#us withdraw troops from afghanistan

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Courtney Kube, Carol E. Lee, Vaughn Hillyard, and Mosheh Gains at NBC News:

The Trump transition team is compiling a list of senior current and former U.S. military officers who were directly involved in the withdrawal from Afghanistan and exploring whether they could be court-martialed for their involvement, according to a U.S. official and a person familiar with the plan.  Officials working on the transition are considering creating a commission to investigate the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan, including gathering information about who was directly involved in the decision-making for the military, how it was carried out, and whether the military leaders could be eligible for charges as serious as treason, the U.S. official and person with knowledge of the plan said. “They’re taking it very seriously,” the person with knowledge of the plan said. The Trump transition team did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Matt Flynn, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global threats, is helping lead the effort, the sources said. It is being framed as a review of how the U.S. first got into the war in Afghanistan and how the U.S. ultimately withdrew.

[...] President-elect Donald Trump has condemned the withdrawal as a “humiliation” and “the most embarrassing day in the history of our country.”  It is not clear, though, what would legally justify “treason” charges since the military officers were following the orders of President Joe Biden to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

A 2022 independent review by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction blamed both the Trump and Biden administrations for the chaotic U.S. withdrawal in 2021. Trump first reached an agreement with the Taliban in 2020 to withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan, roughly 13,000 troops, and release 5,000 Taliban fighters from prison. The Biden administration then completed the withdrawal and badly overestimated the ability of Afghan government forces to fight the Taliban on their own. Trump’s choice for secretary of defense, Fox News personality Pete Hegseth, has criticized the withdrawal, saying the U.S. lost the war and wasted billions of dollars. In his book “The War on Warriors,” Hegseth wrote, “The next president of the United States needs to radically overhaul Pentagon senior leadership to make us ready to defend our nation and defeat our enemies. Lots of people need to be fired. The debacle in Afghanistan, of course, is the most glaring example.”

[...] The transition team is looking at the possibility of recalling several commanders to active duty for possible charges, the U.S. official said.  It’s not clear the Trump administration would pursue treason charges, and instead could focus on lesser charges that highlight the officer’s involvement. “They want to set an example,” said the person with knowledge of the plan.

NBC News is reporting that Donald Trump’s transition team is compiling a list of senior current and former US military officers who were directly involved in the withdrawal from Afghanistan to face a potential court martial.

This is a fascistic insult to common sense.

[darkmaga-returns]

https://en.topwar.ru/253668-the-wall-street-journal-v-komande-trampa-gotovjat-ukaz-o-chistke-generalov-vinovnyh-v-begstve-ssha-iz-afganistana.html

The Wall Street Journal: Trump's team is preparing an order to purge generals guilty of US flight from Afghanistan

Today, 10: 1726

The team of the 47th US President is currently actively working on an executive order to establish a “war council” that will have the power to remove US Army generals and admirals from their positions. fleet. This was reported by The Wall Street Journal. The publication notes that the new body may include retired generals and officers.

As commander in chief, Trump would already be able to fire any officer he wanted, something presidents rarely do for political reasons. But an outside council would be able to bypass the system by signaling to the entire military that he intends to purge a number of generals and admirals.

- notes the publication.

A draft order reviewed by The Wall Street Journal outlines that the military board will review active-duty senior military personnel, focusing on their leadership qualities and commitment to military excellence.

However, as the publication’s sources claim, the first to come under the new body’s scrutiny may be those generals whom Trump considers guilty of the shameful withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan.

It is assumed that the military council will have the right to send recommendations to the US president on the removal of a particular general or admiral from office. Such a recommendation, as the newspaper claims, will become a kind of black mark for the military. After the corresponding recommendation lands on Donald Trump's desk, the general or admiral will be dismissed from their position within 30 days.

Let us add that earlier American media already reported that Donald Trump has prepared a so-called black list of his enemies, with whom he intends to settle accounts during his presidency. According to the press, it includes Joe Biden, Kamala Harris and several other high-ranking current and retired US politicians.

[tomorrowusa]

Donald Trump's botched handling of the pandemic emergency spread COVID-19 throughout the United States. Perhaps memory loss is an unexpected side effect of Long COVID.

It's up to all of us personally to remind people of the horrors of the Trump administration. Don't rely on the media and political ads to do so.

Those who blame Biden for the chaos at the end of US involvement in Afghanistan conveniently leave out the fact that the Trump administration effectively handed over the country to the Taliban.

Senate Republicans, before they became full-time concubines of Trump, were alarmed by the timetable. This is from FactCheck.org

^^^ Li'l Marco should hope that nobody reminds Trump how critical he was of The Orange One's Afghanistan withdrawal.

Biden inherited a flawed deal from Trump. At the time Trump left the White House, US troop levels in Afghanistan were down to 2,500 as 5,000 Taliban prisoners were being released.

Of course not many people in the US were paying a lot of attention to Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of Trump's January 6th coup attempt.

[justforbooks]

Homeland by Richard Beck – how 9/11 changed the US for ever

Journalist Beck argues that the war on terror made America vastly more authoritarian, paving the way for Trump

Almost a quarter of a century on, is the US still being shaped by 9/11? Richard Beck thinks so, despite all the other shocking and pivotal events there since the 2001 attacks, from the financial crisis to the twin election victories of Donald Trump. In this long, ambitious book, which aims to be an “alternative national history”, encompassing politics, popular culture, consumerism, policing, the use of public spaces and even trends in parenting, Beck argues that 9/11 turned the US into a more aggressive, angry and anxious place, with Trump’s ascendancy only one of the consequences.

Beck depicts the “war on terror” that his country launched in response to al-Qaida’s surprise assault as a continuing, almost limitless military operation, which in its first two decades alone caused “900,000 deaths”, including those of “nearly 400,000 civilians”. His account of interventions and atrocities in countries such as Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan is clear and powerful, switching smoothly between strategic objectives and individual victims, yet much of it will be familiar to anyone who even casually follows US foreign policy.

The book is more original when it lays out the war’s less obviously lethal but profoundly malign effect on America itself. A presidency with massively expanded powers; increased surveillance of US citizens; innocent people arrested and detained on vague “national security” grounds; a greater readiness to use torture; and the thickening of the Mexican border into a militarised zone a hundred miles deep – in these and many other ways, the American state has become more authoritarian and intolerant since 9/11. Meanwhile, US society, Beck says, has followed a similar path, making it increasingly difficult for Muslims and other minorities considered suspicious to lead full political lives, or even appear safely in public during the frequent periods of mass panic about terrorism or triumphalism about its supposed vanquishing.

From all this bleak, carefully collated evidence, Beck draws a striking and timely conclusion: “If September 11 had not occurred, Donald Trump could never have become president.” Nor, the book suggests, could he rule in such a draconian and crudely nationalistic manner while retaining so much public support. The desire for revenge after the horror and humiliation of 9/11, conscious or unconscious, remains so huge that it will take many more years to sate. Superpowers that considered themselves wronged do not forget.

