#reverse cotards syndrome

[vocalux]

— sorry if its bad or confusing , its my first time creating something like this !

— reverse cotards syndrome / rcs

rcs is a syndrome in which a dead person has the delusional belief that they are ( still ) alive !

symptoms ; ;

1 - experience of emotions : this describes the unusual experience of individuals who even after death feel emotions .

the emotions may be felt differently , strangely , confusingly , or in extreme ways . people with rcs may not know how to describe or understand what they are feeling , and may not know how to express it .

2 - physical sensations : this symptom describes the false sensation of physical things , such as feeling the wind passing by you , feeling cold , being touched , etc .

usually the false sensation comes along with : feeling blood passing through your body , heart beating , organs working etc .

3 - hunger : people with rcs often feel hunger , whether it is false or " real " , but when they try to eat , they throw up the food .

4 - constant memories : rcs usually comes with constant memories of life when alive , which can be just in the mind , feeling and / or seeing physical things , like people who are not there , old smells , etc .

5 - denial of death : individuals with this syndrome strongly deny that they have died , pretend and / or believe that their memories of death , burial or others are false and created by their own mind .

6 - automated movements / routine : rcs makes the person , even without realizing it , follow the same routine they had when they were alive .

7 - repetitive search for things that make you feel more alive : wearing a certain type of clothing , some makeup or product , way of acting , some object that makes you seem more alive to the point of interfering with your daily life and / or coexistence with other people .

[r477m4n-wh34713y]

[cmykaleidoscope]

Hi, I'm an introject in an osdd system of Will Wood's corpse. AMA.

[cadaverskey]

gazavetters verified campaigns:

vetted gaza evacuation fundraiser list by el-shab-hussein and nabulsi:

gaza support verified campaign list:

bees and watermelons verified campaign list:

i get many asks regarding palestinian campaigns and i check whether each one is vetted, or lacking that, whether it passes a reverse image search. my "#free palestine" tag is primarily campaigns i've checked and shared so i encourage everyone who can to look through and donate (not tagging this post for ease of access because i don't want to clog the tag).

-

i go by cadaver on here. i'm a 22 year old artist and aspiring video game developer based in the united states. i use he/she/it/they and am both a man and a woman. i'm also very loud about my schizoaffective disorder and cotard's syndrome, all of which heavily inspire a lot of my art.

spiritual/witchcraft blog: @spirituallypsychotic

about my main project mallory, OPEN THE DOOR

tags for ease of access below

[hauntedselves]

Introduction to: Delusional Misidentification Syndrome

What is Delusional Misidentification Syndrome?

Delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS) is an umbrella term for a collection of delusions that involve misidentifying a person, object, place, body part, or the delusional person themselves.

DMSs are associated with neurological trauma, dissociation, and schizophrenic disorders.

Types of DMSs

DMSs typically involve misidentifying one of three things: the self, the other, and/or the place.

The self: These delusions involve the misidentification of the person themselves, or a part of their body.

The other: These delusions involve the misidentification of other people, pets, or objects.

The place: These delusions involve the misidentification of places or locations.

The Self

Mirrored self misidentification is the delusion that the person's reflection is someone else.

Syndrome of subjective doubles is the delusion that the person has a double (doppelgänger / clone) of themselves acting independently.

Cotard('s) delusion / syndrome is the delusion that the person, or parts of their body or organs, are dead, dying, or don't exist. Most people with this delusion have severe depression.

Clinical lycanthropy is the delusion that the person has turned, or is turning, into an animal. It can be considered a type of reverse intermetamorphosis.

The Place

Reduplicative paramnesia is the belief that a place or location (or, rarely, an object, person, or part of the body) as having been copied, existing in two places at the same time, or moved to a different location. Most case studies involve people reporting the hospital they are in is in their home town, when it isn't. "Paramnesia" is commonly called déjà vu.

The Other

Capgras delusion is the delusion that someone close to the person, such as a friend, family member, or a pet, has been replaced with an identical imposter.

Fregoli delusion is the delusion that other people are actually the same person in disguise. Capgras and Fregoli delusions often co-exist.

Intermetamorphosis is the delusion that other people can change their appearance and personality at will, pretending to be the person they are basing themselves off.

