#estlink 2

[head-post]

Finland boards oil tanker suspected of cutting off internet, power cable

Finnish authorities seized a vessel in the Baltic Sea on suspicion of disconnecting an underwater power cable connecting Finland and Estonia and damaging four internet lines.

The Cook Islands-registered vessel, Eagle S, was arrested on Thursday, 26 December, by the Finnish Coast Guard, Robin Lardot, director of the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation, reported.

From our side we are investigating grave sabotage. According to our understanding, an anchor of the vessel that is under investigation has caused the damage.

Two fibre-optic cables owned by Finnish operator Elisa and linking Finland and Estonia were severed. The third link between the two countries, belonging to the Chinese company Citic, was also damaged.

The fourth internet cable running between Finland and Germany, owned by Finnish group Cinia, is also suspected to have been severed. The incident highlighted the need for close international co-operation, with the US and NATO expressing their readiness to support the Finnish-Estonian investigation.

The two countries held extraordinary meetings to assess the situation on Thursday, according to separate statements. The Baltic Sea states are on high alert for potential acts of sabotage after a series of cable disruptions since 2022.

Repairs to the 170-kilometre Estlink 2 interconnector would take several months, with the outage raising the risk of power outages in winter, operator Fingrid said. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal, however, emphasised that the country would have sufficient access to electricity.

The Eagle S Panamax oil tanker crossed the Estlink 2 electric cable on Wednesday. Damage to underwater facilities in the Baltic Sea became so frequent that it was hard to believe that it had been caused by a mere accident, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said.

We must understand that damage to submarine infrastructure has become more systematic and thus must be regarded as attacks against our vital structures.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys also said that the growing number of incidents in the Baltic Sea should serve as a warning to NATO and the European Union to step up protection of underwater infrastructure in the region.

The Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany, which runs along the seabed in the same waters, was blown up in 2022. The case is still under investigation in Germany.

Read more HERE

[jeintalu]

Asitõend

Ajakirjandus väidab, et Soome lahe põhjast leiti ankur, mis kuulus laevale Eagle S, mis olevat Eesti-Soome vahelise EstLink 2 elektrikaabli lõhkunud.

See näeb välja asitõendina.

Paljud lääneriikide süüdistused Venemaale ja Hiinale on olnud sellised, et kindlaid asitõendeid sisuliselt ei ole ja olemas on ainult ajakirjandus ning propaganda.

Midagi kindlat ma ei hakka aga väitma.

On palju asju, mida ma ei tea ja ajakirjandus ka ei täpsusta neid detaile.

Ma ei tea, kas rahvusvahelises kohtus selline süüdistus sellise mere põhjast leitud ankruga läbi läheks.

Ma tean aga seda, et kui Läänemeres on juba mitmeid kuid järjest lõhutud mere põhjas olevaid kaableid ja torusid, siis tõenäoliselt on tegemist sabotaažiga.

Samuti, et motiiv selleks on olemas Venemaal.

Ent Venemaa motiivi tõestamiseks tuleb mainida fakti, millest Lääs eelistab vaikida: Venemaa gaasitrassi Nord Stream lasid õhku lääneriigid või tehti seda nende osalusel.

Igatahes Venemaa usub, et see on nii.

Samuti on pärast ankru leidmist ebatõenäolisem, et see oli mõni lääneriik, mis kaableid lõhkus, false flag operation.

Ebatõenäoline, kuigi mitte võimatu.

Ainus kindel viis oleks aga ehitada merealune tunnel ja peita kaablid tunnelisse.

Kahtlane lugu

Tähelepanuväärne on aga see, et NATO salastas kõik andmed Nord Stream gaasitrassi plahvatuste uurimise kohta.

Venemaad, kellele see gaasitrass kuulus, ei lastud sündmuspaigale ligi.

Venemaal ei lastud uurimises osaleda.

Uurimisandmeid ei antud isegi Saksamaa parlamendi julgeolekukomiteele, viidates NATO saladusele.

Uurimistulemusi Venemaaga ei jagatud.

Üldsus ei tea, mida sealt Nord Stream gaasitrassi juurest mere põhjast leiti ja mida sealt ei leitud.

