japan's case, historical figures that regularly backstabbed each other, tortured rival warriors and their lessers, and inflicted horrific casualties on the peasants that they owned (we have a term for that) are cast as noble, honourable, dedicated servants of the Empire.

Why does this matter to me? Samurai movies and TV shows are just media, after all. The issue, for me, is that the actors, the producers - including Hiroyuki Sanada - passionately extoll 'accuracy' as if they genuinely believe they're telling history. They talk emotionally about bushido and its special place in Japanese society.

But the entire concept of bushido is a retroactive, post-conflict, samurai construction. Bushio is bullshit. Despite being spoken of as the central tenet of 2024's Shōgun by actors like Hiroyuki Sanada, Tadanobu Asano, and Tokuma Nishioka, it simply didn't exist at the time. It was made up after the advent of modern nationalism.

It was used to justify horrendous acts during the late Edo period, the Meiji restoration, and the years leading up to the conclusion of Japan's war of aggression in the Pacific. It's still used now by Japan's primarily right-wing government to deny war crimes and justify the horrors unleashed on Asia and the Pacific during World War II as some kind of noble warrior crusade. If you ever want your stomach turned, visit the museum attached to Yasukuni Shrine. It's a theme park dedicated to war crimes denial, linked intimately to Japan's imagined warrior past. Whether or not the production staff, cast, and marketing team of 2024's Shōgun knew they were engaging with a long line of ahistorical bullshit is unknown, but it is important.

It's also important to acknowledge that, having listened to many interviews with Rachel Kondo and Justin Marks, they were acutely aware that they weren't Japanese, to claim to be telling an authentically Japanese story would be wrong, and that all they could do was do their best to make an engaging work that plays on ideas of cultural encounter and letting go. I think the 'authenticity!' thing is mostly marketing, and judicious editing of what the creators and writers actually said in interviews.

So... you hate the show, then? What the hell is this all about?

No, I love the show. It's beautiful. But it's a beautiful artwork.

Just as the noh theatre in the show was a twisting of events within the show, so are all works of fiction that take inspiration from history. Some do it better than others. And on balance, in the show, Shōgun did it better than most. But so much of the marketing and the discussion of this adaptation has been on its accuracy. This has been by design - it was the strategy Disney adopted to market the show and give it a unique viewing proposition.

'This time, Shōgun is authentic!*

*an authentic Japanese period drama, but we won't mention that part.

And audiences have conflated that with what actually happened, as opposed to accuracy to a particular form of Japanese propaganda that has been honed over a century. This difference is crucial.

It doesn't detract from my enjoyment of it. Where I view James Clavell's novel as a horrid remnant of an orientalist, racist past, I believe the showrunners of 2024's Shōgun have updated that story to put Japanese characters front and centre, to decentralise the white protagonist to a more accurate place of observation and interest, and do their best to make a compelling subversion of the 'stranger in a strange land' tale.

But I don't want anyone who reads my words or has followed this series to think that the samurai were better than the armed thugs of any society. They weren't more noble, they weren't more honourable, they weren't more restrained. They just had 260 years in which they worked desk-jobs while wearing two swords to write stories about how glorious the good old days were, and how great people were.

Well... that's a bleak note to end on. Where to from here?

There are beautiful works of fiction that engage much closer with the actual truth of the samurai class that I'd recommend. One even stars Hiroyuki Sanada, and is (I think) his finest role.

I'd really encourage anyone who enjoyed Shōgun to check out The Twilight Samurai. That was the reality for the vast majority of post-Sekigahara samurai

For something closer to the period that Shogun is set, the best film is Seppuku (Hara-Kiri in English releases). It is a post-war Japanese film that engages both with the reality of samurai rule, and, through its central themes, how that created mythos was used to radicalise millions of Japanese into senseless death during the war. It is the best possible response to a romanticisation of a brutal, hateful period of history, dominated by cruel men who put power first, every single time.

I want to end this series, if I can, with hope. I hope that reading the novel or watching the 1980 show or the 2024 show has ignited in people an interest in Japanese culture, or society, or history. But don't let that be an end. Go further. There are so many things that aren't whitewashed warlords nobly killing - the social history of Japan is amazing, as is the women's history. A great book for getting an introduction to this is The Japanese: A History in 20 Lives.

And outside of that, there are so many beautiful Japanese movies and shows that don't deal with glorified violence and death. In fact, it makes up the vast majority of Japanese media! Who would have thought! Your Name was the first major work of art to bridge some of the cultural animosity between China and Japan stemming from WW2, and is a goofy time travel love story. Perfect Days is a beautiful movie about the simple joy of living, and it's about the most Tokyo story you can get.

Please go out, read more, watch more. If you can, try and find your way to Japan. It's one of the most beautiful places on earth. The people are kind, the food is delicious, and the culture is very welcoming to foreigners.

2024's Shōgun was great, but please don't let that be the end. Let it be the beginning, and I hope it serves as a gateway for you.

And I hope our little fandom on here remembers this show as a special time, where we came together to talk about something we loved. I'll miss you all.

[apas-95]

I don't think opposing US entry into WWII was the incorrect view? The US had strong ties to Nazi Germany, the US Nazi party was strong, and Franklin Roosevelt agreed with Nazi antisemitism. There was no reason to think the US would do anything other than what they did - rehabilitate and coop fascists into their own empire. The USSR would have won with or without the US joining and, frankly, would have been much better without them. The CPUSA absolutely is revisionist and useless, but that was one area they were right about.

