#Japanese military history

[theinternetisaweboflies]

Fort Stevens, now an Oregon State Park, remains the only American mainland military base since the battle of 1812 to have been fired upon by a foreign power. Near midnight on June 21, 1942, a Japanese submarine surfaced and fired shells at the fort for approximately 15 minutes before submersing again. There were no casualties.

[historyofguns]

The article "Japanese Type 100 Submachine Gun — Too Few and Too Late," authored by Tom Laemlein, explores the Japanese Type 100 submachine gun and its delayed production during World War II. The article details Japan's initial lack of interest in submachine guns during the 1930s, and how, despite eventually manufacturing the Type 100 in 1944, they missed the opportunity to effectively compete with other nations' short-range firepower. The article traces the history of submachine guns, highlighting the influence of the .45 caliber Thompson and European models, the development of a simplified Bergmann-type submachine gun by Japan, and the evolution of the Type 100 through various models such as the paratrooper version with a folding stock. Despite efforts to update and improve the gun, it was ultimately limited by production constraints and the underpowered 8x22mm Nambu round. The Type 100 remains a historically interesting weapon but was not on par with other submachine guns of World War II.

[bookloversofbath]

Burma 1942: The Japanese Invasion: Both Sides Tell the Story of a Savage Jungle War :: Ian Lyall Grant & Kazou Tamayama

[sgtgrunt0331-3]

On April 1, 1945, U.S. Marines from 2nd Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment, exit their amphibious vehicles onto Green Beach One on the island of Okinawa. It was both Easter Sunday and April Fools when American forces landed that day.

(Photo courtesy of USMC)

[infinitiumme]

Yukio Mishima in paramilitair uniform designed by himself for his tatenokai (shield society)

In cyanotype print

[barbucomedie]

Court Sword from Japan dated to the 19th Century on display at the Royal Armouries in Leeds, England

This Tachi style sword was worn for court to display and is an archaic style derived from China using flowers and foliage as decoration. Such weapons would most likely not be used for combat but as an indication of wealth and rank in court amongst other nobility.

Photographs taken by myself 2024

[ishido-enjoyer]

So I know I haven't been so active in the Napoleonic community in recent months, as I've been pretty absorbed with studying Japanese history and the Japanese language, but the more I've learned about Hideyoshi, the more I found myself comparing him to Napoleon, so here's a post where my two main historical interests get to intersect. :)

Toyotomi Hideyoshi has often been referred to as Japan’s Napoleon Bonaparte. Perhaps a bit Eurocentric given that Hideyoshi was born in 1537, 232 years before Napoleon--if anything it could be said that Napoleon was France’s Hideyoshi, but unfortunately Hideyoshi is not a name most Westerners recognize—otherwise it’s an excellent comparison. I’ve read a great deal about Napoleon over the past several years, and, although my studies on Sengoku Japan are only really in their infancy, I couldn’t help but notice a striking number of parallels and similarities between the lives and military/political careers of Hideyoshi and Napoleon.

Both men came from relatively humble origins and experienced meteoric rises through the ranks via their military service. Napoleon’s family on Corsica were minor nobility—they were not wealthy by any means but at least possessed enough connections to get Napoleon into a military academy; once his training was completed, he was commissioned as an artillery officer. Hideyoshi was born a peasant; his father was an ashigaru (foot soldier) who served a samurai. Hideyoshi followed in his father’s footsteps and became an ashigaru himself, which at the age of 26 brought him into the service of Lord Oda Nobunaga, who was soon the most powerful daimyo in Japan. His talents and intelligence impressed Nobunaga, and Hideyoshi rose to become one of his top generals and retainers by his early thirties. When Nobunaga was betrayed and assassinated in 1582, Hideyoshi, then 35, moved quickly to step into the ensuing power vacuum; within three years he had defeated his main rivals, consolidated his power, and become the most powerful man in Japan himself. Napoleon Bonaparte became a general at age 24 and crowned himself Emperor of the French at age 35. Hideyoshi was never Emperor, nor, being from a peasant background, did he receive the title of shogun, but he was designated kampaku (Imperial Regent) by the Emperor at age 38 and was the real power in the land from this point until his death in 1598.

