#saudi prince hamas suggestion

[good-old-gossip]

U.S.A.'s Favorite Dictator is SUPPRESSING ANTI-ISRAELI SPEECH in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has reportedly launched a crackdown on citizens who express views critical of Israel’s ongoing war on Gaza online.

The claims in a Bloomberg report on Wednesday come as US officials suggested talks are underway for a Saudi-Israel normalisation deal.

According to the report, citing unnamed diplomatic sources, the detentions include an executive who works for a company involved in Vision 2030, the flagship economic project spearheaded by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Sources familiar with the matter said that the person was arrested in connection with expressing “incendiary” views on the current Israel-Gaza conflict.

A second detainee is a media personality who Bloomberg reports had said that “Israel should never be forgiven”, and another is someone who called for a boycott of US fast food restaurants in the kingdom.

MEE has contacted the Saudi foreign ministry for comment but had not received a response by the time of publication. In 2020 and 2021, Israel reached US-brokered normalisation agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco.

Since then, there has been persistent speculation about a similar deal with Saudi Arabia, a key US ally.

In January, Prince Khalid bin Bandar, the Saudi ambassador in London, said that a normalisation deal was “close” but the kingdom paused US-brokered talks after the deadly attack on Israel on 7 October by Hamas-led fighters.

The Saudi foreign ministry said in February that no normalisation will take place without a ceasefire and progress toward Palestinian statehood.

However, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said this week that Washington and Riyadh have engaged in intensive diplomacy over the past month to reach the normalisation deal.

“The work that Saudi Arabia, the United States have been doing together in terms of our own agreements, I think, is potentially very close to completion,” he said on Sunday.

Crackdowns on free speech, particularly the detention of people for social media posts, has been a common practice since Bin Salman became crown prince in 2017. The kingdom does not disclose the number of those detained, and does not prosecute them within the normal judiciary.

[mariacallous]

On Oct. 23, at around the same time the world was learning that the Qatari and Egyptian governments had won the release of two Israeli women who had been held hostage by Hamas, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was featured on Cristiano Ronaldo’s Instagram. The Portuguese soccer star met the crown prince at a panel discussion on the future of esports—that is, competitive video gaming—where the Saudis announced they would host the first-ever Esports World Cup. Important stuff.

The jarring juxtaposition of Qatar and Egypt’s efforts to free hostages in Gaza and the brief Ronaldo-Mohammed bin Salman tête-à-tête in Riyadh suggested that however much the Saudi leadership has told anyone who will listen that the kingdom is the most important and influential country in the Middle East, it still has a long way to go.

Indeed, since the war between Hamas and Israel began almost three weeks ago, the “new Saudis” are acting a lot like the “old Saudis”—there is some motion in Riyadh but no actual action. It is odd because Mohammed bin Salman and his advisors have—for all their faults—pursued significant, important, and positive changes within Saudi Arabia.

When it comes to foreign policy and crisis management, the Saudis seem “useless,” as a former senior U.S. government official, whose name I am withholding due to the private nature of our conversation, put it to me last week. That’s because the Saudis are in a bind: They remain dependent on the United States for security—the same country that is helping to facilitate the withering assault on the Gaza Strip by Israel—itself a country with which just a few weeks ago the crown prince seemed willing to come to terms, without the promise of Palestinian statehood.

One way of dealing with these problems and contradictions would be for the Saudi government to be the constructive and influential actor it claims to be. Instead, the Saudis are busying themselves with statements and meetings.

Just hours after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, which was followed swiftly by Israeli retaliatory strikes on Gaza, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a call for an “immediate halt to the escalation between the two sides.” Since then, the Saudis have issued a stream of statements and readouts from phone calls and multilateral meetings that are sharper but do not contribute to reestablishing regional stability.

For example, just before Mohammed bin Salman met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Oct. 15, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that read, in part, that Riyadh “affirms its categorical rejection of the calls for the forcible displacement of the Palestinian people from Gaza and reiterates its condemnation of the continued targeting of unarmed civilians.” That is a principled position. Yet, if the Saudis are the big dogs of the region—as they claim—then they cannot sit around in Riyadh and offer nothing more than strenuous objections to the horrifying situation in Gaza.

To be fair, the Saudis did do something. On Oct. 18, they convened an executive committee meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The OIC, with 57 members, seeks to do what its name suggests: promote cooperation among predominantly Muslim countries in a variety of fields. In his remarks at the executive committee meeting, which included Iran, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan decried the international community’s inaction and double standards in response to Israel’s military operations in Gaza—standard fare for these types of meetings.

Faisal also reiterated Saudi support for the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Spearheaded by then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the initiative committed Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries to normalizing relations with Israel in exchange for Palestinian statehood. That plan is long dead. By invoking it, though, the foreign minister was highlighting one of the few times the Saudis had something tangible to offer in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and underscoring Riyadh’s commitment to justice for Palestinians.

But for all of the hoopla, the meeting was less a genuine attempt by Riyadh at constructive diplomacy than a public relations exercise meant to provide some cover after months of negotiations with the United States over a possible Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization deal.

There was one interesting wrinkle in the Saudi approach to the Israel-Hamas war. The day before the OIC meeting, Prince Turki bin Faisal—Saudi’s ex-spymaster and Riyadh’s former ambassador in both London and Washington—spoke at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy in Houston. During his address, Turki assailed not only Israel and the West for the bloodshed in Gaza but also Hamas for its killing spree in Israel. He pointedly declared that it was against Islamic beliefs to kill children, women, and older people and stressed that there were “no heroes” in the conflict. It is true that Turki is now a private citizen and no longer a government official, but he is also the person who has said things in public that Saudi royals want to say but cannot.

Turki’s comments in Houston were important. But taken together, the statements coming from the Saudis amount to little more than background noise in the brewing regional conflict.

What makes Saudi inaction even stranger is how circumspect the Saudis have been when it comes to the Iranians. The Saudi readout of Mohammed bin Salman’s call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi about the Israel-Hamas war can be read as an implicit critique of Iran, especially the part where the Saudi leader is said to have “asserted the Kingdom’s opposition to any form of civilian targeting” and underscored his commitment to a “comprehensive and fair peace,” implying support for a two-state solution. Iran, quite obviously, does not share either of these commitments.

But why so oblique? Hamas, a charter member of Tehran’s so-called axis of resistance, just blew up the crown prince’s entire regional strategy with what many suspect was Iranian help. The success of Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030—the country’s self-described ambitious road map to “new growth and investment opportunities, greater global engagement, and enhanced quality of life for our citizens”—depends, in part, on the stability and greater integration of the major economies of the region, including Israel (though not Iran).

The Saudi-Iranian deal in March that restored diplomatic relations between the two countries was supposed to de-escalate tension in the region. It was borne of Saudi weakness, however, and only called off the Saudi-Iranian confrontation. The crown prince clearly does not want to act in the Gaza conflict in a way that arouses the ire of the Iranians so that Tehran’s proxy in Yemen, the Houthis, starts targeting Saudi population centers again with drones and missiles.

After the civil war in Sudan broke out in April, U.S.-Saudi relations were the “best they had ever been,” according to officials from both governments who spoke to me in private conversations at the time. That is because the Saudis were able to make themselves useful to the United States in dealing with that conflict, including by mediating peace talks between the warring parties, providing $100 million in humanitarian aid to Sudan, and helping to evacuate thousands of people from the country.

Washington once again needs assistance stabilizing the region now that there is war in Gaza, but the Saudis seem unable or unwilling to help this time. Although Mohammed bin Salman is dependent on Washington for his country’s security, under present circumstances the U.S.-Saudi relationship is a vulnerability for him. The crown prince may have consolidated his power, but he needs to be careful.

Palestine remains an important symbolic issue in Saudi Arabia, and it will be difficult for the kingdom’s leader to work closely with the Biden administration right now, as the determined way it has moved to support Israel has likely made a strong and negative impression on the Saudi public, which already has a dim view of the country.

For Mohammed bin Salman to be more constructive in the Gaza conflict would mean dealing more with both Washington and Israel. The Saudis could be more straightforward in their criticism of Hamas, offer safe haven for Palestinians in need of medical care, and use their good offices with the Israeli government to privately shape the Israeli response to the Oct. 7 attack. Yet the crown prince has evidently concluded that it is better not to be exposed in this way. From his perspective, issuing statements, criticizing the international community, calling his counterparts, and hanging out with soccer stars is a better strategy. Perhaps it is. But it also reveals Saudi Arabia for what it currently is—weak.

[politicaltheatre]

Empathy, pt.3

Let’s start with this: Jamal Kashshoggi was a man.

Do you remember him? He was a man, a human being, and like any of us he had hopes and dreams and memories.

He was also a journalist. After years of supporting the Saudi royal family and their authoritarian regime, he was murdered in 2018 for writing and speaking out against their abuses and, eventually, their war in Yemen. That was the version of him who fled Saudi Arabia, and the one who was marked for death by the Saudi crown prince he had once called a friend.

Last fall, the Saudi regime commuted the death sentences of the men it offered up as his murderers. Three months ago, an investigation confirmed that it was the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who had ordered his death.

We’re forgetting him. Even now, reading this, we are already forgetting. We can’t help it. At least, we tell ourselves we can’t.

In many ways, Kashshoggi was a lot like Alexei Novalny. Novalny hasn’t left the news quite yet. Like Kashshoggi, he supported the corrupt, authoritarian regime in his country, Russia, before turning against it. The attempt on his life, by poison, failed. Barely. He’s still alive, locked up in a Russian prison, a cautionary tale for those daring to oppose Vladimir Putin.

How long before we’ve forgotten him, too?

It’s a lot to ask of ourselves, remembering everyone around us. Sure, in some abstract way most of us try, “Good will towards men,” and all that, but we have the luxury of looking away and of not having to commit ourselves to thinking of others the way those two men did.

For each of them, it was an inescapable empathy for the suffering of they saw around them that compelled them to risk their lives to draw attention to it. They did so knowing the cost.

That cost - personal loss, imprisonment, death - is enough to keep most of us looking away. So much of what we do is to enable us to look away, to keep unpleasant reality at a distance. When others are already physically far away, it only makes it that much harder for us to do the right thing.

Looking out past our borders, the world today is filled with men, women, and children suffering, more than a few at the hands of authoritarian regimes, and of them far too many paying that cost for standing up against abuse.

The most present case this past week, because videos on social media have made it impossible to ignore in ways that it has been, has been that of the Palestinians.

The facts of this latest series of abuses against them should not be in doubt. During the last days of Ramadan, Israelis began forcing Palestinians out of their homes in the Sheikh Jarrah district in East Jerusalem. This was followed in quick succession by Israeli troops occupying the Al-Aqsa mosque following a confrontation between Palestinians at the mosque for Friday prayers and Israelis celebrating the capture of the mosque in 1967.

This was all a deliberate provocation, beyond the aggressive offense of what the Israelis were doing. The timing of it, during the Muslim holy month while right wing Benjamin Netanyahu struggles to cling to power, was intended to add insult to injury.

It worked. Clearly.

Hamas, ever eager for an excuse to be violent and to be seen to be violent, gave an ultimatum that would make Netanyahu’s regime look weak if accepted, Netanyahu gratefully rejected it, and Hamas began firing rockets, knowing that Israel would escalate and retaliate with a kind of brutality that can only be described as criminal.

The unpleasant reality is that both political powers rely on perpetuating the conflict between them, doing so at the expense of the people they claim to want to serve and protect. And those people pay the cost of it.

Note, please, how I have avoided referring to those instigating these atrocities as Muslims or Jews. That they use their religions and their histories as justification for violence and abuse should not be taken as representative of either religion. If anything, it should be taken as a kind of cruel irony, or perhaps an insight into how the abused, as individuals or groups, can become abusers themselves.

Zionism is not Judaism. It never was and never will be. It grew out of two things: the technology-driven late 19th century belief by Europeans, and their North American “cousins”, in their right to colonial domination of non-Europeans; and the centuries-old, routine and systematic attacks on Jews - pogroms - especially in Central and Eastern Europe that led millions of Jews to flee for their lives, many of them to the United States.

The establishment of Israel in 1948 followed the same pattern: that same, late 19th century belief in the right to claim or assign ownership of others’ land - no matter that it had once belonged to your ancestors; and the routine and systematic attempted genocide of all Jews in Europe - the Holocaust - by Europeans who chose to believe Jews not to be Europeans but some other, lesser race from West Asia.

That, of course, has been the assigned role for Jews the world over: they are accepted as insiders when times are good and scapegoated as outsiders when times are bad. To be Jewish - I am - is to understand that this never quite goes away. There’s always somebody having a bad day, always a big lie ready for justification.

Technically, it is true that Jews are Asian, in the way that Palestinians are also Asian, and that Egyptians are, too, but also African because different people have had different maps which they used for different purposes at different times.

Also true is that these things are only true due to the arbitrary drawing of continental lines on maps made by Europeans, from the ancient Greeks to those carving up the “New World” in the century after Columbus to the 1885 conference in Berlin carving up Africa for colonial exploitation.

This is not, strictly speaking, a European thing. Every culture has a tendency to see themselves as the center of the world. Just ask those living in China, or as they call it, Zhongguo, the “Middle Kingdom”.

The difference here is that modern day Israel was carved out of Palestine, a colonial “protectorate” which was itself carved out of the Ottoman Empire and awarded to the British following World War I. As a spoil of war, formerly-Ottoman Iraq, with its vast oil reserves, had greater value to the British. Palestine had ports on the Mediterranean - “the center of the world” - but was otherwise an afterthought.

Not, however, to the Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. We must remember that the rest of the world didn’t want them. Jews attempting to flee the atrocity they and everyone else couldn’t help but see coming were turned away by everyone else, including the United States.

