#Because you have intrinsic value as a human being just by virtue of existing

[bisexual-horror-fan]

hey bex! i haven’t been using tumblr a lot lately but i am having a little thing that’s bothering me and idk who to talk to. i hope this doesn’t sound stupid but i am (very sure) i am asexual. i do not really want to do anything with another person. but sometimes i feel like a have a month or something that i feel like i am in heat. and feel the need to do something about it myself. which i know is a normal thing to do that yourself but sometimes i even feel bad about doing that. i’m very just lost and i feel like if i do that then i’m fake when i call myself asexual. (also i am a 25 year old female if you were wondering about who sent this)

(also reminder that i think you are very swell and i love this blog and i need to catch up on anything you have written while i haven’t been on this app.)

- 🥶

Well, hey there Ice. Glad you came to me here with this, I love being able to provide support and care when I can. Now, having those wants and urges is totally natural and you wanting to get down with yourself is perfectly fine. It does not make you a fake asexual because it is all a spectrum but also, asexuality is a lack of sexual attraction to people, that is what defines it, not libido. There are ace people in relationships, ace people who have sex and enjoy it and masturbation, ace people who read smut, engage in kink and get genuine pleasure and enjoyment out of it, and this doesn't mean they are any less ace.

I consider myself heavily aromantic in many respects, but I'm married, in a committed, long term, almost eleven year romantic relationship with my husband, doesn't mean I am still not aromantic because I have an exception in my husband.

Just remind yourself that you are allowed to do what you want with your own body, you are allowed to enjoy it to the fullest, you have permission to explore and feel good and experience pleasure. And also, keep in mind, our titles, sexualities, romantic orientations, they are meant to be helpful, not harmful and also, not rigid. We change, we expand, we grow throughout our life times, we gain and shed labels all the time and there is nothing wrong with that. It doesn't mean that you weren't what you said you were at that point, it could very well have been true at one point, and you grow past it at another.

This is totally cornball, but I love it, the moon has phases, and we still think it is valid and respect the moon, why can't you, a living, growing, changing person, also be respected during all your different phases?

Be kind and be gentle to yourself, please. Remember, more often than not we are our own harshest critics.

[mousemilf]

i feel like seeing the world through actions rather than character seems like you're subconsciously distant and dissociated from yourself; as though some deep-seated insecurity or anxiety about an inherent personality trait means that you place value specifically on behavior and not personality.

for example, is a person artistic simply because they make art, or are they compelled to make art because they have this specific inexplicable draw and desire to do so? would someone who was not innately kind or interested in being kind "do" kind things?

which innate trait were you born with that drives you to assume that different opinions must stem from a psychological issue?

anyway, no, i am not innately artistic. nobody (or everybody, which is essentially the same thing) is. i bothers me that we treat art as so much more sacred than other human activities. would you say the same about someone whos hobby is collecting funko pops? are they driven by an inexplicable desire to collect shit figurines?

making art is something i know how to do. its a skill ive acquired, like cooking or driving a car. to attribute it to an innate talent would be to erase the years of study and practice ive put in. if its more initially rewarding because i have any natural advantage, it might be that i have pretty good fine motor skills, but thats a neutral physical trait like my height or weight, which i dont glean any meaningful identity from either. but maybe that initial aptitude led to more satisfaction, encouragement etc which has naturally caused me to think about art more than someone who did not start with that immediate small advantage.

ive had the privilege of teaching hobby painting classes to people who are not skilled and would not consider themselves "artistic," and everybodys reactions when they learn a new technique and make something they thought they couldnt is proof to me that art making is rewarding to *everybody,* not just a special class of divinely ordained creatives. i fundamentally do not believe that i am unique for finding art fulfilling. it feels good to make stuff. thats just human.

as far as kindness goes, if there are intrinsically kind people, it would follow that there are intrinsically unkind people, right? people who are born without kindness as an innate trait... so then what would be the point of trying to rehabilitate people whove committed violent crimes? if they dont have that inherent drive for kindness that innately kind people do, then it would be hopeless, right?

if we can neatly divide people into categorically kind and categorically unkind people i guess it would be much easier for us kind people (im at least flattered that you assume id be on that side of the dichotomy) to like, just be confident that we are morally in the right and not ever have to question the actual impact of our behavior since our intentions are good by virtue of this innate trait we were born with. sure whatever.

assigning importance to intentions and feelings rather than actions and their impact is like very yuckydisgusting to me. like i said in my reblog right before this, if kind thoughts were enough to make someone a kind person, then negative thoughts would be enough to make someone a bad person. silly and obviously wrong. i've fantasized about all kinds of destructive actions, but it literally does not matter at all, the only important thing is my choice not to act on those fantasies.

wanting or trying to be a kind person does not make someone a kind person. some of the nastiest motherfuckers ive ever met were constantly agonizing over whether they were a good person and looking for reassurance that they hadnt done wrong. yet they continued to act selfishly and harm people around them. their desire to be kind did jack shit.

but yeah, i do place value specifically on behavior because thats the only part of personality that meaningfully exists to literally anybody outside of your brain. basically. i think thats the main point of all of this.

[operahousebookworm]

"I know my parent is consistently horrible, but my kid deserves a relationship with their grandparent" no, your kid deserves a relationship with a warm, loving, supportive elder, and your horrible parent has already destroyed the chances of their being that person by not being that person. Shitty people carry on being shitty because people feel obligated to keep them around no matter what. Don't buy into it. They might be capable of change, but they're never gonna start down that road until there are actual, palpable consequences for being shitty.

The real question is, why do you think having a relationship with a grandparent is an intrinsic good? What do you hope your kid gets out of it?

If it's just another loving adult in their life, there are plenty of candidates! Family is what you make.

If it's a connection with their heritage, there are other ways to do that. Look for other members of that community, education groups, resources, local events, etc. Maybe that means you need to reconnect to that heritage so you can be that person for your kid yourself.

If it's a way to give them a mentor who can provide a perspective from a previous generation, other people of that generation exist. Maybe you already know them, maybe you can encourage your kid to volunteer in places where they can connect with those folks. (Or volunteer with your kid, my mom did that with us a lot.)

If it's because you're determined to retain your own relationship with your parent and you think their role as a grandparent is part of that, no. Relationships aren't transitive, and your obligation to protect and nurture your child far outweighs any obligation you may feel to that parent. If your parent doesn't want a relationship with you unless they can also have one with the kid, then I'm so sorry, but they don't want a relationship with you, and it's going to be up to you to sort through the feelings that brings up.

If it's just a vague sense that this is the way things "should" be, also no. Western societal pressures around family structures turn out to be really bad for the development of a functional and emotionally healthy human person, actually. Plenty of people do not have their grandparents in their lives for whatever reason. Grandparents are not a value-add by virtue of existing. They can enrich a child's life by acting in ways that enrich a child's life, no more and no less. If you wouldn't want your kid around this person if there were no familial connection, your kid should not be around this person. Putting that into practice may be hard as hell, but the core truth really is that simple.

[missfay49]

Who is Orange?

Disclaimer: Please enjoy?  Accept?  Beware?  This… Thing that started out as character analysis and turned into a deranged fanfic, because I experienced a literal revelation mid-way through free writing.  I did not clean this up much because I’m still reeling from the theory implications myself.  I cursed a lot.

~

What does Orange Side represent?

What do we know?

Orange is a “Dark Side”, defined as being one of the Sides hidden from C!Thomas.

The other Hidden Sides were Janus, Remus, and Virgil.

All the Hidden Sides were hidden due to a key aspect of their character that C!Thomas had to first acknowledge and then accept.  Virgil required C!Thomas to acknowledge that he had heightened anxiety and accept that anxiety isn’t inherently wrong, just a different form of information that can be processed.  Remus required C!Thomas to acknowledge that he had intrusive thoughts and accept that those thoughts don’t make him evil; they’re just thoughts.  Janus required C!Thomas to acknowledge that he was capable of lying and accept that acting “selfishly” sometimes isn’t just okay, but actually critically important to managing stress.

 What are the common themes here?  

Confronting the reality about ourselves instead of pretending some traits don’t exist.

Understanding ourselves to be more complex than ‘good’ and ‘evil’.

Addressing mental health.  

Orange Side is still hidden, but we can expect him to be something C!Thomas doesn’t want to (or isn’t ready to) acknowledge.  Something that would be difficult to accept about oneself.  All Hidden Sides fall under the jurisdiction of Janus, so let’s take another look at him.

In “Can Lying Be Good?” we get a lot of information about what Janus’ purpose is:

Roman: It you really don’t want to know something, he… can keep our mouths shut.

Logan: You don’t want to believe it.  That’s where his power comes from.  Things that you want to believe.  Things that you wish were true.  And things that you wish weren’t.

Deceit: What you don’t know can’t hurt you.

This all means that Orange Side is something that would cause C!Thomas distress to learn and something he subconsciously wishes weren’t true.  This is not new information to most of you: the spin-off interpretations of Apathy and Pride are widely popular fandom theories, traits that are typically viewed as negative in large doses.

But the Hidden Sides being seen as something negative isn’t their only defining characteristic.  They typically involve an aspect a mental health, involve societal expectations, and... what is it...

Janus is the umbrella over all the other Hidden Sides, sheltering and obscuring them from view. He is the gatekeeper in a very literal sense.  What is he gatekeeping?  

What is it?  What is it what is it, why?  What does he do?  What seems bad but isn’t?  What can he do?  What issue is actually useful?  What’s useful what’s useful WHATS USEFUL WHATS USEFUL?!  WHY DOES IT HAVE TO USEFUL?

shitshitSHITSHISTHISTSTs

I KEPT ASKING MYSELF, WHAT’S USEFUL?  WHAT TRAIT COULD IT BE THAT APPEARS BAD, BUT ISN’T BAD, IS ACTUALLY USEFUL.  ANIEXTY WAS OKAY BECAUSE HE WAS JUST LOOKING OUT FOR US.  LYING WAS OKAY BECAUSE HE JUST WANTED TO PUT C!THOMAS FIRST.  INTRUSIVE CREATIVITY WAS OKAY BECAUSE DARK IDEAS OPEN UP NEW PATHS.

But the whole GODDAMN POINT is ACCEPTANCE!  

You don’t HAVE to be useful to be accepted.  You – yuo just BE.  YOU BE!

PEOPLE don’t have to prove their Usefulness to you before you can treat them with respect.  Our WORTH does not depend on what we PRODUCE. YE GODS, THE COGNITIVE DISSONANCE I JUST BROKE-

~~~

C!Thomas comes back from his self-care stay-cation.  He’s ready to start production, he is rested and refreshed.  BUT JUST LIKE EVERY PREVIOUS DILEMMA, it isn’t Good enough, Original enough, Fast enough.  He’s done everything right, why is it still wrong?  He’s accepted his anxiety, he’s accepted that things aren’t just black and white, he’s Accepted That It’s OKAY to have Dark Thoughts, he Has ACCEPTED SELF_CARE.  Why Isn’t IT ENOUGH?!

“Fuck it.”  

C!Thomas spins in his chair, looking at a man that looks just like him, but not quite.

“What?”

“Fuck it.  Fuck them.”

“You sound like Remus,” Thomas jokes.  He’s lying, of course.  He’s nervous. The Side looks like a normal guy, but something about him is unsettling.  The unidentified Side just presses his lips together, unimpressed.

“Um, ef w-who, exactly?” Thomas asks, but part of him already knows.

“All of them.  Every person who isn’t you.  Every person who expects something from you.”

“Now, you sound like Janus.” Thomas looks back at the computer screen, but the Side’s retort has him spinning around again.  

“Janus is a short-sighted pseudo-rebellious minion of a capitalistic society, just like the rest of them.”

“Uh, excuse me?!”

“Isn’t it obvious? They’re all obsessed with Success. Whether they want to play by the rules, or manipulate them, or break them, whether it’s making money or pumping out good deeds, they’re still just trying to make you be successful within the framework of a system that prioritizes production over a human life.”

Thomas just stares for a moment before he can find his voice.

“Who are you?”

“Dude, seriously?”  He waves his hands, palms up and presenting himself.  “I’m Achilleus.  I’m your motivation.”

~~~

Take a deep breath and follow me down the research black hole, where every topic I looked up was more and more terrifyingly appropriate: 

Freedom

noun

the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint.

Self-Determination

noun

the process by which a person controls their own life.

Autonomy

noun

(in Kantian moral philosophy) the capacity of an agent to act in accordance with objective morality rather than under the influence of desires.

Autonomic Nervous System (because i believe each Hidden Side is closer to the subconscious)

noun

the part of the nervous system responsible for control of the bodily functions not consciously directed, such as breathing, the heartbeat, and digestive processes.

