#john turnbull

[sitting-on-me-bum]

A red handfish (Thymichthys politus) - grumpy fish.

Image credit: John Turnbull

[pam3pr]

john turnbull⋰ 2018 ⍛ anna anufrieva⋰ 2000

[spilladabalia]

Ian Dury & The Blockheads - Sex & Drugs & Rock 'n' Roll

[nerds-yearbook]

In May of 1863, Jonah Hex shot and killed General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. ("Stonewall!", Jonah Hex 37#, DC Comic Event)

[letterboxd-loggd]

The Night of the Party (The Murder Party) (1934) Michael Powell

May 26th 2024

[butchersboobs]

Ladies and gentlemen, may I present 'Karl Urban As Inanimate Objects' for your viewing pleasure...

[pedroam-bang]

Lilah - Jonah Hex (2010)

[davekat-sucks]

https://www.tumblr.com/davekat-sucks/753301119358418944/johndave-is-soooo-canon-im-gonna-delude-myself?source=share to the johndave is CANON anon I think roach is actually running with pesterquest being canon so dave being into john really is part of beyond canon lore

But if James Roach says Pesterquest is canon, then he says the Karkat Route is canon, which has Karkat visit Dave and force Davekat to be a thing. Don't forget as well, the same team in Pesterquest, hated on David Turnbull aka traceexcalibur, the person who put DaveJade in Jade's route. They got a lot of flack from the team and was kicked out from WhatPumpkin because of this. So WhatPumpkin and now James Roach with HICU, are picking and choosing what should be allowed in the Homestuck projects.

[permanentstyle]

https://www.permanentstyle.com/2023/09/the-style-of-king-charles-top-level-classic-menswear.html

The style of King Charles: Top-level classic menswear

[quantomeno]

Also mentioned in this article is his thing about the "36,000 public servants" he wants to get rid of (or at least some of), claiming these people were all hired under Labor and it's a waste of taxpayer money.

I was reading an opinion piece in the Age the other day that highlighted how unachievable this promise would be:

After you ignore Defence-related jobs (which he'd be loath to cut)...

"That leaves about 146,000 workers in other departments and agencies. Who would be cut? The target of 36,000 jobs would require the Coalition to sack one in every four workers from that remaining total. This is impossible without cutting some of the biggest departments and agencies. Getting rid of smaller ones – such as 4700 people at the Department of Climate Change – would barely make a dent in the target. "Dutton would have to target the 30,236 workers at Services Australia, the 21,350 at the Australian Tax Office and the 8069 at the National Disability Insurance Agency. The Liberals and Nationals may not mind if a welfare recipient waits for hours on a helpline, but they will hear about if farmers do not get assistance or business owners have more trouble with the ATO."

(my emphasis in bold)

The point being he simply can't cut that many roles without causing issues for significant proportions of the population and this 36,000 number is all bluster.

The opposition is bringing nothing of any substance to this election and it's pitiful to watch (it's pitiful to watch them most of the time, but the point still stands). Their only significant policy is their energy policy which is just a smokescreen so they can keep doing nothing.

Dutton likes to make a big deal about the Left and their culture wars and what have you, but it's always him turning these matters into divisive issues.

Welp, it’s started in Australia now. Given that he’s echoing Trumpian sentiments and Trump has just made that statement about diversity politics in response to a fatal plane crash, I really don’t think he’s going to get the response he’s after. What a fucking clown.

(For non-Australians, this is our Opposition leader and he’s getting rightfully dragged across the coals for this in the media)

[brokehorrorfan]

Out There Screaming: An Anthology of New Black Horror will be published on October 3 via Random House. It's curated by filmmaker Jordan Peele, who also provides an introduction and serves as editor with John Joseph Adams.

It features short stories by Erin E. Adams, Violet Allen, Lesley Nneka Arimah, Maurice Broaddus, Chesya Burke, P. Djèlí Clark, Ezra Claytan Daniels, Tananarive Due, Nalo Hopkinson, N.K. Jemisin, Justin C. Key, L.D. Lewis, Nnedi Okorafor, Tochi Onyebuchi, Rebecca Roanhorse, Nicole D. Sconiers, Rion Amilcar Scott, Terence Taylor, and Cadwell Turnbull.

The 400-page book will be available in hardcover, e-book, and audio book. The synopsis is below.

