#it's mainly used by the IDF
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schoolhater · 3 months ago
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my friend has been fucked over by gofundme multiple times and has had tens of thousands of dollars taken away from him. he can no longer support his family as they try to survive a genocide
i've posted about my friend @siraj2024 several times at this point, please check out these posts [1, 2]
tl;dr is that in november 2024, his gofundme campaign that he was using to pay rent, buy food and medical care for his family of 24 was terminated without warning. $27,000usd was lost, some of it was refunded and some is stuck somewhere in gofundme's bureaucracy. he quickly made another campaign and raised a few thousand dollars, mainly from people who had received refunds. yesterday, siraj's second campaign was deleted and thousands of dollars have been taken away again.
this situation has absolutely crushed him and caused him both mental and physical stress. though most of us cannot imagine what living in gaza is like, im sure we can all imagine how we'd react if we suddenly lost $27,000+. conditions in gaza continue to get worse as - on top of the constant bombardment from the idf and the constant threat of displacement and death - flooding, crime and all kinds of disease are on the rise. his family has 10 children and elderly people in it.
everyone who donated to his earlier campaigns [the one deleted in november, the one deleted in january] needs to request a refund using this link and once you have recieved that refund, please send it back via his new chuffed campaign.
gofundme has been increasing its restrictions on palestinian fundraising by deleting campaigns that mention gaza, even ones with several thousands of dollars raised and especially ones that aim to support families experiencing genocide. on the other hand, chuffed is generally considered a more reliable fundraising website by people involved in palestinian fundraising, but isn't widely used because donors don't recognize it and assume it is a scam. do not be put off by the new fundraiser host. this new campaign is being run by an associate of siraj who lives abroad, it is reliable.
siraj has also been vetted and personally promoted by nabulsi and el-shab-hussein (line 219). i also conducted an interview with him where he spoke about his experiences living in gaza and how important donations are to palestinians.
@magnus-rhymes-with-swagness is also running a raffle where you can win a necklace if you donate to this new campaign. last day to submit is the 15th
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demon-at-peace · 2 months ago
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DP + DC streamer Sam/Val
seen and a bunch of posts/fics with a streamer Danny or Tucker, but Sam and Val, (it is my new fav ship), anyhow so it's this Gotham girl who is like shouting about eco friendly stuff, rants about endangered animals. And then her buff girlfriend, who goes to protests with her and is smitten. and literally punched a dude who hit on her.
They go viral, cause the internet loves stuff like this, so they get partnerships with a ton of businesses with organic/vegan/eco friendly products. Sam is so enthusiastic, and Val is too, and they go viral again. So Wayne Enterprises reaches out eventually, to promote something.
And who do they talk with? their tech people, aka Tucker and Danny. it's Tim who reaches out (idf about reality) and like they get into a chat, and figure it out. Anyhow they do promote it, but Sam may be very into ecology stuff, but she ain't a tech girl, so she calls Danny and tucker.
The video goes viral, not for the tech, but for Danny and Tucker, the whole internet thinks they are a couple, and goes crazy. Danny posts on TikTok (he mainly posts ghost memes) saying "ew gross that's my bro, like sure i'm gay, that's obvious, I mean look at me, but that's my bro!" Tucker on his does the same thing, (he posts tech blogs). The internet proceeds to ignore them.
Tim's first thought when he sees them, is holy shit the tech dudes I talked to are so hot. He may or may not blush, cause okay fine, he's into fit buff dudes. But they are a couple and he's a CEO and it doesn't matter. Till he sees Tucker's/Danny's video, and is like ok so I do have a chance. But he's a CEO so never mind.
a couple months after this, a hacker (Tim is convinced it's like 5) pops up. They are going for the JL servers. Tim and Oracle as a team effort spent days tracing it back. And it's Danny & Tucker, Tim reaches out to them and is received with, "is Oracle one person, my friend swears she is, but I don't think so?" And Tim is just flabbergasted.
So he answers and tells them to stop hacking the servers, they do, but he ends up stalking them. And interacting with them under disguise, somehow they can tell, and pull him aside after a couple days, and are like, "why are you here? your a CEO, don't you have a company to run."
Tim blurts out for all his stupidity "I had a crush on you, from the video, and your hot and tech dudes" (with guilty smile and Robin level acting) , well okay it isn't a lie but such a stupid cover. Tim almost has a metal breakdown, cause now they think he's a stalker, ect.
Neither of them think that, cause he's way more polite than Vlad, and Tucker is so used Danny's ghost stuff it's hardly weird.
Idk the rest or know the ship, like it could be poly or Tim/Tuck, or Tim/Danny, who cares?
also I wrote this with a fever, so don't judge me, though it's back down to 101 °F , like yay!! hate colds tho,
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sayruq · 1 year ago
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In the early hours of April 7th the Israel Defence Forces’ (idf) 98th Division withdrew from Khan Younis, the second-largest city in Gaza, exactly six months after Hamas’s attack of October 7th. Israel had the sympathy and broad support of much of the West when it sent its army to war with Hamas. Half a year later, much of Gaza lies in ruins. Over 33,000 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Gazan health ministry. The uprooted civilian population faces famine. Israel has lost the battle for global public opinion. Even its closest allies, including America, are considering whether to limit arms shipments. Much of the criticism centres on Israel’s armed forces. Even after its devastating failure to prevent the massacres of October 7th, the idf has remained the most cherished institution in Israeli society. Holding fast to the vision of the idf as both effective and moral is essential to Israelis’ image of themselves. But it is now accused of two catastrophic failures. First, that it has not achieved its military objectives in Gaza. Second, that it has acted immorally and broken the laws of war. The implications for both the idf and Israel are profound.
Major-General Noam Tibon is a retired corps commander who on October 7th rushed to his son’s kibbutz near Gaza, single-handedly extricating his young family while Hamas was on the rampage. In hindsight, he says, the idf should have gone into Rafah first. He believes his former colleagues were “under the illusion that going first into Gaza City would break Hamas psychologically, by taking their symbols of government”. But, he argues, “all the talk of dismantling their brigades and battalions is rubbish. They remain a fundamentalist movement which doesn’t need commanders to fight until death.” The lack of enforcement of even these looser rules of engagement has been such that accusations that Israel has broken the laws of war are plausible. “The standing orders don’t matter in the field,” says one veteran reserve officer who has mostly been in Gaza since October. “Just about any battalion commander can decide that whoever moves in his sector is a terrorist or that buildings should be destroyed because they could have been used by Hamas.” “The only limit to the number of buildings we blew up was the time we had inside Gaza,” says one sapper in a combat-engineering battalion. “If you find a Kalashnikov or even Hamas literature in an apartment, it’s enough to incriminate the building.” Other officers reported a breakdown of discipline in their units, with multiple cases of looting. “I think everyone in our platoon took a coffee set,” said one sergeant. Soldiers have filmed themselves vandalising Palestinian property and, in some cases, put those videos online. On February 20th the idf’s chief of staff published a public letter to all soldiers warning them to use force only where necessary, “to distinguish between a terrorist and who is not, not to take anything which isn’t ours—a souvenir or weaponry—and not to film vengeance videos.” Four months into the war, this was too little, too late. “He should have acted much sooner to root this out,” says one battalion commander. The idf’s third failure is its role in Israel’s obstruction—until an angry phone call between President Joe Biden and Mr Netanyahu on April 4th—of aid efforts to Gazans. Officers have mainly blamed the politicians for this. But some acknowledge that even without a political directive, the army, which is arguably an occupying force in Gaza now, should have assumed this responsibility from the planning stage. Instead it acted only when the humanitarian situation became critical. That does not bode well for the future. The war in Gaza is not over. Israel’s next step is unclear. Mr Netanyahu says that a date has been set for an incursion into Rafah, Hamas’s last major stronghold (in private, Israeli generals deny this).
