#Revolutionary France game

[damez1979]

Arno's Darkest Hour: Expelled From the Brotherhood?

[lil-gingerbread-queen]

I'm losing my fucking mind.

In the last years, my university has been tagged multiple times with racist and neo-nazi symbols. The local of our union against racism and pro lgbtq+ was destroyed multiple times. Nothing was done, but a bit of paint to cover it up. No investigation. No punishment. And when I vocalised my discomfort, I was told it was nothing, just "immature young people trying to get attention".

Last year, the prefect of Paris authorized a Neo-Nazis' protest. Neo-Nazis walked in Paris, freely, as if it's not illegal to express racism or nazi rhetoric in this country. People weren't happy, so the prefete said it would not happen again.

Well, for the 21st of April, multiple protests against racism were organized all around France, and, they were not authorized by the authorities. The same prefect that let, a year ago, Neo-Nazis in the street of Paris, refused to let a protest against racism walk those same streets. He said "It's antisemitic. They support Palestine, they are antisemitic.". Yeah, take us for idiots, the protest against racism is going to be too antisemitic but not the Neo-Nazis you let walk around (and we know he would do it again).

And now, we have Sciences Po, one of the most reputable universities in our country, joining the movement the USAmerican students have started. The Sorbonne, another reputable university, followed. The French gov and media cried about it, called them "terrorists", "uneducated", "revolutionaries" (this one is crazy and really shows the fascism behind it all. We are in France, being revolutionary is NOT a bad thing in our culture. Wtf would you use "revolutionary" negatively in France, unless you are an oppressor?!!!) Students who are calling for the end of Genocide and just sitting on the ground! The cops were sent and dragged them out. For information, the cops CANNOT intervene in an university in France without the authorization of the president of this university. Not even the gov can make the cops enter an university, it's illegal. When students protest inside an university, people don't like seeing the cops being send after them. Two reasons: 1- students have often protest and help for the quality of life of everyone in French history, 2- WWII's trauma, Nazis stormed French universities because they were hiding Jews and resistants. Like, they are straight up acting like the Nazis, again. And the city of Paris wants to cut the budget they give to those two universities to punish them for not keeping their students in line. So, freedom of speech? GONE.

Students are protesting against a massacre, and they are calling them antisemitic. People standing against racism is antisemitic. But not the people branding Neo-Nazi symbols and chanting Neo-Nazi slogans. They don't move if you are branding a swastika, which is illegal, but will if you are branding Palestine's flag, which is not (yet). They let a political party founded with a SS go around and act nice, but the ones asking for the end of a massacre are the Nazis. Make sense.

So, I'm fucking pissed. I'm fucking pissed because I was told to "calm down" when I couldn't stand the antisemitism paint on my university, when I couldn't stand being friendly with the students that did or support that (because I did meet one). I was told to ignore antisemitism and I refused, and now, they call me antisemitic for standing with Palestinians?! How dare they when they tried to gaslight me so I would ignore the antisemitism in front of me?!

They don't care about jewish people! It's not about jewish people or the jewish faith, it's about white supremacy!

The people have already planned to protest during the Olympic Games, because the French gov is going full fascism lately (everyday, we wake up to more bs), and I hope with all my heart that we ruin the event at least (which would harm them financially), and at best, we get rid of the government and this 5th republic.

[poz-patrol]

[genderkoolaid]

I know someone who calls herself a feminist, puts her pronouns in her work email signature, donates money to women’s empowerment funds, and thinks we should deport more refugees. I also know someone who calls people ‘pussies’ when he plays video games, who doesn’t know what a pronoun is, and, for his defence of low-wage women workers in a highly-exploited industry, is a better, more strident defender of the rights of working-class women than almost anyone else I know. Of these two people, I know who is on my team, and who I want on my team, yet the standard liberal feminist calculation would have me chose the woman who loves a little deportation over the man who is occasionally uncouth, solely because the woman knows to keep her language civil, and the man doesn’t. Liberal feminists get incredibly caught up in the politics of language, because language is all they have. They don’t have a revolutionary programme for overthrowing patriarchy, so they’re forced to tinker around the edges of it, quibbling over word choice and jargon instead of building the coalitions necessary for destroying patriarchy.

— We Should Not All Be Feminists by Frances Wright

[kazz-brekker]

been very slowly watching the movie the last duel in between work shifts for the last fays and i respect that unlike other period dramas that try to make people attractive and dressed in a way that appeals to modern viewers this one is just gives all the men absolutely terrible haircuts and covers them in dirt. other thoughts include: i greatly enjoy when movies are split into chapters and also told from the perspective of unreliable narrators so this is up my alley, jodie comer is ethereal and i'm obsessed with marguerite's hairstyle with the hoops of braids around her ears, ben affleck is honestly giving an extremely good performance as a medieval airhead, the lack of commitment to accent is STUNNING (there has been MAYBE one character who had a french accent?? but she only had one line of dialogue so it was hard to tell) and this movie is mostly very grim and heavy but i find a measure of entertainment in watching the king of france's expressions whenever he turns up and how obvious it is he just really wants to watch two guys fight to the death.

[alaiis]

So I want to talk about the Olympic games opening ceremony.

Apparently it's been watched by 1 billion people around the world, so this spectacle promoting queer relationships, women and revolutionary ideals must show quite a progressive picture of France. The fact that so many fascists are crying over it must make it good, right? Right?

We saw statues of important women in the ceremony, like Simone Veil, Louise Michèle and others. I'd like to remind people that today, many of these women would be on the file compiling terrorists and potential terrorists. You know, like so many people who happen to be leftist activists and learned they would not be able to work for the Olympic games or attend them when they tried. For past acts of activism that date years and never resulted in convictions most of the time.

All around the ceremony, LVMH, that luxury brand, was everywhere. Bernard Arnault (currently richest man on earth) surely grabbed the spot for these games. What a great ad for his brand.

The ceremony, which was presented as a "street ceremony for the people" actually only included a few privileged people able to spend 2,000€. The city was empty. The city is empty.

They locked up kilometres and kilometres of the city, where only few can go. Paris is barricaded. Some hospitals have become inaccessible.

They sacked so many homeless people so that the tourists wouldn't see them. Who knows where they are now. They sacked students from their homes too, before even the end of exams. And when the police came and took their rooms, they complained about the housing conditions. Well that's how our students live all year, but that's not a problem then.

And then I could talk about the surveillance conditions, Macron's friendship with the worst world leaders, that they tried (and failed) to make the Seine swimmable by spending billions on it meanwhile people in the colonies over-sea regions still don't have drinkable water. I could speak about the work conditions, that most of the work was made with undocumented workers and so. Much. More.

But that would be a very long post.

So after seeing this opening ceremony and all the great, progressive messages it carried, what you need to remember is this.

France is a police state.

France is a classist country.

France almost elected the far-right to power less than a month ago, and the far-right is still more powerful than ever.

France is a queerphobic country. And a very, very transphobic country.

France is a racist country, where Arabs get murdered while barely making regional news.

France is nothing like what we showed.

That was propaganda at its finest.

[alpaca-clouds]

Let me talk Church and the Revolution

Okay, let me post this preemptively. Because I already know that soon enough those people looking for reasons to hate on Castlevania Nocturne because it is not like the games will also come to cry a river about "they depict the church as evil!!!!"

So, let me quickly talk about the role of the church in the French Revolution. Because there is something you gotta understand about the Church during the French revolution: That there was not THE Church.

Basically within the Catholic church in France there was a fracture over the entire revolution happening. A lot of the higher ranked clergy men stood on the side of the nobles and royals, while a lot of the lower ranked clergymen stood with the revolutionaries. The reason behind that mostly was money.