George W Bush, a reckless rightwing Republican by the standards of his day, if not now, was president when 9/11 happened, and reacted with characteristic illiberalism and overconfidence, establishing much of the secretive bureaucracy and elastic legal framework of the “war on terror”, and disastrously invading Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, the much more revered Barack Obama – who turns out to be one of Beck’s main targets – stealthily continued the war, at times appearing to be winding it down with troop withdrawals and conciliatory speeches, while in reality replacing Bush’s macho “shock and awe” displays of force with drone strikes and other assassinations. On the war’s home front, Beck points out, Obama also “tripled the budget” of the Department of Homeland Security’s infamously tough immigration and customs enforcement agency, “deported some three million people”, and further blurred the line between immigrants and terrorists in the public mind.

Why did a supposedly liberal president, who had opposed the Iraq war as a state senator, end up continuing the “war on terror”? For Beck, there is a grand, systemic explanation for the militarism of every US government since 9/11. “With the United States unable to muster the economic strength to maintain [its] hegemony around the world,” he writes, “militarism is the next best option for managing discontents abroad and at home.” In other words, the “war on terror” has never really been about terrorism, but about maintaining America’s global supremacy and internal status quo, threatened not just by radical Islamism but the rise of other superpowers, and growing domestic and foreign discontent with the US economic model.

It’s a compelling thesis. Yet Beck doesn’t connect its many elements closely enough to make it absolutely convincing. His book seems to want to be both a rigorous geopolitical analysis in the style of New Left Review and a work of novelistic nonfiction, informed by the doomy American panoramas of Don DeLillo. In places, he pulls off this tricky fusion, and the pages hum with unsettling facts and conclusions. But elsewhere the book is too broad-brush.

For all its epic sweep, sometimes plunging far back into America’s violent history, the account also omits at least one important precursor to the “war on terror” era. Ronald Reagan’s 1980s presidency, shortly after the US defeat in Vietnam, was also driven by vengeance and intense nationalism, and featured an ever-expanding and authoritarian government campaign against a supposedly vast global threat, the “war on drugs”.

Reagan is now widely remembered as a charming old conservative, rather than a ruthless enforcer of American privilege. This bold and outspoken book, despite its flaws, could help ensure that the domineering ways of the post-9/11 presidents are better understood.

Daily inspiration. Discover more photos at Just for Books…?

[gryficowa]

Isn't it fascinating to see liberals blaming everyone for feeling in four years what Palestinians have felt for 70 years?

Well listen, karma is a bitch, you treated genocide as a "minor issue", now at least you will experience it for yourself, don't blame the leftists, blame yourself, because the fault was your ignorance and the desire to maintain your privilege at the expense of others

This will last four years, what the Palestinians have been going through has lasted almost 80 years, ignorance is bliss but reality will hit you harder when it comes to you

It's not the leftists' fault, you're just dealing with the consequences of your ignorance

Recall that the US did not stop the holocaust when it started, and only two years after the Third Reich attacked Poland, think of all the people who could have been saved but were not because of America's ignorance, think of the Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians and Yemenis what could have been saved, but the democratic party preferred to help Israel all year round

Think of the women of Afghanistan who wouldn't have had to deal with the Taliban now if Biden had stopped Trump's bill (instead of postponing it a year later) related to the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan

You ignored it because it was the blue party, now your love for them has bitten you in the ass and you're going to face the shit these people have been dealing with for much longer than you want to think

[deadpresidents]

Random question, but something I've wondered for the last few years: concerning Afghanistan, should the US have considered leaving a few thousand troops in Kabul indefinitely while withdrawing troops from the rest of the country?

It seems like the capital city would've been relatively easy for American troops to defend, and their presence there could have blocked the Taliban from fully returning to power. A singular focus on protecting Kabul might've been one way to prevent the worst possible outcome.

When President Trump left office and President Biden was inaugurated in January 2021, there were only 2,500 American troops left in Afghanistan. The Trump Administration had made a deal with the Taliban to withdraw all American troops by May 2021, and Biden pushed that back by a few months, but if the U.S. wanted to defend Kabul we almost certainly would have had to commit to another surge of American troops and that simply wasn't going to happen. It would have required a bigger fight against the Taliban because we would have been pulling out of the deal that the Trump Administration negotiated and the Taliban was already in the process of rapidly regaining control of the country by that time.

Even when he was Vice President, Joe Biden strongly believed that the United States needed to get out of Afghanistan because the only other option was to be there forever. Twenty years of training and equipping Afghan troops still hadn't resulted in a national force that could stand on its own, so Biden had argued against troop surges since the earliest days of the Obama Administration. There was no way that Biden was going to surge the number of troops once he became President, and Trump was so determined to withdraw all the troops from Afghanistan before the end of his term that his Defense Department had to beg him to pump the brakes.

Just to defend Kabul would have required much more than those 2,500 American troops left in the country on the day Biden was inaugurated. And the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani was an unreliable partner that was corrupt and often seemed oblivious to what was actually happening throughout the country. You used the word "indefinitely" and that's exactly what Biden (and Trump, to be fair) wanted to avoid. We had already been in Afghanistan for 20 years, and things weren't heading in the right direction.

I certainly don't agree that we should have been there indefinitely. I think we probably should have bolstered the American forces in Kabul for a short and specific amount of time in order to ensure that the withdrawal was less chaotic. But it was always going to be an ugly end. There was never going to be a victory in Afghanistan, and I supported the decision to withdraw American troops. I wish we would have done a far better job at protecting the Afghan people who worked for ISAF/NATO and ended up left behind to fend for themselves as the Taliban took over once again. It's a tragedy that those final days were such a mess, but one of our leaders was going to have to make the difficult decision to definitively end the neverending war that we were never going to win, and I think history will eventually see President Biden's decisive action in a different light, much like President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon is understood differently today.

[mariacallous]

In a series of farewell addresses during his final week in office, U.S. President Joe Biden is making the case that he’s left the United States in a much stronger position than he found it. During his four years, the country has far outpaced Europe, left Russia engulfed in quagmire, outperformed China economically, and hung on to its global leadership role in spite of the nation’s internal divisions.

In a speech at the State Department on Monday, Biden declared that “during my presidency, I have increased America’s power in every dimension.” He said that “thanks to our administration, the United States is winning the worldwide competition” and added that “our adversaries and competitors are weaker.” Washington’s No. 1 competitor, China, “will never surpass us,” Biden added.

And yet, in what has come to be all too characteristic of Biden, the outgoing president also avoided admitting any errors—though clearly, he’s made his share. In the end, it was this stubbornness that was perhaps the biggest pitfall of Biden’s presidency. (His hubris on foreign policy was aligned with his disastrous insistence on running for a second term even though his faculties were obviously failing at age 82, and despite most of his own party opposing the decision.)