Inherent Value

“inherent value in the case of animal ethics can be described as the value an animal possesses in its own right, as an end-in-itself” – Animal Rights – Inherent Value, by Saahil Papar

Intrinsic Value

“Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.”” – Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value, by Michael J. Zimmerman and Ben Bradley

“Finally, his sense of respect for the intrinsic value of entities, including the non-sentient, is the Kantian notion of the inherent value of all Being.  This is based on the notion that a universe without moral evaluators (e.g. humans) would still be morally valuable, and there is no reason not to regard Being as inherently morally good.” – Technology and the Trajectory of Myth, by David Grant, Lyria Bennett Moses

Motivation

“Another way to conceptualize motivation is through Self-Determination Theory … which is concerned with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  Intrinsic motivation happens when someone does something for its inherent satisfaction.” – Second Language Acquisition Myths: Applying Second Language Research to Classroom Teaching, by Steven Brown, Jenifer Larson-Hall

Capitalism

“The flowery language of the United States Declaration of Independence would have you believe that human life has an inherent value, one that includes inalienable rights such as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” But in America, a major indicator of value is actually placed on being a productive member of society, which typically means working a job that creates monetary revenue (especially if the end result is accumulated wealth and suffering was inherently involved in the process).” – The Diminished Value of Human Life in a Capitalistic Society, by Seren Sensei

Religion

“At the heart of the debate between Calvinism and Arminianism lay the insurmountable chasm between God’s sovereign election versus human self-determination.” – Sovereignty vs. Self-determination: Two Versions of Ephesians 1:3-14, by Reformed Theology

Mythology

“In Classical Greece, Achilles was widely admired as a paragon of male excellence and virtue. Later, during the height of the Roman Empire, his name became synonymous with uncontrollable rage and barbarism… He chooses kleos (glory) over life itself, and he owes his heroic identity to this kleos. He achieves the major goal of the hero: to have his identity put permanently on record through kleos…

“But is this really an accurate characterization of Achilles' pivotal decision? Is he really driven to sacrifice his life by an obsessive quest for honor and glory? One scene in the Iliad suggests the answer to both questions is no.

“When Achilles leaves the battlefield after his dispute with Agamemnon, the Trojans gain the upper hand on the Greeks. Desperate to convince their best warrior to return, Agamemnon sends an envoy of Achilles' closest friends to his tent to persuade him to reconsider his decision. During this scene, Achilles calmly informs his friends that he is no longer interested in giving up his life for the sake of heroic ideals. His exact words are below:

“The same honor waits for the coward and the brave. They both go down to Death, the fighter who shirks, the one who works to exhaustion (IX 386-388)…

“Not only does Achilles reject the envoy's offers of material reward, but he rejects the entire premise that glory is worth a man's life.” – making sense of a hero’s motivation, by Patrick Garvey

Achilles (/əˈkɪliːz/ ə-KIL-eez) or Achilleus (Ancient Greek: Ἀχιλλεύς, [a.kʰilˈleu̯s])

