#Steven Levitsky

[contemplatingoutlander]

"When citizens must think twice about criticizing or opposing the government because they could credibly face government retribution, they no longer live in a full democracy."

—Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way and Daniel Ziblatt

The three political scientists who wrote this opinion column maintain that we in the U.S. have already pretty much lost our democracy because Trump has been turning our nation into a "competitive autocracy."

I encourage people to read the entire column. The concept of "competitive autocracy" offers perhaps the best explanation I have heard of what is happening under the Trump administration. This is a gift 🎁 link, so there is no paywall. Below are some excerpts.

How will Americans know when we have lost our democracy?

Authoritarianism is harder to recognize than it used to be. Most 21st-century autocrats are elected. Rather than violently suppress opposition like Castro or Pinochet, today’s autocrats convert public institutions into political weapons, using law enforcement, tax and regulatory agencies to punish opponents and bully the media and civil society onto the sidelines. We call this competitive authoritarianism — a system in which parties compete in elections but the systematic abuse of an incumbent’s power tilts the playing field against the opposition. It is how autocrats rule in contemporary Hungary, India, Serbia and Turkey and how Hugo Chávez ruled in Venezuela. [...] How, then, can we tell whether America has crossed the line into authoritarianism? We propose a simple metric: the cost of opposing the government. In democracies, citizens are not punished for peacefully opposing those in power. They need not worry about publishing critical opinions, supporting opposition candidates or engaging in peaceful protest because they know they will not suffer retribution from the government. In fact, the idea of legitimate opposition — that all citizens have a right to criticize, organize opposition to and seek to remove the government through elections — is a foundational principle of democracy.

Under authoritarianism, by contrast, opposition comes with a price. Citizens and organizations that run afoul of the government become targets of a range of punitive measures: Politicians may be investigated and prosecuted on baseless or petty charges, media outlets may be hit with frivolous defamation suits or adverse regulatory rulings, businesses may face tax audits or be denied critical contracts or licenses, universities and other civic institutions may lose essential funding or tax-exempt status, and journalists, activists and other critics may be harassed, threatened or physically attacked by government supporters.

When citizens must think twice about criticizing or opposing the government because they could credibly face government retribution, they no longer live in a full democracy.

By that measure, America has crossed the line into competitive authoritarianism. The Trump administration’s weaponization of government agencies and flurry of punitive actions against critics has raised the cost of opposition for a wide range of Americans.

[color emphasis added]

[imkeepinit]

[ravioliraz]

Really good article contextualizing how the republican administration is able to weaponize existing institutions to undermine democracy leading to an “competitive autocracy.”

Give it a read, we need to understand their playbook in order to resist effectively.

[que-tal-ler]

"Muitos esforços do governo para subverter a democracia são "legais", no sentido de que são aprovados pelo Legislativo ou aceitos pelos tribunais. Eles podem até mesmo ser retratados como esforços para aperfeiçoar a democracia - tornar o Judiciário mais eficiente, combater a corrupção ou limpar o processo eleitoral. Os jornais continuam a ser publicados, mas são comprados ou intimidados e levados a se autocensurar. Os cidadãos continuam a criticar o governo, mas muitas vezes se veem envolvidos em problemas com impostos ou outras questões legais. Isso cria perplexidade e confusão nas pessoas. Elas não compreendem imediatamente o que está acontecendo. Muitos continuam a acreditar que estão vivendo sob uma democracia. Em 2011, uma pesquisa da Latinobarómetro perguntou aos venezuelanos que nota dariam a seu país de 1 ("nada democrático") a 10 ("completamente democrático"), e 51% das respostas deram nota 8 ou mais. Como não há um momento único - nenhum golpe, declaração de lei marcial ou suspensão da Constituição - em que o regime obviamente "ultrapassa o limite" para a ditadura, nada é capaz de disparar os dispositivos de alarme da sociedade. Aqueles que denunciam os abusos do governo podem ser descartados como exagerados ou falsos alarmistas. A erosão da democracia é, para muitos, quase imperceptível."