No mistake was more impactful than Biden’s precipitous departure from Afghanistan only half a year into his presidency, a debacle that he never recovered from. Biden insisted that the Taliban wouldn’t simply take over, which they did in just two weeks. And then in subsequent years, right up until this week, Biden and his acolytes continued to insist that there was no better way to leave, though his military advisor had predicted havoc if a small contingent of U.S. troops wasn’t left behind, and the projection of U.S. weakness there was arguably a factor in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

Even at the time, some European diplomats told me that Biden’s ill-conceived withdrawal plan was brazenly unilateralist—that it was not vetted with major U.S. allies such as Britain, France, and Germany, nations that also sacrificed considerable funding and lives in Afghanistan.

It wasn’t the only time that Biden cost himself credibility with pronouncements meant to signal strength and leadership—but which often only led to policy confusion and flip-flopping.

He telegraphed his entire policy on Ukraine by declaring at the outset that Putin wouldn’t have to worry about direct U.S. military involvement, before crossing his own red lines by gradually ratcheting up U.S. military aid. He initially described the Ukraine conflict as a war for democracy and then, without acknowledging the shift, turned it into a war over territorial norms.

Biden repeatedly inflamed relations with Beijing by coming closer than any other president to saying that he would defend Taiwan—only to have his own administration walk those comments back. He often looked ineffectual on the Middle East with what even his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, conceded were many “Lucy and the football” moments—a reference to the Peanuts cartoon—in which Biden repeatedly, and credulously, allowed both Israel and Hamas to endlessly string along negotiations.

When it came to the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, Biden found himself in a state of continual self-contradiction over whether he should use real leverage, such as withholding U.S. weapons, in order to moderate Israeli behavior. He threatened to do so several times—but never did.

As a result, anti-American attitudes in the region are at a level not seen since the Iraq War, Brett Holmgren, the acting director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told 60 Minutes recently.

Much of the dysfunctional nature of Biden’s foreign policy can be attributed to the fact that he had very few naysayers around him.

During his presidency, the only senior official who might have been considered a peer was John Kerry, Biden’s erstwhile climate envoy. But in other respects—especially in making his longtime aide, Blinken, the secretary of state, and another former junior aide, Jake Sullivan, his national security advisor—Biden mostly hired his old staffers.

“He doesn’t surround himself with peers,” said one Democratic foreign-policy expert.

As a result, Biden developed a false sense of confidence about his record that likely contributed to his decision to run for a second term. Speaking to reporters the day after the 2022 midterm elections—when the Democrats performed far better than pundits had predicted, which was mistakenly ascribed to anti-Trump sentiment—Biden was asked what he might do differently to address voters’ concerns about the economy and the widespread sentiment that the country was moving in the wrong direction.

He replied, “Nothing.”

And in the subsequent two years, Biden rejected all internal advice that he was almost certainly going to lose in 2024, even as his approval ratings barely budged beyond 40 percent or so.

In his speech on Monday—which is to be followed by a final Oval Office address on Wednesday—Biden ticked off what he saw as his greatest triumphs, saying that he’d made the largest investment in clean energy in U.S. history and beefed up the country’s industrial base. He also touted his leadership of an expanded NATO against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine as well as his shoring up of U.S. power in Asia, including in the form of an agreement between Japan and South Korea to expand security.

All this will benefit Biden’s successor, Donald Trump, who takes office on Jan. 20, even as the president-elect continues to deride the United States as a “disaster” and a “laughingstock all over the world.”

But Biden showed that he hasn’t learned much about adjusting positions to fit changing facts. He failed to come to any substantive deal with China on climate change or artificial intelligence. He boasted of Iran’s new weakness in the post-Oct. 7, 2023, Middle East without noting that his own diplomatic policies had little to do with it. Three years of failed talks with Tehran over resurrecting the 2015 nuclear pact came to nothing—along with so many other negotiations.

It is a mixed record at best, and a decidedly unfinished one, thanks in part to Biden’s unwillingness to change course.

[thewarfox]

Reagan gave the rich big tax cuts and Trump did too. The war in Afghanistan was still going when Trump was in office. He released 5000 Taliban prisoners including their leader. Now tell me that you paid less taxes and the world was safer under Trump. Denial ain't a river in Egypt, Cletus! Crawl back inside your Trailer. Your cousin is going to have another of your babies now.

... did an AI write this? I'm not even sure if I'm supposed to take this seriously. There's not even an indication of what provoked this. I don't recall saying anything about tax cuts or the 'world being safer'. When those tax cuts end soon and you have to pay through your ass on taxes next year, you tell me what situation you'd prefer, with or without them. As far as Taliban prisoners? If I recall correctly they were released as part of an Afgani peace deal that the US was brokering with the Taliban to try to end conflict. Said deal was to release 5000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1000 of the Taliban's prisoners. The point was that Trump was trying to arrange for the US to withdraw from Afganistan so that the various muslims of the region could solve their own problems and conflicts with one another. That Afganistan withdrawal was utterly and tragically botched by Joe Biden, who left tens of billions of dollars in military equipment, weapons, and money behind for the Taliban, got a lot of people killed, and for good measure he drone-bombed an entire family thinking they were attackers when they were actually US allies who had been providing our people water on the way out. The deal had been to be out by a certain date, giving our people time to remove our equipment, dismantle/destroy our bases, and evacuate our allies and troops without needing to fire a shot. Biden and his incompetent staff not only did not do any of the preparation needed to accomplish any of this, but he also tried to renege on the deal by pushing back the exit date for symbolic reasons(to September 11th, I believe). The Taliban had enough of our shit not sticking to the deal, and forced us out in humiliating and disastrous fashion.

Whether or not Biden liked the deal orchestrated by his predecessor, it was still his duty to see it through, as he's responsible for treaties and military action and whatnot. If you want to talk about what has left the world less safe, $85 BILLION in weapons, armor, helicopters, and other equipment in Taliban hands certainly didn't make things safer. I wouldn't be surprised at all to find out that Hamas in Israel were funded and equipped through this massive transfer of wealth and spurred them into attacking last October.

You're a brainwashed stooge who doesn't know anything about the world, nor do you understand anything about it. And you know what? I will say I paid less taxes under Trump. And I will say that I think the world was trending towards being safer under his leadership, bravery, and guidance. He was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize(FOUR TIMES) for a reason. Fuck off with your shit, scumsucker.

[ivan-fyodorovich-k]

As I witnessed the despair and incomprehension of liberals worldwide after Donald Trump’s victory in November’s U.S. presidential election, I had a sinking feeling that I had been through this before. The moment took me back to 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, signaling the beginning of the end of Soviet Communism and the lifting of the Iron Curtain that had divided Europe since the end of World War II. The difference was that the world that collapsed in 1989 was theirs, the Communists’. Now it is ours, the liberals’.