The visionary writer and director of Get Out, Us, and Nope, and founder of Monkeypaw Productions, curates this groundbreaking anthology of all-new stories of Black horror, exploring not only the terrors of the supernatural but the chilling reality of injustice that haunts our nation. A cop begins seeing huge, blinking eyes where the headlights of cars should be that tell him who to pull over. Two freedom riders take a bus ride that leaves them stranded on a lonely road in Alabama where several unsettling somethings await them. A young girl dives into the depths of the Earth in search of the demon that killed her parents. These are just a few of the worlds of Out There Screaming, Jordan Peele’s anthology of all-new horror stories by Black writers. Featuring an introduction by Peele and an all-star roster of beloved writers and new voices, Out There Screaming is a master class in horror, and—like his spine-chilling films—its stories prey on everything we think we know about our world... and redefine what it means to be afraid.

Pre-order Out There Screaming.

[mostlysignssomeportents]

Apple's encryption capitulation

I'm on a 20+ city book tour for my new novel PICKS AND SHOVELS. Catch me in NYC on TOMORROW (26 Feb) with JOHN HODGMAN and at PENN STATE THURSDAY (Feb 27). More tour dates here. Mail-order signed copies from LA's Diesel Books.

The UK government has just ordered Apple to secretly compromise its security for every iOS user in the world. Instead, Apple announced it will disable a vital security feature for every UK user. This is a terrible outcome, but it just might be the best one, given the circumstances:

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgj54eq4vejo

So let's talk about those circumstances. In 2016, Theresa May's Conservative government passed a law called the "Investigative Powers Act," better known as the "Snooper's Charter":

https://www.snooperscharter.co.uk/

This was a hugely controversial law for many reasons, but most prominent was that it allowed British spy agencies to order tech companies to secretly modify their software to facilitate surveillance. This is alarming in several ways. First, it's hard enough to implement an encryption system without making subtle errors that adversaries can exploit.

Tiny mistakes in encryption systems are leveraged by criminals, foreign spies, griefers, and other bad actors to steal money, lock up our businesses and governments with ransomware, take our data, our intimate images, our health records and worse. The world is already awash in cyberweapons that terrible governments and corporations use to target their adversaries, such as the NSO Group malware that the Saudis used to hack Whatsapp, which let them lure Jamal Khashoggi to his death. The stakes couldn't be higher:

https://pluralistic.net/2025/02/04/citizen-lab/#nso-group

Encryption protects everything from the software updates for pacemakers and anti-lock braking to population-scale financial transactions and patient records. Deliberately introducing bugs into these systems to allow spies and cops to "break" encryption when they need to is impossible, which doesn't stop governments from demanding it. Notoriously, when former Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull was told that the laws of mathematics decreed that there is no way to make encryption that only stops bad guys but lets in good guys, he replied "The laws of mathematics are very commendable but the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia":

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/07/australian-pm-calls-end-end-encryption-ban-says-laws-mathematics-dont-apply-down

The risks don't stop with bad actors leveraging new bugs introduced when the "lawful interception" back-doors are inserted. The keys that open these back-doors inevitably circulate widely within spy and police agencies, and eventually – inevitably – they leak. This is called the "keys under doormats" problem: if the police order tech companies to hide the keys to access billions of peoples' data under their doormats, eventually, bad guys will find them there:

https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/1/1/69/2367066

Again, this isn't a theoretical risk. In 1994, Bill Clinton signed a US law called CALEA that required FBI back-doors for data switches. Most network switches in use today have CALEA back-doors and they have been widely exploited by various bad guys. Most recently, the Chinese military used CALEA backdoors to hack Verizon, AT&T and Lumen:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/10/07/foreseeable-outcomes/#calea

This is the backdrop against which the Snooper's Charter was passed. Parliament stuck its fingers in its ears, covered its eyes, and voted for the damned thing, swearing that it would never result in any of the eminently foreseeable harms they'd been warned of.