See, before the revolution the church was allowed to collect taxes themselves, while also being tax exempt. So they did not have to pay taxes on all the stuff they sold and made to the nobility. Which was why the bishops and general higher ups within the church could have the lavish lifestyle of nobility themselves, often of course ignoring their vows.

Meanwhile a lot of lower clergy (and especially certain groups of monks - especially the franciscans) were like: "We are all equal in the eyes of god. Rich folks do not get into heaven. Equality is what god wanted from us" and supported the revolution because of it.

But of course there was also the thing that the show mentioned: Given the show is set in summer it seems (probably just before the Reign of Terror) it would have been not even a year before that a lot of clergy got slaughtered. Why did they get slaughtered?

Well, short explanation: Royalists and also some of the bishops provoked the war with Prussia in an attempt to overthrow the revolutionary forces with the help of the Prussian military. This of course failed and the revolutionaries were out for blood. So nobles fled into the churches for sanctuary. And in retaliation a lot of clergy died for haboring the nobles in question.

And, yeah. There is of course the other aspect: The church at the time for a lot of historcal and religious reasons very much supported slavery. Meanwhile this is already a point where the revolution at large had decided that slavery should be done away with. And that leads to what we see in the show here: Clergy going on about the revolution being against "the natural order".

(Being frank: I LOVE that they brought this into the show. Which is almost like a whole other thing I could write about. The entire idea of the revolution and the "natural order" and how it is all linked to colonialism.)

Another interesting part here is the order the abbot and Mizrak are from. On the Castlevania discord server I already went into a whole thing trying to figure that out, but my last idea was right: They are from the Knights Hospitaller. The order of St. John.

This order arose during the crusades and as the name Knights Hospitaller suggests: Yeah, they mostly created hospitals (though historically those were not only to cure the sick, but also to be a home - "hospitality" - for those on the road). They were based in Jerusalem for a while, but ended up moving to Malta, which was of course for a long while ruled by France. They referenced here that the Abbot came to France from Malta, which is the reason.

But yeah, they actually were about helping people for the most part. But they also made money from it. And when the revolution came, they seized all the assets from the order, which made the order join into the ranks of clergy who stood against the revolution by 1792.

[honestlyboringperson]

Persona 5 AU anyone? No? Just me? That’s fine.

Anyways, welcome to an AU that’s been bouncing around my head for nearly a year now! It was inspired by @/chrisrin’s take on the MCYT x Persona series as well as @/scruffyturtle’s ACAU! Go check ‘em out!

Team B.E.S.T.

The Scottage + Gem

Fairy Fort

Magical Mountain + Cub

More Information is under the cut!

Grian - “Ace” - The Sun Arcana - Lafayette/Eris

Grian is a college student working for a degree in architecture. He lives with in roommate Mumbo and does journalling and photography as a hobby. For some odd reason however, he can’t seem to remember anything about his past beyond simply going to college, doing a part time job, and spending time with his cousin and friends. This is because Grian isn’t really human. In this AU, the Watchers take the role of Yaldaboath, and created Grian to begin the mental shutdown cases to scare people into looking for someone to look towards. In this case, The Watcher Cult (Called the Pupils) for the Watchers to take control. During his creation, false memories were implanted in certain people in the Pupils for Grian to more seamlessly appear. But unbeknownst to them, the Velvet Room interfered and erased Grian’s memories of his purpose.

Anyways, onto the personas, Grian’s persona is Lafayette, a key figure in the American Revolutionary War and the French Revolution. In both wars, he was known to lead his armies in decisive battles of the war to secure their victory. Even today, he’s celebrated as a hero in both France and in the US. This fits in with canon Grian’s habit of rebelling against any governmental entity that’s in the Hermitcraft server (although he is currently the government) l

His Ultimate persona is Eris, the Greek goddess of chaos and strife. She was the instigator of the Trojan war, where she threw at apple at Aphrodite, Hera, and Athena. She stated that it was for the “fairest goddess” and one thing led to another, and several kingdoms are now at war with each other. Wow, starting a war for shits and giggles? That sounds like Grian!

Jimmy - “Sheriff” - The Fool Arcana - Black Bart/Baldr

Grian’s cousin and charmingly unlucky, Jimmy is often the target of teasing. He’s the one to egg Grian on to actually go to class instead of just doing the online assignments. He’s personally seeking a degree in education, and is a stickler for the rules he agrees with. Unbeknownst to him, he was a victim of the Pupils and one of the people that had false memories implanted in him. He’s extremely excited about being a phantom thief, but his joyous excitement will be tested through the story.

His Persona is Black Bart, an American Outlaw who is known for the poetic messages he left behind after two of his stagecoach robberies. He is considered a gentleman bandit with a flair for style and sophistication. He brandished a shotgun, but was noted to never fire it during his robberies. He was famed to the point there is an annual parade in Redwood Valley, California where there is a Black Bart Parade where he is played and portrayed as a stereotypical Old West Villain.

Anyways, Baldr is Jimmy’s Ultimate Persona. Baldr is a Norse god, and was well loved by everyone in the Aesir. He had a prophetic dream where everything is destroyed and gets terrified. His mother then makes everything in existence to personally promise her they won’t hurt him, rendering him near indestructible. But there was one thing that didn’t promise his mother; mistletoe. Loki kills Baldr when the other gods made a game where they throw countless weapons at the newly indestructible Baldr where he throws a spear made of mistletoe at him. He was the metaphorical “canary in the mine” due to his death being the first domino that trigger Ragnarok. Baldr only returns from the dead after Ragnarok throughly destroys everything.

Impulse - “Rook” - The Hierophant Arcana - Wayland/Hephaestus

Impulse owns a small prop weapons company where he forges and creates prop weapons in his own garage. He is coined the “dad” of the group, but would let a stupid scheme play out if he thinks it’s going to be funny. Unknown to anyone but his close friends (Skizz, Gem, and Pearl), but Impulse has a criminal record. He once worked under the one of the biggest mafia families in the country, and he was caught by the police after his teammates from the mafia abandoned him and used him to distract the cops. Ever since then, Impulse has been secretly trying to locate his former teammates to enact revenge on them.

Wayland is Impulse’s persona. Wayland was a blacksmith who was enslaved under a king. He had revenge on the king by killing both his sons and built wings to escape the king. Afterwards, he supplied weapons to several other people in myths and stories such as Charlemagne and his paladin as well as Beowulf as their weapons maker. Impulse is an advocate for burying the hatchet after using the hatchet to brutally destroy those who wronged him.

Impulse’s Ultimate Persona is Hephaestus, the Greek god of the forge and blacksmiths. After being thrown off Mount Olympus, he swore revenge on Hera. He enacted said revenge by trapping her on top of a golden throne that made her unable to get up. Not only in this story, but also in tales such as Aphrodite’s affair, he is noted to be very vengeful and will not yield unless his demands are reached.

Martyn - “Knave” - The Judgement Arcana - Atlantis/Judas

Martyn is a stagehand in the local theatre known for his friendly and amiable demeanour. However, under that cheery demeanour is a burning desire for revenge. Martyn’s parents were devout worshippers of the Watchers and worked under the Pupils. He was subjected to several grievances due to his parents volunteering him for the Pupil’s experiments and abuses. Ever since he’s escaped, he has focused on destroying the cult. He’s been working as a grey hat hacker to clients with varying levels of morality to get money and further his research on the cult.

Martyn is the navigator of the team with his persona Atlantis. Atlantis was a city that was sunk beneath the sea for being too greedy. It was noted to possess technology that surpassed the technology of times and even to this day, it’s still being searched for. The people were of divine descent, and lost their humility as they became more human after each generation.