Livro: Como as Democracias Morrem

Autor: Steven Levitsky e Daniel Ziblatt

Página: 17

[minhas-leituras-e-peliculas]

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"Uma vez que um aspirante a ditador consegue chegar ao poder, a democracia enfrenta um segundo teste crucial: irá ele subverter as instituições democráticas ou ser constrangido por elas? As instituições isoladamente não são o bastante para conter autocratas eleitos. Constituições têm que ser defendidas - por partidos políticos e cidadãos organizados, mas também por normas democráticas. Sem normas robustas, os freios e contrapesos constitucionais não servem como os bastiões da democracia que nós imaginamos que eles sejam. As instituições se tornam armas políticas, brandidas violentamente por aqueles que as controlam contra aqueles que não as controlam. É assim que os autocratas eleitos subvertem a democracia - aparelhando tribunais e outras agências neutras e usando-os como armas, comprando a mídia e o setor privado (ou intimidando-os para que se calem) e reescrevendo as regras da política para mudar o mando de campo e virar o jogo contra os oponentes. O paradoxo trágico da via eleitoral para o autoritarismo é que os assassinos da democracia usam as próprias instituições da democracia - gradual, sutil e mesmo legalmente - para matá-la."

Livro: Como as Democracias Morrem

Autor: Steven Levitsky e Daniel Ziblatt

Página: 19

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[garyconkling]

Defending Democracy Under Assault

U.S. elections are under assault. The Russians circulate fake videos. Elon Musk stokes conspiracy theories on X. Donald Trump hurls insults and lies in rallies and interviews. Right-wing groups file legal actions to challenge election results before votes are counted. According to Trumpian logic – the only way there isn’t election fraud is if I win. Eventually, the smoke will disappear,…

[thatstormygeek]

This is a thought-provoking interview and definitely worth the read, but the whole piece - and especially this part - made me feel like I was watching the conversation from the other side of a soundproof window, just banging away with my fists.

I don’t understand how you approach a conversation about encroaching fascism in the US in 2024 (or 2023 or 2022) without even mentioning the LGBT community given that every one of those years has seen a record number of bills introduced in state legislatures to curtail the rights of queer - and especially trans - people.

It’s not even ahistorical - queer and trans people were also specifically targeted by the Nazis.

We really are that invisible.

[davidpotash]

Tune-up or Rebuild the Machinery of Government

A few years into the Trump presidency, two Harvard University professors of government, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt wrote How Democracies Die. The book was a best-seller, calling out the decline in tolerance and respect across political party divides. The pair followed that effort in 2023 with Tyranny of the Minority. Equally popular, this volume highlights historical crises to make…

[sinoeurovoices]

美國學術界和商界對川普保持「靜默綏靖」　終將自食其果

這正是集體行動的悲劇，當我們拒絕冒險挺身而出時，所有人都將成為輸家。 ～國際經濟學會主席　羅德瑞克（Dani…

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Rachel Leingang and Dharna Noor at The Guardian:

As Donald Trump dismantles federal agencies, his administration is also creating a chill among non-governmental groups, cowing non-profits, intimidating universities and extracting commitments from law firms to support his aims. Officials have launched investigations into progressive and climate organizations, colleges and recipients of government grants. Experts worry that if nongovernmental groups are frightened into silence, US democracy may not weather the strain. “Trump has a strikingly authoritarian instinct,” said Steven Levitsky, a Harvard political science professor who co-authored the book How Democracies Die. “This is what authoritarians do, they go after civil society,” he added, referring to organizations that exist outside the government and often seek to hold it to account. Some institutions are caving to the president’s demands, or staying quiet about their work in the hope of evading his attention. But others facing attacks have solidified their resolve, doubling down on their missions and even directly taking on the administration. “We will continue to vindicate the rights of our clients, and we do so without fear, because we know that we’re right,” said attorney Eric Lee, who represents a student facing deportation.

Attacks on lawyers

The administration has cracked down in particular on lawyers, especially those who have investigated Trump or represented those who oppose him. Trump has targeted individual law firms and collectively attacked immigration attorneys, who he alleges engage in “unscrupulous behavior”. Some Biden-era officials told the Washington Post they have been unable to find representation because of the menacing effect Trump has had on the field. Some law firms have caved to the president’s demands, obeying his orders as a way to stay in business. [...]

