#senegal president bassirou diomaye faye

[yearningforunity]

Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s win was powered by discontented younger voters. Unemployment among young adults is at nearly 20 per cent in Senegal. © John Wessels/AFP/Getty Images

[oyet]

Senegal swears in former opposition figure Bassirou Diomaye Faye

Senegal inaugurated Bassirou Diomaye Faye as its new president on Tuesday, completing the previously little-known opposition figure’s dramatic ascent from prison to the palace in recent weeks. Faye was released from prison less than two weeks before the March 24 election, along with popular opposition figure and mentor Ousmane Sonko, following a political amnesty announced by outgoing President…

[afrotumble]

Senegal election: Opposition leader Bassirou Diomaye Faye named the next president | AP News

[reasonsforhope]

Note: I super don't like the framing of this headline. "Here's why it matters" idk it's almost like there's an entire country's worth of people who get to keep their democracy! Clearly! But there are few good articles on this in English, so we're going with this one anyway.

--

2024 is the biggest global election year in history and the future of democracy is on every ballot. But amid an international backsliding in democratic norms, including in countries with a longer history of democracy like India, Senegal’s election last week was a major win for democracy. It’s also an indication that a new political class is coming of age in Africa, exemplified by Senegal’s new 44-year-old president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye.

The West African nation managed to pull off a free and fair election on March 24 despite significant obstacles, including efforts by former President Macky Sall to delay the elections and imprison or disqualify opposition candidates. Add those challenges to the fact that many neighboring countries in West Africa — most prominently Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but other nations across the region too — have been repeatedly undermined by military coups since 2020.

Sall had been in power since 2012, serving two terms. He declined to seek a third term following years of speculation that he would do so despite a constitutional two-term limit. But he attempted to extend his term, announcing in February that elections (originally to be held that month) would be pushed off until the end of the year in defiance of the electoral schedule.

Sall’s allies in the National Assembly approved the measure, but only after security forces removed opposition politicians, who vociferously protested the delay. Senegalese society came out in droves to protest Sall’s attempted self-coup, and the Constitutional Council ruled in late February that Sall’s attempt to stay in power could not stand.

That itself was a win for democracy. Still, opposition candidates, including Faye, though legally able to run, remained imprisoned until just days before the election — while others were barred from running at all. The future of Senegal’s democracy seemed uncertain at best.

Cut to Tuesday [April 2, 2024], when Sall stepped down and handed power to Faye, a former tax examiner who won on a campaign of combating corruption, as well as greater sovereignty and economic opportunity for the Senegalese. And it was young voters who carried Faye to victory...

“This election showed the resilience of the democracy in Senegal that resisted the shock of an unexpected postponement,” Adele Ravidà, Senegal country director at the lnternational Foundation for Electoral Systems, told Vox via email. “... after a couple of years of unprecedented episodes of violence [the Senegalese people] turned the page smoothly, allowing a peaceful transfer of power.”

And though Faye’s aims won’t be easy to achieve, his win can tell us not only about how Senegal managed to establish its young democracy, but also about the positive trend of democratic entrenchment and international cooperation in African nations, and the power of young Africans...

Senegal and Democracy in Africa

Since it gained independence from France in 1960, Senegal has never had a coup — military or civilian. Increasingly strong and competitive democracy has been the norm for Senegal, and the country’s civil society went out in great force over the past three years of Sall’s term to enforce those norms.

“I think that it is really the victory of the democratic institutions — the government, but also civil society organization,” Sany said. “They were mobilized, from the unions, teacher unions, workers, NGOs. The civil society in Senegal is one of the most experienced, well-organized democratic institutions on the continent.” Senegalese civil society also pushed back against former President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to cling to power back in 2012, and the Senegalese people voted him out...

Faye will still have his work cut out for him accomplishing the goals he campaigned on, including economic prosperity, transparency, food security, increased sovereignty, and the strengthening of democratic institutions. This will be important, especially for Senegal’s young people, who are at the forefront of another major trend.

Young Africans will play an increasingly key role in the coming decades, both on the continent and on the global stage; Africa’s youth population (people aged 15 to 24) will make up approximately 35 percent of the world’s youth population by 2050, and Africa’s population is expected to grow from 1.5 billion to 2.5 billion during that time. In Senegal, people aged 10 to 24 make up 32 percent of the population, according to the UN.

“These young people have connected to the rest of the world,” Sany said. “They see what’s happening. They are interested. They are smart. They are more educated.” And they have high expectations not only for their economic future but also for their civil rights and autonomy.

