#regional administrative shifts

[townpostin]

Jharkhand Government Reshuffles Administrative Positions

7 state service officers transferred ahead of elections The Jharkhand government has announced a significant administrative reshuffle, transferring seven officers of the Jharkhand State Service to new positions. RANCHI – The Revenue, Registration, and Land Reforms Department of Jharkhand has issued transfer orders for seven critical administrative officers throughout the state. As part of the…

[sayruq]

Biden's visit has concluded. Israel has spent his entire visit trying to muddy the waters of what happened to Al Ahli Hospital and despite their cartoonish efforts, it hasn't worked

The Global South and especially West Asia know who is responsible for the bombing and no amount of AI voice recordings of 'Hamas operatives' can change that.

Israel war crimes continues to backfire on them even in America

Biden backing Israel has had an impact on America's image. Here's a Wall Street Journal article warning that America's continued support is turning countries towards Russia and China which is code for turning countries against America

An EU official said that the EU will pay a heavy price in the Global South for its continued, unabashed support for Israel

There's also speculation that the Biden administration knew about the bombing before it happened.

Countries that were/are allied with Israel continue to distance themselves from Israel like Russia. The reason I keep highlighting Russia is because the West has been running out of ammunition due to the Russia-Ukraine war and that includes Israel which is rumoured to have sent 80-90% of its ammunition to Ukraine. If this conflict lasts a long time, Israel will need to buy weapons and ammunition and Russia would be one of the countries they would turn to (same with China)

So, where are we in terms of the conflict? After days of waffling over a ground operation in Gaza, Israel postponed it until some time after Biden's visit and now we're back here again

Now I'm no military expert but constantly going back and forth on whether or not you'll invade Gaza is bound to do damage to your troops' morale. No wonder they're dealing with mass desertions while their citizens demonstrate on the streets. The Israeli leadership has no plan besides bombing Gaza.

I've seen people on twitter say that the hospital bombing was done deliberately to normalise IDF soldiers to mass civilian deaths in places like hospitals, schools, places of worship, etc. I don't know if I believe that - I think they wanted to push Iran and Hezbollah's buttons before hiding behind Biden. I don't think these people are thinking strategically.

As far as the possibility of regional war is concerned, all indicators show that the West preparing for the war to escalate

Seems to me the Israel has seen what Ukraine has received in just a year and a half of war. They're done receiving a paltry 3.8 billion every year and now prepared to drag out the conflict and I can't say I blame with Biden proposing a 100 billion package for both Ukraine and Israel. This will stretch America too thin as far as funding in concerned. Cracks are already showing

There are parts of the US government that is unhappy that the Ukraine war is losing attention. During the Ukraine war, you had parts of the government that wanted focus to shift from Russia to China. Because of that, the US government has spent the past year alternating between hostility to Russia and threatening to go to war with China over Taiwan. When Niger expelled France from within its borders, America was preparing to join that conflict until Mali and Burkina Faso declared they would fight with Niger. Now they're entering a third front in West Asia. In short, the mighty empire is expending a lot of resources right now and it is not the threat it was when it invaded Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s.

At any rate, the ground invasion of Gaza won't go the way Israel and America hopes it will

The coalition of Palestinian resistance fighters are still patiently waiting for the IDF to come meet them. Their allies aren't backing down either

The reason I keep making these posts is to remind people that, while the genocide of the people of Gaza is horrifying, the war for the liberation of Palestine has not yet been lost.

Do not lose hope. From the river to sea, Palestine WILL be free

[zvaigzdelasas]

[Fox News is Private, Pro-GOP US Media]

"I welcome the U.S. and coalition operations against the Iran-backed Houthi terrorists responsible for violently disrupting international commerce in the Red Sea and attacking American vessels," Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., said in a statement. "President Biden’s decision to use military force against these Iranian proxies is overdue."

"I am hopeful these operations mark an enduring shift in the Biden Administration’s approach to Iran and its proxies. To restore deterrence and change Iran’s calculus, Iranian leaders themselves must believe that they will pay a meaningful price unless they abandon their worldwide campaign of terror," he added.

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Mike McCaul, R-Texas, who said he was meeting with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the strikes were called, also praised the actions. He also called on Biden to restore the Houthis' terror designation.

"I’m pleased the president, in coordination with our allies, finally took action against the Iran-backed Houthis following weeks of instability in the Red Sea. Tonight, with these strikes, we are beginning to restore deterrence. The administration must acknowledge it was a mistake to rescind the Houthis designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and re-list them immediately," he said.

Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, similarly called the action "overdue" and accused the Biden administration of contributing to the increasingly hostile situation in the Red Sea, but said the strikes were "a good first step toward restoring deterrence in the Red Sea."[...]

["]It is important that we follow this action in close consultation with our Saudi partners to ensure they are with us as the situation develops," Wicker said.[...]

Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., an ally of former President Trump's, said he was "very supportive of the Biden Administration’s decision to strike Houthi rebels who have been harassing international shipping and trying to attack Israeli and American interests."[...]

Even rank-and-file Republicans have been issuing cautious and rare praise for the move. Rep. John James, R-Mich., a military combat veteran who served in Iraq, told Fox News Digital, "The Houthis are a terrorist organization. They have been striking at U.S. military personnel since late last year and must be destroyed."[...]

"While I support these targeted, proportional military strikes, I call on the Biden Administration to continue its diplomatic efforts to avoid escalation to a broader regional war and continue to engage Congress on the details of its strategy and legal basis as required by law," Rep. Gregory Meeks, D-N.Y., the top Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said.

11 Jan 24

[assaultmystic]

Disability is not a fixed state or attribute but exists in relation to assemblages of capacity and debility, modulated across historical time, geopo­litical space, institutional mandates, and discursive regimes. The globalization of disability as an identity through ­ human rights discourses contributes to a standardization of bodily usefulness and uselessness that discounts not only the specificity of location but also the ways bodies exceed or defy identities and subjects. The non disabled/disabled binary traverses social, geographic, and po­litical spaces. The distinctions or par­ameters between disabled and non-­disabled bodies shift historically, as designations between productivity, vagrancy, deviancy, illness, and ­ labor market relations have under­gone transformations from subsistence work to waged ­ labor to hypercapitalist modes of surplus accumulation and neoliberal subject formation. They shift geo­graph­ically, as varied cultural, regional, and national conceptualizations of bodily habitations and metaphysics inhabit corporeal relations differently and sometimes irreconcilably, and issues of environmental racism are prominent. They shift infrastructurally, as a wheelchair-­ accessible elevator becomes a completely altered vehicle of mobility, one that masks vari­ous capacities to climb stairs, in many parts of the world where power outages are a daily, if not hourly, occurrence. They shift legally, administratively, and legislatively, as rights-­ bearing subjects are formed and dismantled in response to health care and insurance regimes, ­ human rights discourses, economic opportunism, and the uneven distribution of resources, medical supplies, and basic care. They shift scientifically, as prosthetic technologies of capacity, from wheelchairs to cellphones to dna testing to ste­roids, script and rescript what a body can, could, or should do. And they shift representationally, as discourses of multicultural diversity and plurality absorb “difference” into regimes of visibility that then reor­ga­nize sites of marginalization into subjects of privilege, indeed privileged disabled subjects.

Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability (2017, xiv-xv), Yasbir K. Puar

[mariacallous]

In the space of four days, the Russia-Ukraine war has dramatically shifted. The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Russia’s Kursk region has quickly turned into the largest territorial gain by either side since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson in the fall of 2022. As of this writing, it is still unclear whether thinned-out and poorly prepared Russian forces have been able to halt the Ukrainian advance, with reports of burning columns of Russian reinforcements reminiscent of the early days of the war.

The operation demonstrates Ukraine’s ability to achieve surprise and exploit sudden breakthroughs, something at which Russia has consistently failed since the start of its invasion. It is also the first time Russia has been invaded by foreign troops since World War II, showing Russians in no uncertain terms that the bloody war they unleashed against their neighbor has come home. Ukraine’s Western supporters seem to be on board, with the White House and European Union headquarters issuing statements that it was up to Ukraine to decide on the operation.

Previously, there had been much debate in Washington, Berlin, and among a wildly speculating media about the Kremlin’s supposed red lines that would set off World War III and nuclear Armageddon, with one of the lines being taking the war to Russia with Western weapons. The latter has now occurred. The belief in uncontrolled escalation led the Biden administration and some of its partners to severely restrict both the types of weapons delivered to Ukraine and their permitted range; Ukraine has not been allowed to use Western missiles to hit military installations on the Russian side of the border, for example. Part of the effect and purpose of the Kursk operation could be to demonstrate, once again, the fallacy of the red-line argument.

As the offensive unfolds and Kyiv stays mostly mum on events, it’s still too early to say what strategic goals Ukraine is hoping to achieve. One speculation that has gained a lot of traction is that it could lead to a quicker end to the war. The operation makes it clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Ukraine retains significant potential to inflict pain on Russia. And if Ukrainian forces can hold on and maintain control of Russian territory—for which they appear to be digging in as they bring in more equipment and build new defensive lines—it could strengthen Ukraine’s leverage in any potential negotiations to end the war. Already, Ukraine’s lightning foray into Russia undermines the widespread idea that Putin holds all the cards to dictate the terms of a cease-fire.

Kyiv seems to be signaling that leverage in negotiations is one of the goals of the offensive. An unnamed advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told the Washington Post: “This will give them the leverage they need for negotiations with Russia—this is what it’s all about.” This dovetails with recent hints by Zelensky that Kyiv was ready to negotiate. In an interview with BBC News in July, he said, “We don’t have to recapture all the territories” by military means. “I think that can also be achieved with the help of diplomacy.” Occupied Russia could be traded for occupied Ukraine: As former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt suggested on X, “Would an idea be for both states to retreat to within their respective recognized border?”

If Kyiv seems to be preparing the ground for potential negotiations—by seeking to strengthen its hand and publicly declaring its willingness—it is also a response to several factors.

One is growing war weariness among the Ukrainian population. Although the majority of Ukrainians favor fighting on until all the territories Russia has occupied since 2014 are liberated, the number saying that Ukraine could trade some of that territory for peace has been rising.

Second, there has been growing criticism, particularly in Western Europe and the global south, of the way Ukraine has repeatedly ruled out talks with Moscow. Major substantive issues aside, with the Kremlin apparently back-channeling openness to talks, Kyiv risked being seen as intransigent in preventing an early end to the war.

Finally, Ukraine’s strategic position is risky, even if it holds back Russia and maintains the flow of Western weapons. A victory by Donald Trump in the November U.S. presidential election and a sudden stop of U.S. aid cannot be ruled out, and even a Harris administration may have trouble cobbling together future support packages if the Republicans keep their majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. Zelensky may have decided to gamble to change and accelerate the dynamics of the war, including greater leverage if negotiations end up taking place sooner than anticipated.

