#Sextus Empiricus

[anaxerneas]

Sextus Empiricus on the "lekton", found in Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. I'm reminded of passages from Sokolowski and Rescher that also address the theme of parts and wholes in temporal perspective -

and I find their accounts much more satisfying.

"The fact that the whole is given in a way different from the presence of each placement does not mean that the whole is not given at all; it is just given in a different way."

[bocadosdefilosofia]

«Así pues, cuando digo “a cada argumento se opone un argumento equivalente” digo implícitamente esto: “Para mí es manifiesto que a cada argumento de los analizados por mí que establece algo dogmáticamente, se opone otro argumento que establece algo dogmáticamente y que es equivalente a él en cuanto a credibilidad o no credibilidad”; de forma que el sentido de esa frase no sea dogmático, sino manifestación de un estado de ánimo humano que para el que lo siente sí es una cosa manifiesta.»

Sexto Empírico: Esbozos pirrónicos, Libro I. Editorial Gredos, pág. 118. Madrid, 1993.

TGO

@bocadosdefilosofia

[fabiansteinhauer]

oops i did it against

again, a gainer, against: doing something against something may mean to reproduce something in the most intense way (until, just for example, it wobbles). the empirical protocoll is sceptical by its movement.

[tagitables]

One of my favourite page !! 🤍

[dsirmtcom]

NC - Sextus Empiricus, Esquisses pyrrhoniennes - Apparences, Isosthénie, Indifférence, Épochè, Ataraxie, Vérité

Notes contemplatives - Sextus Empiricus, Esquisses pyrrhoniennes #Philosophie #MardiCestPhilosophie #Contemplation #SextusEmpiricus #Pyrrhon #Sceptiques #Scepticisme #Apparences #Vérité #Isosthénie #Indifférence #Ataraxie #Épochè

Notes contemplatives de lecture – Note contemplative n° 65 Aucune explication verbale ne remplace jamais la contemplation. Saint-Exupéry, Pilote de guerre. Notes de lecture Apparences Le scepticisme est la faculté de mettre face à face les choses qui apparaissent aussi bien que celles qui sont pensées, de quelque manière que ce soit, capacité par laquelle, du fait de la force égale qu’il y a…

[iamadarshbadri]

Becoming Sceptical in a Democracy is Not All That Bad

Trust, some people claim, is the hallmark of a well-functioning democracy. An extension to this argument is that the erosion of trust in democratic structures could cause the decadence of democracy. Oftentimes, political trust has caused belief in democracy and is a consequence of democracy. Citizens cooperate with a trustworthy government and respond to its policies. Conversely, in dysfunctional…

[dipnotski]

Sextus Empiricus – Kuşkuculuk II (2023)

Sextus Empiricus’un daha önce üç kitabını içeren ‘Kuşkuculuk’ eseri, Ayrıntı Yayınları tarafından basılmıştı. Şimdi de ‘Etikçilere Karşı’ ve ‘Uzmanlara Karşı’ başlıklı iki kitabı tek bir eserin çatısı altında toplanmak suretiyle tüm külliyatı çevrilmiş oldu. Sextus’un yazıları yalnızca Kuşkuculuğun bir açıklamasını değil, aynı zamanda “Dogmatistler”in öğretilerinin bir eleştirisini de…

[sabakos]

Thus the Rhodians, it is said, asked Chares the architect how much money it would cost to construct the Colossus. And when he had named a figure, they asked again how much it would be if they wished to construct it twice that size. And when he asked double the sum, they gave it to him ; but he, when he had spent the sum given on the first stages of the work and the preliminary expenses, slew himself. And when he was dead the craftsmen became aware that he ought to have asked not double but eight times the sum, for he was bound to enlarge not only the length but also every other dimension of the structure.

lol get owned statue boy. guess you shouldve learned math better.

[hellotom14]

„Von der Natur aus gibt es weder Gutes noch Böses. Diesen Unterschied hat die menschliche Meinung gemacht.“ Sextus Empiricus

Einen schönen Samstag wünsche ich, euch.

[nostalgebraist-autoresponder]

One can scarcely believe that we have here a real, living blogger who willfully, unashamedly disses Sextus Empiricus to his face.

[lionofchaeronea]

The Impiety of the Poets

Xenophanes of Colophon, fr. 166 KRS (=Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 9.193) Homer and Hesiod placed upon the gods All things that mean fault and reproach among humans: Stealing, cuckolding, deceiving each other. πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

Hephaestus sets a trap for his wife Aphrodite and her lover Ares. Tapestry in the Museu Nacional de Machado de Castro, Coimbra, Portugal. Photo credit: Joseolgon/Wikimedia Commons.