Achilles realizes his own inherent self-worth, thereby freeing himself from the expectations of others; societal or otherwise.  Only once we are free can we find the balance between our own needs and the needs of others in a way that breeds neither anger nor resentment in either.

~~~

But that’s... that’s just... a theory.   Huh.

[ishkah]

Beyond Compassion and Humanity; Justice for Non-human Animals by Martha Nussbaum

-

This is a great essay vegans can draw on for a virtue ethics answer to the question of why do we hold the principle that it's almost always wrong to breed sentient life into captivity?

So for myself and this strain of virtue ethicists it would be because you know you could leave room for other animals to enjoy happy flourishing, being able to express all their capabilities in wild habitat.

Therefore not wanting to parasitically take away life with meaning for low-order pleasure in our hierarchy of needs which we can find elsewhere.

The distinction between this philosophy and consequentialism would simply be if you wished to act this way because fundimentally it’s about who you want to be and who you want to let animal be:

It goes beyond the contractarian view in its starting point, a basic wonder at living beings, and a wish for their flourishing and for a world in which creatures of many types flourish. It goes beyond the intuitive starting point of utilitarianism because it takes an interest not just in pleasure and pain [and interests], but in complex forms of life. It wants to see each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is. . .[and] that the dignity of living organisms not be violated.

Counter-intuitively the author does still cling to a hedonistic view of the right to take life, but hopefully not for much longer:

If animals were really killed in a painless fashion, after a healthy and free-ranging life, what then? Killings of extremely young animals would still be problematic, but it seems unclear that the balance of considerations supports a complete ban on killings for food.

-

BEYOND “COMPASSION AND HUMANITY”

Justice for Non-human Animals

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM

Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals… The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way.

—JOHN RAWLS, A Theory of Justice

In conclusion, we hold that circus animals…are housed in cramped cages, subjected to fear, hunger, pain, not to mention the undignified way of life they have to live, with no respite and the impugned notification has been issued in conformity with the…values of human life, [and] philosophy of the Constitution… Though not homo-sapiens [sic], they are also beings entitled to dignified existence and humane treatment sans cruelty and torture… Therefore, it is not only our fundamental duty to show compassion to our animal friends, but also to recognise and protect their rights…If humans are entitled to fundamental rights, why not animals?

—NAIR V. UNION OF INDIA, Kerala High Court, June 2000

-

“BEINGS ENTITLED TO DIGNIFIED EXISTENCE”

In 55 B.C. the Roman leader Pompey staged a combat between humans and elephants. Surrounded in the arena, the animals perceived that they had no hope of escape. According to Pliny, they then ―entreated the crowd, trying to win their compassion with indescribable gestures, bewailing their plight with a sort of lamentation.‖ The audience, moved to pity and anger by their plight, rose to curse Pompey, feeling, writes Cicero, that the elephants had a relation of commonality (societas) with the human race. [1]

We humans share a world and its scarce resources with other intelligent creatures. These creatures are capable of dignified existence, as the Kerala High Court says. It is difficult to know precisely what we mean by that phrase, but it is rather clear what it does not mean: the conditions of the circus animals in the case, squeezed into cramped, filthy cages, starved, terrorized, and beaten, given only the minimal care that would make them presentable in the ring the following day. The fact that humans act in ways that deny animals a dignified existence appears to be an issue of justice, and an urgent one, although we shall have to say more to those who would deny this claim. There is no obvious reason why notions of basic justice, entitlement, and law cannot be extended across the species barrier, as the Indian court boldly does.

Before we can perform this extension with any hope of success, however, we need to get clear about what theoretical approach is likely to prove most adequate. I shall argue that the capabilities approach as I have developed it—an approach to issues of basic justice and entitlement and to the making of fundamental political principles [2] —provides better theoretical guidance in this area than that supplied by contractarian and utilitarian approaches to the question of animal entitlements, because it is capable of recognizing a wide range of types of animal dignity, and of corresponding needs for flourishing.

-

KANTIAN CONTRACTARIANISM: INDIRECT DUTIES, DUTIES OF COMPASSION

Kant’s own view about animals is very unpromising. He argues that all duties to animals are merely indirect duties to humanity, in that (as he believes) cruel or kind treatment of animals strengthens tendencies to behave in similar fashion to humans. Thus he rests the case for decent treatment of animals on a fragile empirical claim about psychology. He cannot conceive that beings who (in his view) lack self-consciousness and the capacity for moral reciprocity could possibly be objects of moral duty. More generally, he cannot see that such a being can have dignity, an intrinsic worth.

One may, however, be a contractarian—and indeed, in some sense a Kantian— without espousing these narrow views. John Rawls insists that we have direct moral duties to animals, which he calls ―duties of compassion and humanity. [3] But for Rawls these are not issues of justice, and he is explicit that the contract doctrine cannot be extended to deal with these issues, because animals lack those properties of human beings ―in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with the principles of justice‖ (TJ 504). Only moral persons, defined with reference to the ―two moral powers,‖ are subjects of justice.

To some extent, Rawls is led to this conclusion by his Kantian conception of the person, which places great emphasis on rationality and the capacity for moral choice. But it is likely that the very structure of his contractarianism would require such a conclusion, even in the absence of that heavy commitment to rationality. The whole idea of a bargain or contract involving both humans and non-human animals is fantastic, suggesting no clear scenario that would assist our thinking. Although Rawls’s Original Position, like the state of nature in earlier contractarian theories, [4] is not supposed to be an actual historical situation, it is supposed to be a coherent fiction that can help us think well. This means that it has to have realism, at least, concerning the powers and needs of the parties and their basic circumstances. There is no comparable fiction about our decision to make a deal with other animals that would be similarly coherent and helpful. Although we share a world of scarce resources with animals, and although there is in a sense a state of rivalry among species that is comparable to the rivalry in the state of nature, the asymmetry of power between humans and non-human animals is too great to imagine the bargain as a real bargain. Nor can we imagine that the bargain would actually be for mutual advantage, for if we want to protect ourselves from the incursions of wild animals, we can just kill them, as we do. Thus, the Rawlsian condition that no one party to the contract is strong enough to dominate or kill all the others is not met. Thus Rawls’s omission of animals from the theory of justice is deeply woven into the very idea of grounding principles of justice on a bargain struck for mutual advantage (on fair terms) out of a situation of rough equality.

To put it another way, all contractualist views conflate two questions, which might have been kept distinct: Who frames the principles? And for whom are the principles framed? That is how rationality ends up being a criterion of membership in the moral community: because the procedure imagines that people are choosing principles for themselves. But one might imagine things differently, including in the group for whom principles of justice are included many creatures who do not and could not participate in the framing.

We have not yet shown, however, that Rawls’s conclusion is wrong. I have said that the cruel and oppressive treatment of animals raises issues of justice, but I have not really defended that claim against the Rawlsian alternative. What exactly does it mean to say that these are issues of justice, rather than issues of ―compassion and humanity? The emotion of compassion involves the thought that another creature is suffering significantly, and is not (or not mostly) to blame for that suffering. [5] It does not involve the thought that someone is to blame for that suffering. One may have compassion for the victim of a crime, but one may also have compassion for someone who is dying from disease (in a situation where that vulnerability to disease is nobody’s fault). ―Humanity I take to be a similar idea. So compassion omits the essential element of blame for wrongdoing. That is the first problem. But suppose we add that element, saying that duties of compassion involve the thought that it is wrong to cause animals suffering. That is, a duty of compassion would not be just a duty to have compassion, but a duty, as a result of one’s compassion, to refrain from acts that cause the suffering that occasions the compassion. I believe that Rawls would make this addition, although he certainly does not tell us what he takes duties of compassion to be. What is at stake, further, in the decision to say that the mistreatment of animals is not just morally wrong, but morally wrong in a special way, raising questions of justice?

This is a hard question to answer, since justice is a much-disputed notion, and there are many types of justice, political, ethical, and so forth. But it seems that what we most typically mean when we call a bad act unjust is that the creature injured by that act has an entitlement not to be treated in that way, and an entitlement of a particularly urgent or basic type (since we do not believe that all instances of unkindness, thoughtlessness, and so forth are instances of injustice, even if we do believe that people have a right to be treated kindly, and so on). The sphere of justice is the sphere of basic entitlements. When I say that the mistreatment of animals is unjust, I mean to say not only that it is wrong of us to treat them in that way, but also that they have a right, a moral entitlement, not to be treated in that way. It is unfair to them. I believe that thinking of animals as active beings who have a good and who are entitled to pursue it naturally leads us to see important damages done to them as unjust. What is lacking in Rawls’s account, as in Kant’s (though more subtly) is the sense of the animal itself as an agent and a subject, a creature in interaction with whom we live. As we shall see, the capabilities approach does treat animals as agents seeking a flourishing existence; this basic conception, I believe, is one of its greatest strengths.

-

UTILITARIANISM AND ANIMAL FLOURISHING

Utilitarianism has contributed more than any other ethical theory to the recognition of animal entitlements. Both Bentham and Mill in their time and Peter Singer in our own have courageously taken the lead in freeing ethical thought from the shackles of a narrow species-centered conception of worth and entitlement. No doubt this achievement was connected with the founders’ general radicalism and their skepticism about conventional morality, their willingness to follow the ethical argument wherever it leads. These remain very great virtues in the utilitarian position. Nor does utilitarianism make the mistake of running together the question “who receives justice?” With the question “who frames the principles of justice?” Justice is sought for all sentient beings, many of whom cannot participate in the framing of principles.

Thus it is in a spirit of alliance that those concerned with animal entitlements might address a few criticisms to the utilitarian view. There are some difficulties with the utilitarian view, in both of its forms. As Bernard Williams and Amartya Sen usefully analyze the utilitarian position, it has three independent elements: consequentialism (the right choice is the one that produces the best overall consequences), sum-ranking (the utilities of different people are combined by adding them together to produce a single total), and hedonism, or some other substantive theory of the good (such as preference satisfaction). [6] Consequentialism by itself causes the fewest difficulties, since one may always adjust the account of well-being, or the good, in consequentialism so as to admit many important things that utilitarians typically do not make salient: plural and heterogeneous goods, the protection of rights, even personal commitments or agent-centred goods. More or less any moral theory can be consequentialized, that is, put in a form where the matters valued by that theory appear in the account of consequences to be produced. [7] Although I do have some doubts about a comprehensive consequentialism as the best basis for political principles in a pluralistic liberal society, I shall not comment on them at present, but shall turn to the more evidently problematic aspects of the utilitarian view. [8]

Let us next consider the utilitarian commitment to aggregation, or what is called ―sum-ranking. Views that measure principles of justice by the outcome they produce need not simply add all the relevant goods together. They may weight them in other ways. For example, one may insist that each and every person has an indefeasible entitlement to come up above a threshold on certain key goods. In addition, a view may, like Rawls’s view, focus particularly on the situation of the least well off, refusing to permit inequalities that do not raise that person’s position. These ways of considering well-being insist on treating people as ends: They refuse to allow some people’s extremely high well-being to be purchased, so to speak, through other people’s disadvantage. Even the welfare of society as a whole does not lead us to violate an individual, as Rawls says.

Utilitarianism notoriously refuses such insistence on the separateness and inviolability of persons. Because it is committed to the sum-ranking of all relevant pleasures and pains (or preference satisfactions and frustrations), it has no way of ruling out in advance results that are extremely harsh toward a given class or group. Slavery, the lifelong subordination of some to others, the extremely cruel treatment of some humans or of non-human animals—none of this is ruled out by the theory’s core conception of justice, which treats all satisfactions as fungible in a single system. Such results will be ruled out, if at all, by empirical considerations regarding total or average well-being. These questions are notoriously indeterminate (especially when the number of individuals who will be born is also unclear, a point I shall take up later). Even if they were not, it seems that the best reason to be against slavery, torture, and lifelong subordination is a reason of justice, not an empirical calculation of total or average well-being. Moreover, if we focus on preference satisfaction, we must confront the problem of adaptive preferences. For while some ways of treating people badly always cause pain (torture, starvation), there are ways of subordinating people that creep into their very desires, making allies out of the oppressed. Animals too can learn submissive or fear-induced preferences. Martin Seligman’s experiments, for example, show that dogs who have been conditioned into a mental state of learned helplessness have immense difficulty learning to initiate voluntary movement, if they can ever do so. [9]

There are also problems inherent in the views of the good most prevalent within utilitarianism: hedonism (Bentham) and preference satisfaction (Singer). Pleasure is a notoriously elusive notion. Is it a single feeling, varying only in intensity and duration, or are the different pleasures as qualitatively distinct as the activities with which they are associated? Mill, following Aristotle, believed the latter, but if we once grant that point, we are looking at a view that is very different from standard utilitarianism, which is firmly wedded to the homogeneity of good. [10]

Such a commitment looks like an especially grave error when we consider basic political principles. For each basic entitlement is its own thing, and is not bought off, so to speak, by even a very large amount of another entitlement. Suppose we say to a citizen: We will take away your free speech on Tuesdays between 3 and 4P.M., but in return, we will give you, every single day, a double amount of basic welfare and health care support. This is just the wrong picture of basic political entitlements. What is being said when we make a certain entitlement basic is that it is important always and for everyone, as a matter of basic justice. The only way to make that point sufficiently clearly is to preserve the qualitative separateness of each distinct element within our list of basic entitlements.

Once we ask the hedonist to admit plural goods, not commensurable on a single quantitative scale, it is natural to ask, further, whether pleasure and pain are the only things we ought to be looking at. Even if one thinks of pleasure as closely linked to activity, and not simply as a passive sensation, making it the sole end leaves out much of the value we attach to activities of various types. There seem to be valuable things in an animal’s life other than pleasure, such as free movement and physical achievement, and also altruistic sacrifice for kin and group. The grief of an animal for a dead child or parent, or the suffering of a human friend, also seem to be valuable, a sign of attachments that are intrinsically good. There are also bad pleasures, including some of the pleasures of the circus audience—and it is unclear whether such pleasures should even count positively in the social calculus. Some pleasures of animals in harming other animals may also be bad in this way.

Does preference utilitarianism do better? We have already identified some problems, including the problem of misinformed or malicious preferences and that of adaptive (submissive) preferences. Singer’s preference utilitarianism, moreover, defining preference in terms of conscious awareness, has no room for deprivations that never register in the animal’s consciousness.

But of course animals raised under bad conditions can’t imagine the better way of life they have never known, and so the fact that they are not living a more flourishing life will not figure in their awareness. They may still feel pain, and this the utilitarian can consider. What the view cannot consider is all the deprivation of valuable life activity that they do not feel.