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witchlinda · 1 year ago
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i honestly have NO issue believing Hamas r*ped Jewish/Israeli women on Oct/7 in the same way i have no issue beliving the IDF also r*pes Palestinian women. you know why? because it's a *war* (mainly fought by male soldiers) and unfortunately, sexual violence has, for centuries, been used as a weapon of.
no woman deserves to be a victim of sexual violence and it's very sad and infuriating to see feminists and allies completely ignore or mock Israeli survivor's stories.
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probablyasocialecologist · 1 year ago
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The Israeli army’s expanded authorization for bombing non-military targets, the loosening of constraints regarding expected civilian casualties, and the use of an artificial intelligence system to generate more potential targets than ever before, appear to have contributed to the destructive nature of the initial stages of Israel’s current war on the Gaza Strip, an investigation by +972 Magazine and Local Call reveals. These factors, as described by current and former Israeli intelligence members, have likely played a role in producing what has been one of the deadliest military campaigns against Palestinians since the Nakba of 1948. The investigation by +972 and Local Call is based on conversations with seven current and former members of Israel’s intelligence community — including military intelligence and air force personnel who were involved in Israeli operations in the besieged Strip — in addition to Palestinian testimonies, data, and documentation from the Gaza Strip, and official statements by the IDF Spokesperson and other Israeli state institutions. Compared to previous Israeli assaults on Gaza, the current war — which Israel has named “Operation Iron Swords,” and which began in the wake of the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel on October 7 — has seen the army significantly expand its bombing of targets that are not distinctly military in nature. These include private residences as well as public buildings, infrastructure, and high-rise blocks, which sources say the army defines as “power targets” (“matarot otzem”). The bombing of power targets, according to intelligence sources who had first-hand experience with its application in Gaza in the past, is mainly intended to harm Palestinian civil society: to “create a shock” that, among other things, will reverberate powerfully and “lead civilians to put pressure on Hamas,” as one source put it. Several of the sources, who spoke to +972 and Local Call on the condition of anonymity, confirmed that the Israeli army has files on the vast majority of potential targets in Gaza — including homes — which stipulate the number of civilians who are likely to be killed in an attack on a particular target. This number is calculated and known in advance to the army’s intelligence units, who also know shortly before carrying out an attack roughly how many civilians are certain to be killed.
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girlactionfigure · 10 months ago
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When I was in Germany, I traveled outside of Berlin to meet some Palestinian friends who were part of the diaspora community in the country. I hung out with several individuals from Gaza or who have family in the Strip and are part of a network of individuals and organizations that are pro-Palestine. I had extremely intense conversations with these folks, some of whom listened and agreed, some of whom strongly disagreed, some of whom were confused by what I was saying, some who agreed but didn’t see a path forward, and some who literally threatened to beat me up if I didn’t stop talking. Here's what I got out of those conversations:
1. Hamas’s resistance narrative is widely accepted and embraced by large segments of the Palestinian diaspora community, particularly those who are less integrated into the nations in which they live, especially if their environment is mainly made up of other Palestinians, aka echo chambers.
2. Intense emotions and feelings dominate the discourse and how people view the war, Israel, Hamas, the conflict, and any discussions of responsibility and a path forward. Trauma, sadness, anger, and feelings of sheer injustice control the way people see what’s happening, October 7, claims and counterclaims, and competing narratives.
3. Opposition to Hamas, and my views and sentiments were instantly associated with treachery, weakness, cowardice, and embracing “Zionist lies and propaganda.” Undeterred, I argued that not only is opposition to Hamas necessary, courageous, critical, and inseparable from opposition to Israeli occupation and injustices, but that we are in this mess partly due to our complicit silence and acquiescence to Hamas’s Islamist propaganda and destructive narratives that harmed the Palestinians more than any Zionist could ever dream of doing.
4. Misinformation about so many incidents and occurrences is rampant. This is particularly the case when it comes to boycotting things like Starbucks, Coke products, McDonald’s, and hundreds of other goods. The list of “forbidden” things is so huge and contains the most ridiculous of items, such as KitKat, hot sauce, and innocuous consumer products, all because they are perceived as directly supporting Israel, the war, or the IDF. When challenged about the accuracy of their information, almost no one wanted to hear about the futility of these boycotts and their nonexistent impact on the war and broader Israel and Palestine discourse.
5. Some were incredibly furious at me for challenging the “martyrdom” narrative, and one person threatened me with physical violence if I didn’t stop maligning martyrdom. Of course, I didn’t back down and proceeded to rationally challenge this idea of Gazans killed in the war after October 7 being martyrs with a ticket straight to heaven and that this is Islamist propaganda and brainwashing that’s getting us nowhere. I said that my family was killed for nothing and that most Gazans who lost their lives would have chosen life over being killed so that Hamas could maintain its corrupt and despicable rule over the coastal enclave.
6. A pro-resistance man surprisingly agreed with me when I told him that Hamas prevented civilians from evacuating Gaza’s north early in the war and didn’t want people to leave, a ruthless decision that caused unnecessary loss of life. This is something that many Western fools refuse to acknowledge: Hamas wanted Gazans to stay put so that they could be used as human shields by the group and frustrate the Israeli military’s operations by causing maximum civilian casualties.
7. Several agreed with me that Hamas is only interested in maintaining power, but in the absence of alternatives, they didn’t see anything wrong with this. When I kept saying that Hamas’s continued rule in Gaza means endless wars and more death & destruction, none seemed to have any meaningful responses beyond some mumbles and incoherent rants.
8. The military occupation of the West Bank and settlement expansion kept coming up over and over. Whenever I pushed on Hamas, taking responsibility, having to accept Israel’s existence & continued existence, embracing and rebranding peace, rejecting violence, what’s happening in the West Bank kept coming up. Folks didn’t see Gaza in isolation, but as part of a broader issue/conflict/problem that can’t be compartmentalized. “If Gaza were peaceful, stable, and developed,” argued one man, “the West Bank will still be occupied,” which, in his mind, necessitates Hamas’s “resistance.”
9. This is my own assessment and inference, but I truly strongly felt that support for Hamas was primarily driven by the lack of alternatives and the binary nature of everything related to the conflict: Fatah VS. Hamas; Israel VS. Palestine; Armed resistance VS. diplomacy and nonviolence; us VS. them; kill VS. be killed; Palestinian narrative VS. Jewish narrative. In other words, there was almost little to no ability to hold multiple truths, approach the issue with nuance and rational balance, and an entrenched belief that one truth must inherently be mutually exclusive and must by default cancel out the other. When engaged, however, some were willing to think differently.
10. There was clearly a high degree of conformity when people were together versus when I engaged individuals one-on-one. In other words, group settings made for largely unproductive and hostile discussions, while individual conversations were much more likely to be productive and change people’s minds and thinking. This is consistent with the universal trend that individuals are smart, groups are dumb; people are afraid to say what they really believe and think in front of others but are much more likely to speak their minds when anonymous, alone, or away from the “community’s ears and eyes” as one gentleman put it.