Without much leverage, Kyiv has had to appeal to moral, normative, and legal arguments when communicating with its foreign partners about any peace short of full liberation. In the past, this has led to highly skewed negotiations. In the talks that produced the Minsk I and II accords in 2014 and 2015, Ukraine had such a weak hand that it had to agree to impossible terms: It could only get the Russian-controlled Donbas back if it allowed Moscow’s proxies to become part of the Ukrainian polity through local elections manipulated by the Kremlin, which would have given Moscow a permanent veto over Kyiv’s politics. Previously occupied and annexed Crimea was not even included in the discussion.

In March 2022, direct talks between Ukraine and Russia on the Belarusian border were not a negotiation but Russia’s delivery of surrender terms to Ukraine. In April 2022, negotiations brokered by Turkey in Istanbul also went nowhere: Russia’s price for ending its invasion was a considerable limitation of Ukrainian sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Since then, Russia’s proposal has been for Ukraine to permanently cede, in addition to Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—including substantial parts that Russia has never occupied.

Not only has Ukraine lacked negotiation leverage, but Russia has also been successful in promoting, to audiences around the world, its land-for-peace approach to ending this round of the war. As Ukrainian counteroffensives after 2022 largely failed and the Russian war machine slowly but steadily took more territory in Ukraine’s east, another Minsk-type deal limiting Ukrainian territorial integrity and political sovereignty seemed to loom on the horizon.

Kyiv has not only changed the military narrative on the ground but may also be trying to change the narrative on negotiations—from a “land for peace” deal to a “land for land” deal. This puts Putin in a bind: Loss of control over parts of Russia proper is an enormous embarrassment for the Kremlin. But since their illegal annexation by Russia, the Ukrainian territories Putin seeks to keep are also part of the state territory he is obliged to defend. That said, in terms of Russian elite and popular perception, the restoration of Russia’s legitimate state territory will take precedence over continued occupation of recently conquered domains—especially if a land swap opens an avenue to the end of Western sanctions.

In a way, the new Ukrainian strategy may provide an opening for doves in the Russian leadership—assuming they exist and have any influence over Putin—to argue that the annexations should be reversed in order to restore Russia’s territorial integrity. As long as Ukraine can hold on to its captured territories in Russia, there will a strong pressure on Putin to return them under Moscow’s control.

None of this, however, changes the most fundamental problem with a negotiated outcome: the fact that Russia has ignored just about every agreement it has signed with Ukraine. But for Ukrainians and their Western supporters hoping for an end to the war, some intriguing possibilities may soon be on the table.

[whencyclopedia]

Byzantine-Armenian Relations

The relationship between the Byzantine Empire and ancient Armenia was a constant and varied one with an equal mix of wars, occupations, treaties of friendship, mutual military aid, and cultural exchange. Regarded as a vital defence to the Empire's eastern frontiers, emperors used various means of influence from outright takeover to gifts of titles and lands to Armenian nobles. Influence went in the other direction, too, with several important Byzantine emperors being of Armenian descent, as well as many individuals who held key military and administrative positions in Constantinople and beyond.

Sources

There are several difficulties in assessing the relations between Byzantium and ancient Armenia. Aside from the usual problem of ancient historical sources having an inherent bias towards rulers, noble families, and high politics, account must be taken of the shifting geographical location of Armenia over the centuries and its regular division and redivision by successive empires in the region. There are problems, too, with primary sources which can be coloured by nationalism and left incomplete with deliberate omissions. There are also long silences in the historical record, notably from 730 to 850 CE and 925 to 980 CE. Nevertheless, a reasonable picture of relations between the two states can be drawn and the historian T. W. Greenwood, by way of a summary, highlights three stand-out features of this relationship:

In the first place, relation were continuous…Secondly, they were multi-layered…it seems very likely that lesser lords and individual bishops were also in contact with Byzantium throughout…Thirdly, they were reciprocal. Byzantium was eager to secure its eastern flank and therefore sought to attract Armenian clients into its service. At the same time Armenian princes looked to Byzantium to bolster their own status within Armenia through the concession of titles, gifts and money…It is no coincidence that the Byzantine army - and then the state - came to be filled with men of Armenian origin or descent. (Shepard, 363-4)

Continue reading...

[soon-palestine]

https://t.co/J3fEqiIOIk

Since June 2019, Sudan has been caught in a whirlwind of revolution, descending into a profound economic and political crisis. The initial optimism that followed President Omar H. al-Bashir's ousting has led to chaos, influenced by powerful international actors with their respective political agendas. The geopolitical quagmire is further complicated by the involvement of neighbouring countries.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's (PhD) recent visit to Port Sudan, where he met with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Gen.), the head of the Sudanese army and the Saudi- and Egyptian-backed Sovereign Council of Sudan, evidenced Ethiopia’s vested interests. The visit should be particularly important given Abiy’s prior engagement with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader, whom he hosted in Addis Abeba in December 2023 to advocate for peace in Sudan.

Ethiopia's economic ties with Sudan are substantial. The slowdown in the 211.5 million dollar investment circuit between Khartoum and Addis Abeba has adversely affected both countries. Small businesses along the Sudan-Ethiopia border have borne the brunt of the ongoing conflict. Prime Minister Abiy’s visit can be seen as an effort to stabilise these economic ties and promote peace for mutual benefit. However, if influenced by Western countries or Saudi Arabia, Abiy’s administration may face political backlash from its ally, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The role of international players was evident early on. The UAE was among several countries, including the United States (US), Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that expressed solidarity with the Sudanese people. Saudi Arabia and the UAE notably provided three billion dollars in economic aid to Al-Burhan’s leadership, signalling their approval of the political shift in Khartoum. However, the situation in Sudan soon deteriorated into an ongoing civil war, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing and further international scrutiny.

Sudan's civil war, however, extends beyond regional dynamics. Recent reports have uncovered the involvement of external actors in perpetuating the conflict.

In May this year, American Senator Ben Cardin, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, raised concerns about a UN Panel of Experts' report from the previous year, which provided evidence of the UAE supplying weapons to the RSF, a group notorious for its brutal tactics. US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, echoed these concerns, calling for “external actors" to stop "fueling and prolonging this conflict and enabling these atrocities by funnelling weapons into Sudan.”

Abu Dhabi has been working vigorously to clear its name in response to these accusations. Through diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid, the UAE has sought to counter allegations of its involvement in the Sudanese civil war. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been funnelled to humanitarian organisations operating in Sudan through various UN agencies, a move seen by many as an attempt by Abu Dhabi to portray itself as a force for good amidst the chaos.

Despite these efforts, a recent UN report has further implicated the UAE. The report exposed that the RSF, supported by Abu Dhabi, committed international crimes by receiving and laundering gold illegally exported from Sudan. The UAE has vehemently denied any involvement in Sudan’s political turmoil or illegal gold trade practices, calling the allegations a political mockery of its humanitarian generosity.

While these revelations add layers of complexity, the international community’s response remains lacklustre. The US and the UN have the political and diplomatic clout to influence the situation, but the resolution of Sudan’s crisis ultimately lies in the hands of its people. The international community can only play a supportive role in the Sudanese-led efforts to resolve the political disorder, providing the necessary space and resources for Sudan to shape its destiny.

Although belatedly, the Addis Abeba-based African Union (AU) has also begun addressing the dire humanitarian situation in Sudan. The Chairperson of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, Mohamed Ibn Chambas (PhD), has begun to speak out about the severe impacts of the ongoing civil war. However, stronger official condemnations from the AU were expected, holding all groups and countries involved in the war accountable.

Ironically, Sudan’s revolution is no longer a story of a failed uprising but an ongoing civil war marked by international intrigue and regional power struggles.

[tanadrin]

Shoemaker on literacy, memory, oral tradition, and the Quran:

Studies of literacy in pre-Islamic Arabia have been severely overlooked in recent Quran scholarship; in fact, literacy in the 7th century Hijaz was "almost completely unknown" and "writing was hardly practiced at all in the time of Muhammad." "[T]here seems to be a widespread agreement among experts on the early history of the Arabic language 'that, before and immediately after the rise of Islam, Arab culture was in all important respects fundamentally oral.'" Ancient graffiti in the region seems to have been a bit like early runic writing in Scandinavia--not central to the culture, mostly decorative and incidental, and certainly not used for long, important texts. "There is, in effect, a lot of 'Kilroy was here' scattered across the Arabian desert." Indeed, most of these graffiti are personal names or private in nature--we're not talking monumental inscriptions here, we're talking bored herders scratching stuff onto rocks to pass the time.

Southern Arabia and the larger oases to the north had more in the way of literate elites (and thus things like monumental inscriptions), but these places were far from the central inland Hijaz. If someone in this region did want to become literate, they would probably have learned to read and write in Greek or Aramaic, which were useful and important linguae francae.

As in very early Christianity, writing occupied a controversial position vis a vis orality--oral tradition was primary for the production and transmission of culturally important things like religious texts, poetry, literary prose, genealogy, and history. The shift to a literate culture came only with the expansion of Muhammad's polity into a wealthy, multicultural empire rather than a tribal state. Indeed, much of the early Caliphate's administration used Greek and other languages--Arabic entered administration only slowly, since a lot of early bureaucrats were drawn from the Roman and Sasanian bureaucracy.

And like early Christianity, another reason not to feel any urgency to write down Muhammad's teachings was that early Muslims expected the end of the world to come very soon, maybe initially even before Muhammad's own death.

The dialect of the Quran is distinctive and unusual; it is very difficult to locate where this dialect might have originated. Ahmad Al-Jallad tentatively identifies an Old Hijazi dialect, but the evidence for this dialect (besides the Quran itself) is limited and mostly much more recent, and he assumes the Quran was produced in the Hijaz.

The Arabic of the Quran can probably be identified with the prestige dialect of Levantine Arabic in the Ummayad period, but the origin of that dialect, and what Arabic dialects were brought together there in that time, is hard to ascertain with certainty.

Shoemaker thinks the Quran started as short collections drawn from individual memories following the conquest and encounters with widespread literacy; these collections would have been considered open, and subject to influence from oral tradition. They were combined into increasingly larger collections, with additional traditions and revisions, emergin as something like divergent versions of the Quran (though still not fully static and closed). Finally, the traditions of these regional versions, with other written and oral traditions, were fashioned into their canonical form under Abd al-Malik, and this version was progressively enforced across the empire.

Shoemaker brings in memory science and the anthropology of oral cultures: memory is highly frangible and fallible. Even though it functions well for day to day tasks, it's important not to overlook how common misremembering and re-remembering alters information in both personal and collective memory when talking about a text that even Islamic tradition agrees was not written down within Muhammad's lifetime.

Most forgetting occurs shortly after an event in question; a small core of memories we develop about an event will persist for a significant time after. These findings have been corroborated both in the lab and in the circumstances of everyday life.