Martyn’s ultimate persona is Judas. Judas was one of the original disciples for the Big J, and sold out him out for 30 pieces of silver. Martyn’s story in this AU revolves around his grudge against the Pupils and the Watchers, so his persona is someone who betrayed a religious figurehead.

Mumbo - “Vamp” - The Hermit Arcana - Galileo/Thoth

Mumbo is Grian’s roommate and a self proclaimed “spoon”. He is working towards a degree in Computer Science and is often found tinkering with old technology in his room, often to the point him and Grian step on loose screws and pieces of plastic on a weekly basis. Much like Jimmy, he had false memories of Grian implanted in him, which would come into conflict when the origins of Grian is revealed. This was because the main reason he joined the Phantom Thieves was out of concern for Grian. According to him, the day he turned 18 is when his signature moustache just grew spontaneously.

Mumbo’s persona is Galileo, the father of modern science and the scientific method. His studies were considered blasphemous against the church and he was sentenced to house arrest. Even though he was imprisoned, he still had faith in his discoveries and continued his studies within the confines of his house,

His Ultimate Persona is Thoth, the Egyptian God of the moon, wisdom, knowledge, writing, hieroglyphs, and judgement. He’s associated with Hermes and due to the connection, created the epithet Trismegestus. He is someone who solves his issues with diplomacy and reason instead of pure power and strength.

[secretmellowblog]

Okay, here are some random panels I’m personally looking forward to at the online Les mis convention Barricadescon starting tomorrow!! (note that this off the top of my head, and they’re in no particular order, and that I am excited for all of em.)

(Also note that it’s the last day to register, which you can do on their site here. You can also see the full program of all the panels/their descriptions here.)

1. I’ll say any of the Guests of Honor (Jean Baptiste Hugo, the descendant of Hugo will be talking about his project photographing his ancestor’s house; Christina Soontornvat, author of the award-winning Les Mis retelling “A Wish in the Dark;” and Luciano Muriel, playwright of a 2018 play about Grantaire.)

2. @psalm22-6 ‘s panel “Early Transformative Works,” which is about the earliest Les Mis retellings, parodies, and “fanfics” from the 1800s/early 20th century. They’ve shared deeply cursed sneak peeks with me. Apparently in 1863 a man wrote a “proper Christian” retelling of Les Mis where Javert is reimagined as a proper Christian woman following poor criminals around giving them charity while they keep rejecting her kindness. Powerful. Javert as Mary Sue. (Note that I may be explaining poorly because I haven’t seen the panel yet.

3. History podcaster David Montgomery’s panel “The Yellow Passport: Surveillance and Control in 19th Century France,” which dives into the role of the police and strategies of government surveillance at the time Les Mis is set!

4. My own panel “Why Is There a Roller Coaster in Les Mis,” which I shared the first five minutes of here. There’s an actual scene in Les Mis where Fantine rides a roller coaster so I made a full defunctland video on how that roller coaster got to Paris in 1817, the fascinating historical context behind early roller coasters, and why it became defunct.

5. @thecandlesticksfromlesmis ‘s panel “Beat for Beat,” analyzing the script of Les Mis 2012 and contrasting it with the book and musical. Discussion of 2012 is almost overwhelmingly always about its music or cinematography, and I’m fascinated to hear someone finally analyzing the screenplay/ structural changes.

6. Morbidly curious for “Lee’s Miserables,” the academic panel discussing the paradoxical popularity of a censored version Les Mis in the Confederate South (with all the references to the evils of slavery carefully removed of course)

7. “Barricades as a Tactic,” a panel discussing how barricades actually functioned as a tool of warfare historically and the echoes of them in the modern day.

8. All the little social meetups, including the Preliminary Gaieties drinking game!

9. I’m biased because I’m also helping present this one, but the @lesmisletters panel (on the Dracula-daily inspired Les Mis readalong happening now.)

10. “The Fallibility of History in Les Miserables,” by @syrupsyche. It’s a panel analyzing the way Hugo often treats Les mis as a story that he learned about through research/gossip, rather than a fictional narrative— analyzing where Hugo does that in the text and what it means thematically.

11. The Unknown Light Examined, by Madeleine— a panel analyzing the chapter where the Bishop confronts the elderly revolutionary, and is forced to re examine his political beliefs! An iconic chapter, and the abstract is very compelling.

But also a lot more, check out the exhaustive list here XD. And also register at this link!

[scalproie]

tag people you want to get to know better

was tagged by @aztarion teeheehee thankies jez mwah💖💖💖

tagging: mmmh. @kazooyah @kazamajun @shiroboom @solidsnakecake @gothpirates @zenyamin @purgetrooperfox @ntaras but no rush or pressure tho it's just for fun

last song: Devil's Child - Judas Priest

currently watching: I finally picked up revolutionary girl utena up again 🥹 (im so sorry it took so long drake)

three ships: kazjun, subscorp and uuuuuuh jarthur (not even really a ship let alone romantic, its more like. an experience now)

favorite color: lmao

currently consuming: sour cream and onion pringles

first ship: PROBABLY vegebul back in middle school

place of birth: brittany

current location: south france✌️

relationship status: I dont really care

last movie: Slay The Princess which is totally a movie and not a game I cannot play right now

currently working on: like four different aus I need to put into words now. playing laughing having fun👍 also getting the crystal heart in my new hollow knight save

[mariacallous]

“How much evil we must do in order to do good,” the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr wrote in 1946. “This, I think, is a very succinct statement of the human situation.” Niebuhr was writing after one global war had forced the victors to do great evil to prevent the incalculably greater evil of a world ruled by its most aggressive regimes. He was witnessing the onset of another global conflict in which the United States would periodically transgress its own values in order to defend them. But the fundamental question Niebuhr raised—how liberal states can reconcile worthy ends with the unsavory means needed to attain them—is timeless. It is among the most vexing dilemmas facing the United States today.

U.S. President Joe Biden took office pledging to wage a fateful contest between democracy and autocracy. After Russia invaded Ukraine, he summoned like-minded nations to a struggle “between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.” Biden’s team has indeed made big moves in its contest with China and Russia, strengthening solidarity among advanced democracies that want to protect freedom by keeping powerful tyrannies in check. But even before the war between Hamas and Israel presented its own thicket of problems, an administration that has emphasized the ideological nature of great-power rivalry was finding itself ensnared by a morally ambiguous world.

In Asia, Biden has bent over backward to woo a backsliding India, a communist Vietnam, and other not so liberal states. In Europe, wartime exigencies have muted concerns about creeping authoritarianism on NATO’s eastern and southern fronts. In the Middle East, Biden has concluded that Arab dictators are not pariahs but vital partners. Defending a threatened order involves reviving the free-world community. It also, apparently, entails buttressing an arc of imperfect democracies and outright autocracies across much of the globe.

Biden’s conflicted strategy reflects the realities of contemporary coalition building: when it comes to countering China and Russia, democratic alliances go only so far. Biden’s approach also reflects a deeper, more enduring tension. American interests are inextricably tied to American values: the United States typically enters into great-power competition because it fears mighty autocracies will otherwise make the world unsafe for democracy. But an age of conflict invariably becomes, to some degree, an age of amorality because the only way to protect a world fit for freedom is to court impure partners and engage in impure acts.

Expect more of this. If the stakes of today’s rivalries are as high as Biden claims, Washington will engage in some breathtakingly cynical behavior to keep its foes contained. Yet an ethos of pure expediency is fraught with dangers, from domestic disillusion to the loss of the moral asymmetry that has long amplified U.S. influence in global affairs. Strategy, for a liberal superpower, is the art of balancing power without subverting democratic purpose. The United States is about to rediscover just how hard that can be.

