#Crown Prince of UAE

[rightnewshindi]

भारत की पहली यात्रा पर आएंगे संयुक्त अरब अमीरात के क्राउन प्रिंस, पीएम मोदी ने दिया था निमंत्रण

भारत की पहली यात्रा पर आएंगे संयुक्त अरब अमीरात के क्राउन प्रिंस, पीएम मोदी ने दिया था निमंत्रण #news #viral #trending #update #newspaper #breakingnews #currentaffairs #dailynews #newsletter #newspapers #newsupdate #People #Media #info #Journalism #Press

Delhi News: संयुक्त अरब अमीरात के क्राउन प्रिंस शेख खालिद बिन मोहम्मद बिन जायद अल नाहयान अगल�� हफ्ते भारत की 2 दिवसीय यात्रा पर आने वाले हैं। कुछ महीने पहले उन्हें प्रधानमंत्री नरेंद्र मोदी ने भारत आने का निमंत्रण दिया था। अबू धाबी के क्राउन प्रिंस शेख खालिद बिन मोहम्मद बिन जायद अल नाहयान ने पीएम मोदी के निमंत्रण को स्वीकार कर लिया है। अब वह आगामी 9-10 सितंबर को भारत की आधिकारिक यात्रा…

[hamdan-fazza]

Fazza 14.02.2025

Sheikh Hamdan, Crown Prince of Dubai, attended the reception hosted by the family of Ahmed Mohammed bin Sheikh Mejren, marking the marriage of his son Rashid to the daughter of Saeed Ahmed bin Sheikh Mejren, in Dubai.

[kazifatagar]

Najib asked UAE crown prince to help clear step son Riza Aziz’s name

Datuk Seri Najib Razak admitted in court to seeking help from the UAE’s then crown prince, Sheikh Mohamed Zayed Al-Nahyan, to clear his stepson Riza Aziz of allegations linked to 1MDB funds. Transcripts of 2016 phone calls revealed Najib making a personal request for the crown prince to facilitate a loan agreement to legitimize the funds Riza used for filmmaking, following the US Department of…

[groupfazza]

شهد سمو الشيخ حمدان بن محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم، ولي عهد دبي نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء وزير الدفاع، جانباً من منافسات اليوم الثاني من النسخة السادسة من "ألعاب دبي" التي تقام بمشاركة 244 فريقاً من مختلف أنحاء العالم.

His Highness Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Crown Prince of Dubai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the UAE, attends part of the thrilling competitions on the second day of the sixth edition of DUBAI GAMES.

Friday, 21 February 2025 الجمعه

[mariacallous]

Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza—and the assassinations, tanker wars, and drone attacks it has provoked throughout the broader Middle East—means the Gulf states are on edge. As the U.S. election approaches, the region’s two powerhouses—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—might be expected to lean toward stability in the form of Vice President Kamala Harris, the Democratic nominee for president. But Harris’s policies may not bring the sort of stability that they desire.

Harris is likely to take a tougher stance on the conflicts in Sudan and Yemen and engage diplomatically with Iran, positions that are at odds with the two Gulf states’ geopolitical aspirations. Both countries, therefore, would likely prefer to see former President Donald Trump return to the White House. Trump’s transactional approach to diplomacy and disregard for political norms were vital to amplifying both Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s regional power.

This preference reflects a deeper strategic calculation. Under Trump’s previous administration, the Gulf states enjoyed unprecedented levels of U.S. support, including via arms deals and Washington’s hard-line stance against Iran. Harris’s expected approach to U.S. foreign policy presents a stark contrast. Although the Biden administration has maintained some tough positions on Iran, they are no match for the Trump era.

Harris would likely revive diplomatic engagements from the era of former President Barack Obama, shifting away from aggressive policies that have favored the Gulf states’ strategic objectives. The vice president argued in 2019, when she was a U.S. senator, that she would return to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal that Trump withdrew from, and that she would take whatever action was necessary to counteract Iran and its proxies and defend U.S. troops stationed in the region. Biden made a similar pledge during his 2020 presidential campaign, but the negotiations stalled for a variety of reasons.

