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jamesrthorpe · 11 years

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Craig's Confusion: McTaggart's Paradox and Presentism

McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time has has occupied the attention of many philosophers of time since its publication in 1908. While few today accept the soundness of the argument in its entirety, his categorization of the serial conceptions of time into what he called, rather blandly, A-Series and B-Series, have been almost universally adopted. An A-Series is a tensed, dynamic series of time, in which the positions run from the past, to the present, and to the future. The B-Series, on the other hand, is a tenseless, static time series, in which positions run from “earlier to later” (McTaggart 1908). Broadly, McTaggart’s argument has two basic parts; firstly, he shows that the A-Series is the only true time series, and then, secondly, he proceeds to show the A-Series to be incoherent, leading to his famous conclusion that time does not exist. We will here briefly outline both of these parts, and then assess a popular criticism of the argument.

McTaggart begins his proof by outlining two basic intuitions about the nature of time; (1) that time involves change, and (2) that time has a direction. The B-Series certainly accommodates the latter of these intuitions, but it is not clear whether it can account for real change. Perhaps change occurs in the B-Series when one event stops, and another starts - but the B-Series involves an eternally ordered set; events can not simply ‘pop in’ or ‘pop out’ of the series! Perhaps then, the change occurs when two events overlap in time. The same problem, however, reoccurs here; while two events can have a common element, they can not be the same event, for this would preclude the possibility of change. If some event M changes into some other event N, M has ceased to be M and N has become to be N - but as we have already seen, no event can begin or cease to be in the B series. Hence, the B-Series cannot account for change.

The A-Series, on the other hand, involves both direction and change; events in the A-Series change from being future, to being present, and then become past - therefore making it a true time series. However, according to McTaggart, on closer inspection the A-Series appears to be incoherent. If we take the A-properties of “being past” or “being present” or “being future” in the A-Series as being non-relational, then every event simultaneously has all three of these contradictory properties, as every event will be past, present or future at some point in the series. Of course, we know that an event cannot be past, present and future all at once; events travel from ‘being future’ to ‘being present’, then to ‘being past’ - but this is a vicious circle, as it assumes the existence of time in order to make sense. Perhaps then, our A-properties are relational to something - the present. But by what virtue do we take a certain event to be present? Perhaps it is that a present event will have the A-property of being present - but if this is the case, all events would have this property, as all events are/will present at some point. It would seem that the relational point needs to exist outside the A-Series. With this in mind, we could posit another A* Series that gives a special property to present events. But again, all events would have this property, so another A** Series would be needed, and so on ad infinitum. So, McTaggart concludes, as the A-Series is the only true theory of time (because it accommodates both of our intuitions about time, while the B-Series cannot), and the A-Series is incoherent, and these exhaust the options, therefore time does not exist.

Most attempts to refute McTaggart’s argument have either involved accepting his first premise (that the A-Series is the only true time series) while denying the second (that the A- Series is incoherent - also known as McTaggart’s paradox), or denying the first while maintaining the second. One instance of the former has been posited by William Lane Craig and Robin DePoidevin, who point out that McTaggart may not be attacking the A-Theory at all in the second part of his argument, but rather a hybrid A-B Theory, which “combines tenseless ontology with temporal intrinsic properties of tense” (Craig 2001). Although this seems to be an odd objection (McTaggart defined our terms, after all), McTaggart does seem to implicitly maintain that any series of time must always include some kind of B-Theoretic event ontology; an eternally indexed, tenseless series of events. An A-Theory of this kind certainly exists; the moving spotlight A-Theory combines the B-Ontology of eternalism with a privileged present and thus tense, and hence falls easily for McTaggart’s paradox. However, as the paradox relies on “an event ontology of tenselessly existing events” (DePoidevin 1991), an A-Theory that has no such B-Ontology - such as presentism - would never see it arise. On presentism, the relational point of the present is easily defined, as present events are the only events that exist. This eliminates the need for a relational point outside of the A-Series, thus avoiding the infinite regress of A* Series’ that follow in the paradox.

Nathan Oaklander has disputed this point, however, pointing out that Craig appeals to tensed possible successive worlds¹ which “did, do or will obtain” to justify his talk about events having existed in the past (Oaklander, 1999, emphasis mine) - that is to say, that the past and the future exist in some sense, but only obtain as they become present. This, however, obviously begs the B-theoretical concept of succession; past and future events still exist both tenselessly and in an eternal relation on this view, even if they are abstract objects. With this in mind, Craig’s view of presentism seems to be little more than a hybrid A-B Theory - a group which he himself claims are ‘in deep trouble’ with regard to the paradox (Craig 1998).