Delusional companion syndrome (DCS) is the delusion that objects (often stuffed toys) are sentient, and have their own sense of self, wants and needs.

What can be done for a person with DMS?

Option 1: Nothing. Psychotic people can live happy lives without any intervention!

Option 2: Therapy. This can include either accepting the delusion / going along with it, or trying to change it. It can be used in combination with pharmacotherapy (medication).

Option 3: Pharmacotherapy. Antipsychotics and other medication can help reduce symptoms. It can be used in combination with talk therapy.

No matter what choice the person makes (and it should be up to the person), the desired outcome is reducing suffering (which might not mean trying to stop or slow the psychosis) and increasing their quality of life.

[kunthug]

“A person may be in solitary confinement,” Donald Winnicott writes in “The Capacity to Be Alone,” published sometime after he invented the good-enough mother, “and yet not be able to be alone. How greatly he must suffer is beyond imagination.” Winnicott goes on to parse the sentence I am alone into a progression of existential maturation: from I (acknowledgment of existence in space) to I am (acknowledgment of being alive) to I am alone (an expression, paradoxically, of the certainty of eventual company—the knowledge that solitude isn’t a permanent state).

*

In the syndrome known as Cotard delusion, the patient believes that her body, in whole or in part, has disappeared: phantom limb in reverse. She might believe she is physically dead and claim to be able to smell her own putrefying flesh. In Winnicott’s formulation, I think this would translate to a truncated sentence: am alone. Before the capacity to be alone must first come the capacity to I.

—the capacity to be alone, anna moschovakis. via

[psychanalyse-et-psychopatho-blog]

Report on the Copenhagen Meeting'Towards the NLS Congress'

December the 13th 2014

Moments of crisis: The problem of negative therapeutic reaction, F Sauvagnat , NLS Conference, Copenhagen, December the 13th 2014