Seevastu Soome-Eesti elektrikaabli lõhkumise puhul on kohe leitud ankur ja kohe räägib sellest ajakirjandus.

Seetõttu ei usugi ma mitte ühtegi sõna, mida nad seal kirjutavad.

Minu poolest võivad nad sealt mere põhjast kasvõi kümme ankrut leida.

[collapsedsquid]

The Eagle S – a tanker ship carrying Russian oil and suspected of severing the Estlink 2 power cable running under the Baltic Sea between Finland and Estonia – was reportedly brimming with spy equipment. The cable incident is the latest in a series of such events in this strategically important region as tensions with Russia have mounted in the wake of its war on Ukraine. After being seized by Finnish Police, the Eagle S was found to be “kitted out with special transmitting and receiving devices that were used to monitor naval activity, according to a source with direct involvement in the ship,” Lloyds List reported. That equipment “effectively allowed it to become a ‘spy ship’ for Russia.”

@todays-problematic-ship falling down on the job recently

[channeledhistory]

An undersea power cable linking Finland and Estonia broke down on Wednesday, Finland’s prime minister said, the latest in a series of incidents involving cables and energy pipelines in the Baltic Sea.

The Finnish electricity grid’s head of operations, Arto Pahkin, told the public broadcaster Yle that sabotage could not be ruled out.

Finland’s prime minister, Petteri Orpo, said the outage had not affected the country’s electricity supplies.

[...]

Fingrid said current on the EstLink 2 cable sending electricity to Estonia was cut at 12:26pm local time (10:26 GMT).

[...]

[curtvilescomic]

On 25th december 2024 suspected russian shadow fleet tanker Eagle S alledgedly dragged it's anchor severing and damaging subsea information cables and breaking undersea power line Estlink 2.

Third such"accident" in a year. So what did Finland do?

Yeah. We seized and confiscated the vessel. Which was missing it's anchor.

Apparently russian view is clear. Since stopping their fuckery is wrong we have to be bad guys. We have to be pirates.

Cute.

Then again I look like this:

The eyepatch one. Who likes tools

see if you behave, we behave. Easy. There is no ill will to russians as people, just with parts that illegally invade sovereign nations, tamper with their elections, they subjugate and oppress their own women and minorities ( especially sexual minorities) and with all that we are not okay with.

Russian state likes to bully. They have nuclear weapons. So what? Einstein said that the one after World War three is fought with sticks and stones. Like we don't know how to use those?

[awesome-casuallyfamouscollector]

“Hi-tech” Russian signals intelligence equipment was reportedly carried by the tanker Eagle S, currently in custody after reportedly cutting the Estlink-2 cable in the Baltic, per Lloyd’s List. “They were monitoring all Nato naval ships and aircraft,” Lloyd’s List was told. Source: OSINTtechnical

P.S. This is absolutely no surprise! Even before the formation and strengthening of the Putin's regime, the Russians were spying on the former West completely UNINTERRUPTED...! The funny thing is that the companies and politicians of the former, now defunct West sold all the necessary espionage and military technology to the Russians...!!! Now the broken West has finally started to think 30 years too late...

[mariacallous]

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are about to take a historic energy security step on February 9, when they will synchronize their former Soviet electricity systems with the Continental Europe Network (CEN). This will conclude the final chapter of Russia’s involvement in the energy sectors of these frontline European Union (EU) and NATO member states. But the Baltic states and their NATO allies must now work to secure this hard-won energy independence from Russia’s ongoing hybrid attacks on critical energy infrastructure. 

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have faced a wide array of Russian coercive energy policy measures arising from their historical dependence on Russian energy supplies and Soviet-era energy infrastructure. These measures included a total economic and energy blockade of Lithuania in 1990 in response to its independence movement, a prompt shutdown of an oil pipeline after Lithuania declined to sell its crude oil refinery to a Russian company in 2006, and long-term politically motivated gas pricing for the Baltics, to name just a few well-known cases. 