Threatening non-profits

The Trump administration is taking aim at non-profit advocacy groups, particularly if it sees their goals as antithetical to his aims. An array of non-profit employees told the Guardian that they are not willing to speak publicly about their work for fear of ending up on the administration’s radar. Some of the work in question was once seen as bipartisan or noncontroversial but is being treated as radical by the Trump administration, such as alleviating poverty, lowering utility bills or providing people with food. [...] In November, the House passed the “non-profit killer bill”, which would hand the executive branch broad powers to do so in the name of fighting “terrorism”. Many are concerned it will also pass the Senate if put up for a vote. But even in the absence of such legislation, advocates fear the administration will strip non-profits’ legal status on technical grounds. [...]

Defunding universities

Universities, which are often hotbeds of progressive politics and dissent, are also facing repression. In early March, the administration announced the cancelation of $400m in grants and loans to Columbia University, alleging the school has failed to protect students from antisemitic harassment. In response, school officials yielded to a series of changes demanded by federal officials, sparking outrage from advocates. Weeks later, officials went after Harvard University, announcing a plan to review some $9bn in contracts and multiyear grants over accusations that the university also did not protect Jewish students and promoted “divisive ideologies over free inquiry”. The following day, Princeton University said dozens of its federal research grants were suspended over allegations of the promotion of antisemitism. The administration also paused $175m in federal funding to the University of Pennsylvania over its inclusion of transgender athletes in women’s college sports. “I’ve studied authoritarianism and authoritarian regimes for more than 30 years [and] authoritarian regimes tend to go after universities because they are usually very influential centers of dissent,” said Harvard’s Levitsky, who was among the 700 who signed a letter calling for the university to resist pressure to capitulate to Trump’s demands. The Trump administration also announced a task force on alleged antisemitism at 10 major universities, placed 60 colleges and universities under investigation for allegations of antisemitic harassment and discrimination, and arrested current and former college students for participating in pro-Palestinian demonstrations.

The Guardian has an excellent piece on the authoritarian takeover of this country by the evil Trump Regime, ranging from law firms caving in to attacks on universities to threats to nonprofits.

[mariacallous]

The recent weeks have obliged me to unearth some research I had hoped could stay on the backburner. In 2023, I wrote about the major forms of democratic erosion facing the United States: election subversion and executive aggrandizement. “Even a legitimately elected leader can undermine democracy,” I noted, “if they eliminate governmental ‘checks and balances’ or consolidate power in unaccountable institutions.” In 2022, I suggested that, if weaknesses in the formal institutions of American politics made it difficult to forestall additional assaults on the Constitution, the final backstop of democracy is civil society.

Historically, the United States has been fortunate to have a strong civil society. Many of these institutions have weakened. In this article, I quickly review how some sectors—the media, the academy, business, and mass voluntary organizations—are responding to “the most serious examples of executive branch malfeasance in American history.”

American civil society has essential nodes of power that must be energized in the coming days and for the foreseeable future. Not merely the individuals in these institutions, but the institutions themselves must coordinate to provide a public counterweight to the sharp lurch toward personalist rule. That work is not easy. Any more time lost to disbelief, silence, and acquiescence will make it much harder.

Some major media institutions have been slow off the mark. Major scoops have come from unexpected outlets, including independent journalists and the technology magazine WIRED, which was the first to reveal that Elon Musk’s young staff had the power to alter the $6 trillion Treasury payment system, a fact that Treasury officials had denied. (A federal judge has since blocked access. An earlier ruling had limited access to read-only, a problematic ruling given Musk’s conflicts of interest and the security threats posed by his unvetted and secretive young staff. It is unclear if either order is being followed.)

DC’s hometown paper, the Washington Post, should by rights have the best sources in the federal government, but the interference of the paper’s owner, Jeff Bezos, in the planned endorsement of Kamala Harris, and his prominent place at the Trump inauguration, may well be keeping whistleblowers away. The paper nonetheless has provided some important reporting, including this round-up of Elon Musk’s interference in government operations. The New York Times has buried several excellent, insightful analyses and essays deep in the paper, and adopted tortured euphemisms and vague, small-print headlines that leave their readers uninformed of the gravity of the news.