This is not to say that every presentist is committed to a B-ontology in this way. Oaklander points out that Prior, Levison and Christensen - presentists, of whom Craig counts himself alongside - all reject B-ontology in favor of a ‘pure A-Theory’ of presentism. According to Oaklander, their presentism differs from Craig’s, in that they “... reject an ontology that includes events, they reject the property of presentness that events acquire and shed, and most importantly, they reject the notion that there is a genuine change that an event, or anything else, undergoes as it becomes present and recedes into the past” (Oaklander 1999). Prior explicates this in his (1968), claiming that “... what looks like talk about events is really at bottom talk about things, and that what looks like talk about changes in events is really just slightly more complicated talk about changes in things.” (Prior 1968:10). The flow of time, he thus claims, is “merely metaphorical, not only because what is meant by it isn’t a genuine movement, but further because what is meant by it isn’t a genuine change” (Prior 1968:11).

By denying that temporal becoming involves change, this form of presentism adriotly avoids McTaggart’s paradox, as it denies the existence of the A-properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ that events gain and shed. It does not, however, avoid the first premise of his argument, as it flatly denies McTaggart’s first intuition about time; that time involves change. This is because, as Oaklander points out, on a pure A-Theory of presentism, “... there are only individual things and the present tensed facts that such individuals or substances enter into” (Oaklander 1999). By McTaggart’s lights, this “pure A-theory” would not be a true time series at all, for exactly the same reason that initially disqualified the B-Series.

By way of summary, we have assessed two unsuccessful strategies that presentists have deployed to avoid McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time; to either reject B-ontology completely in favour of a ‘pure A-theory’ that denies temporal becoming as a species of change, and thus disqualify itself in the first premise of McTaggart’s argument, or, in an effort to make sense of talk about past and future events, accept a hybrid A-B theory that rests (in some capacity) on B- ontology, and in doing so become subject to McTaggart’s paradox in his second premise. Of course, this does not prove presentism or the A-series as a whole to be necessarily inconsistent; one could certainly reject McTaggart’s intuitions about time, or attack his argument in other ways than which we have discussed, but, as we have seen, either disposition of presentism cannot completely avoid McTaggart’s argument, as it has been claimed.

Notes

¹ Meant in the serious actualist sense. Oaklander: '... states of affairs which exist as abstract objects but which are not instantiated' (Oaklander, 1999)

References

Craig, W. L. 1998. McTaggart’s Paradox and the problem of temporary intrinsics. Analysis 58: 122–27.

–––––. 2001. McTaggart's Paradox and Temporal Solipsism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, Iss. 1

LePoidevin, Robin. 1991. Change, Cause and Contradiction: A Defense of the Tenseless Theory of Time. London: Macmillan.

McTaggart, John Ellis. 1908. The Unreality of Time. Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17: 456-73.

Oaklander, L. N. 1996. McTaggart’s Paradox and Smith’s tensed theory of time. Synthese 107: 205–21

–––––. 1999. Craig on McTaggart’s Paradox and the problem of temporary intrinsics. Analysis 59: 314.

Prior, A. N. 1968. Changes in events and changes in things. Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

#philosophy #philosophyoftime #williamlanecraig #nathanoaklander #prior #actuality #metaphysics

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biointernet · 5 years

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557 World Physics Year 2000

I've come up with a set of rules that describe our reactions to technologies: 1. Anything that is in the world when you're born is normal and ordinary and is just a natural part of the way the world works. 2. Anything that's invented between when you're fifteen and thirty-five is new and exciting and revolutionary and you can probably get a career in it. 3. Anything invented after you're thirty-five is against the natural order of things. DOUGLAS ADAMS, The Salmon of Doubt

World Physics Year 2000 #557

TUNISIA TUNISIENNE TUNIS - 2005 World Physics Year 2000 Used stamp timbre - hourglass, clepsydra Cards and Hourglass on Cards My Hourglass Collection Read the full article

#1999-2000 #Philosophyoftime #PracticalPhilosophy #psychophysics #stamp #Timeinphysics #WorldPhysicsYear #WorldPhysicsYear2000

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Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia is sensitive experience

Qualia and Time Perception

Qualia

Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences

Qualia is qualities of awareness

Qualia is sensitive experience See also: Time perception and Sense of Time, The Hourglass of Emotions, Time Travel Management What it feels like, experimentally, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. Likewise for hearing a musical note played by a piano and hearing the same musical note played by a tuba. The qualia of these experiences are what give each of them its characteristic "feel" and also what distinguish them from one another. Qualia have traditionally been thought to be intrinsic qualities of experience that are directly available to introspection. However, some philosophers offer theories of qualia that deny one or both of those features. Qualia, standard psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy term: The word Qualia refers to the range of ways in which experience presents itself. Experiences can be richly colored or bare and monochromatic, they can be spatial and kinesthetic or devoid of geometry and directions, they can be flavorfully blended or felt as coming from mutually unintelligible dimensions, and so on. Classic qualia examples include things like the redness of red, the tartness of lime, and the glow of bodily warmth. However, qualia extends into categories far beyond the classic examples, beyond the wildest of our common-sense conceptions. There are modes of experience as altogether different from everything we have ever experienced as vision qualia is different from sound qualia. Qualia and Time Sense

Philosophy of perception

The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data, in particular how they relate to beliefs about, or knowledge of, the world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism—the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived—is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. More about Philosophy of perception on Wiki.