The reality of government is always different from the promise of campaigning, but Faye’s election is part of a promising trend of democratic entrenchment in Africa, exemplified by successful transitions of power in Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone over the past year. To be sure, those elections were not without challenges, but on the whole, they provide an important counterweight to democratic backsliding.

Senegalese people, especially the younger generation, have high expectations for what democracy can and should deliver for them. It’s up to Faye and his government to follow."

-via Vox, April 4, 2024

[zvaigzdelasas]

[BBC is UK State Media]

Months in jail alongside ally and kingmaker Ousmane Sonko ended suddenly, with the pair released the week before the presidential election.

Now Mr Clean, as he's nicknamed, must get to work on the sweeping reforms he has promised.[...]

Fighting poverty, injustice and corruption are top of Mr Faye's agenda. While working at the Treasury, he and Mr Sonko created a union taskforce to tackle graft.

Gas, oil, fishing and defence deals must all be negotiated to better serve the Senegalese people, says Mr Faye.

He is ushering in an era of "sovereignty" and "rupture" as opposed to more of the same, he told voters, and that is especially true of ties to France.

Senegal's president-elect says he will drop the much-criticised CFA franc currency, which is pegged to the euro and backed by former colonial power France.

Mr Faye wants to replace it with a new Senegalese, or regional West African, currency[...]

Strengthening judicial independence and creating jobs for Senegal's large young population are also key priorities for Mr Faye[...]

One of Mr Faye's heroes is the late Senegalese historian Cheikh Anta Diop - whose work is seen as a precursor to Afrocentrism. Both are seen as left-wing cheerleaders for pan-Africanism.

As early results came in on Monday showing Mr Faye was set for victory, people in the capital, Dakar, celebrated by honking car horns and singing to loud music.

The reaction from international markets was less jubilant, with Senegal's dollar bonds falling to their lowest level in five months. Reuters news agency reports that investors are concerned Mr Faye's presidency may wind down the country's business-friendly policies.

25 Mar 24

[ptseti]

Senegal officially becomes an oil-producing country with the first extraction from the Sangomar field, expected to produce up to 125,000 barrels per day. This will generate billions of dollars over 30 years, vital for the government’s new program. The Australian operator Woodside owns 82% of the project, while the remaining 18% is held by the Senegalese state through Petrosen. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye aims to renegotiate the production-sharing contract.

[beardedmrbean]

Senegalese commuters hoping to browse the news on their way to work were left disappointed on Tuesday - most national newspapers refused to publish in protest against what they see as shrinking media freedom under the new government.

The media is experiencing "one of the darkest days of its history," the local Council of Press Distributors and Publishers (CDEPS) said.

It accuses the government - led by former opposition politicians - of freezing the bank accounts of media companies and seizing their equipment over alleged non-payment of taxes.

Officials justify the crackdown by saying they were trying to end practices that lead to financial embezzlement and mismanagement in the media industry.

President Bassirou Diomaye Faye came to power in March after defeating the ruling coalition's candidate in elections.

His rise to power came after the opposition led huge protests to demand elections that then-President Macky Sall postponed in what his critics saw as a ploy to cling to power.

As part of Tuesday's media blackout, newspapers were displayed on newsstands with no content inside. The editions solely consisted a black cover reading "journée sans presse" ( French for "day without press") and an image of three raised fists gripping a pencil.

Not all papers participated in the protest - private outlet Wal Fadjri called the blackout an “ugly scar on the cheek of our beautiful democracy”.

While agreeing that the press was experiencing a "crisis", Wal Fadjri said a blackout should be the last resort as it would deprive readers of their right to information.

Radio stations largely rejected the boycott, but two popular private stations opted to play music instead of airing the news.

Private television channels like TFM (owned by Grammy award-winning singer Youssou N’Dour), ITV, and 7 TV broadcast news while demonstrating their support for the protest by featuring its slogan and image.

Concerns that the Mr Faye's government would try to restrict the media emerged a few months ago.

Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko was criticised by media professionals in June for warning that the government would no longer tolerate "falsehood" by journalists who he said were enjoying "too much impunity".

Mr Sonko used to be the public face of the opposition, and was barred from running for the presidency. He then backed Mr Faye.

Both of them had been imprisoned under the former government, and pledged to tackle corruption and strengthen democracy in Senegal.

From 2021 to 2024, Senegal slipped from 49th to 94th place on media watchdog Reporters Without Borders' world press freedom index.