Which brings us to today. Two weeks ago, the Washington Post's Joseph Menn broke the story that Apple had received a secret order from the British government, demanding that they install a back-door in the encryption system that protects cloud backups of iOS devices:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/02/07/apple-encryption-backdoor-uk/

Virtually every iOS device in the world regularly backs itself up to Apple's cloud backup service. This is very useful: if your phone or tablet is lost, stolen or damaged, you can recover your backup to a new device in a matter of minutes and get on with your day. It's also very lucrative for Apple, which charges every iOS user a few dollars every month for backup services. The dollar amount here is small, but that sum is multiplied by the very large number of Apple devices, and it rolls in every single month.

Since 2022, Apple has offered its users a feature called "Advanced Data Protection" that employs "end-to-end" encryption (E2EE) for these backups. End-to-end encryption keeps data encrypted between the sender and the receiver, so that the service provider can't see what they're saying to each other. In the case of iCloud backups, this means that while an Apple customer can decrypt their backup data when they access it in the cloud, Apple itself cannot. All Apple can see is that there is an impenetrable blob of user data on one of its servers.

2022 was very late for Apple to have added E2EE to its cloud backups. After all, in 2014, Apple customers suffered a massive iCloud breach when hackers broke into the iCloud backups of hundreds of celebrities, leaking nude photos and other private data, in a breach colloquially called "Celebgate" or "The Fappening":

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_celebrity_nude_photo_leak

Apple almost rolled out E2EE for iCloud in 2018, but scrapped the plans after Donald Trump's FBI leaned on them:

https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sour-idUSKBN1ZK1CO/

Better late than never. For three years, Apple customers' backups have been encrypted, at rest, on Apple's servers, their contents fully opaque to everyone except the devices' owners. Enter His Majesty's Government, clutching the Snooper's Charter. As the eminent cryptographer Matthew Green writes, a secret order to compromise the cloud backups of British users is necessarily a secret order to compromise all users' encrypted backups:

https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/02/23/three-questions-about-apple-encryption-and-the-u-k/

There's no way to roll out a compromised system in the UK that differs from non-British backups without the legion of reverse-engineers and security analysts noticing that something new is happening in Britain and correctly inferring that Apple has been served with a secret "Technical Capability Notice" under the Snooper's Charter:

Even if you imagine that Apple is only being asked only to target users in the U.K., the company would either need to build this capability globally, or it would need to deploy a new version or “zone”1 for U.K. users that would work differently from the version for, say, U.S. users. From a technical perspective, this would be tantamount to admitting that the U.K.’s version is somehow operationally distinct from the U.S. version. That would invite reverse-engineers to ask very pointed questions and the secret would almost certainly be out.

For Apple, the only winning move was not to play. Rather than breaking the security for its iCloud backups worldwide, it simply promised to turn off all security for backups in the UK. If they go through with it, every British iOS user – doctors, lawyers, small and large business, and individuals – will be exposed to incalculable risk from spies and criminals, both organized and petty.

For Green, this is Apple making the best of an impossible conundrum. Apple does have a long and proud history of standing up to governmental demands to compromise its users. Most notably, the FBI ordered Apple to push an encryption-removing update to its phones in 2016, to help it gain access to a device recovered from the bodies of the San Bernardino shooters:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/eff-support-apple-encryption-battle

But it's worth zooming out here for a moment and considering all the things that led up to Apple facing this demand. By design, Apple's iOS platform blocks users from installing software unless Apple approves it and lists it in the App Store. Apple uses legal protections (such as Section 1201 of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Article 6 of the EUCD, which the UK adopted in 2003 through the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations) to make it a jailable offense to reverse-engineer and bypass these blocks. They also devote substantial technical effort to preventing third parties from reverse-engineering its software and hardware locks. Installing software forbidden by Apple on your own iPhone is thus both illegal and very, very hard.

This means that if Apple removes an app from its App Store, its customers can no longer get that app. When Apple launched this system, they were warned – by the same cohort of experts who warned the UK government about the risks of the Snooper's Charter – that it would turn into an attractive nuisance. If a corporation has the power to compromise billions of users' devices, governments will inevitably order that corporation to do so.

Which is exactly what happened. Apple has already removed all working privacy tools for its Chinese users, purging the Chinese App Store of secure VPN apps, compromising its Chinese cloud backups, and downgrading its Airdrop file-transfer software to help the Chinese state crack down on protesters:

https://pluralistic.net/2022/11/11/foreseeable-consequences/#airdropped

These are the absolutely foreseeable – and foreseen – outcomes of Apple arrogating total remote control over its customers' devices to itself. If we're going to fault Theresa May's Conservatives for refusing to heed the warnings of the risks introduced by the Snooper's Charter, we should be every bit as critical of Apple for chasing profits at the expense of billions of its customers in the face of warnings that its "curated computing" model would inevitably give rise to the Snooper's Charter and laws like it.