Introducing his talk, F Sauvagnat presented the notion of negative therapeutic reaction as paradigmatic of the double meaning of the word crisis: aggravation of the symptomatology without a break in the continuity of treatment (as opposed to situations in which patients “disappear”or discontinue the in various ways ) and secondly, in a “negative way”, they put forward a critical, decisive point, both unseen and urgent… Freud claims several times that difficult cures, in spite of their unpleasant sides, have the advantage of putting forward what quick therapeutic effects tend to leave in the dark. Discussing negative therapeutic reactions does not only mean speaking about our responsibility before the possible aggravations of an analysand, it also implies debating the various reorientations and modifications of the strategy and tactics of the cure that have been proposed, especially after the years 1920,. The notion has been defined by S Freud in the wake of his elaborations on the dependencies of the Ego and the death-drives (Das Ich und das Es, 1923)[1]. He first differentiates it from the “defiance” (Trotz) specific of the negative transference, such as it had been defined by K. Abraham[2], and describes it as a strange tipping point in which patients, “when they are given hope, or when you show them that you are satisfied of the state of the treatment (Stand der Behandlung), appear dissatisfied, and worsen their condition(…) they react to the progress of the cure in a contrary manner”. He assigns this reaction to “unconscious guilt”; he discusses the occurrence of it in melancholia and obsessional neurosis, and in the course of the discussion also adds hysteria. The first solutions he outlines -- differentiating neurotic and psychotic cases; differentiating guilt by identification (“usually brilliantly resolved”) from a more deeply ingrained feeling of culpability -- opened the debate and invited his disciples to formulate a variety of attempted solutions, which F Sauvagnat has described in an article published by the Clinical Section of Rennes.[3] On the first side, S Ferenczi and those he has more or less directly influenced, who proffered that the main recourse against negative therapeutic reaction should be focusing on the countertransference. Ferenczi has described in his paper“The unwelcome child and his death instinct”[4] , cases in which an obvious parental rejection provokes psychosomatic disorders, actings out and a suicidal tendency – that was the Ferenczian version of the death-drives, which, allegedly, had to be counteracted by recurring to the analysis of counter-transference. This direction was subsequently followed by Margaret I Little and the post-Kleinians. On the other side, Ego-psychology was divided between restrictive positions – a marked weakness of the Ego, an insufficiency of paternal identifications were seen as serious motives of exclusion, and growing limitations in analysability tended to be advised (E. Zetzel)[5] – whereas several initiatives aiming at broadening the indications were taken by analysts like O. Kernberg[6] (on the basis of the notion of “pathological personality” and the pragmatic structuration of the therapeutic framework). The neo-Kleinian stream, somewhat marginalized, found renewed inspiration in the ferenczian tradition; and finally, the notion that at least some of the negative therapeutic reactions should be understood as the result of “narcissistic rage” has been popular in the partisans of the “self psychology” theory launched by H. Kohut[7] and reconducted by the recent intersubjectivists. In his presentation, F Sauvagnat has insisted on the diversity of the means proposed by J. Lacan to tackle reactive therapeutic reactions, and the evolution of his theory concerning this moment of crisis par excellence. Freud considered that it could be defined by four aspects, 1) Diagnosis issues,2) Something beyond resistance and negative transference, 3) its determination by the death-drive, and its incarnation in unconscious guilt, 4)its link with the goal of “symptom dissolution”. As J.A Miller has noticed, Lacan’s elaboration of the death drives have been progressive, and F Sauvagnat has considered that in most of his work, Lacan discussed the first three aspects, and it was not before the seventies that the link between the second and the fourth were fully discussed. In the 1930ies, when the big question was the death drive, Lacan insists on the various forms of narcissistic aggressive reactions, and even underscores the criminal aspects of what he calls “aggressive tensions”[8]; the few mentions of negative therapeutic reaction do not clearly differentiate it from “deadly rivalry”. By that time, he seems to adhere to F Alexander’s view, according to whom the goal of psychoanalysis should be the destruction of the sadistic superego.