Memory is not primarily reproductive; literal recall is, in evolutionary terms, pretty unimportant, and brains omit needless detail. Remembering thus involves a lot of reconstruction more than it does reproduction; memories are storied piecewise in different parts of the brain, and are assembled on recall, with the gaps being filled in using similar memory fragments drawn from comparable experiences.

Note Bartlett's experiments using a short Native American folktale; when asked to recall this story, even after only fifteen minutes participants introduced major and minor changes. Subsequent recall didn't improve accuracy, though the basic structure of the memory developed pretty quickly in each individual. But this structure was not especially accurate, and significant details vanished or were replaced with new information. Most often this information was drawn from the subject's culture (in this case, Edwardian England), forming a memory that made more sense to them and had more relevance in their context. The overall style was quickly lost, and replaced by new formations, and there was a persistent tendency to abbreviate. After a few months, narrative recall consisted mostly of false memory reports, a finding verified by subsequent replications of his experiments.

Experiential and textual memory in particular degrades very rapidly; this degredation is much faster when information is transmitted from one person to another. Epithets change into their opposites, incidents and events are transposed, names and numbers rarely survive intact more than a few reproductions, opinions and conclusions are reversed, etc. Figures like Jesus or Muhammad will hardly be remembered accurately even by people who knew them.

The style of the Quran (e.g., prose, and often terse, elliptic, and occasionally downright nonsensical prose at that) does not lend itself to memorization; Shoemaker argues it is only possible for people to memorize the Quran now because it has become a written document they can consult in the process.

Eyewitness testimony is of course also notoriously unreliable, despite what apologists (in particular Christian apologists) have argued. Cf. Franz von Liszt's experiment in 1902, where a staged argument in a lecture escalates to one student pulling a gun on another--after revealing this event was scripted and staged, and asking different students to recall the details of the event at different intervals afterward, literally none of them got it right--the best reports, taken immediately, got things about one quarter correct. Even repeatedly imagining a scenario vividly enough can eventually lead to a false memory of it occurring (a phenomenon which may explain some alien abduction reports). People mistake post-even hearsay or visualization for firsthand knowledge, especially in the case of dramatic events.

What memory excels at is remembering broad strokes--we are adapted to retain the information which is most likely to be needed, i.e., the gist (or, more likely, the broad themes) of events and information, and not its exact form.

There's a long digression here about John Dean's testimony on the Watergate conspiracy--this may be the first book in early Islamic studies to have Richard Nixon in the index.

Even competitive memory champions train for short-term recall of large amounts of information; they, and other people with preternaturally good memories, are of course exceedingly rare. It's very unlikely that someone could remember, several decades after the fact, precisely (or even mostly) what was told to them by their friend whose brother's wife's cousin was really there. So even within the traditional account of the Quran's composition, it makes no sense to claim it is in fact the verbatim word of Muhammad.

As in the case of Solomon Shereshevski, when you do have preternaturally good recall even for (say) lists of nonsense syllables, the result is actually kind of debilitating--you have so many useless details to sort through, it makes it quite hard to function at an abstract level. And hyperthymesiacs, though they exhibit a high level of recall about their past, still often remember things incorrectly, at about the same rate as people with normal memories--they are no less susceptible to false or distorted memories.

Nevertheless most modern scholars treat the Quran as a verbatim transcript of Muhammad's words. This is exceedingly unlikely! Especially given that "group" or "collaborative" memory--memories as reconstructed by individuals working together--appears to be even less accurate than individual memory. You get better results having people try to recall events by themselves.

Since during the age of conquests the majority of converts were not closely preoccurpied with the interpretation of the Quran, it would have had to have been rediscovered and hermeneutically reinvented later; the memory of Muhammad's words were being shaped by the nature of the community he founded, as its members collective and individual needs continued to evolve along with the context of transmission.

Many people, both scholars and the general public, seem to believe that people in oral cultures have remarkable capacities for memory not possessed by those of written cultures. Study of oral cultures has shown this is demonstrably false; literacy in fact strengthens verbal and visual memory, while illiteracy impairs these abilities. People in literate cultures have better memories!

Oral transmission is not rote replication; it is a process of recomposition as the tradition is recreated very time it is transmitted. Oral cultures can effectively preserve the gist of events over time, but each time the details are reconstituted, and the tradition can radically diverge from its first repetition, with the stories of the past being reshaped to make them relevant to the present and present concerns.

The collective memory of Muhammad and the origins of Islam as preserved in the Sunni tradition would have forgotten many details as a matter of course, many others because they were no longer relevant to the later Sunni community, and they would have been reshaped in ways that made them particularly suited to the life and community of their contemporary circumstances, exemplifying and validating their religious beliefs--ones very different from those of Muhammad's earliest followers.

The early Muslim conquests put a comparatively small number of soldiers, scattered across a huge territory, in a wildly different cultural and social context, especially in close contact with different Christian and Jewish communities, esp. in the Levant, which rapidly became the cultural center of the new empire. Jews and Christians may have joined the new religious community in large numbers in this time also; their faith and identity would have continued to evolve in this period, as we would expect from comparative episodes in the history of other religions. By the time that Muhammad's teachings were formally inscribed, the memories of his few hundred initial companions would have been transmitted and dispersed to a large number of people in a totally different set of circumstances, with consequences for how those memories exactly were recalled.

Jack Goody, researcher on oral traditions: "It is rather in literate societies that verbatim memory flourishes. Partly because the existence of a fixed original makes it much easier; partly because of the elaboration of spatially oriented memory techniques; partly because of the school situation which has to encourage "decontextualized" memory tasks since it has removed learning from doing and has redefined the corpus of knowledge. Verbatim memorizing is the equivalent of exact copying, which is intrinsic to the transmission of scribal culture, indeed manuscript cultures generally."

Techniques like the ars memoriae belong to literate cultures and were invented by literate people; they are unknown in oral cultures. Oral and literate cultures in fact have a radically different idea of what it means for a text to be "the same"--in the former, word-for-word reproduction is not necessary. A poem can be "the same poem" even if every time it is performed it is largely unique.

Case of the Bagre, the sacred text of the LoDagaa people of Ghana, an extended religious poem used in a liturgical context. Variations in its recitation aren't just variations in wording; changes in recitation can be radical, and the last version is always the starting point. Nevertheless (as in other oral cultures) it is considered "the same," functionally identical with each recitation. These differences appeared even among different performances by the same reciter, or multiple times in the same ceremony. Even the most formulaic parts have great variability. Similar variability in oral texts in other oral cultures has been documented by other anthropologists, including for historical events.

Shoemaker notes that the tradition that the Vedas were transmitted without variation from the time of their composition remains an article of faith in some quarters of South Asian studies; this flies in the face of all available evidence. In fact we have no idea what the state of the Vedic texts was prior to the earliest manuscripts; they may have been written all along.

Collective memory is shaped by contemporary cultural imperatives--examples of Abe Lincoln, a white supremacist considered nothing special by his peers; Christopher Columbus, once revered; the last stand at Masada, considered a minor event of little importance to broader Jewish history until the founding of Israel.

There doesn't have to be any conspiracy or coordinated effort for false narratives about the past to take root.

The hard horizon of communicative memory is around eighty years; so historical consciousness basically only has two modes: the mythic past of collective memory, and the recent past less than eighty or so years ago.

Lack of a clear "generic" monotheism in the Hijaz around the time of Muhammad's birth means the expectations and memory of Muhammad would have been profoundly shaped by Christian and Jewish beliefs.

Early Islam, like early Christianity, wasn't old enough to have a clear distinction between historical/origins memory and recent/communicative memory.

"For most of the seventh century, then, Muhammad’s followers had a memory that was still immersed in the social and cultural milieux of the late ancient Near East, from which they had yet to clearly differentiate themselves. They eventually would do this in large part by developing a distinctive collective memory for their group, different from those inherited from Judaism and Christianity, a process that was no doubt delayed by their fervent belief that the world would soon come to an end, making such an endeavor rather pointless for a time. Only as the end continued to remain in abeyance, and the community’s living memory grew ever distant from the time of origins did they develop a collective memory of their own. Yet, as Islamic collective memory began to evolve, one imagines that it initially took different shapes within the various pockets of Believers that were scattered across their empire. The basic elements of this nascent collective memory were, as Halbwachs says of the early Christians, “still dispersed among a multitude of spatially separated small communities. These communities were neither astonished, anxious, nor scandalized that the beliefs of one community differed from those of another and that the community of today was not exactly the same as that of yesterday.” Thus, we should expect to find a significant degree of diversity in religious faith and memory among the different early communities of the Believers, scattered and outnumbered as they were among the Jews and Christians of their burgeoning empire. Only with ʿAbd al-Malik’s program of Arabization and Islamicization was a new, distinctively Islamic collective memory and identity concretized and established for this new religious community. It was a collective identity that was formed from the top down and imposed, at the expense of any other alternative collective memories, with the full power and backing of the imperial state."

The limits of oral tradition apply even more strongly to the hadith and biographies.

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

VPs of Brazil and China call for global peace, celebrate partnerships, sign cooperation agreements

Geraldo Alckmin and Han Zheng co-chaired the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Concertation Commission (Cosban) plenary session in Beijing, China.

Brazilian Vice President and Minister of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services Geraldo Alckmin and Chinese Vice President Han Zheng co-chaired the 7th Plenary Session of the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Concertation Commission (Cosban) on June 6. Founded during President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's first term, Cosban turns 12 years old in 2024, representing a high-level bilateral negotiating venue.

"At a time of great international instability, with armed conflicts taking place in various regions of the planet, Brazil-China relations remain characterized by predictability and stability," said Alckmin. According to Zheng, in light of the shifting and turbulent global landscape, "putting energy into bringing peace and development to the world” is imperative.

In addition to global issues, the two leaders emphasized the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Brazilian relationship, which will be celebrated in 2024. Economic cooperation was another point of convergence.

Alckmin welcomed current Chinese investment in Brazil and invited Chinese companies to contribute with the modernization of Brazilian infrastructure, a project President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration has been promoting through the New Growth Acceleration Program (Novo PAC). "I invite all Chinese companies to join the effort to modernize Brazil's infrastructure, which is the New PAC".

Continue reading.

[blackhistorystoryteller]

This is a message to my black brothers and sisters

Learn about your history

Ethiopia is one of the oldest countries in Africa; the emergence of Ethiopian civilization dates back thousands of years. Abyssinia or rather "Ze Etiyopia" was ruled by the Semitic Abyssinians (Habesha) composed mainly of the Amhara and Tigray, the Cushitic Agaw. In the Eastern escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands and more so the lowlands was the home of the Arab-descended Harari that founded Sultanates such as Ifat and Adal and the Afars. In the central and south were found the ancient Sidama and Semitic Gurage, among otheres. One of the first kingdoms to rise to power in the territory was the kingdom of D'mt in the 10th century BC, which established its capital at Yeha. In the first century AD the Aksumite Kingdom rose to power in the modern Tigray Region with its capital at Aksum and grew into a major power on the Red Sea, subjugating South Arabia and Meroe and its surrounding areas. In the early fourth century, during the reign of Ezana, Christianity was declared the state religion. Ezana's reign is also when the Aksumites first identified themselves as "Ethiopians", and not long after, Philostorgius became the first foreign author to call the Aksumites Ethiopians.[The Aksumite empire fell into decline with the rise of Islam in the Arabian peninsula, which slowly shifted trade away from the Christian Aksum.[citation needed] It eventually became isolated, its economy slumped and Aksum's commercial domination of the region ended.The Aksumites gave way to the Zagwe dynasty, who established a new capital at Lalibela before giving way to the Solomonic dynasty in the 13th century. During the early Solomonic period, Ethiopia went through military reforms and imperial expansion that allowed it to dominate the Horn of Africa.