In summary, my conversations were difficult and quite depressing in some regards. However, these same unpleasant and discouraging conversations actually gave me hope that with respectful, patient, persistent, rational, calm, evidence-based, and analytical/non-emotional engagements and outreach, meaningful seeds can be planted to change hearts and minds and begin the 1000-mile journey towards political transformation and the arduous effort to rebrand peace and coexistence as a necessary evolution to preserve the Palestinian people on their lands and forge a different path forward.
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mariacallous · 1 month ago
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For the residents of Nahal Oz, there can be little doubt that the Israeli military failed miserably in protecting the country on Oct. 7, 2023. For at least seven hours, they were undefended, at the mercy of Hamas militants engaged in acts of murder and sexual violence on the kibbutz and across a wide swath of Israel’s western Negev region.
According to an investigation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released on March 4, the first wave of 180 Hamas members entered Nahal Oz at 6:30 a.m. under cover of rocket fire. The only resistance they met was from 11 border guards who happened to be stationed there. Further waves of attacks followed at 10 and 11 a.m. The first significant amount of troops only reached the kibbutz at 1:15 p.m., long after the worst of the Hamas attack was over. Fifteen people from Nahal Oz were killed that day, and eight others were kidnapped, one of whom was subsequently killed in captivity. Two are still being held hostage in Gaza.
“I know that lots of people were murdered, and their last words were, ‘Where is the IDF?’ I know that. It’s very hard for us [to accept that],” Herzi Halevi, who was Israeli chief of staff on Oct. 7, said to local council leaders in leaked remarks.
Seventeen months later, Israelis continue to ask, “Where was the IDF?” And that’s precisely where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants the questioning to stop—with the army and the rest of the defense establishment taking the blame rather than the civilian leadership. At no point since the attack has Netanyahu accepted any personal responsibility for it. He has resisted pressure to form a state commission of inquiry to investigate the debacle that ended with approximately 1,200 Israelis dead and 251 kidnapped.
Having issued reports in recent weeks, the IDF has taken at least one step toward answering the question of where the military was that day (Shin Bet, Israel’s security agency, also published a report of its own). But it’s only a step. It did not assign personal responsibility to the generals involved and was careful to steer clear of addressing the role of civilian leaders.  Halevi himself has admitted responsibility and recently stepped down from his post, as have a host of other generals who had a direct role in the Oct. 7 debacle.
As to its overall role in the disaster, the IDF was pretty candid, even if it added relatively little new information to events that have been thoroughly documented by the media, personal testimonies, and even independent citizens’ commissions of inquiry. The Shin Bet and military intelligence ignored the evidence that Hamas was preparing for a major attack. Thus, the 40-mile border Israel shared with Gaza was manned by just 767 soldiers when an estimated 5,600 attackers stormed the border fence, quickly overrunning military installations and civilian communities. Blinded by Hamas’s assault on the high-tech equipment that was supposed to alert the Israeli army to an incursion, the top military brass had no clear picture of what was happening for hours. In the meantime, it responded slowly and with confusion.
There was, of course, a much bigger and deeper failure that enabled all this to happen—one that goes back at least to 2014—as the army report recounts. Resources were directed to fighting Iran and Hezbollah on the assumption that Hamas had been pacified at least to the degree that it couldn’t or wouldn’t ever mount a large-scale attack. It was believed to be mainly interested in preserving its power in Gaza and, for that purpose, it wanted to improve economic conditions. With that misconception driving policy, the IDF calculated that it just needed timely intelligence and early-warning systems to ensure Israel’s security. Hamas encouraged this Israeli misconception, even as its leader, Yahya Sinwar, began planning what the organization called Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
While the responsibility of the political echelon is not addressed in the IDF investigation, the army’s faulty assumptions were shared by Netanyahu. He wasn’t interested in a decisive military assault on Gaza and lent a hand to stabilizing its economy by authorizing Qatar to deliver suitcases of money to Hamas in the years after 2018. The prime minister preferred a strong and stable Hamas as a rival to the more moderate Palestinian Authority that rules the West Bank. Keeping the West Bank and Gaza divided would make Netanyahu’s goal of evading a peace process harder.
Getting to the truth of a cataclysmic event is a laudable goal. The United States did so after President John F. Kennedy’s assassination and 9/11, South Africa did so after the fall of apartheid, and much of Eastern Europe did so after the fall of communism. However, such efforts inevitably come with a political cost for those held responsible, a fate Netanyahu is determined not to suffer.
In the case of Israel, there is a long history of state commissions of inquiry being established after a catastrophe. Among the most important: the Agranat Commission that probed the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Kahan Commission that looked into the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 1982, and the Shamgar Commission that investigated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination. The Winograd Commission (technically a somewhat lesser government commission of inquiry) formed after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War led to IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz to resign. Netanyahu demanded the resignation of Ehud Olmert, who was prime minister at the time. Olmert limped along for another two years, but his political career was over.
These commissions, whose status is set out in a 1968 law, are independent and powerful. They can call witnesses; recommend further action against politicians, generals, and officials found culpable; and propose policy changes. Their conclusions have the imprimatur of official history, so it comes as no surprise that Netanyahu fears an Oct. 7 commission.
For the supremely legacy-conscious prime minister, a commission that holds him at least partially responsible for the debacle—as is inevitable—would create a powerful narrative in contrast with the image he cultivates of an unparalleled strategist and statesman, as well as the country’s resolute protector. More concretely, the commission might recommend that he should step down. Almost certainly, it would dim his reelection prospects.
The risk for Netanyahu is especially high given the role played in state commissions of inquiry by the Supreme Court, an institution Netanyahu has been at war with due to the government’s judicial overhaul plans. By law, commission members are appointed by the chief justice of the court and the panel itself is usually chaired by a former chief justice. The current chief justice, Yitzhak Amit, was named over the objections of the government, which has been boycotting him. Netanyahu perceives Esther Hayut, Amit’s predecessor and a likely chair, as no less an enemy.
Netanyahu and his allies have offered various justifications for not forming a state commission, including: It must wait until the war is over (although he seems determined to continue the fighting indefinitely); a state commission is fated to be biased against him; and there isn’t a national consensus to form one. However, a majority of the public supports forming either a state commission or a government probe (which would have fewer powers) at the very least. A news poll from last week, for instance, found that only 15 percent of the public say there is no need for such a probe. Worryingly for Netanyahu, other polls show Israelis believe he is more to blame for Oct. 7 than the heads of the IDF or Shin Bet.
The Supreme Court, which often rules on issues of public concern, ordered Netanyahu’s cabinet to debate the issue and to justify its opposition by May 11. Meanwhile, a coalition backbencher has proposed a sui generis type of commission appointed by the Knesset. On paper, the plan sounds reasonable, but between the lines, it’s clear its terms are designed to turn the panel into a partisan slugfest whose conclusions, if it could reach any, would be tainted. Last December, coalition lawmakers blocked an opposition bill to form a state commission, meaning it cannot be resubmitted as legislation until June.
Netanyahu has poisoned the political atmosphere surrounding Oct. 7 so much that even if one is eventually formed, a commission may be unable to win broad support for its conclusions. The prime minister’s supporters not only defend their chief against any and all connection with the debacle, but proffer conspiracy theories built on the canard that there a leftist deep state out to topple him. Before Oct. 7, the conspiracy theories centered  mainly on the judicial system; since then, they have come to include the army and the Shin Bet, which are alleged to have conspired to enable a catastrophe on a scale that the prime minister would have no choice but to resign. As implausible as this sounds, a December poll by the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility found that 47 percent of coalition voters believe it.