[9] According to F Sauvagnat, we must assume that Lacan’s elaborations in the 50ies, in which the functional difference between the imaginary and the real allows to make space for desire as an “absolute condition”, also include the notion that failing that, negative therapeutic reaction is an immediate threat, following the model of anorexia. This is certainly a powerful motive of Lacan’s critique of the “resistance analysis” promoted by Ego-psychologists, - a confrontational strategy that amounted to throwing out the baby with the bath water. A whole array of modes of interpretation and intervention are calculated on this model: “subjective rectification” – Lacan congratulated Freud for “dislodging” Dora from the position of victim[10]; the paradoxical promotion of the inexact interpretation [11], allowing the patient to “rectify the error” of the analyst, whose discreetly exhibited failure is a homage to the dignity of the analysand’s desire : as Polonius puts it in Hamlet (act 2 sc 1)”Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth », quoted by Freud in Construction in psychoanalysis; the varying duration of the session, giving space to surprise, failing which desire is stifled by repetition; the uncovering of how obsessional desire organises its stalemate situations (“he has been driven to recognize the place he has occupied in the destruction exerted by one of his parents on the desire of the other --, discover his constant manoeuvres to protect the Other…[12]), the activation of the frozen figure of the “impotent” father, which will have to be made out by a “calculated vacillation” [13]. The crucial point is to “preserve the place of desire”, which of course includes the wish that “the Other will not know”, and all the more so that the Other is the locus where knowledge is supposed to sit. Moreover, Lacan’s elaborations on fantasy[14] as a “construction”, temporal logic, “framing”, are as many objections to Freud’s search of a “real event” seen as a univocal “fixation point”. This forced inquiry had , in effect, provoked in the Wolf-man a psychotic episode that can hardly avoid being seen as a negative therapeutic reaction. Another important point is Lacan’s underscoring of Freud’s Schumpeterian distinction between infantile wish as the “capitalist” and the last day’s motives as the “entrepreneur” : Lacan insists that the distinction between these two functions is crucial in the causation of the subject. One fascinating moment occurs in the Seminar From an Other to the other[15], with new elaborations on the subject as a player, already introduced in the seminar on EA Poe’s Purloined Letter. B. Pascal’s view about the subject of the bet underscores the relationship between the object and the structure of the Other: how the experience of satisfaction or its absence will be taken as a sign of salvation or doom , as a result of the existence or inexistence of the Other, how the hope of salvation or the fear of doom will condition the perception of jouissance, and Lacan differentiates four different positions. This leads to precious reflexions on the paradoxical status of paradise, defined by B Pascal as “an infinity of infinitely happy lives”, and the question whether this can really be compatible with desire – Lacan alludes to what would happen if we were granted infinite satisfaction: to what extent would this be any different from the dreadful Cotard’s syndrome, in which a psychotically depressive subject has the intuition that death has disappeared. This will be discussed again in the Louvain conference (1973)[16] in which Lacan notes that death, paradoxically, is not so much “irrepresentable” as something that needs a “leap of faith” (“Death belongs to the domain of faith. You are right to believe that you will die; it sustains you; if you didn’t believe in it how could you stand the life you have?”); failing this , a subject succumbs to psychotic depression. This reversal of the Freudian “irrepresentable” notion of death culminates when Lacan questions the implicit Freudian goal of the “dissolution of the symptom” (even if for Freud, it should remain an “indirect goal”). As J-A Miller has shown, until the 1970ies, the aim of the cure was presented by Lacan as a “loss of illusions”, a “traversal of the fantasy” in the 1967 Proposition on the Analyst of the School[17]. In the 1970ies, Lacan focusses on two aspects: on one side, the inconsistency of the Other and even the “inexistence of the Other”, which confirms and accentuates certain aspects of the “traversal of the fantasy” goal; but on the other side, he promotes the “identification to the symptom/sinthome”, which runs quite opposite to what he had previously promoted. This second aspect, in Sauvagnat’s view, should be understood as a radical interpretation of the negative therapeutic reaction: Negative therapeutic reaction is not only specific of some structures , defences, dramatic personal histories or special modes of interaction (even if some cases are of course more difficult than others), it has to do with something that is radically irreconcilable: the inexistence of sexual relationship. The idea is that when , as Freud puts it, the “hope” …of the “dissolution of the symptom” is promoted, this might in a certain way sound like the “disappearance of death” in manic-depressive cases. This is a crucial aspect of the Lacan’s new approach of the symptom from 1973-74 on. Lacan discusses it specifically in his seminar Les non-dupes errent[18]: he criticizes the metaphor of the “viator”, the pilgrim, according to which, especially in Christian traditions, life is a voyage of illusion, and in French, the corresponding term, errer, comes from two Latin verbs, errare (to err) and itinerare (to journey) ; the notion of the “dissolution of the symptom” can be considered as a particular form of this “errance” ideology. Lacan claims that another strategy is possible, making oneself the “dupe of the unconscious” to avoid “erring”…( that is, bringing the analysands into dire straits by refusing to consider what the symptom tries to respond to), and respecting the ways, the “style” in which the symptom manages to cope with the inexistence of the sexual relationship. This implies a new reading of the death-drive, ie. considering that what is finally “dominant” over