This in no way justifies what was done in Palestine in the 1930s and 40s, it’s just to place it in context. By turning Jews away, by attempting to forget them and their suffering, the world gave weight and power to right wing groups within the refugees.

Starting in the 1930s, those groups began to engage in terrorism against Arabs to force their position into Palestine and against the British to force them out. Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) and later the Stern Gang carried out assassinations and killed hundreds of Arabs and British with bombs.

After what the Nazis did to the Jews in Europe, memorialized in newsreels for all the world to see, who would take the Arabs’ side? Who could? The British were in no position to hold onto their colonial possessions anywhere, so they gave up and pulled out and in 1948 the state of Israel was born. Palestinian Arabs were forced from their homes and stripped of rights they had held under the Ottomans and even the British.

Again, this was not Judaism. As the name “Irgun” suggests, those terrorists were a right wing, nationalist militia doing what right wing, nationalist militias have done before and since, using an ethnic or religious identity to justify committing atrocities to take land and property.

After standing by and allowing the Nazis to do what they did, the world vowed never to forget; part of the price they were willing to pay - that they were willing to allow the Palestinian Arabs to pay - was to forget what Irgun and the Stern Gang had done, and to turn a blind eye to anything the Israelis did going forward.

There was a racist element to it, to be sure. This is part of the pattern of colonial withdrawal, negotiating a partition of land and possessions among the colonized groups, pitting them against each other, and then letting them fend for themselves. Nothing like creating a power vacuum to draw out the worst of us.

The British did the same thing in South Asia in 1947, pitting Muslim and Hindu groups against each other, erupting in spasms of violence before settling into a Cold War, complete with nuclear weapons. Even in their most secular eras, religious nationalism has defined the politics and leadership of each nation.

The result of this, naturally, has been an increasingly corrupt leadership exploiting religious hatred and mistrust to gain more power and wealth for themselves. It should be noted, yet again, that the political entities of Pakistan and India, though led by religious nationalists, do not represent Islam or Hinduism.

Their actions and failures do not represent those religions in any way. They are the actions and failures of men and women seeking power, seeking to acquire it and seeking to hold onto it. They are no different than the Netanyahu regime or Hamas, or our own right wing leaders in the United States.

For all of them, it is in their interest to cling to memory of conflict as a means of manipulation; in Israel and Palestine, nationalist leaders preach as if 1948 or 1967 are now; in India and Pakistan, it’s still 1947; and for America’s white nationalists, it’s either 1865 or 1965, take your pick. For the Serbs slaughtering thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica twenty-six years ago, it was 1389, the year the Ottomans conquered the Balkans.

The wars, cold or hot, can never end because time is never allowed to change. This, again, is a function of proximity. By freezing themselves in the increasingly distant past, the leaders and those choosing to follow them do not have to accept the changes facing them in the present. Their fantasy is to return to that idyllic, earlier time, when they possessed everything and did not have to be accountable to anyone.

And they will all fail for the same reason: in the present or near future, we will have reached a point at which we can no longer allow ourselves to ignore those suffering and in doing so forget them.

That is what we have done to the Palestinians. What has been done and what is being done now is in no small part because we forget them, routinely and systematically and purposefully.

The videos sent from Gaza of children being pulled from rubble should help us remember. They should. Ideally, they will have the same effect as those of last year’s Black Live Matter protests, but the people of Gaza remain far away. For many of us, it will be enough that the missiles and rockets have stopped.

Videos sent from India’s emergency rooms and crematoria should help us remember, but they, too, remain far away. Already, we’re starting to put India’s crisis behind us.

Will we remember either of them a month from now? Two? Or will they fade into the background, as the imprisoned Hong Kong democracy protesters have, or those dying of Covid-19 in Brazil, or those shot down in the streets fighting police brutality in Columbia, or those caught between warring factions in Ethiopia’s Tigray region? Or, for that matter, those half a century ago in Argentina who were simply “disappeared”?

What about the coup in Myanmar? Remember that? How about the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim Rohingya people, supported by the now-deposed and jailed regime of fallen-hero Aung San Suu Kyi? What was done to them was no different than what was done to the Armenians in what is now eastern Turkey by the Ottoman Empire in 1915. That genocide was recently recognized by President Biden, an act of official, international recognition that took over a century and which itself is already being forgotten. The Rohingya may have to wait as long to be remembered themselves, or longer.

The point of all this isn’t that we forget, try as we might, but that despite it we find ways to remember. That Biden recognized the Armenians came because they did not forget and did not allow that crime to be forgotten. 

If this sounds like what nationalists all claim to do themselves - always demanding that everyone remember this date or that insult - remember that actual justice never seems to be their goal.

Justice requires memory, full memory. For us to remember anything fully, we must take the good with the bad. We must recognize the good and bad in each of us and in each group and in each series of actions. We must understand that for the worst act done by anyone in the name of any group or religion, there remain those within those groups and religions who stand against it.

So, let’s end with this: George Floyd 

George Floyd was a man, a human being, and like any of us he had hopes and dreams and memories. He died one year ago today in no small part because we forgot him. 

We remember now, today especially, because of what was done to him on this date, but we should recognize the role that forgetting him and people like him played in the events that led to his murder. We as a society have looked away from the suffering of minorities in this country, and from the violence done to certain groups within our society.

The easiest thing to say, certainly as we watched that video and the countless videos of police brutalizing non-violent protesters all last summer, was that “all cops are bad”. They aren’t. Hard as it may be to hear, they aren’t.

They are, however, led by men and women who push an adversarial culture, who encourage violence and racism, who are corrupt, and who thrive on the failure of reform. And most of them, far, far too many, stand by in silence as men and women are murdered in that culture’s name. In that silence, they have failed us all.

If we want to change that culture, we need those who would stand for justice to stand up and speak. They are there, just as they are in Israel and Palestine, and in Pakistan and India and elsewhere: intimidated, ostracized, and struggling to be heard.

Of course, May 25th, 2020 wasn’t just any other day in America. It was Memorial Day. That is a cruel irony. Another is how little we do to honor that day. It was created to honor those who died for this country, to remember not only them but what they did and what they supposedly did it for. Instead, we grill meats and drink beer and forget our troubles for just one day.

Few deaths may have the lasting impact on this country that George Floyd’s has had and will have, and he died in no small part because he, too, had been forgotten. This coming Memorial Day, let us take a moment to remember him and all of the others everywhere in this world who have died and deserve to be remembered.

- Daniel Ward

[jordanianroyals]

Princess Haya’s Court Case Fact-Finding Judgement Publications

Re: AI M handed down by Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the Family Division

The court case between Princess Haya and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid’s fact finding judgements have been published online. 

You can read them on this link: https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/re-ai-m-handed-down-by-sir-andrew-mcfarlane-president-of-the-family-division/

Princess Haya is referred in the documents as “the mother”

Sheikh Mohammed is referred as “the father”

Important points taken from the documents:

Sheikh Mohammed has divorced Princess Haya on 7 February, 2019, the 20th death anniversary of her father King Hussein, under the Sharia law. She saw this as an insult to greatly upset her

Princess Haya has been harassed by Sheikh Mohammed’s “intimidation campaign” and lived in fears for her life, which ultimately led to her decision to move to London with the children 

Haya feels shunned. She and the children have been isolated by many people they considered as friends in the past as a result of Sheikh Mohammed’s smear campaign against her 

On Shamsa and Latifa’s cases

Haya said she first read about Shamsa’s abduction in a 2001 Guardian news article in 2016 but she didn’t believe Sheikh Mohammed would do such a thing. Prior to this, she knew Shamsa as only his other daughter who lived in another house 

Haya first believed Sheikh Mohammed’s explanation that Latifa is being used by criminals and is bi-polar but grew increasingly concerned after reading reports from international media 

“In early December 2018 the mother arranged for a doctor, who was trusted by the paternal family, to visit Latifa together with a psychiatrist. The doctor apparently reported to the mother in unequivocal terms that there was nothing wrong with Latifa. The mother reports that she began to become more troubled and began to question the account of mental ill health that she had been given by her husband. She asked to see Latifa herself and she asked to see Latifa’s medical records.”

“I went upstairs and knocked on Latifa’s bedroom door. She opened the door, looked at me, embraced me, and burst into tears. She cried for a long time. She looked vulnerable. She had no makeup on and she had pale skin. She had a track suit and a hoodie on, her body language was closed and her sleeves were pulled down over her hands. She looked like she was deliberately making no effort with herself. She did not look unwell but she certainly did not look happy or content.”

“She was grateful to me for visiting her and seemed to regret the focus on her, saying she had not wanted to cause a scandal, she just wanted her freedom. She offered to “take it all back” publicly and seemed very much to regret what had happened.”

Haya regularly visited Latifa until 2019 and tried to intervene on her behalf to Sheikh Mohammed but he refused and insisted Latifa must stay locked in her present location. In January 2019, Haya felt her relationship with Sheikh Mohammed cooled and was told by him and Latifa’s mother not to interfere in their business

Intimidation campaign against Princess Haya

Starting from February 2019, Sheikh Mohammed intimidated Haya by phone calls about her alleged affairs with a British bodyguard and by writing a poem (which she believed is a reference to her) 

“On 4 February 2019 there was an announcement that the mother’s representative at the Ruler’s Court should leave and, on 11 March 2019 the mother was told that, on the father’s instruction, she no longer had a desk at the Ruler’s Court. The mother explains that this was “a huge public slap in the face”, indicating that she no longer had any official status within the Ruler’s Court.”

11 March 2019, a day Haya describes as “one of the longest and most frightening days I ever remember living” - a helicopter landed outside her Dubai residence and the pilot said he was there to take one person to a desert prison. Haya believed her son Zayed’s presence kept her safe 

“In addition, throughout this period the mother received a series of anonymous notes, left in her bedroom or elsewhere, making threats, for example “We will take your son – your daughter is ours – your life is over” or warning her to be careful. On two occasions in March 2019 the mother states that she found a gun left on her bed with the muzzle pointing towards the door and the safety catch off.”

“In May 2019 the mother claims that the father threatened her saying “You and the children will never be safe in England”.”

“On 13 June a user named “UAE Properties” posted a video on Instagram which had been filmed inside the father’s private tent in Marmoum. The video shows the father and another man dancing and waving swords in what the mother says is a traditional Bedouin dance of victory over one’s enemies. The mother believes that the father had allowed himself to be filmed in this private space and then permitted it to be posted online with the intention of intimidating her; she is clear that no one would ever post a video of him dancing in this way unless he had expressly requested them to do so.”

“The mother’s legal team have identified in the region of 1,100 media articles published worldwide about the mother in the short period between 24 June 2019 and 14 July 2019. Many of the articles are wholly inaccurate for example, suggesting in some that the mother is an agent of Hamas and intending to overthrow the State of Jordan.”

“In early February she records that during a telephone conversation with the father referring to Zayed, the father laughed and said “He is a desert boy. In a few months we will take him from you – you will see”. On the same day Zayed’s UAE security guard brought the boy back from a trip to some bouncy castles and, as he left, he said “He is our Sheikh, in a few months you won’t see him again. He will come and live with the men, he is ours.” Later, in March 2010 during a visit to the children the mother records that the father said to them “We don’t need your mum anymore do we?” The children replied, “Yes we do”. The father is said to have responded, “No we don’t need her”. In similar terms, on 27 March, the mother records the father saying “Zayed, do we need momma?...You see Haya we don’t need you anymore – we don’t need you or want you”.” Princess Haya believes Sheikh Mohammed and Crown Prince Hamdan wants to arrange Jalila’s marriage to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman but the judge dismissed this allegation as Haya cannot provide solid proof

[mideastsoccer]

Battle for the Soul of Islam

By James M. Dorsey

 This story was first published in Horizons

 TROUBLE is brewing in the backyard of Muslim-majority states competing for religious soft power and leadership of the Muslim world in what amounts to a battle for the soul of Islam. Shifting youth attitudes towards religion and religiosity threaten to undermine the rival efforts of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser degree, the United Arab Emirates, to cement their individual state-controlled interpretations of Islam as the Muslim world’s dominant religious narrative. Each of the rivals see their efforts as key to securing their autocratic or authoritarian rule as well as advancing their endeavors to carve out a place for themselves in a new world order in which power is being rebalanced.

Research and opinion polls consistently show that the gap between the religious aspirations of youth—and, in the case of Iran other age groups—and state-imposed interpretations of Islam is widening. The shifting attitudes amount to a rejection of Ash’arism, the fundament of centuries-long religiously legitimized authoritarian rule in the Sunni Muslim world that stresses the role of scriptural and clerical authority. Mustafa Akyol, a prominent Turkish Muslim intellectual, argues that Ash’arism has dominated Muslim politics for centuries at the expense of more liberal strands of the faith “not because of its merits, but because of the support of the states that ruled the medieval Muslim world.”

Similarly, Nadia Oweidat, a student of the history of Islamic thought, notes that “no topic has impacted the region more profoundly than religion. It has changed the geography of the region, it has changed its language, it has changed its culture. It has been shaping the region for thousands of years. [...] Religion controls every aspect of people who live in the Arab world.”

The polls and research suggest that youth are increasingly skeptical towards religious and worldly authority. They aspire to more individual, more spiritual experien­ces of religion. Their search leads them in multiple directions that range from changes in personal religious behavior that deviates from that proscribed by the state to conversions in secret to other religions even though apostasy is banned and punishable by death, to an abandonment of organized religion all together in favor of deism, agnosticism, or atheism.

“The youth are not interested in institutions or organizations. These do not attract them or give them any incentive; just the opposite, these institutions and organizations and their leadership take advantage of them only when they are needed for their attendance and for filling out the crowds,” said Palestinian scholar and former Hamas education minister Nasser al-Din al-Shaer.