Academic institutions are largely silent, but that may be changing. Academics have for years been sounding the alarm about America’s democratic erosion, and many continue to provide vital analysis and context. See, for example, these analyses from Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Don Moynihan. But academia has been outspoken as individuals. Institutions have mostly remained silent—though they may be shaken loose from their apathy by the executive orders interfering with billions in congressionally appropriated funds for scientific research.

Coordinated public pronouncements from university leadership, especially from law and medical schools, would assist citizens in understanding the scope of the dangers confronting the country. Top hospital administrators and medical associations that have been quiescent in recent weeks need to make clear the immense public health costs of ill-considered, arbitrary, and unlawful interference with government-funded science. In addition, professional associations have the power to sanction their members, a power they should exercise in defense of the public sphere, as my colleague Quinta Jurecic has argued.

Business concerns are not yet being channeled into political action. Autocratic populist leaders damage the economy; their countries see their GDPs drop due to erratic policymaking, cronyism, and underinvestment in public goods. But, as I wrote last year, business leaders have a tragic history of misjudging these dangers. American business influence, moreover, has grown increasingly ideologically conservative and focused on narrow benefits like tax cuts and regulatory rollbacks.

Since the election, business leaders have truckled to the new administration—a trend many, including President Trump, have suggested is driven by fear of official reprisals. That fear is, of course, one of the common ways in which opposition to populist authoritarian leaders is eliminated.

It may be, however, that business will awake to the massive economic dangers posed by executive overreach. Opaque and unpredictable stoppages of congressionally mandated spending by federal agencies will ramify throughout the economy. An unvetted young individual meddling with the code that underwrites the Treasury payment system is, as one Treasury contractor wrote, an “unprecedented insider threat risk.” (That contractor has since been “removed” by their employer, Booz Allen, a consulting firm heavily reliant on government contracts.)

Mass mobilization is underway, but those efforts will struggle if elites continue to underplay the magnitude of the moment. Congressional offices have been flooded with phone calls. As the volume went from the usual dozens to more than 1,500 calls per minute, the phone system buckled under the strain. Advocacy organizations appear to have been caught flat-footed by the speed of Musk’s incursions. Small protests have occurred at government agencies and congressional offices, with union organizations often playing a key role.

Religious organizations have not yet been prominent in most public protests, but they have an essential role to play. As my colleague Jonathan Rauch has written in a new book, churches must combat the rise of what has been termed Christian nationalism.

More broadly, public opposition to the second Trump administration remains far smaller than it was the last time around, even though recent actions represent a far more aggressive assault on American governance. This is perhaps in part because Trump’s loss of the popular vote in 2016 provided an impetus for organizing before the administration even began. Whether the organizing gap will close is a critical question in the weeks and months to come.

Across all of sectors of civil society, coordination is key. Individual objections do not carry the weight of joint action. It is worth noting that censorship in authoritarian China does not focus on “negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state,” it silences “comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization.” Resistance to authoritarianism, like democracy itself, is a collective endeavor.

[shrinkrants]

President Trump’s intensifying conflict with the federal courts is unusually aggressive compared with similar disputes in other countries, according to scholars. Unlike leaders who subverted or restructured the courts, Mr. Trump is acting as if judges were already too weak to constrain his power.

“Honest to god, I’ve never seen anything like it,” said Steven Levitsky, a Harvard political scientist and coauthor of “How Democracies Die” and “Competitive Authoritarianism.”

“We look at these comparative cases in the 21st century, like Hungary and Poland and Turkey. And in a lot of respects, this is worse,” he said. “These first two months have been much more aggressively authoritarian than almost any other comparable case I know of democratic backsliding.”

There are many examples of autocratic leaders constraining the power of the judiciary by packing courts with compliant judges, or by changing the laws that give them authority, he said. But it is extremely rare for leaders to simply claim the power to disregard or override court orders directly, especially so immediately after taking office.