In 1989, I was living within a Warsaw Pact nation, in my final year of studying philosophy at Bulgaria’s Sofia University, when the world turned upside down. The whole experience felt like an extended course in French existentialism. To see the sudden end of something that we had been told would last forever was bewildering—liberating and alarming in equal measure. My fellow students and I were overwhelmed by the new sense of freedom, but we were also acutely conscious of the fragility of all things political. That radical rupture turned out to be a defining experience for my generation.

But the rupture was even broader—on a greater global scale—than many of us realized at the time. The year 1989 was indeed an annus mirabilis, but one very different from the way Western liberals have framed it for the past three decades. The resilience that the Chinese Communist Party demonstrated in suppressing the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square turned out to be more consequential than the fall of the Berlin Wall. For Russians, the most important aspect of 1989 was not the end of Communism, but the end of the Soviet empire, with the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. It was thus the year that Osama bin Laden proclaimed the jihadists’ victory over the godless U.S.S.R. And 1989 was also when nationalism began to reclaim its political primacy in the former Yugoslavia.

The return of Trump to power in the United States may prove another such instance in a period of enormous political rupture. If liberals are to respond effectively to the challenge of a new Trump administration, they will need to reflect critically on what happened in 1989, and discard the story they’ve always told themselves about it. The means of overcoming despair is to be found in better comprehension.

From a liberal point of view, comparing the anti-Soviet revolutions of 1989 with the illiberal revolutions today might seem scandalous. In Francis Fukuyama’s famous phrase, 1989 was “the end of history,” whereas Trump’s victory, many liberals assert, may portend the end of democracy. The year the Berlin Wall fell was viewed as the triumph of the West; now the decline of the West dominates the conversation. The collapse of Communism was marked by a vision for a democratic, capitalist future; that future is now riddled with uncertainty. The mood in 1989 was internationalist and optimistic; today, it has soured into nationalism, at times even nihilism.

But to insist on those differences between then and now is to miss the point about their similarities. Living through such moments in history teaches one many things, but the most important is the sheer speed of change: People can totally alter their views and political identity overnight; what only yesterday was considered unthinkable seems self-evident today. The shift is so profound that people soon find their old assumptions and choices unfathomable.

Translated to this moment: How, just six months ago, could any sane person have believed that an aging and unpopular Joe Biden could be reelected?

Trump captured the public imagination not because he had a better plan for how to win the war in Ukraine or manage globalization, but because he understood that the world of yesterday could be no more. The United States’ postwar political identity has vanished into the abyss of the ballot box. This Trump administration may succeed or fail on its own terms, but the old world will not return. Even most liberals do not want it back. Few Americans today are comfortable with the notion of American exceptionalism.

In the aftermath of Trump’s victory, some political commentators grimly looked back to the 1930s, when fascism stalked the world. The problem is that the 1930s are beyond living memory, whereas the 1990s are still vivid to many of us. What I learned from that decade is that a radical political rupture gives the winners a blank check. Understanding why people voted for Trump will be little help in apprehending what he will do in office.

Political ruptures are achieved by previously unimaginable coalitions, united more by their intensity than a common program. Politicians who belong to these coalitions typically have a chameleonlike ability to suit themselves to the moment—none more so, in our time, than Trump. American liberals who are gobsmacked that people can treat a billionaire playboy as the leader of an anti-establishment movement might recall that Boris Yeltsin, the hero of Russia’s 1990s anti-Communist revolution, had been one of the leaders of the Communist Party just a few short years earlier.

Like the end of the Soviet era, Trump’s reelection victory will have global dimensions. It marks the passing of the United States as a liberal empire. America remains the world’s preeminent power, yes, and will remain an empire of sorts, but it won’t be a liberal one. As Biden’s spotty record of mobilizing support to defend the “liberal international order” in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, the very idea of such an order was for many critics always a Western fiction. It existed as long as the U.S. had the power and political will to impose it.

This is not what Trump will do. In foreign policy, Trump is neither a realist nor an isolationist; he is a revisionist. Trump is convinced that the U.S. is the biggest loser in the world it has made. Over the past three decades, in his view, America has become a hostage, rather than a hegemon, of the liberal international order. In the postwar world, the U.S. successfully integrated its defeated adversaries Germany and Japan into democratic governance, international trade, and economic prosperity. This did not apply to China: In Trump’s view, Beijing has been the real winner of the post-1989 changes.

Trump’s second coming will clearly be different from the first. In 2016, Trump’s encounter with American power was like a blind date. He didn’t know exactly what he wanted, and American power didn’t know exactly who he was. Not this time. America may remain a democracy, but it will become a more feral one. Under new management, its institutions will likely depart from the safety of consensual politics and go wild. In times of rapid change, political leaders seek not to administer the state, but to defeat it. They see the state and the “deep state” as synonymous. Illiberal leaders select their cabinet members in the same way that emperors used to choose the governors of rebellious provinces: What matters most is the appointee’s loyalty and capacity to resist being suborned or co-opted by others.

In Trump’s first administration, chaos reigned; his second administration will reign by wielding chaos as a weapon. This White House will overwhelm its opponents by “flooding the zone” with executive orders and proclamations. He will leave many adversaries guessing about why he is making the decisions he does, and disorient others with their rapidity and quantity.

In 2020, Biden defeated Trump by promising normalcy. Normalcy will no longer help the Democrats. In the most recent example of an antipopulist victory, Donald Tusk triumphed in Poland’s 2023 parliamentary elections and returned to be prime minister, not because he promised business as usual but because his party, Civic Platform, was able to forge a compelling new political identity. Tusk’s party adopted more progressive positions on such controversial issues as abortion rights and workers’ protections, but it also wrapped itself in the flag and embraced patriotism. Tusk offered Poles a new grand narrative, not simply a different electoral strategy. Civic Platform’s success still depended on forming a coalition with other parties, a potentially fragile basis for governing, but it offers a template, at least, for how the liberal center can reinvent itself and check the advance of illiberal populism.

The risk for the United States is high: The next few years could easily see American politics descend into cruel, petty vengefulness, or worse. But for liberals to respond to this moment by acting as defenders of a disappearing status quo would be unwise. To do so would entail merely reacting to whatever Trump does. The mindset of resistance may be the best way to understand tyranny, but it is not the best way to handle a moment of radical political rupture, in which tyranny is possible but not inevitable.

Back in 1989, the political scientist Ken Jowitt, the author of a great study of Communist upheaval in that period, New World Disorder, observed that a rupture of this type forces political leaders to devise a new vocabulary. At such moments, formerly magic words do not work anymore. The slogan “Democracy is under threat” did not benefit the Democrats during the election, because many voters simply did not see Trump himself as that threat.

As the writer George Orwell observed, “To see what is in front of one’s nose needs a constant struggle.” The challenge of apprehending the new, even when the fact of its arrival is undeniable, means that it may come as a shock to liberal sensibilities how few tears will be shed for the passing of the old order. Contrary to what seemed the correct response in 2016, the task of Trump opponents today is not to resist the political change that he has unleashed but to embrace it—and use this moment to fashion a new coalition for a better society.