Atheists and converts cite perceived discriminatory provisions in Islam’s legal code towards various Muslim sects, non-Muslims, and women as a reason for turning their back on the faith. “The primary thing that led me to atheism is Islam’s moral aspect. How can, for example, a merciful and compassionate God, said to be more merciful than a woman on her baby, permit slavery and the trade of slaves in slave markets? How come He permits rape of women simply because they are war prisoners? These acts would not be committed by a merciful human being much less by a merciful God,” said Hicham Nostic, a Moroccan atheist, writing under a pen name.

 Revival, Reversal

The recent research and polls suggest a reversal of an Islamic revival that scholars like John Esposito in the 1990s and Jean-Paul Carvalho in 2009 observed that was bolstered by the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the results of a 1996 World Values Survey that reported a strengthening of traditional religious values in the Muslim world, the rise of Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the initial Muslim Brotherhood electoral victories in Egypt and Tunisia in the wake of the 2011 popular Arab revolts.

“The indices of Islamic reawakening in personal life are many: increased attention to religious observances (mosque attendance, prayer, fasting), proliferation of religious programming and publications, more emphasis on Islamic dress and values, the revitalization of Sufism (mysticism). This broader-based renewal has also been accompanied by Islam’s reassertion in public life: an increase in Islamically oriented governments, organizations, laws, banks, social welfare services, and educational institutions,” Esposito noted at the time.

Carvalho argued that an economic “growth reversal which raised aspirations and led subsequently to a decline in social mobility which left aspirations unfulfilled among the educated middle class (and) increasing income inequality and impoverishment of the lower-middle class” was driving the revival. The same factors currently fuel a shift away from traditional, Orthodox, and ultra-conservative values and norms of religiosity.

The shift in Muslim-majority countries also contrasts starkly with a trend towards greater religious Orthodoxy in some Muslim minority communities in Europe. A 2018 report by the Dutch government’s Social and Cultural Planning Bureau noted that the number of Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan descent who strictly observe traditional religious precepts had increased by approximately eight percent. Dutch citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent account for two-thirds of the country’s Muslim community. The report suggested that in a pluralistic society in which Muslims are a minority, “the more personal, individualistic search for true Islam can lead to youth becoming more strict in observance than their parents or environment ever were.”

Changing attitudes towards religion and religiosity that mirror shifting attitudes in non-Muslim countries are particularly risky for leaders, irrespective of their politics, who cloak themselves in the mantle of religion as well as nationalism and seek to leverage that in their geopolitical pursuit of religious soft power. The 2011 popular Arab revolts as well as mass anti-government protests in various Middle Eastern countries in 2019 and 2020 spotlighted the subversiveness of the change. “The Arab Spring was the tipping point in the shift [...]. It was the epitome of how we see the change. The calls were for ‘dawla madiniya,’ a civic state. A civic state is as close as you can come to saying [...], we want a state where the laws are written by people so that we can challenge them, we can change them, we can adjust them. It’s not God’s law, it’s madiniya, it’s people’s law,” Oweidat, the Islamic thought scholar, said.

Akyol went further, noting in a journal article that “too many terrible things have recently happened in the Arab world in the name of Islam. These include the sectarian civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, where most of the belligerents have fought in the name of God, often with appalling brutality. The millions of victims and bystanders of these wars have experienced shock and disillusionment with religious politics, and more than a few began asking deeper questions.”

The 2011 popular Arab revolts reverberated across the Middle East, reshaping relations between states as well as domestic policies, even though initial achievements of the protesters were rolled back in Egypt and sparked wars in Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a 3.5 year-long diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar in part to cut their youth off from access to the Gulf state’s popular Al Jazeera television network that supported the revolts and Islamist groups that challenged the region’s autocratic rulers. Seeking to lead and tightly control a social and economic reform agenda driven by youth who were enamored by the uprisings, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman “sought to recapture this mandate of change, wrap it in a national mantle, and sever it from its Arab Spring associations. The boycott and ensuing nationalist campaign against Qatar became central to achieving that,” said Gulf scholar Kristin Smith Diwan.

Referring to the revolts, Moroccan journalist Ahmed Benchemsi suggested that “the Arab Spring may have stalled, if not receded, but when it comes to religious beliefs and attitudes, a generational dynamic is at play. Large numbers of individuals are tilting away from the rote religiosity Westerners reflexively associate with the Arab world.”

Benchemsi went on to argue that “in today’s Arab world, it’s not religiosity that is mandatory; it’s the appearance of it. Nonreligious attitudes and beliefs are tolerated as long as they’re not conspicuous. As a system, social hypocrisy provides breathing room to secular lifestyles, while preserving the façade of religion. Atheism, per se, is not the problem. Claiming it out loud is. So those who publicize their atheism in the Arab world are fighting less for freedom of conscience than for freedom of speech.” The same could be said for the right to convert or opt for alternative practices of Islam.

Syrian journalist Sham al-Ali recounts the story of a female relative who escaped the civil war to Germany where she decided to remove her hijab. Her father, who lives in Turkey, accepted his daughter’s decision but threatened to disown her if she posted pictures of herself uncovered on Facebook. “His issue was not with his daughter’s abandonment of religious duty, but with her publicizing that before her family and society at large,” Al-Ali said.

 Neo-patriarchism

Neo-patriarchism, a pillar of Arab autocratic rule, heightens concern about public appearance and perception. A phrase coined by American-Palestinian scholar Hisham Sharabi, neo-patriarchism involves projection of the autocratic leader as a father figure. Autocratic Arab society, according to Sharabi, was built on the dominance of the father, a patriarch around which the national as well as the nuclear family are organized. Relations between a ruler and the ruled are replicated in the relationship between a father and his children. In both settings, the paternal will is absolute, mediated in society as well as the family by a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion.

As a result, neo-patriarchism often reinforces pressure to abide by state-imposed religious behavior and at the same time fuels changes in attitudes towards religion and religiosity among youth who resent their inability to chart a path of their own. Primary and secondary schools have emerged as one frontline in the struggle to determine the boundaries of religious expression and behavior. Recent developments in Egypt, a brutal autocracy, and Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy, offer contrasting perspectives on how the tug of war between students and parents, schoolteachers and administrations, and the state plays out.

Mada Masr, Egypt’s foremost independent news outlet, documented how in 2020 Egyptian schoolgirls who refused to wear a hijab were being coerced and publicly shamed in the knowledge that the education ministry was reluctant to enforce its policy not to mandate the wearing of a headdress. “The model, decent girl is expected to dress modestly and wear a hijab to signal her pride in her religious identity, since hijab is what distinguishes her from a Christian girl,” said Lamia Lotfy, a gender consultant and rights activist. Teachers at public high schools said they were reluctant to take boys to task for violating dress codes because they were more likely to push back and create problems.

In sharp contrast, Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas issued in early 2021 a decree together with the ministers of home affairs and education threatening to sanction state schools that seek to impose religious garb in violation of government rules and regulations. The decree was issued amid a public row sparked by the refusal of a Christian student to obey her school principal’s instructions requiring all pupils to wear Islamic clothing. Qoumas is a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim movement and foremost advocate of theological reform in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. “Religions do not promote conflict, neither do they justify acting unfairly against those who are different,” Qoumas said.

A Muslim nation that replaced a decades long autocratic regime with a democracy in a popular revolt in 1998, Indonesia is Middle Eastern rulers’ worst nightmare. The shifting attitudes of Middle Eastern youth towards religion and religiosity suggest that experimentation with religion in post-revolt Indonesia is a path that it would embark on if given the opportunity. Indonesia is “where the removal of constraints imposed by an authoritarian regime has opened up the imaginative terrain, allowing particular types of religious beliefs and practices to emerge [...]. The Indonesian cases study [...] brings into sharper relief processes that are happening in ordinary Muslim life elsewhere,” said Indonesia scholar Nur Amali Ibrahim.

A 2019 poll of Arab youth showed that two-thirds of those surveyed felt that religion played too large a role in their lives, up from 50 percent four years earlier. Nearly 80 percent argued that religious institutions needed to be reformed while half said that religious values were holding the Arab world back. Surveys conducted over the last decade by Arab Barometer, a research network at Princeton University and the University of Michigan, showed a growing number of youths turning their backs on religion. “Personal piety has declined some 43 percent over the past decade, indicating less than a quarter of the population now define themselves as religious,” the survey concluded.

With the trend being the strongest among Libyans, many Libyan youth gravitate towards secretive atheist Facebook pages. They often are products of the UAE’s failed attempt to align the hard power of its military intervention in Libya with religious soft power. Said, a 25-year-old student from Benghazi, the stronghold of the UAE and Saudi-backed rebel forces led by self-appointed Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, turned his back on religion after his cousin was beheaded in 2016 for speaking out against militants. UAE backing of Haftar has involved the population of his army by Madkhalists, a branch of Salafism named after a Saudi scholar who preaches absolute obedience to the ruler and projects the kingdom as a model of Islamic governance. “My cousin’s death occurred during a period when I was deeply religious, praying five times a day and studying ten new pages of the Qur’an each evening,” Said said.

A majority of respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Iran said in a 2017 poll conducted by Washington-based John Zogby Associates that they wanted religious movements to focus on personal faith and spiritual guidance and not involve themselves in politics. Iraq and Palestine were the outliers with a majority favoring a political role for religious groups.

The response to polls in the second half of the second decade of the twenty-first century contrasts starkly with attitudes expressed in a survey of the world’s Muslims by the Pew Research Center several years earlier. Pew’s polling suggested that ultra-conservative attitudes long promoted by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar that legitimized authoritarian and autocratic regimes remained popular. More than 70 percent of those surveyed at the time in South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa favored making Sharia the law of the land and granting Sharia courts jurisdiction over family law and property disputes.

Those numbers varied broadly, however, when respondents were asked about specific issues like apostasy and corporal punishment. Three-quarters of South Asians favored the death sentence for apostasy as opposed to 56 percent in the Middle East and only 27 percent in Southeast Asia, while 81 percent in South Asia supported physical punishment compared to 57 percent in the Middle East and North Africa and 46 percent in Southeast Asia. South Asia emerged as the only part of the Muslim world in which respondents preferred a strong leader to democracy while a majority of the faithful in all three regions viewed religious freedom as positive. Between 65 and 79 percent in all regions wanted to see religious leaders have political influence.

Honor killings may be the one area where attitudes have not changed that much in recent years. Arab Barometer’s polling in 2018 and 2019 showed that more people thought honor killings were acceptable than homosexuality. In most countries polled, young Arabs appeared more likely than their parents to condone honor killings. Social media and occasional protests bear that out. Thousands rallied in early 2020 in Hebron, a conservative city on the West Bank, after the Palestinian Authority signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Nonetheless, the assertions by Saudi Arabia that projects itself as the leader of an unidentified form of moderate Islam that preaches absolute obedience to the ruler and by advocates of varying strands of political Islam such as Turkey and Iran ring hollow in light of the dramatic shift in attitudes towards religion and religiosity.

 Acknowledging Change

Among the Middle Eastern rivals for religious soft power, the United Arab Emirates, populated in majority by non-nationals, may be the only one to emerge with a cleaner slate. The UAE is the only contender to have started acknowledging changing attitudes and demographic realities. Authorities in November 2020 lifted the ban on consumption of alcohol and cohabitation among unmarried couples. In a further effort to reach out to youth, the UAE organized in 2021 a virtual consultation with 3,000 students aimed at motivating them to think innovatively over the country’s path in the next 50 years.

Such moves do not fundamentally eliminate the risk that the changing attitudes may undercut the religious soft power efforts of the UAE and its Middle Eastern competitors. The problem for rulers like the UAE and Saudi crown princes, Mohammed bin Zayed and Mohammed bin Salman, respectively, is that the loosening of social restrictions in Saudi Arabia—including the emasculation of the kingdom’s religious police, the lifting of a ban on women’s driving, less strict implementation of gender segregation, the introduction of Western-style entertainment and greater professional opportunities for women, and a degree of genuine religious tolerance and pluralism in the UAE—are only first steps in responding to youth aspirations.

“People are sick and tired of organized religion and being told what to do. That is true for all Gulf states and the rest of the Arab world,” quipped a Saudi businessman. Social scientist Ellen van de Bovenkamp describes Moroccans she interviewed for her PhD thesis as living “a personalized, self-made religiosity, in which ethics and politics are more important than rituals.”

Nevertheless, religious authorities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Morocco continue to project interpretations of the faith that serve the state and are often framed in the language of tolerance and inter-faith dialogue but preserve outmoded legal categories, traditions, and scripture that date back centuries. Outdated concepts of slavery, who is a believer and who is an infidel, apostasy, blasphemy, and physical punishment that need reconceptualization remain in terms of religious law frozen in time. Many of those concepts, with the exception of slavery that has been banned in national law yet remains part of Islamic law, have been embedded in national legislations.

While Turkey continues to, at least nominally, adhere to its secular republican origins, it is no different from its rivals when it comes to grooming state-aligned clergymen, whose ability to think out of the box and develop new interpretations of the faith is impeded by a religious education system that stymies critical thinking and creativity. Instead, it too emphasizes the study of Arabic and memorization of the Qur’an and other religious texts and creates a religious and political establishment that discourages, if not penalizes, innovation.

Widening the gap between state projections of religion and popular aspirations is the fact that governments’ subjugation of religious establishments turns clerics and scholars into regime parrots and fuels youth skepticism towards religious institutions and leaders.

“Youth have [...] witnessed how religious figures, who still remain influential in many Arab societies, can sometimes give in to change even if they have resisted it initially. This not only feeds into Arab youth’s skepticism towards religious institutions but also further highlights the inconsistency of the religious discourse and its inability to provide timely explanations or justifications to the changing reality of today,” said Gulf scholar Eman Alhussein in a commentary on the 2020 Arab Youth Survey.