[que-tal-ler]

"Foi somente em 2003 que Chávez deu seus primeiros passos claros rumo ao autoritarismo. Com o apoio público enfraquecendo, ele postergou um referendo liderado pela oposição que o teria destituído - adiando-o para o ano seguinte, quando os preços do petróleo, em forte alta, impulsionaram sua posição o bastante para que ele ganhasse. Em 2004, o governo fez uma lista negra dos que tinham assinado a petição para o referendo e aparelhou a Suprema Corte, alterando sua composição, mas a reeleição esmagadora de Chávez em 2006 permitiu que ele mantivesse um verniz democrático. O regime chavista se tornou mais repressivo depois de 2006, fechando uma importante emissora de televisão, prendendo ou exilando políticos, juízes e figuras da mídia oposicionistas com acusações dúbias e eliminando limites aos mandatos presidenciais para que Chávez pudesse permanecer indefinidamente no poder. Quando Chávez, então morrendo de câncer, foi reeleito em 2012, a disputa foi livre, mas não justa: o chavismo controlava grande parte da mídia e desdobrou a vasta máquina do governo em seu favor. Após a morte de Chávez um ano depois, seu sucessor, Nicolás Maduro, ganhou outra eleição questionável, e, em 2014, seu governo prendeu um dos principais líderes da oposição. Ainda assim, a vitória acachapante da oposição nas eleições legislativas de 2015 pareceu desmentir a afirmação dos críticos de que a Venezuela não era mais democrática. Só quando uma Assembleia Constituinte unipartidária usurpou o poder do Congresso em 2017, quase duas décadas depois de Chávez ter sido eleito presidente pela primeira vez, a Venezuela foi amplamente reconhecida como uma autocracia.

É assim que as democracias morrem agora. A ditadura ostensiva - sob a forma de fascismo, comunismo ou domínio militar - desapareceu em grande parte do mundo. Golpes militares e outras tomadas violentas do poder são raros. A maioria dos países realiza eleições regulares. Democracias ainda morrem, mas por meios diferentes. Desde o final da Guerra Fria, a maior parte dos colapsos democráticos não foi causada por generais e soldados, mas pelos próprios governos eleitos. Como Chávez na Venezuela, líderes eleitos subverteram as instituições democráticas em países como Geórgia, Hungria, Nicarágua, Peru, Filipinas, Polônia, Rússia, Sri Lanka, Turquia e Ucrânia. O retrocesso democrático hoje começa nas urnas."

Livro: Como as Democracias Morrem

Autor: Steven Levitsky e Daniel Ziblatt

Página: 16

[minhas-leituras-e-peliculas]

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"A política venezuelana era há muito dominada por dois partidos, a Ação Democrática, de centro-esquerda, e o Partido Social Cristão, de centro-direita, de Caldera (conhecido como Copei). Os dois se alternaram no poder pacificamente por mais de trinta anos, e, nos anos 1970, a Venezuela era vista como uma democracia modelo numa região infestada por golpes de Estado e ditaduras. Durante os anos 1980, entretanto, dependente do petróleo, a economia do país afundou numa prolongada depressão, crise que persistiu por mais de uma década, quase dobrando a taxa de pobreza. Não é de surpreender, os venezuelanos ficaram cada vez mais insatisfeitos. Distúrbios maciços em fevereiro de 1989 sugeriam que os partidos estabelecidos estavam em dificuldades. Três anos depois, em fevereiro de 1992, um grupo de oficiais de baixa patente se rebelou contra o presidente Carlos Andrés Pérez. Liderados por Hugo Chávez, os rebeldes se autodenominaram "bolivarianos", em homenagem ao reverenciado herói da independência Simón Bolívar. O golpe fracassou. Porém, quando o então detido Chávez apareceu ao vivo na televisão e disse a seus apoiadores para depor as armas (declarando, em termos que se tornaram lendários, que a missão deles tinha fracassado "por enquanto"), ele se tornou um herói aos olhos de muitos venezuelanos, particularmente os mais pobres. Na sequência de um segundo golpe fracassado em novembro de 1992, o encarcerado Chávez mudou de curso, optando por buscar o poder pela via eleitoral. Ele precisaria de ajuda. Embora o ex-presidente Caldera fosse um estadista veterano bem-conceituado, sua carreira política estava em declínio em 1992. Quatro anos antes, ele não havia conseguido assegurar sua nomeação como candidato presidencial do partido, passando pouco depois a ser considerado uma relíquia

política. Mas o senador de 76 anos ainda sonhava retornar à Presidência, e o surgimento de Chávez deu a ele uma tábua de salvação. Na noite do golpe inicial de Chávez, o ex-presidente se levantou durante uma sessão conjunta de emergência do Congresso e abraçou a causa dos rebeldes, declarando:

'É difícil pedir ao povo para se sacrificar em nome da liberdade e da democracia quando ele pensa que essa liberdade e essa democracia são incapazes de lhe dar alimento para comer, de conter a alta astronômica do custo de vida ou de acabar definitivamente com a corrupção, que, aos olhos de todo o mundo, está corroendo as instituições da Venezuela a cada dia que passa.'