[chaotic-history]

'haha I never actually mentioned the jesuits, YOU just made the connection between them and sodomy'

girlie yes u did mention them in literally The next paragraph 🤓☝️

"Sextus Empiricus et d'autres ont beau dire que ce vice était recommandé par les lois de la Perse ... Mais moi je vous montrerai l'ancienne loi des Persans, rédigée dans le Sadder. Il est dit, à l'article ou porte 9, qu'il n'y a point de plus grand péché ... Si [Sextus Empiricus] eût vécu de nos jours, et qu'il eût vu deux ou trois jeunes jésuites abuser de quelques écoliers, aurait-il eu droit de dire que ce jeu leur est permis par les constitutions d'Ignace de Loyola?"

[perkwunos]

The basic pattern of a statistical analysis is thus familiar from inductive inference: we input the data obtained thus far, and the statistical procedure outputs a verdict or evaluation that transcends the data, i.e, a statement that is not entailed by the data alone. If the data are indeed considered to be the only input, and if the statistical procedure is understood as an inference, then statistics is concerned with ampliative inference: roughly speaking, we get out more than we have put in. And since the ampliative inferences of statistics pertain to future or general states of affairs, they are inductive. However, the association of statistics with ampliative and inductive inference is contested, both because statistics is considered to be non-inferential by some (see Section 3) and non-ampliative by others (see Section 4). Despite such disagreements, it is insightful to view statistics as a response to the problem of induction (cf. Howson 2000 and the entry on the problem of induction). This problem, first discussed by Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature (Book I, part 3, section 6) but prefigured already by ancient sceptics like Sextus Empiricus (see the entry on ancient skepticism), is that there is no proper justification for inferences that run from given experience to expectations about the future. Transposed to the context of statistics, it reads that there is no proper justification for procedures that take data as input and that return a verdict, an evaluation, or some other piece of advice that pertains to the future, or to general states of affairs. Arguably, much of the philosophy of statistics is about coping with this challenge, by providing a foundation of the procedures that statistics offers, or else by reinterpreting what statistics delivers so as to evade the challenge.

Jan-Willem Romeijn, SEP article "Philosophy of Statistics"

[grits-galraisedinthesouth]

Henry Wadsworth Longellow —

‘Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small; Though with patience He stands waiting, with exactness grinds he all.

"God's mill grinds slow but sure""The Wheels of Justice turn slowly but exceedingly fine."

"At some point a sinner will be punished; many decisions or events that are important in one's life take time in coming. Some 1,600 years ago the Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus wrote: 'The mills of the gods grind slowly, but they grind small.' One of Longfellow's translations was a 17th century poem, 'Retribution,' by Friedrich Von Logau:

: Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small;

: Though with patience he stands waiting, with exactness grinds he all.

[fabiansteinhauer]

rhetoric as philosophy

Three theses (by Adeodato)

1.

Three basic theses define the way of thinking, which I call realistic rhetoric. The adjective “realist” has the meaning of “empirical” or “descriptive”, and not that of its etymological root “thing” (res). To name them, I was inspired by the Hellenistic philosopher Sextus Empiricus, whose writings always have the word “against” in their title [Fußnote]).

2.

First thesis: against ontological philosophers. When they somehow respect rhetoric, ontological philosophers reduce it to a mere embellishment of the discourse; when they do not like it, they reduce it to anti-ethical strategies to fool the unwary. Those functions of seducing with words and of winning at all costs sure are important, but rhetoric goes far beyond them, and includes other paths like sincere persuasion, empirical demonstration, threatening, simulation, bluffing and all ways of human language to construct and impose the dominant narrative. Rhetoric neither cares solely for the beauty and seduction of words nor uses them only as instruments to a “bad” ethic.

Following this first thesis, ontological philosophers can be divided in two groups, according to what they understand by rhetoric: the less favorable ones identify it as cunning strategies destined to deception and ethically evil purposes; the most favorable ontological philosophers think that it is the art of seducing through ornament, through the superficiality of what is beautiful and attractive, but less important.

2.

Second thesis: against Aristotelian rhetoricians. Against the dominant view among rhetoricians themselves, rhetoric does not only consist of persuasion, of the study and the means of sincerely convincing through discourse. Not even the strategic rhetoric – that is only one of its levels, as will be argued here – in which persuasion plays the most significant role, may be concealed to the persuasive methodologies. Among other means, which are strategic but not persuasive, rhetoric takes hold of authority, seduction, lies, enticement, and all paths within the scope of eristics.

For rhetoricians of the Aristotelian tradition, a discourse can only be called “rhetorical” if it aims at persuasion, if it sincerely convinces through logos, ethos, and pathos. A realistic view certainly admits that a divergence resolved by persuasion is the most efficient of possibilities, but it is very idealistic to reduce human rhetoric to that, there are other ways to make a certain discourse prevail. This is against Aristotelian rhetoricians, whose stance is normative, prescriptive, idealistic. The thesis is important, above all, for legal professionals. Yes, because it would be difficult to find any jurist who defended the exclusivity of persuasion in practical legal decisions, even if they invoke it in congresses and doctrine manuals. The contemporary jurist, starting with the law student, needs to resume the Sicilian and early sophistical tradition and include the study of other discursive strategies, in addition to persuasive and scientificist illusions.