I cannot help but disagree for exactly the reasons you laid out. The US were nazi allies, they just decided, as fascists do, to take over the competing enterprise when they had an opportunity. US-governed Germany or Japan was just as fascist as before, but now was integrated into a much larger project of extermination with a more sustainable methodology - the holocaust by bullet that was visited upon most of eastern europe was replaced with a holocaust by stratofortress and napalm. When the US appropriated half of the Korean peninsula from the Japanese empire it did not do all that much to improve the lot of the Korean people, it just widened the scale of collaboration and allowed the Korean armed forces and KCIA to take part in the massacre of Vietnamese.

For exactly these reasons the US victory in the US-German war (and US-Japanese war) was not a victory for the proletariat, it was a battle between empires where the proletariat were both the prized resource to be won, as well as the blood that fueled the contest of industrial production capability. The CPUSA's decision to cease and condemn anti-government actives and sabotage, in support of the US state's war effort, was a clear and evident failure of policy that had an entire party suddenly stop listening to genuine complaints from striking workers and start jingoistically parroting government slogans about supporting the nation. Germany and the US were and are functionally identical in their nature as bourgeois states, Germany was simply, due to its more developed class relations and contradictions, as well as economic pressure following military defeat, put in a position where it came into conflict with its hostile brother. A manufacturing empire and a merchant empire went to war at sea, and at home their communists sat mutely.

'Conversion of the imperialist war into revolutionary war' is not merely a slogan, it is an inevitable conclusion.

[whencyclopedia]

The Causes of WWII

The origins of the Second World War (1939-45) may be traced back to the harsh peace settlement of the First World War (1914-18) and the economic crisis of the 1930s, while more immediate causes were the aggressive invasions of their neighbours by Germany, Italy, and Japan. A weak and divided Europe, an isolationist USA, and an opportunistic USSR were all intent on peace, but the policy of appeasement only delivered what everyone most feared: another long and terrible world war.

The main causes of WWII were:

The harsh Treaty of Versailles

The economic crisis of the 1930s

The rise of fascism

Germany's rearmament

The cult of Adolf Hitler

The policy of appeasement by Western powers

Treaties of mutual interest between Axis Powers

Lack of treaties between the Allies

The territorial expansion of Germany, Italy, and Japan

The Nazi-Soviet Pact

The invasion of Poland in September 1939

The Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbour

Treaty of Versailles

Germany was defeated in the First World War, and the victors established harsh terms to ensure that some of the costs of the war were recuperated and to prevent Germany from becoming a future threat. With European economies and populations greatly damaged by the war, the victors were in no mood to be lenient since Germany had almost won and its industry was still intact. Germany remained a dangerous state. However, Britain and France did not want a totally punitive settlement, as this might lead to lasting resentment and make Germany unable to become a valuable market for exports.

The peace terms were set out in the Treaty of Versailles, signed by all parties except the USSR on 28 June 1919. The Rhineland must be demilitarised to act as a buffer zone between Germany and France. All colonies and the Saar, a coal-rich area of western Germany, were removed from German authority. Poland was given the industrial area of Upper Silesia and a corridor to the sea, which included Danzig (Gdánsk) and cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany. France regained the regions of Alsace and Lorraine. Germany had to pay war reparations to France and Belgium. Germany had limits on its armed forces and could not build tanks, aircraft, submarines, or battleships. Finally, Germany was to accept complete responsibility, that is the guilt, for starting the war. Many Germans viewed the peace terms as highly dishonourable.

The settlement established nine new countries in Eastern Europe, a recipe for instability since all of them disputed their borders, and many contained large minority groups who claimed to be part of another country. Germany, Italy, and Russia, once powerful again after the heavy costs of WWI, looked upon these fledgling states with imperialist envy.

In the 1920s, Germany signed two important treaties. The Locarno Treaty of 1925 guaranteed Germany's western borders but allowed some scope for change in the east. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed by 56 countries. All the major powers promised not to conduct foreign policy using military means. In 1929, Germany's reparations as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles were reduced from £6.6 million to £2 million. In 1932, the reparations were cancelled altogether. This was all very promising, but through the 1930s, the complex web of European diplomacy began to quickly unravel in a climate of economic decline.

Continue reading...

[djuvlipen]

Wanna learn about women history and WWII? Here is a non-exhaustive list to get you started

German women and the Nazi regime

Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics, Claudia Koonz

Female SS Guards and Workaday Violence: The Majdanek Concentration Camp, 1942-1944, Elissa Mailänder

Zwangssterilisation im Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Rassenpolitik und Frauenpolitik, Gisela Bock

Hitler's Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields, Wendy Lower

"Backlash against Prostitutes' Rights: Origins and Dynamics of Nazi Prostitution Policies," in Journal of the History of Sexuality Julia Roos

"German Women and the Holocaust in the Nazi East," Wendy Lower, in Women and Genocide, Elissa Bemporad & Joyce W. Warren

Frausein im Dritten Reich, Rita Thalmann

Women as victims or perpetrators of the Holocaust (general)

"Women and the Holocaust: A Reconsideration of Research," in Signs, Joan Ringelheim

Women in the Holocaust, Dalia Ofer & Lenore J. Weitzman

Das KZ-Bordell: Sexuelle Zwangsarbeit in nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern, Robert Sommer

SS-Bordelle und Oral History. Problematische Quellen und die Existenz von Bordellen für die SS in Konzentrationslagern, Christa Paul & Robert Sommer