Having faced the destructive impacts of Russia’s weaponization of energy, the Baltic states have become leaders among European nations in severing ties with Russia’s energy supplies over the past decade. The installation of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipėda, Lithuania’s seaport, in late 2014 marked a significant step in this direction. It opened the Baltic gas markets to global LNG suppliers, including those from the United States. This alternative gas supply route enabled the Baltic states to ban all Russian gas imports, both piped and LNG, just two months into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. The Baltic states became the first European countries to take such a principled stance, and they are among those advocating for the rest of the EU members to follow suit by implementing a blanket ban on Russian LNG.  

Flipping the switch

The timely diversification of oil and electricity supply routes also allowed the Baltics to stop importing these energy sources from Russia. In terms of electricity, the Baltic states use the interconnectors Estlink 1 and Estlink 2 between Estonia and Finland, Nordbalt between Lithuania and Sweden, and LitPol Link between Lithuania and Poland for power exchanges with Europe. However, the Baltic states’ early market-level integration with their EU neighbors did not mean the immediate end of Russia’s involvement in the their electricity sectors on the system control level.

These are the last days that the Baltic states’ power grids remain a part of the Russian-controlled Integrated Power System/United Power System (IPS/UPS) grid. This effectively means that a dispatch in Moscow is still responsible for maintaining electric frequency stability in the Baltic states—bringing all the risks that such a dependency on Moscow entails. Ukraine and Moldova performed a test desynchronization from the IPS/UPS grid concurrently with the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, immediately asking for an emergency synchronization with the European grid, which was granted. Lithuania was aware of the potential need to perform an emergency synchronization, too, and thus had prepared its power grid to function in an isolated mode if needed. On February 8, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will decouple from the Russian-controlled grid and conduct a joint isolated operation test before joining the European grid on February 9.

The planning for the Baltic synchronization with the European grid began as early as 2007, but—due to multiple project phases involving political, regulatory, and infrastructural components in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland—it has only now been finalized. The project was co-financed by the EU, which has allocated more than €1.2 billion from its Connecting Europe Facility. For the EU, the project is as important as it is for the Baltic states: only with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia connected to the European grid can the EU achieve its goal of a fully integrated European energy market, in which all uncontrolled third-party impacts on its member states are eliminated.

Securing critical infrastructure

Although Russia will no longer exert direct influence over the energy supply and system control of the Baltic states, Moscow may now focus on targeting their critical energy, communications, and data infrastructure. Since October 2023, at least eleven cables running under the Baltic Sea have been damaged. This includes the underwater Balticconnector gas pipeline between Estonia and Finland; communications cables linking Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Lithuania; and the Estlink 2 power cable between Estonia and Finland. A data cable between Latvia and Sweden has been damaged as recently as January 26. The Lithuanian government is responding with increased military involvement in protecting critical seaborne energy infrastructure under the Baltic Sea amid an attempted sabotage of the NordBalt power cable that connects it to Sweden.

The damage was caused by vessels dragging their anchors on the Baltic Sea’s seabed. Investigations into the circumstances of the damage are still ongoing, but the rapid increase in such incidents and the vessels involved—mostly Russia’s “shadow fleet” oil tankers—raise concerns that the damage was intentional. As a response, NATO has stepped up its presence in the Baltic Sea by launching a new military patrol mission called Baltic Sentry. This mission involves deploying frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and naval drones to enhance the ability of littoral states to respond to destabilizing acts on their critical infrastructure. The Alliance has also established a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to enhance information-sharing and situational awareness and a dedicated Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command in Northwood, United Kingdom. 

Crucial first steps have also been made to increase the protection level of the onshore LitPol Link interconnector between Lithuania and Poland, through which the Baltics are synchronizing with the European grid. Lithuania’s Public Security Service has taken over the protection of several LitPol Link sites from a private security company that had previously been assigned this role. The Baltic states and Poland, fully aware of Russia’s hybrid activities in the region, have also urged the EU to provide financial support for enhancing current security measures for the LitPol Link and other critical energy infrastructure in the region. 

It’s a start, but more needs to be done, particularly in the case of Lithuania. With vital interconnectors—LitPol Link in energy and Rail Baltica in transport and military logistics—passing through the country, Lithuania is emerging as a crucial gateway connecting continental Europe to the Baltics, the Nordic region, and even the Arctic.