Finally, all utilitarian views are highly vulnerable on the question of numbers. The meat industry brings countless animals into the world who would never have existed but for that. For Singer, these births of new animals are not by themselves a bad thing: Indeed, we can expect new births to add to the total of social utility, from which we would then subtract the pain such animals suffer. It is unclear where this calculation would come out. Apart from this question of indeterminacy, it seems unclear that we should even say that these births of new animals are a good thing, if the animals are brought into the world only as tools of human rapacity.

So utilitarianism has great merits, but also great problems.

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TYPES OF DIGNITY, TYPES OF FLOURISHING: EXTENDING THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

The capabilities approach in its current form starts from the notion of human dignity and a life worthy of it. But I shall now argue that it can be extended to provide a more adequate basis for animal entitlements than the other two theories under consideration. The basic moral intuition behind the approach concerns the dignity of a form of life that possesses both deep needs and abilities; its basic goal is to address the need for a rich plurality of life activities. With Aristotle and Marx, the approach has insisted that there is waste and tragedy when a living creature has the innate, or ―basic,‖ capability for some functions that are evaluated as important and good, but never gets the opportunity to perform those functions. Failures to educate women, failures to provide adequate health care, failures to extend the freedoms of speech and conscience to all citizens—all these are treated as causing a kind of premature death, the death of a form of flourishing that has been judged to be worthy of respect and wonder. The idea that a human being should have a chance to flourish in its own way, provided it does no harm to others, is thus very deep in the account the capabilities approach gives of the justification of basic political entitlements.

The species norm is evaluative, as I have insisted; it does not simply read off norms from the way nature actually is. The difficult questions this valuational exercise raises for the case of non-human animals will be discussed in the following section. But once we have judged that a central human power is one of the good ones, one of the ones whose flourishing defines the good of the creature, we have a strong moral reason for promoting its flourishing and removing obstacles to it.

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Dignity and Wonder: The Intuitive Starting Point

The same attitude to natural powers that guides the approach in the case of human beings guides it in the case of all forms of life. For there is a more general attitude behind the respect we have for human powers, and it is very different from the type of respect that animates Kantian ethics. For Kant, only humanity and rationality are worthy of respect and wonder; the rest of nature is just a set of tools. The capabilities approach judges instead, with the biologist Aristotle (who criticized his students’ disdain for the study of animals), that there is something wonderful and wonder-inspiring in all the complex forms of animal life.

Aristotle’s scientific spirit is not the whole of what the capabilities approach embodies, for we need, in addition, an ethical concern that the functions of life not be impeded, that the dignity of living organisms not be violated. And yet, if we feel wonder looking at a complex organism, that wonder at least suggests the idea that it is good for that being to flourish as the kind of thing it is. And this idea is next door to the ethical judgment that it is wrong when the flourishing of a creature is blocked by the harmful agency of another. That more complex idea lies at the heart of the capabilities approach.

So I believe that the capabilities approach is well placed, intuitively, to go beyond both contractarian and utilitarian views. It goes beyond the contractarian view in its starting point, a basic wonder at living beings, and a wish for their flourishing and for a world in which creatures of many types flourish. It goes beyond the intuitive starting point of utilitarianism because it takes an interest not just in pleasure and pain, but in complex forms of life. It wants to see each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is.

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By Whom and for Whom? The Purposes of Social Cooperation

For a contractarian, as we have seen, the question ―Who makes the laws and principles? is treated as having, necessarily, the same answer as the question ―For whom are the laws and principles made? That conflation is dictated by the theory’s account of the purposes of social cooperation. But there is obviously no reason at all why these two questions should be put together in this way. The capabilities approach, as so far developed for the human case, looks at the world and asks how to arrange that justice be done in it. Justice is among the intrinsic ends that it pursues. Its parties are imagined looking at all the brutality and misery, the goodness and kindness of the world and trying to think how to make a world in which a core group of very important entitlements, inherent in the notion of human dignity, will be protected. Because they look at the whole of the human world, not just people roughly equal to themselves, they are able to be concerned directly and non-derivatively, as we saw, with the good of the mentally disabled. This feature makes it easy to extend the approach to include human-animal relations.

Let us now begin the extension. The purpose of social cooperation, by analogy and extension, ought to be to live decently together in a world in which many species try to flourish. (Cooperation itself will now assume multiple and complex forms.) The general aim of the capabilities approach in charting political principles to shape the human-animal relationship would be, following the intuitive ideas of the theory, that no animal should be cut off from the chance at a flourishing life and that all animals should enjoy certain positive opportunities to flourish. With due respect for a world that contains many forms of life, we attend with ethical concern to each characteristic type of flourishing and strive that it not be cut off or fruitless.

Such an approach seems superior to contractarianism because it contains direct obligations of justice to animals; it does not make these derivative from or posterior to the duties we have to fellow humans, and it is able to recognize that animals are subjects who have entitlements to flourishing and who thus are subjects of justice, not just objects of compassion. It is superior to utilitarianism because it respects each individual creature, refusing to aggregate the goods of different lives and types of lives. No creature is being used as a means to the ends of others, or of society as a whole. The capabilities approach also refuses to aggregate across the diverse constituents of each life and type of life. Thus, unlike utilitarianism, it can keep in focus the fact that each species has a different form of life and different ends; moreover, within a given species, each life has multiple and heterogeneous ends.

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How Comprehensive?

In the human case, the capabilities approach does not operate with a fully comprehensive conception of the good, because of the respect it has for the diverse ways in which people choose to live their lives in a pluralistic society. It aims at securing some core entitlements that are held to be implicit in the idea of a life with dignity, but it aims at capability, not functioning, and it focuses on a small list. In the case of human-animal relations, the need for restraint is even more acute, since animals will not in fact be participating directly in the framing of political principles, and thus they cannot revise them over time should they prove inadequate.

And yet there is a countervailing consideration: Human beings affect animals’ opportunities for flourishing pervasively, and it is hard to think of a species that one could simply leave alone to flourish in its own way. The human species dominates the other species in a way that no human individual or nation has ever dominated other humans. Respect for other species’ opportunities for flourishing suggests, then, that human law must include robust, positive political commitments to the protection of animals, even though, had human beings not so pervasively interfered with animals’ ways of life, the most respectful course might have been simply to leave them alone, living the lives that they make for themselves.

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The Species and the Individual

What should the focus of these commitments be? It seems that here, as in the human case, the focus should be the individual creature. The capabilities approach attaches no importance to increased numbers as such; its focus is on the well-being of existing creatures and the harm that is done to them when their powers are blighted.

As for the continuation of species, this would have little moral weight as a consideration of justice (though it might have aesthetic significance or some other sort of ethical significance), if species were just becoming extinct because of factors having nothing to do with human action that affects individual creatures. But species are becoming extinct because human beings are killing their members and damaging their natural environments. Thus, damage to species occurs through damage to individuals, and this individual damage should be the focus of ethical concern within the capabilities approach.

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Do Levels of Complexity Matter?

Almost all ethical views of animal entitlements hold that there are morally relevant distinctions among forms of life. Killing a mosquito is not the same sort of thing as killing a chimpanzee. But the question is: What sort of difference is relevant for basic justice? Singer, following Bentham, puts the issue in terms of sentience. Animals of many kinds can suffer bodily pain, and it is always bad to cause pain to a sentient being. If there are non-sentient or barely sentient animals—and it appears that crustaceans, mollusks, sponges, and the other creatures Aristotle called ―stationary animals‖ are such creatures—there is either no harm or only a trivial harm done in killing them. Among the sentient creatures, moreover, there are some who can suffer additional harms through their cognitive capacity: A few animals can foresee and mind their own deaths, and others will have conscious, sentient interests in continuing to live that are frustrated by death. The painless killing of an animal that does not foresee its own death or take a conscious interest in the continuation of its life is, for Singer and Bentham, not bad, for all badness, for them, consists in the frustration of interests, understood as forms of conscious awareness. [11] Singer is not, then, saying that some animals are inherently more worthy of esteem than others. He is simply saying that, if we agree with him that all harms reside in sentience, the creature’s form of life limits the conditions under which it can actually suffer harm.

Similarly, James Rachels, whose view does not focus on sentience alone, holds that the level of complexity of a creature affects what can be a harm for it. [12] What is relevant to the harm of pain is sentience; what is relevant to the harm of a specific type of pain is a specific type of sentience (e.g., the ability to imagine one’s own death). What is relevant to the harm of diminished freedom is a capacity for freedom or autonomy. It would make no sense to complain that a worm is being deprived of autonomy, or a rabbit of the right to vote.

What should the capabilities approach say about this issue? It seems to me that it should not follow Aristotle in saying that there is a natural ranking of forms of life, some being intrinsically more worthy of support and wonder than others. That consideration might have evaluative significance of some other kind, but it seems dubious that it should affect questions of basic justice.

Rachels’s view offers good guidance here. Because the capabilities approach finds ethical significance in the flourishing of basic (innate) capabilities—those that are evaluated as both good and central (see the section on evaluating animal capabilities)—it will also find harm in the thwarting or blighting of those capabilities. More complex forms of life have more and more complex capabilities to be blighted, so they can suffer more and different types of harm. Level of life is relevant not because it gives different species differential worth per se, but because the type and degree of harm a creature can suffer varies with its form of life.

At the same time, I believe that the capabilities approach should admit the wisdom in utilitarianism. Sentience is not the only thing that matters for basic justice, but it seems plausible to consider sentience a threshold condition for membership in the community of beings who have entitlements based on justice. Thus, killing a sponge does not seem to be a matter of basic justice.

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Does the Species Matter?

For the utilitarians, and for Rachels, the species to which a creature belongs has no moral relevance. All that is morally relevant are the capacities of the individual creature: Rachels calls this view ―moral individualism.‖ Utilitarian writers are fond of comparing apes to young children and to mentally disabled humans. The capabilities approach, by contrast, with its talk of characteristic functioning and forms of life, seems to attach some significance to species membership as such. What type of significance is this?

We should admit that there is much to be learned from reflection on the continuum of life. Capacities do crisscross and overlap; a chimpanzee may have more capacity for empathy and perspectival thinking than a very young child or an older autistic child. And capacities that humans sometimes arrogantly claim for themselves alone are found very widely in nature. But it seems wrong to conclude from such facts that species membership is morally and politically irrelevant. A mentally disabled child is actually very different from a chimpanzee, though in certain respects some of her capacities may be comparable. Such a child’s life is tragic in a way that the life of a chimpanzee is not tragic: She is cut off from forms of flourishing that, but for the disability, she might have had, disabilities that it is the job of science to prevent or cure, wherever that is possible. There is something blighted and disharmonious in her life, whereas the life of a chimpanzee may be perfectly flourishing. Her social and political functioning is threatened by these disabilities, in a way that the normal functioning of a chimpanzee in the community of chimpanzees is not threatened by its cognitive endowment.

All this is relevant when we consider issues of basic justice. For a child born with Down syndrome, it is crucial that the political culture in which he lives make a big effort to extend to him the fullest benefits of citizenship he can attain, through health benefits, education, and the reeducation of the public culture. That is so because he can only flourish as a human being. He has no option of flourishing as a happy chimpanzee. For a chimpanzee, on the other hand, it seems to me that expensive efforts to teach language, while interesting and revealing, are not matters of basic justice. A chimpanzee flourishes in its own way, communicating with its own community in a perfectly adequate manner that has gone on for ages.

In short, the species norm (duly evaluated) tells us what the appropriate benchmark is for judging whether a given creature has decent opportunities for flourishing.

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EVALUATING ANIMAL CAPABILITIES: NO NATURE WORSHIP

In the human case, the capabilities view does not attempt to extract norms directly from some facts about human nature. We should know what we can about the innate capacities of human beings, and this information is valuable, in telling us what our opportunities are and what our dangers might be. But we must begin by evaluating the innate powers of human beings, asking which ones are the good ones, the ones that are central to the notion of a decently flourishing human life, a life with dignity. Thus not only evaluation but also ethical evaluation is put into the approach from the start. Many things that are found in human life are not on the capabilities list.

There is a danger in any theory that alludes to the characteristic flourishing and form of life of a species: the danger of romanticizing nature, or suggesting that things are in order as they are, if only we would stop interfering. This danger looms large when we turn from the human case, where it seems inevitable that we will need to do some moral evaluating, to the animal case, where evaluating is elusive and difficult. Inherent in at least some environmentalist writing is a picture of nature as harmonious and wise, and of humans as wasteful overreachers who would live better were we to get in tune with this fine harmony. This image of nature was already very sensibly attacked by John Stuart Mill in his great essay ―Nature,‖ which pointed out that nature, far from being morally normative, is actually violent, heedless of moral norms, prodigal, full of conflict, harsh to humans and animals both. A similar view lies at the heart of much modern ecological thinking, which now stresses the inconstancy and imbalance of nature, [13] arguing, inter alia, that many of the natural ecosystems that we admire as such actually sustain themselves to the extent that they do only on account of various forms of human intervention.

Thus, a no-evaluation view, which extracts norms directly from observation of animals’ characteristic ways of life, is probably not going to be a helpful way of promoting the good of animals. Instead, we need a careful evaluation of both ―nature‖ and possible changes. Respect for nature should not and cannot mean just leaving nature as it is, and must involve careful normative arguments about what plausible goals might be.

In the case of humans, the primary area in which the political conception inhibits or fails to foster tendencies that are pervasive in human life is the area of harm to others. Animals, of course, pervasively cause harm, both to members of their own species and, far more often, to members of other species.

In both of these cases, the capabilities theorist will have a strong inclination to say that the harm-causing capabilities in question are not among those that should be protected by political and social principles. But if we leave these capabilities off the list, how can we claim to be promoting flourishing lives? Even though the capabilities approach is not utilitarian and does not hold that all good is in sentience, it will still be difficult to maintain that a creature who feels frustration at the inhibition of its predatory capacities is living a flourishing life. A human being can be expected to learn to flourish without homicide and, let us hope, even without most killing of animals. But a lion who is given no exercise for its predatory capacity appears to suffer greatly.