the the life-drives, what has been described as the “ultimate goal” (Empedocles) is nothing else than the inexistence of the sexual relationship. Whereas Lacan, while discussing the case of Little Hans in the Seminar on The object-relationship, considered that the mother’s complains were the result of the father’s insufficiency, in the 70ies, the symptom becomes what , literally, writes the subject, in spite of the inexistence of the sexual relationship; the analytic “bet” is set on the “pire” (the worst), the “One” described by Parmenides and accentuated by Gorgias[19], whose repetition is the very structure of the symptom, and the main issue is to uncover what, behind the apparent necessity of the “One”, proves to be contingent. [1] Freud S :Die Abhängigkeiten des Ichs, in Gesammelte Werke, Bd V. [2] Abraham, K. (1919) Une forme particulière de résistance névrotique à la méthode psychanalytique, in Abraham, K.: Oeuvres complètes, 2. Payot, Paris 1966, . 83-90 [3] Sauvagnat F "A propos de la réaction thérapeutique négative, in Problématiques du transfert, ouvrage collectif, Institut du Champ Freudien, Section Clinique de Rennes, juin 1998, p. 57-80 [4]Ferenczi S (1929) The Unwelcome Child and his Death-Instinct. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 10:125-129 The Unwelcomhttp://nonoedipal.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/the-unwelcome-child-and-his-death-instinct.pdf [5] Zetzel, E: The so-called good hysteric, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1968, 49, 256 [6] Kernberg, O. (1984). Severe Personality Disorders: Psychotherapeutic Strategies. New Haven :Yale University press. [7] Kohut, Heinz (1971) The Analysis of the Self. New York: International Universities Press. [8] Lacan J : L’agressivité en psychanalyse, in Ecrits, Seuil, Paris 1966 [9] Alexander F, Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit, Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1931 [10] Lacan J : Intervention sur le transfert, in Ecrits, Seuil, Paris 1966. [11] Edward Glover, The therapeutic effect of inexact interpretation ; a contribution to the theory of suggestion, Int. J. Psa., XII, p. 4, quoted by Lacan in Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage, in Ecrits Seuil Paris 1966 note 112. [12] Lacan J : La direction de la cure, in Ecrits Seuil Paris 1966. [13] Lacan J : Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, in Ecrits Seuil Paris 1966 [14] Lacan J : Le séminaire : La logique du fantasme,( to be published) [15] Lacan J : Le séminaire : d’un Autre à l’autre, Paris Seuil 2006. [16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31iQQTPY-kA [17] Proposition de 1967 sur l’analyste de l’Ecole, in Lacan J : Autres Ecrits [18] Lacan J : Le séminaire : Les non-dupes errent, 13 novembre 1973 [19] On Gorgias’ refutation of Parmenides’ ontology, see Barbara Cassin, Si Parmenide ; le traité anonyme De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia, Presses Universitaires de Lille/MSH 1980 ; On the implications for psychoanalysis of this refutation, see J-A Miller, seminar L’Etre et l’Un, 4-5-2011. Moments de crise :Le problème de la réaction thérapeutique négative, conférence de François Sauvagnat à la NLS Copenhague le 13 décembre 2014 En introduction, François Sauvagnat a présenté la réaction thérapeutique négative comme recoupant le double sens du mot crise, d’une part cette expression désigne des aggravations du symptômes sans « séparation » par rapport à la continuité du traitement (au contraire des patients qui « disparaissent » ou s’absentent de différentes façons), et d’autre part, de façon précisément « négative », ils viennent mettre en avant un point crucial, décisif, particulièrement urgent tout autant qu’inaperçu… Freud signale à plusieurs reprises que les cures difficiles, malgré leurs désagréments ont au moins le mérite de mettre en lumière ce que des résultats thérapeutiques rapides peuvent de leur côté avoir d’inexpliqué. Vouloir traiter de la réaction thérapeutique négative, ce n’est pas seulement parler de notre responsabilité devant les aggravations toujours possibles d’un analysant, c’est aussi discuter des nombreuses réorientations et modifications de la stratégie et de la tactique qui ont pu être proposées à ce propos. La notion de réaction thérapeutique négative a été définie par S Freud dans le sillage de ses élaborations sur Les états de dépendance du moi et la pulsion de mort (Das Ich und das Es, 1923)[19] Il la différencie du « défi » (Trotz) propre au transfert négatif tel qu’avait pu le décrire K. Abraham[19], et la décrit comme un étrange moment de bascule dans lesquels les patients, « lorsqu’on leur donne de l’espoir ou qu’on leur montre qu’on est satisfait de l’état du traitement (Stand der Behandlung), se montrent insatisfaits, et aggravent régulièrement leur état (….) réagissent au progrès de la cure de façon contraire », réaction qu’il attribue à la culpabilité inconsciente ; il en discute directement l’occurrence dans la mélancolie et la névrose obsessionnelle, et y ajoute également l’hystérie. Les premières solutions qu’il esquisse – d’un côté, différencier les cas névrotiques des psychotiques, de l’autre différencier la culpabilité acquise ou non – ouvrira à une série de propositions ultérieures par ses élèves, dont F Sauvagnat a proposé une sériation dans un article publié par la Section Clinique de Rennes.