All these interconnections traverse the narrow land corridor between Lithuania and Poland, known as the Suwałki Gap. This notorious area borders Belarus to the east and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the west.

Russia could attempt to isolate the Baltics from the rest of Europe by obstructing the Suwałki Gap from these territories. Thus, beyond the punctual tactics of strengthening the security of the LitPol Link and, later, the planned additional onshore electricity interconnector between Lithuania and Poland that is reportedly set to run along the Rail Baltica tracks, an approach of a comprehensive protection regime for this vulnerable border area is needed. An increased NATO military presence in Lithuania and regional measures, such as installing the Baltic Defense Line along the Baltic states’ borders with mainland Russia, its Kaliningrad region, and Belarus, are important steps toward a solution.

With the Baltic power systems soon operating in harmony with those in continental Europe, the regional security agenda shifts from concerns over the security of energy supply to the protection of critical energy infrastructure. The Baltic nations and their allies should further enhance their proactive efforts to deter sabotage and secure this strategically vital region.

[partisan-by-default]

An undersea power cable that runs between Finland and Estonia was disconnected on Christmas Day. Finland is pretty sure that Russia is to blame. On Thursday, Finnish authorities boarded an oil tanker that is part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” used to dodge sanctions and that just so happened to be spotted passing over the EstLink 2 underwater cable as it stopped working, according to the Financial Times.

Per The Guardian, the incident happened at 12:26 pm local time on Wednesday, and Arto Pahkin, Finland’s head of operations for the electricity grid, immediately said sabotage could not be ruled out. Finnish authorities have also confirmed that damage was caused to at least three other cables, potentially part of the same incident.

This led to the seizure of Eagle S, an oil tanker registered to the Cook Islands but believed to belong to Russia. The ship’s tracking data suggests it was carrying oil from Russia to Egypt, but apparently made room to cause some chaos along the route. Authorities believe the ship’s anchor, which could not be found on the ship, was used to cut the cables.

The Eagle S is believed by authorities to be part of Russia’s shadow fleet, which the country has been using since the start of its war with Ukraine to evade Western sanctions. The fleet consists of old, rickety vessels that Russia obscures its ownership of using a variety of techniques including labyrinthian management structures, frequent cargo transfers between vessels, falsified information, identification system blackouts, and other schemes. It’s believed the country operates about 600 ships as part of its off-the-books oil business. Because many of these ships carry oil and are poorly maintained, they often violate modern safety standards and ignore regulations, resulting in additional harm including oil spills.

[beardedmrbean]

HELSINKI (Reuters) - Crew on board an oil tanker accused of sabotaging undersea power and communications cables in the Baltic Sea were poised to cut other cables and pipelines when Finnish authorities boarded the vessel last month, the head of the Finnish investigation said.

Baltic Sea nations are on high alert after a string of power cable, telecom link and gas pipeline outages since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Leaders of the NATO member states around the Baltic Sea are set to meet in Helsinki on Tuesday to discuss the alliance's response to the threat.

On Dec. 26, Finnish authorities seized oil tanker Eagle S carrying Russian oil. They said they suspected the vessel had damaged the Finnish-Estonian Estlink 2 power line and four telecoms cables by dragging its anchor across the seabed for more than 100 km (60 miles).

The head of the investigation, Risto Lohi of the National Bureau of Investigation, told Reuters the vessel was threatening to cut a second power cable, Estlink1, and the BalticConnector gas pipe between Finland and Estonia at the time it was seized.

"There would have been an almost immediate danger that other cables or pipes related to our critical underwater infrastructure could have been damaged," he said.

Lohi said a ninth crew member from the ship had been added to a list of those being treated as suspects and barred from travelling. Finland announced earlier this month that eight of the 24 crew members were being barred from travel. The captain of the ship is Georgian and the crew are citizens of India and Georgia.

"We have heard and interrogated the crew, and at the moment we have nine crew members as suspects. They are under travel bans related to this to secure the investigation," Lohi said.

"Naturally, our priority are the individuals whose tasks or responsibilities include the navigation of the ship and the operations related to the anchors."