Pooyan Tamimi Arab, the co-organizer of an online survey in 2020 of Iranian attitudes towards religion that revealed a stunning rejection of state-imposed adherence to conservative religious mores as well as the role of religion in public life noted the widening gap “becomes an existential question. The state wants you to be something that you don’t want to be [...]. “Political disappointment steadily turned into religious disappointment [...]. Iranians have turned away from institutional religion on an unprecedented scale.”

In a similar vein, Turkish art historian Nese Yildiran recently warned that a fatwa issued by President Erdogan’s Directorate of Religious Affairs or Diyanet declaring popular talismans to ward off “the evil eye” as forbidden by Islam fueled criticism of one of the best-funded branches of government. The fatwa followed the issuance of similar religious opinions banning the dying of men’s moustaches and beards, feeding dogs at home, tattoos, and playing the national lottery as well as statements that were perceived to condone or belittle child abuse and violence against women.

Although compatible with a trend across the Middle East, the Iranian survey’s results, which is based on 50,000 respondents who overwhelmingly said they resided in the Islamic republic, suggested that Iranians were in the frontlines of the region’s quest for religious change.

Funded by Washington-based Iranian human rights activist Ladan Boroumand, the Iranian survey, coupled with other research and opinion polls across the Middle East and North Africa, suggests that not only Muslim youth, but also other age groups, who are increasingly skeptical towards religious and worldly authority, aspire to more individual, more spiritual experiences of religion.

Their quest runs the gamut from changes in personal religious behavior to conversions in secret to other religions because apostasy is banned and, in some cases, punishable by death, to an abandonment of religion in favor of agnosticism or atheism. Responding to the survey, 80 percent of the participants said they believed in God but only 32.2 percent identified themselves as Shiite Muslims—a far lower percentage than asserted in official figures of predominantly Shiite Iran.

More than one third of the respondents said that they either did not belong to a religion or were atheists or agnostics. Between 43 and 53 percent, depending on age group, suggested that their religious views had changed over time with 6 percent of those saying that they had converted to another religious orientation.

In addition, 68 percent said they opposed the inclusion of religious precepts in national legislation. Moreover 70 percent rejected public funding of religious institutions while 56 percent opposed mandatory religious education in schools. Almost 60 percent admitted that they do not pray, and 72 percent disagreed with women being obliged to wear a hijab in public.

An unpublished slide of the survey shows the change in religiosity reflected in the fact that an increasing number of Iranians no longer name their children after religious figures.

A five-minute YouTube clip uploaded by an ultra-conservative channel allegedly related to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards attacked the survey despite having distributed the questionnaire once the pollsters disclosed in their report that the poll had been supported by an exile human rights group.

“Tehran may well be the least religious capital in the Middle East. Clerics dominate the news headlines and play the communal elders in soap operas, but I never saw them on the street, except on billboards. Unlike most Muslim countries, the call to prayer is almost inaudible [...]. Alcohol is banned but home delivery is faster for wine than for pizza [...]. Religion felt frustratingly hard to locate and the truly religious seemed sidelined, like a minority,” wrote journalist Nicholas Pelham based on a visit in 2019 during which he was detained for several weeks.

In yet another sign of rejection of state-imposed expressions of Islam, Iranians have sought to alleviate the social impact of COVID-19 related lockdowns and restrictions on face-to-face human contact by acquiring dogs, cats, birds, and even reptiles as pets. The Islamic Republic has long viewed pets as a fixture of Western culture. One of the main reasons for keeping pets in Iran is that people no longer believe in the old cultural, religious, or doctrinal taboos as the unalterable words of God. “This shift towards deconstructing old taboos signals a transformation of the Iranian identity—from the traditional to the new,” said psychologist Farnoush Khaledi.

Pets are one form of dissent; clandestine conversions are another. Exiled Iranian Shiite scholar Yaser Mirdamadi noted that “Iranians no longer have faith in state-imposed religion and are groping for religious alternatives.”

A former Israeli army intelligence chief, retired Lt. Col. Marco Moreno, puts the number of converts in Iran, a country of 83 million, at about one million. Moreno’s estimate may be an overestimate. Other studies in put the figure at between 100,000 and 500,000. Whatever the number is, the conversions fit a trend not only in Iran but across the Muslim world of changing attitudes towards religion, a rejection of state-imposed interpretations of Islam, and a search for more individual and varied religious experiences. Iranian press reports about the discovery of clandestine church gatherings in homes in the holy city of Qom suggest conversions to Christianity began more than a decade ago. “The fact that conversions had reached Qom was an indication that this was happening elsewhere in the country,” Mirdamadi, the Shiite cleric, said.

Seeing the converts as an Israeli asset, Moreno backed production of a two-hour documentary, Sheep Among Wolves Volume II, produced by two American Evangelists, one of which resettled on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, that asserts that Iran’s underground community of converts to Christianity is the world’s fastest growing church.

“What if I told you the mosques are empty inside Iran?” said a church leader in the film, his identity masked and his voice distorted to avoid identification. Based on interviews with Iranian converts while they were travelling abroad, the documentary opens with a scene on an Indonesian beach where they meet with the filmmakers for a religious training session.

“What if I told you that Islam is dead? What if I told you that the mosques are empty inside Iran? [...] What if I told you no one follows Islam inside of Iran? Would you believe me? This is exactly what is happening inside of Iran. God is moving powerfully inside of Iran?” the church leader added. Unsurprisingly, given the film’s Israeli backing and the filmmaker’s affinity with Israel, the documentary emphasizes the converts’ break with Iran’s staunch rejection of the Jewish State by emphasizing their empathy for Judaism and Israel.

 Reduced Religiosity

The Iran survey’s results as well as observations by analysts and journalists like Pelham stroke with responses to various polls of Arab public opinion in recent years and fit a global pattern of reduced religiosity. A 2019 Pew Research Center study concluded that adherence to Christianity in the United States was declining at a rapid pace.

The Arab Youth Survey found that, despite 40 percent of those polled defining religion as the most important constituent element of their identity, 66 percent saw a need for religious institutions to be reformed. “The way some Arab countries consume religion in the political discourse, which is further amplified on social media, is no longer deceptive to the youth who can now see through it,” Alhussein, the Gulf scholar, said.

A 2018 Arab Opinion Index poll suggested that public opinion may support the reconceptualization of Muslim jurisprudence. Almost 70 percent of those polled agreed that “no religious authority is entitled to declare followers of other religions to be infidels.” Similarly, 70 percent of those surveyed rejected the notion that democracy was incompatible with Islam while 76 percent viewed it as the most appropriate system of governance.

What that means in practice is, however, less clear. Arab public opinion appears split down the middle when it comes to issues like separation of religion and politics or the right to protest.

Arab Barometer director Michael Robbins cautioned in a commentary in the Washington Post, co-authored with international affairs scholar Lawrence Rubin, that recent moves by the government of Sudan to separate religion and state may not enjoy public support.

The transitional government brought to office in 2020 by a popular revolt that topped decades of Islamist rule by ousted President Omar al-Bashir agreed in peace talks with Sudanese rebel groups to a “separation of religion and state.” The government also ended the ban on apostasy and consumption of alcohol by non-Muslims and prohibited corporal punishment, including public flogging.

Robbins and Rubin noted that 61 percent of those surveyed on the eve of the revolt believed that Sudanese law should be based on the Sharia or Islamic law defined by two-thirds of the respondents as ensuring the provision of basic services and lack of corruption. The researchers, nonetheless, also concluded that youth favored a reduced role of religious leaders in political life. They said youth had soured on the idea of religion-based governance because of widespread corruption during the region of Al-Bashir who professed his adherence to religious principles.

“If the transitional government can deliver on providing basic services to the country’s citizens and tackling corruption, the formal shift away from Sharia is likely to be acceptable in the eyes of the public. However, if these problems remain, a new set of religious leaders may be able to galvanize a movement aimed at reinstituting Sharia as a means to achieve these objectives,” Robbins and Rubin warned.

Writing at the outset of the popular revolt that toppled Al-Bashir, Islam scholar and former Sudanese diplomat Abdelwahab El-Affendi noted that “for most Sudanese, Islamism came to signify corruption, hypocrisy, cruelty, and bad faith. Sudan is perhaps the first genuinely anti-Islamist country in popular terms. But being anti-Islamist in Sudan does not mean being secular.”

It is a warning that is as valid for Sudan as it is for much of the Arab and Muslim world.

Saudi columnist Wafa al-Rashid sparked fiery debate on social media after calling in a local newspaper for a secular state in the kingdom. “How long will we continue to shy away from enlightenment and change? Religious enlightenment, which is in line with reality and the thinking of youth, who rebelled and withdrew from us because we are no longer like them. [...] We no longer speak their language or understand their dreams,” Al-Rashid wrote.

Asked in a poll conducted by The Washington Institute of Near East Policy whether “it’s a good thing we aren’t having big street demonstrations here now the way they do in some other countries”—a reference to the past decade of popular revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq and Sudan—Saudi public opinion was split down the middle. The numbers indicate that 48 percent of respondents agreed and 48 percent disagreed. Saudis, like most Gulf Arabs, are likely less inclined to take grievances to the streets. Nonetheless, the poll indicates that they may prove to be more empathetic to protests should they occur.

Tamimi Arab, the Iran pollster, argued that his Iran survey “shows that there is a social basis” for concern among authoritarian and autocratic governments that employ religion to further their geopolitical goals and seek to maintain their grip on potentially restive populations. His warning reverberates in the responses by governments in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the Middle East to changing attitudes towards religion and religiosity. They demonstrate the degree to which they perceive the change as a threat, often expressed in existential terms.

Mohammad Mehdi Mirbaqeri, a prominent Shiite cleric and member of Iran’s powerful Assembly of Experts that appoints the country’s supreme leader, described COVID-19 in late 2020 as a “secular virus” and a declaration of war on “religious civilization” and “religious institutions.”

Saudi Arabia went further by defining the “calling for atheist thought in any form” as terrorism in its anti-terrorism law. Saudi dissident and activist Rafi Badawi was sentenced on charges of apostasy to ten years in prison and 1,000 lashes for questioning why Saudis should be obliged to adhere to Islam and asserting that the faith did not have answers to all questions.

Analysts, writers, journalists, and pollsters have traced changes in attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the wider Muslim world for much of the past decade, if not longer. A Western Bangladesh scholar resident in Dacca in 1989 recalled Bangladeshis looking for a copy of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses as soon as it was banned by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who condemned the British author to death. “It was the allure of forbidden fruit. Yet, I also found that many were looking for things to criticize, an excuse to think differently,” the scholar wrote.

Widely viewed as a bastion of ultra-conservatism. Malaysia’s top religious regulatory body, the Malaysian Islamic Development Department (Jakim), which responsible for training Islamic teachers and preparing weekly state-controlled Friday sermons, has long portrayed liberalism and pluralism as threats, pointing to a national fatwa that in 2006 condemned liberalism as heretical. “The pulpit would like to state today that many tactics are being undertaken by irresponsible people to weaken Muslim unity, among them through spreading new but inverse thinking like Pluralism, Liberalism, and such. The pulpit would like to state that the Liberal movement contains concepts that are found to have deviated from the Islamic faith and shariah,” read a 2014 Friday sermon drafted and distributed by Jakim.

The fatwa echoed a similar legal opinion issued a year earlier by Indonesia’s semi-governmental Council of Religious Scholars (MUI) labelled with SIPILIS as its acronym to equate secularism, pluralism, and liberalism with the venereal disease. The council was headed at the time by current Vice President Ma’ruf Amin, a prominent Nahdlatul Ulama figure.

Challenging attempts by governments and religious authorities to suppress changing attitudes rather than engage with groups groping for greater religious freedom, Kuwaiti writer Sajed al-Abdali noted in 2012 that “it is essential that we acknowledge today that atheism exists and is increasing in our society, especially among our youth, and evidence of this is in no short supply.”

Al-Abdali sounded his alarm three years prior to the publication of a Pew Research Center study that sought to predict the growth trajectories of the world’s religions by the year 2050. The study suggested that the number of people among the 300 million inhabitants of the Middle East and North Africa that were unaffiliated with any faith would remain stable at about 0.6 percent of the population.

Two years later, the Egyptian government’s religious advisory body, Dar al-Ifta Al-Missriya, published a scientifically disputed survey that sought to project the number of atheists in the region as negligible. The survey identified 2,293 atheists, including 866 Egyptians, 325 Moroccans, 320 Tunisians, 242 Iraqis, 178 Saudis, 170 Jordanians, 70 Sudanese, 56 Syrians, 34 Libyans, and 32 Yemenis. It defined atheists as not only those who did not believe in God but also as encompassing converts to other religions and advocates of a secular state. A poll conducted that same year by Al Azhar, Cairo’s ancient citadel of Islamic learning, concluded that Egypt counted 10.7 million atheists. Al Azhar’s Grand Imam, Ahmad al-Tayyeb, warned at the time on state television that the flight from religion constituted a social problem.

A 2012 survey by international polling firm WIN/Gallup International reported that 5 percent of Saudis—or more than one million people—identified themselves as “convinced atheists” on par with the percentage in the United States; while 19 percent described themselves as non-religious. By the same token, Benchemsi, the Moroccan journalist, found 250 Arab atheism-related pages or groups while searching the internet, with memberships ranging from a few individuals to more than 11,000. “And these numbers only pertain to Arab atheists (or Arabs concerned with the topic of atheism) who are committed enough to leave a trace online,” Benchemsi said, noting that many more were unlikely to publicly disclose their beliefs.

The picture is replicated across the Middle East. The number of atheists and agnostics in Iraq, for example, is growing. Iraqi writer and one-time Shiite cleric Gaith al-Tamimi argued that religious figures have come to represent all that’s inherently wrong in Iraqi politics society. Iraqis of all generations seek to escape religious dogma, he says, adding that “Iraqis are questioning the role religion serves today.” Fadhil, a 30-year-old from the southern port city of Basra complained that religious leaders “overuse and misuse God’s name, police human bodies, prohibit extramarital sex, and police the bodies of women.” Changing attitudes towards religion figured prominently in mass anti-government protests in Iraq in 2019 and 2020 that rejected sectarianism and called for a secular national Iraqi identity.