A DIRTY GAME

Biden has consistently been right about one thing: clashes between great powers are clashes of ideas and interests alike. In the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years’ War was fueled by doctrinal differences no less than by the struggle for European primacy. In the late eighteenth century, the politics of revolutionary France upheaved the geopolitics of the entire continent. World War II was a collision of rival political traditions—democracy and totalitarianism—as well as rival alliances. “This was no accidental war,” German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop declared in 1940, “but a question of the determination of one system to destroy the other.” When great powers fight, they do so not just over land and glory. They fight over which ideas, which values, will chart humanity’s course.

In this sense, U.S. competition with China and Russia is the latest round in a long struggle over whether the world will be shaped by liberal democracies or their autocratic enemies. In World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, autocracies in Eurasia sought global primacy by achieving preeminence within that central landmass. Three times, the United States intervened, not just to ensure its security but also to preserve a balance of power that permitted the survival and expansion of liberalism—to “make the world safe for democracy,” in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s words. President Franklin Roosevelt made a similar point in 1939, saying, “There comes a time in the affairs of men when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments, and their very civilization are founded.” Yet as Roosevelt understood, balancing power is a dirty game.

Western democracies prevailed in World War II only by helping an awful tyrant, Joseph Stalin, crush an even more awful foe, Adolf Hitler. They used tactics, such as fire-bombing and atomic-bombing enemy cities, that would have been abhorrent in less desperate times. The United States then waged the Cold War out of conviction, as President Harry Truman declared, that it was a conflict “between alternative ways of life���; the closest U.S. allies were fellow democracies that made up the Western world. Yet holding the line in a high-stakes struggle also involved some deeply questionable, even undemocratic, acts.

In a Third World convulsed by instability, the United States employed right-wing tyrants as proxies; it suppressed communist influence through coups, covert and overt interventions, and counterinsurgencies with staggering death tolls. To deter aggression along a global perimeter, the Pentagon relied on the threat of using nuclear weapons so destructive that their actual employment could serve no constructive end. To close the ring around the Soviet Union, Washington eventually partnered with another homicidal communist, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong. And to ease the politics of containment, U.S. officials sometimes exaggerated the Soviet threat or simply deceived the American people about policies carried out in their name.

Strategy involves setting priorities, and U.S. officials believed that lesser evils were needed to avoid greater ones, such as communism running riot in vital regions or democracies failing to find their strength and purpose before it was too late. The eventual payoff from the U.S. victory in the Cold War—a world safer from autocratic predation, and safer for human freedom, than ever before—suggests that they were, on balance, correct. Along the way, the fact that Washington was pursuing such a worthy objective, against such an unworthy opponent, provided a certain comfort with the conflict’s ethical ambiguities. As NSC-68, the influential strategy document Truman approved in 1950, put it (quoting Alexander Hamilton), “The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief.” When the West was facing a totalitarian enemy determined to remake humanity in its image, some pretty ugly means could, apparently, be justified.

That comfort wasn’t infinite, however, and the Cold War saw fierce fights over whether the United States was getting its priorities right. In the 1950s, hawks took Washington to task for not doing enough to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, with the Republican Party platform of 1952 deriding containment as “negative, futile, and immoral.” In the 1960s and 1970s, an avalanche of amorality—a bloody and misbegotten war in Vietnam, support for a coterie of nasty dictators, revelations of CIA assassination plots—convinced many liberal critics that the United States was betraying the values it claimed to defend. Meanwhile, the pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union, a strategy that deemphasized ideological confrontation in search of diplomatic stability, led some conservatives to allege that Washington was abandoning the moral high ground. Throughout the 1970s and after, these debates whipsawed U.S. policy. Even in this most Manichean of contests, relating strategy to morality was a continual challenge.

In fact, Cold War misdeeds gave rise to a complex of legal and administrative constraints—from prohibitions on political assassination to requirements to notify congressional committees about covert action—that mostly remain in place today. Since the Cold War, these restrictions have been complemented by curbs on aid to coup makers who topple elected governments and to military units that engage in gross violations of human rights. Americans clearly regretted some measures they had used to win the Cold War. The question is whether they can do without them as global rivalry heats up again.

IDEAS MATTER

Threats from autocratic enemies heighten ideological impulses in U.S. policy by underscoring the clash of ideas that often drives global tensions. Since taking office, Biden has defined the threat from U.S. rivals, particularly China, in starkly ideological terms.

The world has reached an “inflection point,” Biden has repeatedly declared. In March 2021, he suggested that future historians would be studying “the issue of who succeeded: autocracy or democracy.” At root, Biden has argued, U.S.-Chinese competition is a test of which model can better meet the demands of the modern era. And if China becomes the world’s preeminent power, U.S. officials fear, it will entrench autocracy in friendly countries while coercing democratic governments in hostile ones. Just witness how Beijing has used economic leverage to punish criticism of its policies by democratic societies from Australia to Norway. In making the system safe for illiberalism, a dominant China would make it unsafe for liberalism in places near and far.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinforced Biden’s thesis. It offered a case study in autocratic aggression and atrocity and a warning that a world led by illiberal states would be lethally violent, not least for vulnerable democracies nearby. Coming weeks after Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin had sealed a “no limits” strategic partnership, the Ukraine invasion also raised the specter of a coordinated autocratic assault on the liberal international order. Ukraine, Biden explained, was the central front in a “larger fight for . . . essential democratic principles.” So the United States would rally the free world against “democracy’s mortal foes.”

The shock of the Ukraine war, combined with the steadying hand of U.S. leadership, produced an expanded transatlantic union of democracies. Sweden and Finland sought membership in NATO; the West supported Ukraine and inflicted heavy costs on Russia. The Biden administration also sought to confine China by weaving a web of democratic ties around the country. It has upgraded bilateral alliances with the likes of Japan and Australia. It has improved the Quad (the security and diplomatic dialogue with Australia, India, and Japan) and established AUKUS (a military partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom). And it has repurposed existing multilateral bodies, such as the G-7, to meet the peril from Beijing. There are even whispers of a “three plus one” coalition—Australia, Japan, the United States, plus Taiwan—that would cooperate to defend that frontline democracy from Chinese assault.

These ties transcend regional boundaries. Ukraine is getting aid from Asian democracies, such as South Korea, that understand that their security will suffer if the liberal order is fractured. Democracies from multiple continents have come together to confront China’s economic coercion, counter its military buildup, and constrict its access to high-end semiconductors. The principal problem for the United States is a loose alliance of revisionist powers pushing outward from the core of Eurasia. Biden’s answer is a cohering global coalition of democracies, pushing back from around the margins.

Today, those advanced democracies are more unified than at any time in decades. In this respect, Biden has aligned the essential goal of U.S. strategy, defending an imperiled liberal order, with the methods and partners used to pursue it. Yet across Eurasia’s three key regions, the messier realities of rivalry are raising Niebuhr’s question anew.

CONTROVERSIAL FRIENDS

Consider the situation in Europe. NATO is mostly an alliance of democracies. But holding that pact together during the Ukraine war has required Biden to downplay the illiberal tendencies of a Polish government that—until its electoral defeat in October—was systematically eroding checks and balances. Securing its northern flank, by welcoming Finland and Sweden, has involved diplomatic horse-trading with Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who, in addition to frequently undercutting U.S. interests, has been steering his country toward autocratic rule.

In Asia, the administration spent much of 2021 and 2022 carefully preserving U.S. ties to the Philippines, at the time led by Rodrigo Duterte, a man whose drug war had killed thousands. Biden has assiduously courted India as a bulwark against China, even though the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has curbed speech, harassed opposition leaders, fanned religious grievances, and allegedly killed dissidents abroad. And after visiting New Delhi in September 2023, Biden traveled to Hanoi to sign a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Vietnam’s one-party regime. Once again, the United States is using some communists to contain others.