Philosophy is like Sex - you can get some exciting results, but it is not why you will do it Why do you FEEL pain or pleasure? Do plants have emotions? How is possible that some people do not understand other’s emotions? Emotions seem to be everywhere, giving meaning to all events of our lives. They are the backbone of social activities as well as they drive the cognitive processes of several living entities. Several animals, including humans, have emotions. Do machine can have emotions? Qualia and Time Sense

Sense data

Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. For instance, sense data theorists say that, upon viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image is red and round. The mental image is an example of a “sense datum.” Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either because they believe that perception gives us direct awareness of physical phenomena, rather than mere mental images, or because they believe that the mental phenomena involved in perception do not have the properties that appear to us (for instance, I might have a visual experience representing a red, round tomato, but my experience is not itself red or round). Defenders of sense data have argued, among other things, that sense data are required to explain such phenomena as perspectival variation, illusion, and hallucination. Critics of sense data have objected to the theory's commitment to mind-body dualism, the problems it raises for our knowledge of the external world, its difficulty in locating sense data in physical space, and its apparent commitment to the existence of objects with indeterminate properties.

What Are Sense Data?

1.1. The Standard Conception On the most common conception, sense data (singular: “sense datum”) have three defining characteristics: Sense data are the kind of thing we are directly aware of in perception,Sense data are dependent on the mind, andSense data have the properties that perceptually appear to us. More about Sense data on the website Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here. Qualia and Time Sense

Deepak Chopra about Qualia

https://youtu.be/sCglvcsC9Ss Deepak Chopra explores and explains ways of describing our subjective experiences - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and emotions.* Qualia is a term used to describe these subjective experiences, how can we use these qualitative units to describe experience? And what is the relationship between consciousness and experience? Deepak addresses these and other facets of experience.

MHC Exhibitions

Exhibitions:Beauty Bio NetHourglass and CardsArt GlassMHC Dead Sea CollectionThe Full History of Time3DHM ExhibitionHourglass Figure Sophia Loren Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia ain’t in the head

ALEX BYRNE Massachusetts Institute of Technology MICHAEL TYE The University of Texas at Austin Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different addition of some relatively innocuous assumptions, they are inconsistent. Take color as an example. Consider Bill and Ben, ordinary humans who are enjoying color experiences with different qualia. Let x be a (possible) duplicate of Bill, and let y be a (possible) duplicate of Ben. Given a specific externalist theory of content (which need not be reductive), with some ingenuity we can plausibly construct different environments for each, such that the theory predicts that x and y’s color experiences have the same content; so, by (weak) intentionalism, they have the same qualia. By qualia internalism, x’s experience has the same qualia as Bill’s, and y’s experience has the same qualia as Ben’s, so x’s and y’s experiences differ in qualia; contradiction. Alternatively, since an intentionalist about color qualia will typically endorse the converse thesis that the color content of an experience supervenes on its color qualia, we can start with a pair of duplicates x* and y* in different environments and use content externalism to argue that their experiences differ in content. Since x* and y* are duplicates, their experiences have the same qualia; by the converse intentionalist thesis, their experiences have the same content. So: content externalism and intentionalism (jointly, ‘‘externalist inten- tionalism’’) naturally lead to qualia externalism. And what’s wrong with that? Isn’t the doctrine of qualia internalism the last bastion of a widely discredited Cartesian conception of the mind? Not according to many philosophers, who view qualia externalism with the same incredulity that greeted Churchland-style eliminativism. Qualia externalism, they think, is an absurd thesis, accepted by a handful of philosophers with too much respect for philosophical theory and not enough common sense. To his credit, Adam Pautz (2006) does not rest his opposition to qualia externalism on this kind of ‘‘intuition’’. He attempts to provide an argument against the principal motivation for it, namely externalist intentionalism. Moreover, the argument purports to be in significant degree empirical, drawing on results from a variety of disciplines, including psychophysics and neuroscience. The orthodox response to our quasi-inconsistent triad is to deny inten- tionalism, not content externalism. Interestingly, Pautz takes the other option, and embraces content internalism. So far, we have not mentioned the issue of reductive physicalism, which looms large in Pautz’s presentation. In our view, bringing in inevitably controversial reductive theses of the ‘‘awareness relation’’ at the start just makes it harder to see what is going on. Accordingly, we will initially set out Pautz’s argument against externalist intentionalism while ignoring the various reductive proposals that Pautz discusses. After having explained why Pautz’s argument fails, we then turn (in section 2) to the entirely separate issue of whether there is some relatively compact wide physicalistic account of the awareness relation. Full text here. Qualia and Time Sense

New Times

Sundial watch Object #336 Vintage postal envelope The Hourglass of Emotions Wham! – Last Christmas Time Machine How to dress an hourglass figure Time of Life #335 Flow away MHC Flikr Time synonyms Cyclocosmia hourglass spider