Even in Syria, a fulcrum of militant and ultra-conservative forms of Islam that fed on a decade of brutal civil war and foreign intervention, many concluded in the words of Al-Ali, the Syrian journalist, that “religious and political authorities are ‘protective friends one of the other,’ and that political despotism stems from religious absolutism. [...] In Syria, the prestige sheikhs had enjoyed was undermined alongside that of the regime.” Religion and religious figures’ inability to explain the horror that Syria was experiencing and that had uprooted the lives of millions drove many forced to flee to question long-held beliefs.

Multiple Turkish surveys suggested that Erdogan’s goal of raising a religious generation had backfired despite pouring billions of dollars into religious education. Students often rejected religion, described themselves as atheists, deists, or feminists, and challenged the interpretation of Islam taught in schools. A 2019 survey by polling and data company IPSOS reported that only 12 percent of Turks trusted religious officials and 44 percent distrusted clerics. “We have declined when religious sincerity and morality expressed by the people is taken into account,” said Ali Bardakoglu, who headed Erdogan’s Religious Affairs Department or Diyanet from 2003 to 2010.

Unaware that microphones had not been muted, Erdogan expressed concern a year earlier to his education minister about the spread of deism, a belief in a God that does not intervene in the universe and that is not defined by organized religion, among Turkish youth during a meeting of his party’s parliamentary group. “No, no such thing can happen,” Erdogan ordained against the backdrop of Turkish officials painting deism as a Western conspiracy designed to weaken Turkey. Erdogan’s comments came in response to the publication of an education ministry report that, in line with the subsequent survey, warned that popular rejection of religious knowledge acquired through revelation and religious teachings and a growing embrace of reason was on the rise.

The report noted that increased enrollment in a rising number of state-run religious Imam Hatip high schools had not stopped mounting questioning of orthodox Islamic precepts. Neither had increased study of religion in mainstream schools that deemphasized the teaching of evolution. The greater emphasis on religion failed to advance Erdogan’s dream of a pious generation that would have a Qur’an in one hand and a computer in the other. Instead, reflecting a discussion on faith and youth among some 50 religion teachers, the report suggested that lack of faith in educators had fueled the rise of deism. Teachers were unable to answer the often-posed question: why does God not intervene to halt evil and why does he remain silent? The report’s cautionary note was bolstered by a flurry of anonymous confessions and personal stories by deists as well as atheists recounted in newspaper interviews.

Acting on Erdogan’s instructions, Ali Erbas, the director of Diyanet, declared war on deism. The government’s top cleric, Erbas blamed Western missionaries seeking to convert Turkish youth to Christianity for deism’s increased popularity. Erbas’ declaration followed a three-day consultation with 70 religious scholars and bureaucrats convened by the Directorate that identified “Deism, Atheism, Nihilism, Agnosticism” as the enemy. Erdogan’s alarm and Erbas’ spinning of conspiracy theories constituted attempts to detract attention from the fact that youth in Tukey, like in Iran and the Arab world, were turning their back on orthodox and classical interpretations of Islam on the back of increasingly authoritarian and autocratic rule. Erdogan thundered that “there is no such thing” as LGBT and added that “this country is national and spiritual, and will continue to walk into the future as such” when protesting students displayed a poster depicting one of Islam’s holiest sites, the Kaaba shrine in Mecca, with LGBT flags.

“There is a dictatorship in Turkey. This drives people away from religion,” said Temel Karamollaoglu, the leader of the Islamist Felicity Party that opposes Erdogan’s AKP because of its authoritarianism. Turkey scholar Mucahit Bilici described Turkish youths’ rejection of Orthodox and politicized interpretations of Islam as “a flowering of post-Islamist sentiment” by a “younger generation (that) is choosing the path of individualized spirituality and a silent rejection of tradition.”

Saudi authorities view the high numbers in the WIN/Gallup International as a threat to the religious legitimacy that the kingdom’s ruling Al-Saud family has long cloaked itself in. The groundswell of aspirations that have guided youth away from the confines of ultra-conservatism highlight failed efforts of the government and the religious establishment going back to the 1980s. The culture and information ministry banned the word ‘modernity’ at the time in a bid to squash an emerging debate that challenged the narrow confines of ultra-conservatism as well as the authority of religion and the religious establishment to govern personal and public life.

 False Equation

The threat perceived by Saudi and other Middle Eastern autocrats and authoritarians as well as conservative religious voices is fueled by an implicit equation of atheism and/or rejection of state-imposed conservative and ultra-conservative strands of the faith with anarchy.

“Any calls that challenge Islamic rule or Islamic ideology is considered subversive in Saudi Arabia and would be subversive and could lead to chaos,” said Saudi ambassador to the United Nations Abdallah al-Mouallimi. Echoing journalist Benchemsi, Muallimi argued that “if (a person) was disbelieving in God, and keeping that to himself, and conducting himself, nobody would do anything or say anything about it. If he is going out in the public, and saying, ‘I don’t believe in God,’ that’s subversive. He is inviting others to retaliate.”

Similarly, Sheikh Ahmad Turki, speaking as the coordinator of the anti-atheism campaign of the Egyptian Ministry of Endowments, asserted that atheism “is a national security issue. Atheists have no principles; it’s certain that they have dysfunctional concepts—in ethics, views of the society and even in their nationalistic affiliations. If [atheists] rebel against religion, they will rebel against everything.’’

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have sought to experiment with alternatives to orthodox and ultra-conservative strands of Islam without surrendering state control by encouraging Al Azhar to embrace legal reform that is influenced by Sufism, Islam’s mystical tradition. “There is a movement of renewal of Islamic jurisprudence. [...] It’s a movement that is funded by the wealthy Gulf countries. Don’t forget that one reason for the success of the Salafis is the financial power that backed them for decades. This financial power is now being directed to the Azharis, and they are taking advantage of it. [...] Don’t underestimate what is happening. It might be a true alternative to Salafism,” said Egyptian Islam scholar Wael Farouq.

By contrast, Pakistan, a country influenced by Saudi-inspired ultra-conservatism, has stepped up its efforts to ringfence religious minorities. In an act of overreach modelled on American insistence on extra-territorial abidance by some of its laws, Pakistan laid down a gauntlet in the struggle to define religious freedom by seeking to block and shut down a U.S.-based website associated with Ahmadis on charges of blasphemy.

Ahmadis are a minority sect viewed as heretics by many Muslims that have been targeted in Indonesia and elsewhere, but nowhere more so than in Pakistan where they have been constitutionally classified as non-Muslims. Blasphemy is potentially punishable in Pakistan with a death sentence.

The Pakistani effort was launched at a moment that anti-Ahmadi and anti-Shiite sentiment in Pakistan, home to the world’s largest Shia Muslim minority, was on the rise. Mass demonstrations denounced Shiites as “blasphemers” and “infidels” and called for their beheading as the number of blasphemy cases being filed against Shiites in the courts mushroomed.

Shifting attitudes towards religion and religiosity raise fundamental chicken and egg questions about the relationship between religious and political reform, including what comes first and whether one is possible without the other. Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama argues that religious reform requires recontextualization of the faith as well as a revision of legal codes and religious jurisprudence. The only Muslim institution to have initiated a process of eliminating legal concepts in Islamic law that are obsolete or discriminatory—such as the endorsement of slavery and notions of infidels and dhimmis or People of the Book with lesser rights—Nahdlatul Ulama, a movement created almost a century ago in opposition to Wahhabism, the puritan interpretation of Islam on which Saudi Arabia was founded, is in alignment with advocates of religious reform elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Said Mohammed Sharour, a Syrian Quranist who believed that the Qur’an was Islam’s only relevant text, dismissed the Hadith—the compilation of the Prophet’s sayings and the Sunnah, the traditions, and practices of the Prophet that serve as a model for Muslims: “The religious heritage must be critically read and interpreted anew. Cultural and religious reforms are more important than political ones, as they are the preconditions for any secular reforms.” Shahrour went on to say that the reforms, comparable to those of 16th century scholar and priest Martin Luther’s reformation of Christianity, “must include all those ideas on which the people who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks based their interpretations of sources. [...] We simply have to rethink the fundamental principles. It is [...] said that the fixed values of religion cannot be rethought. But I say that it is exactly these values that we must study and rethink.”

The thinking of Nahdlatul Ulama’s critical mass of Islamic scholars and men like Shahrour offers little solace to authoritarian and autocratic leaders and their religious allies in the Muslim world at a time that Muslims are clamoring not only for political and religious change. If anything, it puts them on the spot by offering a bottom-up alternative to state-controlled religion that seeks to ensure the survival of autocratic regimes and the protection of vested interests. 

James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of Nanyang Technological University, Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute, and an Honorary Senior Non-Resident Fellow at Eye on ISIS. You may follow him on Twitter @mideastsoccer.

[rtawngs20815]

U.S. Takes Step Towards Embrace Of Gulf Plan To Destabilize Iran

The Trump administration this week appeared to take a potential step closer to backing efforts plotted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to destabilize Iran; possibly topple its Islamic government; and force Qatar to fall into line with Gulf policies that target Iran, political Islam, and militants; with the appointment of a seasoned covert operations officer as head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Iran operations.

The appointment of Michael D’Andrea, a hard-charging, chain-smoking operative, alternatively nicknamed the Dark Prince or Ayatollah Mike, whose track record includes overseeing the hunt for Osama Bin Laden, suggested that the CIA was likely to take a more operational approach in confronting Iran in line with President Donald J. Trump’s Saudi and UAE-backed hard line towards the Islamic republic, which involves a possible push for regime change.

Mr. D’Andrea took up his new post at a moment that the US focus appeared to be shifting to Iran as the Islamic State suffered significant defeats with the near fall of Mosul in Iraq and the imminent fall of Raqqa, the group’s self-declared capital in Syria.

Saudi support of militant groups in Pakistani Balochistan that operate across the border in the Iranian province of Sistan and Balochistan is abetted by a US policy that allows militancy to fester by failing to recognize links between multiple conflicts in South and Central Asia.

Balochistan serves as a safe haven for the Afghan Taliban and as a transit station in the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan to Iran and beyond. It is also the focal point of at least two regional proxy wars: the escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the perennial dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan accuses Indian intelligence of supporting Baloch separatists in retaliation for Islamabad’s backing of militants in Kashmir.

Mohammad Baksh Sajdi, the assistant commissioner of the Baloch district of Kharran, in a demonstration of the influence of Saudi-inspired, anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatism, recently banned barbers from “cutting beards in a fashionable way which is against the principles of Islam according to all religious scholars.” A similar edict was issued in Balochistan’s Omara district. A magistrate in Kharran re-imposed the ban after it was cancelled by the government because it was illegal.

Mr. D’Andrea, who converted to Islam to marry his Muslim wife rather than out of religious conviction, brings an impressive covert operations record to challenging Iran. Mr. D’Andrea was reportedly involved in the use of torture in interrogations of suspected militants under President George W. Bush.

He also played a key role in the targeting in 2008 of Imad Mugniyah, the international operations chief for Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah who maintained close ties to Iran. Mr. Mugniyah was assassinated in Damascus in an operation carried out together with Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad. Mr. D’Andrea was also involved in the ramping up of US drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen that target Islamist militants.

The New York Times noted that Mr. D’Andrea’s appointment came as some US officials, including Ezra Cohen-Watnick, the National Security Council’s senior director for intelligence, were pushing for a US policy of regime change in Iran.

Mike Pompeo, an advocate in the past of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, wrote last summer before his appointment by Mr. Trump as CIA director that “Congress must act to change Iranian behaviour, and, ultimately, the Iranian regime.”

Other senior Trump administration officials, including Defense Secretary General (retired) James Mattis and National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, are believed to be hardliners when it comes to Iran.

Mr. D’Andrea’s appointment stroked with an emerging Saudi strategy to escalate the kingdom’s proxy war with Iran by fomenting unrest among the Islamic republic’s ethnic minorities as well as to confront together with the United States Iranian-backed groups in Syria and Yemen. The Trump administration has already stepped up support for Saudi Arabia’s two-year old, ill-fated intervention in Yemen.

Iran is unlikely to stand by idly if Saudi Arabia and the US were to initiate covert operations against it. “There’s just one small problem: Iran is unlikely to back down,” said US Naval Postgraduate School Iran expert Afshon Ostovar. Mr. Ostovar noted that Iran’s ability to operate through proxy groups like Hezbollah, Lebanon’s Shiite militia, Palestine’s Islamic Jihad, and militias in Iraq was “its most strategic asset.”

As a result, the US-Saudi-UAE strategy risks Iran retaliating by attempting to stir trouble among Shiites in Bahrain, home to a low-level insurgency since the island’s Sunni Muslim minority regime brutally squashed a popular uprising in 2011 with the support of Saudi troops, and in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich, predominantly Shiite Eastern province.

To be sure, Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are Bahrainis and Saudis first and Shiites second. But decades of discriminatory policies in both regions have left their toll, and offer Iran potential opportunity to stir the pot.

Saudi Arabia’s Okaz newspaper reported this week that authorities had foiled an attack on US forces based in Qatar. The newspaper said the foiled attempt was planned by an Al Qaeda unit headed by a Qatari national.

Okaz’s report came in the wake of a suicide bombing in Qatif in the Eastern Province and a Saudi and UAE-sponsored media campaign against Qatar because of its ties to Iran and alleged support for militants. Saudi Shiite activists accused a US-trained Saudi interior ministry unit of having instigated the Qatif bombing in an effort to bolster the kingdom’s claim that it is a victim of Iran-inspired political violence.