Then there is the Middle East, where Biden’s “free world” coalition is quite the motley crew. In 2020, Biden threatened to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” over the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi. By 2023, his administration—panicked by Chinese inroads and rising gas prices—was trying to make that country Washington’s newest treaty ally instead. That initiative, moreover, was part of a concept, inherited from the Trump administration, in which regional stability would rest on rapprochement between Arab autocracies and an Israeli government with its own illiberal tendencies, while Palestinian aspirations were mostly pushed to the side. Not surprisingly, then, human rights and political freedoms receded in relations with countries from Egypt to the United Arab Emirates. Biden also did little to halt the strangulation of democracy in Tunisia—just as he had decided, effectively, to abandon Afghanistan’s endangered democracy in 2021.

Indeed, if 2022 was a year of soaring rhetoric, 2023 was a year of awkward accommodation. References to the “battle between democracy and autocracy” became scarcer in Biden’s speeches, as the administration made big plays that defied that description of the world. Key human rights–related positions at the White House and the State Department sat vacant. The administration rolled back sanctions on Venezuela—an initiative described publicly as a bid to secure freer and fairer elections, but one that was mostly an effort to get an oppressive regime to stop exporting refugees and start exporting more oil. And when a junta toppled the elected government of Niger, U.S. officials waited for more than two months to call the coup a coup, for fear of triggering the cutoff of U.S. aid and thereby pushing the new regime into Moscow’s arms. Such compromises have always been part of foreign policy. But today, they testify to key dynamics U.S. officials must confront.

THE DECISIVE DECADE

First is the cruel math of Eurasian geopolitics. Advanced democracies possess a preponderance of power globally, but in every critical region, holding the frontline requires a more eclectic ensemble.

Poland has had its domestic problems; it is also the logistical linchpin of the coalition backing Ukraine. Turkey is politically illiberal and, often, unhelpful; nonetheless, it holds the intersection of two continents and two seas. In South and Southeast Asia, the primary barrier to Chinese hegemony is a line of less-than-ideal partners running from India to Indonesia. In the Middle East, a picky superpower will be a lonely superpower. Democratic solidarity is great, but geography is stubborn. Across Eurasia, Washington needs illiberal friends to confine its illiberal foes.

The ideological battlefield has also shifted in adverse ways. During the Cold War, anticommunism served as ideological glue between a democratic superpower and its autocratic allies, because the latter knew they were finished if the Soviet Union ever triumphed. Now, however, U.S. enemies feature a form of autocracy less existentially threatening to other nondemocracies: strongmen in the Persian Gulf, or in Hungary and Turkey, arguably have more in common with Xi and Putin than they do with Biden. The gap between “good” and “bad” authoritarians is narrower than it once was—which makes the United States work harder, and pay more, to keep illiberal partners imperfectly onside.

Desperate times also call for morally dexterous measures. When Washington faced no serious strategic challengers after the Cold War, it paid a smaller penalty for foregrounding its values. As the margin of safety shrinks, the tradeoffs between power and principle grow. Right now, war—or the threat of it—menaces East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Biden says the 2020s will be the “decisive decade” for the world. As Winston Churchill quipped in 1941, “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.” When threats are dire, democracies will do what it takes to rally coalitions and keep the enemy from breaking through. Thus, a central irony of Washington’s approach to competition is that the same challenges that activate its ideological energy make it harder to keep U.S. diplomacy pure.

So far, the moral compromises of U.S. policy today are modest compared with those of World War II or the Cold War, in part because the constraints on unsavory methods are stronger than they were when Hitler and Stalin stalked the earth. But rules and norms can change as a country’s circumstances do. So Biden and his successors may soon face a daunting reality: high-stakes rivalries carry countries, and leaders, to places they never sought to go.

When the Cold War started, few officials imagined that Washington would conduct covert interventions from Afghanistan to Angola. Just three years ago, hardly anyone predicted that the United States would soon fight a proxy war meant to bleed Putin’s army to death in Ukraine. As the present competitions intensify, the tactics used to wage them could become more extreme.

Washington could find itself covertly trying to tip the balance in elections in some crucial swing state if the alternative is seeing that country shift hard toward Moscow or Beijing. It could use coercion to keep Latin America’s military facilities and other critical infrastructure out of Chinese hands. And if the United States is already ambivalent about acknowledging coups in out-of-the-way countries, perhaps it would excuse far greater atrocities committed by a more important partner in a more important place.

Those who doubt that Washington will resort to dirty tricks have short memories and limited imaginations. If today’s competitions will truly shape the fate of humanity, why wouldn’t a vigilant superpower do almost anything to come out on top?

DON’T LOSE YOURSELF

There’s no reason to be unduly embarrassed about this. A country that lacks the self-confidence to defend its interests will lack the power to achieve any great purpose in global affairs. Put differently, the damage the United States does to its values by engaging dubious allies, and engaging in dubious behavior, is surely less than the damage that would be done if a hyperaggressive Russia or neototalitarian China spread its influence across Eurasia and beyond. As during the Cold War, the United States can eventually repay the moral debts it incurs in a lengthy struggle—if it successfully sustains a system in which democracy thrives because its fiercest enemies are suppressed.

It would be dangerous to adopt a pure end-justifies-the-means mentality, however, because there is always a point at which foul means corrupt fair ends. Even short of that, serial amorality will prove politically corrosive: a country whose population has rallied to defend its values as well as its interests will not forever support a strategy that seems to cast those values aside. And ultimately, the greatest flaw of such a strategy is that it forfeits a potent U.S. advantage.

During World War II, as the historian Richard Overy has argued, the Allied cause was widely seen to be more just and humane than the Axis cause, which is one reason the former alliance attracted so many more countries than the latter. In the Cold War, the sense that the United States stood, however imperfectly, for fundamental rights and liberties the Kremlin suppressed helped Washington appeal to other democratic societies—and even to dissidents within the Soviet bloc. The tactics of great-power competition must not obscure the central issue of that competition. If the world comes to see today’s rivalries as slugfests devoid of larger moral meaning, the United States will lose the asymmetry of legitimacy that has served it well.

This is not some hypothetical dilemma. Since October 2023, Biden has rightly framed the Israel-Hamas war as a struggle between a flawed democracy and a tyrannical enemy seeking its destruction. There is strong justification, moral and strategic, for backing a U.S. ally against a vicious proxy of a U.S. enemy, Iran. Moreover, there is no serious ethical comparison between a terrorist group that rapes, tortures, kidnaps, and kills civilians and a country that mostly tries, within the limits war imposes, to protect them.

Yet rightly or wrongly, large swaths of the global South view the war as a testament to American double standards: opposing occupation and appropriation of foreign territory by Russia but not by Israel, valuing the lives and liberties of some victims more than those of others. Russian and Chinese propagandists are amplifying these messages to drive a wedge between Washington and the developing world. This is why the Biden administration has tried, and sometimes struggled, to balance support for Israel with efforts to mitigate the harm the conflict brings—and why the war may presage renewed U.S. focus on the peace process with the Palestinians, as unpromising as that currently seems. The lesson here is that the merits of an issue may be disputed, but for a superpower that wears its values on its sleeve, the costs of perceivedhypocrisy are very real.

RULES FOR RIVALRY

Succeeding in this round of rivalry will thus require calibrating the moral compromises inherent in foreign policy by finding an ethos that is sufficiently ruthless and realistic at the same time. Although there is no precise formula for this—the appropriateness of any action depends on its context—some guiding principles can help.