In another incident, Finland and other Baltic Sea nations suspect a Chinese bulk carrier, Yi Peng 3, of dragging its anchor to breach two undersea fibre-optic communications cables in November.

Sweden's Civil Defence Minister Carl-Oskar Bohlin said on Sunday said that authorities had determined the Chinese ship had also threatened to cut a power cable connecting the Baltic states and the Nordic countries.

"We can today report that it has been determined that there are traces of an anchor, probably from Yi Peng 3, also in connection with NordBalt-cable, that is, the connection between Sweden and Lithuania. This obviously illustrates the seriousness of the situation we find ourselves in," he told reporters.

[sergejbiohazardov]

Какие-то новости

BDSN 63.364.9.03.25

Политика, экономика, стихия 

Израиль бомбил Ливан. Суд в США постановил взыскать с КНР $24 млрд за сокрытие данных о распространении COVID-19 в начале пандемии. Наводнение в Буэнос-Айресе, 10 человек погибли, более 1,3 тысячи эвакуированы. В РФ готовится гос. проект по слежке за всеми гражданами по геотрекам от мобильных операторов. Финляндия, Германия и другие страны НАТО, расследуя обрыв кабелей EstLink 2 и C-Lion1 и других подобных инцидентов на Балтике, не нашли никаких подтверждений, что они связаны с властями других стран. Украина бомбила РФ. Крупные лесные пожары вспыхнули на Лонг-Айленде. На Земле бушует геомагнитный апокалипсис,  аномально большая корональная дыра на Солнце, из-за которой магнитные бури не прекратятся до 19 марта. 

Местное

В Латвии уже объявились клещи. В Латвии несколько дней подряд фиксируются рекорды тепла. 

Разное

Согласно данным ежегодного отчёта Wealth Report компании Knight Frank,

количество людей, состояние которых превышает 10 млн долларов, выросло на 4,4% в 2024 году и превысило 2,341 млн человек. Количество физических лиц с состоянием свыше 100 млн долларов впервые в истории превысило 100 тысяч. Всего на планете — более 2,34 млн человек, которых можно назвать мультимиллионерами. 40% из них живут в США — это вдвое больше, чем в Китае. За последний год количество богатейших людей в США выросло на 5,2%. Количество миллиардеров год за год также увеличилось — на целых 8%.  Богатство миллиардного уровня имеют в мире 204 человека.

Но продолжаем помнить и приговаривать, что не в деньгах счастье. 

Администрация Трампа запретила 200 слов, включая «женщина», «секс», «феминизм» и «ЛГБТ». Власти США ввели запрет на использование ряда слов в официальных документах и на сайтах госструктур. По данным The New York Times, в черный список попало 200 терминов, среди которых «женщина», «мужчина», «феминизм», «инклюзивность», «небинарность», «антирасизм» и «жертва». Такое решение ограничивает использование понятий, связанных с правами человека, равенством и социальной справедливостью.

Ну что, поиграем в Алиас. Ваканда, раскрашенные сиськи, радуга. 

Видосы. На Парижской неделе моды представили киберпанк-одежду со встроенными в ткань десятками тысяч LED-элементов. Всё это станет частью осенне-зимней коллекции 2025–2026 японского бренда Anrealage. А ты гей, с какой планеты? В химчистку принимаете? 

#какиетоновости #картинканемоя #BDSN #news #sergejbiohazardov 

[head-post]

Finland to search tanker over alleged Baltic cable rupture

Finnish authorities plan to inspect the Eagle S tanker suspected of involvement in sabotaging an undersea cable in the Baltic Sea, according to Euractiv.

Sanna Sonninen, director of the country’s transport agency, claimed that the tanker was suspected of belonging to a Russian “shadow fleet” and involved in the sabotage. The inspection is scheduled for Thursday, in addition to an investigation already launched by the Finnish police.

On January 2, 2025, the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom will start a control inspection. We are carrying out the inspection in a way that does not interfere with the police operations and the investigation.

The Cook Islands-flagged Eagle S is suspected of damaging the EstLink2 power cable connecting Finland and Estonia on 25 December. Seven sailors were placed under investigation on Tuesday with a ban on leaving the country.