[19] D’un côté, Ferenczi et ceux qu’il aura plus ou moins directement inspirés, faisant le plus souvent de la focalisation sur le contre transfert la solution à la réaction thérapeutique négative. Ferenczi a décrit, avec l’ »enfant non bienvenu » (Das Unwillkommene Kind)[19] des cas dans lesquels un rejet parental évident provoque des troubles psychosomatiques, des acting out, voire une tendance au suicide ; c’était en quelque sorte la version ferenczienne de la pulsion de mort, qu’il s’agissait donc pour lui de contrecarrer par une accentuation de la mise en question du contre-transfert, pente ultérieurement suivie par Margaret Little et les post-kleiniens. De l’autre, la psychologie du moi, se fracturant entre une position restrictive – toute insuffisance des identifications paternelles sera un motif d’exclusion, avec des restrictions de plus en plus importantes (E. Zetzel)[19] -- et diverses initiatives d’assouplissements, dont celle de Kernberg[19] sera certainement la plus populaire (faisant fond notamment sur la notion de « personnalité pathologique » et la restructuration du cadre). Enfin les tentatives kleiniennes, maintenant fortement marginalisées, et qui ont fini par se ranger sous la bannière ferenczienne ; et plus récemment l’insistance mise sur la « rage narcissique » chez les tenants de la psychologie du self (lancée par H. Kohut[19]) et les intersubjectivistes. Dans sa présentation, F Sauvagnat a particulièrement insisté sur la diversité des moyens proposés par J Lacan devant la réaction thérapeutique négative, et l’évolution de sa doctrine par rapport au « moment de crise par excellence » que constitue la réaction thérapeutique négative. Pour Freud, celle-ci se caractérisait par quatre aspects, 1) Problèmes de diagnostic,2)Un au-delà de la résistance et du transfert négatif 3)le fait d’être déterminé par la pulsion de mort, incarnée par la culpabilité inconsciente,4) son lien à la visée de « modification du symptôme ». Tout se passe comme si Lacan avait pris d’emblée en compte les trois premiers aspects, et ne réalisait le poids singulier du dernier aspect, et son lien avec le deuxième, que tardivement. Au moment où la grande affaire était la pulsion de mort, dans les années 1930, J Lacan insiste sur les diverses formes de réactions agressives narcissiques, l’aspect « criminel » de ce qu’il appelait « tensions agressives »[19] étant particulièrement souligné, et les quelques notation évoquant la réaction thérapeutique négative ne la différenciant guère d’une rivalité mortelle. A l’époque, il fait assez largement sienne la proposition de Franz Alexander, que le but de l’analyse soit la destruction du surmoi sadique[19]. On doit, pour F Sauvagnat, supposer que les élaborations des années 1950, dans lesquelles la discontinuité, la différence de fonctionnement entre l’imaginaire et le réel permettent en retour de laisser la place au désir comme « condition absolue », sont également faites avec l’idée que faute de cela, la réaction thérapeutique négative menace – sur le modèle de l’anorexie. C’est certainement le sens de la critique par Lacan de l’analyse des résistances, risquant en quelque sorte d’emporter le bébé avec l’eau du bain. Toute une série de modes d’intervention sont précisément calculés en fonction de ce « risque » : la « rectification subjective », Lacan faisant compliment à Freud de la façon dont il déloge gentiment Dora de son enfermement dans un statut de « victime »[19] ; la promotion paradoxale de l’ »interprétation inexacte »[19], permettant au patient de « rectifier l’erreur » d’un analyste dont la défaillance discrètement affichée est une reconnaissance par anticipation de la dignité du désir (« la carpe de la vérité est attrappée par l’appât du mensonge » comme s’exprime Polonius dans Hamlet, cité par Freud dans Constructions en analyse ; la séance à durée variable, ménageant la place de la surprise sans quoi le désir s’étouffe sous la répétition ; le « débusquement » de l’enlisement volontaire du désir obsessionnel (- « on lui a fait reconnaître la place qu’il a prise dans le jeu de la destruction exercée par l’un de ses parents sur le désir de l’autre -- , découvrir sa manoeuvre de tous les instants pour protéger l’Autre »,[19]) ; l’extirpation de la figure glacée du père « impuissant » qu’il s’agira de faire glisser par une « vacillation calculée »[19](Subversion du sujet). Bref, le point crucial est de « préserver la place du désir », place qui inclut le souhait que l’ »Autre ne sache pas », et ce d’autant plus qu’il est le lieu où le savoir se suppose. En outre, les élaborations sur le fantasme[19], comme « construction », logique temporelle, « mise en cadre », s’opposent à ce que la recherche du « point de fixation réel» avait chez Freud de trop forcé – et avaient d’ailleurs ouvert, chez l’Homme aux loups, sur un épisode psychotique qu’il est difficile, rétrospectivement, de ne pas saisir comme réaction thérapeutique négative. La différenciation schumpeterienne faite par Freud, dans sa Traumdeutung, entre le désir infantile comme « capitaliste du rêve » et les souvenirs diurnes comme « entrepreneur » prend son relief, dans l’Envers de la psychanalyse, de la présentation très kojévienne de la dialectique entre le signifiant maître et celui du savoir : pour le sujet, la distinction entre l’une et l’autre fonction est en quelque sorte une question de vie ou de mort. Un moment tout à fait fascinant apparaît dans le Séminaire d’un Autre à l’autre[19], avec le retour du sujet comme joueur déjà évoqué à propos de la lettre volée d’Edgar Poe. Le sujet pascalien pose la question de la relation entre l’objet et la structure de l’Autre, de la façon dont telle ou telle satisfaction va être prise comme signe de salut ou non, en fonction des paris que l’Autre