Here the capabilities view may, however, distinguish two aspects of the capability in question. The capability to kill small animals, defined as such, is not valuable, and political principles can omit it (and even inhibit it in some cases, to be discussed in the following section). But the capability to exercise one’s predatory nature so as to avoid the pain of frustration may well have value, if the pain of frustration is considerable. Zoos have learned how to make this distinction. Noticing that they were giving predatory animals insufficient exercise for their predatory capacities, they had to face the question of the harm done to smaller animals by allowing these capabilities to be exercised. Should they give a tiger a tender gazelle to crunch on? The Bronx Zoo has found that it can give the tiger a large ball on a rope, whose resistance and weight symbolize the gazelle. The tiger seems satisfied. Wherever predatory animals are living under direct human support and control, these solutions seem the most ethically sound.

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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, CAPABILITY AND FUNCTIONING

In the human case, there is a traditional distinction between positive and negative duties that it seems important to call into question. Traditional moralities hold that we have a strict duty not to commit aggression and fraud, but we have no correspondingly strict duty to stop hunger or disease, nor to give money to promote their cessation. [14]

The capabilities approach calls this distinction into question. All the human capabilities require affirmative support, usually including state action. This is just as true of protecting property and personal security as it is of health care, just as true of the political and civil liberties as it is of providing adequate shelter.

In the case of animals, unlike the human case, there might appear to be some room for a positive-negative distinction that makes some sense. It seems at least coherent to say that the human community has the obligation to refrain from certain egregious harms toward animals, but that it is not obliged to support the welfare of all animals, in the sense of ensuring them adequate food, shelter, and health care. The animals themselves have the rest of the task of ensuring their own flourishing.

There is much plausibility in this contention. And certainly if our political principles simply ruled out the many egregious forms of harm to animals, they would have done quite a lot. But the contention, and the distinction it suggests, cannot be accepted in full. First of all, large numbers of animals live under humans’ direct control: domestic animals, farm animals, and those members of wild species that are in zoos or other forms of captivity. Humans have direct responsibility for the nutrition and health care of these animals, as even our defective current systems of law acknowledge. [15] Animals in the wild appear to go their way unaffected by human beings. But of course that can hardly be so in many cases in today’s world. Human beings pervasively affect the habitats of animals, determining opportunities for nutrition, free movement, and other aspects of flourishing.

Thus, while we may still maintain that one primary area of human responsibility to animals is that of refraining from a whole range of bad acts (to be discussed shortly), we cannot plausibly stop there. The only questions should be how extensive our duties are, and how to balance them against appropriate respect for the autonomy of a species.

In the human case, one way in which the approach respects autonomy is to focus on capability, and not functioning, as the legitimate political goal. But paternalistic treatment (which aims at functioning rather than capability) is warranted wherever the individual’s capacity for choice and autonomy is compromised (thus, for children and the severely mentally disabled). This principle suggests that paternalism is usually appropriate when we are dealing with non-human animals. That conclusion, however, should be qualified by our previous endorsement of the idea that species autonomy, in pursuit of flourishing, is part of the good for non-human animals. How, then, should the two principles be combined, and can they be coherently combined? I believe that they can be combined, if we adopt a type of paternalism that is highly sensitive to the different forms of flourishing that different species pursue. It is no use saying that we should just let tigers flourish in their own way, given that human activity ubiquitously affects the possibilities for tigers to flourish. This being the case, the only decent alternative to complete neglect of tiger flourishing is a policy that thinks carefully about the flourishing of tigers and what habitat that requires, and then tries hard to create such habitats. In the case of domestic animals, an intelligent paternalism would encourage training, discipline, and even, where appropriate, strenuous training focused on special excellences of a breed (such as the border collie or the hunter-jumper). But the animal, like a child, will retain certain entitlements, which they hold regardless of what their human guardian thinks about it. They are not merely objects for human beings’ use and control.

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TOWARD BASIC POLITICAL PRINCIPLES: THE CAPABILITIES LIST

It is now time to see whether we can actually use the human basis of the capabilities approach to map out some basic political principles that will guide law and public policy in dealing with animals. The list I have defended as useful in the human case is as follows:

The Central Human Capabilities

Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason—and to do these things in a ―truly human‖ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.

Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us and to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial to our development.)

Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)

Affiliation. (A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.) (B) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. (This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.)

Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

Control over One’s Environment. (A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation; protections of free speech and association. (B) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

Although the entitlements of animals are species specific, the main large categories of the existing list, suitably fleshed out, turn out to be a good basis for a sketch of some basic political principles.

In the capabilities approach, all animals are entitled to continue their lives, whether or not they have such a conscious interest. All sentient animals have a secure entitlement against gratuitous killing for sport. Killing for luxury items such as fur falls in this category, and should be banned. On the other hand, intelligently respectful paternalism supports euthanasia for elderly animals in pain. In the middle are the very difficult cases, such as the question of predation to control populations, and the question of killing for food. The reason these cases are so difficult is that animals will die anyway in nature, and often more painfully. Painless predation might well be preferable to allowing the animal to be torn to bits in the wild or starved through overpopulation. As for food, the capabilities approach agrees with utilitarianism in being most troubled by the torture of living animals. If animals were really killed in a painless fashion, after a healthy and free-ranging life, what then? Killings of extremely young animals would still be problematic, but it seems unclear that the balance of considerations supports a complete ban on killings for food.

Bodily Health. One of the most central entitlements of animals is the entitlement to a healthy life. Where animals are directly under human control, it is relatively clear what policies this entails: laws banning cruel treatment and neglect; laws banning the confinement and ill treatment of animals in the meat and fur industries; laws forbidding harsh or cruel treatment for working animals, including circus animals; laws regulating zoos and aquariums, mandating adequate nutrition and space. Many of these laws already exist, although they are not well enforced. The striking asymmetry in current practice is that animals being raised for food are not protected in the way other animals are protected. This asymmetry must be eliminated.

Bodily Integrity. This goes closely with the preceding. Under the capabilities approach, animals have direct entitlements against violations of their bodily integrity by violence, abuse, and other forms of harmful treatment—whether or not the treatment in question is painful. Thus the declawing of cats would probably be banned under this rubric, on the grounds that it prevents the cat from flourishing in its own characteristic way, even though it may be done in a painfree manner and cause no subsequent pain. On the other hand, forms of training that, though involving discipline, equip the animal to manifest excellences that are part of its characteristic capabilities profile would not be eliminated.

Senses, Imagination, and Thought. For humans, this capability creates a wide range of entitlements: to appropriate education, to free speech and artistic expression, to the freedom of religion. It also includes a more general entitlement to pleasurable experiences and the avoidance of non-beneficial pain. By now it ought to be rather obvious where the latter point takes us in thinking about animals: toward laws banning harsh, cruel, and abusive treatment and ensuring animals’ access to sources of pleasure, such as free movement in an environment that stimulates and pleases the senses. The freedom-related part of this capability has no precise analogue, and yet we can come up with appropriate analogues in the case of each type of animal, by asking what choices and areas of freedom seem most important to each. Clearly this reflection would lead us to reject close confinement and to regulate the places in which animals of all kinds are kept for spaciousness, light and shade, and the variety of opportunities they offer the animals for a range of characteristic activities. Again, the capabilities approach seems superior to utilitarianism in its ability to recognize such entitlements, for few animals will have a conscious interest, as such, in variety and space.

Emotions. Animals have a wide range of emotions. All or almost all sentient animals have fear. Many animals can experience anger, resentment, gratitude, grief, envy, and joy. A small number—those who are capable of perspectival thinking—can experience compassion. [16] Like human beings, they are entitled to lives in which it is open to them to have attachments to others, to love and care for others, and not to have those attachments warped by enforced isolation or the deliberate infliction of fear. We understand well what this means where our cherished domestic animals are in question. Oddly, we do not extend the same consideration to animals we think of as ―wild. Until recently, zoos took no thought for the emotional needs of animals, and animals being used for research were often treated with gross carelessness in this regard, being left in isolation and confinement when they might easily have had decent emotional lives. [17]

Practical Reason. In each case, we need to ask to what extent the creature has a capacity to frame goals and projects and to plan its life. To the extent that this capacity is present, it ought to be supported, and this support requires many of the same policies already suggested by capability 4: plenty of room to move around, opportunities for a variety of activities.

Affiliation. In the human case, this capability has two parts: an interpersonal part (being able to live with and toward others) and a more public part, focused on self-respect and non-humiliation. It seems to me that the same two parts are pertinent for non-human animals. Animals are entitled to opportunities to form attachments (as in capability 5) and to engage in characteristic forms of bonding and interrelationship. They are also entitled to relations with humans, where humans enter the picture, that are rewarding and reciprocal, rather than tyrannical. At the same time, they are entitled to live in a world public culture that respects them and treats them as dignified beings. This entitlement does not just mean protecting them from instances of humiliation that they will feel as painful. The capabilities approach here extends more broadly than utilitarianism, holding that animals are entitled to world policies that grant them political rights and the legal status of dignified beings, whether they understand that status or not.

Other Species. If human beings are entitled to ―be able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature,‖ so too are other animals, in relation to species not their own, including the human species, and the rest of the natural world. This capability, seen from both the human and the animal side, calls for the gradual formation of an interdependent world in which all species will enjoy cooperative and mutually supportive relations with one another. Nature is not that way and never has been. So it calls, in a very general way, for the gradual supplanting of the natural by the just.

Play. This capability is obviously central to the lives of all sentient animals. It calls for many of the same policies we have already discussed: provision of adequate space, light, and sensory stimulation in living places, and, above all, the presence of other species members.

Control over One’s Environment. In the human case, this capability has two prongs, the political and the material. The political is defined in terms of active citizenship and rights of political participation. For non-human animals, the important thing is being part of a political conception that is framed so as to respect them and that is committed to treating them justly. It is important, however, that animals have entitlements directly, so that a human guardian has standing to go to court, as with children, to vindicate those entitlements. On the material side, for non-human animals, the analogue to property rights is respect for the territorial integrity of their habitats, whether domestic or in the wild.

Are there animal capabilities not covered by this list, suitably specified? It seems to me not, although in the spirit of the capabilities approach we should insist that the list is open-ended, subject to supplementation or deletion.

In general, the capabilities approach suggests that it is appropriate for nations to include in their constitutions or other founding statements of principle a commitment to animals as subjects of political justice and a commitment that animals will be treated with dignity. The constitution might also spell out some of the very general principles suggested by this capabilities list. The rest of the work of protecting animal entitlements might be done by suitable legislation and by court cases demanding the enforcement of the law, where it is not enforced. At the same time, many of the issues covered by this approach cannot be dealt with by nations in isolation, but can only be addressed by international cooperation. So we also need international accords committing the world community to the protection of animal habitats and the eradication of cruel practices.

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THE INELIMINABILITY OF CONFLICT

In the human case, we often face the question of conflict between one capability and another. But if the capabilities list and its thresholds are suitably designed, we ought to say that the presence of conflict between one capability and another is a sign that society has gone wrong somewhere. [18] We should focus on long-term planning that will create a world in which all the capabilities can be secured to all citizens.

Our world contains persistent and often tragic conflicts between the well-being of human beings and the well-being of animals. Some bad treatment of animals can be eliminated without serious losses in human wellbeing: Such is the case with the use of animals for fur, and the brutal and confining treatment of animals used for food. The use of animals for food in general is a much more difficult case, since nobody really knows what the impact on the world environment would be of a total switch to vegetarian sources of protein, or the extent to which such a diet could be made compatible with the health of all the world’s children. A still more difficult problem is the use of animals in research.

A lot can be done to improve the lives of research animals without stopping useful research. As Steven Wise has shown, primates used in research often live in squalid, lonely conditions while they are used as medical subjects. This of course is totally unnecessary and morally unacceptable and could be ended without ending the research. Some research that is done is unnecessary and can be terminated, for example, the testing of cosmetics on rabbits, which seems to have been bypassed without loss of quality by some cosmetic firms. But much important research with major consequences for the life and health of human beings and other animals will inflict disease, pain, and death on at least some animals, even under the best conditions.

I do not favor stopping all such research. What I do favor is (a) asking whether the research is really necessary for a major human capability; (b) focusing on the use of less-complex sentient animals where possible, on the grounds that they suffer fewer and lesser harms from such research; (c) improving the conditions of research animals, including palliative terminal care when they have contracted a terminal illness, and supportive interactions with both humans and other animals; (d) removing the psychological brutality that is inherent in so much treatment of animals for research; (e) choosing topics cautiously and seriously, so that no animal is harmed for a frivolous reason; and (f) a constant effort to develop experimental methods (for example, computer simulations) that do not have these bad consequences.

Above all, it means constant public discussion of these issues, together with an acknowledgment that such uses of animals in research are tragic, violating basic entitlements. Such public acknowledgments are far from useless. They state what is morally true, and thus acknowledge the dignity of animals and our own culpability toward them. They reaffirm dispositions to behave well toward them where no such urgent exigencies intervene. Finally, they prompt us to seek a world in which the pertinent research could in fact be done in other ways.

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TOWARD A TRULY GLOBAL JUSTICE

It has been obvious for a long time that the pursuit of global justice requires the inclusion of many people and groups who were not previously included as fully equal subjects of justice: the poor; members of religious, ethnic, and racial minorities; and more recently women, the disabled, and inhabitants of nations distant from one’s own.