The rights group recently urged Senegal's new president to take action to promote press freedom after years of "arrests and attacks on journalists, media closures and arbitrary Internet shutdowns" under Mr Sall.

[readyforevolution]

Senegal's newly elected President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his prime minister, Ousmane Sonko, swept into office after a remarkable three-week period that saw the two opposition figures go from prison to leading the country.

[mariacallous]

As former Senegalese President Macky Sall slyly tried to indefinitely postpone presidential elections in February this year, all eyes turned to the West African regional bloc—the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—to see whether it would react to this clear flouting of democratic rules. Unsurprisingly, to many observers who had grown accustomed to ECOWAS’s behavior in the face of such democratic failures, it responded weakly. It did not pledge sanctions or restrictions on Sall but simply encouraged the announcement of a new election date.

Nonetheless, Sall was prevented from postponing the poll by Senegal’s own constitutional court, which showed more strength than ECOWAS has done in years and said it was imperative that the election take place before the end of Sall’s mandate on April 2.

Opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye, only released from prison days beforehand, emerged victorious in the first round. Sall left office disgraced: Not only did he fail to facilitate an election win for his chosen successor, but he will also be remembered more for threatening to undermine Senegalese democracy than for any of the vast infrastructure projects and development that he presided over during his 12 years in office.

However, while Sall is the clear loser, the democratic win for Senegal may provide a welcome boost to the increasingly inept ECOWAS. The defense of democracy in Senegal could make it easier to uphold such norms elsewhere in West Africa, reviving hopes that democracy can be maintained and remains relevant across a region that has witnessed multiple coups and coup attempts since the start of 2020.

While not exactly demonstrating ECOWAS’s capacity for good, the case of Senegal at least reaffirms that there are countries in West Africa that agree with the basic norms that ECOWAS claims to stand for, including the sanctity of democracy.

Sall’s election gambit was not the first attempt at a constitutional coup in West Africa, though it was perhaps one of the least successful. Recent events in Togo have threatened democracy in the region—and ECOWAS’s credibility—even more.

In 2019, Togo passed constitutional amendments to allow President Faure Gnassingbé to reset his electoral eligibility and stand for an additional two terms. Then, this March, his government passed a new constitution that shifts Togo from a presidential to a parliamentary system and cements the Gnassingbé family’s authority over the country. The new constitution was introduced in the lead-up to legislative elections, which clearly violates ECOWAS’s Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Article 2.1 of this document stipulates that “[n]o substantial modification shall be made to the electoral laws in the last six (6) months before the elections.”

But Togo’s new constitution eliminates universal suffrage for the presidential elections and removes term limits, allowing Gnassingbé, who will now take on the role of the president of the Council of Ministers—a role similar to that of a prime minister—to retain power indefinitely. Despite manipulating the law to effectively make Gnassingbé into a lifelong monarch of Togo, ECOWAS’s reaction has been almost entirely muted.

Neighboring countries have also fallen from grace. Benin’s opposition parties were effectively excluded from legislative polls in 2019 following the passage of strict eligibility laws and a boycott, and in its 2021 presidential election, several of the leading candidates were excluded from the race and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. (Opposition parties did participate in the following legislative election in 2023, but the ruling coalition won and retained power.)

In 2020, Guinean President Alpha Condé, who had already served two terms, amended the constitution to reset term limits. He was later reelected for another six-year term in an election marred by violence and irregularities.

The same year, in Ivory Coast, President Alassane Ouattara reneged on a plan not to stand for an unconstitutional third term after his chosen successor died. His third-term bid, much like Condé’s, was accompanied with widespread violence and unrest, though he did eventually win amid an opposition boycott.

The international and regional reaction to these political machinations and rewriting of constitutions has been minimal over the years. Condé’s reelection in 2020 was barely remarked upon by ECOWAS, and Ouattara has been one of the darlings of the bloc and the West since the start of his third term. A real attempt to crack down on abuses of democratic power has been conspicuously absent.

ECOWAS’s failure to do more is likely in part due to its awkward approach to democracy. The bloc is underpinned by the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, adopted in 2001, which includes a mechanism for responding to undemocratic changes of power and requires democratic governance, elections, neutrality of the judiciary, and impartiality of the security forces in member states.

However, once leaders have held elections and can show that they have been chosen as president via the ballot box—however flawed that process may have been—the stringent stipulations of the protocol often go out the window. As such, a leader who undertakes a constitutional amendment or forces the judiciary’s hand to remain in office, or even one who seizes power by force, may subsequently be treated as a democratically mandated leader if he or she wins an election.