Sexual Violence during the Holocaust—The Case of Forced Prostitution in the Warsaw Ghetto, in Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, Katarzyna Person

"Gender: A Crucial Tool in Holocaust Research," Marion Kaplan, in Women and Genocide, Elissa Bemporad & Joyce W. Warren

Different Voices: Women and the Holocaust, Carol Rittner & John K. Roth

Resilience and Courage: Women, Men, and the Holocaust, Nechema Tec

« Reframing Sexual Violence as a Weapon and Strategy of War: The Case of the German Wehrmacht during the War and Genocide in the Soviet Union, 1941–1944 », in Journal of the History of Sexuality, Regina Mühlhäuser

Sex and the Nazi soldier. Violent, commercial and consensual encounters during the war in the Soviet Union, 1941-45, Regina Mülhäuser

Romani women during the Holocaust

« Krieg im Frieden im Krieg: Reading the Romani Holocaust in terms of race, gender and colonialism », Eve Rosenhaft

« Hidden Lives : Sinti and Roma Women », Sybil Milton

« Romani women and the Holocaust Testimonies of Sexual Violence in Transnistria », Michelle Kelso

"No Shelter to Cry In: Romani Girls and Responsibility during the Holocaust," Michelle Kelso, in Women and Genocide, Elissa Bemporad & Joyce W. Warren

Jewish women during the Holocaust

Jewish women's sexual behaviour and sexualized abuse during the Nazi era, in The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, Beverley Chalmers

Sexual Violence against Jewish Women During the Holocaust, Sonja M. Hedgepeth & Rochelle G. Saidel

Persecution of lesbians by the Nazis

Days of Masquerade: Life Stories of Lesbians during the Third Reich, Claudia Schoppmann

Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität, Claudia Schoppmann

“This Kind of Love”: Descriptions of Lesbian Behaviour in Nazi Concentration Camps, from Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität, Claudia Schoppmann

Queer in Europe during the Second World War, Regis Schlagdenhauffen

Ravensbrück

Ravensbrück. Everyday Life in a Woman’s Concentration Camp 1939-45, Jack G. Morrison

Ravensbruck: Life and Death in Hitler's Concentration Camp for Women, Sarah Helm

Women and the Memory of WWII

Women, Genocide, and Memory: The Ethics of Feminist Ethnography in Holocaust Research, in Gender & Society, Janet Jacobs

Lessons Learned from Gentle Heroism: Women's Holocaust Narratives, in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Myrna Goldenberg

« An Austrian Roma Family Remembers: Trauma and Gender in Autobiographies by Ceija, Karl, and Mongo Stojka », Lorely French

Beyond Survival: Navigating Women's Personal Narratives of Sexual Violence in the Holocaust, Roy Schwartzman

Comfort Women and imperial Japan

Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, Yoshimi Yoshiaki

The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War, George Hicks

The Japanese Comfort Women and Sexual Slavery During the China and Pacific Wars, Caroline Norma

Lola's House: Filipino Women Living With War, Evelina Galang

Soviet Women during WWII

« “Girls” and “Women”. Love, Sex, Duty and Sexual Harassment in the Ranks of the Red Army 1941-1945 », in The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Brandon M. Schechter

Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War, Roger D. Markwick & Euridice Charon Cardona

Soviet Women in Combat. A History of Violence on the Eastern Front, Anna Krylova

[cathkaesque]

That the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact regularly gets defenders on here is maddening. The points raised in its defence (namely that Stalin tried to solicit an alliance with the British and French and they denied him for anticommunist reasons) are simply not true - there were deep negotiations at the initiative of the Western powers to set up a triple alliance against the Germans. Chamberlain told parliament that they were willing to abandon any ideological misgivings with the Soviets such was the threat of Germany. All attempts by the Germans to solicit an alliance with the Japanese, Italians, and the Poles in 1939 so they could fight the Western powers without worrying about a two front war. Germany's foreign currency reserves were depleted and they were cutting expenditure on the military in 1939 due to the lack of imported raw materials. They only had enough bullets for two weeks of fighting. And then the Pact comes and saves the Germans, providing them with a huge tranche of raw materials in exchange for spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. It was a completely opportunist policy that stabbed the rest of the world in the back and completely failed in all of its objectives.

[i-am-aprl]

THROWBACK TO 1998: STUDENT CALLS ON U.S. TO IMPLEMENT INT’L LAW FOR ALL

In this 1998 clip, an Ohio State University student told then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (1997-2001) that US policy should be consistent in enforcing international law, whether in Iraq, Israel or East Timor. He alleged the United States disregards international law for its allies, such as Israel, which has received the most US foreign aid since 1948.

The United States emerged as a superpower after World War II, which some call the second imperialist war. During that time, the US conducted the first atomic bombardment, killing an estimated 214,000 Japanese and leaving thousands of others to suffer disfigurement, side effects of radiation exposure, and diseases like leukaemia and cancer.

The United States became one of the founding members of the United Nations, which gave it veto power on the UN Security Council, the UN body with the power to pass legally binding resolutions.

Unfortunately, this has allowed the United States to use its military force and diplomatic and economic power to subjugate other countries, such as Korea, Vietnam and others. After the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States began to invade countries without international consensus and under the premise of the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle.

[basedhighsenberg]

If I'm helping upper class white customers, I'm looking at at 40 different pieces only for them to pick something that looks like a $30 etsy piece that also somehow costs $10,000. Younger guys in this category will sometimes call their parents and ask "is this good?" at random points.