Harris generally favors a more diplomatic and multilateral approach to regional dilemmas. Trump, by contrast, closely aligned himself with Gulf interests while in office, particularly on Iran and Yemen. In a potential second Trump presidency, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi see an opportunity to further bolster their regional ambitions.

Under Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began negotiating a megadeal with the United States. It would establish a security pact, civilian nuclear cooperation, and defense cooperation—including arms sales—between the two countries.

There was a catch, however: Saudi Arabia would have to normalize ties with Israel, contingent on significant progress toward Palestinian statehood. Those talks have been hampered by the ongoing war in Gaza.

While it has been referred to by commentators as a NATO-style agreement, the proposed pact is more similar to the defense treaty that the United States has with Japan. Unlike NATO’s Article 5, this deal stops short of guaranteeing an automatic U.S. military action in the event of an attack, allowing Washington some discretion in how much support it gives Saudi Arabia.

By all accounts, Harris is more likely to limit the scope of U.S. security commitments to Riyadh—and adhere to established regulations—than Trump. In 2019, during Trump’s administration, Saudi Arabia suffered an attack on two Aramco oil installations. In response, the United States deployed additional troops, missile defense systems, and radar equipment to Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman is convinced that Trump’s willingness to provide unconditional support for Saudi security interests makes a formalized deal with the United States more feasible, even if the two-state solution remains a sticking point.

The Saudi crown prince seeks a military edge over his regional neighbors. The defense component of the agreement aims to bolster U.S.-Saudi military ties through joint training, advisory programs, and increased arms sales. Riyadh is keen to secure advanced air defense systems to counter drone and missile threats from regional adversaries, particularly Iran and its so-called axis of resistance.

Trump has a track record of delivering: In 2017, his administration facilitated a major arms deal with Riyadh, potentially worth $110 billion. This move may have significantly bolstered Saudi military capabilities and regional dominance. (Some analysts have argued that this figure was exaggerated, noting that much of the package consisted of informal letters of intent or interest rather than contracts.)

In 2021, by contrast, Biden froze military sales to Saudi Arabia as part of a broader reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations, citing concerns over the “humanitarian and strategic catastrophe” in Yemen. While military sales were restarted in 2024, with Washington citing escalating regional threats from Iran and Houthi forces, analysts have argued that Harris may impose greater scrutiny on arms sales to Riyadh, given her votes against Saudi arms sales while in the Senate.

Saudi Arabia also has nuclear ambitions—and the deal seeks to advance Riyadh’s goal of building a civilian nuclear program, akin to Iran’s. But the U.S. Senate and the international community have expressed concerns that the kingdom could eventually use that technology and infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons.

These fears are not unfounded: Mohammed bin Salman has explicitly argued that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would follow suit.

During the Trump presidency, however, members of the administration and U.S.-based nuclear firm Westinghouse are alleged to have held private negotiations with Saudi Arabia with minimal oversight, according to a report published in 2019 by Democrats in the House of Representatives. This signaled that Trump might be willing to assist Riyadh in developing nuclear infrastructure.

While Riyadh has always seen Tehran as its major regional threat, it was Mohammed bin Salman who advanced an explicitly aggressive and confrontational position against Iran. Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and new punitive measures significantly dented Iran’s economy; he positioned his administration as a key ally in curbing Iran’s regional influence.

Although Saudi Arabia and Iran have enjoyed official détente since 2023 thanks to a deal that China sponsored, Riyadh still perceives Tehran as the most significant threat to its security and regional ambitions. Harris’s signaling that she is willing to restart talks with Tehran and rejoin the nuclear deal may pose a strategic concern and dilemma for Riyadh—and could also reignite fears among Gulf countries of Iranian regional dominance.

The UAE’s preference for Trump is rooted in Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s diplomatic, security, and geopolitical considerations. Abu Dhabi’s strategic goals include gaining a military advantage over its neighbors—something that the Trump administration assisted the country with in the past.