[rockyp77mk3]

Grocery stores have been gouging customers since 2020. Trump was in office then. Why didn't he do something about the prices then? Why didn't he pull troops out of Afghansitan then? He said he got rid of Isis but that's bullshit. Wake the fuck up! He's a pile of bullshit!

If you look at the data, neutral and unbiased data that is, gross profit margins of grocery stores have been relatively flat since 2018. A sharp and sustained rise in gross profits would be how you judge gouging. Gross profits refer to the money left in company coffers after paying the direct cost of producing and stocking goods. So, inflation, increased fuel costs, wage increases, cost of production, increases in governmental regulations, and quite a few other things all contributed to increased cost of food. But of course these prices really took off in the last two years of the Biden-Harris administration.

Trump was getting us out of Afghanistan, the right way. The right way wasn't the cut and run remake of the fall of Saigon produced and directed by the Biden-Harris team. Trump had set goals for the Afghani government and Taliban to meet in order for the US to withdraw in a metered and orderly fashion. Biden-Harris rushed a poorly planned mass exit that not only left billions of dollars worth of military hardware behind but cost the lives of 13 servicemembers, not to mention leaving many of our allies in the lurch. Biden-Harris screwed up, just admit it.

Trump had ISIS to the point where it didn't have two suicide vests to clack off together. No nation no matter how failed would give them a secure base from which to operate. Their funding was drying up, their support was slipping away. In other words they were defeated. Then a president with the spine of a chocolate eclair took the Oval Office and the pressure was taken off the shattered remains of ISIS. In fact the pressure was taken off just about every terror group. In the absence of that pressure the terror groups made something of a comeback. Once again not Trump's fault. You have to blame the Biden-Harris team again.

The only pile of bullshit brought to this this discussion was delivered by you.

[ritchiepage2001newaccount]

Project2025 #CorpMedia #Oligarchs #MegaBanks vs #Union #Occupy #NoDAPL #BLM #SDF #DACA #MeToo #Humanity #FeelTheBern

JinJiyanAzadi #BijiRojava Trump believes fight against DAESH achieved goal [UPDATES]

According to reports by Reuters and numerous American media, the US military troops are to be withdrawn from Syria…

RELATED UPDATE: Mattis resigns after clash with Trump over troop withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-announces-mattis-will-leave-as-defense-secretary-at-the-end-of-february/2018/12/20/e1a846ee-e147-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html

RELATED UPDATE: Top U.S. envoy in the fight against ISIS resigns

RELATED UPDATE: Journalist Houda-Pepin: We betrayed the Kurds

RELATED UPDATE: Chief Pentagon spokeswoman announces resignation

RELATED UPDATE: Bolton’s visit to Ankara: Yellow vests, 944 and more

RELATED UPDATE: Trump Says ISIS Is Defeated. Reality Says Otherwise.

RELATED UPDATE: Report Warns ISIS is “Resurging” in Syria After Trump Ordered a Partial Troop Withdrawal

RELATED UPDATE: The Man Who Couldn’t Take It Anymore

FURTHER READING:

[darkmaga-returns]

Since October 7, 2023, the United States has quietly but significantly expanded its military presence across the Middle East, reversing the drawdown that followed its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

U.S. troop numbers in the region have risen from approximately 34,000 to nearly 50,000 as of early 2025, a level not seen since the height of the anti-ISIS campaign, in addition to a rapid increase in naval and aerial deployments. This shift reflects a strategic recalibration that appears driven less by long-term planning than by an improvised response to perceived Iranian threats, instability in the Red Sea, and domestic political pressure to “do something” without committing to a full-scale conflict.

While these movements have mostly evaded public scrutiny, they mark a significant increase in the regional U.S. force posture. Among the most visible developments has been the deployment of three aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Yemen: the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, the USS Carl Vinson, and the USS Harry S. Truman, as part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational task force launched in response to Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.

[misfitwashere]

Friends,

What might otherwise be considered a minor error of judgment can blow up into a big issue in a political campaign when the error evokes a candidate’s deeper flaws. 

Yesterday, the U.S. Army issued a stern rebuke to the Trump campaign over his visit on Monday to the Arlington National Cemetery, where Trump sought to score political points by marking the third anniversary of a deadly attack on U.S. troops in Afghanistan as American forces withdrew from the country. Thirteen American service members were killed in the attack at Kabul airport’s Abbey Gate.

A video of the visit posted by the Trump campaign on TikTok shows Trump visiting grave sites, with audio of him blasting Biden’s “disaster” of the Afghanistan withdrawal.

The Army said in its statement that participants in the ceremony “were made aware of federal laws” which “clearly prohibit political activities on cemetery grounds.” The statement also noted that an Arlington National Cemetery official “who attempted to ensure adherence” to these rules “was abruptly pushed aside.” 

Reportedly, when the cemetery official — a woman — tried to prevent Trump and his staff from entering the prohibited area, Trump’s staff verbally abused her and pushed her out of the way so Trump could enter. 

The Army statement went on to say: “It is unfortunate that the ANC employee and her professionalism has been unfairly attacked. ANC is a national shrine to the honored dead of the Armed Forces, and its dedicated staff will continue to ensure public ceremonies are conducted with the dignity and respect the nation’s fallen deserve.”

The incident has blown up into a big issue, but not because the Trump campaign erroneously held a political event at the Arlington National Cemetery. 

It’s blown up because it’s a microcosm of Donald Trump’s moral squalor. 

Trump has repeatedly shown contempt for military heroism. He claimed that the late John McCain, who had been a prisoner of war, was “not a war hero. He was a war hero because he was captured. I like people who weren’t captured.” 

When General Mark Milley invited a wounded, wheelchair-bound soldier to sing “God Bless America” at Milley’s welcoming ceremony as Trump’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Trump admonished him, “Why do you bring people like that here? No one wants to see that, the wounded.”

On a trip to France in 2018, Trump refused to visit the Aisne-Marne American Cemetery, where more than 2,200 U.S. service members are buried. “Why should I go to that cemetery?” he asked staff members. “It’s filled with losers.” 

According to Trump’s then-chief of staff John Kelly, Trump called the Marines who died at Belleau Wood “suckers” for getting killed.

Trump recently said that the Congressional Medal of Freedom he’d awarded to Republican donor Miriam Adelson was “much better” than the Medal of Honor because Medal of Honor recipients are “either in very bad shape because they’ve been hit so many times by bullets or they are dead.”

It’s not only Trump’s disdain for military heroism that’s brought to mind by what happened at Arlington National Cemetery. It’s also Trump’s disdain for the law, suggesting other occasions when Trump and his henchmen have disregarded legal rules, including their attempt to reverse the outcome of the 2020 election. 