What is it, Time of Life? Qualia and Time Sense

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia

David J. Chalmers Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 ] 1 The principle of organizational invariance It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper. To put the issue differently, even once it is accepted that experience arises from physical systems, the question remains open: in virtue of what sort of physical properties does conscious experience arise? Some property that brains can possess will presumably be among them, but it is far from clear just what the relevant properties are. Some have suggested biochemical properties; some have suggested quantum-mechanical properties; many have professed uncertainty. A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates. In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a principle of organizational invariance, holding that experience is invariant across systems with the same fine-grained functional organization. More precisely, the principle states that given any system that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. A full specification of a system's fine-grained functional organization will fully determine any conscious experiences that arise. To clarify this, we must first clarify the notion of functional organization. This is best understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction between the components of a system, and perhaps between these components and external inputs and outputs. A functional organization is determined by specifying (1) a number of abstract components, (2) for each component, a number of different possible states, and (3) a system of dependency relations, specifying how the states of each component depends on the previous states of all components and on inputs to the system, and how outputs from the system depend on previous component states. Beyond specifying their number and their dependency relations, the nature of the components and the states is left unspecified. A physical system realizes a given functional organization when the system can be divided into an appropriate number of physical components each with the appropriate number of possible states, such that the causal dependency relations between the components of the system, inputs, and outputs precisely reflect the dependency relations given in the specification of the functional organization. A given functional organization can be realized by diverse physical systems. For example, the organization realized by the brain at the neural level might in principle be realized by a silicon system. A physical system has functional organization at many different levels, depending on how finely we individuate its parts and on how finely we divide the states of those parts. At a coarse level, for instance, it is likely that the two hemispheres of the brain can be seen as realizing a simple two-component organization, if we choose appropriate interdependent states of the hemispheres. It is generally more useful to view cognitive systems at a finer level, however. For our purposes I will always focus on a level of organization fine enough to determine the behavioral capacities and dispositions of a cognitive system. This is the role of the "fine enough grain" clause in the statement of the organizational invariance principle; the level of organization relevant to the application of the principle is one fine enough to determine a system's behavioral dispositions. In the brain, it is likely that the neural level suffices, although a coarser level might also work. For the purposes of illustration I will generally focus on the neural level of organization of the brain, but the arguments generalize. Strictly speaking, for the purposes of the invariance principle we must require that for two systems to share their functional organization, they must be in corresponding states at the time in question; if not for this requirement, my sleeping twin might count as sharing my organization, but he certainly does not share my experiences. When two systems share their organization at a fine enough grain (including the requirement that they be in corresponding states), I will say that they are functionally isomorphic systems, or that they are functional isomorphs. The invariance principle holds that any functional isomorph of a conscious system has experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the original system. Full text about Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia here. Qualia and Time Sense The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences (@Harvard Science of Psychedelics Club) Andrés Gómez Emilsson from the Qualia Research Institute presents about the Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences. At a high-level, this video presents an algorithmic reduction of DMT phenomenology which imports concepts from hyperbolic geometry and dynamic systems theory in order to explain the "weirder than weird" hallucinations one can have on this drug. Andrés describes what different levels of DMT intoxication feel like in light of a model in which experience has both variable geometric curvature and information content. The benefit of this model cashes out in a novel approach to design DMT experiences in order to maximize specific desired benefits. https://youtu.be/loCBvaj4eSg Qualia and Time Sense