How did Ethiopia Resist Imperialism?

Ethiopia, formerly Abyssinia, is one of the world’s oldest countries. Dating to around 400 BCE, the region is documented in the in the King James Version of the Bible as the Kingdom of Axum. Along with Rome, Persia, and China, Axum was considered one of the four great powers of the era. Throughout the millennia of its history, the willingness of the country’s people—from farmers to kings—to come together as one, coupled with its geographic isolation and economic prosperity, helped Ethiopia score decisive victories against a series of global colonialist forces.

Ethiopia is considered “never colonized” by some scholars, despite Italy's occupation from 1936–1941 because it did not result in a lasting colonial administration.

Seeking to expand its already considerable colonial empire in Africa, Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1895. In the ensuing First Italo-Ethiopian War (1895-1896), Ethiopian troops won a crushing victory over Italian forces at the Battle of Adwa on March 1, 1896. On October 23, 1896, Italy agreed to the Treaty of Addis Ababa, ending the war and recognizing Ethiopia as an independent state.

On Oct. 3, 1935, Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, hoping to rebuild his nation’s prestige lost in the Battle of Adwa, ordered a second invasion of Ethiopia. On May 9, 1936, Italy succeeded in annexing Ethiopia. On June 1 of that year, the country was merged with Eritrea and Italian Somalia to form Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI or Italian East Africa).

Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie made an impassioned appeal for assistance in removing the Italians and re-establishing independence to the League of Nations on June 30, 1936, gaining support from the U.S. and Russia. But many League of Nations members, including Britain and France, recognized Italian colonization.

It was not until May 5, 1941, when Selassie was restored to the Ethiopian throne, that independence was regained.

Ethiopia's ability to resist being swept up in the "Scramble for Africa" can be credited to the stability of its longstanding imperial government, beginning with the Abyssinian Empire in the 13th century, and lasting into the late 20th century, with the exception of a brief Italian occupation during the 1930s. King Menelik II, the Emperor during the period of rampant European exploration and colonization in Africa, was careful to cultivate an alliance with the smaller surrounding kingdoms of North Africa, and with European powers including Italy and Russia. When Italy began to turn the sights of their imperial ambitions toward Ethiopia, the Ethiopian military became the only African kingdom able to successfully resist the military might of European colonial power, using Russian-supplied weapons to defeat the Italian invading force at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. In the aftermath of the battle, in exchange for permanent recognition as an independent empire, Menelik II granted Italy the right to claim the neighboring territory of Eritrea under their imperial umbrella.

Ethiopians have a history of taming lions.

Many Emperors kept pet lions including Halie Selassie. Occasionally visitors like Kwame Nkrumah could pet one of the lions!

This practice of keeping lions is said to date back thousands of years to the Axumite period.The descendants of the Royal Lions currently live in the Addis Ababa zoo.

Meet his imperial majesty, the King of the Jungle.

And if, with his thick, shaggy mane Challa seems to have something of a frisky regal air about him - it's because he knows that he is a genuine blue blood.Challa is a direct descendant of Mochuria and Mollua - royal lions, which the late Emperor Haile Selassie kept as pets. The Emperor's practice of keeping pet lions is said to date thousands of years back to the Axumite period.Years ago in Ethiopia, Lions were pets to the people, some were used like donkeys, some like dogs kept at home. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia had lions he kept as pets, while some Ethiopians could even ride on them. These were not wild lions, they grew up with humans and became domesticated.They didn't go after human blood or other animals, lions roamed around the streets of Ethiopia and live was beautiful with them. Ethiopia is in East Africa, it's a rugged, landlocked country split by the Great Rift Valley, Ethiopia is a place of ancient culture, they believe and still hold on to ancient affairs.

Any lion that goes wild was immediately hunted killed, they were only killed if they kill a human and not animals like goats and chickens. They forbid killing and eating of any lion because lions were pets used in different palaces.

Ethiopia as a country had its origin in about 980 B.C., which makes it one of the oldest nations in the world.

Due to this very long history and an unmatched diversity of people and cultures, the country has often been described as a “museum of peoples”. With such a highly diverse population, Ethiopia houses an intricate tapestry of language and ethnic groups.

Also nicknamed the “Land of 13 Sunshine’s”, Ethiopia is often described as one of the most enthralling and enchanting places in the world – and definitely in Africa.

Ethiopia may not be the first place any traveller think of when planning or booking a next holiday, but it may just as well soon be the case. As African country Ethiopia can boast about having been at peace for at least the previous 15 years or more years and its economy is consequently one of the fastest growing in the world.

With the added bonus of an astounding diversity of landscapes, mixture of cultures and history that tracks back to when homo sapiens first started to raise itself up onto two legs, a traveller suddenly may look forward to a surprising and breath-taking travel destination.

But talking about planning and holiday dated, you probably didn’t know that this unique nation even has its own calendar?

This is but one of a myriad fascinating facts about the country, of which a number are discussed in this article. Looking at the country’s ancient and statutory history, its religion, culture, people and natural phenomena, here are at least 44 random but fascinating facts that you can ponder in anticipation of a visit to this eastern African country in the near future:

Fact number 1 – The oldest people in the world probably lived here.

Fact number 2 – Ethiopia is the oldest independent country in Africa and the only African country that could evade colonial rule.

Fact number 3 – Ethiopia was one of the first African forces to achieve a significant victory over a European colonial power.

Fact number 4 – Ethiopia has a rich history of rulers, including emperors and queens.

Fact number 5 – Ethiopia is perceived to be the diplomatic capital of the African continent

Fact number 6 – Ethiopia is the country with the second highest population in Africa, and with almost 1,5 % of the world population.

Fact number 8 – Ethiopia has the most orphans in the world.

Fact number 10 – Addis Ababa is the highest capital city in Africa.

Fact number 11 – More than 200 dialects are spoken by the peoples of the country.

Please like and share so others can see, drop your comments below and let me know what you think.

[y-rhywbeth2]

Lore: Baldur's Gate #2

Demographics of the Western Heartlands

Link: Disclaimer regarding D&D "canon" & Index [tldr: D&D lore is a giant conflicting mess. Larian's lore is also a conflicting mess. There's a lot of lore; I don't know everything. You learn to take what you want and leave the rest]

The City | Demographics | Law & Legal System | Administration & Government | ??? - WIP

A sort of overview of how people fit into the region. When I say "Baldur's Gate is a human city" I am not overexaggerating.

So: detailing the five main human groups of the region: the elves would rather stay in Evereska, thanks; the half-elves would rather not stay in Evereska: the halflings are cheerfully exploiting the local adventurers; the gnomes mind their own business; the dwarves have a local history that's just the world hitting them with sticks; and for some reason the Hells have it out for the Western Heartlands, and tieflings are resented for being a reminder. (And the occasional half-orc and dragonborn is there too, I guess.)

-

While the exact percentages may have shifted up or down somewhat over the course of events at the end of the Era of Upheaval and so on, they're still a pretty solid idea of what to expect from the Western Heartlands, and thus Baldur's Gate as the largest population centre (it's also where the most diversity is, being the only major port city for miles).

The breakdown is:

78% Human 7% Elven 4% Half-elven 3% Halfling 2% Gnome 1% Dwarf 1% "Other" [Tiefling, Half-orc, Dragonborn]

-

So 78% of the entire population of the Western Heartlands is human; consisting mostly of five ethnic groups. These groups being defined by their shared inherited cultural norms and genetics across Faerûn. Chondathan culture heavily shapes Baldur's Gate.

80% of these humans are Tethyrian [melting pot of cultures and genetics, predominantly Calishite and Chondathan by ancestry. By average: brown skin; black hair; blue eyes (northern) or brown eyes (southern). Their primary ancestors were the native people of the lands that became Tethyr and Calmishan. The further north you go the more Netherese and Illuskan genes enter the pool, and lighter skin and blue eyes becomes more common. In the Western Heartlands - they mostly follow Chondathan cultural norms. They have a history of being colonised and enslaved (largely by Calimshan), value freedom and community above all else; slavery is the pinnacle of evil. They have a strong bardic tradition due to relying on oral lore and song to keep their histories and what remains of their distinct culture alive (the majority of their cultural norms will be determined by the dominant culture they've mixed with). The average Tethyrian is raised to mistrust authorities with more jurisdiction than a city state (kingdoms and empires = bad). -

10% are Calishite [dark brown skin; black hair; dark brown eyes. Tend to be short. Due to genie ancestry, most genasi are Calishite]. The percentage is probably higher in the 15th century, due to a wave of refugees. The ancestors of the Calishites were slaves of genies who came to Toril, set up their empires, annoyed the local elves and got wiped off the map and left the humans to inherit their master's empire. Calimshan is one of the oldest human empires still standing, and they're very proud of this fact. They value reputation above all else (personal and family, both highly interconnected) which is basically a form of social currency. Very strict social divides: Class matters, traditionally they're patriarchal and gender roles are strict, marriage is important and the father determines social class (only women may marry "above their station"). In recent history, a return of the ruling djinn and efreeti led to a lot of war and destruction in Calimshan, sending a wave of refugees into the world. Most of those refugees live seperate from the main city in "Little Calimshan" in the Outer City. Said war has recently ended, due to the actions of a Chosen of Ilmater, and many Calishites in Baldur's Gate are considering returning home (especially because there is considerable friction between the refugees and the locals). Sorcery is a common occurance, and Calishites have a strong arcane and divine tradition. -

5% are Chondathan ["tawny" brown skin; light brown to black hair; brown or green eyes. Tend to be tall]. Their ancestors started off as warriors, whose many wars led to them destroying an elven city and a retaliatory tidal wave that eventually led them to discover that trade worked better for them (this did not stop them pissing off elves everywhere they went), they did such a good job that they dominated Central Faerûn through mercentile skill, and Chondathan culture (i.e. language, the Thorass alphabet and such) is a major influence pretty much all over Faerûn. Typically Chondathans have adapted quickly and peaceful to the norms and laws of other peoples, and a Baldurian, Cormyrian and a Sembian will not be perfectly interchangable. Still they will often have shared values: Violence is tacky and counterproductive. a reputation for honesty is paramount and breaking your word is taboo. Tend to be cat people, with a strong appreciation for tressyms. They value hard work, industry and admire wealth (which is power and evidence of a good work ethic). Social standing is determined by money and influence. Class divides don't tend to be rigid, and it's generally believed that hard work should open doors. You start work at 12 (apprenticeships) and if you're able bodied you will be shamed for "not pulling your weight". The elderly tend to hang around after retirement and tutor the next generation. They have little in the way of magical traditions, or interest in it. -