But a truly global justice requires not simply that we look across the world for other fellow species members who are entitled to a decent life. It also requires looking around the world at the other sentient beings with whose lives our own are inextricably and complexly intertwined. Traditional contractarian approaches to the theory of justice did not and, in their very form, could not confront these questions as questions of justice. Utilitarian approaches boldly did so, and they deserve high praise. But in the end, I have argued, utilitarianism is too homogenizing—both across lives and with respect to the heterogeneous constituents of each life—to provide us with an adequate theory of animal justice. The capabilities approach, which begins from an ethically attuned wonder before each form of animal life, offers a model that does justice to the complexity of animal lives and their strivings for flourishing. Such a model seems an important part of a fully global theory of justice.

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NOTES

This essay derives from my Tanner Lectures in 2003 and is published by courtesy of the University of Utah Press and the Trustees of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values.

The incident is discussed in Pliny Nat. Hist. 8.7.20–21, Cicero Ad Fam. 7.1.3; see also Dio Cassius Hist. 39, 38, 2–4. See the discussion in Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 124–125.

For this approach, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and ―Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, Feminist Economics 9 (2003): 33–59. The approach was pioneered by Amartya Sen within economics, and is used by him in some rather different ways, without a definite commitment to a normative theory of justice.

All references are to John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), hereafter TJ.

Rawls himself makes the comparison at TJ 12; his analogue to the state of nature is the equality of the parties in the Original Position.

See the analysis in Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 6; thus far the analysis is uncontroversial, recapitulating a long tradition of analysis.

See Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, introduction to Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 3–4.

See the comment by Nussbaum in Goodness and Advice, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Tanner Lectures (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), discussing work along these lines by Amartya Sen and others.

Briefly put, my worries are those of Rawls in Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), who points out that it is illiberal for political principles to contain any comprehensive account of what is best. Instead, political principles should be committed to a partial set of ethical norms endorsed for political purposes, leaving it to citizens to fill out the rest of the ethical picture in accordance with their own comprehensive conceptions of value, religious or secular. Thus I would be happy with a partial political consequentialism, but not with comprehensive consequentialism, as a basis for political principles.

Martin Seligman, Helplessness: On Development, Depression, and Death (New York: Freeman, 1975).

Here I agree with Thomson (who is thinking mostly about Moore); see Goodness and Advice.

Peter Singer, ―Animals and the Value of Life,‖ in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1980), 356.

James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

Daniel B. Botkin, ―Adjusting Law to Nature’s Discordant Harmonies,‖ Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 7 (1996): 25–37.

See the critique by Martha Nussbaum in ―Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy,‖ Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 1–31.

The laws do not cover all animals, in particular, not animals who are going to be used for food or fur.

On all this, see Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, ch. 2.

See Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus, 2000), ch. 1.

See Martha C. Nussbaum, ―The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Implications of Cost-Benefit Analysis,‖ in Cost-Benefit Analysis, ed. Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 169–200.

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#5yrsago Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century

Thomas Piketty's Capital in the 21st Century is a bestselling economics tome whose combination of deep, careful presentation of centuries' worth of data, along with an equally careful analysis of where capitalism is headed has ignited a global conversation about inequality, tax, and policy. Cory Doctorow summarizes the conversation without making you read 696 pages (though you should).

To sum up: modern growth, which is based on the growth of productivity and the diffusion of knowledge, has made it possible to avoid the apocalypse predicted by Marx and to balance the process of capital accumulation. But it has not altered the deep structures of capital -- or at any rate has not truly reduced the macroeconomic importance of capital relative to labor. I must now examine whether the same is true for inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. How much has the structure of inequality with respect to both labor and capital actually changed since the nineteenth century?

I've been writing about Piketty's work for more than a year, as the first inklings of his French-language publications began to trickle into the Anglosphere. With the explosive publication of the English edition of Capital in the 21st Century last March, the trickle's turned into a flood of Piketty commentary, which I've followed as I made my way through the text, a process that took a lot longer than I expected.

Piketty has come in for a lot of praise for the clarity of his writing, and I think it's deserved. There's very little math in this book, and it assumes very little prior knowledge of economics. In part, this is because Piketty is offering something fresh in the discourse: an unimaginably massive data-set that traces the ebb and flow of wealth and productivity around the globe for three centuries. Piketty's been very transparent about the assumptions he and his team made in pulling together the data, offering more than 100 pages of endnotes that explain the logic behind each assumption (the data itself is online, too).

If there was one word I'd use to sum up the structure of Capital, it's "careful." Piketty is offering up an inflammatory thesis (more on that in a minute), but his presentation is almost plodding. He retraces and reiterates his arguments again and again, which is helpful for those of us who don't trade in economics in our daily lives, and also is set to head off lazy critics who want to dismiss him out of hand. Indeed, one of the most entertaining episodes in the debate so far has been The Financial Times affair, where the FT's Chris Giles pointed out a bunch of "errors" in Piketty's work, only to have the normally even-keeled Piketty come back with a long, detailed rebuttal that boiled down to "Hey, asshole, if you'd bothered to look, you'd see that I documented every one of the decisions you're characterizing as an error, and if you want to disagree with me, then argue with my explicit, detailed assumptions instead of sloppily assuming I didn't even realize I was making them."

Piketty's thesis has been shorthanded as r > g: that the rate of return on capital today -- and through most of history -- has been higher than general economic growth. This means that simply having money is the best way to get more money. Piketty uses examples from English and French literature (Austen, James and Balzac) to illustrate just how unimaginably weird this situation is by modern standards. The literature of the pre-modern era is full of people who understand that the being rich is a hereditary condition, and no matter what you create, or where you work, or how important you are, or how great you are, the only way to get rich is to be rich or marry someone rich.

The most striking fact is that the United States has become noticeably more inegalitarian than France (and Europe as a whole) from the turn of the twentieth century until now, even though the United States was more egalitarian at the beginning of this period. What makes the US case complex is that the end of the process did not simply mark a return to the situation that had existed at the beginning: US inequality in 2010 is quantitatively as extreme as in old Europe in the first decade of the twentieth century, but the structure of that inequality is rather clearly different.

In the US (and Canada), this is a more remote memory, because the European colonists who came to the "New World" generally arrived without much capital, and notwithstanding the occasional land-baron or rail tycoon, have not had the opportunity to set up the kind of enduring, centuries-long dynasties that characterized the world they'd left. But for Piketty, this extreme wealth disparity is a central fact of history, and it is supposed to be the thing that modernity -- and capitalism -- conquered, through a "meritocratic" system that rewards people who do amazing things with amazing fortunes, and that recognizes that merely being the kid of someone who did something amazing is not, in itself, amazing, and should not entitle you to the exalted heights that your storied forebears attained.

The estate tax became progressive in France in 1901, but the highest rate on direct-line bequests was no more than 5 percent (and applied to at most a few dozen bequests a year). A rate of this magnitude, assessed once a generation, cannot have much effect on the concentration of wealth, no matter what wealthy individuals thought at the time. Quite different in their effect were the rates of 20–30 percent or higher that were imposed in most wealthy countries in the wake of the military, economic, and political shocks of 1914–1945. The upshot of such taxes was that each successive generation had to reduce its expenditures and save more (or else make particularly profitable investments) if the family fortune was to grow as rapidly as average income. Hence it became more and more difficult to maintain one's rank. Conversely, it became easier for those who started at the bottom to make their way, for instance by buying businesses or shares sold when estates went to probate.

Piketty challenges the idea that modernity somehow led to "merit" asserting itself as the new determinant of wealth. Instead, he makes a very convincing case that the increasing size of the capital class -- which expanded comfortably during the period of colonial expansion -- created a hunger for wealth that turned the aristocracy on itself in a squabble over who got to loot the colonies, which was World War I. This war was incredibly destructive of capital, and left many of the aristocracy holding onto potentially worthless government bonds issued by states that had nearly bankrupted themselves during the Great War. These states were so beholden to the rich that they couldn't contemplate inflating or taxing or defaulting their way out of debt, and so they took heroic and improbable measures to keep bondholders whole, which led to the economic chaos of of which WWII was born.

WWII destroyed so much accumulated wealth that in its aftermath, a raft of previously unimaginable policies became the norm. Trade unionism, progressive taxation, tenants' rights and other rules that spread out access to economic privilege and mobility became the norm, and the growth of fortunes was dramatically slowed all over the world. But by the 1980s, there was a big and important enough class of very rich people that they were able to exert serious political pressure, and the neoliberal era began, with Reagan and Thatcher. From then on, the return on capital has mounted even as growth has slowed, and the gap between the rich and poor has widened to the point where we are teetering on the brink of a society with such entrenched hereditary inequality that it can make no claim to "meritocratic" virtue.

In my view, there is absolutely no doubt that the increase of inequality in the United States contributed to the nation's financial instability. The reason is simple: one consequence of increasing inequality was virtual stagnation of the purchasing power of the lower and middle classes in the United States, which inevitably made it more likely that modest households would take on debt, especially since unscrupulous banks and financial intermediaries, freed from regulation and eager to earn good yields on the enormous savings injected into the system by the well-to-do, offered credit on increasingly generous terms.

This is a crisis. The reason for capitalism is that it is supposed to allocate reward based on "merit" -- it is supposed to move capital into the hands of the people who can do the most with it -- and if all our policy decisions are made in service to a class of supermanagers whose wealth comes from squatting on a fortune managed by some green-eyeshade quants who grow it without its owner ever doing a notable thing apart from being born to dynasty, there is no more reason for capitalism. Piketty darkly hints that the last time this happened, the world tore itself to pieces, twice, in an orgy of destruction that left millions dead and whole nations in ruin.

The main purpose of the health sector is not to provide other sectors with workers in good health. By the same token, the main purpose of the educational sector is not to prepare students to take up an occupation in some other sector of the economy. In all human societies, health and education have an intrinsic value: the ability to enjoy years of good health, like the ability to acquire knowledge and culture, is one of the fundamental purposes of civilization.

Piketty's controversial prescription for this is to impose a global wealth tax. Not a very big one, mind -- he talks at length about how a couple of percentage points per year would be more than enough. But just enough that every squillionaire would have to account for his wealth, disclosing its particulars and its disposition (laying bare the world's tax-havens), and that there would be enough redistributive pressure in the system to keep dynastic fortunes from growing, thus allowing for a middle-class to flourish (Piketty convincingly shows that even at the peak of "meritocratic" redistribution, the poor's share of the world's wealth has not changed appreciably -- rather, that the loosened control of the rich has made room for a middle-class).

A global tax on capital is a utopian idea. It is hard to imagine the nations of the world agreeing on any such thing anytime soon. To achieve this goal, they would have to establish a tax schedule applicable to all wealth around the world and then decide how to apportion the revenues. But if the idea is utopian, it is nevertheless useful, for several reasons. First, even if nothing resembling this ideal is put into practice in the foreseeable future, it can serve as a worthwhile reference point, a standard against which alternative proposals can be measured. Admittedly, a global tax on capital would require a very high and no doubt unrealistic level of international cooperation. But countries wishing to move in this direction could very well do so incrementally, starting at the regional level (in Europe, for instance). Unless something like this happens, a defensive reaction of a nationalist stripe would very likely occur. For example, one might see a return to various forms of protectionism coupled with imposition of capital controls. Because such policies are seldom effective, however, they would very likely lead to frustration and increase international tensions.

There are lots of reasons for this to be controversial. First, as Piketty admits, it's impractical. Getting all the countries of the world to agree to this scheme is implausible. But, he says, we don't need everyone to cooperate to realize some immediate benefit:

To reject the global tax on capital out of hand would be all the more regrettable because it is perfectly possible to move toward this ideal solution step by step, first at the continental or regional level and then by arranging for closer cooperation among regions. One can see a model for this sort of approach in the recent discussions on automatic sharing of bank data between the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, various forms of capital taxation already exist in most countries, especially in North America and Europe, and these could obviously serve as starting points.

There's something ineluctably European and scholarly in Piketty's willingness to treat redistribution as legitimate. "Redistribution" is political poison in the USA, though it wasn't always thus:

In 1919, Irving Fisher, then president of the American Economic Association, went even further. He chose to devote his presidential address to the question of US inequality and in no uncertain terms told his colleagues that the increasing concentration of wealth was the nation's foremost economic problem. Fisher found King's estimates alarming. The fact that "2 percent of the population owns more than 50 percent of the wealth" and that "two-thirds of the population owns almost nothing" struck him as "an undemocratic distribution of wealth," which threatened the very foundations of US society. Rather than restrict the share of profits or the return on capital arbitrarily -- possibilities Fisher mentioned only to reject them -- he argued that the best solution was to impose a heavy tax on the largest estates (he mentioned a tax rate of two-thirds the size of the estate, rising to 100 percent if the estate was more than three generations old).

Indeed, an unwillingness to tax creates all kinds of evils. For starters, if a state can't fund its core programs out of tax, it has to borrow. And when it borrows, it borrows from the rich. So instead of taxation -- which weakens the fortunes and political influence of the wealthy -- we get bonds, through which the wealthy are paid interest out of the funds extracted from those who lack the political clout to escape taxation. The wealthy get more wealthy, and exert more political pressure. Piketty illustrates this beautifully with a couple of well-chosen examples -- for example, take the sky-high CEO salary. Why weren't the CEOs of the post-war period paid tens of millions, while their financialized descendants bring home the makings of a hereditary dynasty? It's all down to an unwillingness to have real progressive taxation:

...Lower top income tax rates, especially in the United States and Britain, where top rates fell dramatically, totally transformed the way executive salaries are determined. It is always difficult for an executive to convince other parties involved in the firm (direct subordinates, workers lower down in the hierarchy, stockholders, and members of the compensation committee) that a large pay raise -- say of a million dollars -- is truly justified. In the 1950s and 1960s, executives in British and US firms had little reason to fight for such raises, and other interested parties were less inclined to accept them, because 80–90 percent of the increase would in any case go directly to the government. After 1980, the game was utterly transformed, however, and the evidence suggests that executives went to considerable lengths to persuade other interested parties to grant them substantial raises. Because it is objectively difficult to measure individual contributions to a firm's output, top managers found it relatively easy to persuade boards and stockholders that they were worth the money, especially since the members of compensation committees were often chosen in a rather incestuous manner.