Principia Qualia

Blueprint for a new science

v1 Michael Edward Johnson Qualia Research Institute Special thanks1 to Dr. Randal Koene, whose mentorship, feedback, and conversations about brains helped make this research happen. To Dr. Radhika Dirks, for feedback & editing, physics expertise, encouragement, and wisdom. To Andres Gomez Emilsson, who saw the full problem, rolled up his sleeves, and worked on it. And to my family & Lili Mao. Thanks also to Giego Caleiro, Scott Jackisch, Romeo Stevens, Anthony Rudd, Stephen Frey, Adam Safron, Joshua Vogelstein, Duncan Wilson, Mark Lippman, Emily Crotteau, Eli Tyre, Andrew Lapinski-Barker, Allan Herman-Pool, Anatoly Karlin, Alex Alekseyenko, and Leopold Haller for offering helpful feedback on drafts along the way. 1 Except as noted the views herein are my own, and the above acknowledgements of contribution do not imply endorsements of my positions. 2 collaborative meetings with Dr. Koene. The background arguments about brains and IIT were significantly aided by an extensive series of Abstract: Philosophers have been wondering about the nature of consciousness (what it feels like to have subjective experience) and qualia (individual components of subjective experience) for as long as philosophy has existed. Advancements in physics and neuroscience have informed and constrained this mystery, but have not solved it. What would a systematic solution to the mystery of consciousness look like? Part I begins with grounding this topic by considering a concrete question: what makes some conscious experiences more pleasant than others? We first review what’s known about the neuroscience of pain & pleasure, find the current state of knowledge narrow, inconsistent, and often circular, and conclude we must look elsewhere for a systematic framework (Sections I & II). We then review the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and several variants of IIT, and find each of them promising, yet also underdeveloped and flawed (Sections III-V). We then take a step back and distill what kind of problem consciousness is. Importantly, we offer eight sub-problems whose solutions would, in aggregate, constitute a complete theory of consciousness (Section VI). Armed with this framework, in Part II we return to the subject of pain & pleasure (valence) and offer some assumptions, distinctions, and heuristics to clarify and constrain the problem (Sections VII-IX). Of particular interest, we then offer a specific hypothesis on what valence is (Section X) and several novel empirical predictions which follow from this (Section XI). Part III finishes with discussion of how this general approach may inform open problems in neuroscience, and the prospects for building a new science of qualia (Sections XII & XIII). Lastly, we identify further research threads within this framework (Appendices A-F). Introduction: Some experiences feel better than others, and this informs and undergirds everything about the human condition. But why-- what makes some experiences better than others? This question has been a recurring puzzle, posed in various forms by e.g., Epicurus, Shakespeare, Jeremy Bentham, and affective neuroscience. But despite literal millennia of research, we know an embarrassingly small amount about the mechanisms and metaphysics behind it, and there’s little agreement on even what a proper answer should look like. We can call this the problem of valence. I believe there’s a rigorous, crisp, and relatively simple solution to this puzzle, but there’s a lot of theoretical scaffolding that needs to be put in place first. Part 1 reviews what is known and the leading quantitative hypotheses about valence, qualia and consciousness, with a focus on affective neuroscience and IIT. I end this section by summarizing and synthesizing a framework for understanding consciousness research in terms of modular, granular sub-problems. Part 2 directly addresses valence as a sub-problem in consciousness research, offers a hypothesis as to what valence is, and suggests specific empirical tests of the hypothesis. In Part 3 we discuss further predictions, implications, practical applications and current relevance. Finally, in the appendices we describe how to grow this approach into a formal science of qualia. Readers with a strong grasp of the literature on valence and on IIT, or those wanting to quickly get to the heart of the argument, should feel free to jump to Section VI. Contents Part I - Review Why some things feel better than others: the view from neuroscience Clarifying the Problem of Valence The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) Critiques of IIT Alternative versions of IIT: Perceptronium and FIIH Summary and synthesis: eight problems for a new science of consciousness Part II - Valence Three principles for a mathematical derivation of valence Distinctions in qualia: charting the explanation space for valence Summary of heuristics for reverse-engineering the pattern for valence A simple hypothesis about valence Testing this hypothesis today Part III - Discussion Taking Stock Closing thoughts Appendices A-F Part I - Review I. Why some things feel better than others: the view from neuroscience Affective neuroscience has been very effective at illuminating the dynamics and correlations of how valenceworksinthehumanbrain,onapracticallevel,andwhatvalenceisnot, onametaphysicallevel. This is useful yet not philosophically rigorous, and this trend is likely to continue. Full text Principia Qualia here Qualia and Time Sense