O discurso político surpreendente ressuscitou a carreira política de Caldera. Tendo capitalizado a base antissistema de Chávez, o apoio público ao ex-presidente aumentou, o que lhe permitiu concorrer com êxito à Presidência em 1993. O flerte público de Caldera com Chávez fez mais do que impulsionar a posição de Caldera nas pesquisas; também deu nova credibilidade a Chávez. Chávez e seus camaradas tinham tentado destruir a democracia de 34 anos de seu país. Porém, em vez de denunciar os líderes do golpe como uma ameaça extremista, o ex-presidente ofereceu a eles a sua solidariedade pública - e, com ela, uma abertura para a política convencional. Caldera também ajudou a abrir os portões do palácio presidencial para Chávez, desferindo um golpe mortal nos partidos estabelecidos da Venezuela. Numa reviravolta surpreendente, ele abandonou o Copei, partido que havia fundado quase meio século antes, e lançou sua candidatura presidencial independente. Sem dúvida, os partidos já estavam em crise, mas a saída de Caldera e sua campanha antiestablishment subsequente ajudaram a sepultá-los. O sistema partidário entrou em colapso depois da eleição de Caldera em 1993 como independente antipartido, pavimentando o caminho para futuros outsiders. Cinco anos mais tarde, seria a vez de Chávez. Contudo, voltando a 1993, Chávez ainda tinha um problema maior. Estava preso, esperando julgamento por traição. Em 1994, entretanto, o presidente Caldera retirou todas as acusações contra ele. O ato final de Caldera ao empoderar Chávez foi literalmente abrir os portões - da prisão - para ele. Logo após a soltura de Chávez, um repórter lhe perguntou aonde estava indo. "Para o poder", respondeu ele. Libertar Chávez era uma medida popular, e Caldera tinha prometido fazê-lo durante a campanha. Como a maior parte das elites venezuelanas, ele via em Chávez uma moda passageira - alguém que provavelmente já teria perdido a simpatia do público nas eleições seguintes." Mas, ao retirar todas as acusações em vez de permitir que Chávez fosse julgado e, depois, perdoá-lo, Caldera o elevou, transformando o ex-líder do golpe da noite para o dia em um candidato presidencial viável. Em 6 de dezembro de 1998, Chávez ganhou a Presidência, derrotando com facilidade um candidato apoiado pelo establishment. No dia da posse, Caldera, o presidente que se retirava, não conseguiu ter forças para tomar o juramento de Chávez, conforme ditava a tradição. Em vez disso, afastou-se melancolicamente para o lado.

Apesar de suas enormes diferenças, Hitler, Mussolini e Chávez percorreram caminhos que compartilham semelhanças espantosas para chegar ao poder. Não apenas todos eles eram outsiders com talento para capturar a atenção pública, mas cada um deles ascendeu ao poder porque políticos do establishment negligenciaram os sinais de alerta e, ou bem lhes entregaram o poder (Hitler e Mussolini), ou então lhes abriram a porta (Chávez). A abdicação de responsabilidades políticas da parte de seus líderes marca o primeiro passo de uma nação rumo ao autoritarismo. Anos depois da vitória de Chávez, Rafael Caldera explicou seus erros de maneira simples: "Ninguém pensava que o sr. Chávez tivesse a mais remota chance de se tornar presidente." E, apenas um dia depois de Hitler se tornar chanceler, um conservador destacado que o ajudara admitiu: "Acabei de cometer a maior estupidez da minha vida; aliei-me ao maior demagogo da história mundial."

Livro: Como as Democracias Morrem

Autor: Steven Levitsky e Daniel Ziblatt

Página: 27 a 30

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