Qatar announced amid the Saudi-UAE campaign that six of its soldiers had been wounded in Yemen “while conducting their duties within the Qatari contingent defending the southern borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”.

In a move reminiscent of past Qatari efforts to placate UAE and Saudi criticism, Qatar was reported to have expelled several officials of Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip, who were involved in the group’s activities on the Israeli occupied West Bank.

In the latest episode of the Gulf cyberwar, leaked mails from the email account of the UAE ambassador in Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, whose authenticity was confirmed by Huffpost and The Intercept, showed the UAE looking at ways to influence Iran’s domestic situation.

The UAE was also pressing the Trump administration in cooperation with the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies to move its US air force base, the largest in the Middle East, out of Qatar.

The emails also revealed efforts to persuade US companies not to pursue opportunities in Iran. Various media reports suggested that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were gunning for the removal of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani as emir of Qatar.

A proposed agenda for a meeting this week between senior UAE officials and Foundation executives included discussion of possible US and UAE “policies to positively impact Iranian internal situation”. Among the list of policies were “political, economic, military, intelligence, and cyber tools,” and efforts “contain and defeat Iranian aggression.” The agenda also included countering Qatari support for Islamist and militant groups; its “destabilizing role in Egypt, Syria, Libya, the Gulf;” and “Al Jazeera as an instrument of regional instability.”

The Foundation, which has played a leading role in arguing against the 2015 agreement that ended the Iranian nuclear crisis and lifted crippling international sanctions against the Islamic republic, enjoys funding from wealthy US conservatives, including gambling mogul Sheldon Adelson, who supported Mr. Trump’s election campaign and is a close associate of Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.

The Saudis backed by the US are likely to be fishing in murky ponds in Iran. Baloch groups are largely delineated along either nationalist or Sunni Muslim ultra-conservative lines with Pakistani intelligence backing religious groups against the nationalists.

However, communities like the Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan, Iran’s oil-rich province that Arabs call Ahwaz after the region’s main city, are deeply divided and factitious and often a cesspool of personal, political and ideological rivalries. Various of the Ahwazi and Baloch groups maintain links with one another. Yet, sorting out who is who is often an almost impossible task.

In an assertion of ethnic identity, thousands of Iranian Arabs attended in March 2017 an Asian soccer competition match between Esteghlal Ahvaz FC, the local team in the Khuzestan capital of Ahwaz, and Qatar’s Lekhwiya SC dressed in traditional Arab garb.

Ahwaz Monitor, an Iranian Arab website, said the fans were protesting government efforts to suppress their identity. It said the fans cheered their team in Arabic rather than Farsi and chanted “Arabic is my identity and honour” and “Al Ahwaz for Ahwazis and all Gulf state residents are dearest to us.” Fans also reportedly recited poetry celebrating their region’s Arab heritage.

The website created last summer by Iranian Arab activists is emblematic of the factitiousness of exile Iranian ethnic minority groups. Yasser Abadi, an Ahwazi activist, who founded the website, rejected allegations that it was Saudi-backed or had links to militant Saudi-backed groups like Jundullah in Balochistan or the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Al-Ahwaz (Harakat Al-Nizal L’Tahrir al-Ahwaz) that has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Khuzestan.

Al Nizal is believed to have close ties to Sunni Muslim ultra-conservatives in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The group’s spokesmen appear on Wesal TV, a Saudi-based, virulently anti-Shiite satellite broadcaster.

Mr. Abadi insisted that he had funded the site himself, paying GBP 350 for three years of Internet hosting. The site “doesn’t need Saudi or Arab League support or encouragement,” Mr. Abadi said.

Mr. Abadi described Saudi policy towards Khuzestan as “volatile’ and geared towards “militarizing the region.” Mr. Abadi said most Ahwazis rejected violence because of the death and destruction they see elsewhere in the Middle East. He said his group relied on “Arab influence,” which he defined as indirect “media support, Arab votes in UN sub-committees against Iranian practices...publications, and legal support.”

Iran watchers noted that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has allowed some voice of dissent to be heard. “The more that this happens, the less the Saudi-backed separatists win. What the separatists want is the polarisation of views and to incite the regime to attack the (Iranian Arab) community, thereby securing a popular backlash. In recent weeks, they have conducted more murders, mostly of security personnel but also of non-security officials. They want mass arrests and public executions in order to establish themselves as the vanguard of the Ahwazi resistance,” one expert said.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa as well as Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.

-- This feed and its contents are the property of The Huffington Post, and use is subject to our terms. It may be used for personal consumption, but may not be distributed on a website.

from DIYS http://ift.tt/2sDPaCF

[savetopnow]

2018-03-19 20 BUSINESS now

BUSINESS

Business Insider

10 things you need to know before the opening bell (SPY, SPX, QQQ, DIA, AAPL)

Facebook cofounder Chris Hughes explains what he learned from sinking $25 million into a business venture that ultimately failed

A British woman who fought ISIS in an all-female combat unit has been killed in Syria

THE BLOCKCHAIN IN BANKING REPORT: The future of blockchain solutions and technologies

How Trump's policies made Canada spend $131 million more on border patrols after its refugee system was inundated

Harvard Business Review

6 Ways to Counteract Your Smartphone Addiction

Socially Responsible Business Can Only Succeed If It Becomes a Movement

How to Prepare for a Crisis You Couldn’t Possibly Predict

Finding New Ideas When You Don’t Have a Broad Network

Why You Need an Untouchable Day Every Week

Inc

Your Headphones Have a Huge Flaw. Here's What 1 Company Is Doing About It

7 Ways Generation Z Can Best Use Social Media in the Workplace

This Is The Real Reason Startups Succeed--And No, It's Not Money

Working on a Product? Please Don't Underestimate Your Influence

Yale Research Confirms What You've Always Suspected: Nobody Is Normal

New York Times Business

Stanford History Event Was ‘Too White and Too Male,’ Organizer Admits

Advertising: Air France Reminds Travelers What Their Flight Could Be Like

FedEx Follows Amazon Into the Robotic Future

Xi Taps Harvard-Educated Adviser to Tighten Grip on China’s Economy

Kelp Farms and Mammoth Windmills Are Just Two of the Government’s Long-Shot Energy Bets

Reddit Business

TIL 82% of business fail because of poor understanding of cash flow and management... a redditor made this checklist to cover the basics

Alibaba to invest extra $2 billion in Lazada in aggressive Southeast Asian expansion

TIL there's a good calculator for small business owners (or future entrepreneurs) to calculate how much tax they'll end up paying

Making a good first impression Vs. Making a lasting Impression.

5 reasons Toys R Us failed to survive bankruptcy

Reddit Startup

I believe we've failed and I need your help

Paralysed by Research, Any suggestions? (Cross-Post from r/startup)

Is it a good idea to make SaaS free, and monetize later?

Here is how you find out if your business is sellable.

The Perfect Networking Equation: How to Get Noticed, Get Involved, and Get Your Foot in the Door

The Economist Business and Finance

Why China is swooping on Georgia’s airline industry

Online starlets are refashioning Chinese e-commerce

Which firms profit most from America’s health-care system

Unilever picks Rotterdam

Germany’s two biggest utilities strike a deal

Wall Street Journal Business

Grubhub Expands Pact With Yelp, Aiming for Cheaper Deliveries

Trade Associations to Petition Trump Administration to Halt China-Tariff Plans

Facebook Ignites Debate Over Third-Party Access to User Data

Wynn Attorney Claims Woman Advanced Extortionist Demands

Inside Nike, Women Staffers Circulated Survey About Workplace Behavior

Yahoo Finance

Lindsey Graham Warns Trump: Firing Mueller Would Be ‘Beginning Of The End’

Saudi Crown Prince Must Answer For Atrocities In Yemen

Facebook suspends Cambridge Analytica with ties to Trump campaign

Teen girl home, man in custody after both located in Mexico

Hamas Gaza tunnel destroyed in air raid, says Israeli military

[wakingthefury]

Hamas is calling for the assassination of President Trump

Listen to Today's Program JD: Hamas had placed up in front of the Dome of the Rock the poster a member of Hamas with a rifle pointed at President Trump, President of Egypt el-Sisi and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the call for assassination of these three men. What do you know about this report? WM: Well Jimmy that happened if I'm not mistaken last Friday. So the police are a lot less present at the time and they sort of don't keep a close watch. And that's when in the past and also on Friday demonstrations come out, masked people, chanting, raving and as you said they indicated a violent response to diplomatic suggestions for peace negotiations. If I can't go up on the Temple Mount and you as a Christian can't go up on the Temple Mount and read from our holy books. We're not saying that the present moment to build a Temple or a synagog or a church which was done in the past. But to benefit from the site from the sacredness that I'm sure you would agree with me you feel at that place. Why be denied? We're talking to God we're not talking to them. And so it's unfortunate that the posters and other violent demonstrations in the past are disturbing. JD: Winkie Medad explaining the militants of the terror organization Hamas placing a poster in front of the Dome of the Rock calling for the assassination of President Trump and other political leaders. We report this information because it is setting the stage for Bible prophecy to be fulfilled. Winkie's report is very shocking. The fact that the President of the United States is threatened by Hamas the Palestinian terror group in Israel is evidence of the hatred that the Palestinian people have for America and its leadership. They have this because the United States wants a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This report falls in line with the prophetic scenario that is found in the Bible. Malachi chapter 1 says that the Edomites, the Palestinian people of today they will come into Israel in the last days and set up their borders which the Lord said will be borders of wickedness. The Lord also said that He will have ending nation against these people forever. The threat by Hamas to assassinate President Trump is indeed evidence that we are at the time of Malachi and what he foretold; the ancient Jewish prophet was talking about today. via Jimmy DeYoung's News Update https://ift.tt/383dbr4

[newspatron]

Why Saudi Prince's comparing Hamas to Indian Freedom Struggle

Do you agree or disagree with the Saudi Prince’s comparision of Hamas to freedom struggle of India is wrong. Is Hamas worthy of comparision? Read this opinion piece and share your thoughts.

Lets call the statement Saudi Prince Hamas statement. Recently a statement was made by the Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former senior government official and intelligence chief of Saudi Arabia. He said that Hamas should learn from India’s example and adopt non-violent methods to achieve their goals. He compared the terrorists of Hamas with the freedom fighters of India, who fought against British…

[opedguy]

Trump Says U.S. Locked-and-Loaded with Iran

LOS ANGELES (OnlineColumnist.com), Sept. 15, 2019.--Responding to Iran’s threats of “all-out war” with the United States, 73-year-old President Donald Trump said the Pentagon was “locked-and-loaded,” after Iran’s Houthi rebels hit Saudi Arabia’s main petroleum refinery yesterday with a predator drone attack.  When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly attributed the attacks on Saudi’s Abaqiq refinery and its Khurais oil fields to Iran, Tehran responded that it’s ready for “all-out war.”  Iran has supplied Yemen’s Houthi rebels with predator drones and ballistic missiles to launch war against the Kingdom.  Over the past two years, Iran’s oil infrastructure and its international airport have been targets of the Iran-backed Houthi rebels missile strikes. When markets open tomorrow, Trump ordered the release of millions of barrels of crude oil from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve [SPR] to offset what promises to be a spike in global crude oil prices.

            When oil markets open tomorrow, oil prices could spike from $55 a barrel to $70, adding more downward pressure on a slowing global economy.  Although Saudi Arabia accounts for about 10% of the world oil supply, geopolitical events like the Houthi’s attack on Saudi Arabia’s key refinery and oil fields could throw global oil markets into chaos.  Trump’s bigger problem is building a global coalition against Iran’s malign activities in the Mideast and North Africa.  Up to this point, the European Union [EU], led by French President Emmanuel Macron, has done everything possible to placate Iran, especially in the wake of the Houthi attacks.  EU officials haven’t accepted yet that Iran is behind Houthi proxy war against the Kingdom.  Now that global oil markets—and indeed the world economy—have been destabilized by the attacks, the EU must take more seriously Iran’s role.

            Trump said the White House is in close consultation with Saudi Arabia to pinpoint who’s responsible for the predator drone attacks on the Abaqiq refinery and Khurais oil fields.  Saying the U.S. is “locked-and-loaded,” Trump said he’s waiting for Riyadh to provide the evidence of who’s responsible.  Pompeo clearly said Iran was responsible for the attacks, not the Houthi rebels in isolation.  When you consider that the Houthi’s are used by Iran as proxies, it’s Iran’s responsibility. “Unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply,” said Pompeo, laying the blame on Iran.  “There is reason to believe that we know the culprit, are locked and loaded depending on verification,” Trump said on Twitter. Trump’s language suggests that the U.S. would consider retaliatory strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure. Responding to that, Tehran threatened “all-out war” if the U.S. retaliates in-kind.

            Trump’s critics blame him for pulling out of the July 15, 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA], the nuke deal that exchanged billions of dollars for Iran’s agreement to suspend it uranium enrichment program.  Before Trump cancelled U.S. involvement in the JCPOA, Iran was already in a proxy war with Saudi Arabia, using Yemen’s Houthi rebels as their surrogates.  Iran also supplied arms and ballistic missiles to Hamas in Gaza and Hexbollah in Beirut to attack Israel, a close U.S. Mideast ally.  So, whatever talk there is about Trump pulling out of the JCPOA causing the current problems, it’s just plain false.  Iran’s malign activities in the Mideast and North Afrcia go back to the 1799 Islamic Revolution, where they’ve tried to spread anarchy across a broad cross sections of the Middle East. Goldman Sachs estimates that the late drone attack on Saudi’s oil infrastructure could spike oil $15 a barrel.