First, morality is a compass, not a straitjacket. For political sustainability and strategic self-interest, American statecraft should point toward a world consistent with its values. But the United States cannot paralyze itself by trying to fully embody those values in every tactical decision. Nor—even at a moment when its own democracy faces internal threats—should it insist on purifying itself at home before exerting constructive influence abroad. If it does so, the system will be shaped by regimes that are more ruthless—and less shackled by their own imperfections.

The United States should also avoid the fallacy of the false alternative. It must evaluate choices, and partners, against the plausible possibilities, not against the utopian ideal. The realistic alternative to maintaining ties to a military regime in Africa may be watching as murderous Russian mercenaries fill the void. The realistic alternative to engaging Modi’s India may be seeing South Asia fall further under the shadow of a China that assiduously exports illiberalism. Similarly, proximity to a Saudi regime that carves up its critics is deeply uncomfortable. But the realistic alternative to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is probably a regime that remains quite repressive—and is far less committed to empowering women, curbing religious zealots, and otherwise making the country a more open, tolerant place. In a world of lousy options, the crucial question is often: Lousy compared with what?

Another guiding principle: good things don’t all come at once. Cold War policymakers sometimes justified coup making and support for repressive regimes on grounds that preventing Third World countries from going communist then preserved the possibility that they might go democratic later. That logic was suspiciously convenient—and, in many cases, correct. Countries in Latin America and other developing regions did eventually experience political openings as they reached higher levels of development, and democratic values radiated outward from the West.

Today, unseemly bargains can sometimes lead to better outcomes. By not breaking the U.S.-Philippine alliance during Duterte’s drug war, Washington sustained the relationship until a more cooperative, less draconian government emerged. By staying close to a Polish government with some worrying tendencies, the United States bought time until, late last year, that country’s voters elected a coalition promising to strengthen its democratic institutions. The same argument could be made for staying engaged with other democracies where autocratic tendencies are pronounced but electoral mechanisms remain intact—Hungary, India, and Turkey, to name a few. More broadly, liberalism is most likely to flourish in a system led by a democracy. So simply forestalling the ascent of powerful autocracies may eventually help democratic values spread into once inhospitable places.

Similarly, the United States should remember that taking the broad view is as vital as taking the long view. Support for democracy and human rights is not an all-or-nothing proposition. As Biden’s statecraft has shown, transactional deals with dictators can complement a strategy that stresses democratic cooperation at its core. Honoring American values, moreover, is more than a matter of hectoring repressive regimes. A foreign policy that raises international living standards through trade, addresses global problems such as food insecurity, and holds the line against great-power war serves the cause of human dignity very well. A strategy that emphasizes such efforts may actually be more appealing to countries, including developing democracies from Brazil to Indonesia, that resist democracy-versus-autocracy framing because they don’t want any part of a Manichean fight.

Of course, these principles can seem like a recipe for rationalization—a way of excusing the grossest behavior by claiming it serves a greater cause. Another important principle, then, revives Hamilton’s dictum that the means must be proportioned to the mischief. The greater the compromise, the greater the payoff it provides—or the damage it avoids—must be.

By this standard, the case for cooperation with an India or a Poland is clear-cut. These countries are troubled but mostly admirable democracies that play critical roles in raging competitions. Until the world contains only liberal democracies, Washington can hardly avoid seeking blemished friends.

The United States should, however, be more cautious about courting countries that regularly engage in the very practices it deems most corrosive to the liberal order: systematic torture or murder of their people, coercion of their neighbors, or export of repression across borders, to name a few. A Saudi Arabia, for instance, that periodically engages in some of these practices is a troublesome partner. A Saudi Arabia that flagrantly and consistently commits such acts risks destroying the moral and diplomatic basis of its relationship with the United States. American officials should be more hesitant still to distort or destabilize the politics of other countries, especially other democracies, for strategic gain. If Washington is going to get back into the coup business in Latin America or Southeast Asia, the bad outcomes to be prevented must be truly severe—a major, potentially lasting shift in a key regional balance of power, perhaps—to justify policies so manifestly in tension with the causes the United States claims to defend.

Mitigating the harm to those causes means heeding a further principle: marginal improvement matters. Washington will not convince leaders in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, or Vietnam to commit political suicide by abandoning their domestic model. But leverage works both ways in these relationships. Countries on the firing line need a superpower patron just as much as it needs them. U.S. officials can use that leverage to discourage extraterritorial repression, seek the release of political prisoners, make elections a bit freer and fairer, or otherwise obtain modest but meaningful changes. Doing so may be the price of keeping these relationships intact, by convincing proponents of human rights and democracy in Congress that the White House has not forgotten such issues altogether.

This relates to an additional principle: the United States must be scrupulously honest with itself. American officials need to recognize that illiberal allies will be selective or unreliable allies because their domestic models put them at odds with important norms of the liberal order—and because they tend to generate resentment that may eventually cause an explosion. In the same vein, the problem with laws that mandate aid cutoffs to coup plotters is that they encourage self-deception. In cases in which Washington fears the strategic fallout from a break in relations, U.S. officials are motivated to pretend that a coup has not occurred. The better approach, in line with reforms approved by Congress in December 2022, is a framework that allows presidents to waive such cutoffs on national security grounds—but forces them to acknowledge and justify that choice. The work of making moral tradeoffs in foreign policy begins with admitting those tradeoffs exist.

Some of these principles are in tension with others, which means their application in specific cases must always be a matter of judgment. But the issue of reconciling opposites relates to a final principle: soaring idealism and brutal realism can coexist. During the 1970s, moral debates ruptured the Cold War consensus. During the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan adequately repaired—but never fully restored—that consensus by combining flexibility of tactics with clarity of purpose.

Reagan supported awful dictators, murderous militaries, and thuggish “freedom fighters” in the Third World, sometimes through ploys—such as the Iran-contra scandal—that were dodgy or simply illegal. Yet he also backed democratic movements from Chile to South Korea; he paired rhetorical condemnations of the Kremlin with ringing affirmations of Western ideals. The takeaway is that rough measures may be more tolerable if they are part of a larger package that emphasizes, in word and deed, the values that must anchor the United States’ approach to the world. Some will see this as heightening the hypocrisy. In reality, it is the best way to preserve the balance—political, moral, and strategic—that a democratic superpower requires.

[dailyanarchistposts]

Innate to Anarchism practice is the practice of guerrilla struggle. Anarchism as an ideology and practice is one of asymmetric warfare — this means struggle that does not play the game of the oppressors such as the state or the capitalists. It seeks to undermine those forces through propaganda and action, to trigger an insurrectionary process that sweeps away the old world, for the new one built on federalism, mutual aid and solidarity.

Anarchist Guerrilla practice is taking many forms around the world, overwhelmingly armed and mobile.

It places hit and run tactics at the forefront, unlike static insurrectionary squatting and informal attacks by individuals, it recognizes the need for support networks, group organisation and mobile, underground tactics. A rejection of mass structures of organisation and and an emphasis on direct action, waged by autonomous groups is at the heart of the modern anarcho-guerrilla.

The Guerrilla is our practice, the group is our preferred form of organisation. The autonomous group, sometimes known as the affinity group in the history books, does not negate the necessity for structured, permanent organisation, roles and specialization. It also does not stifle the absolute need for individual initiative from within and outside the groups themselves. The small group is both structured and flexible, allowing the fullest development of the individual and the concerted attack of the collective. It rejects mass structures, which soon descend into leadership, bureaucracy, and are prone to police infiltration.

With a tight nit security, and small numbers as a limit on scale, informally federating with other groups for specific actions, any police infiltration is kept to a minimum, isolated in each group — ling at worst.

Contemporary examples such as RUIS, formerly the IRPGF in Rojava and “Revolutionary Struggle” in Greece are the seeds of this new (and old) anarchism.