Several similar incidents have occurred in the Baltic Sea area since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022. Earlier in the autumn, on 17 and 18 November, two telecommunications cables were cut in Swedish territorial waters. The Chinese-flagged cargo ship Yi Peng 3 sailing over the cables at the time was suspected of being involved. However, it has since left the area.

The Baltic Sea is surrounded by several members of NATO, which has pledged to reinforce defences against an attack on critical infrastructure. The alliance announced an increased presence in the region after the cable rupture. Estonia has already deployed a ship to protect the EstLink1 power cable.

The European Union also announced enhanced measures to protect undersea cables through better information sharing and the use of new detection and repair technologies.

Read more HERE

[jeintalu]

Kaablitest ja mõistuspuudulikkusest

Lääneriikide jutt Venemaa "varilaevastikust" ja kaablite lõhkumisest Läänemerel ei klapi kokku ja on täiesti skisofreeniline.

Kui loll peab selleks olema, et sellist juttu uskuma jääda?

Esiteks on need laevad täiesti avalikud ja seaduslikud. Ainus, mida nad "varjavad" on see, et nad veavad salaja Venemaa naftat - nendele samadele lääneriikidele, kelle firmad seda salaja ostavad.

Muidugi on võimalik, et need laevad on vormistatud mingi kolmanda riigi lipu alla, et skeemi nii kerge avastada poleks.

Aga nüüd merekaablite lõhkumisest.

Kui Euroopa Liit ja NATO teatavad veendunult, et neid kaableid lõhuti tahtlikult, et tegemist on sabotaažiga, kuidas siis asjasse puutub see, et seda teinud laevad vedasid salaja naftat?

Loomulikult on see väga tõenäoline, et kui kaableid mere põhjas sedasi regulaarselt lõhutakse, siis on see tahtlik.

Ent selgituseta jääb skisofreeniline mõttekäik, et võidelda tuleb just sanktsioonide rikkumises süüdistatavate nafta tankeritega.

Ükskõik milline kaubalaev saab ankruga lõhkuda kaabli mere põhjas.

Kui see lõhkumine on tahtlik, siis kuidas see asjasse puutub, kas laev veab salanaftat või veab midagi muud, mis ei ole sanktsioonide all?

Kuna ma ei tea, kus nimelt lääneriigid jälle valetavad, siis minu jaoks on nullist erineva tõenäosusega ka hüpotees, et neid kaableid tegelikult ei lõhutud või et mõned lääneriigid tegid seda ise.

Eesmärgist blokeerida Peterburist tulevaid laevu räägiti avalikult seoses Soome astumisega NATO-sse ja veel enne seda, kui kaableid lõhuti.

Mis aga kaablite kaitsmisse puutub, siis pärast Nord Stream gaasitrassi õhku laskmist on üsna võimalik, et Venemaa tahab vastuseks lõhkuda NATO riikide kaableid ja torusid mere põhjas.

Kaubalaevade jälitamine aga teeb selle ülesande Venemaale ainult raskemaks, aeglasemaks ja kallimaks - ent mitte võimatuks.

Venemaa on täiesti võimeline laskma õhku kaableid kasvõi Atlandi ookeani põhjas.

Kui aga Venemaa laevadel takistatakse Peterburist merele pääseda, siis on see seaduslik casus belli - põhjus alustada sõda.

Tüüpidel ei ole ilmselt mõistust peas.

PS

Pärast selle postituse tegemist, järgmisel päeval, näen DELFI-s propagandaartiklit, mille pealkirjas aetakse segamini põhjus ja tagajärg:

"Millal hakkab lääs Venemaale samaväärselt vastama?"

Jutt käis kaablite ja torude lõhkumisest Läänemeres.

Ent kuigi Venemaa alustas sõda Ukrainas, ei olnud see kindlasti mitte Venemaa, kes alustas sabotaažiakte Läänemerel.

Minu järgmist kommentaari ei õnnestunud mul seal avaldada, mis on täiesti tüüpiline:

"No kuulge, kõigepealt lasti õhku Venemaale kuuluv Nord Stream gaasitrass."