The bloc’s rapid reversal in its approach to leaders violating democratic norms once they have held elections is noteworthy. Togo’s Gnassingbé was elected as ECOWAS’s chairperson in 2017 despite presiding over a quasi-coup in 2005, sparking widespread riots and leading to the deaths of nearly 1,000 people. ECOWAS did sanction Togo during this time, but less than a year later, it declared that an election that allowed Gnassingbé to retain his power was free and fair. And there has been a deafening silence from ECOWAS amid the recent outcry that Togo has now become that same leader’s dynasty.

This inaction in the face of constitutional coups stands in stark contrast to ECOWAS’s immediate fierce condemnation of military coups in West Africa in recent years. Coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Guinea all saw ECOWAS impose sanctions and call for electoral timetables to be introduced, and the bloc even toyed with the idea of a military intervention in Niger. While these actions have largely been ineffectual, at least ECOWAS appeared interested in doing something to counteract such coups.

But ECOWAS’s task in dealing with military coups was made much harder by its woeful inaction in the face of constitutional coups, which pervaded the region in the preceding decades. This inertia has had an enormous impact on civilians in West Africa. Amid decades of flawed elections that have brought little more than bloodshed and quasi-authoritarian rule, confidence that democracy will enable populations to achieve change has diminished, almost by default creating an attraction to military rule.

Afrobarometer data from 36 countries surveyed in 2021 and 2022 shows that although two-thirds of Africans preferred democracy over any other form of government, only 38 percent of respondents were satisfied with the way that democracy functions in their country.

For example, the military coup in Guinea in 2021 was greeted with widespread celebrations even though it took place less than a year after Condé had won an unconstitutional third term. Residents had lost faith in the ability of their institutions to protect them from autocrats, so they required change by other means.

Of course, this constitutional-coup-followed-by-military-coup blueprint has not occurred everywhere. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger did not experience such a succession of events.

Yet, it is highly likely that the military leadership in these countries, as elsewhere, noted the lack of reaction to the weakening of democratic authority in the region. The failure of ECOWAS to do much to prevent constitutional coups and flagrant violations of democratic norms sent a message reverberating across the region that democracy was there to be challenged.

Not only were democratic norms being eroded—so too was the legitimacy of ECOWAS. Leaders could clearly see that the bloc would have no ground to stand on if it opposed a coup that was widely popular in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, or Guinea after having failed to crack down on incredibly unpopular efforts by supposedly democratically elected presidents to cling on to power in Guinea, Benin, and Togo.

Sure, ECOWAS has imposed sanctions and spoken out against military coups—but it has, as the coup leaders likely suspected, proven itself incapable of effectively standing up to any of these military regimes. Efforts to convince the ruling juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, or Niger to adhere to a transitional timetable and hold elections have been ineffectual at best, often proving downright embarrassing.

Coup leaders have periodically agreed to dates for elections only to rapidly renege and offer pathetic excuses for doing so. Burkina Faso’s junta recently extended military rule for at least another five years, while Mali is reportedly also discussing such a move despite ECOWAS lifting sanctions earlier this year in a misguided, clearly desperate effort to convince the country’s military leaders to return to the democratic fold.

These failings occurred likely at least in part because democratic norms had been eroded and weakened by ECOWAS’s inaction long before the string of military coups took place. Thus, where the bloc was already weakened by its apathy surrounding constitutional coups in the 2000s and 2010s, it has been thoroughly delegitimized by the spate of military coups of the 2020s. Increasingly, it seems that it has no might at all to stand up to any violation of its regulations in the region.

In August 2023, in a last-ditch effort to save itself, the bloc announced plans to launch an invasion of Niger to uphold democracy there after President Mohamed Bazoum was ousted. But the plan ultimately came to nothing, as Mali and Burkina Faso threw their weight behind the coup leaders in Niger, and the intervention force seemed to have little support in the wider region or in Niger itself.

As if to rub salt in the wound, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger announced in early 2024 that they would leave the bloc entirely, establishing the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) instead.

By then, the regional bloc seemed to be coming to the end of the road.

Faye’s election in Senegal may just provide a lifeline to ECOWAS. His arrival in power and the reinforcement of the country’s democratic cycle, though not remotely a result of ECOWAS assistance, will likely serve to boost democratic norms in the region once more. While ECOWAS may not be any stronger, this could make its job marginally easier.

Faye’s widespread popularity and his desire to encourage Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to rejoin ECOWAS will also boost its reputation.