If I'm helping lower class white customers, regardless of what it is I'm probably running them for finance. They will also argue at least once during the process. I've had a few transactions that could've been on Jerry Springer. Literally "You agreed on the one that was only 2k!" "Yeah? Well you cheated on me!"

Hispanic customers will match their white counterparts in terms of money spent on a piece, but it will be 5 minutes before closing and usually paid in cash. They will also usually face time one older female family member before purchase.

Middle Eastern: Are usually exactly the same as upper class white customers, and sometimes ill look at me like I'm poor because the highest gold karat I sell is only 18k (they're right).

Asians are a mixed bag. Korean and Japanese customers will come at you with solid and savvy bullet points but present them like a beaten orphan asking for extra soup. Chinese customers will attempt to haggle you down by sheer volume of words/questions and want certs for everything. Mongolians will give you that 30 second steppe stare and ask "discount?" before going to Costco.

Polynesians- 10 minute conversation about who I'm dating, who my friends are and who else I know before we get into anything sales related. One out of every 3 sales are usually dependent on whether or not we can engrave "mahunaloahunaloahuna" or something into the ring.

Black customers- due to the state I live in I barely have any black customers, the ones that I do get are usually either ex military and support Trump so they're basically white. The ones that don't fit into this category have either been paid for with drug money or were credit card fraud.

Lesbians: If you can get past the point in the sales presentation where they announce they're a couple like they're revealing a plot point in a YA novel without rolling your eyes, they usually buy. Two rings man- at the same time.

Gay men: avoid, will break up before your 30 day return policy and will say the universe is telling them to focus on themselves at age 47.

[tmarshconnors]

Franklin D. Roosevelt was warned.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour became one of the most infamous events in American history, leading the United States into World War II. However, a lesser-known aspect of this tragic day is the series of warnings that were issued to American military installations in the days leading up to the attack. Ten days before the Japanese planes descended upon Pearl Harbor, both the Army and Navy sent explicit messages warning of imminent war to key locations, including Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, and the Canal Zone. These warnings, unfortunately, were largely ignored by the facilities in Oahu, resulting in catastrophic consequences.

In late November 1941, the increasing tension in the Pacific was palpable. Intelligence gathered by American cryptanalysts indicated that Japan was planning a significant military operation. On November 27, 1941, a "war warning" was sent out by both the War Department and the Navy Department. This warning indicated that a Japanese attack was likely and urged all Pacific commands to take appropriate defensive measures.

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardise your defence."

Similarly, the Navy's communication emphasized the imminence of war and the need for vigilance:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days."

Despite the urgency conveyed in these messages, the response from military facilities in Oahu, where Pearl Harbor is located, was shockingly lax. Several factors contributed to this alarming oversight, including a misinterpretation of the threat's location and a general underestimation of Japan's capabilities and intentions.

Another controversial aspect of the lead-up to Pearl Harbor is the role of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Critics argue that Roosevelt was aware of the impending danger but failed to take adequate steps to prevent the attack. While it is true that Roosevelt had access to intelligence reports indicating a potential threat, the extent to which he understood or acted on this information remains a topic of debate among historians.

Some theorists suggest that Roosevelt might have allowed the attack to happen to galvanize American public opinion in favor of entering World War II. However, most historians dismiss this notion as a conspiracy theory, citing the immense risk and unpredictable consequences of such an action. What is clear, though, is that the warnings from both the Army and Navy were not given the level of attention and urgency they warranted, either by Roosevelt's administration or the military commanders in Hawaii.

The attack on Pearl Harbor had devastating effects, resulting in the deaths of over 2,400 Americans and the loss of numerous ships and aircraft. In the aftermath, numerous investigations sought to understand how such a significant surprise attack could have occurred. These inquiries highlighted the failures in communication, preparedness, and the underestimation of the Japanese threat.

One of the crucial lessons from Pearl Harbor is the importance of heeding intelligence warnings and ensuring that all levels of command understand and act upon them appropriately. The tragedy underscored the need for improved communication and coordination among military and government agencies to prevent such lapses in the future.

The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack serve as a poignant reminder of the consequences of ignoring clear warnings. The messages sent ten days prior to the attack were explicit and direct, yet the failure to act on them resulted in one of the darkest days in American history.

As we remember Pearl Harbour, it is essential to acknowledge the lessons it taught us about vigilance, preparedness, and the critical importance of acting on intelligence to safeguard national security.

[sailorspica]

imo the funniest thing about aot is its germanness is shallow, if anything it appropriates/bastardizes western and northern european cultures in a similar way to FMA (ymir is norse and sticks out in a potpurri of anglo and germanic names except for literally just jean), hence my crusade to add more slavic names to fanfiction like rico brzenska and uplift its (east) asianness

all of my reading of parent-child relationships here are grounded in how filial piety and various asian family ethics perpetuate abuse: children are expected to forgive everything (annie, reiner) and give care (pieck, connie); pay for their parents' crimes (the grice boys, rod referencing grisha's "sin", the marleyan military's dangling of "eldian atonement"); carry on their legacies (the fritz king's will, erwin's guilt toward his father)—oh, the very premise of children cannibalizing their parents, which sounds like an L for the parents but is the opposite, the kid is even more physically beholden to them than simple birth, inheritance is more of a burden than a boon. arguably zeke and historia's massive refusal of this piety / redirection to other causes (ksaver's suicidality, the zackly junta) lead to the rumbling, or cement the circumstances for eren to do it at all

said it in my big dumb astrology post but here's the shortest version of my paradis = japan thesis statement: [link]

diversity and "purity" in the world eldian diaspora vs marley's "ethnic cleansing" propaganda: [link]

how i approach iseyma's handling of of anti-jewish policies and canards: [link] [link]

i write about parent-child and cross-generational relationships in attack on titan all the time, because i do this all as a filipino with the twin cultural diseases of confucianism and catholicism ruining my life and health well into adulthood: [link] [link] [link]