[inprimalinie]

NATO nu a găsit dovezi ale implicării Rusiei în ruperea cablurilor din Marea Baltică

NATO nu a găsit dovezi privind implicarea Rusiei în ruperea cablurilor din Marea Baltică, scrie The Wall Street Journal. Georgiana Arsene Potrivit publicației, în cadrul investigației privind ruperea cablurilor EstLink 2 și C-Lion1 în Marea Baltică, desfășurată de Finlanda, Germania și alte țări NATO, nu au fost găsite dovezi care să indice implicarea Rusiei sau a altor state. În ultimul an,…

[khafji-bridge-iran-18]

People of Berlin, these satellites are EstLink 2 and EstLink 1, and this is trash. They have 10 days left to trample on them.😁

[curtvilescomic]

Current events break from all things Comics.. as russian illegal war against Ukraina continues they are having hybrid war on the whole western world. Oh, excuse me: on the whole World. But as their current leadership has downright racist view of Africa and Asia that after real opposition haa been dealt with they can do their colonial expansion easily thereafter.

During past year many information cables in bottom of the Baltic sea have been cut. Few Chinese vessels have just dragged their anchors cutting cables between Finland and Germany and Sweden and Germany and between Finland and Estonia.

On 25th december 2024 Estlink 2 submarine power cable between Finland and Estonia was cut. Part of russias Shadow fleet, Eagle S tanker had ran over the area.

The ship is under Cook islands flag and the single ship of Arab Emirates shipping company. Sure.

Finnish police with help from our coast guard and military took the ship over , captured the crew and confiscated the vessel. Which was missing it's anchor.

Here is what the police had to say at information event:

for non-finnish speaking minority:

Journalist: Have you took contact to russian authorities?

Police: No we have not. Journalist: Are you going to contact russian authorities? Police: No we will not.

Journalist: Why not? Police: I will not continue on this enquiry

Too long overdue. FAFO

[cyberbenb]

The Baltic Sea’s energy infrastructure is under attack. NATO must act

The European Union and NATO must strengthen cooperation to protect critical energy infrastructure from attacks, which pose a growing threat to European stability. The Kremlin, with its history of weaponizing energy, remains a prime suspect. NATO must properly secure the Baltic Sea — the so-called NATO lake.

The Baltic states achieved independence from the post-Soviet energy system in February by connecting to the continental grid via Poland. However, this transition is being overshadowed by a series of incidents in the Baltic Sea, underscoring the urgent need to secure the energy bridge from Poland, known as the LitPol Link. Poland and the Baltic states are ramping up their preparations.

Energy ministers from the Baltic states and Poland discussed preparations on Jan. 24 for the synchronization scheduled for Feb. 8-9. They announced plans for joint protection of the infrastructure required for this effort, following multiple incidents in the Baltic Sea. The synchronization will proceed without relying on the Estlink 2 cable, which was damaged in one of these incidents.

The meeting in Riga focused on finalizing preparations for synchronization and strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure. “The damage to the Estlink 2 power cable connecting Finland to Estonia has not impacted the ability of the Baltic states to safely disconnect from the Belarusian and Russian energy system and connect to the European grid,” the ministers concluded.

Analyses indicate that the Baltic states have sufficient cross-border capacity through Estlink 1, NordBalt, and LitPol Link to synchronize with Europe without relying on Estlink 2. Synchronization entails disconnecting the Baltic states from the post-Soviet BRELL system — which will continue to include Belarus and Russia — and adapting Baltic energy systems to operate on the continental frequency.

The LitPol Link power connection, running through Poland, will facilitate this transition. Synchronizing with the continental grid will eliminate energy exchanges with the BRELL system. This move is particularly significant for Kaliningrad Oblast, which will become an energy island — just as the Baltic states would have been if disconnected from BRELL without European synchronization.

“The resilience and protection of infrastructure have never been more important."

However, we cannot be sure that other parts of the critical infrastructure needed for a successful disconnection from the post-Soviet system are safe from malign activity. The Baltic states and Poland are enhancing the security of LitPol Link and other critical infrastructure elements to protect the synchronization process.