Yet ECOWAS’s long-term survival will hinge on its ability to learn from its failures. It will need to reconcile itself with the fact that it now encompasses a region where nearly one-third of its members are led by unelected juntas, and at least 1 in 5 member states are trying to withdraw. But mostly, the bloc will need to recognize that its willingness to acquiesce to democratic abuses and constitutional coups since the early 2010s has significantly contributed to the mess in which it now finds itself.

ECOWAS will need more than one firebrand democrat in Senegal to fix such deep-seated problems. Its ability to stand up to Gnassingbé—and potentially also Ouattara, who looks increasingly likely to seek an unconstitutional fourth term in 2025—will be crucial tests of its willingness to reform itself and face up to its responsibilities in West Africa.

[darnellafrica]

Senegal’s 🇸🇳 President Suspiciously Suspends Elections

President Mackey Sall (who is unpopular in his country) has decided that Senegal 🇸🇳 is not ready to vote on his replacement due to “legal” reasons.

Senegalese President Macky Sall on Saturday announced that elections scheduled for Feb. 25 would be indefinitely delayed, marking a first in Senegal’s history and fueling concerns about the electoral process in a country with one of the strongest histories of democracy in West Africa. […]

Sall said that his decision to postpone the elections was intended to preserve their credibility, which he said was jeopardized by disagreements between the constitutional court and legislative branch centered on which candidates are allowed to run. Sall promised to hold a national dialogue to ensure that the elections are fair and transparent but offered no timeline. […]

Guillaume Soto-Mayor, a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute, said the decision to delay the election didn’t seem to have constitutional grounds and appears rooted in fear among the elite that Bassirou Diomaye Faye, the candidate selected by Sonko to run as his replacement, would win if elections were held Feb. 25. Sall was supporting Prime Minister Amadou Ba. (Washington Post)

This is the first time elections have been delayed in Senegal 🇸🇳, which is one of the few French-speaking African nations that has never experienced a military coup. With no date set for when elections will be held, some are seeing this latest move by President Sall to postpone his retirement from office & remain in power indefinitely.

If President Mackey fails to come up with a reasonable timeline for new elections, we could witness riots again—or worse—a military coup capturing the country.

[yearningforunity]

Bassirou Diomaye Faye pictured on 22 March during the election campaign in Senegal (AFP via Getty)

[wiwsport]

CAN Beach Soccer – Le Président Bassirou Diomaye Faye félicite les Lions : « Vous honorez une fois de plus le Sénégal par votre talent et votre détermination, nous sommes fiers de vous » https://wiwsport.com/2024/10/26/can-beach-soccer-le-president-bassirou-diomaye-faye-felicite-les-lions-vous-honorez-une-fois-de-plus-le-senegal-par-votre-talent-et-votre-determination-nous-sommes-fiers-de-vous/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=tumblr

[uniqueeval]

Senegal’s president on reforms, snap election and pan-Africanism | Politics

Bassirou Diomaye Faye on domestic and geopolitical challenges, five months into his presidency. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Africa’s youngest elected leader, became Senegal’s president in April, weeks after being released from prison. The 44-year-old’s rise followed political unrest and marked him as a symbol of hope for the Senegalese youth. Faye promised to reform the economy, tackle unemployment,…

[zvaigzdelasas]

Faye told the nation in a televised speech on Wednesday, stressing the nation's openness to investors.

The audit is one of the first policy moves announced since the 44-year-old former tax inspector's inauguration on Tuesday, Reuters reported.

Faye defeated the ruling coalition's candidate in a March election by a landslide, reflecting high hopes for change in the country of around 18 million.

"The exploitation of our natural resources, which according to the constitution belong to the people, will receive particular attention from my government," he said.

"I will proceed with the disclosure of the effective ownership of extractive companies (and) with an audit of the mining, oil, and gas sector."

He did provide further details, but sought also to reassure investors, who he said were "welcome in Senegal."

"Investor rights will always be protected, as well as the interests of the state and the people," he said.

Senegal's first offshore oil development is due to start production in mid-2024. The Sangomar oil and gas project operated by Woodside Energy is expected to produce about 100,000 barrels per day.

The country is also gearing up to launch the $4.8 billion Grand Tortue Ahmeyim liquefied natural gas project later this year, spearheaded by BP Plc and Kosmos Energy Ltd.

According to Bloomberg, the projects are expected to spur economic growth of more than 8% in 2024 and over 10% in 2025. Senegal is already one of the African countries to dominate the world’s top 10 growing economies. Senegal's growth is expected to be fueled by increasing private and infrastructure projects.

4 Apr 24