3% are Illuskan [pale skin; blonde, red or black hair; blue or grey eyes. Tend to be very tall]. Rarely found outside of the North (including the Sword Coast North, across the border), most Illuskan cultures are tribes and settlements on the frontiers. They value courage, battle prowess and survival and haven't been as successful in the larger world because they tend to prefer war and raids to trade. Larger civilisation hinders growth and encourages weakness and dependency, and is largely shunned. The rest of the world considers them "no better than orcs" and the Illuskans think the rest of the world are a bunch of cowards unworthy of respect. Not being able to be the warrior hero of some kind of epic tale (or being bold enough to aspire to be) is not necessarily a thing to be ashamed of that you will be mistreated for, but you won't be given any respect past basic courtesy either. Magic is not infrequent amongst Illuskans, due to Netherese ancestry, but it is mistrusted due to the history of the Arcane Brotherhood of Luskan, who are evil bastards. Religion is eh. Illuskans generally only have uses for gods who serve a practical purpose (so appeasing the gods of fury (such as Auril and Umberlee) and Tempus, god of war). -

1% consists of the Gur [brown skin; thick, straight black hair; dark brown eyes. Tend to be hirsute and short, but "stocky"] The ancestors of the Gur were Rashemi, a people they still strongly resemble, physically. The modern people feel no kinship with their distant kin though. They're mostly nomads, but some Gur can be found permanently settled in the slums of cities like Baldur's Gate and Elturel, where they're treated as subhuman. Their patron deity is Selûne: protector of travellers and outcasts, and a patron of diviners, which the Gur practice for protection and aid in navigation (as such they also worship Savras, god of truth and fate, patron god of divination). Amongst their own the Gur speak a unique dialect of Rashemi that no outsiders are privy to. There's not a lot on the Gur, but if they share any cultural norms with the Rashemi, it might be something like this: The Rashemi value personal skill/strength (in whatever form that takes) and achievements, and scorn the concept of inherited (unearned) titles and wealth. They also value the wellbeing of the land itself, to which they show respect. While they don't shun work, they don't live for it either; the youth are often found carousing loudly with their friends, and while the adults are expected to contribute to society, they also enjoy a good time. Children are subject to tests as they mature, and elders are afforded great respect for their experience and the challenges they have overcome in reaching their age. Interestingly, Rashemi expats also have a reputation for being "nuisances" outside of Rashemen: many struggle with culture shock, and the stereotype is that they will get drunk and wander around picking fights everywhere (the Rashemar norm of challenging others to help them and you improve comes across as aggression to outsiders). -

The remaining 1% is a mixture of the many, many, many different humans on Toril. This canonically includes one of Faerûn's only Maztican communities, consisting of the Nexala people living in Baldur's Gate (I think they drew inspiration from the Mexica?) and there appears to include a Kozakuran (Japanese fantasy counterpart) minority. TSR's decision to start creating fantasy world counterparts to real world cultures for "exotic" expansions is... hmm, contentious, and I don't know enough about the real world counterparts to know if I'm handling it well, so I'm not going further into that.

------

7% of the population of the Western Heartlands is elves, making up the largest non-human population of the region.

It's mostly moon elves [fair skin, often seen in literal white hues likened to alabaster and marble, with blue undertones; white, silver (like the metal, not grey) or black hair; eyes always flecked with gold] and then some wood elves [copper brown skin, tinged with green; blonde, red, brown or black hair; brown or green eyes. Metallic sheen to hair and skin.] Some sun elves returned to Faerûn in the mid-1300s [gold, bronze or amber skin; blonde, red or black hair; golden brown, green or black eyes. Metallic sheen to hair and skin.] (both moon elves and sun elves are categorised as "high elves", in BG3 mechanical parlance). Moon elves are individualistic and have a reputation for flightiness, thrill-seeking and hedonism. Sun elves are conservative, more observant of social hierarchies, have a strong cultural focus on magic (divine and arcane both) and extremely wary of humans due to historical conflict and human expansion into (now lost) elven lands. Wood elves are known for their open mindedness towards non-elves and many hope for elves to live fully amongst the non-elves one day, but due to their nature-oriented spirituality and way of life they rarely venture into human civilisation and are usually highly uncomfortable there. When compared to the percentages of other demihumans in the area, the elven population seems very high, though that 7% accounts for Evereska, the last major bastion of elven civilisation on Faerûn. Although apparently the elves are trying to rebuild Myth Drannor yet again, and good luck with making that stick. While elves do make up the largest non-human minority group in Baldur's Gate, the vast majority of that 7% traditionally remains in Evereska and refuses to leave their homeland's borders, and of those that leave it's almost entirely moon elves, who are the most likely to assimilate into human culture. A minority of wood elves might be able to get comfortable in cities. Your average sun elf, to whom preservation of elven culture is a sacred duty given by Corellon him/herself, would be horrified by the concept of assimilating into the N'Quess, and any that aren't are going to be under immense social pressure from their house/clan to come home and conform (especially because there's a chance that their family may view humans as dangerous). That said, the flightiness of youth can generally be forgiven (they'll grow out of it). Most encountered are young adventurers under 100 years old and semi-nomadic family groups of moon elves who wander between human settlements as their whims (and/or the mercantile work of their clan/house) takes them. Older elves are unlikely to be found in Baldur's Gate in high numbers, as the rapid, demanding pace of the metropolis clashes badly with the "take your time" philosophies and lifespan of elves. A few families of sun elves also established themselves in the minor human cities of Iriaebor and Berdusk, further South East, after returning from the Retreat.

- 4% of the population is half-elven, almost entirely of moon elven descent, and, on the human side, likely to be of Tethyrian ancestry.

It's likely most are found in human cities, even if they weren't already born there. The noble houses of Evereska have traditionally been extremely xenophobic (even the elven commoner clans were considered beneath them), and the only non-elves permitted entry for most of Evereska's existence have been Harpers: the opportunities for half-elves to be born within the realm have been fewer that otherwise. Human civilisations also saw an influx of half-elven immigration during the late 14th century - albeit most moved North - when the Spellplague caused Evereska and the Feywild to merge slightly, and an increase in xenophobic attitudes made many feel unwelcome.

- 3% is halfling, almost entirely lightfoot [very, very wide genetic pool. The hin have moved around enough that no features or colouration has become a norm for an entire geographic population.]

Lightfoot halflings - or hin, amongst themselves - are pretty much all over Faerûn, having made themselves comfortable and unobtrusive living alongside humans. They mostly assimilate into human cultures, though there is still a focus on clan and family. There is a small village in the region called Gullykin, which mostly keeps to itself and profits from its brewery (which also happens to be the temple of Yondalla). They also cheerfully make a side profit off of the frequent adventuring parties who use the village as a rest stop while exploring the nearby ruins (Durlag's Tower and the Firewine Ruins). The locals have no interest in the ruins themselves, considering Firewine particularly cursed, and pride themselves in being as peacefully boring as they possibly can.

- 2% consists of gnomes, almost entirely rock gnomes [brown skin; white hair; no information given on eye colour, although "glittering black" has been used as a descriptor.]

Gnomes prefer to stay well hidden, in secret villages scattered around the world and unseen by outsiders, but a minority are drawn to Baldur's Gate. Rock gnomes split their time and focus between their career (usually craft of some sort, and rock gnome working environments are known for their very relaxed, friendly atmospheres) and partying.

- 1% consists of dwarves, shield dwarves [pale to light brown skin; dark hair; blue eyes] and gold dwarves [light to dark brown skin with a reddish hue; black, grey or brown hair; brown or hazel eyes]. Exact numbers aren't given, but as, historically, the shield dwarves almost went extinct due to wars where the gold dwarven numbers reached such levels of overpopulation in the Great Rift during the Thunder Blessing of 1306 DR that many were forced to migrate in droves, I would assume that it's either, like, a 50/50 split, or the gold dwarven population is the higher one.

Gold dwarves put their success and survival down to adherence to dwarven ways of life and are staunch traditionalists, cleaving to family, clan and faith: Dwarven history being characterised by the loss of homeland after homeland, they are very keen to ensure that their way of life survives. They have a bad history with the various inhabitants of the Underdark (especially drow). Shield dwarves have been in the area the longest. They have lost many of their homelands in the North to orc invasions and the expansion of humanity in their subsequent weakened state. Those found in the Western Heartlands belong to a subdivision called the Wanderers; dwarves who after the loss of their ancestral homes took to a more nomadic life, making a living as mercenaries and crafters in the settlements of other races. Many may have non-dwarven ancestry, as shield dwarves started intermarrying to bolster their numbers due to wars and an infertility crisis rendering their population dangerously low - non-dwarven ancestry is mostly humans and gnomes, though some hin and elven blood can be found. The same traditions their gold dwarven kin hold to exist in shield dwarven culture, but due to the pressures of survival many traditions are looser or have fallen by the wayside. The most successful dwarves are presumably the Shattershield clan, who settled in Baldur's Gate at the time of the city's origin and became the Gate's sole non-human Patriar family. There have been attempts to create new homelands in the Western Heartlands, and all of them met with disaster. The town of Kanaglym, established in 722 DR eventually discovered that they'd accidentally found a portal to the Fugue Plane in the town well. The half-dwarven adventurer Daeros Dragonspear established Dragonspear Castle aboveground, over the town's location in 1255 DR, creating a safe haven for the dwarven people that was also guarded by Daeros' copper dragon companion Halatathlaer, who had a lair nearby. Then a mage, seeking the dwarves' wealth, decided to embark on a complicated plot, of which the most relevant step was opening a portal to Avernus and tricking Daeros to walk into it, and also destroying the castle with an invasion of dragons. A dwarf by the name of Durlag Trollkiller also established a home for his clan (Durlag's Tower) at some unknown date, and that was later annihilated by an infiltration of doppelgangers and mind flayers. The Orothiar clan settled in the Cloakwood, however they were forced to abandon their clanhold when a mine wall was accidentally breached: the river flooded their home, and wiped out most of their people, bar a few survivors.

- 1% covers everybody else. Hobgoblins, gnolls, goblins, kobolds and such will make up the majority of this category; the recently established Yuan-ti kingdom of Najara has also joined this percentage; with a minority of half-orcs (orcs are not really found in the Western Heartlands, the nearest are mountain orcs in the North), and then a smaller handful of planetouched (tieflings, genasi, aasimar (mostly tieflings and genasi)) and dragonborn left over.