“The resilience and protection of infrastructure have never been more important. The Russian Federation is deliberately destroying Ukraine’s power grid, and its hybrid activities in the Baltic Sea underscore the importance of a well-secured energy system for defense,” said Krzysztof Bolesta, state secretary at Poland’s Ministry of Climate and Environment.

Captain Thomas Zimmerman (L) orders the NATO flag hoisted for the first time on HMS Carlskrona (P04) near Karlskrona, Sweden, on Feb. 4, 2025. (Johan Nilsson/TT News Agency/AFP via Getty Images)

A Helicopter 15 (HKP15) lands on the flight deck of HMS Carlskrona (P04) near Karlskrona, Sweden, on Feb. 4, 2025, during NATO’s Baltic Sentry patrol. (Johan Nilsson/TT News Agency/AFP via Getty Images)

Poland is also taking lessons from another energy bridge to Lithuania, known as Harmony Link. Rising costs and security considerations led Polish and Lithuanian operators to plan Harmony Link as a subsoil cable instead of the originally proposed sea route. Land-based infrastructure is easier to secure and — more importantly — can be repaired faster. If sabotage damage can be repaired within a few weeks, the act of sabotage loses much of its impact. That is why the news that Finnish telecom company Elisa managed to repair two undersea cables in about two weeks was so encouraging.

Another type of threat is emerging as well. Baltic operators have reported the spread of disinformation regarding the synchronization of their energy systems with Europe. “We urge the public to critically evaluate information, resist emotional opinions, and refrain from spreading unverified reports,” participants of the Riga meeting emphasized. Beyond spreading fear, the enemy may be attempting to promote a false economic narrative — that disconnection from BRELL would significantly increase electricity costs.

That narrative is false. According to a study conducted during the preparations, the average increase in energy prices for consumers with an average consumption of 140 kWh per month would be minimal: 50 cents per month in Lithuania, 60 cents in Estonia, and around one euro in Latvia. Relatively speaking, this is not a heavy impact. In return, the Baltic states gain energy independence from the Russian operator and market coupling with Europe, which promotes price decreases.

Energy system operators in Poland and the Baltic states have been instructed by their governments to implement an urgent package of measures to enhance the security of critical energy infrastructure. Lithuania’s Interior Ministry expedited the strengthening of the LitPol Link cable’s protection, advancing the timeline from April to Jan. 15 in response to the severing of the Estlink 2 cable between Finland and Estonia on Dec. 26, 2024.

Poland is also taking action. “Polish Transmission System Operator (PSE) ensures the protection of transmission infrastructure within the Republic of Poland’s territory. The company collaborates with relevant national services and institutions, as well as transmission system operators in neighboring countries,” PSE stated in a comment for the Energy Drink podcast.

“Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a state of heightened readiness has been in place, and the infrastructure is continuously monitored, with particular attention given to interconnections with Lithuania, Sweden, and Ukraine. New measures to enhance physical security are also being implemented.”

(L-R) Henna Virkkunen, Mette Frederiksen, Ulf Kristersson, Gitanas Nausėda, Alexander Stubb, Mark Rutte, Kristen Michal, Edgars Rinkēvičs, Olaf Scholz, and Donald Tusk pose at the Baltic Sea NATO summit in Helsinki, Finland, on Jan. 14, 2025. (Vesa Moilanen/Lehtikuva/AFP via Getty Images)

PSE reports ongoing collaboration with operators in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to strengthen regional infrastructure protection. “Discussions are underway about launching joint projects in this area and securing EU funding for them,” the statement adds.

The increasing frequency of attacks on critical infrastructure — such as the recent incident involving the undersea cable between Latvia and Gotland — highlights the difficulty of attributing blame in a complex and interconnected world. Scandinavian media reports suggest it could have been an accident.

However, there have been too many such “accidents” since Russia’s unlawful aggression against Ukraine began. The West needs to take the initiative and stop retreating. The EU and NATO must develop new tools and strategies to address these challenges and protect collective security — especially in the Baltic Sea, which must be properly secured as a NATO-controlled waterway.

Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.

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