Verbally abusing and pushing the cemetery employee who was trying to enforce the law, after she notified Trump and his staff that it was illegal to stage political events at the ceremony, recalls other instances when Trump and gang have pushed people aside, using violence to try to get their way. Think January 6, 2021. 

That the employee in question is a woman brings to mind the multitude of ways Trump has employed violence against women, from grabbing their genitals to raping them to stirring up his followers to threaten them. She declined to press charges because, according to military officials, she feared retaliation by Trump supporters. 

The entire incident is also a microcosm of Trump’s utter disdain for morality, honor, and patriotism — the public virtues, the common good. The cemetery is a sacred, hallowed ground. It is considered to be a national shrine. Trump sullied it to achieve his personal goal of the moment: to get a news clip in which he could bash Biden and, indirectly, Kamala Harris. 

The incident rings the warning bells, rekindles the dark memories, revives the fears. 

What happened at Arlington National Cemetery earlier this week was much more than an erroneous photo op. It was Trump on full display.

***********************************************************************

It was a crime.

[beardedmrbean]

NBC’s Kristen Welker "incorrectly implied" that Vice President Kamala Harris was in attendance at the dignified transfer of U.S. troops killed during the Afghanistan withdrawal.

Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., appeared on NBC’s "Meet the Press" Sunday and criticized President Biden and Harris for ignoring the families of the fallen soldiers. 

"Joe Biden and Kamala Harris — where were they? Joe Biden was sitting at a beach. Kamala Harris was sitting at her mansion in Washington, D.C. She was four miles away — ten minutes. She could've gone to the cemetery and honored the sacrifice of those young men and women, but she hasn't. She never has spoken to them or taken a meeting with them," Cotton told Welker. "It is because of her and Joe Biden's incompetence that those 13 Americans were killed in Afghanistan."

"They did meet them during the dignified transfer. They were with them at the dignified transfer," Welker interjected.

TRUMP SUPPORTERS, GOLD STAR FAMILIES FLOOD HARRIS' X ACCOUNT AFTER ARLINGTON ATTACK: ADMIN 'KILLED MY SON'

NBC posted a correction on the show's X account after the show. 

"On our broadcast this morning, we incorrectly implied that both President Biden and Vice President Harris attended the dignified transfer of 13 American service members killed during the Afghanistan withdrawal,"  NBC wrote on their "Meet the Press" X account.

"Biden was in attendance but Harris was not," the statement continued.

GOLD STAR FAMILIES SLAM KAMALA HARRIS FOR 'PLAYING POLITICS' OVER TRUMP'S VISIT TO ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY

President Biden was at the event, photographed "repeatedly checking his watch" during the proceedings.

Former President Trump, who attended the Arlington National Cemetery at the request of Gold Star families, commemorated the third year anniversary of botched withdrawal from Afghanistan that left 13 U.S. service members killed. 

"The Trump team is very, very respectful and cognizant. They wanted to be respectful to everyone there," Christy Shamblin, mother of fallen U.S. Marine Sgt. Nicole Gee, one of the Fallen 13 from Afghanistan, told "The Sacramento Bee." 

"The big news stories that the mainstream media covers about the [Fallen] 13 aren’t stories of honor and respect. It’s hard to understand why. There are always stories about some kind of conflict that didn’t happen... The Trump team worked diligently with us and with Arlington to make sure there weren’t any disruptions to services, or even to any school groups," Shamblin continued. 

Gee’s mother also went on to tell "The Bee" that she was "confident" that a second term for the Trump Administration would be "better for veterans and their families." 

The families of the 13 service-members have said they have yet to hear from Biden or Harris, despite having made attempts to reach out to the administration.

"At least Biden sent us a form letter," Shamblin added. "I think one of the most devastating parts of having the administration really just ignore this and not speak their names and speak to us, is that you start to feel like your loss is really in vain."

[tomorrowusa]

« Four main factors will influence the course of the war. The first is the level of resistance and national unity shown by Ukrainians, which has until now been extraordinary. The second is international support for Ukraine, which, though recently falling short of the country’s expectations, remains broad. The third factor is the nature of modern warfare, a contest that turns on a combination of industrial might and command, control, communications and intelligence systems. One reason Russia has struggled in this war is that it is yet to recover from the dramatic deindustrialisation it suffered after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The final factor is information. When it comes to decision-making, Vladimir Putin is trapped in an information cocoon, thanks to his having been in power so long. The Russian president and his national-security team lack access to accurate intelligence. The system they operate lacks an efficient mechanism for correcting errors. Their Ukrainian counterparts are more flexible and effective. In combination, these four factors make Russia’s eventual defeat inevitable. In time it will be forced to withdraw from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Its nuclear capability is no guarantee of success. Didn’t a nuclear-armed America withdraw from Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan? »

— Prof. Feng Yujun, Director of the Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University, writing at The Economist (archived).

Prof. Feng is one of China's leading "Russia watchers". His views may not reflect official thinking of the Chinese government though they are probably not distant from it.

China is currently benefiting economically in several ways from the war, but this does not mean Putin is highly regarded among Chinese policy makers.

Putin made a gross miscalculation with his invasion of Ukraine. He has put his military on international display as embarrassingly incompetent. Russian military hardware has been shown to be generally inferior to what Ukraine has gotten from the West and also inferior to various items of Ukrainian manufacture. Russia's few recent successes involve using its own troops as cannon fodder to make slow and costly advances.

With Putin's three-day "special operation" heading into day 789 and with Russian casualties equal to the population of a medium large city, Putin has clearly lost face in China.

[mariacallous]

What would Donald Trump’s foreign policy look like, should he win a second presidential term? The debate ranges between those who believe he will abandon Ukraine, withdraw from NATO, and herald a “post-American Europe”—and those who predict he will escalate the Russian-Ukrainian war and continue his fiercely anti-communist policies. Foreign governments have been frantically reaching out to Trump and Republican circles to understand, if not influence, the future direction of his policies; one such visit may have even played a role in Trump’s acquiescence to the most recent batch of U.S. military aid to Ukraine following months of delay by many of his Republican supporters in the U.S. Congress.

One fact is already clear: If Trump regains the presidency, he and his potential advisors will return to a significantly changed global landscape—marked by two regional wars, the threat of a third in Asia, the return of great-power geopolitics, and globalization measurably in decline. While many expect a Trump 2.0 to be a more intense version of Trump 1.0, his response to the dramatic changes in the geopolitical environment could lead to unexpected outcomes.

Trump may now be less eager to abandon Europe given fast-rising European defense spending and an ongoing major war. The strengthening U.S. economy and flux in global supply chains could facilitate a broader decoupling from China and market-access agreements with allies. Expanded Iranian aggression could make it easier for Trump 2.0 to build a large international coalition. An examination of these and other changes of the last four years could yield surprising insights into how a second Trump administration could differ significantly from the first.