It's a rare thing to see economists, especially pro-capitalist economists, praising taxation itself, but Piketty -- careful, unemotional Piketty -- dares:

Without taxes, society has no common destiny, and collective action is impossible. This has always been true. At the heart of every major political upheaval lies a fiscal revolution. The Ancien Régime was swept away when the revolutionary assemblies voted to abolish the fiscal privileges of the nobility and clergy and establish a modern system of universal taxation. The American Revolution was born when subjects of the British colonies decided to take their destiny in hand and set their own taxes. ("No taxation without representation"). Two centuries later the context is different, but the heart of the issue remains the same. How can sovereign citizens democratically decide how much of their resources they wish to devote to common goals such as education, health, retirement, inequality reduction, employment, sustainable development, and so on?

Picketty has little patience for economic doctrine in general, and gets some serious digs in:

Among the members of these upper income groups are US academic economists, many of whom believe that the economy of the United States is working fairly well and, in particular, that it rewards talent and merit accurately and precisely...Some economists have an unfortunate tendency to defend their private interest while implausibly claiming to champion the general interest.

Besides, he says, the thing every red-blooded entrepreneur wants to see is people getting rich by their wits and deeds, not by the birthright of kings. Consider the heiress to the L'oreal fortune and Bill Gates:

All large fortunes, whether inherited or entrepreneurial in origin, grow at extremely high rates, regardless of whether the owner of the fortune works or not. To be sure, one should be careful not to overestimate the precision of the conclusions one can draw from these data, which are based on a small number of observations and collected in a somewhat careless and piecemeal fashion. The fact is nevertheless interesting.

Take a particularly clear example at the very top of the global wealth hierarchy. Between 1990 and 2010, the fortune of Bill Gates -- the founder of Microsoft, the world leader in operating systems, and the very incarnation of entrepreneurial wealth and number one in the Forbes rankings for more than ten years -- increased from $4 billion to $50 billion. At the same time, the fortune of Liliane Bettencourt -- the heiress of L'Oréal, the world leader in cosmetics, founded by her father Eugène Schueller, who in 1907 invented a range of hair dyes that were destined to do well in a way reminiscent of César Birotteau's success with perfume a century earlier -- increased from $2 billion to $25 billion, again according to Forbes.

In other words, Liliane Bettencourt, who never worked a day in her life, saw her fortune grow exactly as fast as that of Bill Gates, the high-tech pioneer, whose wealth has incidentally continued to grow just as rapidly since he stopped working. Once a fortune is established, the capital grows according to a dynamic of its own, and it can continue to grow at a rapid pace for decades simply because of its size. Note, in particular, that once a fortune passes a certain threshold, size effects due to economies of scale in the management of the portfolio and opportunities for risk are reinforced by the fact that nearly all the income on this capital can be plowed back into investment. An individual with this level of wealth can easily live magnificently on an amount equivalent to only a few tenths of percent of his capital each year, and he can therefore reinvest nearly all of his income. This is a basic but important economic mechanism, with dramatic consequences for the long-term dynamics of accumulation and distribution of wealth. Money tends to reproduce itself.

(A dry postscript on those who say that feckless descendants correct this problem on their own: "It would in any case be rather imprudent to rely solely on the eternal but arbitrary force of family degeneration to limit the future proliferation of billionaires.")

But how does money increase itself? It turns out that if you have a lot of money to invest, you get a lot more in return, as Piketty demonstrates by picking apart the investment returns of the Ivy League university endowments, which are the only privately invested fortunes whose investment strategies are subject to public scrutiny:

If we look at the investment strategies of different universities, we find highly diversified portfolios at all levels, with a clear preference for US and foreign stocks and private sector bonds (government bonds, especially US Treasuries, which do not pay well, account for less than 10 percent of all these portfolios and are almost totally absent from the largest endowments). The higher we go in the endowment hierarchy, the more often we find "alternative investment strategies," that is, very high yield investments such as shares in private equity funds and unlisted foreign stocks (which require great expertise), hedge funds, derivatives, real estate, and raw materials, including energy, natural resources, and related products (these, too, require specialized expertise and offer very high potential yields). If we consider the importance in these various portfolios of "alternative investments," whose only common feature is that they abandon the usual strategies of investing in stocks and bonds accessible to all, we find that they represent only 10 percent of the portfolios of institutions with endowments of less than 50 million euros, 25 percent of those with endowments between 50 and 100 million euros, 35 percent of those between 100 and 500 million euros, 45 percent of those between 500 million and 1 billion euros, and ultimately more than 60 percent of those above 1 billion euros. The available data, which are both public and extremely detailed, show unambiguously that it is these alternative investment strategies that enable the very largest endowments to obtain real returns of close to 10 percent a year, while smaller endowments must make do with 5 percent.

In other words, if you're a normal person with a 401(k), you'd be lucky to clear inflation with your nest egg. If you're a gazillionaire, you can hire financial talent who'll get you 10 points even in the worst market, and you can pay them hundreds of millions out of chump change.

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The low point was attained in the 1970s: after several decades of small inheritances and accumulation of new wealth, inherited capital accounted for just over 40 percent of total private capital. For the first time in history (except in new countries), wealth accumulated in the lifetime of the living constituted the majority of all wealth: nearly 60 percent. It is important to realize two things: first, the nature of capital effectively changed in the postwar period, and second, we are just emerging from this exceptional period. Nevertheless, we are now clearly out of it: the share of inherited wealth in total wealth has grown steadily since the 1970s. Inherited wealth once again accounted for the majority of wealth in the 1980s, and according to the latest available figures it represents roughly two-thirds of private capital in France in 2010, compared with barely one-third of capital accumulated from savings. In view of today's very high inheritance flows, it is quite likely, if current trends continue, that the share of inherited wealth will continue to grow in the decades to come, surpassing 70 percent by 2020 and approaching 80 percent in the 2030s.

Piketty says that the "normal" state of affairs in which anyone has a crack at fame and fortune is a blip in the long run of human history that has been largely characterized by a self-serving, greedy hereditary aristocracy whose comfort was only possible because of the enmiseration of nearly everyone else. Absent some kind of extraordinary intervention, hereditary wealth will reassert itself as the primary political mover in our world. The people at the top have always convinced themselves that they live in a meritocracy, because hey, they're the best people they know, and they're at the top of the pyramid. QED. But this story is impossible to square with the data:

The fact that income inequality in the United States in 2000–2010 attained a level higher than that observed in the poor and emerging countries at various times in the past -- for example, higher than in India or South Africa in 1920–1930, 1960–1970, and 2000–2010 -- also casts doubt on any explanation based solely on objective inequalities of productivity. Is it really the case that inequality of individual skills and productivities is greater in the United States today than in the half-illiterate India of the recent past (or even today) or in apartheid (or postapartheid) South Africa? If that were the case, it would be bad news for US educational institutions, which surely need to be improved and made more accessible but probably do not deserve such extravagant blame...

...Since it is impossible to give a precise estimate of each manager's contribution to the firm's output, it is inevitable that this process yields decisions that are largely arbitrary and dependent on hierarchical relationships and on the relative bargaining power of the individuals involved. It is only reasonable to assume that people in a position to set their own salaries have a natural incentive to treat themselves generously, or at the very least to be rather optimistic in gauging their marginal productivity. To behave in this way is only human, especially since the necessary information is, in objective terms, highly imperfect. It may be excessive to accuse senior executives of having their "hands in the till," but the metaphor is probably more apt than Adam Smith's metaphor of the market's "invisible hand." In practice, the invisible hand does not exist, any more than "pure and perfect" competition does, and the market is always embodied in specific institutions such as corporate hierarchies and compensation committees.

...Regardless of whether the wealth a person holds at age fifty or sixty is inherited or earned, the fact remains that beyond a certain threshold, capital tends to reproduce itself and accumulates exponentially. The logic of r > g implies that the entrepreneur always tends to turn into a rentier. Even if this happens later in life, the phenomenon becomes important as life expectancy increases. The fact that a person has good ideas at age thirty or forty does not imply that she will still be having them at seventy or eighty, yet her wealth will continue to increase by itself. Or it can be passed on to the next generation and continue to increase there. Nineteenth-century French economic elites were creative and dynamic entrepreneurs, but the crucial fact remains that their efforts ultimately -- and largely unwittingly -- reinforced and perpetuated a society of rentiers owing to the logic of r > g.

This inequality of access also seems to exist at the top of the economic hierarchy, not only because of the high cost of attending the most prestigious private universities (high even in relation to the income of upper-middle-class parents) but also because admissions decisions clearly depend in significant ways on the parents' financial capacity to make donations to the universities. For example, one study has shown that gifts by graduates to their former universities are strangely concentrated in the period when the children are of college age. By comparing various sources of data, moreover, it is possible to estimate that the average income of the parents of Harvard students is currently about $450,000, which corresponds to the average income of the top 2 percent of the US income hierarchy. Such a finding does not seem entirely compatible with the idea of selection based solely on merit. The contrast between the official meritocratic discourse and the reality seems particularly extreme in this case. The total absence of transparency regarding selection procedures should also be noted.

Remember, hereditary wealth isn't just unfair, it's also an invitation to laziness. Just as competition disciplines firms, so to does taxation discipline dynasties:

A classic argument in favor of a capital tax should not be neglected. It relies on a logic of incentives. The basic idea is that a tax on capital is an incentive to seek the best possible return on one's capital stock. Concretely, a tax of 1 or 2 percent on wealth is relatively light for an entrepreneur who manages to earn 10 percent a year on her capital. By contrast, it is quite heavy for a person who is content to park her wealth in investments returning at most 2 or 3 percent a year. According to this logic, the purpose of the tax on capital is thus to force people who use their wealth inefficiently to sell assets in order to pay their taxes, thus ensuring that those assets wind up in the hands of more dynamic investors.

There have been a number of critcisms leveled at Piketty since the English translation of Capital, and, like the Financial Times broadside, most of these have been unserious -- coming from people who clearly haven't read the book carefully enough. But there's one criticism I have a lot of time for: Suresh Naidu's critique of the politics of Piketty's analysis. Piketty treats the rate of return on capital as largely financial, while Naidu argues (convincingly) that it's political. The rules of property and the willingness of the state to support those rules through everything from guard labor to anti-default/anti-inflationary policies are political decisions, not laws of nature, and they are the crux of the rate of return. And since the relative positions of the rate of return versus the rate of growth (r > g) is at the crux of his theory, this is a significant challenge to his analysis.

Piketty, in Naidu's view, is limited by his unwillingness to challenge capitalism itself. As Naidu says:

This is where Piketty’s Walrasian conventions dampen his contribution: he discusses the first, but not the second. It’s like saying slavery is an inequality of assets between slaves and slaveholders without describing the plantation.

Even Adam Smith suggested measuring a person’s income by the “quantity of that labor which he can command.” This has normally been taken to mean income of the rich relative to the wage. But it also means looking at “command”: what privileges and obligations can one demand from the soul purchased (or rented)?

An economy that allows indentured labor means that wealth can purchase more power over people; an economy with robust union contracts means that capital is trammeled in its control over the shop floor. From sexual harassment on the job to the indignities of gentrification and nonprofit funding, a world of massive inequality is a world where rich people get to shape environments that everybody else has to accept.

Piketty repeatedly announces that politics plays a large role in the distribution of income. But he neglects that the distribution of income and wealth also generates inequalities of larger privileges and prerogatives; wealth inequality together with a thoroughly commodified society enables a million mini-dictatorships, wherein the political power of the rich is exercised through the market itself.

Piketty is locked in a curious dance with Marx -- there is a spectre haunting Capital in the 21st Century and it is Kapital -- the Marxist critique of power-dynamics themselves. Piketty wants desperately to salvage capitalism, even if that means proposing something that every capitalist will hate: a global wealth tax.

(Image: Piketty in Cambridge, Sue Gardner, CC-BY-SA)

-Cory Doctorow

https://boingboing.net/2014/06/24/thomas-pikettys-capital-in-t.html

[fuckthegovfucklove]

The Love Ideology: What is love?

Trying to define love is a bloody tiring mission encumbered by vagueness, contradictions and inconsistencies. So I’m not going to attempt to define the word but rather look at some of the different shapes love comes in within interpersonal relationships.

I want to look at the different types of love, the function of each, the power dynamics that exist and their relevance as a basis to share my speculative thoughts on the wider implications of love in later posts.

Loving is touted as a necessity, a source of joy and an objectively good thing for humanity. I’m not so sure I agree and I think a counter-argument against love is useful in redirecting our focus to more urgent issues and developing critical thought, or at the very least being more conscious of the way you love (if you must).

I briefly look at self love, romantic love, platonic love and familial love from a mainstream (western) perspective since that’s what's most prevalent and all I know anyway. Love is not confined to interpersonal relationships and critique of it can be extended to sentiments like unwaveringly love for homeland (patriotism), love for a public figure (idolatry), love for an ideology (cultism).

You’ll find that in every case where love is referred to, it could easily be replaced by a more revealing synonym.

Self love

I know your familiar with this one, we rave on about it all the time. It’s being content with who you are, knowing your “worth” (you see the capitalist undertones too right?). Some call it a radical self-acceptance and according to John Kim the ‘life coach’, self love looks like this:

“When you get to a place where you like yourself, the action of loving yourself will come more naturally. You’ll have non-negotiables. You won’t tolerate certain behaviour from others. You’ll seek less approval. Your friendships will be less lopsided. You won’t have as many holes to fill within you. You’ll be more gentle with yourself, more forgiving. You’ll believe you deserve more, better, different. You’ll finally stop breaking the promises you’ve made with you. And the relationship you have with yourself will improve. “

Ah so, curing all the problems caused by love (and capitalism) with more.. love? Think about why you do what you do. You compromise because you love, tolerate because you love, seek approval because you want love, your love is quantifiable and isn’t always reciprocated, love told you you need it feel whole, to love you must forgive, you deserve love.

Is loving yourself enough in a capitalist world that measures your social worth on how full your cup of love is? (think about the [profitable] factors that determine this too). Will the inferiority complex completely dissipate? If you walk out on the expectations of this here capitalist world perhaps, but abandoning the pursuit of love might be a quicker route.

“You can’t love somebody else until you love yourself“ is a widely known cliché typically used in a romantic context. Some critique the adage saying self-love isn’t actually a precondition for loving others, clinical psychologist Leon F. Seltzer proposes a better alternative: “To deepen your love and acceptance of another, first develop love and acceptance for yourself.” Interesting. I still think theres a semblance of truth in the former that could easily be extrapolated to other types of love.