...and then there's the tiny japanese visuals, like eremika's tokito sibling-style firewood backpacks, jean's omelet is an omurice bento

in general you'll find these annoying ass political readings tagged #aot politics, and my larger meta tag is #aot meta

[satoshi-mochida]

Metaphor: ReFantazio ‘ATLUS Exclusive’ introduces election candidates, followers - Gematsu

Publisher ATLUS and developer Studio Zero have released the fourth “ATLUS Exclusive” showcase video for Metaphor: ReFantazio, which introduces the candidates vying for the throne and the followers that support the protagonist.

Metaphor: ReFantazio is due out for PlayStation 5, Xbox Series, PlayStation 4, and PC via Steam and Microsoft Store on October 11.

Watch the footage below, including a full transcript.

ATLUS Exclusive 4 Showcase

English

Japanese

Transcript:

■ Introduction

Hello, everyone. I am Katsura Hashino, the director of Metaphor. My representative works include Shin Megami Tensei III, Persona 3, Persona 4, and Persona 5. In the previous showcases, we have introduced you to the story and the world in which the main characters will be competing in the royal tournament.

In this ATLUS Exclusive Metaphor: ReFantazio Character Edition Showcase, we’ll be looking at the campaign in its early stage, introduce the rival candidates and their believers, the fascinating supporters who help the protagonist win the election, and the bonds you will form with these characters. I will introduce them in more depth than what we have done in previous Exclusives

We will continue to introduce new information about Metaphor on the ATLUS YouTube channel, so please be sure to subscribe to our channel. Now, let’s begin the Character Edition Showcase.

■ Synopsis

First, here is a synopsis of the story. On a special mission to save the prince, the protagonist attends the king’s funeral to assassinate the mastermind, the great criminal Louis. Suddenly, the giant face of the supposedly dead king appears in the sky over the Royal Capital, and the “election magic” is triggered. “Whoever can win the most support from the people by the deadline will be the next king.” Thus began an unprecedented uprising for the throne, allowing the citizens to be a candidate to become the next king.

Gathering popular support is not an easy task for regular citizens who have no electoral experience. That is when Sanctifex Forden of the Sanctus Church, a leading figure in the country, declares the “Tournament for the Throne” as an opportunity for people to put their powers on display and gather support. In this “Tournament for the Throne,” those who have put themselves forward as candidates for king are tasked to visit the major cities in the kingdom, proving their worth to the public as they tackle tough challenges. The first destination, Port Brielhaven, will host the “Exhibition of the Brave,” in which candidates compete to see who can bring in the biggest monster head. Those who make it through will head to Altabury Heights to take on the next challenge.

It is Batlin, a Sanctus crier, who is responsible for informing the public about the Tournament for the Throne, which has become a truly national event. His lighthearted play-by-play keeps the public engaged in the tournament.

■ Candidates Vying for the Throne

Now, in this national election campaign, candidates with various agendas come forward. The two most powerful men leading the tournament from unassailable positions are Forden and the protagonist’s arch-nemesis, Louis.

Forden

Forden is the supreme authority of Sanctism, the state religion of the United Kingdom of Euchronia, and is also the head of the Crown Theocracy, the government ruled with Sanctism at its center. In the turmoil following the sudden death of the previous king, he has garnered wide support from the population, given his position as the leader of the moderate faction.

Louis

Louis, on the other hand, in contrast to the moderate Forden, is an army officer with military prowess who believes in true meritocracy, wielding overwhelming combat and magical skills that enable him to defeat the humans. His policy of valuing skill and rationality over birth or circumstance has garnered tremendous support, especially among radical youths.

Of course, these two are not the only ones who will be competing in the Royal Tournament campaign. Other candidates also put their names forward in the campaign, each with their own quirky platforms.

Gideaux

The first one I would like to introduce is Gideaux. He is Forden’s primary bodyguard, as well as the Captain of the Monk Army, the enforcement arm of the Crown Theocracy. He himself does not intend to be king, but he doesn’t seem to take kindly to the arrival of the “filthy” elda protagonist.

Godell

Next, Godell. Known as “Godell the Black Hound,” he is Louis’ subordinate, but is a rather ambitious man who is running for election on the platform of rising to power. He makes no effort to hide his open hostility, which may eventually become a thorny issue for you.

Milo

One of the oddballs is Milo of the ishkia tribe, who preaches an agenda where those of beauty will strip all the hideous of their titles. Wherever he goes, you’re bound to hear the high-pitched screams of his fans.

Loveless

Next, the third son of a tavern owner, with the slogan of “All you can drink all year round.” Without giving much thought to the future of the kingdom, some might be tempted to agree with Loveless’ pledge, which falls in line with his hedonistic paripus traits.

Rudolf

Rudolf, another bloodthirsty candidate .He pledges to establish a roussainte military dictatorship. His appeal for greater control of the roussainte tribe seems to have attracted the support of those who feel repressed by the rule of moderate clemars.