existe ou non, comment l’espoir du salut ou la crainte de la damnation conditionne la perception de la jouissance, et Lacan différencie au moins quatre positions. Ceci conduit à de précieuses réflexions sur ce que peut être le paradis, défini par B. Pascal comme une « infinité de vies infiniment heureuses », et la question de savoir si ceci est vraiment compatible avec le désir – Lacan fait allusion à ce qui se passerait si nous nous voyions attribuer une satisfaction infinie : jusqu’à quel point ceci serait différenciable du syndrome de Cotard, dans lequel le sujet mélancolique a la certitude que la mort a disparu. Ceci sera repris dans la Conférence de Louvain (13 octobre 1972[19]), où Lacan note que la mort n’est pas seulement irreprésentable, comme le voulait Freud, mais qu’elle suppose un acte de foi (« La mort est du domaine de la foi. Vous avez bien raison de croire que vous allez mourir bien sûr ; ça vous soutient. Si vous n’y croyez pas, est-ce que vous pourriez supporter la vie que vous avez ?»), faute de quoi on se trouve dans le cas de figure de la mélancolie délirante. Ce renversement atteint son comble, lorsque Lacan met en question la visée freudienne de « dissolution du symptôme » ; comme noté précédemment, jusqu’alors, l’analyse était très largement comprise comme désillusionnement – traversée du fantasme, dans la Proposition de 1967[19]. Il faut donc comprendre la nouvelle visée proposée par Lacan – l’identification au symptôme – comme quelque chose qui tient radicalement compte du « message » de la réaction thérapeutique négative : selon les termes de Freud, ce qui arrive à certains sujets lorsque l’ »espoir »….de « disparition du symptôme » est promu, ceci pourrait d’une certaine façon sonner comme la « disparition de la mort » dans les états maniaco-dépressifs. C’est un aspect assez peu discuté de la nouvelle appréhension du symptôme par J Lacan à partir des années 73-74. J Lacan la discute de façon particulièrement frontale lorsque, dans Les non-dupes errent, il critique la métaphore, prévalente y compris chez Freud, du « viator » [19]: selon cette métaphore, abondamment utilisée dans les traditions chrétiennes, la vie est un voyage, une « errance-itinérance » -- la « disparition du symptôme » n’en étant qu’une forme particulière --, et Lacan appelle, au contraire, se faire « dupe de l’inconscient » pour ne pas errer (c’est-à-dire provoquer, par une insistance excessive sur le sens, la réaction thérapeutique négative), et respecter les manières, le « style » par lequel le symptôme arrive à répondre à l’inexistence du rapport sexuel . Ceci implique une nouvelle lecture de la pulsion de mort. Ce message est le suivant, qui n’avait été que très partiellement pris en compte auparavant : le symptôme est une solution à l’inexistence radicale du rapport sexuel. Alors que ce dernier point était auparavant volontiers compris comme résultat d’une insuffisance (par exemple, insuffisance du père du Petit Hans dans le séminaire La relation d’objet), il devient, dans les années 1970 ce qui, littéralement, écrit le sujet en dépit de l’inexistence du rapport sexuel ; dès lors, le pari est fait sur le « pire », le « Un tout seul » décrit par Parménide et accentué par Gorgias[19], dont la répétition est la structure même du symptôme, et le problème crucial devient de découvrir ce qui, derrière l’apparente nécessité du « Un », s’avère contingent. Notes; [1] Freud S :Die Abhängigkeiten des Ichs, in Gesammelte Werke, Bd V. [2] Abraham, K. (1919) Une forme particulière de résistance névrotique à la méthode psychanalytique, in Abraham, K.: Oeuvres complètes, 2. Payot, Paris 1966, . 83-90 [3] Sauvagnat F "A propos de la réaction thérapeutique négative, in Problématiques du transfert, ouvrage collectif, Institut du Champ Freudien, Section Clinique de Rennes, juin 1998, p. 57-80 [4] Ferenczi,S. (1982-1990) Oeuvres complètes, (Complete works) Payot,Paris [5] Zetzel, E: The so-called good hysteric, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 1968, 49, 256 [6] Kernberg, O. (1984). Severe Personality Disorders: Psychotherapeutic Strategies. New Haven :Yale University press. [7] Kohut, Heinz (1971) The Analysis of the Self. New York: International Universities Press [8] Lacan J : L’agressivité en psychanalyse, in Ecrits, Seuil, Paris 1966 [9] Alexander F, Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit, 1931 [10] Lacan J : Intervention sur le transfert, in Ecrits, Seuil, Paris 1966. [11] Edward Glover, The therapeutic effect of inexact interpretation ; a contribution to the theory of suggestion, Int. J. Psa., XII, p. 4, cite par Lacan dans Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage, in Ecrits Seuil Paris 1966 note 112. [12] Lacan J : La direction de la cure, in Ecrits Seuil Paris 1966. [13] Lacan J : Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir, in Ecrits Seuil Paris 1966. [14] Lacan J : Le séminaire : La logique du fantasme, à paraître. [15] Lacan J : Le séminaire : d’un Autre à l’autre, Paris Seuil 2006. [16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31iQQTPY-kA [17] Lacan J : Proposition de 1967 sur l’analyste de l’Ecole, in Autres Ecrits, Seuil Paris 2010. [18] Lacan J : Le séminaire : Les non-dupes errent, 13 novembre 1973 [19] Sur la réfutation par Gorgias de l’ontologie parménidienne, voir Barbara Cassin, Si Parménide : le traité anonyme anonyme De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia, Presses Universitaires de Lille/MSH 1980 ; sur les implications pour la psychanalyse de cette réfutation, voir J-A Miller, seminaire L’Etre et l’Un, 4-5-2011.