Historical examples such Los Solidarios, Los Indomables in Spain, OPR-33 in Uruguay and numerous other examples, effectively prosecuted the armed struggle against both state and capital, based out of networks of community support.

These militant struggles, particularly in the Spanish experience were instrumental in building the revolutionary movements and cultures of their respective countries. They formed the backbone of the revolt against the fascist onslaught and were the embryos of the Durruti column, the Ascaso column, the Ortiz column and the Iron column ect. The groups were kept small but structured, embedded in local communities.

Utilising propaganda of the deed and sabotage they prosecuted a wars of attrition, culminating in organised insurrectionary attempts. These insurrectionary attempts, while highly organised where massive propaganda efforts to draw more working class individuals towards the anarchists and to cause cyclical revolutionary attempts culminating in the destruction of the state.

The networks of groups used expropriation to fund their acquisitions of arms and to support the numerous prisoner held in Spanish jails at the time. After the failed revolution, Anarchists such as Sabate, Facerias and many other continued to prosecute the guerrilla war against Franco, often circumventing the formal structures of the CNT-FAI, which as before the revolution, tended towards reformism and compromise — and even outright complicity with the state.

In many other countries, it was the armed guerrilla that provided the backbone to Anarchist struggle, from Bulgaria, to France to South America the armed anarchist guerrilla, based out of small groups have waged war against the capitalist order.

This is a history that has been widely ignored among “anarcho-liberals” and their historians, mostly likely due to their own cowardice and lack of revolutionary intent. Leave the “anarcho-liberals” to their reformism-build the revolutionary movement of action!

Slowly Anarchism is being re-armed and therefore rein-vigorated.

Long live the Insurrection! Renzo Durruti.

[josefavomjaaga]

A Prussian at Napoleon's court

Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Freiherr von Knobelsdorff was a Prussian officer and high-ranking diplomat who had been for some time ambassador in Constantinople. In 1804, he was sent as King Friedrich Wilhelm III’s special envoy from Berlin to Paris for Napoleon’s coronation ceremonies. This is a report he wrote back home, translated from Publicationen aus den k. Preussischen Staatsarchiven, Volume 29. The original is, of course, in French.

Sojourn in Fontainebleau. Knobelsdorff's report. Paris 28 November 1804 I believe it is my duty to report to Your Majesty some details of my stay at Fontainebleau, as the extraordinarily distinguished manner in which I was treated there can only be seen as a public mark that the Emperor of the French wished to bestow on a man who has the honour of being entrusted with a special commission from Your Majesty. On the morning of the 26th I received a letter from Marshal Berthier inviting me, in the name of the Emperor, to go to Fontainebleau the next day to go hunting with the sovereign; I am the only foreigner and member of the diplomatic corps to have received such an invitation.

All the others donated candles in the castle chapel in relief because they did not have to expose themselves to this mortal danger. - Okay, so Knobelsdorff did not write that. But I still bet it’s true.

I arrived at Fontainebleau at eight in the morning on the 27th and was asked to go to the château for breakfast at 9.30. My wife was invited to have breakfast with the Empress. The Grand Marshal showed me the carriage by which I would be taken to the place in the forest where the hunt was to begin, and the Master of the Horse handed me a paper containing the names of five of the Emperor's horses which would be at my disposal.

Caulaincourt also likely warned him that if on Knobelsdorff’s return the slightest harm had come to any of these five horses, Knobelsdorff would regret it for the rest of his life.

My carriage was immediately in front of the Emperor's, and Marshals Soult, Ney and General Duroc were travelling with me.

Ney and Soult together in one carriage, huh?

Knobelsdorff to Duroc: Oh, Your Excellency will also join us in the carriage?

Duroc (patting down both Soult and Ney, confiscating all sharp objects): Yepp. Somebody has to babysit these other two excellencies, you know.

They forced me to take a seat at the back, [...]

Duroc: Sit here. Don’t move. If any of these two as much as twitches, warn me!

[…] while my wife was in the Empress's carriage, who was kind enough to give her a seat between herself and Princess Joseph. On our return from the hunt, Mme de La Rochefoucauld invited us to dine with the Empress; as we sat down for dinner, the Emperor asked me to sit next to the Empress, opposite him. After dinner, two games of whist were arranged; the Emperor, who does not usually play cards, was kind enough to play with my wife, and I had the honour of playing with the Empress.

I hope Josephine was also kind enough to loose to the husband what Napoleon won through cheating from the wife.

After the game, which hardly lasted more than half an hour, the Emperor spoke in a very interesting way about his campaigns in Egypt and spoke more particularly with me about the present situation of the Ottoman Empire; at about ten o'clock in the evening the Emperor and the Empress retired, and I left the same night for Paris...

So, somewhat more seriously: This report was not put in chiffres, so it was part of the official correspondence that could easily be intercepted by the French and read in Lavalette’s Cabinet noir. That alone guaranteed that Knobelsdorff would have nothing but praise for how he was treated by this newly minted emperor and his makeshift court. But it is still interesting how friendly relations between France and Prussia had been ever since Prussia dropped out the coalition against revolutionary France, and how10 years later the Prussians would claim to be France’s arch-nemesis.

But mostly I like to see Soult and Ney in that carriage together, apparently stille quite at ease with each other and maybe even on friendly terms by 1804.

[poz-patrol]

[cabe0512]

Richter Belmont and Maria Renard, the Duo Protagonists of The Rondo of Blood.

Even with the bigger cast of characters for The Rondo of Blood, it's best that I should narrow the focus of the first few arcs down to the main protagonists of the story, namely Richter, Maria, and later Annette.

I personally loathed the way Nocturne portrayed Maria as this foul-mouthed, sarcastic revolutionary instead of the lovely, purehearted character whose compassion and unwavering hopefulness is what compelled her to face such harrowing dangers that even Dracula found endearing. So I took influence from that and being 12 years old in the game, she undergoes a certain character arc where her worldview is tested by the obstacles she meets like Shaft, the Revolution, and her own developing abilities, forcing her to grow and mature as both a child and as a magician.

Richter, on the other hand, is leagues different from his portrayal in Nocturne (which I equally despised for how badly-written and inconsistent it was). Even though he still faces a great tragedy back in 1783 (this time it's his father, Reinhardt Schneider, a distant descendant of Trevor Belmont, who dies at the hands of Eztli/formerly N!Olrox), Richter developed a sense of guilt that further boiled into anger and would be the driving force behind his desire to be stronger, in hopes of protecting his mother (now named Sonja Belmont) from a similar fate.

Richter also recovered his magic earlier in the year 1789, the same year he met the young alchemist Annette de Winter and Sonja being killed by the same vampire behind his father's murder, further fueling his thirst for vengeance. Annette becomes his close friend and companion as they survived the horrors that came with the outbreak of the revolution, with their bond growing stronger over their shared grief as Annette also lost her mother Iris earlier that year. Under Juste's tutelage, Richter had grown accustomed to his magical abilities and strives to do his parents justice by saving innocent lives from the forces of evil and hunting down the vampire Eztli.

The main storyline begins in 1792 just as the two first met in Boston with Maria having escaped the chaos in France, being forced to leave Annette behind which weighed heavily on her conscience. This would give me the opportunity to build up their dynamic a lot more than Nocturne, forming a makeshift siblingship bond during the little time they had in Boston. Bound by their shared love for Annette (being Maria's adoptive older sister and guardian), the duo leave the comforts of America behind and return to France to save their lost friend from a rising threat across the sea.