Since Trump left office, the U.S.-Mexico border crisis has worsened significantly. In 2020, Trump’s last full year in office, U.S. Customs and Border Protection carried out 646,822 enforcement actions, including against three individuals on the Terrorist Screening Data Set. By 2023, this had skyrocketed to 3.2 million encounters, including 172 people on the terrorist list. Under the Biden-Harris administration, there have been some 10 million illegal border crossings, including nearly 2 million known so-called gotaways—illegal crossers who could not be apprehended. The unsecured border, broken asylum process, and overwhelmed immigration courts have enabled significant fentanyl trafficking, resulting in over 200,000 American deaths in the last three years.

For a second Trump administration, sealing the border would be the critical national security issue, overshadowing all others. The Republican platform calls for completion of the border wall, the use of advanced technology on the border, and shifting the focus of federal law enforcement to migration. It also proposes redeploying troops from overseas to the southern border and deploying the U.S. Navy to impose a fentanyl blockade. Americans now see the border as a major problem, and Congress is likely to support significant spending. This reallocation will impact other areas, since the U.S. Army and Navy are already struggling with personnel and fleet size targets. Navigating tensions with Mexico and Central American countries, many of which have free-trade agreements with the United States and receive U.S. assistance, will be challenging.

Facing escalating regional wars and the smallest U.S. military in generations, Trump would likely oversee the most significant U.S. military buildup in nearly 50 years. The U.S. Armed Forces are shrinking, and the defense budget is close to its post-World War II low in terms of both federal budget share and percentage of GDP. The capacity, capabilities, and readiness of the U.S. military are weakening, and the defense industrial base has atrophied. The disastrous defeat in Afghanistan has led to a significant drop in Americans’ confidence in the military.

Trump has long supported a bigger and stronger military, but his administration’s modest budget increases primarily went to personnel, operations, and maintenance, with little investment in capabilities. Under then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, the 2018 National Defense Strategy abandoned the long-standing U.S. doctrine of maintaining readiness to fight wars in two regions simultaneously, focusing instead on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. Today’s Trump-approved Republican platform pledges a larger, modern military, investment in the defense industrial base, and a national missile defense shield. Republican Sen. Roger Wicker, likely the next chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has proposed a detailed plan to raise defense spending from 3 percent of GDP in 2024 to 5 percent within five to seven years. This plan aligns with Trump’s policies and could lead to a domestic manufacturing boom. Trump could announce the first-ever trillion-dollar defense budget with broad Republican support, determined not to be remembered as the president who let China surpass the U.S. militarily.

Notwithstanding the Biden administration’s climate agenda, the United States’ historic rise as the world’s energy superpower could empower Trump to pursue more punitive policies against Russia and Iran while wielding greater leverage over China. The United States is now producing and exporting more energy than ever, even as its carbon emissions have decreased, largely due to the shift from coal to gas. In 2019, the country became a net energy exporter. Since 2017, total energy exports have nearly doubled, and the country has surpassed Russia and Saudi Arabia to become the world’s biggest oil producer. By further ramping up liquefied natural gas exports to Europe, a second Trump administration could reduce Russia’s influence, reshape European geopolitics, and strengthen trans-Atlantic ties. It would also greatly reduce the trade deficit with Europe, something Trump frequently rails about. Expanding energy production would also increase U.S. leverage over China, the world’s largest energy importer. Greater production—as well as closer alignment with Saudi Arabia under Trump—could do much to lower gas prices in the United States and oil prices globally. This, in turn, would allow Trump to pursue more aggressive strategic policies, such as striking Iranian nuclear assets or, should he wish to do so, diminishing Russian oil and gas exports.

The relative strength of the U.S. economy and major shifts in trading patterns would give another Trump administration far greater leverage on trade—including winning a trade war with China and striking new or revised trade deals with others.

Many Americans have a pessimistic view of their country’s economy, but it is far stronger relative to its peers than in 2016 or 2020. This year, the U.S. economy will account for an estimated 26 percent of global GDP, the highest share in almost two decades. It was nearly four times the size of Japan’s when Trump first entered office, and it will be seven times as large by the end of this year. As recently as 2008, the U.S. and Eurozone economies were similar in size. Today, the former towers over the latter, with the U.S. economy almost 80 percent larger. Britain’s relative decline is similar.

The strength of the U.S. economy would give Trump the leverage to strike the fair and reciprocal trade deals he seeks. Japan, facing an ever-aggressive China and urgently needing to boost economic growth, might build on the 2019 U.S.-Japan market access deal. Trump could resume the talks with Britain from the end of his first term with more leverage; a former Trump official indicated that a deal with Britain would be a priority in a second term. Trump might also revisit negotiations with the EU, following up on a market access agreement signed in 2019 following his imposition of tariffs. After eight years on top, the United States has overtaken China to be Germany’s top trading partner again. Trump’s aim to secure better deals is evident, and he may find more willing partners than before.

The same dynamics may lead to a far broader trade war with and decoupling from China. The U.S. economy has grown relative to China’s over the past eight years, with the gap widening in both directions: The U.S. economy is larger and the Chinese one smaller than economists expected. The forecast for when China’s economy might surpass the United States’ keeps sliding further and further into the future and may never happen at all. The International Monetary Fund projects that China’s share of the Asia-Pacific region’s GDP will be slightly smaller in five years than it is today, and it may never become the majority share. Even China’s official, flattering statistics suggest its economy is experiencing a lost decade due to deeply structural challenges, not temporary ones.

Over the past eight years, the U.S. economy has also become less dependent on foreign trade, including with China. In 2016, China was the top U.S. trading partner, accounting for more than 20 percent of U.S. imports and about 16 percent of total U.S. trade. By 2023, China slipped to third place, accounting for 13.9 percent of imports and 11.3 percent of trade. This shift would give greater credibility to Trump’s threats to revoke China’s most-favored nation trading status and impose wide-ranging tariffs. While these measures would have economic costs for Americans, around 80 percent of Americans view China unfavorably today, a significant increase from 2017, and the United States is now better positioned to withstand a protracted trade war with China than a few years ago.

Trump 2.0 would have the potential to lead a broader containment approach toward China. First, Trump and most Americans blame the Chinese government for the COVID-19 pandemic, which killed more than 1 million Americans, forced the U.S. economy into a deep recession, and likely cost Trump his reelection in 2020. Whether through trade measures, sanctions, or a demand for reparations, Trump will seek to hold China accountable for the estimated $18 trillion in damage the COVID-19 pandemic caused to the United States. In parallel, he is likely to end the attempts at partnership made by the Biden administration and Trump during parts of his first term. Issues like climate change, public health, foreign investment, Chinese land purchases in the United States, and Beijing’s role in the fentanyl epidemic will be viewed through the lens of strategic independence from China, as outlined in the Republican platform.