As Pavel Chekov famously wrote: "a phaser on the bridge in act one will always go off by act three." Apple set itself up with the power to override its customers' decisions about the devices it sells them, and then that power was abused in a hundred ways, large and small:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/09/22/vin-locking/#thought-differently

Of course, there are plenty of third-party apps in the App Store that allow you to make an end-to-end encrypted backup to non-Apple cloud servers, and Apple's onerous App Store payment policies mean that they get to cream off 30% of every dollar you spend with its rivals:

https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/1iv072y/endtoend_encrypted_alternative_to_icloud_drive/

It's entirely possible to find an end-to-end encrypted backup provider that has no presence in the UK and can tell the UK government to fuck off with its ridiculous back-door demands. For example, Signal has repeatedly promised to pull its personnel and assets out of the UK before it would compromise its encryption:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/03/05/theyre-still-trying-to-ban-cryptography/

But even if the company that provides your backup is impervious to pressure from HMG, Apple isn't. Apple has the absolute, unchallenged power to decide which apps are in its App Store. Apple has a long history of nuking privacy-preserving and privacy-enhancing apps from its App Store in response to complaints, even petty ones from rival companies like Meta:

https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/29/23378541/the-og-app-instagram-clone-pulled-from-app-store

If they're going to cave into Zuck's demand to facilitate spying on Instagram users, do we really think they'll resist Kier Starmer's demands to remove Signal – and any other app that stands up to the Snooper's Charter – from the App Store?

It goes without saying that the "bad guys" the UK government claims it wants to target will be able to communicate in secret no matter what Apple does here. They can just use an Android phone and sideload a secure messaging app, or register an iPhone in Ireland or any other country and bring it to the UK. The only people who will be harmed by the combination of the British government's reckless disregard for security, and Apple's designs that trade the security of its users for the security of its shareholders are millions of law-abiding Britons, whose most sensitive data will be up for grabs by anyone who hacks their accounts.

If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2025/02/25/sneak-and-peek/#pavel-chekov

Image: Mitch Barrie (modified) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Daytona_Skeleton_AR-15_completed_rifle_%2817551907724%29.jpg

CC BY-SA 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/deed.en

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Kambanji https://www.flickr.com/photos/kambanji/4135216486/

CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

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Rawpixel https://www.rawpixel.com/image/12438797/png-white-background

[snototter]

Montipora sp. coral on One Tree Island, QLD, Australia

by John Turnbull

[herpsandbirds]

After showing off my cresties color changes now I wonder what your favorite color changing critters might be?

Color Change:

Well, hands down, it would have to be cephalopods. They have amazing color change capabilities... especially the cuttlefish!

Broadclub Cuttlefish (Sepia latimanus), family Sepiidae, found in the Indo-Pacific region

These images, of the same individual, were taken just seconds apart from each other.

photographs by Nick Hobgood

Reaper or Red Cuttlefish (Sepia mestus), family Sepiidae, Cronulla, New South Wales, Australia

photograph by John Turnbull 

Giant Cuttlefish (Sepia apama), family Sepiidae, found along the southern coasts of Australia & Tasmania

photographs by Lawrence Scheele

[amnhnyc]

Rockin’ around… the uh… what? Meet the Christmas tree worm (Spirobranchus giganteus). This “festive” marine worm lives on tropical coral reefs around the planet. Its name is derived from the spiny fir trees that are emblems of the holiday season. But at just 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) in size, you won’t find any decorations hanging from this species’ “branches.” While part of the worm is buried in the coral, its colorful appendages are used for breathing and for snatching plankton to eat. In ideal conditions, Christmas tree worms can live for up to 40 years!

Photo: John Turnbull, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0, flickr

[marineexplorer]

Curious wrasse drawn to bubble pocket #marineexplorer by John Turnbull Via Flickr: When we survey in overhangs our bubbles can form pockets of air on the underside of the rock. This crimson banded wrasse was most interested in the bubble formation. Jervis Bay RLS.