Lina

Lina, a eugief candidate and the only daughter of the family that runs the Kayden Workshop, is participating to promote the gauntlet runner family business.

Goddard

Goddard, a demolitionist of the rhoag tribe, is a representative of the elderly, with his pledge to give preferential treatment to the old and tax the young.

Roger

Roger, a young man of the clemar tribe, believes in his own righteousness and is pushing forward with his vision of a truly free country with no taxes, no laws, and no religion

Jin

Jin from the nidia tribe is intent on winning no matter what, changing his campaign pledge depending on where he goes and who he needs to please at the moment.

Julian

We also have Julian of the ishkia tribe who is very conscious about pro-animal rights even when it comes to monsters that threaten people.

Edeni

Edeni, an island chief of the mustari tribe, decides to participate in the tournament as a pagan advocate for religious freedom.

And others with various agendas and objectives will appear.

As you can see, the “Tournament for the Throne” has a festive aspect with a truly diverse field of rival candidates. But maybe Gallica is right. If one of these candidates become king, the country will face bigger problems.

The candidates we’ve introduced are all powerful people who have expensive gauntlet runners at their disposal. And I think you will find that there are many who want to represent the tribe they come from and increase their influence. However, some of these rivals are so impacted by the protagonist’s actions down the line that they later become his supporters. I won’t go into detail now, but I hope you will look forward to that as well. Posters highlighting the candidates’ pledges are posted in cities with influential power. You may want to listen to people’s opinions as you walk the streets to see what they think of the candidates’ promises and claims made in speeches.

During the election period, the protagonist’s popularity ranking in the race can be checked by pressing a specific button in the overworld. At the beginning, the protagonist’s support ranking starts in a rather low position, around 8,121st place as you see here. This is not a simulation game where the popularity ranking fluctuates in real time, so it is only a flavor element of the game. But these rankings will change significantly as the campaign progresses.

The protagonist is a nobody at the lowest level in the country. Of course, he is not the kind of person that anyone would expect to be king. You will feel the dynamics of this royal tournament campaign as you watch the ranking gradually change with the results of completing your missions and through your actions towards the people of the city!

■ Followers that Support the Protagonist

Now, while there are rivals in the tournament who stand in the protagonist’s way, there are also encouraging allies who will support your campaign. In the cities that the protagonist will stay at, there are many people with various kinds of problems. By listening to them and helping them, they will become strong supporters of the protagonist.

Of course, the allies who travel with him, such as Strohl and Hulkenberg, are also important supporters of the protagonist. But he will also meet unique supporters on his journey who do not directly participate in battle. The unique feature of interacting with supporters, or followers as we call them in this title, is that you can acquire powerful Archetypes that you can equip and use in battle.

Let us now introduce you to what kinds of followers we have.

Brigitta

First, there is a rhoag follower named Brigitta who owns an ignitor shop in the Royal Capital. She notices that the protagonist is an elda and asks him to take on a quest to test his strength. If you can complete said request and gain her trust, she will be a powerful follower. When she becomes a follower, the protagonist will not only be able to awaken to the Merchant Archetype, which offers more rewards in battle, but he will also be able to make purchases at the ignitor shop in the Royal Capital, which is usually not available to the elda.

Maria

Next is a girl named Maria who lives at the Hushed Honeybee Inn located in the Royal Capital. Separated from her parents and having no friends due to her rhoag and ishkia mixed background, she eagerly awaits the souvenir of stories that the protagonists bring back through encounters they have on their travels. If you can help her feel less lonely, she will also be a powerful follower. The bond with Maria awakens the Healer Archetype, which specializes in healing and purification.

Bardon

Next is Bardon, a roussainte who is the captain of the guard corps in Martira. He is a simple, clumsy, but likeable and earnest man who faces new problems after an incident that happens in his town is solved. By supporting him, he will become a strong follower. Your bond with him awakens the Commander Archetype, which can bend the flow of battles to your will.

Alonzo

Like Bardon, we meet Alonzo in Martira, an elusive and enigmatic young man of the nidia tribe. His smooth talk leads the protagonist to undertake a certain quest. Even though he swings the protagonist around with his words and actions that go back and forth, he ends up being a one-of-a-kind follower. If you can strengthen your bond with him, you will be able to awaken the Faker, that can be used as a trump card to tackle difficult enemies.

Catherina

Last but not least is Catherina, a bounty hunter. She is one of the protagonist’s followers, but she is also a candidate herself who stands up for her tribe—the paripus—which is often looked down upon, with the pledge to make them wealthier. From the bond you form with her, you can awaken the Brawler Archetype, which can deliver decisive blows. While they may be rivals in the campaign together, they do form a strong bond, allowing the protagonist and Catherina to create a unique relationship. We invite you to see for yourself how the competition between the candidates will play out.

Party Members

In addition to the followers introduced here, you can also bond with fellow party members such as Strohl and Hulkenberg, and build a follower relationship with them. Interacting with characters of all ages, tribes, and values, and from different perspectives, will give you a new experience unlike any you have had in previous titles.

Strengthening bonds with followers can lead to the evolution of Archetypes to higher levels and the unlocking of abilities that will give you a strategic advantage. So please be proactive and talk to your followers when you see them in town or in gauntlet runners. You can check the status of your interactions with your followers, as well as the Archetypes and abilities you have acquired through them, at any time in the main menu, which will help you strategize how to use your time during the operation periods.