As a result of their respective meteoric rises and remarkable military successes, both men came to view themselves as destined for greatness. Napoleon frequently spoke of destiny and believed himself guided by it. “Is there a man so blind,” he wrote in December of 1798, “as not to see that destiny itself guides all my operations? Is there anyone so faithless as to doubt that everything in this vast universe is bound to the empire of destiny?” (Broers, Napoleon: Soldier of Fortune, 195) This belief, which pervaded through his life, also made him take great risks, convinced that he was destined to succeed in his endeavors. Hideyoshi came to genuinely believe his own rise was divinely inspired and even developed his own backstory, giving himself celestial origins, and making sure to mention them frequently in his letters to others as a means of convincing them of the rightness of his cause. “At the time my mother conceived me,” he wrote on one occasion, “she had an auspicious dream. That night, a ray of sun filled the room as if it were noontime. All were overcome with astonishment and fright and when the diviners had gathered, they interpreted the event saying: when he reaches the prime of life, his virtue will illuminate the four seas, his authority will emanate to the myriad peoples.” (Berry, Hideyoshi, 9). He even went so far as bringing up his supposedly heavenly origins in a letter to the King of Korea, in hopes of pushing his case to the King to permit his armies safe passage through Korea so he could carry out his planned conquest of Ming China.

Both were regarded as military geniuses by their contemporaries. Napoleon’s quick, dominant successes in Italy, and his crushing victories against Austria, Russia, and Prussia between 1805-1807, solidified his reputation as one of the greatest generals in European history, and arguably the best military commander of his time. Hideyoshi never suffered a defeat in the numerous campaigns he waged over the years to complete the work of unifying Japan that had begun under Nobunaga.

Likewise, both men’s reputations for military genius were severely tarnished by campaigns driven out of an increasingly megalomaniacal drive for conquest abroad. Hideyoshi, his confidence bolstered by his string of military successes, began setting his sights on China, and even hinted in his correspondence that one day, after China had submitted as his vassal, he might even attempt to conquer India. To begin his conquest of China, he first needed to bring his armies through Korea. He attempted to negotiate with the King of Korea to gain safe passage for his armies, but Korea had strong ties to the Ming Dynasty, the negotiations soon broke down, and Hideyoshi sent his armies to invade Korea in 1592. The Japanese initially smashed through the pitiful Korean defenses and made a rapid drive up the peninsula, but with Ming reinforcements soon arriving to turn the tide, and the Japanese navy being repeatedly pummeled by the brilliant Admiral Yi Sun-Sin, the Japanese advance was soon stalled. Eventually the Japanese forces retreated to the southern coastline, where they hunkered down in hastily-built fortifications while peace negotiations dragged out for years between Hideyoshi’s court and the Ming court. When these negotiations also eventually broke down, Hideyoshi launched a second invasion of Korea, less for the sake of conquering China this time than simply for punishing Korea as much as possible for thwarting his initial plans. Hideyoshi himself never actually personally led his armies in Korea—he never went to Korea at all—but relied instead on the reports of his generals and inspectors, whose reports often downplayed or whitewashed the truth of Japanese defeats out of fear. Additionally, some of his primary commanders (like Konishi Yukinaga and Kato Kiyomasa) openly hated each other and their quarrels and personal rivalries occasionally hampered military operations, not unlike the quarrels of Napoleon’s commanders in Russia. The second invasion was turning into a stalemate when Hideyoshi abruptly died in September of 1598 at the age of 61. The remnants of the Japanese army eventually returned to Japan, and a six-year period of nearly relentless horrors and atrocities in Korea had all been for nothing. Napoleon, of course, launched his infamous 1812 invasion of Russia, which, while of much shorter duration than Hideyoshi’s war(s) in Korea, led to a much more thorough destruction of his armies and arguably contributed to his fall from power in 1814. Not that the Korean conflicts left the Toyotomi forces unscathed, and it can also be argued that the extent to which the Western armies had bled themselves out in Korea helped contribute to the victory of Hideoyoshi’s rival, Tokugawa Ieyasu, against his Toyotomi-loyalist enemies at Sekigahara in 1600, as Ieyasu, based in Japan’s eastern Kanto region, had pointedly kept his own forces out of the war.

Both men enacted sweeping reforms in their respective societies which long outlasted either them or the dynasties they both failed to leave behind. Both initiated nationwide cadastral surveys and land registries to make tax collection more accurate and efficient. In 1595, six leading daimyo under Hideyoshi drafted, on his behalf, a code comprised of fourteen brief articles, all of which were centered around keeping the peace, carrying out justice, and governing the behavior of the various social classes in Japan. Napoleon issued his civil code (also not written by himself), now known as the Napoleonic Code, in 1804. While not as brief as the Toyotomi regime’s code, it was written in the vernacular to make it more accessible to the average person.