In 2020, under Trump, the UAE became a signatory to the Abraham Accords, enhancing its diplomatic and economic clout. By 2022, bilateral trade with Israel had exceeded $2.5 billion, covering various sectors such as technology, agriculture, defense, and health care. Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Israel has proved useful in its quest to diversify its economy. Since its signing, the UAE has fostered collaborations with Israeli firms dealing in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, financial technology, and renewable energy.

As part of Trump’s efforts to get the UAE to sign the Abraham Accords, he promised to sell the country F-35 fighter jets; Abu Dhabi expected that its military capabilities would experience a boost as a result. But Biden initially froze the sale due to regional security concerns and human rights issues. The freeze was lifted in April 2021 after a review.

Under Harris, this deal may face further delays or stricter conditions, particularly given the UAE’s involvement in conflicts in Yemen and Libya, and more recently, Sudan.

In Sudan, the UAE is supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, possibly in collaboration with Russia, in the militia’s war against the Sudanese government. With Trump expected to adopt a more lenient stance toward Moscow, this Emirati-Russia cooperation may continue to flourish.

Meanwhile, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, the UAE has been developing military and port infrastructure, including the controversial Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This deal, which granted landlocked Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s coastline, has sparked outrage from the Somali government and escalated regional tensions. It has also contributed to the formation of an anti-Ethiopian “axis”; Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia recently formalized a security partnership aimed at countering Ethiopia’s growing influence.

Under Trump, Abu Dhabi pursued its ambitions with little interference, benefiting from the former U.S. president’s transactional foreign policy, which prioritized economic deals over political concerns. Biden, by contrast, has criticized the Saudi-led coalition, and in his first foreign-policy speech as president, he signaled that his administration would be “ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales” in Yemen.

During a second Trump presidency, Abu Dhabi would have greater leeway to pursue its new goals.

Palestine remains the central political issue in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and managing this file—particularly the future of Gaza—could allow Abu Dhabi to overshadow Riyadh as a leading Islamic power, at least as long as a U.S.-brokered deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains elusive.

During the Gaza war, the UAE has supplied humanitarian aid to civilians and pushed for a cease-fire at the U.N. Security Council. Abu Dhabi has also advocated for a two-state solution while also balancing its Abraham Accords commitments with Israel, such as increasing trade and establishing a land corridor to bypass the Houthis’ attacks on ships in the Red Sea.

Although both Saudi Arabia and the UAE may prefer Trump over Harris, he could also heighten the rivalry between the two states. Trump’s transactional foreign policy tends to be superficial—and it often overlooks the underlying tensions between countries.

While Saudi Arabia and the UAE each stand to gain militarily and economically under Trump, their competition could intensify if one secures a closer relationship with Washington, potentially shifting the regional balance of power and complicating U.S. relations with both nations.

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Brazil, UAE sign MoU to collaborate on mining

The Brazilian minister of mines and energy, Alexandre Silveira, signed a memorandum of understanding for mining development and investments.

The minister of mines and energy of Brazil, Alexandre Silveira, signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, with the UAE’s minister of investments, Mohamed Hassan Alsuwaidi, for research and development and investments in the mineral sector (including oil and mining) in both countries, the UAE state news agency WAM reported on Friday (10).

The MoU aims to support mutual investments in mineral exploration and development, as well as research, and workforce education and training in technical fields. According to information from WAM, the MoU builds on the discussions during a meeting between the crown prince and chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, held last November in Brazil.

Following the signing, Alsuwaidi said the MoU “is a milestone in enhancing [Brazil-UAE] cooperation in the mining sector.” Silveira said, “In an increasingly interconnected world, such robust international collaborations are essential to ensure responsible resource management while fostering economic growth.”

During the signing, Silveira also met with the crown prince of the UAE. During the meeting, discussions focused on ways to enhance economic relations between the two nations, particularly in sectors such as energy and mineral exploration.