            Saudi Arabia churns out about 10 million barrels of light crude petroleum a day.  Yesterday’s attacks could cut production by 50% for an extended period of time, potentially doing more damage to global crude oil supplies.  “Unquestionably, oil prices will be up significantly when the market opens on Monday,” said Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Washington D.C.-based non-profit Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.  Trump’s strong  words about ‘locked-and-loaded,” follow Iran’s June 20 shoot-down of a U.S. Global Hawk surveillance drone.  Trump was ready to retaliate then but held off because of possible collateral damage. Yesterday’s attack on Saudi’s oil infrastructure is far more egregious, considering the fallout on world oil markets but, more importantly, the global economy.  If Trump determines that Iran is primarily responsible for the drone attack, he’ll have no choice but to respond.

            Trump’s got some big decisions to make after watching Saudi’s oil infrastructure set ablaze by Iran’s Houthi rebels.  Without Iran supplying the predator drones and ballistic missiles, Houths could do very little to dent Saudi Arabia’s defenses. Calling Pompeo’s accusations “meaningless,” “not comprehensible” and “pointless,” Iran’s 59-year-old U.S.-educated Foreign Minister Mohammad  Javad Zarif, showed that Iran has pulled out all the stops to deny responsibility. “The Fake News is saying that I am willing to meet with Iran, ‘No Conditions.’  That is an incorrect statement [as usual],” Trump tweeted. Trump told Iran after they downed a U.S. drone that he will respond at a time of his choosing.  If Saudi Defense Minister Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman says its Iran, Trump will be forced to respond, not with more talk or sanctions but decisive military action.

About the Author

John M. Curtis writes politically neutral commentary analyzing spin in national and global news. He’s editor of OnlineColumnsit.com and author of Dodging The Bullet and Operation Charisma.

O�.

[livenews24pk]

Bin Salman 'tried to persuade Netanyahu to go to war in Gaza' say sources

Bin Salman ‘tried to persuade Netanyahu to go to war in Gaza’ say sources

War was among scenarios suggested by damage-limitation task force established to advise Saudi

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed receptacle Salman endeavored to influence Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to begin a contention with Hamas in Gaza as a major aspect of an arrangement to redirect consideration from the slaughtering of columnist Jamal Khashoggi, sources inside Saudi Arabia have…

[renka-aardvarknews-blog]

The complex situation in the Middle-East

Courtesy TAMER FAKAHANY The modern Middle East has been plagued by ruinous wars: country versus country, civil wars with internecine and sectarian bloodletting, and numerous eruptions centered on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But never in the last 70 years have they seemed as interconnected as now with Iran and Saudi Arabia vying for regional control, while Israel also seeks to maintain a military supremacy of its own. Russia, the United States and Turkey make up the other powerbrokers in a region where not only wars but proxy battlefields within those wars are on a feverish and hostile footing. The ongoing wars in Syria, Yemen, this week's mass killing of Palestinians by Israel in Gaza, Turkish-Kurdish hostilities, and the potential for an all-encompassing war sparked by an Iranian-Israeli conflagration in Syria or Lebanon, all have tentacles that reach across borders and back again. Suggestion in recent years of a Sunni/Shiite schism across the Middle East and Persian Gulf appears much less a factor than the jockeying of the key actors with the most military, financial and diplomatic muscle who are trying to shape the region in their image, or at least to the satisfaction of their national security and various leaders' hubris. Here's a look at each of the main power players, whom they are aligned with, and what their ultimate goals are. ISRAEL WHAT'S AT STAKE: Direct conflict with Iran has been simmering and briefly looked like it might burst into full-blown conflagration after Israel launched a blistering bombardment of Iranian positions in Syria, killing Iranian fighters after an alleged Iranian rocket barrage toward its positions on the annexed Golan Heights. The exchange followed several earlier suspected Israeli strikes on Iranian positions in Syria. Israel sees Iran as its mortal enemy and 'existential' threat. Conflict with Iran would likely drag in Tehran's ally, Hezbollah. An Israeli-Hezbollah conflict could play out in southern Lebanon and northern Israel, with each side warning it will strike across the opponent's country. Israel is bolstered by unprecedented support from U.S. President Donald Trump. Israel is determined to suffocate the Iran nuclear deal; Trump withdrew from the accord and days later sent his daughter and son-in-law to preside over the U.S. Embassy move to disputed Jerusalem, a move that angered the Arab and Muslim worlds. Bloodshed at the Gaza border may have revived global opprobrium against Israel for use of disproportionate live fire against unarmed protesters, killing dozens; but Trump's backing gives it reason to feel emboldened. Behind the scenes, Israel is building relations with Gulf nations also opposed to Iran. WHAT IT WANTS: A much weakened Iran, the continuation of the Gaza blockade — which is also imposed by Egypt — with a ferociously controlled border, and no concessions to the Palestinians with regards to land for peace. IRAN WHAT'S AT STAKE: The rapprochement with America under President Barack Obama is now ashes. Sanctions relief, running to hundreds of billions of dollars, is at risk, as Washington targets Tehran again, though a nuclear deal may be salvaged with EU nations, Russia and China. Iran has built up alliances to counter Israel and Saudi Arabia. In Syria, the presence of its troops and allied Shiite militias has been critical to President Bashar Assad's survival. In Yemen, it is allied to Shiite Houthi rebels battling Saudi-backed forces. Tehran strongly supports the Palestinian cause, though its ties with Hamas have weakened. WHAT IT WANTS: Iran has pretty much accomplished a goal its officials have often trumpeted, building a corridor of power from Iran across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. In all those countries, it funds and arms powerful Shiite militias and has enormous political influence. It seeks a continuation of the nuclear deal with the other global signatories, hoping to bolster its financial coffers. There has already been discontent in Iran that sanctions relief was not flowing to the people. RUSSIA WHAT'S AT STAKE: President Vladimir Putin has ruthlessly filled the U.S. vacuum in Syria. Moscow's support of Assad turned the tide of war in his favor when defeat seemed imminent several years ago. Russia is also allied to Iran. But it also hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for its Victory Day celebrations hours before Israel's attack on Iranian positions in Syria, raising speculation the two were quietly coordinating so that Israel kept well away from Moscow's forces and planes in Syria. WHAT IT WANTS: Russia's regional goal in is to sustain and build on the major foothold it now has in the Middle East, beyond Syria, notably where the U.S. might have been once before. U.S. WHAT'S AT STAKE: "Traditionally we've tried to play a role of fireman in the Middle East. Now we're playing the role of arsonist," says Ilan Goldenberg, a former State Department and Pentagon official who runs the Mideast program at the Center for a New American Security. That seems to have plenty of currency in the region now. The Palestinians have essentially cut off contacts and say the U.S. cannot be an honest broker. So Trump's promised "deal of the century" doesn't seem to be in the cards for now. Trump withdrew from the Iran deal. He has by his side hawks like National Security Adviser John Bolton, who has advocated for attacking Iran and regime change. Trump can't decide on Syria — to keep the U.S. presence or not? He doesn't seem intent on ruffling Putin over Syria unless chemical weapons rear their head again, which prompted U.S.-led airstrikes last month. The administration is very closely allied to Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and seems set to continue following Riyadh's lead on Yemen. Washington may get an unpleasant surprise if a heavily pro-Iran government emerges in Iraq after last week's elections. WHAT IT WANTS: The administration is in complete synch with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Saber-rattling with Iran could escalate, and it shows no urgency in pushing for Israel-Palestinian negotiations. SAUDI ARABIA WHAT'S AT STAKE: Also emboldened by Trump, the Saudi crown prince is determined to make his mark. Riyadh is spending billions of dollars in the Yemen war, leading a Gulf Arab coalition against Iranian-allied Shiite Houthi rebels. Thousands of civilians have been killed by Saudi airstrikes and starvation in the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Prince Mohammed has made vague threats that the kingdom will build a nuclear bomb if Iran starts its program again. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as the single greatest threat to the region and its competition for the dominant role it wants for itself. The kingdom is closely tied to Trump, who chose it as the destination for his first overseas trip as president, and it has been back-channeling with Israel. At the same time, it has lost influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon after placing bets on losing partners or failed gambits. WHAT IT WANTS: Emasculation regionally of Iran and to be the dominant power in the region. TURKEY WHAT'S AT STAKE: For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it's almost exclusively about the Kurds, who in an alliance with the U.S. helped defeat the Islamic State group in Syria and in the process captured a quarter of the country. This has infuriated Turkey to the point it launched a military campaign seizing a pocket of northern Syria, and it threatens to attack Kurds all the way to the Iraqi border. The presence of U.S. forces among the Kurds is perhaps the only thing that's held Turkey back this long. Ankara views Kurdish fighters in Syria as an extension of the Turkish Kurdish PKK, which it considers a terrorist group. Turkey also gives vocal support to the Palestinians, while relations are at a nadir with Israel. Turkey has also offered to take in wounded Palestinians from Gaza for treatment. WHAT IT WANTS: To break Kurdish strength and, above all, prevent a Kurdish autonomous mini-state in Syria along its border. It also wants some say in post-war Syria where it has supported opposition fighters and Islamist groups opposed to Assad. Tamer Fakahany is AP Global News manager and has directed international coverage for AP for 15 years. Read the full article

[investmart007]

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates | Gulf Arab states rebuke Israel, but alliances inch closer

New Post has been published on https://is.gd/oKcfRF

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates | Gulf Arab states rebuke Israel, but alliances inch closer

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates— Arab states resoundingly condemned the killing of more than 50 Palestinians in this week’s Gaza protests, just as they have after previous Israeli violence going back decades — but behind the scenes fears over Iran have divided Arab leaders, with some willing to quietly reach out to Israel.

Saudi Arabia, which has used its control of holy sites in Mecca and Medina to brand itself the protector of Islam around the world, offered a brief statement of condemnation and reaffirmed its support for “the Palestinian brotherly people” and their “legitimate rights.”

Over the past year its powerful Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has cultivated close ties with President Donald Trump’s administration. Palestinian officials say Saudi intermediaries have conveyed details of U.S. peace proposals that strongly favor Israel. The administration is said to have been working on a plan for more than a year, but has released no details.

In March, just as the weekly Gaza protests were getting underway, the crown prince met with pro-Israel Jewish American leaders, where he was quoted by Axios, an online newsletter focused on Washington politics, as saying the Palestinians should accept the proposals or “shut up and stop complaining.” The prince later appeared to acknowledge Jewish claims to Israel, telling The Atlantic that Israelis “have the right to have their own land.”

He also suggested that if there is peace, relations between Gulf Arab states and Israel would be of mutual interest.

At a ceremony Monday to mark the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to contested Jerusalem — one of the targets of the Gaza protests — Trump’s son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner said alliances are already shifting in favor of Israel.

“From Israel to Jordan to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and beyond, many leaders are fighting to modernize their countries and create better lives for their people,” Kushner said. “In confronting common threats and in pursuit of common interests, previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances are emerging.”

He spoke as Israeli forces shot and killed at least 59 Palestinians and wounded more than 2,700 during mass protests along the Gaza border.

Kushner has developed a particularly close relationship with the Saudi crown prince, who has used the relationship to build pressure against Iran. The kingdom was one of the few countries to welcome Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal last week.

It isn’t just Saudi Arabia that has inched closer to Israel. Bahrain’s foreign minister, Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, tweeted support for Israel after an attack on Iranian targets in Syria last week. The tiny Gulf country, where the Sunni monarchy put down an uprising supported by its Shiite majority in 2011, has long viewed Iran as a threat.

Despite signs of outreach with Israel and a shared enmity for Iran, Bahrain condemned the targeting of Palestinian civilians on Monday, and reaffirmed support for an independent Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital. The United Arab Emirates also condemned Israel’s “current escalation in the Gaza Strip.”

State-aligned media took a tougher line. A front-page editorial Tuesday in Dubai’s Gulf News ran with the headline: “Mr. President, you killed any glimmer of hope for peace.” The front page of Abu Dhabi’s The National described the U.S. Embassy move as “a new catastrophe.”

Tough rhetoric aside, Israeli businessmen are known to work in the UAE, often traveling in on American or European passports. The UAE hosts an Israeli representative to the Abu Dhabi-based International Renewable Energy Agency, while Israeli judo stars spar in annual competitions in the Emirati capital. Bicyclists sponsored by the UAE and Bahrain recently took part in the Giro d ‘Italia race leg held in Israel.

Among Arab Gulf states, Qatar’s statement was the most fiercely-worded. It described the violence as a “brutal massacre and systematic killing committed by the Israeli occupation forces against unarmed Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, including children and women, during their peaceful and legitimate protest.”

Qatar’s leaders have spent millions of dollars on rebuilding the Gaza Strip and, in coordination with Israel, supplying humanitarian aid there. Qatar has also hosted Hamas leaders over the years.

But even as it has provided aid to the Palestinians, Qatar has welcomed prominent pro-Israel figures from the U.S. over the past year for conversations with the ruling emir. Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz was among those invited, later writing that his visit to Qatar was paid for by the emir and commending Qatar for welcoming Israeli athletes to tournaments there.

Qatar’s outreach appears to be driven by an effort to maneuver politically in the face of a nearly year-long blockade by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. The standoff was ignited in part by Qatar’s support of Islamist groups, such as Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip and has fought three wars against Israel. The other Arab states are also angered by Qatar’s warm relations with Iran.

Egypt, which once led the Arab struggle against Israel and fought several wars against it, became the first Arab nation to make peace in 1978. But the peace was always cold, with ordinary Egyptians enforcing a cultural boycott of Israel and regularly holding mass rallies in support of the Palestinians.

In recent years, however, Egypt has found common cause with Israel in containing Hamas and combatting Islamic extremists in the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt helps maintain the Israeli blockade of Gaza by only rarely opening its Rafah border crossing. Meanwhile, the Islamist and leftist activists who once organized demonstrations are nearly all in jail or exile, amid a sweeping crackdown on dissent.