In addition, the follower characters are also voiced by talented voice actors, which we believe will provide a deeper game experience.

■ Closing

How did you like it? We are pleased to announce that we have released new information on quite a few characters. Was there a character you liked among the unique candidates and followers? Let us know your favorite in the comments.

One of the most exciting aspects of this game system is the fact that the bonding process increases the number of very powerful Archetypes. Thinking about what battles you can fight with the Archetypes you acquire from the followers you meet will play a large role in your strategies. It is up to you, the player, to choose a follower in favor of strategy or choose a follower whose circumstances are of interest to you. It is well worth giving thought to, so I hope you look forward to it.

Up to this point, we have introduced the battle system, the dungeons, the story, and the characters. However, a new and different aspect of Metaphor is the element of enjoying daily activities on your journey. In the next Showcase, I will finally introduce the journey aspect in detail, so please stay tuned.

Once again, Metaphor is scheduled for release this fall on October 11, 2024. Both the physical and digital editions are available for pre-orders, so please pre-order your copy or add it to your wishlist. Along with the standard edition, a Digital Deluxe Edition commemorating the 35th anniversary of the ATLUS brand is also available. You can also get additional pre-order bonuses, so make sure to pre-order today. See you at the next ATLUS Exclusive Showcase! Thank you very much for your time today!

[mariacallous]

In 1999, American bombers accidentally blew up China’s embassy during an attack on Belgrade, killing three. The Chinese reacted with outrage, demanding reparations and official apologies. To prove their seriousness, they made nationalist speeches that whipped Chinese citizens into a frenzy, culminating in tens of thousands of protesters throwing rocks and encircling the U.S. embassy in Beijing.

For Chinese leaders, this was par for the course. In responding to international crises, China long hewed to a simple playbook: stoking anti-foreign protests to show resolve and pressure the other side to desist.

But today, something has changed: Chinese leader Xi Jinping, hardly averse to invoking nationalism when it suits him, has nonetheless eschewed stirring up frenzied protests when facing international crisis. During the biggest foreign-policy crisis for China in decades, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, Xi did not encourage Chinese protests—in fact, nationalist fervor was met with online repression, including a temporary shutdown of social media. Instead, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) carried out a series of unprecedented exercises to punish Taiwan and redraw the cross-strait status quo.

Xi’s avoidance of anger on the Chinese street is not a one-off. In the past decade under Xi, crises have not abated but accelerated—yet they’ve been matched by the effective absence of anti-foreign protests in the streets and frequent displays of military force. The reasons for Xi’s shift away from protest bargaining are multifaceted, rooted in domestic politics and a preference for showing strength both at home and abroad. The result of a new crisis-signaling playbook is a China that shows resolve in crises not through anger in the streets but through warplanes and the fleet.

Chinese leaders, facing wave after wave of crisis over the past three decades, have long turned to protests to bargain. The turn of the century brought not just Belgrade but the 2001 EP-3 incident, where a lethal collision between planes resulted in Chinese diplomats threatening their U.S. counterparts with the rage of the Chinese streets if appropriate amends were not made. Throughout the 2010s, China and Japan feuded repeatedly over the status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, most notably in 2012, when Chinese government-stoked protests in reaction to the Japanese government’s purchase of the islands from private hands resulted in thousands of protesters engulfing 85 Chinese cities.

Jessica Chen Weiss, in her groundbreaking study of Chinese protests, examined more than 80 orchestrated protests in the quarter century preceding Xi’s ascension to power. She argued that protests are China’s attempt to do what economist Thomas Schelling called “tying hands”—increasing bargaining power by showing that one can’t back down.

Just as democratic leaders can point to polls as proof they’re fenced in at home, China can allow protests to rage in the streets to show the people will turn on it if it doesn’t get its way. China’s opponent will fear the effects of unrest that could become regime-threatening instability; considering the alternative, just letting Beijing have its way is preferable.

Yet few, if any, examples exist of Xi stoking anti-foreign protests during his tenure as president. In fact, he has worked actively to suppress such protests. While prior Chinese leaders frequently leveraged domestic protests as bargaining tools, Xi is hesitant to use nationalist uproar as his default option. Instead, Xi is more comfortable showcasing the PLA’s military power in major coercive demonstrations while suppressing nationalist movements at home.

To the extent that the people have mobilized under Xi, it has been for government-orchestrated “boycotts” that attempt to pressure other countries economically. Genuinely outraged Chinese citizens were discouraged from physically protesting during the deployment of a THAAD missile defense system in South Korea in 2017. Instead, Chinese consumers were encouraged to boycott the major retail conglomerate Lotte, which eventually drove the South Korean company out of China.

The new approach can be explained by several shifts within China over the past decade.

First, China’s leadership has changed. Xi is as confident about his nation’s strength as he is paranoid about the stability of his rule. As China’s unchallenged chairman of everything, Xi has consolidated control over all facets of Chinese society, presiding over the decimation of collective leadership, anti-corruption campaigns that have neutered elite opposition, and a massive surveillance network.

But this is not compatible with bargaining through protests, which inherently involves both telegraphing and accepting political vulnerability, requiring Xi to suggest that his power has limits and can be imperiled. Stoking protests constitutes evidence of Xi’s precarity among the elites or the population and is too risky to accept. Xi, knowing that his road to absolute control was paved with the ouster of all rivals, has installed himself as ruler for life; for such a leader, the prospect of being ousted is legitimately existential.