Continue reading.

[hamdanfazzasheik]

Prince hamdan fazza from United Arab Emirates Dubai UAE crown prince 🇦🇪🇦🇪🇦🇪

[jordanianroyals]

11 December 2024: The situation in Syria and current regional developments were at the top of the agenda of King Abdullah II’s meeting in Abu Dhabi with United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

The two leaders affirmed their shared views on respecting the choices of the Syrian people and safeguarding Syria’s security, stability, territorial integrity, and national institutions, stressing that Syria’s stability is a strategic Arab and regional interest.

During the meeting in Abu Dhabi, attended by Crown Prince Hussein, His Majesty reaffirmed the need to stop the Israeli war on Gaza and bolster the humanitarian response.

The King reiterated that the continuation of the war on Gaza prevents reaching comprehensive calm, calling for creating a political horizon for the Palestinian issue, on the basis of the two-state solution. Turning to the situation in Lebanon, His Majesty called for exerting utmost efforts to ensure the success of the ceasefire.

The King noted the importance of the UAE's efforts, led by Sheikh Mohamed, in supporting regional stability and preventing the expansion of conflict.

The meeting also covered the deep-rooted ties between the two countries and peoples, as well as keenness to expand prospects for cooperation across all fields.

Earlier, His Majesty was received at Al Bateen Executive Airport in Abu Dhabi by Sheikh Mohamed, Jordan’s Ambassador to the UAE Nassar Habashneh, and a number of senior officials, who were also there to bid the King farewell.

[desertcrowns]

Happy Birthday to Sheikh Hamdan Bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum

Born on 14th November 1982, Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, is the second son of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice-President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, and Sheikha Hind bint Maktoum bin Juma

[dzthenerd490]

News Post

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TW - R4PE mention, S4xual Ass4ult

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Palestine

Israel attacks school sheltering displaced Palestinians in Gaza | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera

Europeans, Arab and Muslim nations launch new initiative for independent Palestinian state | AP News

Saudi crown prince said he personally 'doesn't care' about Palestinian issue | Middle East Eye

Posting pro-Palestine slogans may prevent German citizenship - The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)

Ukraine

Zelensky gives his Ukraine 'victory plan' a hard sell in the US - did the pitch fall flat? (bbc.com)

Has Russia’s military improved enough to take on NATO? | Russia-Ukraine war | Al Jazeera

Ukraine said it struck a Russian ammo depot with long-range drones right after Iranian missiles arrived there (yahoo.com)

Volodymyr Zelensky says his latest US trip 'saved bipartisan support of Ukraine'  (thehill.com)

Sudan

Sudan becoming ‘fertile ground’ for jihadis, says ex-prime minister (ft.com)

Sudan war: ‘R*** me, not my daughters' - Women narrate Sudan's horrific war - BBC News Pidgin

Sudan army general visits key battleground north of Khartoum as fighting eases - Sudan Tribune

Sudan military denies targeting UAE diplomatic post in Khartoum | Conflict News | Al Jazeera

Lebanon

Live updates: Israel-Hezbollah war, strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen | CNN

Hezbollah deputy delivers defiant message following killing of Nasrallah | Israel-Lebanon attacks News | Al Jazeera

What is Hezbollah and why is Israel attacking Lebanon? (bbc.com)

What happened in Lebanon and why is Israel attacking Hezbollah? | CNN

Other

Israeli forces kill dozens across Gaza as tanks advance deeper into Rafah | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera

Rwanda's army and an armed group shelled displaced people camps in Congo, rights group says | AP News

What to know about the humanitarian crisis in Democratic Republic of the Congo - CBS News

A child bride won the right to divorce - now the Taliban say it doesn't count (bbc.com)

How the Taliban’s new ‘vice and virtue’ law erases women by justifying violence against them (theconversation.com)

Afghanistan: Taliban impose new restrictions on media – DW – 09/27/2024

Somalia's PM to Ethiopia: Somalia has 'rights to defend its territorial integrity' | Africanews

Meskel in Ethiopia: Festival fires burn bright despite downpour (bbc.com)

Myanmar rebels reject embattled junta's peace offer (bbc.com)

Myanmar's opposition rejects a military appeal for talks on a political solution to armed conflict | AP News

Morocco brings together Sahel countries in New York (yabiladi.com)

Three Sahel Military Juntas Sign Satellite Deal With Russia (thedefensepost.com)

[coldwellbankerswap]

On this special day, Coldwell Banker Swap Real Estate wishes our Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum a very Happy Birthday!