State of the Qualia, Fall 2019

Qualia Research Institute’s inaugural newsletter. What is QRI trying to do? Our long-term vision is to end suffering. To destroy hell, and to build tools for exploring all the bright futures which come after. To take the Buddha’s vision of 2600 years ago, support it with advanced theory and technology, and make it real for all creatures. Our medium-term goal is to build a ‘full-stack’ approach to the mind and brain, centered around emotional valence. Critically, better philosophy should lead to better neuroscience, and better neuroscience should lead to better neurotechnology. We’re skeptical of any philosophical approaches that don’t try to ��pay rent” by building empirically useful things. Our short-term deliverables are to refine our tools for evaluating EEG readings of emotionally-intense states (e.g. 5-MeO-DMT), build a hardware platform for non-invasive precision brain stimulation, and release an updated version of our full-stack theory of brain dynamics (‘neural annealing’). We think we’re on track for all of these goals. On one level this is a huge claim- but as Archimedes said, “Give me a place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the world.” We think we have that lever, and we’re building a place to stand. More Qualia References, Links and Bibliography Block, N. 1999. ‘‘Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness’’. Philosophical Topics 26 (1&2): 39–70. Bradley, P., and M. Tye. 2001. ‘‘Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves’’. Journal of Philosophy 98: 469–87. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2003. ‘‘Color Realism and Color Science’’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 3–21. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2004. ‘‘Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism’’. Journal of Philosophy 101: 37–43. Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers (expanded edition). Indianapolis: Hackett. Lewis, D. 1984. ‘‘Putnam’s Paradox’’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 221–36. Mollon, J. D. 1997. ‘‘‘‘. . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone’’: Some Perceptual Themes 1946–1996’’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A: 859–78. Pautz, A. 2006. ‘‘Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism’’. Nouˆs 40: 205–40. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tye, M. 2006. ‘‘The Puzzle of True Blue’’. Analysis 66. Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ‘‘Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components?’’ In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell. Block, N. (1978) Troubles with functionalism. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed.) `Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. Harvard University Press, 1980 Block, N. (1990) Inverted earth. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed J. Tomberlin. Ridgeview Block, N. (1995) “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-247 Block, N. (2002) “The Harder Problem of Consciousness”, The Journal of Philosophy XCIX, No. 8, August 2002, 1-35 Byrne, A., (2001) "Intentionalism Defended", Philosophical Review 110, Chalmers, David, 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press: New York Dennett, D. (1988) `Quining Qualia.' In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press: Oxford Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Little Brown: New York Harman, G. (1982) “Conceptual Role Semantics” The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Horgan, T. (1984) `Jackson on physical information and qualia'. Philosophical Quarterly Jackson, F. (1986) `What Mary didn't know.' Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-95 Jackson, F. (1993) `Armchair metaphysics'. In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Levine, J. (1993) `On leaving out what it is like.' In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Loar, B. (1990) `Phenomenal properties.' In J. Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Ridgeview. Lycan, W. (1996) Consciousness and Experience MIT Press: Cambridge McGinn, C. (1991) The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell Nida-Rümelin, M. 1996. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82:145-57. Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (6), 1-21. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press: Oxford Peacocke, C. (1989) `No resting place: a critical notice of The View from Nowhere', The Philosophical Review 98, 65-82. Perry, J. (2001), Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, MIT Press: Cambridge Rey, G. (1993) `Sensational Sentences Switched'. Philosophical Studies 70, 1: Shoemaker, S. (1975) `Functionalism and qualia.' Philosophical Studies 27: 291-315. Shoemaker, S. (1981) `Absent qualia are impossible--a reply to Block'. The Philosophical Review 90,4:581-599 Sturgeon, S. (1994) “The Epistemic View of Subjectivity” The Journal of Philosophy XCI, 5, 1994 Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content, MIT Press: Cambridge Van Gulick, R. (1993) Understanding the phenomenal mind: are we all just armadillos? In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) White, S. L. (1986): `Curse of the qualia', Synthese 68: 333-368. White, S. L (1995) `Color and the narrow contents of experience' Philosophical Topics 23 Block, N. (1981). Troubles with functionalism. In (Block, ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 111-27. Horgan, T. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 453-69. Pylyshyn, Z. (1980). The `causal power' of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 442-4. Savitt, S. (1982). Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 342-3. Searle, J.R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-57. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-81. https://www.qualiaresearchinstitute.org https://www.iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Qualia and Time Sense

Q,Q,Q - Quality, Quantity, Qualia (soon)

See also:

Time symbolism

Time is… The Full History of Time Time in physics and time Science Symbolism of Melencolia I by Albrecht Dürer Time and Text

DADA Time

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The Hourglass Figure:

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#BEZ #BioInternet #Korotkov #PhilosophyislikeSex #Philosophyofperception #Philosophyoftime #Qualia #QualiaandTimePerception #QualiaandTimeSense #Quality #Quantity #Sensedata #Timeperception #Timesense

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Time Philosophy

Space and time are the framework within which the mind is constrained to construct its experience of reality. Immanuel Kant Philosophy of space and time is the branch of philosophy concerned with the issues surrounding the ontology, epistemology, and character of space and time. While such ideas have been central to philosophy from its inception, the philosophy of space and time was both an inspiration for and a central aspect of early analytic philosophy. DADA Time today

Time Philosophy

The subject focuses on a number of basic issues, including whether time and space exist independently of the mind (Father Time), whether they exist independently of one another, what accounts for time's apparently unidirectional flow, whether times other than the present moment exist, and questions about the nature of identity (particularly the nature of identity over time). Discussions of the nature of time, and of various issues related to time, have always featured prominently in philosophy, but they have been especially important since the beginning of the 20th Century. DADA Time today Main topics in the philosophy of time — Fatalism; Reductionism and Platonism with respect to time; the topology of time; McTaggart's arguments; The A Theory and The B Theory; Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory; time travel; and the 3D/4D controversy — together with some suggestions for further reading on each topic.

Time Philosophy

Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time, which takes the view that all existence in time is equally real, as opposed to presentism or the growing block universe theory of time, in which at least the future is not the same as any other time. More on Wiki What is the time theory? The B-theory of time is the name given to one of two positions regarding philosophy of time. B-theorists argue that the flow of time is an illusion, that the past, present and future are equally real, and that time is tenseless. ... B-theory is often drawn upon in theoretical physics, and in theories such as Eternalism. DADA Time now Famous Hourglass figure – Sophia Loren

The Full History of Time

Exhibition MHC Soon The Full History of Time Exhibition on My Hourglass Collection virtual museum.