Second, the United States’ major European allies have become much more critical of China than when Trump left office—the result of COVID-19, Chinese “wolf warrior” diplomacy, Beijing’s support for Moscow’s war in Ukraine, and mounting issues concerning trade, technology, and supply chains. The references to China in the 2024 G-7 summit statement and NATO summit communique, compared to the last versions under Trump in 2019, make that clear. Europe is following Washington’s lead in imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, restricting Chinese telecoms from 5G infrastructure, and exposing and punishing Chinese espionage. A second Trump administration could build a coalition against Chinese behavior.

Third, the United States’ Asian allies are enhancing their military capabilities and cooperation among themselves. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others are increasing their defense spending, and the United States recently negotiated expanded military access to key sites in the Philippines. Improved regional alliances and partnerships, including the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) pact, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), much improved Japan-South Korea relations, and growing Japan-Philippines cooperation will strengthen Trump’s hand with Beijing.

However, the China Trump will face is more powerful and aggressive than ever before. It has significantly increased its military harassment of Taiwan, the Philippines, and India. It has also deepened its strategic partnership with Russia: The two countries declared a “partnership without limits” in 2022, and Chinese President Xi Jinping told Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2023 that the world is undergoing changes “we haven’t seen for 100 years—and we are the ones driving these changes together.” China’s navy, already larger than its U.S. counterpart since around 2015, could be about 50 percent larger by the end of Trump’s second term. How would Trump respond if China attacked Taiwan? Washington assesses that Xi has ordered the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to win a war against Taiwan by 2027, and U.S. war games consistently indicate the U.S. could lose such a conflict. Trump continues to hew to the decadeslong policy of maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan’s defense, even if he has included Taiwan in his familiar critique of allies not doing enough for their own defense. Nevertheless, the continuously eroding balance of power and rapidly evolving correlation of forces could make Trump less likely to assist Taiwan than one might suspect given his overall China policy. As Trump recently acknowledged in the bluntest of terms, Taiwan is 9,500 miles away from the United States but only 68 miles away from China.

Trump would return as commander in chief with the largest European war since World War II raging in Ukraine, the increased presence of U.S. forces on the continent, and European NATO members ramping up their defense spending. The much-changed situation in Europe could make him far less likely to withdraw U.S. troops, end support for Ukraine, or seek a grand bargain with Putin.

Trump’s persistent haranguing of European allies when he was president, coupled with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has prompted European countries to rapidly increase their defense spending. Whereas only five NATO members spent at least 2 percent of GDP on defense in 2016 and nine did so in 2020, 23 do so now. European NATO nations have increased their collective defense spending by more than half since Trump first took office, far ahead of the United States’ much smaller increase during the same period. Germany has even surpassed Britain as Europe’s biggest defense spender. The burden sharing Trump pushed for is beginning to happen: European NATO allies are now shouldering a greater share of bloc-wide defense spending, and Europe also provides the majority of aid to Ukraine. U.S. companies and workers are benefiting: The U.S. share of global arms exports rose from 34 percent to 42 percent over the most recent five-year period.

In his first term, Trump welcomed both Montenegro and North Macedonia into NATO, even though neither met the 2 percent mark at the time. His inclination to move U.S. forces farther east along NATO’s frontier is now a reality. Today, 20,000 U.S. forces are stationed in the alliance’s eastern frontier states, part of what Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen. Christopher Cavoli called a “definite shift eastward.” With the addition of Finland and Sweden as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO now has a significantly reshaped posture.

While the 2 percent floor for defense spending is now grossly inadequate, European states are proposing higher benchmarks. The European Union has released its first-ever defense industrial strategy, and many European countries are planning further increases in spending. Were Trump to preside over the June 2025 NATO summit in the Netherlands, he could not only announce “mission accomplished” with respect to the 2 percent target, but that NATO has collectively pledged a higher 3 percent floor.

Trump has promised to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours”—but has also threatened to dramatically increase arms support to Ukraine if Putin does not comply. He has never outright opposed military aid to Ukraine, acquiesced to congressional passage of a large supplemental in April, and recently concluded a positive call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Having observed how Biden’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan sunk his presidency, Trump may be determined to avoid a similar loss of Ukraine.

Facing a Middle East with escalating Tehran-backed conflicts and a near-nuclear Iran, Trump 2.0 might also double down and increase U.S. military involvement to douse the fires Tehran has lit.

Trump is likely to end the Biden administration’s pressure on Israel to end the war against Hamas, de-escalate against Iran, and withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank. Trump would end Biden’s embargo on certain U.S. arms deliveries to Israel, halt aid to Gaza, and de-emphasize humanitarian concerns. Trump has consistently supported an Israeli “victory”—a stance repeated by his running mate, Sen. J.D. Vance—and called on Israel to “finish the job.” Trump has walked back his previous endorsement of a Palestinian state, suggesting a very different approach to the “day after.” If a major war between Israel and Hezbollah breaks out, Trump’s track record suggests he would support swift Israeli action with less concern for civilian casualties, with full U.S. support but no direct military involvement.

Trump 2.0 would quickly face the choice of whether to take preemptive military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran is now a nuclear breakout state, capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium for several bombs in less than 10 days, even if weaponization may take several months to a year. Berlin, Paris, and London, antagonists to Trump 1.0’s Iran policy, may be supporters of Trump 2.0’s, as Iran’s growing military alliance with Russia, nuclear progress, and support for the Houthis have shifted European attitudes. Having repeatedly passed the wartime tests by Iran and its proxies, Israeli anti-air capabilities have rapidly improved, as has coordination with Arab partners. Trump will likely recharge his maximum-pressure approach, but he may be more likely to threaten Iran directly than ever before.

Trump 2.0 could also launch a campaign against the Houthis similar to that against the Islamic State during Trump 1.0. He would inherit a 24-nation coalition that is currently failing to restore freedom of navigation through the Red Sea. Despite the most intense U.S. naval combat operations since World War II, Suez Canal transits are still fewer than half of what they were a year ago; so far, over 90 commercial vessels have been hit and more than 100 warships attacked. Just as he declared the defeat and destruction of the Islamic State to be his “highest priority” on the first day of his presidency, he may flip the mission from a defensive to offensive one by hitting Houthi launch sites, targeting critical infrastructure, eliminating Iranian naval support, and directly threatening Tehran. A successful campaign could restore commercial shipping, lower energy and shipping costs, and foster diplomatic cooperation with European, Middle Eastern, and Asian governments.

Even if Trump’s instincts and inclinations remain unchanged, the world’s vastly shifted circumstances could prompt unexpected approaches. If Trump 1.0 was an alliance disruptor and protectionist, a second Trump administration could turn out to be a coalition builder and forger of significant trade deals. Concerns over U.S. abandonment of Europe and withdrawal from the Middle East may prove to have been hasty, with altered circumstances leading to greater stability in Europe and a rollback of Iranian aggression in the Middle East. Dealmaking with China may give way to the best opportunity to build a Cold War-like coalition to blunt aggressive Chinese behavior.