ColdwellBankerSwap #ColdwellBankerUAE #ColdwellBanker #dubai #mydubai #uae #fazza #faz3 #dxb #almaktoum #dubaiprince #mrm #princeofdubai #princehamdan #royalfamily #sheikhhamdan #crownprinceofdubai #fazzafans #princefazza

[rightnewshindi]

सऊदी के क्राउन प्रिंस मोहम्मद बिन सलमान को सता रहा हत्या के डर, जानें क्यों अमेरिका के सामने व्यक्त की चिंता

Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman: सऊदी अरब के शासक और क्राउन प्रिंस मोहम्मद बिन सलमान (MBS) ने अपनी सुरक्षा को लेकर चिंता जाहिर की है। पोलिटिको की एक हालिया रिपोर्ट के अनुसार, एमबीएस ने अमेरिका के सामने अपनी जान की खतरे की आशंका जताया है। उन्होंने यह चिंता खासतौर पर इजरायल के साथ संबंधों को सामान्य बनाने की अमेरिका की योजना के संदर्भ में व्यक्त की है। MBS को क्यों सता रहा है जान के…

[hamdan-fazza]

Sheikh Hamdan / فزاع FAZZA /approves ‘Therme Dubai’ project, world’s tallest resort in Zabeel Park

[howieabel]

'Among the most brutal aspects of this period for Palestinians have been the loss of support for their cause in neighboring Arab states. The Arab political party in Israel, Balad, said that by signing this pact, “the UAE has officially joined Israel against Palestine, and placed itself in the camp of the enemies of the Palestinian people.” The UAE’s change from supporting Palestinian dignity and freedom to supporting Israel’s never-ending occupation is a calculated move by UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, a shrewd Middle East dictator who uses his country’s military and financial resources to thwart moves towards democracy and respect for human rights under the guise of fighting Islamic terrorism.' - Medea Benjamin in The Deceptive Trump, UAE-Israel ‘Peace Deal’, Consortium News, (14 August 2020)

[groupfazza]

التقى سموّ الشيخ حمدان بن محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم، ولي عهد دبي، نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء وزير الدفاع، اليوم الاثنين، معالي الشيخ عبدالله علي عبدالله الصباح، وزير الدفاع بدولة الكويت الشقيقة، وذلك على هامش أعمال معرض الدفاع الدولي آيدكس 2025 مع انطلاق دورته السابعة عشرة في أبوظبي.

H.H. Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Crown Prince of Dubai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the UAE, today met with Sheikh Abdullah Ali Abdullah Al-Sabah, Minister of Defence of Kuwait, on the sidelines of the 17th edition of the International Defence Exhibition (IDEX 2025) in Abu Dhabi.

Monday, 17 February 2025 الأثنين

[mariacallous]

Fighting in Sudan, now in its third month, shows no signs of abating. The country’s two rival generals have flouted multiple cease-fires as they vie for control. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who first gained power after the 2019 ousting of longtime Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir and later cemented his position in a 2021 coup, is fighting Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, who heads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Under Bashir, Hemeti led the RSF (formerly known as the janjaweed) alongside Burhan’s army in Darfur. After a so-called Sovereign Council was formed following the 2021 coup, Hemeti stepped in as Burhan’s deputy. However, their relationship became turbulent as both generals squabbled over power and how to merge the RSF into the Sudanese military. The clashes—which began on April 15—have so far resulted in hefty humanitarian costs, with more than 3,000 people dead and some 2.1 million internally displaced.