Both were patrons of the arts; in Hideyoshi’s case, of Noh theater (which he became so passionate about he eventually even performed in plays in front of his subordinates), tea ceremonies, and painting; Napoleon also patronized painters, established art museums and, while not up to becoming a performer in his own right like Hideyoshi, he did attend the opera regularly.  

Both Hideyoshi and Napoleon struggled to produce an heir. Hideyoshi’s only son, Tsurumatsu, died at the age of 2 in 1591. Hideyoshi named his nephew Hidetsugu his heir in the meantime, but hoped to have another son. Neither his wife nor his considerable number of concubines were able to give him a child, leading historians to speculate that Hideyoshi may have been sterile by this point, possible as the result of a sexually transmitted disease. In 1592 his concubine Yodo-dono, also known as Chacha, gave birth to a son, Hideyori, who would become Hideyoshi’s only heir (the unfortunate nephew, Hidetsugu, was soon charged with treason and forced to commit seppuku not long after Hideyori’s birth). Hideyoshi’s inability to create an heir with so many other women led to rumors spreading, even before he died, that Hideyori was not really his child. Napoleon also struggled to produce an heir for years after crowning himself Emperor, but, as he demonstrated no problem creating sons with his mistresses, the problem was attributed to his wife’s infertility. He divorced Josephine, married a much younger princess, and soon enough had an heir of his own.

When Hideyoshi died in 1598, his heir was only five years old; when Napoleon fell from power in 1815, his heir was four years old. Both Hideyoshi’s heir and Napoleon’s heir died at the age of 21.

[cid5]

Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force Kanoya Air Base circa May 1945 in Kanoya, Kagoshima, Japan.

[troythecatfish]

[greatworldwar2]

• Satoru Anabuki (Japanese IJAAF Ace)

Lieutenant Colonel Satoru Anabuki 穴吹 智, Anabuki Satoru, was depending on the source, the second or third highest-scoring flying ace of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force in World War II, with 39 victories (51 claimed).

Born into a farming family in the Kagawa Prefecture, he graduated high school to take the entrance examination for the Juvenile Flying Soldier School and entered the Tokyo Army Aviation School in April 1938, In Oct 1940, he was enrolled in Tachi'arai flight school in Fukuoka Prefecture graduating in March 1941 in the 6th Juvenile Soldier Course and receiving a promotion to corporal in October. He was assigned to the 3rd Company of the 50th Air Squadron, stationed on Formosa in 1941. With the outbreak of the Pacific War, he fought in the conquest of the Philippines, where he claimed his first victory, a Curtiss P-40, on December 22nd, 1941 flying a Ki-27 aircraft. On February 9th, 1942, he shot down two more.

He returned to Japan with his squadron in Apr 1942, where the squadron was re-equipped with Ki-43 Hayabusa aircraft; Anabuki named his new fighter "Fubuki", partially based on his own surname. In Jun 1942, his squadron was transferred to Burma, where he would see combat over Burma, India, and southwestern China. He was promoted to the rank of sergeant in Dec 1942. On December 20th, 1942, he shot down a Blenheim bomber over Magwe, Burma, the first of many bomber victories. On December 24th, he shot down three British Hurricane fighters in combat over Magwe, Burma. In May 1943, he received a new Ki-43 fighter; he named this new aircraft "Kimikaze" after his wife Kimiko. He was seriously wounded in combat while flying "Kimikaze" over Rangoon, Burma on October 8th, 1943; after initial recuperation, he was transferred to the Akeno Army Flying School in Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan in Feb 1944.

In late 1944, after being cleared to fly once again, he shot down four US F6F Hellcat fighters over Takao, Taiwan and the Philippine Islands while ferrying Ki-84 Hayate fighters from Japan southwards. In December 1944, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant major. In the final months of the war, he was an instructor at Akeno with frequent combat assignments; in this role, he scored his 39th and final confirmed victory (53rd claimed victory), a B-29 bomber, over Japan while flying a Ki-100 fighter. After the war, he joined the Police Reserve in 1950, eventually reaching the rank of captain. Later, he joined the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, becoming a helicopter pilot stationed in northeastern Japan; he retired from his military career in 1971 at the rank of lieutenant colonel. He worked for Japan Airlines before retiring in 1984. Many of Anabuki's victory claims during the Burma Campaign have been contested by comparing them to Allied records of lost aircraft on particular occasions. In several cases, there were no records of Allied planes even operating in the area where the claims were made. Anabuki passed away on an unknown date in June of 2005 at the age of 83 years old.