Second, China’s approach to foreign policy has changed. In previous decades, protests were an appropriate tool for reacting to a crisis foisted upon China, a weaker country telegraphing to the other side that it needed to cease the unwelcome behavior.

Xi Jinping, however, has moved away from former leader Deng Xiaoping’s mantra of “hide and bide” as China has grown increasingly powerful. Old territorial disputes have been dusted off: China has attempted to expand control of the South China Sea, harassed India on the countries’ shared border, pushed Japan in the East China Sea, and exerted unrelenting pressure on Taiwan.

Many of these disputes amounted to “crises”—only this time, they were initiated by China, making domestic protests a less effective tool to coerce weaker countries compared to military harassment by air and sea.

China, due to its rapid growth, also no longer sees protests as useful for telegraphing domestic weakness. China used to self-identify as a non-threatening developing country, and protests were helpful in advancing this image; the United States had no reason to worry about China dominating Asia when the country couldn’t even control its own streets. Yet today’s China advertises itself as a real power, proclaiming that Mao Zedong made Chinese people stand up, and Deng made them rich, but only Xi made them strong. This strong China is at the center of what Xi calls the rise of the East and the decline of the West. Such a country is not liable to be brought to its knees by anger in its streets.

The young people who make up the bulk of protestors are also a more volatile tool than in the past. From the May 4, 1919, demonstrations onward, Chinese university students have historically been reliable sources of nationalist anger directed at Japanese or American imperialists. But today, China’s younger generation lives in what has been called “an age of malaise,” confronting a whirlwind of economic and political problems ranging from slower growth to a collapsing real estate sector and widespread youth unemployment. Young adults are motivated more by frustration over the COVID-19 pandemic’s aftermath or the desire to “lie flat” in the face of persistent joblessness, hardly concerns Xi wants to be vocalized.

The protests today have also simply lost effectiveness as a bargaining tool. China’s successful deployment of the method relied on it credibly tying its own hands, suggesting that leaders bucked public opinion at their own peril. But if China can simply ignore or suppress protests, or is perceived as capable of doing so, there is not much credibility in hand tying and, thus, in the threats.

Xi’s success in concentrating power at home has accomplished just that. Improvements in the effectiveness of the repressive domestic apparatus have removed any credible constraint that could be believed by a foreign country. Xi’s tenure has intersected with a remarkable revolution in surveillance and censorship technology, with the world as its witness. Over the past 10 years, China has built the most monitored society ever: Eight of the 10 most surveilled cities in the world are Chinese; of the world’s billion surveillance cameras, half are in China. Online, private group chats are constantly monitored by algorithms and live agents, with real-world arrests frequently made.

As such, Xi’s campaign to centralize power and muffle opposition has eliminated any collective action that can be even remotely considered regime-threatening and, along with it, any prospect that protests could be used as a bargaining instrument. While previous Chinese leaders could reasonably point to popular or intra-political constraints, akin to an American president tied down by the U.S. Congress or polls, the omnipotent chairman of everything will struggle to convince others of his impotence.

The 2022 White Paper protests, set against a decade of popular passivity, were a clear moment of assertiveness and the most forceful domestic demonstration against Xi. But foreign onlookers saw that even the worst case for Xi—unrest spurred by something as aberrational and impactful as COVID-19 policy—could nonetheless be contained. If so, then smaller displays, such as anti-foreign demonstrations outside embassies, undoubtedly can be managed too. The alacrity with which China managed the White Paper protests has also fed the perception that they were a one-off: Protesters themselves were surprised by the degree to which China responded and held participants responsible, with one noting that “it’s going to be very difficult to mobilize people again.”

At the most basic level, Xi’s increased emphasis on military displays means international crises will run a greater risk of accidents. Military exercises, missile launches, and close encounters at sea or air are not risk-free, given the proximity in which the U.S. and Chinese militaries operate in the Pacific. If each military crisis is a roll of the dice, more crises mean rolling the dice more frequently—with more opportunities for something truly catastrophic to happen.

But more fundamentally, repeated military crises prime both sides to always reach for the military option, viewing anything less as a weakness and a retreat. Should China try to telegraph to the United States that its interests are at stake, the United States, well-accustomed to displays of force, may assume China’s response is cheap talk, absent a coupling with something more muscular. Consider the Pelosi visit in 2022. Xi’s repeated verbal warnings were dismissed as a bluff, and the United States persisted, which boxed Xi into sweeping military displays: a simulated blockade of Taiwan, firing a ballistic missile over the island, and commencing what has now become regular incursions of the Taiwan Strait’s median line.

In an ideal world, policymakers on both sides would recognize the dangers created by Xi’s new playbook and actively work to limit crises. Given the deep-seated interests involved on both sides, this is unlikely. But even without behavioral changes, policymakers would benefit from recognizing that assumptions from previous decades of crisis management no longer hold. This should provide the impetus for renewed stability dialogues: discussing redlines to avoid flashpoints, sharing insights on how each side views crisis management to manage disputes, and building firebreaks to contain incidents that risk spiraling out of control.

The alternative is continuing down a dangerous path, where future crises begin where the prior ones left off and Chinese leaders feeling pressure to not just repeat but one-up their previous response. Once a line has been crossed, uncrossing it appears weak and unthinkable. But as both sides climb the escalation ladder, fewer rungs will remain. As noted in these pages, this creates a new normal that leaves both parties living on the “edge of chaos”—permanently.