But the conflict between Burhan and Hemeti is not just a domestic squabble. Sudan is a bridge that links the Middle East and Africa, and its abundant natural resources mean the battle for Khartoum has taken on a regional dimension. Gulf heavyweights Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates view the war as a chance to cement their hegemonic status in the Middle East. While Saudi Arabia supports Burhan, the UAE has backed Hemeti.

Given Burhan’s international legitimacy, the chances of an RSF victory over the Sudanese military are slim. More likely is that Burhan and Hemeti establish rival spheres of control in Sudan that mimic the situation in Libya, where an ongoing rivalry between various political and military factions has created a fragmented state with multiple centers of power. In such a scenario, the RSF would be a thorn in the side of Burhan and his external benefactors—giving the UAE added leverage in the country’s future and helping to cement Abu Dhabi as the emerging preeminent power in the Gulf.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—both members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—have been ostensible allies for decades. But their relationship has always featured a hint of competition for regional primacy that is now escalating.

For a long time, tensions within the Middle East required Saudi Arabia and the UAE to prioritize partnership over competition. Now, as Riyadh normalizes ties with its archrival Tehran—and appears be to mediating in Lebanon, Syria, as well as among feuding Palestinian political parties—Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has taken his rivalry with the UAE up a notch.

Geopolitical changes have been buttressed by economic ones. In recent years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE focused on diversifying their economies away from oil, forging more prominent regional and international roles in aviation, sports, infrastructure, and other areas. Riyadh under Mohammed bin Salman has shifted from an identity dominated by Islam to hypernationalism, while Abu Dhabi under President Mohammed bin Zayed has adopted a cultural policy that promotes more religious diversity and acceptance.

Abu Dhabi and Riyadh began butting heads in 2009, when they disagreed over where to locate the GCC’s proposed central bank, which would have promoted a more unified Gulf economy and a common currency. The council agreed that the UAE would house the bank, only for Riyadh to pull out of the plan at the last minute without explanation. Neither the bank nor the currency has since come to fruition. Instead, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have bubbled to the surface—sometimes violently by proxy.

The UAE is considered a partner in Saudi Arabia’s ongoing war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. But since the conflict began in 2015, Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s objectives gradually diverged, as Riyadh supported the internationally recognized government of Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, while Abu Dhabi opted to back the Southern Transitional Council. This gave the UAE control over many of Yemen’s ports and islands—and therefore access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Horn of Africa.

In 2019, fierce clashes broke out between the Southern Transitional Council and Hadi’s forces in a bid to control the port city of Aden. But the Saudi-Emirati rivalry in Yemen was not limited to ports. Reports leaked to Al Jazeera in 2018 showed that Riyadh had planned to construct a pipeline transporting Saudi oil to the Yemeni seaport of Nishtun on the border with Oman, which would have reduced the risk of any Iranian threats by bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The project would have undermined the UAE’s key position in oil and gas transportation and given the kingdom more control within OPEC.

Outside the Middle East, Washington has also become a key venue for Saudi-Emirati competition. The rise of Mohammed bin Salman—who U.S. intelligence concluded ordered the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi—has caused the relationship between Riyadh and U.S. policymakers to become frosty in recent years. This gave the UAE a golden opportunity to replace Riyadh as Washington’s favorite Gulf military ally.

Abu Dhabi’s standing was only bolstered when it signed the U.S.-sponsored Abraham Accords to normalize ties with Israel in 2020. (The United States is currently promoting Saudi-Israeli normalization, to little bite from Riyadh so far.) While the United States suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia over the war in Yemen, the Trump administration chose to supply its most advanced fighter jet, the F-35, to the UAE—although the Biden administration paused the sale for review. If the deal goes through, it would make the UAE the first Arab country to receive the plane.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expanded their competition to Africa—and resource-rich, strategically located Sudan in particular.