Art, Science, Love, Magic, Technologies, Human Light System, Logic, Divinity

In classical philosophy, Time is divided into three distinct regions; the "past", the "present", and the "future". Using that representational model, the past is generally seen as being immutably fixed, and the future as at least partly undefined. As time passes, the moment that was once the present becomes part of the past; and part of the future, in turn, becomes the new present. In this way time is said to pass, with a distinct present moment "moving" forward into the future and leaving the past behind. Within this intuitive understanding of time is the philosophy of presentism, which argues that only the present exists. It does not travel forward through an environment of time, moving from a real point in the past and toward a real point in the future. Instead, the present simply changes. DADA Time The past and future do not exist (The Death does not exist) and are only concepts used to describe the real, isolated, and changing present. This conventional model presents a number of difficult philosophical problems, and seems difficult to reconcile with currently accepted scientific theories such as the theory of relativity

A bright pink rhinoceros emblazoned with Extinction Rebellions signature logo, next to the chancellery at the Reichstag in Berlin The Death Does Not ExistHourglass SephoraHourglass Figure Sophia LorenHourglass body measurementsExtinction Rebellion – Time against LifeText, Time, MHCHourglass – Sablier, Sanduhr, Stundenglas, Reloj de arena, الساعة الرملية, Rellotge de sorra, přesýpací hodiny, velago, itula tioata, Clessidra, 砂時計, timeglass, Zandloper, Timglas, Isikhwama, SoatglassTime in physics and time Science?MHC YouTube channelSymbolism of Melencolia I by Albrecht DürerCreate Ma, Upgrade MaA New Theory On TimeFrank LaCavera hourglass collectionsTime perception or sense of timeTime and TextLunar calendar and moon’s phases nowTime TravelTime ManagementTime symbolism What did Albert Einstein say about time? Einstein said that realising gravity and acceleration were the same thing was "the happiest thought of my life". It is at the heart of the theory of relativity, which states that time and space are not as immutable and fixed as we think they are from the immediate experience of everyday life. Is Time an illusion? Time is a prime conflict between relativity and quantum mechanics, measured and malleable in relativity while assumed as background (and not an observable) in quantum mechanics. To many physicists, while we experience time as psychologically real, time is not fundamentally real.

DADA Time before

Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective by Steven F. Savitt Logicians have frequently dwelt upon the equivocation of ‘is’ as between the “is of identity” on the one hand, and the “is of predication”on the other. The temporal equivocation of ‘is’ has, however, been little heeded. Yet it is quite clear that there are several very distinct possibilities: (i) The “atemporal is” that means “is timelessly.” (“Three is a prime number.”) (ii) The “is of the present” that means “is now.” (“The sun is setting.”)(iii) The “omni temporal is” that means “is always.” (“Copper is a conductor of electricity.”)(iv) The “transtemporal is” that means “is in the present period.” (“The earth is a planet of the sun.”)So begins a paper by Nicholas Rescher, “On the Logic of Chronological Propositions,” that appeared in Mind in 1966. I will assume with Rescher that ‘is’ (and other verbs as well, including the verb ‘exists’), is temporally equivocal in much the way he sketches, although Rescher’s sense (iv) will play no role in the considerations to follow. I will argue that the temporal equivocation of ‘is’ (and other verbs as well,including the verb ‘exists’), has still not been sufficiently heeded by showing that a contemporary debate in the metaphysics of time, the debate between the apparently opposed views known as presentism and eternalism, can be clarified and enriched when these distinctions are respected. More https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternalism_(philosophy_of_time) https://www.space.com/29859-the-illusion-of-time.html https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/ The Death Does Not Exist Hourglass Figure Sophia Loren Hourglass body measurements Extinction Rebellion – Time against Life Text, Time, MHC Time in physics and time Science? Kozyrev mirrors Kozyrev mirrors are created by enclosing a space which weakens the magnetic field of the Earth, and which then provides more human access to solar and galactic information. Through numerous experiments using the mirrors, the ISRICA has focused studies in a number of areas, including human psycho-physiology, pathology of disease and health, and the evolvement of telepathic fields and remote sensing. A Kozyrev mirrors is a device made from aluminum (sometimes from glass, or reflecting mirror-like material) spiral shape surfaces, which are able to focus different types of radiation including that coming from biological objects. They are named after the famous astronomer Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kozyrev, though they were neither invented nor described by him.

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kozyrev Nikolai A. Kozyrev was born on September 2, 1908 in St. Petersburg, Russia As a young man, Kozyrev aspired to become an astrophysicist and he subsequently was admitted to Leningrad University where he received degrees in physics and mathematics. More about Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kozyrev on Kozyrev Mirrors project.

Father Time Exhibition

Personification of Time Father Time – Time personified as an old bearded man, usually carrying a scythe and an hourglass Dynamic Vision Board Meta Model by Adam Pierce soon at MHC virtual museum father time symbol is hourglass

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Father Time and Mother Nature

Time-Space Trinity: Father Time, Mother Nature and Baby New Year

Father Time and Mother Nature

Father Time Exhibition

Mother Earth, Mother Nature

Baby New Year

Father Time Department at MHC virtual museum

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Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia is sensitive experience

Qualia and Time Perception

Qualia

Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences

Qualia is qualities of awareness

Philosophy of perception

Sense data

What Are Sense Data?