[bijoumikhawal]

*sees a long post from an American comparing Cardassia to the USSR/China* *rolls eyes and keeps scrolling*

[vikkicomics]

Coloured version!

Vincent and his red-tailed hawk Flosshild, concept art for Moth. A young man and his hawk was a very popular subject for portrait paintings in traditional Japanese woodblock art, which leant inspiration for this piece. This is set in Japan, 1907, when the Japan was still employing Prussian officers to modernize their military.

A young man in a pickelhaube visiting a Buddhist temple, as is shown behind him, creates a striking contrast between Pacifist and Militarist symbols, as well as between Eastern and Western aesthetics and philosophies. Both are condemned by the English-speaking establishment, we are permitted to be neither Pacifists, nor Militarists, everything we do now is expected to be motivated by plutocracy.

[nickysfacts]

The onna-musha are a great example of how traditionalism and women empowerment are not always apposing ideas!

🇯🇵🚺🏯

[tmarshconnors]

Franklin D. Roosevelt was warned.

On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour became one of the most infamous events in American history, leading the United States into World War II. However, a lesser-known aspect of this tragic day is the series of warnings that were issued to American military installations in the days leading up to the attack. Ten days before the Japanese planes descended upon Pearl Harbor, both the Army and Navy sent explicit messages warning of imminent war to key locations, including Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, and the Canal Zone. These warnings, unfortunately, were largely ignored by the facilities in Oahu, resulting in catastrophic consequences.

In late November 1941, the increasing tension in the Pacific was palpable. Intelligence gathered by American cryptanalysts indicated that Japan was planning a significant military operation. On November 27, 1941, a "war warning" was sent out by both the War Department and the Navy Department. This warning indicated that a Japanese attack was likely and urged all Pacific commands to take appropriate defensive measures.

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardise your defence."

Similarly, the Navy's communication emphasized the imminence of war and the need for vigilance:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days."

Despite the urgency conveyed in these messages, the response from military facilities in Oahu, where Pearl Harbor is located, was shockingly lax. Several factors contributed to this alarming oversight, including a misinterpretation of the threat's location and a general underestimation of Japan's capabilities and intentions.

Another controversial aspect of the lead-up to Pearl Harbor is the role of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Critics argue that Roosevelt was aware of the impending danger but failed to take adequate steps to prevent the attack. While it is true that Roosevelt had access to intelligence reports indicating a potential threat, the extent to which he understood or acted on this information remains a topic of debate among historians.

Some theorists suggest that Roosevelt might have allowed the attack to happen to galvanize American public opinion in favor of entering World War II. However, most historians dismiss this notion as a conspiracy theory, citing the immense risk and unpredictable consequences of such an action. What is clear, though, is that the warnings from both the Army and Navy were not given the level of attention and urgency they warranted, either by Roosevelt's administration or the military commanders in Hawaii.

The attack on Pearl Harbor had devastating effects, resulting in the deaths of over 2,400 Americans and the loss of numerous ships and aircraft. In the aftermath, numerous investigations sought to understand how such a significant surprise attack could have occurred. These inquiries highlighted the failures in communication, preparedness, and the underestimation of the Japanese threat.

One of the crucial lessons from Pearl Harbor is the importance of heeding intelligence warnings and ensuring that all levels of command understand and act upon them appropriately. The tragedy underscored the need for improved communication and coordination among military and government agencies to prevent such lapses in the future.

The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack serve as a poignant reminder of the consequences of ignoring clear warnings. The messages sent ten days prior to the attack were explicit and direct, yet the failure to act on them resulted in one of the darkest days in American history.

As we remember Pearl Harbour, it is essential to acknowledge the lessons it taught us about vigilance, preparedness, and the critical importance of acting on intelligence to safeguard national security.

[sgtgrunt0331-3]

"We wanted to pull the beach over our heads like a blanket."

On February 19, 1945, U.S. Marines land on the black, volcanic sands of Iwo Jima. For the next 36 days, the Marines fought one of the most ferocious and bloodiest battles in their history.

(Video footage courtesy of the film "To the Shores of Iwo Jima")

[lonestarbattleship]

Combined Fleet Resupplying for the Battle of Leyte Gulf, in Brunei Bay. From left to right, Mogami (最上) in front of Musashi (武蔵), and Chokai (鳥海) in front of Yamato (大和).

Date: October 21, 1944

Colorized by Irootoko Jr: link