Thus, far from being a basis for a national reckoning and a process for making sense of what was the most traumatic event in the country’s history, the idea of a state commission has become a political punching bag—which means Netanyahu has already gotten his wish.
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the-garbanzo-annex-jr · 10 months ago
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Universities across the world are facing pressure—from students but also from academic staff—to cut ties with Israeli institutions over the war in Gaza. In the US, a dozen universities have struck agreements with activists and partly conceded to their demands, including divestment from Israeli companies. In Europe, dozens of Spanish universities and five Norwegian universities have resolved to sever all ties with Israeli partners deemed “complicit” in the war in Gaza. Several Belgian universities have now suspended all collaborations with Israeli universities because of their collaborations with the IDF. Even without a formal boycott, pressure from anti-Israel protests and the BDS movement has already led to pervasive exclusion of Israeli scientists and students. In the liberal Israeli newspaper Haaretz, over 60 academics have testified what this amounts to: cancelled invitations to lectures and committees, desk rejections of papers on political grounds, freezing of ongoing collaborations, disrupted guest lectures, and withdrawn co-authorships.Damned in Amsterdam: A Bizarre DeplatformingWe wanted to give a talk on how ideological bias hampers science—and were disinvited because of our politics.QuilletteJerry A. Coyne
What arguments are there for such a boycott? An open letter at Ghent University signed by more than 1500 students and staff, including dozens of professors (mainly from the humanities), denounces the stark “contrast” between the treatment of Israel and that of Russia in the wake of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, when many Western universities cut all ties with Russian universities. According to the signatories, Israel is currently committing a “genocide” in Gaza, and they demand that any cooperation with Israeli universities be suspended “as long as the current war continues.”
However, the “contrast” in reactions to both conflicts is perfectly defensible. Ukraine was brutally invaded by Russia without any prior provocation or military threat, simply because Putin imagines that Ukraine is a “fictional” nation that has no right to exist. If thousands of Ukrainian fighters had committed a gruesome massacre on Russian soil in January 2022, methodically slaughtering 1,200 innocent men, women, and children and taking another 250 hostages, only then would there be any semblance of similarity between both conflicts (as with many open letters from pro-Palestinian protestors, the letter completely ignores the terrorist attack of 7 October). It should also be noted that almost all Russian universities pledged their unequivocal support of the invasion of Ukraine, in a statement released by the Russian Union of Rectors and signed by more than 300 academic institutions.
As for the genocide charge, we believe it is as obscene as it is baseless. The tragic death of civilians as an unwanted side-effect of legitimate military objectives is completely different from the deliberate and methodical killing of civilians. It is perfectly reasonable to criticise Israel’s current military strategies and to question the sufficiency of measures taken to prevent civilian casualties, but it is absurd to pretend that the IDF is pursuing the opposite goal. The only genocidal party in this conflict is Hamas, which in its founding charter fantasises about the killing of the last Jew on earth.
In any event, a call for an “immediate and permanent ceasefire” and a boycott “as long as the war continues,” as the open letter demands, entails that no form of warfare against Hamas is deemed acceptable, which amounts to a de facto denial of Israel’s right to self-defence under the international law of war. No country would tolerate a terrorist group like Hamas at its border, least of all after a pogrom like that of 7 October.
Israel has the right to eliminate Hamas’s military capacity in Gaza, but unfortunately this terrorist entity has been digging hundreds of kilometres of reinforced tunnels for over 17 years (but not a single shelter for its civilian population). Hamas also has a long history of using Palestinian civilians as human shields, and deliberately firing rockets from hospitals, schools, UN buildings, mosques, and in the vicinity of humanitarian zones. All these reprehensible tactics are mainly aimed at getting as many “martyrs” as possible in front of cameras, in order to manipulate Western political opinion and turn it against Israel. Judging by the sentiments prevalent on many college campuses, Hamas’s cynical strategy has been a resounding success.
No one in their right mind would deny that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is horrific, and no one can remain indifferent to the unacceptable suffering of Palestinian children. We would all like to see an end to the violence as soon as possible. Still, to demand that Israel accept a permanent ceasefire without any further conditions (the elimination of Hamas’s military capability and the release of hostages) amounts to an unequivocal choice for Hamas and against Israel.
Urban warfare is always hell, and was no less so in Mosul and Raqqa, when a Western alliance carried out a massive bombing campaign against the Islamic State, with broad support from almost the entire Western world. We now know that thousands of civilians died in Mosul alone, and unlike in Gaza, people had little or no opportunity to evacuate.
How many academics in Europe or the US would adopt the same anti-war attitude if a terrorist group had slaughtered over 1,200 of their compatriots (the equivalent of 13 times the casualties of 9/11 for the US) and proudly live-streamed their atrocities? And not on “occupied” or “colonised” land, but on internationally recognised territory. Many Westerners, accustomed to decades of peace and security, no longer understand what it means to live in a fragile democracy (the only one in the region), which has been under existential threat since its founding and is currently surrounded by multiple terrorist groups committed to wiping it off the map.
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sailorhaumea · 1 year ago
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This is going to be my only contribution to Discourse for the foreseeable future: the fact that I now find myself having to check the Tumblr of people whose fics seem interesting on AO3 to make sure they're not a straight up war crimes denier/conspiracy theorist (any conflict, really, take your pick, but this was mainly prompted by Palestine) is incredibly upsetting and not good for my mental health. And stop trying to fandomize conflict when *real people* are dying. It's fucked up. If your activism doesn't recognize this very important detail it's not helping anyone.
Don't be posting completely monstrous things like "actually hostages are treated well" or "there's no evidence of sexual violence" or "actually all the people killed were killed by Israel" or telling Jews to "go back to Poland". What the fuck is wrong with you? This isn't helping people who are suffering. No one is benefiting from this! And neither is opposing a ceasefire because you think it'd let the IDF win. When people did this on Twitter they were called out by actual Palestinians for it because, again, this is real life, not a game. This isn't two sports teams playing against each other. People are dying every day.
On another note: as someone who saw her Syrian friends talk for years about the Assad regime grinding hundreds of thousands of people into dust, some of them being permanently silenced out of nowhere one day never to say another word because their life was snuffed out by a barrel bomb, if someone tried to make a fucked up "fandom" around the Syrian Revolution, I'd think they were an asshole. Do better. And don't you fucking dare heap praise on groups pretending to care about your cause when they're also still helping Assad kill more people. Fuck off with your praise for the Houthis, or Hezbollah, or the IRGC. I have lost friends to these murderers. Their claims to care about your cause are lies. They only care about human rights violations against Palestinians if they can be used as a prop to distract people from recognizing their own crimes against humanity.
I will not be lectured about how Hezbollah or Assad are friends of Palestinians when they slaughtered countless Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk. When Assad's father Hafez was a Syrian nationalist who openly stated that Palestinians were just Syrians, that there was no Palestinian people.
And please, for the love of G-d, don't fucking boost people like Rania Khalek, or Max Blumenthal, or Ben Norton, who cheerlead these mass murderers from one side of their mouth while pretending to care about civilians if they're Palestinians. If you see someone reposting some sort of Twitter bluecheck, please fucking do a background check, because for years Assadists have used Palestine as a way to do entryism into movements.
That's all I have to say. I left Twitter and made Tumblr my primary social media to get away from having to subject myself to the worst takes imaginable. This is my only return to anything that could be considered political I intend to do on this website. You will see no other posts remotely related to this topic from me. Don't ask me to make more. I've suffered enough damage to my mental health as a Jewish woman the past seven months.