While generally not popular anywhere, tieflings are particularly mistrusted in the Western Heartlands. They're associated with the Dragonspear Wars - the first of which took place in 1356 DR - where Waterdeep and Baldur's Gate went to war with the invading forces of Avernus (coming from portals set up in the eponymous Dragonspear Castle). There was another invasion in 1363 DR. Then that time Mephistopheles invaded Waterdeep in 1372 with the intention of conquering Toril and turning it into the tenth layer of hell probably didn't help their reputation either. Nor the fey'ri invasion of Evereska in 1374 DR. Nor did the Elturel incident... It's not unlikely that there are a fair few people with dormant infernal blood in their veins, but the tiefling population isn't likely to see much growth, as the birth of a tiefling child to human parents is not infrequently met with panic and infanticide.

There's nothing I can really find on half-orcs, but I would imagine most are of mountain orc and Illuskan heritage, and they or their ancestor/s migrated from the North.

I'd hazard a guess that the entire dragonborn population of Baldur's Gate - possibly the entire region - can be seen in-game. They have no history in the area that I know of.

[the-garbanzo-annex-jr]

by Seth Mandel

President Biden made clear in a speech today that he wants the war in Gaza to end without Hamas’s eradication. Unveiling the outline of a ceasefire agreement, Biden said that “the people of Israel should know they can make this offer without any further risk to their own security because they have devastated Hamas forces over the past eight months. At this point Hamas no longer is capable of carrying out another October 7.”

Thus have the goals shifted, although that process began in December with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s comments that the U.S. “will continue to support Israel’s efforts to do everything possible to ensure that Hamas cannot repeat the horrors of October 7. And that means, among other things, that Hamas cannot remain responsible for governance in Gaza and it cannot retain the capacity to repeat those attacks.”

This was the Biden administration’s way of telling the public what it had told Israeli leaders earlier that day in December: The U.S. would no longer support the original goal of Hamas’s eradication.

Today, President Biden made that point himself. “Indefinite war in pursuit of an unidentified notion of total victory will only bog down Israel in Gaza,” the president admonished, “draining the economic, military, and human resources and furthering Israel’s isolation in the world.”

According to Biden, Israel’s long-professed characterization of victory isn’t possible. Continuing its operations in Gaza “will not bring an enduring defeat of Hamas.” He described a path that instead would see Israel out of Gaza and becoming part of “a regional security network” that ideally would include Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile Gaza will be rebuilt with the help of the international community “in a manner that does not allow Hamas to rearm.” So, again, the president envisions Hamas continuing to exist. Of course, “Israel will always have the right to defend itself against threats to security and to bring those responsible for October 7 to justice.” Translation: If at some point in the future Yahya Sinwar turns up at the Super-Pharm in Tel Aviv to pick up some Advil, go ahead and arrest him.

[zvaigzdelasas]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be digging in for a “long and difficult war” but former leader Ehud Barak [In an exclusive interview with POLITICO] fears Israel has only weeks left to eliminate Hamas, as public opinion — most significantly in the U.S. — rapidly swings against its attacks on Gaza.[...]

Barak, who led Israel between 1999 and 2001, observed the rhetoric of U.S. officials had shifted in recent days with a mounting chorus of calls for a humanitarian pause in the fighting. [...]

“You can see the window is closing. It’s clear we are heading towards friction with the Americans about the offensive. America cannot dictate to Israel what to do. But we cannot ignore them,” he said, in reference to Washington’s role as the main guarantor of Israel’s security. “We will have to come to terms with the American demands within the next two or three weeks, probably less.”[...]

Barak added it would take months or even a year to extirpate the Islamist militant group Hamas — the main war aim set by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and his war cabinet – but noted Western support was weakening because of the civilian death toll in Gaza and fears of Israel’s campaign sparking a much broader and even more catastrophic war in the region.

Western nations are also anxious about their nationals among the 242 hostages Hamas is holding captive in Gaza, he continued. “Listen to the public tone — and behind doors it is a little bit more explicit. We are losing public opinion in Europe and in a week or two we’ll start to lose governments in Europe. And after another week the friction with the Americans will emerge to the surface,” Barak said.[...]

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken pressed the case with Netanyahu and the Israeli war cabinet telling them they should now prioritize the protection of civilians in Gaza and minimize civilian casualties. Blinken’s efforts so far have been spurned by Netanyahu but Barak didn’t think the Israeli war cabinet would be able to fend off the Biden administration and Europeans for much longer.

7 Nov 23

[if-you-fan-a-fire]

"The Progressives’ design for the penitentiary did alter the system of incarceration. Their ideas on normalization, classification, education, labor, and discipline had an important effect upon prison administration. But in this field, perhaps above all others, innovation must not be confused with reform. Once again, rhetoric and reality diverged substantially. Progressive programs were adopted more readily in some states than in others, more often in industrialized and urban areas, less often in southern, border, and mountain regions. Nowhere, however, were they adopted consistently. One finds a part of the program in one prison, another part in a second or in a third. Change was piecemeal, not consistent, and procedures were almost nowhere implemented to the degree that reformers wished. One should think not of a Progressive prison, but of prisons with more or less Progressive features.

The change that would have first struck a visitor to a twentieth-century institution who was familiar with traditional practices, was the new style of prisoners’ dress. The day of the stripes passed, outlandish designs gave way to more ordinary dress. It was a small shift, but officials enthusiastically linked it to a new orientation for incarceration. In 1896 the warden of Illinois’s Joliet prison commented that inmates “should be treated in a manner that would tend to cultivate in them, spirit of self-respect, manhood and self-denial. . . , We are certainly making rapid headway, as is shown by the recently adopted Parole Law and the abolishment of prison stripes.” In 1906, the directors of the New Hampshire prison, eager to follow the dictates of the “science of criminology” and “the laws of modern prisons,” complained that “the old unsightly black and red convict suit is still used. . . . This prison garb is degrading to the prisoner and in modern prisons is no longer worn.” The uniform should be grey: “Modern prisons have almost without exception adopted this color.” The next year they proudly announced that the legislature had approved an appropriation of $700 to cover the costs of the turnover. By the mid-1930’s the Attorney General’s survey of prison conditions reported that only four states (all southern) still used striped uniforms. The rest had abandoned “the ridiculous costumes of earlier days.”

To the same ends, most penitentiaries abolished the lock step and the rules of silence. Sing-Sing, which had invented that curious shuffle, substituted a simple march. Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary, world famous for creating and enforcing the silent system, now allowed prisoners to talk in dining rooms, in shops, and in the yard. Odd variations on these practices also ended. “It had been the custom for years,” noted the New Hampshire prison directors, “not to allow prisoners to look in any direction except downward,” so that “when a man is released from prison he will carry with him as a result of this rule a furtive and hang-dog expression.” In keeping with the new ethos, they abolished the regulation.

Concomitantly, prisons allowed inmates “freedom of the yard,” to mingle, converse, and exercise for an hour or two daily. Some institutions built baseball fields and basketbaIl courts and organized prison teams. “An important phase in the care of the prisoner,” declared the warden of California’s Folsom prison, “is the provisions made for proper recreation. Without something to look forward to, the men would become disheartened. . . . Baseball is the chief means of recreation and it is extremely popular.” The new premium on exercise and recreation was the penitentiary’s counterpart to the Progressive playground movement and settlement house athletic clubs.

This same orientation led prisons to introduce movies. Sing Sing showed films two nights a week, others settled for once a week, and the warden or the chaplain usually made the choice. Folsom’s warden, for example, like to keep them light: “Good wholesome comedy with its laugh provoking qualities seems to be the most beneficial.” Radio soon appeared as well. The prisons generally established a central system, providing inmates with earphones in their cells to listen to the programs that the administration selected. The Virginia State Penitentiary allowed inmates to use their own sets, with the result that, as a visitor remarked “the institution looks like a large cob-web with hundreds of antennas, leads and groundwires strung about the roofs and around the cell block.”

Given a commitment to sociability, prisons liberalized rules of correspondence and visits. Sing-Sing placed no restrictions on the number of letters, San Quentin allowed one a day, the New Jersey penitentiary at Trenton permitted six a month. Visitors could now come to most prisons twice a month and some institutions, like Sing-Sing, allowed visits five times a month. Newspapers and magazines also enjoyed freer circulation. As New Hampshire’s warden observed in 1916: “The new privileges include newspapers, that the men may keep up with the events of the day, more frequent writing of letters and receiving of letters from friends, more frequent visits from relatives . . . all of which tend to contentment and the reestablishment of self-respect.’? All of this would make the prisoners’ “life as nearly normal as circumstances will permit, so that when they are finally given their liberty they will not have so great a gap to bridge between the life they have led here . . . and the life that we hope they are to lead.”

These innovations may well have eased the burden of incarceration. Under conditions of total deprivation of liberty, amenities are not to be taken lightly. But whether they could normalize the prison environment and breed self-respect among inmates is quite another matter. For all these changes, the prison community remained abnormal. Inmates simply did not look like civilians; no one would mistake a group of convicts for a gathering of ordinary citizens. The baggy grey pants and the formless grey jacket, each item marked prominently with a stenciled identification number, became the typical prison garb. And the fact that many prisons allowed the purchase of bits of clothing, such as a sweater or more commonly a cap, hardly gave inmates a better appearance. The new dress substituted one kind of uniform for another. Stripes gave way to numbers.

So too, prisoners undoubtedly welcomed the right to march or walk as opposed to shuffle, and the right to talk to each other without fear of penalty. But freedom of the yard was limited to an hour or two a day and it was usually spent in “aimless milling about.” Recreational facilities were generally primitive, and organized athletic programs included only a handful of men. More disturbing, prisoners still spent the bulk of non-working time in their cells. Even liberal prisons locked their men in by 5:30 in the afternoon and kept them shut up until the next morning. Administrators continued to censor mail, reading materials, movies, and radio programs; their favorite prohibitions involved all matter dealing with sex or communism. Inmates preferred eating together to eating alone in a cell. But wardens, concerned about the possibility of riots with so many inmates congregated together, often added a catwalk above the mess hall and put armed guards on patrol.

Prisoners may well have welcomed liberalized visiting regulations, but the encounters took place under trying conditions. Some prisons permitted an initial embrace, more prohibited all physical contact. The rooms were dingy and gloomy. Most institutions had the prisoner and his visitor talk across a table, generally separated by a glass or wire mesh. The more security-minded went to greater pains. At Trenton, for example, bullet-proof glass divided inmate from visitor; they talked through a perforated metal opening in the glass. Almost everywhere guards sat at the ends of the tables and conversations had to be carried on in a normal voice; anyone caught whispering would be returned to his cell. The whole experience was undoubtedly more frustrating than satisfying.