Gulf countries have played a significant role in Sudan since Bashir’s ouster. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh immediately funded the Transitional Military Council, the junta that took over, with $3 billion worth of aid. At the time, Saudi and Emirati interests in Sudan were generally aligned, and both helped play a role in the country’s short-lived democratic transition. Both states also extracted concessions from Khartoum: Sudan provided military support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen, and the UAE mediated Khartoum’s accession to the Abraham Accords.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also long invested in Sudan’s economy. As of 2018, Abu Dhabi had cumulatively invested $7.6 billion in the country. Since Bashir fell, the UAE has added another $6 billion worth of investments that include agricultural projects and a Red Sea port. In October 2022, Riyadh announced that it would invest up to $24 billion in sectors of Sudan’s economy including infrastructure, mining, and agriculture.

As emerging Middle East hegemons, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are now at odds—each seeking to control Sudan’s resources, energy, and logistics gateways by aligning with Burhan and Hemeti, respectively. While their interests in the country initially aligned—particularly when Bashir remained neutral during the Saudi-Emirati blockade on their foe Qatar—Burhan has since sought to thaw relations with Doha. The UAE gained trust in Hemeti because RSF fighters had been active in southern Yemen since 2015 and in 2019 expanded to Libya to back Gen. Khalifa Haftar, one of the country’s rival leaders who is backed by Abu Dhabi.

While Saudi Arabia has cooperated with Egypt in supporting Burhan, the UAE has collaborated with Russia in supporting the RSF through the paramilitary Wagner Group. The Wagner Group has been active in Sudan since 2017, when it signed contracts with the country’s resource ministry for projects in Darfur, where the RSF was active. Wagner in 2019 became active in Libya, fighting on behalf of Haftar. (After Wagner’s failed mutiny in Russia last month, its future is uncertain, though reports suggest the group is still operating “as usual” in the many countries where it is active.)

Abu Dhabi has kept silent about its alliance with the RSF. But reports suggest Hemeti has acted as a custodian of Emirati interests in Sudan, guarding gold mines controlled by Wagner; gold from these mines is then shipped to the UAE en route to Russia. The three-way relationship between the UAE, the RSF, and Russia via the Wagner Group was cemented by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow became more dependent on gold and other finances to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The U.S. Treasury Department recently sanctioned two firms associated with Hemeti that operate in the gold industry, Al Junaid and Tradive. They are based in Sudan and the UAE. (Treasury also sanctioned two defense companies associated with Burhan.)

While the UAE has been fighting for gold, Saudi Arabia has worked tirelessly to brand itself as a peacemaker and humanitarian in Sudan. Riyadh has sponsored cease-fire talks with the United States in the Saudi city of Jeddah, provided aid to the Sudanese people both inside and outside the country, and helped evacuate many civilians out of Khartoum. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi—a Saudi ally—has also provided aid to the Sudanese military, particularly air support, in its bid to regain full control of the state.

Analysts have suggested that Egypt may be considering a full-scale invasion of Sudan in a bid to help Burhan fight the RSF. This would ensure that Saudi investments in Sudan are protected and also expand Riyadh’s influence into Africa. But, as Mahmoud Salem recently wrote in Foreign Policy, Egypt finds itself in a Catch-22: Cairo “does not have the resources or the desire to fight a war, yet it cannot afford to ignore the situation any longer.”

The fall of Sudan under the control of either Burhan or Hemeti—and thereby either the Saudi or Emirati sphere of influence—would shift the balance of power in the Gulf and escalate tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. But it is unlikely that the outcome of the war will be this clear-cut: Similar to Libya, Sudan is likely to fracture even further, perhaps along ethnic and tribal lines.

The conflict in Sudan is an opportunity for both Saudi Arabia and the UAE to expand their regional presence—and control. For Riyadh, a total victory for the Sudanese military would reinforce its stature as a leader in Arab and Islamic worlds. For the UAE, any RSF gains create leverage to weaken Riyadh’s grip over the Middle East—which would be a win for Abu Dhabi.