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diabolus1exmachina · 2 years ago
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Lamborghini Urraco P300
Despite having been conceptualised as the model to dramatically increase sales and bring Lamborghini greater financial stability, the Urraco P250 proved a commercial flop. Production started in late 1972 following major equipment and floorspace investment. However, by late 1974, less than 500 had been delivered. The Urraco should have gone into production two years earlier than it eventually did. Lamborghini had originally conceived the model with a view to selling over 1000 examples every year.
The disappointing reality left Lamborghini deep in the red, but the Urraco was only partly responsible for a difficult few years.
Compounding the firm’s troubles had been delays for the Countach, a worldwide recession, problems at Lamborghini Trattori and unionised labour, all of which contrived to take their toll on the company founder. In 1972, Ferruccio Lamborghini had sold his tractor company along with 51% of his motor car business. He cashed out of the final 49% in 1974 when the world was in the midst of an energy crisis that slashed demand for gas guzzling machinery.
Throughout this tumultuous period, development work continued on the Urraco. It mainly focused on the Paolo Stanzani-designed V8 engine that had been created especially for the new model at considerable expense. In November 1974, an uprated Urraco P300 was launched at the Turin Motor Show. It immediately went into production alongside the Countach LP400, Espada Series 3 and Jarama S.
Most significantly, the Urraco P300 came with an enlarged three-litre engine. Equally importantly, the power unit now incorporated dual instead of single overhead camshafts.
To take capacity up to three-litres, Paolo Stanzani’s all-alloy 90° V8 was stroked from 53mm to 64.5mm. Bore went unchanged at 86mm for an overall displacement of 2997cc (an increase of 534cc). Compression was dropped from 10.5:1 to 10.0:1. Four new Weber 40 DCNF twin-choke downdraught carburettors were installed to replace the old 40 IDF 1s used previously.
The consequence of these improvements was a dramatic jump in output. Peak power was up 40bhp to 260bhp at an otherwise unchanged 7500rpm. The torque rating also rose considerably; 195lb-ft was now on tap at 3500rpm compared to 166lb-ft at 5750rpm for the P250.
As before, ignition was via two Marelli coils and a single Marelli distributor.
Lamborghini’s five-speed manual gearbox was beefed up to cope with the increased power and torque. Transmission was via a single dry-plate clutch and Lamborghini differential. New damper settings improved the ride, but otherwise little was changed to the existing platform The P300 was based on the same steel monocoque body shell as its predecessor. The engine was housed transversely like the Miura.
Suspension was independent all-round with MacPherson struts, coil springs and telescopic shocks. Anti-roll bars were fitted at either end The twin circuit brake system incorporated unchanged 278mm ventilated Girling discs. Campagnolo’s handsome five-bolt cast magnesium wheels were retained. They measured 7.5 x 14-inches and originally came shod with Michelin XWX tyres.
An 80-litre fuel tank was fitted in the engine bay.
Visually, the only change made to the P300 Urraco was a switch from a two-bank to six-bank radiator cooling vent on the front lid. The rest of Marcello Gandini’s soft wedge creation was unaltered.In a decade not exactly renowned for design longevity, the Urraco proved somewhat timeless. Compared to Bertone’s other mid-engined 2+2, the Ferrari Dino 308 GT4, the baby Lamborghini aged very well, even though it was ultimately outsold by the Maranello product by five to one.Build quality was considerably improved over earlier examples and nowhere was this more apparent than in the cockpit.Bertone had originally been responsible for furnishing the bodyshells, but by the time the P300 was on stream, this work had been taken in-house.
Lamborghini used better quality materials and ensured a higher standard of fit and finish.To this end, P300s were generally equipped with full leather interiors instead of the often garish two-tone leather and fabric combinations seen earlier.
The full width dash layout was still just as haphazard though. The rev counter and speedometer were located at either end of the instrument binnacle and angled in towards the driver. Supplementary gauges and various rocker switches were housed in between.
Lamborghini’s unusual deep dish steering wheel with its four arced horizontal spokes and leather rim was also retained. Like the P250 (which remained in production for a few months longer to use up an overstock of parts), the only update was the gradual shift to anodised black bumpers, wipers and window frames. A more conventional three-spoke steering wheel was also introduced towards the end of production.
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eretzyisrael · 1 year ago
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By Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg
Throughout the 17 years since the Hamas takeover, numerous reports have been published and videos posted detailing the growth of the terrorist capabilities inside Gaza. The frequent clashes with the IDF exposed additional information on the terror network and command centers located under and inside civilian locations, such as hospitals, mosques, schools and residential buildings. In the course of the operation that began following the October 7 attack, the IDF and journalists have added to this information, posting numerous pictures and videos showing the links between the aid operations and Hamas installations.
UNRWA is the largest aid framework operating in Gaza. It employs 30,000 staffers, mainly Palestinians, as well as about 200 international staff members, many based in Gaza or periodic visitors. It strains credulity to claim that the heads of the organization were unaware of the Hamas activities under and in the immediate proximity of their facilities and residences. In fact, evidence indicates that UNRWA international officials maintained a code of silence and cooperation with Hamas and associated terror groups, including promoting their propaganda and incitement and training of children for terror. Many UNRWA teachers have participated in antisemitic social media platforms, as documented repeatedly by UN Watch and other watchdogs. (On UNRWA corruption, see “UN Aid Chief Quits Amid Probe Into Palestinian Refugee Program.”) In May 2021, following the 11-day conflict, the top UNRWA international staffer in Gaza was forced to resign after acknowledging that the IDF counterterror strikes had been “precise” and “sophisticated.” The logical assumption, to be examined in this documentation process and evaluation, is that other UNRWA officials would have had similar information.
In addition to UNRWA, at least 12 other UN agencies are active in Gaza, including UN-OCHA (the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization. A preliminary review of the history indicates that the officials and employees of these organizations also followed a policy of silence, and in some cases, directly cooperated with Hamas.
Similarly, UNICEF maintained direct and open cooperation with terror-linked NGOs, such as Defense for Children in Palestine (DCIP). UNICEF also provided medical services during the Hamas-organized violent confrontations along the border with Israel under the facade of the “Great March of Return” (2018-2019), which served as rehearsals for the October 7 massacre. In addition, UNICEF’s disregard for Israeli children targeted in missile attacks from Gaza, including those who were murdered, is another important part of the record.
The same questions and issues apply to documenting the terror-enabling activities of diplomats and officials from government aid organizations. The EU is the largest single financial supporter and aid donor to the Palestinians, and therefore likely to have been a major source of materials diverted to terror. In this context, it should be noted that the European Union’s Head of Delegation (ambassador) to the West Bank and Gaza, Sven Kuhn von Burgsdorff (2019-2023), met with officials of NGOs linked to terror organizations (see below), and in February 2022, participated in an EU-funded workshop “focused on the strategies and mechanisms needed to combat counter-terrorism policies, regulations, and policies (sic).” In July 2023, von Burgsdorff smuggled a paraglider into Gaza and demonstrated its use, declaring, “Once you have a free Palestine, a free Gaza, you can do exactly the same thing.” Three months later, the Hamas attack involved terrorists using paragliders.
The third category concerns leaders and employees of NGOs that operated in Gaza. NGO Monitor has compiled a list, based on UN financial information, of 70 NGOs that were active in recent years, and the total is likely to be higher. The largest, as measured by budgets and extent of involvement, include the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), and Islamic Relief. Many major donor countries, including the US, maintain a list of “trusted partners” whose activities and personnel are exempt from detailed oversight and review.