The one reform that might have fundamentally altered the internal organization of the prison, Osborne’s Mutual Welfare League, was not implemented to any degree at all. The League persisted for a few years at Sing-Sing, but a riot in 1929 gave guards and other critics the occasion to eliminate it. One couId argue that inmate self-rule under Osborne was little more than a skillful exercise in manipulation, allowing Osborne to cloak his own authority in a more benevolent guise. It is unnecessary, however, to dwell on so fine a point. Wardens were simply not prepared to give over any degree of power to inmates. After all, how could men who had already abused their freedom on the outside be trusted to exercise it on the inside? Administrators also feared, not unreasonably, that inmate rule would empower inmate gangs to abuse fellow prisoners. In brief, the concept of a Mutual Welfare League made little impact on prison systems throughout this period.

If prisons could not approximate a normal community, they fared no better in attempting to approximate a therapeutic community. Again, reform programs frequently did alter inherited practices but they inevitably fell far short of fulfilling expectations. Prisons did not warrant the label of hospital or school.

Starting in the 1910’s and even more commonly through the 1920's, state penitentiaries established a period of isolation and classification for entering inmates. New prisoners were confined to a separate building or cell block (or occasionally, to one institution in a complex of state institutions); they remained there for a two- to four-week period, took tests and underwent interviews, and then were placed in the general prison population. In the Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures: Prisons forty-five institutions in a sample of sixty followed such practices. Eastern State Penitentiary, for example, isolated newcomers for thirty days under the supervision of a classification committee made up of two deputy wardens, the parole officer, a physician, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, the educational director, the social service director, and two chaplains. The federal government’s new prison at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, opened in 1932 and, eager to employ the most modern principles, also followed this routine. All new prisoners were on “quarantine status,” and over the course of a month each received a medical examination, psychometric tests to measure his intelligence, and an interview with the Supervisor of Education. The Supervisor then decided on a program, subject to the approval of its Classification Board. All of this was to insure “that an integrated program . . . may lead to the most effective adjustment, both within the Institution and after discharge.”

It was within the framework of these procedures that psychiatrists and psychologists took up posts inside the prisons for the first time. The change can be dated precisely. By 1926, sixty-seven institutions employed psychiatrists: thirty-five of them made their appointments between 1920 and 1926. Of forty-five institutions having psychologists, twenty-seven hired them between 1920 and 1926. The innovation was quite popular among prison officials. “The only rational method of caring for prisoners,” one Connecticut administrator declared, “is by classifying and treating them according to scientific knowledge . . . [that] can only be obtained by the employment of the psychologist, the psychiatrist, and the physician.” In fact, one New York official believed it “very unfair to the inmate as well as to the institution to try and manage an institution of this type without the aid of a psychiatrist.”

Over this same period several states also implemented greater institutional specialization. Most noteworthy was their frequent isolation of the criminal insane from the general population. In 1904, only five states maintained prisons for the criminally insane; by 1930, twenty-four did. At the same time, reformatories for young first offenders, those between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five or sixteen and thirty, became increasingly popular. In 1904, eleven states operated such facilities; in 1930, eighteen did. Several states which constructed new prisons between 1900 and 1935 attempted to give each facility a specific assignment. No state pursued this policy more diligently than New York. It added Great Meadow (Comstock), and Attica to its chain of institutions, the first two to service minor offenders, the latter, for the toughest cases. New York‘s only rival was Pennsylvania. By the early 1930’s it ran a prison farm on a minimum security basis; it had a new Eastern State Penitentiary at Grateford and the older Western State Penitentiary at Pittsburgh for medium security; and it made the parent of all prisons, the Eastern State Penitentiary at Philadelphia, the maximum security institution. Some states with two penitentiaries which traditionally had served different geographic regions, now tried to distinguish them by class of criminals. In California, for instance, San Quentin was to hold the more hopeful cases, Folsom the hard core.

But invariably, these would-be therapeutic innovations had little effect on prison routines. They never managed to penetrate the system in any depth. Only a distinct minority of institutions attempted to implement such programs and even their efforts produced thin results. Change never moved beyond the superficial."

- David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America. Revised Edition. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2002 (1980), p. 128-134

[fatehbaz]

How is it that a small wedge of the South American continent, long claimed by a major European power and still administered by it, could present a profile of wilderness at the end of the twentieth century? How might this same location on the globe have proved useful for such an unlikely combination of purposes as the resettlement of convicted criminals and the launching of rockets?

French Guiana remains a remarkably insignificant artifact of the political landscape - rarely noticed by most of France, let alone anyone else - as well as one of the least settled regions of the world. It has also hosted two exceptional experiments of the French state: the historical penal colony known in English as “Devil's Island,” which operated between 1852 and 1946, and the contemporary space center that launches the European consortium rocket Ariane, responsible for transporting a good half of the commercial satellites orbiting our globe. [...] Its base, the Guiana Space Center (CSG), indeed lived up to its slogan, becoming “Europe's Spaceport,” a center of high technology near the equator. [...]

---

[T]he penal colony begins operation in the middle of the nineteenth century, partly as a substitute for a system of plantation slavery. It conceives of French Guiana as open land for agricultural settlement, fertile ground for a tropical - and French - Australia, where the action of moral reform can translate into a scheme of colonization. [...] [T]hese early hopes are belied by the high mortality of the convicts [...]. Despite periodic calls for reform and increasing international discomfort, the bagne lasts through World War II. It leaves a deep mark on French Guiana, in both symbolic and material terms. As the movement of seventy thousand exiles progresses, the surrounding landscape shifts from a luxuriant field of dreams into a tableau of terror. At the same time, the colony as a whole grows accustomed to the presence of this artificial prison world within it [...].

---

The space center begins operation in the second half of the twentieth century, in the midst of the Space Race and in the aftermath of the Algerian War. It conceives of French Guiana as open land for technical experiments and a gateway into equatorial orbit, an even more tropical - and French - Cape Canaveral. [...] [A] regular stream of technicians and engineers arrives to assemble and guide it into space. The initial mandate to provide France with a launch site expands into a focus on commercial satellites, and although local opposition to the project continues, the effects of the enterprise on French Guiana in both symbolic and material terms only deepen. As the Ariane rocket gains importance, the surrounding landscape transforms from an orphan of history into a handmaiden of the future. At the same time, the department grows accustomed to an increased infusion of consumer goods, technical personnel, and [...] a new island with an artificial environment and a powerfully altered social profile.

---

At slightly closer range a number of striking structural similarities emerge. Not only do both projects found towns (St. Laurent on the one hand and the new Kourou on the other), but both operate as rival poles of influence and authority relative to the civil administration of French Guiana. Each involves [...] its own hierarchies, its own links to bureaucratic networks in Paris, and its own claims to significant national French interests. Each [...] exerts considerable influence over the surrounding economy. Most crucially, each controls and orders a separate territory within the larger political entity; each has a spatial presence, a direct impact on the landscape. And tied to this spatial strategy, each comes to serve as a symbolic nexus in collective Metropolitan imagination. [...] One employs leftover forces of law and order, whereas the other employs highly trained technical personnel; thus [...] both [...] have ties to the military [...]. The penal colony imports the unwanted of France, whereas the space center imports the selected few. [...]

And the bagne reflects visions of an ancient underworld, whereas Ariane reflects visions of a new overworld. [...]

Many of the specific additional attributes of a desirable site for penal colonization (distance from the Metropole, possibility of confinement and surveillance, and prevention of local disturbance) find echoes in the specific additional attributes of a desirable site for launching rockets (distance from the Metropole, adequate security, adequate possibility of transport, and political stability).[...]

---

The penal colony takes shape at a crucial moment in European colonial understandings of place and labor. Slavery had just been abolished in the French Empire, and an accompanying understanding of work in terms of race had far from expended its interpretive force. [...] Work represented the route to a better future, to the growth of new, valuable lands. [...] If slavery were at an end, then the crucial question facing the colony was that of finding an alternative source of labor. During the period of the early penal colony we see this search for new slaves, not only in French Guiana, but also throughout colonies built on the plantation model. Thousands of Asian Indians and Chinese found their way to new homes in different corners of the British Empire, serving as contract laborers on plantations. [...]

Kourou [the space center] is a neutralized, controlled corner of the tropics, with much of its cultural fabric simply imported. Amid the restricted space of artificially cooled buildings and automobiles, in zones free of carrier mosquitoes and amply supplied with wine and cheese airlifted from France, the distance between Paris and Cayenne shortens; the effects of translation between them grow less clear. If the island mimics the mainland successfully, if Crusoe builds a little England - or France - is his task done? [...] To answer this question, let us return to a crucial turning point of Guyane's history: the aftermath of World War II and the period of formal empire. It was during this era that the natural, political, and moral space of French Guiana was neutralized through a combination of DDT spraying, departmentalization, and the final closing of the penal colony. In 1949, a former teacher [...] in Martinique published an overview of the new overseas departments and territories. His description of French Guiana includes a call to arms for its development, a development still conceived in terms of a need for [...] agriculture, and industry [...]. Gold mines aside, it seems that the method of painstaking labor is the only one really applicable at present. Incontestably, there is magnificent work to accomplish there, such as should tempt young men fond of broad horizons and adventure. The appeal is for an army of Crusoes, advancing ashore to improve their collective island. The questions of race and level of expertise filter through patterns of history and perceived practicality. But the call remains, the call of a wilderness inviting domestication.

---

All text above by: Peter Redfield. Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana. 2000. [Bold emphasis and some paragraph breaks/contractions added by me. Presented here for commentary, teaching, criticism purposes.]

[mariacallous]

The Farm Bill is a critical piece of legislation that reauthorizes the country’s agricultural and nutrition programs about every five years—and the 2024 version is now on legislators’ desks, with some major changes. 

Originally designed to support farmers, the Farm Bill has evolved over time to prioritize nutrition assistance, with the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) now comprising 76% of the budget—projected to increase to 84% in the current version. This shift underscores the growing emphasis on addressing food insecurity among low-income Americans, as SNAP currently serves over 42 million individuals, or about 12% of the population.

The 2024 Farm Bill will fund SNAP, agriculture subsidies, and crop insurance through 2029, at a projected cost of $1.5 trillion. However, as the first Farm Bill to exceed $1 trillion, it faces heightened scrutiny as both parties clash over the allocation of funding between SNAP, subsidies, and other key programs.  

The current version of the bill, introduced by the Republican-led House Agriculture Committee, has sparked controversy by proposing a $30 billion cut to SNAP funding over the next decade. This reduction would be achieved by limiting adjustments to the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP)—a low-cost, standardized estimate of the minimum cost of a nutritious diet, used to determine SNAP benefit levels—to inflation rates only.  

The TFP is reevaluated every five years to reflect current food costs. In 2021, the Biden administration reevaluated the TFP to respond to high food costs due to COVID-19 and supply chain issues in the global food industry, resulting in the largest-ever increase in SNAP benefits, totaling $256 billion. Now, Republicans are seeking to restrict future adjustments to reflect only inflation costs, marking the largest SNAP reduction in nearly three decades. But Democrats and researchers argue that such a restriction could have significant impacts on the 42 million SNAP recipients, including 17 million children, 6 million older adults, and 4 million people with disabilities.