Deepak Chopra about Qualia

Deepak Chopra explores and explains ways of describing our subjective experiences - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and emotions.* Qualia is a term used to describe these subjective experiences, how can we use these qualitative units to describe experience? And what is the relationship between consciousness and experience? Deepak addresses these and other facets of experience. (See on YouTube)

MHC Exhibitions

Exhibitions:Beauty Bio NetHourglass and CardsArt GlassMHC Dead Sea CollectionThe Full History of Time3DHM ExhibitionHourglass Figure Sophia Loren Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia ain’t in the head

New Times

What is it, Time of Life? Qualia and Time Sense

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia

Principia Qualia

Blueprint for a new science

State of the Qualia, Fall 2019

Qualia Research Institute’s inaugural newsletter. What is QRI trying to do? Our long-term vision is to end suffering. To destroy hell, and to build tools for exploring all the bright futures which come after. To take the Buddha’s vision of 2600 years ago, support it with advanced theory and technology, and make it real for all creatures. Our medium-term goal is to build a ‘full-stack’ approach to the mind and brain, centered around emotional valence. Critically, better philosophy should lead to better neuroscience, and better neuroscience should lead to better neurotechnology. We’re skeptical of any philosophical approaches that don’t try to “pay rent” by building empirically useful things. Our short-term deliverables are to refine our tools for evaluating EEG readings of emotionally-intense states (e.g. 5-MeO-DMT), build a hardware platform for non-invasive precision brain stimulation, and release an updated version of our full-stack theory of brain dynamics (‘neural annealing’). We think we’re on track for all of these goals. On one level this is a huge claim- but as Archimedes said, “Give me a place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the world.” We think we have that lever, and we’re building a place to stand. More Qualia References, Links and Bibliography Block, N. 1999. ‘‘Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness’’. Philosophical Topics 26 (1&2): 39–70. Bradley, P., and M. Tye. 2001. ‘‘Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves’’. Journal of Philosophy 98: 469–87. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2003. ‘‘Color Realism and Color Science��’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 3–21. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2004. ‘‘Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism’’. Journal of Philosophy 101: 37–43. Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers (expanded edition). Indianapolis: Hackett. Lewis, D. 1984. ‘‘Putnam’s Paradox’’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 221–36. Mollon, J. D. 1997. ‘‘‘‘. . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone’’: Some Perceptual Themes 1946–1996’’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A: 859–78. Pautz, A. 2006. ‘‘Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism’’. Nouˆs 40: 205–40. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tye, M. 2006. ‘‘The Puzzle of True Blue’’. Analysis 66. Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ‘‘Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components?’’ In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell. Block, N. (1978) Troubles with functionalism. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed.) `Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. Harvard University Press, 1980 Block, N. (1990) Inverted earth. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed J. Tomberlin. Ridgeview Block, N. (1995) “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-247 Block, N. (2002) “The Harder Problem of Consciousness”, The Journal of Philosophy XCIX, No. 8, August 2002, 1-35 Byrne, A., (2001) "Intentionalism Defended", Philosophical Review 110, Chalmers, David, 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press: New York Dennett, D. (1988) `Quining Qualia.' In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press: Oxford Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Little Brown: New York Harman, G. (1982) “Conceptual Role Semantics” The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Horgan, T. (1984) `Jackson on physical information and qualia'. Philosophical Quarterly Jackson, F. (1986) `What Mary didn't know.' Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-95 Jackson, F. (1993) `Armchair metaphysics'. In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Levine, J. (1993) `On leaving out what it is like.' In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Loar, B. (1990) `Phenomenal properties.' In J. Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Ridgeview. Lycan, W. (1996) Consciousness and Experience MIT Press: Cambridge McGinn, C. (1991) The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell Nida-Rümelin, M. 1996. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82:145-57. Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (6), 1-21. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press: Oxford Peacocke, C. (1989) `No resting place: a critical notice of The View from Nowhere', The Philosophical Review 98, 65-82. Perry, J. (2001), Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, MIT Press: Cambridge Rey, G. (1993) `Sensational Sentences Switched'. Philosophical Studies 70, 1: Shoemaker, S. (1975) `Functionalism and qualia.' Philosophical Studies 27: 291-315. Shoemaker, S. (1981) `Absent qualia are impossible--a reply to Block'. The Philosophical Review 90,4:581-599 Sturgeon, S. (1994) “The Epistemic View of Subjectivity” The Journal of Philosophy XCI, 5, 1994 Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content, MIT Press: Cambridge Van Gulick, R. (1993) Understanding the phenomenal mind: are we all just armadillos? In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) White, S. L. (1986): `Curse of the qualia', Synthese 68: 333-368. White, S. L (1995) `Color and the narrow contents of experience' Philosophical Topics 23 Block, N. (1981). Troubles with functionalism. In (Block, ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 111-27. Horgan, T. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 453-69. Pylyshyn, Z. (1980). The `causal power' of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 442-4. Savitt, S. (1982). Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 342-3. Searle, J.R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-57. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-81. https://www.qualiaresearchinstitute.org https://www.iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Qualia and Time Sense

Q,Q,Q - Quality, Quantity, Qualia (soon)