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hexcrystals · 1 year ago
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To be honest I feel like “everything bad in the world is all X show’s fans’ fault” is so SO much more embarrassing and terminally-online and fandom-brainrot than just being a fan of something. Like anti-trans legislation and Palestine and other real-life problems have nothing whatsoever to do with ofmd. Why do these people keep bringing it up?
yeah it's baffling. there's a genocide being perpetrated by the israeli government and the idf and funded by the us government and supported by various celebrities - but ofmd fans are the real problem. trans rights are under fire in america because of politicians and wealthy lobbyists and the christian right - but mainly ofmd fans, apparently.
'oh but that billboard money could've helped people' sure! where's your anger towards the corporations who run vastly more expensive ads in the same space? where's your anger towards celebrities on red carpets wearing outfits that cost more than my dad's house? why are you focused on ordinary people who threw £10 towards a billboard in the same way that some people spend £10 on a gym membership or a few coffees or a taxi home from work when they've had a horrible shift?
the transphobia post in particular is so fucking dumb bc newsflash some ofmd fans aren't american! idk what i'm supposed to do about american anti-trans laws! i don't have an elected rep i can contact! i'm busy trying to improve conditions for trans people in my own horrible transphobic country but that doesn't count apparently
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mithliya · 1 year ago
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this article is so illuminating and shows why so many of us believe this is a genocide-- according to the own words of IDF soldiers and israeli govt and their actions. they are admitting repeatedly that they sometimes target civilian areas and civilians and cultural heritage sites intentionally, knowing hamas is not there, in a twisted attempt of turning creating civil pressure on hamas.
Compared to previous Israeli assaults on Gaza, the current war — which Israel has named “Operation Iron Swords,” and which began in the wake of the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel on October 7 — has seen the army significantly expand its bombing of targets that are not distinctly military in nature. These include private residences as well as public buildings, infrastructure, and high-rise blocks, which sources say the army defines as “power targets” (“matarot otzem”). The bombing of power targets, according to intelligence sources who had first-hand experience with its application in Gaza in the past, is mainly intended to harm Palestinian civil society: to “create a shock” that, among other things, will reverberate powerfully and “lead civilians to put pressure on Hamas,” as one source put it.
theyre literally intentionally terrorising and killing palestinian civilians hoping it will somehow cause palestinians to somehow do the job of getting hamas for israel. instead of actually just.......idk.......trying to get hamas.
Several of the sources, who spoke to +972 and Local Call on the condition of anonymity, confirmed that the Israeli army has files on the vast majority of potential targets in Gaza — including homes — which stipulate the number of civilians who are likely to be killed in an attack on a particular target. This number is calculated and known in advance to the army’s intelligence units, who also know shortly before carrying out an attack roughly how many civilians are certain to be killed. In one case discussed by the sources, the Israeli military command knowingly approved the killing of hundreds of Palestinian civilians in an attempt to assassinate a single top Hamas military commander. “The numbers increased from dozens of civilian deaths [permitted] as collateral damage as part of an attack on a senior official in previous operations, to hundreds of civilian deaths as collateral damage,” said one source. “Nothing happens by accident,” said another source. “When a 3-year-old girl is killed in a home in Gaza, it’s because someone in the army decided it wasn’t a big deal for her to be killed — that it was a price worth paying in order to hit [another] target. We are not Hamas. These are not random rockets. Everything is intentional. We know exactly how much collateral damage there is in every home.”
the usage of "we are not hamas" to say that they are intentionally choosing to kill civilians instead of doing so at random is.. insane. "we are not hamas" should be followed by being more humane, not.. "we decided killing hundreds of palestinian civilians is worth it to get 1 single hamas member!"
According to the sources, the increasing use of AI-based systems like Habsora allows the army to carry out strikes on residential homes where a single Hamas member lives on a massive scale, even those who are junior Hamas operatives. Yet testimonies of Palestinians in Gaza suggest that since October 7, the army has also attacked many private residences where there was no known or apparent member of Hamas or any other militant group residing. Such strikes, sources confirmed to +972 and Local Call, can knowingly kill entire families in the process.
so, unshockingly, they are sometimes killing everyone within a building over some potential 1 hamas member, and sometimes there isnt a singular hamas member known in that building. so it could just be purely civilians being killed.
Another source said that a senior intelligence officer told his officers after October 7 that the goal was to “kill as many Hamas operatives as possible,” for which the criteria around harming Palestinian civilians were significantly relaxed. As such, there are “cases in which we shell based on a wide cellular pinpointing of where the target is, killing civilians. This is often done to save time, instead of doing a little more work to get a more accurate pinpointing,” said the source.
so they can be more accurate and precise with their attacks, as should be obvious for a highly sophisticated military, but they decide its better to just kill thousands of civilians if it saves them time.
From the first moment after the October 7 attack, decisionmakers in Israel openly declared that the response would be of a completely different magnitude to previous military operations in Gaza, with the stated aim of totally eradicating Hamas. “The emphasis is on damage and not on accuracy,” said IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari on Oct. 9. The army swiftly translated those declarations into actions.
The third is “power targets,” which includes high-rises and residential towers in the heart of cities, and public buildings such as universities, banks, and government offices. The idea behind hitting such targets, say three intelligence sources who were involved in planning or conducting strikes on power targets in the past, is that a deliberate attack on Palestinian society will exert “civil pressure” on Hamas.
they are deliberately destroying palestinian culture and history and society, hoping it will somehow create more pressure on hamas. 0 regard for palestinians' well-beings and safety and existence and they keep saying this over & over again
The final category consists of “family homes” or “operatives’ homes.” The stated purpose of these attacks is to destroy private residences in order to assassinate a single resident suspected of being a Hamas or Islamic Jihad operative. However, in the current war, Palestinian testimonies assert that some of the families that were killed did not include any operatives from these organizations. In the early stages of the current war, the Israeli army appears to have given particular attention to the third and fourth categories of targets. According to statements on Oct. 11 by the IDF Spokesperson, during the first five days of fighting, half of the targets bombed — 1,329 out of a total 2,687 — were deemed power targets.
so half of their targets were specifically intended to terrorise palestinian civilians and weren't actually attacks on hamas.
“We are asked to look for high-rise buildings with half a floor that can be attributed to Hamas,” said one source who took part in previous Israeli offensives in Gaza. “Sometimes it is a militant group’s spokesperson’s office, or a point where operatives meet. I understood that the floor is an excuse that allows the army to cause a lot of destruction in Gaza. That is what they told us. “If they would tell the whole world that the [Islamic Jihad] offices on the 10th floor are not important as a target, but that its existence is a justification to bring down the entire high-rise with the aim of pressuring civilian families who live in it in order to put pressure on terrorist organizations, this would itself be seen as terrorism. So they do not say it,” the source added.
the goal of their destruction of residential buildings isn't even about getting a hamas member who may or may not be there, its terrorism against palestinians.
Various sources who served in IDF intelligence units said that at least until the current war, army protocols allowed for attacking power targets only when the buildings were empty of residents at the time of the strike. However, testimonies and videos from Gaza suggest that since October 7, some of these targets have been attacked without prior notice being given to their occupants, killing entire families as a result.
unshockingly its as palestinians in gaza have been saying: they get attacked with no warning and countless civilian deaths occur as a result.