Americans face rising food insecurity and barriers in accessing nutritious diets  

The proposed cuts, along with provisions to outsource program operations, could undermine SNAP’s ability to effectively combat food insecurity. This is especially concerning given that food insecurity rates rose to 13.5% of U.S. households in 2023, affecting 18 million families—a statistically significantly increase from 2022, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Food insecurity rates are notably higher for single-parent, female-headed households; Black and Latino or Hispanic households; and households in principal cities and rural areas. In addition, voters are growing increasingly worried about inflation and high food costs, with 70% citing food prices as a major concern. This view is especially pronounced among younger voters, who have been hit hard by a 20% surge in food costs since 2020, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  

In addition to concerns surrounding food insecurity and rising costs, the TFP debate risks being a superficial fix that overlooks deeper, more critical challenges low-income families face in accessing nutritious diets. A USDA study found that 88% of SNAP participants encounter challenges in maintaining a healthy diet, with 61% citing the high cost of healthy foods as a key barrier. Other reasons include a lack of time to prepare meals at home and transportation difficulties in accessing healthy foods.  

Access barriers—combined with broader economic factors such as regional variations in real food prices and other costs of living, shifts in food composition data, changing consumption patterns, and updated dietary guidance—significantly impact low-income households’ ability to maintain affordable, nutritious diets. Addressing such factors is crucial for creating a more sustainable and impactful SNAP program, yet they remain sidelined in favor of quick, inflation-focused approaches that do little to address systemic barriers to healthy food access for vulnerable families.

The proposed $30 billion cut to SNAP funding over the next decade by restricting the USDA’s authority to adjust the TFP beyond inflation rates will have serious and multidimensional challenges for these low-income, food-insecure households. In addition, the bill’s proposal to outsource core SNAP operations to private entities could create complications in the application process and eligibility criteria, while also increasing federal costs by $1 million.  

Notably, the current version of the bill proposes to expand SNAP’s purpose to include the prevention of diet-related chronic diseases. Critics, such as the HEAL (Health, Environment, Agriculture, Labor) Food Alliance, argue that this risks diverting attention away from SNAP’s core mission of reducing food insecurity, and instead shifts the focus to diet-related concerns facing low-income populations. Yet these diet-related concerns are often a result of multifaceted challenges such as stress (or “bandwidth poverty”), food insecurity, and other factors such households face. The current version of the bill also proposes to cut climate-focused conservation efforts introduced by the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Proposed changes to agricultural subsidies have sparked equity concerns 

The proposed Farm Bill aims to reallocate funds by raising price floors for key agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat, and soybeans, while cutting SNAP funding. A large portion of the increased spending is directed toward farm programs and crop insurance—raising concerns about equity and the disproportionate benefits to large, wealthy farms. 

A report from the American Enterprise Institute highlights this disparity, revealing that the top 10% of farms receive 56.4% of all crop insurance subsidies, with the top 5% receiving 36.4%. Since these subsidies are not means-tested—and the level of subsidies is directly proportional to an agri-business’s production levels—the wealthiest and largest businesses capture the most significant share of these benefits. Research from the Environmental Working Group confirms evidence on the concentration of these subsidies toward the wealthiest agri-business owners. They found that between 1995 and 2021, the top 1% of recipients received 27% of the total $478 billion in farm subsidies—underscoring the disproportionate benefits to large-scale, wealthy farmers. Moreover, these subsidies favor a narrow range of commodity crops such as corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton, which accumulates benefits to white, wealthy farmers while farmers of color receive little support. This inequitable allocation of resources raises important questions about the Farm Bill’s broader social and economic implications.  

The Government Accountability Office and Congressional Budget Office have proposed reforms to the current inequitable structure of these subsidies. Such reforms have the potential to reduce the fiscal deficit while protecting rights of farmers, ensuring food assistance to low-income populations, and maintaining price levels of key commodities. Reforms include implementing income limits on premium subsidies for wealthy farmers, adjusting compensation for insurance companies to reflect market rates, and reducing taxpayer reimbursements for administrative costs.

SNAP benefits aren’t keeping up with the true costs of a healthy diet 

A critical aspect of SNAP that is often overlooked in fiscal policy debates is the economic adequacy of the program’s benefits. There is a growing body of research suggesting that SNAP benefits in their current form are insufficient to cover the “real” cost of a healthy diet. 

In other words, the TFP might not truly reflect the real value of food costs low-income households face. The TFP was originally intended to represent the minimum food expenditure basket that would allow low-income households to avoid food insecurity. It is not necessarily based on the most recent scientific methodologies that factor in food prices, accessibility, and dietary needs.  

Recent evaluations have shown that the TFP often underestimates the cost of a nutritious diet, particularly in areas with higher living costs. An Urban Institute study found that despite food price inflation moderating in 2023, SNAP benefits remained inadequate for covering food costs: By the end of 2023, the average modestly priced meal cost $3.37, which was 19% more than the average maximum SNAP benefit of $2.84. Families with zero net income faced a shortfall of $49.29 per month by the end of the year, with urban areas experiencing a 28% gap between meal costs and SNAP benefits, compared to 17% in rural areas. In the five counties with the largest gaps, the shortfall exceeded 70% throughout the year. 

Recent economic research indicates that current SNAP benefits often fall short of covering the actual cost of a low-budget, healthy diet, with significant variations in benefit adequacy across U.S. regions. Researchers have found that these geographic variations in SNAP purchasing power significantly affect welfare outcomes such as child health and food insecurity. Despite deductions for housing and child care, many regions face much higher real costs of food, and SNAP dollars do not go far in such high-cost areas. To ensure equitable support, social scientists have put forth proposals to index SNAP benefits to local area food prices.   

Therefore, the proposed cuts to SNAP funding risk exacerbating systemic and multidimensional challenges low-income populations already face. Concerns about food insecurity and diet-related chronic diseases are symptomatic of deeper systemic challenges related to health insurance access, stress and bandwidth poverty, access to healthy foods, the higher cost of healthy foods, and structural oligopolies in the American food industry. Research suggests that SNAP inadequacy is linked to worse health outcomes, such as increased risk of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension. Yet instead of focusing on deeper systemic issues, the current Farm Bill proposes a quick fix, Band-Aid solution by proposing to cut SNAP funding further.

Policy recommendations for a stronger Farm Bill 

Despite proposing massive cuts to SNAP, increasing inequitable farm subsidies, and cutting climate funding for conservation efforts, the 2024 Farm Bill does lay out some positive measures. These include raising the income cutoff for SNAP eligibility (the Earned Income Deduction) from 20% to 22% of income, which will ensure more households just at the margin of earned income now have access to SNAP benefits. It proposes to give benefits access to individuals with drug-related convictions, who were previously excluded. Further, it proposes to extend the age limit for high school students on SNAP from 18 to 22 years, allowing students to work without disincentivizing income for eligibility. However, despite these positives, the proposed cuts and other changes could undermine the Farm Bill’s effectiveness in addressing food insecurity and equity concerns in agricultural subsidies.  

The proposed cuts based on restricting SNAP increases to only reflect inflation diverge significantly from academic research underscoring that the TFP should be updated regularly to factor in food prices, consumption patterns, and nutritional guidelines. While this measure could save $29 billion between 2025 and 2033, it will further dampen SNAP’s purchasing power as food costs continue to rise and vary across regions. 

The polarization of the Farm Bill reflects a broader ideological divide over the role of welfare in American society. Republicans have historically advocated for limited assistance and stricter work requirements for SNAP recipients. In contrast, Democrats have historically perceived welfare programs such as SNAP as essential tools for reducing poverty and inequality, and advocated for expanded benefits and more coverage.  

Politicians need to look beyond this ideological gap and focus instead on creating a more equitable and effective Farm Bill that addresses society’s economic and welfare needs. A zero-sum approach that pits agricultural interests against the needs of food-insecure, low-income consumers is not proving to be effective.  

What follows are key policy recommendations for crafting an inclusive and equitable Farm Bill that addresses the economic and welfare needs of vulnerable populations, including low-income households and underrepresented farmers. 

Evidence-based SNAP adjustments: Use scientific methodologies to measure the TFP’s adequacy and issue frequent and regular updates to SNAP benefits. Factors that impact the TFP beyond inflation include other costs of living, regional variations in SNAP adequacy, food consumption patterns, and healthy diet guidelines. 

Index benefits to reflect local economic conditions: Implement regional cost-of-living adjustments to SNAP benefits, which can address disparities in food costs and improve equity across geographic regions.  

Expand access to healthy foods: Invest in initiatives that improve access to healthier food options, such as affordable farmers markets, community gardens, and incentives for retailers in underserved areas to improve food access and support local economies.  

Rebalance agricultural subsidies: Impose income limits on farm subsidies and expand efforts to improve subsidy access for small-scale and BIPOC farmers.   

Integrate climate goals: Allocate funding for climate-resilient agricultural practices and provide financial assistance and incentives to small-scale and BIPOC farmers to invest in such technologies.  

Foster bipartisan collaboration: Encourage cooperation across party lines to create a Farm Bill that balances agricultural support with food assistance—recognizing their interdependence rather than treating them as competing interests. 

Engage stakeholders: Involve farmers, nutrition advocates, and SNAP recipients in the legislative process to ensure policies reflect the needs and realities of those directly impacted. 

The 2024 Farm Bill represents a critical opportunity for Congress to craft a more equitable and inclusive policy that addresses the dual needs of supporting agricultural production as well as nutrition assistance. However, as it currently stands, proposals such as the $30 billion cut to SNAP funding, the shift in focus toward preventing diet-related diseases, and the continued expansion of agricultural subsidies that disproportionately benefit white, wealthy farmers and a limited number of commodity crops risk undermining SNAP’s response to food insecurity and worsening inequality in the agriculture sector. 

Policymakers must look beyond zero-sum dynamics that pit agricultural subsidies against nutrition assistance, when the fundamental issues farmers and low-income households face are symptomatic of deeper systemic inequalities in the economic and welfare structures of fiscal policy. Therefore, rather than continuing to concentrate support in the hands of wealthy, large-scale agricultural producers, the Farm Bill should prioritize uplifting smaller, diverse farmers and ensuring low-income households have the resources they need to access nutritious food. Encouraging small-scale and low-income BIPOC farmers to invest in green technology is also essential, as this would foster more sustainable agricultural practices while supporting communities’ economic growth. At the same time, Congress must ensure that commodity prices remain stable and affordable, preventing further economic burdens on consumers. 

An equitable and welfare-focused Farm Bill would embrace a broader vision—one that balances the needs of both rural farming communities and urban, food-insecure families. By aligning agricultural subsidies with sustainable practices and expanding SNAP’s effectiveness, Congress can craft a policy that not only strengthens food security, but also builds a more just, resilient, and environmentally responsible food system for all Americans.