In a sign of improved ties with Israel, the Israeli Embassy in Cairo celebrated the 70th anniversary of the country’s founding earlier this month at the Nile Ritz Carlton. Only seven years earlier, protesters in Cairo had ransacked the Israeli embassy, climbing up the high-rise tower overlooking the Nile and tearing down the Israeli flag.

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By AYA BATRAWY and JON GAMBRELL, By Associated Press – published on STL.News by St. Louis Media, LLC (Z.S)

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[friend-clarity]

Let Abbas’s Vile Words Be His Last as Palestinian Leader

Abbas subsequently apologized but his words are meaningless. Deeds speak louder than words. 

Let Abbas’s Vile Words Be His Last as Palestinian Leader, May 2, 2018

By The Editorial Board, NY Times.

The editorial board represents the opinions of the board, its editor and the publisher. It is separate from the newsroom and the Op-Ed section.

Feeding reprehensible anti-Semitic myths and conspiracy theories in a speech on Monday, the Palestinian Authority president, Mahmoud Abbas, shed all credibility as a trustworthy partner if the Palestinians and Israelis ever again have the nerve to try negotiations.

Speaking to the Palestinian legislative body, Mr. Abbas, 82, said the mass murder of European Jews in the Holocaust was the result of the victims’ financial activities, not their religious identity and anti-Semitism.

“So the Jewish question that was widespread throughout Europe was not against their religion, but against their social function, which relates to usury (unscrupulous money lending) and banking and such,” he said, according to the BBC.

Mr. Abbas’s anti-Semitic tendencies are not new. In the 1980s, he wrote a dissertation that seemed to question the widely accepted Holocaust death toll of six million Jews.

While seen as a successor to the longtime Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, in 2003 he played down that notion, saying, “The Holocaust was a terrible, unforgivable crime against the Jewish nation, a crime against humanity that cannot be accepted by humankind.”

Things looked more hopeful in 1993 when, in glorious sunshine on the White House lawn, Mr. Abbas, then the foreign policy aide for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, signed the Oslo Accords, which were supposed to eventually lead to two states and peace.

In the intervening years, there have been ups and downs in that quest, but the trend for some time has been depressingly downward. The dream of an independent Palestine faded further away and Mr. Abbas came under increasing pressure.

Since the last serious peace talks collapsed in 2014, Israel’s hard-line government has expanded settlement building to cover more of the land envisioned for a Palestinian state. Although President Trump promised a peace plan, none has materialized, but reports suggest it would favor Israel.

Arab nations, once the Palestinians’ patrons, have lost interest and have turned their attention to fighting wars in Yemen and Syria and checking Iran’s regional influence. During a recent meeting with Jewish-American leaders, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia faulted Palestinian leaders for complaining and rejecting past Israeli peace offers.

Mr. Abbas opposed Mr. Arafat during the 2000-2005 second intifada, recognized Israel, and committed himself to a nonviolent approach to negotiations for peace and a two-state solution. He was valued by the West as Mr. Arafat’s successor, and for years he has deployed Palestinian forces to help Israelis maintain security in the West Bank.

But pressures, some of his own making and many others caused by Israel, which has ultimate control over the West Bank, are building. Mr. Abbas, who oversees a governing system plagued by corruption and dysfunction, has lost support among the Palestinian people.

He has weakened government institutions that are essential for a future state and refused to call new elections, thus overstaying his term by many years and preventing younger leaders from emerging.

He has also failed to unify the Palestinians in the West Bank, where his Fatah faction dominates, with those in the even more desperate circumstances of the Gaza Strip, where Hamas holds sway.

Even in this gloomy climate, however, Mr. Abbas’s vile speech was a new low. No doubt he feels embittered and besieged on all sides. But by succumbing to such dark, corrosive instincts he showed that it is time for him to leave office.

Palestinians need a leader with energy, integrity and vision, one who might have a better chance of achieving Palestinian independence and enabling both peoples to live in peace.

Correction: May 3, 2018

An earlier version of this editorial misidentified the signers of the Oslo Accords in 1993. They were Mahmoud Abbas, who was the foreign policy aide for the Palestine Liberation Organization at the time, and Shimon Peres, who was then the foreign minister of Israel. The Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel attended the ceremony but did not sign the pact.

[newstfionline]

Tapes Reveal Egyptian Leaders’ Tacit Acceptance of Jerusalem Move

By David D. Kirkpatrick, NY Times, Jan. 6, 2018

As President Trump moved last month to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, an Egyptian intelligence officer quietly placed phone calls to the hosts of several influential talk shows in Egypt.

“Like all our Arab brothers,” Egypt would denounce the decision in public, the officer, Capt. Ashraf al-Kholi, told the hosts.

But strife with Israel was not in Egypt’s national interest, Captain Kholi said. He told the hosts that instead of condemning the decision, they should persuade their viewers to accept it. Palestinians, he suggested, should content themselves with the dreary West Bank town that currently houses the Palestinian Authority, Ramallah.

“How is Jerusalem different from Ramallah, really?” Captain Kholi asked repeatedly in four audio recordings of his telephone calls obtained by The New York Times.

“Exactly that,” agreed one host, Azmi Megahed, who confirmed the authenticity of the recording.

For decades, powerful Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have publicly criticized Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, while privately acquiescing to Israel’s continued occupation of territory the Palestinians claim as their homeland.

But now a de facto alliance against shared foes such as Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic State militants and the Arab Spring uprisings is drawing the Arab leaders into an ever-closer collaboration with their one-time nemesis, Israel--producing especially stark juxtapositions between their posturing in public and private.

Mr. Trump’s decision broke with a central premise of 50 years of American-sponsored peace talks, defied decades of Arab demands that East Jerusalem be the capital of a Palestinian state, and stoked fears of a violent backlash across the Middle East.

Arab governments, mindful of the popular sympathy for the Palestinian cause, rushed to publicly condemn it.

Egyptian state media reported that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had personally protested to Mr. Trump. Egyptian religious leaders close to the government refused to meet with Vice President Mike Pence, and Egypt submitted a United Nations Security Council resolution demanding a reversal of Mr. Trump’s decision. (The United States vetoed the resolution, although the General Assembly adopted a similar one, over American objections, days later.)

King Salman of Saudi Arabia, arguably the most influential Arab state, also publicly denounced Mr. Trump’s decision.

At the same time, though, the kingdom had already quietly signaled its acquiescence or even tacit approval of the Israeli claim to Jerusalem. Days before Mr. Trump’s announcement, the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, privately urged the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, to accept a radically curtailed vision of statehood without a capital in East Jerusalem, according to Palestinian, Arab and European officials who have heard Mr. Abbas’s version of events.

Saudi Arabia publicly disputed those reports.

The hosts Captain Kholi called all heeded his advice, and most other voices in the state-owned and pro-government news media across the Arab world were also strikingly muted, even unemotional, about the status of Jerusalem. Such a response would have been all but unthinkable even a decade ago, much less during the period between 1948 and 1973, when Egypt and its Arab allies fought three wars against Israel.

Shibley Telhami, a scholar of the region at the University of Maryland and the Brookings Institution, called the Arab states’ acceptance of the decision “transformational.”

“I don’t think it would have happened a decade ago, because Arab leaders would have made clear they wouldn’t live with it,” he said. Instead, he said, preoccupied by concerns about their own stability, the Arab leaders signaled that--while they may not like the decision--they “will find a way to work with it,” and “with a White House that is prepared to break with what had been taboos in American foreign policy.”

Two spokesmen for the Egyptian government did not respond to requests for comment for this article. Captain Kholi could not be reached.

Television talk shows play a formative role in shaping public debate in Egypt, and Egyptian intelligence services often brief the presenters of the programs about messages to convey to the public. The hosts typically prefer to characterize the conversations as journalists talking to sources.

In addition to the call with Mr. Megahed, three other audio recordings of strikingly similar telephone conversations with the same intelligence agent, Captain Kholi, were all provided to The Times by an intermediary supportive of the Palestinian cause and opposed to President Sisi. The origin of the recordings could not be determined.

The recordings all appear to match public recordings of their voices, and Captain Kholi’s talking points in each of the calls follow the same lines as his conversation with Mr. Megahed.

“I was just calling to tell you what our public stance is, so if you go on TV or speak in an interview, I am telling you what is the stance of Egypt’s national security apparatus and what it stands to benefit from in this matter of announcing Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel, O.K.?” Captain Kholi began one conversation, with Mr. Hassaseen.

“Give me orders, sir,” Mr. Hassaseen replied, according to the recording. “I am at your command.”

“We, like all our Arab brothers, are denouncing this matter,” Captain Kholi continued. But, he added, “After that, this thing will become a reality. Palestinians can’t resist and we don’t want to go to war. We have enough on our plate as you know.”

The Egyptian military has struggled for more than four years to try to defeat a simmering militant Islamist insurgence centered in the North Sinai, and Egyptian officials have sometimes accused Hamas, the militant Palestinian group that controls the adjacent Gaza Strip, of abetting violence against the government of Egypt.

“The point that is dangerous for us is the intifada issue,” Captain Kholi explained. “An intifada would not serve Egypt’s national security interests because an intifada would revive the Islamists and Hamas. Hamas would be reborn once more.”

“At the end of the day, later on, Jerusalem won’t be much different from Ramallah. What matters is ending the suffering of the Palestinian people,” Captain Kholi concluded. “Concessions are a must and if we reach a concession whereby Jerusalem will be--Ramallah will be the capital of Palestine, to end the war and so no one else dies, then we would go for it.”

All three recipients of his calls pledged to convey his messages, and some echoed his arguments in broadcasts. “Enough already. It got old,” Mr. Megahed told his viewers about the issue of Jerusalem.

In his conversation with Mr. Megahed, however, Captain Kholi added an extra flourish. He charged that Egypt’s regional foe Qatar and its ruler, Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, were the ones guilty of collaborating with Israel.

“You also will say that Tamim and Qatar have secret ties to Israel. You know all that,” Captain Kholi told the talk show host.

“Obvious ties,” Mr. Megahed replied. “My pleasure. My pleasure. I will include it in the next episode, God willing.”

[conspiracy-talk-blog]

New Post has been published on Conspiracy Talk News

New Post has been published on https://goo.gl/TL1gep

Middle East reacts to Trump's decision on Jerusalem

JERUSALEM (Conspiracy Talk News) – The Palestinians closed schools and shops and called for protests in the West Bank on Thursday as the leader of the armed Hamas group called for a new uprising, in a widespread demonstration of discontent over the recognition of the US President Donald Trump to the disputed city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Wednesday’s decision broke with decades of US strategy within Jerusalem and collides with years of international pledges to the Palestinians or promises for a negotiated solution to the fate of this city. The Palestinians claim Eastern Jerusalem, annexed by Israel in 1967, as their future capital.

There were no signs of serious violence at the moment. But on Friday, the Muslim holy day, it could be an important test when the Palestinians gather for mass prayers.

In the Gaza Strip, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh called for a new uprising against Israel.

“The US decision is an aggression against our people and a war on our sanctuaries,” he said in a speech urging his followers to “be prepared for any order.”

“We want the uprising to last and continue, as for President Trump and the occupation, they will regret this decision,” Haniyeh said.

Hamas, a group that aspires to the destruction of Israel, killed hundreds of Israelis during an armed uprising in the early 2000, but its ability to attack is more limited now days. Israel has imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip, the stronghold of the group, and many of Hamas supporters in the West Bank have been arrested.

Even so, Hamas has a large arsenal of rockets in Gaza capable of reaching many places inside Israel.

During the night there were spontaneous protests in Gaza in which protesters burned tires, American and Israeli flags and posters with the image of President Donald Trump.

The Israeli army said it would deploy additional troops in the West Bank by Friday and had put other contingents on alert to respond to “possible events.”

The different claims about Jerusalem, and especially about its historic neighborhood, where there are sacred places for Jews, Muslims and Christians, are a key piece of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Although Trump’s decision had no impact on the daily life of the city, it carries a deep symbolism and was interpreted as Donald Trump taking the side of Israel.

Israel, which claims all of Jerusalem as its capital, has celebrated President Trump’s decision. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Trump has “forever linked” to the history of the city and said other countries are looking to follow his example.

The indignation against the United States has traveled all around the Arab world.

Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and his influential son, condemned the decision of the Trump government in an unusual criticism of his American alley.

Saudi Arabia, a regional power that could help the White House reach an agreement in the Middle East, said on Thursday that the kingdom had already warned against that measure and that “it continues to express it’s deep sadness at the decision of the American Government of the United States”, which he described as” unjustified and irresponsible “.

Trump’s decision leaves the Sunni nation in a difficult position. The kingdom, and especially its powerful crown prince, Mohammad Bin Salman, who enjoys close relations with D. Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who leads Washington’s efforts to revive the Middle East peace talks.

US embassies in much of the Middle East and parts of Africa warned American citizens of possible protests.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas suggested that the United States had disqualified itself as a mediator between Israelis and Palestinians, a role it has exclusively exercised during more than two decades of intermittent negotiations on the formation of the Palestinian state with Israel.

The dialogue, stalled in recent years, has not brought the Palestinians closer to getting the state they want to form in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, lands captured by Israel in the 1967 Middle East war. Meanwhile, Israel He has steadily expanded Jewish settlements in areas occupied after the war, despite his statements that he wanted to negotiate an agreement.

Trump’s claim on Wednesday that he is still seeking what he described as the “ultimate” agreement for the Middle East was met with growing skepticism.

“With this decision, the United States has isolated itself and Israel, and has pushed the area into a dangerous situation and halted the peace process,” said Nabil Abu Rdeneh, a senior adviser to Abbas. “Without a doubt, the decision will not help at all to solve the problems in the area, but it reinforces the extremists.”

Abás has not indicated what measures he will take. He planned to meet Thursday with his closest Arab ally, King Abdullah II of Jordan, to coordinate positions.

Jordan plays a key role in the growing controversy and, like other US allies within the region, has criticized President Trump’s decision on Jerusalem.