According to the Israeli army, during the first five days of fighting it dropped 6,000 bombs on the Strip, with a total weight of about 4,000 tons. Media outlets reported that the army had wiped out entire neighborhoods; according to the Gaza-based Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, these attacks led to “the complete destruction of residential neighborhoods, the destruction of infrastructure, and the mass killing of residents.”   As documented by Al Mezan and numerous images coming out of Gaza, Israel bombed the Islamic University of Gaza, the Palestinian Bar Association, a UN building for an educational program for outstanding students, a building belonging to the Palestine Telecommunications Company, the Ministry of National Economy, the Ministry of Culture, roads, and dozens of high-rise buildings and homes — especially in Gaza’s northern neighborhoods.
Yet despite the unbridled Israeli bombardment, the damage to Hamas’ military infrastructure in northern Gaza during the first days of the war appears to have been very minimal. Indeed, intelligence sources told +972 and Local Call that military targets that were part of power targets have previously been used many times as a fig leaf for harming the civilian population. “Hamas is everywhere in Gaza; there is no building that does not have something of Hamas in it, so if you want to find a way to turn a high-rise into a target, you will be able to do so,” said one former intelligence official.
they admit they use the excuse of hamas to justify attacking overwhelmingly civilian areas.
Indeed, according to sources who were involved in the compiling of power targets in previous wars, although the target file usually contains some kind of alleged association with Hamas or other militant groups, striking the target functions primarily as a “means that allows damage to civil society.” The sources understood, some explicitly and some implicitly, that damage to civilians is the real purpose of these attacks.
According to the doctrine — developed by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, who is now a Knesset member and part of the current war cabinet — in a war against guerrilla groups such as Hamas or Hezbollah, Israel must use disproportionate and overwhelming force while targeting civilian and government infrastructure in order to establish deterrence and force the civilian population to pressure the groups to end their attacks. The concept of “power targets” seems to have emanated from this same logic. The first time the Israeli army publicly defined power targets in Gaza was at the end of Operation Protective Edge in 2014. The army bombed four buildings during the last four days of the war — three residential multi-story buildings in Gaza City, and a high-rise in Rafah. The security establishment explained at the time that the attacks were intended to convey to the Palestinians of Gaza that “nothing is immune anymore,” and to put pressure on Hamas to agree to a ceasefire. “The evidence we collected shows that the massive destruction [of the buildings] was carried out deliberately, and without any military justification,” stated an Amnesty report in late 2014.
Not only has the current war seen Israel attack an unprecedented number of power targets, it has also seen the army abandon prior policies that aimed at avoiding harm to civilians. Whereas previously the army’s official procedure was that it was possible to attack power targets only after all civilians had been evacuated from them, testimonies from Palestinian residents in Gaza indicate that, since October 7, Israel has attacked high-rises with their residents still inside, or without having taken significant steps to evacuate them, leading to many civilian deaths. Such attacks very often result in the killing of entire families, as experienced in previous offensives; according to an investigation by AP conducted after the 2014 war, about 89 percent of those killed in the aerial bombings of family homes were unarmed residents, and most of them were children and women.
However, evidence from Gaza suggests that some high-rises — which we assume to have been power targets — were toppled without prior warning. +972 and Local Call located at least two cases during the current war in which entire residential high-rises were bombed and collapsed without warning, and one case in which, according to the evidence, a high-rise building collapsed on civilians who were inside.
therefore palestinian civilians are being killed without even being given warnings, just for the sake of terrorising other palestinians and hopefully pressuring hamas.
Six days later, on Oct. 31, the eight-story Al-Mohandseen residential building was bombed without warning. Between 30 and 45 bodies were reportedly recovered from the ruins on the first day. One baby was found alive, without his parents. Journalists estimated that over 150 people were killed in the attack, as many remained buried under the rubble. The building used to stand in Nuseirat Refugee Camp, south of Wadi Gaza — in the supposed “safe zone” to which Israel directed the Palestinians who fled their homes in northern and central Gaza — and therefore served as temporary shelter for the displaced, according to testimonies.
so theyre also attacking "safe zones".
According to an investigation by Amnesty International, on Oct. 9, Israel shelled at least three multi-story buildings, as well as an open flea market on a crowded street in the Jabaliya Refugee Camp, killing at least 69 people. “The bodies were burned … I didn’t want to look, I was scared of looking at Imad’s face,” said the father of a child who was killed. “The bodies were scattered on the floor. Everyone was looking for their children in these piles. I recognized my son only by his trousers. I wanted to bury him immediately, so I carried my son and got him out.” According to Amnesty’s investigation, the army said that the attack on the market area was aimed at a mosque “where there were Hamas operatives.” However, according to the same investigation, satellite images do not show a mosque in the vicinity.
independent investigations are finding inconsistencies between IDF claims and reality.
According to the IDF Spokesperson, by Nov. 10, during the first 35 days of fighting, Israel attacked a total of 15,000 targets in Gaza. Based on multiple sources, this is a very high figure compared to the four previous major operations in the Strip. During Guardian of the Walls in 2021, Israel attacked 1,500 targets in 11 days. In Protective Edge in 2014, which lasted 51 days, Israel struck between 5,266 and 6,231 targets. During Pillar of Defense in 2012, about 1,500 targets were attacked over eight days. In Cast Lead” in 2008, Israel struck 3,400 targets in 22 days. Intelligence sources who served in the previous operations also told +972 and Local Call that, for 10 days in 2021 and three weeks in 2014, an attack rate of 100 to 200 targets per day led to a situation in which the Israeli Air Force had no targets of military value left. Why, then, after nearly two months, has the Israeli army not yet run out of targets in the current war?
Israeli analysts have admitted that the military effectiveness of these kinds of disproportionate aerial attacks is limited. Two weeks after the start of the bombings in Gaza (and before the ground invasion) — after the bodies of 1,903 children, approximately 1,000 women, and 187 elderly men were counted in the Gaza Strip — Israeli commentator Avi Issacharoff tweeted: “As hard as it is to hear, on the 14th day of fighting, it does not appear that the military arm of Hamas has been significantly harmed. The most significant damage to the military leadership is the assassination of [Hamas commander] Ayman Nofal.”
i did not share all of the article so u can feel free to read all of it but it just confirms what many of us know to be the horrific and cruel acts of the IDF.
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girlactionfigure · 7 months ago
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🔘FRIDAY - events from Israel  
ISRAEL REALTIME - Connecting to Israel in Realtime
✡️Erev Shabbat - Parshat (Torah portion) Shoftim - Deuteronomy 16:18 - Moses instructs the people of Israel to appoint judges and law enforcement officers in every city. “Justice, justice shall you pursue,” he commands them, and you must administer it without corruption or favoritism.
▪️HAMAS HORROR PROPAGANDA.. during the Shivah, Hamas publishes a video from the captivity of the murdered hostage Hersh Goldberg-Polin, may G-d avenge his blood.  Reports the US is upset as this may affect negotiations., the murdered was a US citizen. 
▪️SAMARIA - JENIN.. The Arabs report that the IDF forces left the city of Jenin and the Jenin camp area after ten days of military activity.  The Mayor of Jenin: The occupation has halted the supply of electricity and water to Jenin. The Palestinian Authority will require external assistance to rebuild Jenin and the Jenin camp.  The IDF: "We are continuing the operation in Jenin until its objectives are completed."
▪️TIT-FOR-TAT CONTINUES WITH HEZBOLLAH.. 100 rockets and missiles were launched by Hezbollah at northern Israel yesterday. IDF fighter jets struck more than 10 Hezbollah rocket launchers and other infrastructure across southern Lebanon overnight, per the IDF.