[teecupangel]

I come bearing Unity thoughts. How about Yew Branch style Desmond, but in Revolutionary France? And to just make things interesting... As one of the children of Marquis de Sade

Now, I am merely doing Sequence 5 so I have no idea if they show in the game. But! Consider Desmond low-key having fun at the expense of others. Even if it is only because he is bored, he knows who his father is (historically) and modern time sense of modesty does not measure up to those of his now-contemporary France

In short: Desmond finds Cafe de Theatre and has fun making Arno blush. By using modern style innuendo

Before we start, I will confess that I do plan to write a Yew Branch for August 26, Arno’s birthday, but it’s more or less set before Unity because… uuuhhh… plot reasons? XD

Anyway, I will say AC Unity has the easiest time to just kick Desmond anywhere we want because you can pick anyone from the Nomad Assassins in the companion app and bam, you have Desmond’s new identity.

Also, here’s Desmond being reborn as either Arno’s brother or Élise’s brother/twin and, while this is more focused on AC3, here’s Desmond being reborn as Marie Antoinette.

Okay, let’s set up Desmond’s life as Marquis de Sade’s son.

Now, we actually have two options for this (according to wiki):

Louis Marie de Sade (1767) would be a year older than Arno

Donatien Claude Armand de Sade (1769) would be a year younger than Arno

If you wanna go down the ‘Desmond gets a pussy’ route, there’s Madeleine Laure de Sade (1771) as well, but if we’re gonna give Arno some dick, then I like the idea of Madeleine being a secret fangirl who totally ships her brother (and maybe even her father) with that sexy hooded man.

(As far as I remember, they don’t show Marquis de Sade’s children in the game so we’re good to go)

Regardless of who we pick as Desmond’s new identity (an older man showing Arno the ‘ropes’ or a younger man who Arno believes to be the most dangerous of all… in a very different way), Arno’s in for a very… well… informative time of his life.

The de Sade Family:

Marquis de Sade doesn’t formally invites his children to his ‘new kingdom’ but he will welcome them nonetheless if they do join. He and his wife don’t really have a good relationship so he’s not that close to his children. Desmond would definitely be his favorite and, even if Desmond is reborn as his second son (if we’re going for the younger man route), he would still name Desmond as his heir and successor because, as far as he knows, Desmond is his ‘true child’.

Desmond doesn’t want any title or riches or whatever. He does, however, like Marquis de Sade. As a father? Far better than William Miles, hands down. But honestly? Desmond saw how the Marquis was lonely as not many people understood his ‘true self’. Desmond gets it though since he experimented a lot when he left the Farm and learned how sex could be quite enjoyable. Desmond actually knows more than Marquis de Sade and sorta-kinda acts as his proofreader.

In public, Desmond is considered to be polite and as noble as one gets, heavily leaning on Haytham Kenway’s remaining bleeds. In his father’s new kingdom though… total dom. Known to be the bored prince and there’s a lot of people that try to get his attention in any way they can. Desmond is usually just there to make sure his father doesn’t do anything actually illegal or every ‘depravity’ he does would be done with consent on all sides. He does disappear as soon as his father starts… really going because, yeah, he doesn’t have a kink for that one.

The brother we don’t choose will have an inferiority complex against Desmond and think that Desmond is a depraved sick bastard. But he will also remember how kind and understanding Desmond was to him when they were children. Hell, he was still kind to him even when it’s clear that he was trying to bully him (Desmond just thinks it’s cute he thinks he could bully Desmond). This conflicting feelings make him ignore everything that Desmond does in their father’s kingdom while trying to protect both him and their father as much as he could. He would insist he’s protecting the family name though. (His kink is definitely a form of cuckolding)

Desmond’s mother would be distant and ignore all of her children (except maybe her daughter) because the whole relationship was just to keep the power among the nobles so there’s no love lost anywhere. Desmond doesn’t feel anything for her and, yeah, there’s some childish pain there, but he’s good at ignoring his unresolved feelings for his parents at this point anyway.

Madeleine is Desmond’s favorite sibling and she’s quite spoiled. Desmond’s influence makes her more open to their father’s preferences but she’s quite reserve about it, blushing whenever she tries to open up and ends up just going ‘never mind’. Desmond gives her a more clinical explanation to these kinds of things in a form of a notebook of some sort because he thought she would be too embarrassed and awkward if he directly talked to her. This leads her to the path of voyeurism and enjoying erotica so… well… you win some, you lose some. She joins her brother in visiting their father in secret though, because if words got out that the young de Sade girl was a deviant, she’ll be ruined in the eyes of the nobility. Their father and Desmond just go “it’ll be fine.” because they’re actual deviants (by 17th~18th century standard anyway)

His father and sister are the main reason why Desmond stayed in France. He could have gone to America as soon as he turned 13 (maybe even 10 if he was really determined enough) but he didn’t because he didn’t want to leave his little sister and someone has to look after his father without judgmental eyes.

Desmond does, however, send money and supplies to Davenport manor, disguising it as an investment or some sort although the American Brotherhood knows he’s an ally of some kind. He is also Ratonhnhaké:ton’s pen pal.

Arno and Desmond’s Relationship

Arno would see Desmond as a beautiful mysterious man tempting him at every chance. The way he moves, the way he speaks, the way he looks at Arno. It makes Arno feel a lot of things that he had never felt before and he is torn between remaining loyal to Élise who is always running (not from him, Arno doesn’t think that, she’s not… is she?) or finally taking a bite of the fruit the devil keeps dangling in front of him.

Desmond… knows Arno has a crush on him but he actually doesn’t act all that different. He might have a soft spot for Arno because he’s an Assassin who clearly needs help and maybe he pays more attention to Arno than the men and women throwing themselves at the bored prince but, let’s be clear, Desmond isn’t trying to lead him on. He’s flirting with him but it’s more on the side of “I’ve been a bartender far too long that flirting on an easy mark is more of an unconscious choice because I might get more tips” than actual serious flirting.

Unfortunately, Desmond doesn’t know that Arno is having a very confusing bisexual awakening that’s only amped up by all the usual 17th~18th century repression thing soooo, yeah, Desmond doesn’t know he’s affecting the young man more than he was thinking.

Marquis de Sade definitely wants Arno to join in. With him or with his son, he doesn’t care, Arno is just a wonderful specimen to be left in that uptight boring world. He also knows Arno’s ‘crush’ on his son, he keeps pushing him to his son though because that would be fun.

In other words, Desmond is unintentionally creating a love triangle that he honestly have no time or desire to be part of. He doesn’t know about Élise! He honestly thought Arno is single (“He has that pathetic wet virgin kitty vibe to him.” “I don’t think he’s a virgin, my boy.” “Oh, definitely not. Maybe it’ll be better to say he’s ‘pure’?” “Ah. Well then, have fun corrupting him.” “We’ll see, father.”)

Once Desmond learns of Élise, he’ll back off (and even feel a bit icky because he was unintentionally becoming the ‘hoe who the asshole cheated on’) and it’s… it’s gonna get messy, especially considering Desmond’s inclusion in Arno’s life makes Arno wonder if he and Élise are even still together or if… his love for Élise was true and not something twisted by his lonely childhood and his ‘abandonment’ issues.

Oh shit. I just turned this smutty fic idea to angst, abort, abort, abort.

If Desmond and Arno will have a relationship, it’ll be after Dead Kings DLC.

You know what would be funny?

If Arno realized he wasn’t just sexually attracted to Desmond but was in love with him during the ending parts of Dead Kings when he finally accepts Élise’s death.

Then when he returned to Paris?

He learned that Desmond had taken his sister to America and now…

Arno thinks Desmond is the one who got away.

(“Arno, I can’t believe I’m saying this… you can follow him to America. He’s literally living with the American Brotherhood. We know where he is.” “I have missed my chance. There is nothing left for me to do.” “Oh my god. Someone just chokes this drama queen unconscious so we can ship his ass to America!”)