Copyright F Sauvagnat

[poppita-cap-blog]

I decided to investigate further into the contextual side of my last project of Memory. I wanted to explore the human brain again but from a different point of view both through my research and through the materials that i wish to use. 

For this project I composed a brainstorm of differing rare mental health disorders to take my focus from, this is found in my sketchbook, after much thought and processing i decided to focus my theme on Cotard’s Delusion.

Cotard’s Delusion is when the brain sends signals to the body to make them belief that they have already died, are without blood or internal organs or are putrefying. This condition is the reverse of Capgras Syndrome where the patient believes that their friends and family have all been replaced by look-a-like imposters or spies. 

[fivedollarradio]

Cotard’s delusion is related to Capgras delusion. Both are rare, and affect the same regions of the brain. The person afflicted with the delusion is unable to process faces in an emotional manner; it is thought that this lack leads to a conclusion — with Capgras, that the person’s loved ones have been replaced by doubles (“invasion of the body-snatchers” and “reverse zombie syndrome” are two pop-journalism, unsubtle references to low-grade horror that have little to do with the actual horror of either of these delusions), and in Cotard’s, that the person is herself dead.

The entire article is beautifully crafted and articulated, but I’m having trouble distinguishing this from depersonalization or dissociation. I know what both of those feel like, and they’re fairly common, distributed among the symptom profiles of several disorders. Cotard’s delusion seems like a hyperextended version of depersonalization, but it’s a specific -- and rare -- thing. Maybe it isn’t so rare.

[r477m4n-wh34713y]

someone cut me open and replaced me bit by bit with circuit boards and wires. I can feel the piston in my chest pumping coolant through me and the clockwork in my ears tick away. I am a cruel amalgamation of parts. I am someone’s long rusted experiment.