The military says the targets had "posed a threat to Israeli civilians."
▪️1,307 ROCKETS.. were fired at Israel from the north, Lebanon and Syria, amounting to just over 40 a day on average.
▪️ON THE CONSULATE ATTACK IN MUNICH, GERMANY.. official: the shooter in Munich was an Islamist terrorist of Bosnian origin who belonged to the Syrian organization Jabhat al-Nusra.
▪️ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SCANDAL.. Amit Segal: Mandelblit's court request for a gag order was rejected.
.. Recordings: how he recognized a strategic consultant as his main opponent - after two years he sent him to false arrest in a far-fetched affair without disqualifying himself. (N12)
▪️ON THE TEACHER UNION HIGH SCHOOL STRIKE.. Against the background of the strike: alternative educational frameworks will be activated starting next week.  In a joint initiative of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and the Local Government Center to be operated by the local authorities, the ministries agreed on the activation of alternative frameworks for secondary school students.
▪️AI.. Israel has signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Use of Artificial Intelligence.  The purpose of the treaty is to ensure that artificial intelligence systems operate while maintaining human rights, democracy and the rule of law, without creating new human rights.  The convention applies mainly to artificial intelligence systems used by the public sector, while excluding uses in national security contexts and some of the R&D stages.
▪️ECONOMY.. Salesforce buys the Israeli startup Own for $1.9 billion.
▪️NEWS SOURCES.. Survey: Israelis, what is the main TV channel where you keep up to date about the war?  Ch. 12 - 38%, Ch. 14 36%.  ( Ch. 13 apparently doesn’t make the list, and sadly neither does Israel Realtime.  Did you know you can share us with a friend?  Send them the links at the bottom, they click, they join!  Special Rosh Chodesh deal
♦️SAMARIA - TUBAS.. IDF carried out three drone strikes against Arab gunmen who were shooting at troops during a raid in the Tubas. Forces began a new raid overnight in Tubas and the nearby Far'a camp, as well as a separate operation in Jericho.
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the-garbanzo-annex-jr · 10 months ago
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by Andrew Fox
In the case of the 2023-24 Gaza war, Western critics have almost comically misunderstood what the Israeli military is trying to do.
The flaw in Western analysis is always the same: “We wouldn’t do it that way.”
Yet the IDF has absolutely no intention of using the clear-hold-build COIN tactics the West tried in Afghanistan and Iraq.
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Those tactics were an unmitigated disaster in both campaigns, which ended in humiliating defeats at the hands of technologically inferior armies.
COIN tactics are time-consuming and costly.
They also require huge troop levels to “hold” ground, for years if not indefinitely.
Assuming Western doctrinal ratios of 1 soldier to every 40 civilians, Gaza would require an enduring deployment of 50,000 combat troops, before we even consider enabling logistics, engineers, artillery and the like.
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Such tactics would also be insanely wasteful, since Israel has a safe base on the Israeli side of the Gaza border, and can therefore enjoy the luxury of only committing to intelligence-led operations at times and on ground of their choosing — advantages that the West did not have in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
So why is the IDF repeating operations in areas that it has already cleared — for example, in the Shifa hospital, or in ongoing operations in Jabalia, which they struck from the air at the start of the conflict?
Critics call this approach “mowing the grass,” a phrase adopted in the West to describe the failure to deploy sufficient troops in Iraq or Afghanistan, leading to repeated clearances of the same areas after they were thought to have been “cleared.”
I contend that the IDF is trying something completely different, and it makes sense.
Israel’s strategic aims are defeating Hamas and securing the Gaza border with Israel to prevent a repeat of Oct. 7.
“Never again is now” isn’t just an empty slogan.
IDF operational design is built around making sure Oct. 7 can never happen again.
Absent the possibility of any enduring political solution, that is simply what success looks like.
In military terms, Hamas will not be destroyed, which means rendered totally combat ineffective.
Hamas is too numerous and too entrenched within Gaza — where every male of fighting age is a potential future Hamas fighter.
Their cellular structure makes them hard to target, and when a commander is killed, they have shown the flexibility to promote the next man up.
They are also mainly backing away from a fight in Gaza, relying on booby traps, IEDs, and small arms engagements before melting away from decisive engagements.
This makes them hard to kill.
What is possible, however, is defeating Hamas.
In Western doctrinal terms, “defeating” an enemy means reducing it to 50% to 69% of its fighting strength.
As Gaza is neither a conventional war nor a counterterrorism operation in the classic senses of each, we can frame that percentage as the removal of Hamas’ ability to repeat Oct. 7.
So how does the IDF plan to achieve the aim of defeating Hamas?
Through a political solution?
Definitely not.
No one on the international stage has expressed any interest in helping with governance in Gaza.
Nor is there any evidence that these nonexistent partners would do anything other than act as human shields for Hamas, making it impossible for Israel to attack its foes when necessary.
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clarabosswald · 6 months ago
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I wonder how can you still live in Israel as an antiZionist. Doesn't it make you feel angry towrds yourself?
How do you feel about October 7th? The war? The hostages? The Isreali goverment?
Another question is do you think any if your local and global political opinions changed because of October 7th?
Stay safe.
I know that it musn't easy.
hi anon -
thanks for the respectful ask, i'm glad i didn't have to immediately regret opening my box to anons again.
a little clarification - i'm not anti zionist, i'm non zionist. there are things in both zionism and anti-zionism that i strongly disagree with, then there are things in both that i agree with, and overall and i don't associate myself with either of them.
living in israel as a non zionist is... complicated. and in recent years, increasingly frustrating. in some way i'm lucky that my dad shares about the same opinions on zionism as i do, so we kind of share that pain together. (we've both been actively joining public protests for a long time) how can i still live here? well, i'm poor, currently unemployed, and with multiple chronic mental and medical conditions (=relying on the israeli social welfare policy to be able to afford my medical needs). so it's quite impossible for me to leave. not to mention that, after everything's said and done, it's still my home, where i was born and raised, and with everything that i hate about it, it's still the only home i've ever known.
angry towards myself? no, not really. mainly i just hate the feeling of helplessness, my complete lack of ability to truly impact what's happening. but that's anger towards outside forces, not towards myself.
i could write a LOT about the next list of topics so i'm gonna make it short, and if you'd like me to expand on any of them you can ask again:
-october 7th was one of the single most horrible days in my life -the war in the strip is completely directionless and conducted horribly by the government, and it really just became a twisted combo of dick size measuring competition and a cat-and-mouse game between idf and hamas/pij at the expanse of the civilian population of gaza first and foremost, and of the hostages (and israeli civilians again, since in the last couple of days we started seeing rocket launches from the strip again after a long period of silence on that front) -the hostages should've always been the first priority. there were multiple chances to bring the hostages back in multiple chances at swap deals months and months ago and the israeli government (or rather bibi since the final words is his) threw them away. it's unforgivable -fuck this government
my local political opinion stayed the same, or rather i grew even more convicted of it. the israeli-palestinian conflict needs to end and the two state solution is the only feasible way to move forward
my opinion of global politics changed drastically in that i've grown completely disconnected from the global left. again, it's not my political opinions or stances that have changed; rather, the global left started embracing ideals that go completely against my moral compass. the global left used to feel like home for me. the change over the last year felt like a deep betrayal that i don't think i'll ever be able to get over.
that's about it in a nutshell. without touching the thousand other topics such as all the non-gaza war fronts and stuff.
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