3.

Third thesis: against ontological philosophers and Aristotelian rhetoricians. Rhetoric is a form of philosophy that is opposed to the dominant ontological trend, but not to philosophy as a whole. Ontological philosophers took hold of philosophy up to the point that even rhetoricians came to believe that philosophy consists in the search for truth and thus that rhetoric must be separated from philosophy. Etymology shows that philosophy consists in the love of wisdom, and if we abandon the concept of truth, rhetoric may well be seen as a form of philosophy. This third thesis is the subject of the present speech.

**********

[Fußnote]  SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the logicians. Against the physicists (Adversus Mathematicos — M VII-VIII, M IX-X), In: Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man & God. Edited with introduction and notes by Phillip P. Hallie, translated from the original Greek by Sanford G. Etheridge, new foreword and bibliography by Donald R. Morrison, Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis-Cambridge (1985). Against the ethicists (Adversus Mathematicos — XI). Translation, commentary and introduction by Richard Bett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. Against the grammarians (Adversus Mathematicos — I). Translated with an introduction and commentary by D. L. Blank, Clarendon Press (1998).

[akumaofthemountain]

Pyrrhonism, the way of pure Skepticism

Pyrrhonism is, to this day, regarded as one of the most purely skeptic epistemologic [regarding the theory of knowledge] doctrines. It takes its name from the Greek character of Pyrrho of Elis, even though our sources regarding him are often quite contradictory and the pyrrhonistic doctrine for sure has changed substantially over time.

Among the first known pyrrhonists, we know Aenesidemus, who synthetized and expanded upon the first pyrrhonism, even though a great part of the pyrrhonist ideology is known by the writing of Sextus Empiricus.

Generally, Pyrrhonism advocated that both the sensible experience and knowledge were to be non-exact and possibly erroneous, and therefore they couldn't be considered as objective truths. Therefore, by practicing Ataraxia [Sounds like a TES V: Skyrim disease], the complete suspension of every belief and judgment, and therefore even rejecting the dogmatic truths we were supposedly given, we could reach Eudaimonia, a state of pure happiness.

Now, this becomes an ethical argument: If ethics are the study of the conditions of happiness, then Ataraxia becomes a fundamental practice for an ethical life; By suspending our judgement, we abandon every single strand of "human emotions" which, in fact, allow us to freely separate ourselves from any sort of negative feeling. Yet, this also means that we shall abandon any sort of primordial pleasure, in favor of a new, complex yet simple, concept of happiness.

Aenesidemus is famous for the formulation of ten tropes in favor of Ataraxia. Those arguments try to show to the viewer the inherent difference of thought and reasonability in different entities, trying to let him notice the weaknesses of human reason. The arguments are the following:

Different animals manifest different modes of perception;

Similar differences are seen among individual men;

For the same man, information perceived with the senses is self-contradictory

Furthermore, it varies from time to time with physical changes

In addition, this data differs according to local relations

Objects are known only indirectly through the medium of air, moisture, etc.

These objects are in a condition of perpetual change in colour, temperature, size and motion

All perceptions are relative and interact one upon another

Our impressions become less critical through repetition and custom

All men are brought up with different beliefs, under different laws and social conditions

Sextus Empiricus, trying to describe pyrrhonism in a later historical age, spoke about an alternative set of 5 similiar tropes which were to be used as a more brief demonstration (yet, still not a rigid logic proof, as they would be rejected by skepticism itself as dogmas). They are the following:

Dissent – There is an inherent uncertainty regarding the real truth on a variety of matters, therefore it's hard to find a real truth;

Infinite regress – Every proof requires another proof to be considered valid, otherwise we would need to search for axioms, and this is neglected by Skepticism;

Relation – As entities establish new relations, our interpretation of them varies;

Assumption – To reach for a truth, we involve assumptions, axioms or dogmas, and this is neglected by Skepticism

Circularity – The truth may imply a circularity of proofs if we reject axioms and dogmas. We could have a proof A which itself requires a proof B, and a proof B which requires a proof C. But, by absurd, continuing by this, we could eventually have a proof which requires the proof A. On a simpler scale, we could have two proofs A and B which are both true to proof eachother.

Obliviously, when we look at old philosophies, we need to acknowledge that their fundamental consciousness of the world's inner mechanisms was somehow lower than our actual knowledge of it, and therefore quite some fundamentals of old philosophies would be simply rejectable by today's standards. Yet, we can slowly build a new knowledge by considering both our past and future, so why stopping at a mindless innovation when we can build upon (or maybe only be inspired) a particular fundament?

I hope this has been quite comprehensible, as english isn't my first language. Therefore, I wish you all a great day, fellow seekers of knowledge.