See loving the Other can only be done by identifying parts of yourself within them and seeing qualities in them that you like. It’s impossible to imagine what loving something entirely disconnected from us looks like because everything is in some way connected to self. We extend ourselves to the object of our love so that by loving the Other we are also loving ourselves. Kierkegaard calls this ‘self-love’. Loving your partner is loving self, loving your friend is loving self, loving your family is loving self, loving your nation is loving self, loving the environment is loving self, loving an ideology is loving self; no matter how selfless or sacrificial the nature. Thus, I have made the cheeky decision to sub them all under this title.

Romantic love

The most sought after, most regulated, most distracting and arguably the most delusional of loves. Romance is where we can write our own fiction and relies on our own imagination to create a world where it can function. Driven by our libidinal desires, we seek to conquer the heart of another. Our romantic interests becoming personified virtues who make us feel like we’ve never felt before (until they don’t).

It is here we are forced to learn a gender and organise our desires around them. Our bizarre sex-sentimentality makes romantic love a safe space to be completely uninhibited. Eroticism is confined to the couple as is building a life project (cohabitation, economic merging, child-rearing).

We have a set criteria of what we look for in a partner (our fantasy), too busy setting up our Tinder to question why our list is identical to the next persons and what is informing these ~ preferences ~. The success of romantic interactions are contingent upon the degree to which projective identification is continually effective, that is when a person projects their fantasy onto another so that they feel inclined or pressured to fall in line with the projective fantasy. In romance, this is typically one of amour passion where by confessing your feelings the other now hopefully joins you in this romantic fantasy.

We must then commit to this person, overcommit then merge. The merging process frequently comes with the dissolution of autonomy and boundaries because complete trust in the other is a requirement. We simultaneously create rules and install dependencies to solidify this union because subconsciously we know that love is not enough to keep two together.

Unpaid labour is an intrinsic part of romantic love and it’s usually gendered - maintaining a healthy relationship requires work (cishet women and those taking the role of woman/femme/more domesticised doing most of the labour). So is it that we enjoy working 9-5 + unpaid overtime or do the promised benefits of coupledom outweigh the cons?

Those who opt for singledom and see no sense in romantic love are considered immature or are diagnosed with the infamous disorder the therapists call ‘fear of intimacy’. Those who are single by circumstances are told that “the one“ will soon come and/or are often pitied. The social worth of an individual increases when they are in a couple as the partner is pretty much considered personal property.

Unions formed on the basis of romantic love are the only ones that are eligible to sign a contract with the state (think about why) and in exchange are afforded a multitude of benefits from adoption rights and tax deductions to immigration and residency for partners from other countries. These unions, called marriage, are usually accompanied by an expensive celebration party where friends and family are expected to attend and bring gifts.

So what is the purpose of romantic love and why do we desire it? Lynn Paramore sums it up.

“Romantic love is not based on companionship, but on the feeling of being desired. This kind of love appears to give us the opportunity, just as money does, to constantly remake ourselves, to project new version of our lives. It’s about longing, fleeting highs, the same stimulation we feel in buying a new car, a new wardrobe. As the married couple’s romantic attraction wanes, the need for stimulation is transferred to the next big purchase, the washing machine, the wide-screen TV. Capitalism goes humming along.”

Platonic love

Where there’s romance, love is expected to consume you. Friendships aren’t similarly expected to be as emotionally weighty and intoxicating; we expect support in good times and bad, someone to laugh, gossip and cry with and a companion to embark on new adventures with. We hope for our friendships to last long but don’t spend as much time deliberating about our future, we truly live in the present with those we consider friends.

These relationships are usually built off of shared values and interests, and an appreciation of the stark realities of the individual characters. They aren’t typically sought after but are formed by being in the right place at the right time. Friendships usually have no issue respecting autonomy, there’s something more rational and ethical about the bond. The voluntarist nature of the entanglements allow this and in comparison to romantic love, platonic love expects little.

The performative actions designed to win affection that are part and parcel of romance are left at the door. Platonic love isn’t devoid of affection but arbitrary limits are put in place e.g sexual intercourse. According popular culture sex ruins a friendship (loooool). Friends do typically seek a level of validation and affirmation from their peers, considerably higher (from my observations) for those socialised as men.

While platonic love doesn’t demand the cognitive bending that romantic love does, it’s similar in the sense that it’s love through favouritism. We give preferential treatment to those who favour us even in situations where logically we would do otherwise. It is expected of us. Platonic love however does not hold the same social value as romantic love and friendships are often “demoted“ once a new romantic interest takes the stage. Andrew Sullivan voiced his disapproval on this common practice:

“The great modern enemy of friendship has turned out to be love. By love, I don't mean the principle of giving and mutual regard that lies at the heart of friendship [but] love in the banal, ubiquitous, compelling, and resilient modern meaning of love: the romantic love that obliterates all other goods, the love to which every life must apparently lead, the love that is consummated in sex and celebrated in every particle of our popular culture, the love that is institutionalized in marriage and instilled as a primary and ultimate good in every Western child...We live in a world, in fact, in which respect and support for eros (romantic love) has acquired the hallmarks of a cult. “

Familial love

Familial love presents in a lot of arrangements. Between two individuals it can be a progression from platonic love or romantic love (though they can coexist). It’s a fondness born out of familiarity, dependency, mutual protection and non-judgmental support. Family can also describe a group of people you share similar experiences and rituals with, such as a church family or work family.

The primal familial love, the “blood is thicker than water“ love that is somewhat universal refers to the instinctual affection and protection we show to those with blood (shared genetics/common ancestors) and perhaps legal bonds (legally bound through adoption/guardianship). The love of a parent towards offspring and vice versa. Or extended blood family. With familial love theres an inherent hierarchy: offspring, spouse, parents-siblings, extended blood family and then other forms of family if chosen. I will refer to familial love as what exists between parent and offspring henceforth as it customarily obliterates the rest.

This familial love conventionally implies unconditional, ultra-protective, “I’d die for you“ love towards child. It’s not given according to their personal qualities (although once they’re no longer a minor it often weakens) and if a child should stray on the wrong path the parent will most likely do everything in their power to save them. The family is the nuclear of civilisation and the most basic unit of society. The education of almost all starts in the family, particularly character and moral education.

The familial love of a parent is one of duty and protection, and for the child it’s one of dependance and trust. As parents are the legal guardians of children, they position themselves as the authority and the child recognises them as such. Parents have a wider understanding of society and often try balance preserving a child’s innocence (I often wonder why) whilst making them aware of the “real world”. In order to ensure a child obeys them and trusts that they know what's best for them they often remind the child that there’s bad people out there that do bad things i.e “don’t talk to strangers, they could kidnap you“. Children are then obliged to submit to the parental safety that the home provides, whilst also being dependent on their parent for sustenance.

Familial love is assumed to be natural and present in all. It’s blasphemy to confess you do not love your parents or you do not love your child. In situations of conflict, familial love is supposed water down any malice, and forgiveness/reconciliation should follow. The family is expected to have your best interest at heart at all time and familial love is thought of as permanent, parents often say things along the lines of: “Your family remains even when everyone leaves“. Loyalty and favouritism is therefore expected and should also trump that of friends and romantic partners.

Many choose to reproduce. They get to experience the reverse of child-parent familial love where they are the ones in authority and build a life project from that. Why do people choose to have children? Some of the reasons people give range from: looking to find a sense of purpose, familism, pressure from peers and family, belief that it is your duty to continue your biological lineage etc. A growing number of people are choosing not to reproduce usually because they aren’t interested in parenting or bringing more people into the world (voluntary childlessness/anti-natalism).

Humanaesfera suggests a political explanation for the desire to create a family:

“Since the emergence of capitalism (ie, the industrial capital, the proletariat and the modern state, simultaneously, eighteenth century), the familism is the central fetish by which the proletarians (ie, those deprived of the property of any means of life) accept willingly to engage in maintaining and improving the enterprise and the government, creating and accumulating with dedication the very hostile power that systematically subjugates them, wears out them, recycles them, discards them and abandons them - the capital. This is because they place their libido (cathexis), their desires, in the family, pseudo capitalist property in which they fantasize are accumulating their own capital on a par with the capitalists. This leads them to support the ruling class and the police, that is, the state as guarantor of this fictitious property.”

[warsofasoiaf]

Any chance you want to give us some analysis of the psychologist and chaplain on the Unity, Sister Miriam? Reynold did a pretty solid job making her more than some crazy protestant fundamentalist, and some of her "We Must Dissent" critiques on how technology is being applied have a tinge of your own cynicism, although filtered through the lens of an extreme evangelical.

Miriam is one controversial character. On the surface, she’s a Bible-thumping fundamentalist, her preferred government choice is even called “Fundamentalist,” her facial expression even seems to scream: “Jesus is watching you.” Yet this does the writers a deep disservice, as evidenced by the other factions, they are capable of writing fully-realized characters and philosophies.

We don’t get an actual declaration of what sect of Christianity Miriam, or even what ecumenical form Christianity took at the time the Unity took off, all we know is that apparently the United States transformed into a theocracy at some point, so it’s probably some sect of Protestantism. Truth be told, it doesn’t actually matter whether we do or not, Miriam expresses herself well enough through her own quotes. She tends to express herself primarily in two ways, fierce condemnation of reckless progress without regard to morality, and a softer, comforting tone likely given among her own flock. This is key for Miriam, she cares about her people in a way that faction heads do not. Morgan, Santiago, and Zakharov see the virtue of their progress as proof of its intrinsic morality, Yang is nihilistic, Deidre is rushing off so much with her plants and fungus that she’s losing touch with her humanity, and Lal is bureaucratic, impersonal, and more than a bit hypocritical, concerned with style over substance. Miriam wants to ensure that the spiritual wellbeing of her citizens is protected, and she truly practices what she preaches: “And so we return again to the holy void. Some say this is simply our destiny, but I would have you remember always that the void EXISTS, just as surely as you or I. Is nothingness any less a miracle than substance?” The fate of humanity is ever precarious and Miriam knows that people can be pushed close to the breaking point, and she is there with the balm of Gilead to get people to feel better. Her people believe in her too, they’re more than willing to support a large military before feeling discontent and fight hard to accomplish her goals. More than any other faction, Miriam expresses sympathy for the downtrodden. On the other side, she is strict and condemnatory toward others who refuse her message and her AI is fairly aggressive. In this sense she still has that sort of militant preacher vibe, but it’s to the credit of the writers that they took this archetype and fleshed it out. Like every other faction, Miriam has her strengths and her weaknesses, things she can be lauded for and criticized.

One of the big criticisms levelled at Miriam is that she is either a Luddite, a technophobe, or suspicious of science itself. She is none of these, her approach to research stems from a true sense of social conservatism. After all, she’s a psychologist and she understands the chemical states of matter, she is both clearly educated in multiple scientific disciplines and has no intrinsic distrust of science: “Evil lurks in the datalinks as it lurked in the streets of yesteryear. But it was never the streets that were evil.” This quote suggests that she considers the datalinks evil in and of themselves, but other quotes give her a more complete picture. Look at this selection of quotes from her key work, “We Must Dissent,” her treatise castigating the technological development of the other factions: 

“Already we have turned all of our critical industries, all of our material resources, over to these… things… these lumps of silver and paste we call nanorobots. And now we propose to teach them intelligence? What, pray tell, will we do when these little homunculi awaken one day and announce that they have no further need for us?”

“And what of the immortal soul in such transactions? Can this machine transmit and reattach it as well? Or is it lost forever, leaving a soulless body to wander the world in despair?”

“Will we next create false gods to rule over us? How proud we have become, and how blind.”

Miriam is clear, she wants others to think about what they’re doing. The pursuit of progress without being cognizant of the risks and costs arguably helped contribute to the catastrophe of Earth. What things have the labtechs at the University of Planet failed to take into account, what corners did Morgan cut in pursuit of the next great product, what happens to the mental state of people in Deidre’s psychic networks? She celebrates beneficial advances in technology, she even refers to the plasma accretion process creating “new miracles,” she’s afraid of it’s misuse. That’s why she doesn’t accumulate research points in the first couple years and that’s why her research is slow. Sure, there is less funding for laboratories over churches as well, but her greatest concern is to understand how these changes will effect the psychology of her people and of the society at large. The end-game techs are in no uncertain terms terrifying. Controlled singularities, self-aware colonies, molecular reassembly, all of these things improperly considered are an extinction level event on their own, but each faction continues to roll them out, eager for gain, not knowing what next they will unleash because they lack the wisdom of restraint. Her dichotomy is best summed up in two quotes: “Beware, you who seek first and final principles, for you are trampling the garden of an angry God, and He awaits you just beyond the last theorem.” This sounds like a fire-and-brimstone street preacher, but it’s the other quote that accompanies Quantum mechanics that is exceptional: “Men in their arrogance claim to understand the nature of creation, and devise elaborate theories to describe its behavior. But always they discover in the end that God was quite a bit more clever than they thought.“ The proof is in the pudding there, while the former appears to be direct and so a bit of fiery language can be expected, this appears to be a reflection or philosophy. Mankind is flawed and refusal to accept it leads to catastrophe.

Protestantism doesn’t have a Pope or Patriarch and instead professes a universal priesthood, suggesting that Miriam’s administration is modeled with theological and secular components, influencing the other but not under the direction of a religious caste. A Democratic Miriam loosens the restrictions and military funding for greater promotion of the self through community and activity, while a Police State Miriam utilizes a state of emergency and herself as governmental head to act in preservation of her people and their souls. Miriam preserves fundamentalism, which likely strips funding from labs in the interests of devoting the majority of the social fabric to religious concerns and the totality of existence as universal believers, protecting them from foreign influence without becoming the paranoid police state of informants that a Bloodraven might promote.

Economically, Miriam forbids nothing. A Planned Economy probably is fashioned similar to Christian communialism through common ownership and shared industry, justified in sermons and enforced through a small army of bureaucratic clerks. A Free Market Miriam resembles the American South, with an emphasis on charitable giving and a strong sense of community. A Green Miriam acknowledges that resources are limited and so encourages thrift and voluntary deprivation for the sake of the community, using less so that others might have more as proscribed by Christian virtues.

Miriam forbids Knowledge as a value, and this makes sense given what is mentioned above, pursuit of knowledge for its own sake makes one heedless to its risks. If Miriam values power, she has probably come to accept the necessity of a holy war as the only way to save mankind from its own recklessness. Wealth Miriam likely focuses more upon the prosperity gospel, where good people gain money through goodness, build industry to employ others, and so on.

A Cybernetic Miriam probably has increasing automation to permit others freedom in their tasks and devote themselves more completely to other matters, but this doesn’t sound appealing to Miriam who fears the machine rising against the master. A Eudaimonic Miriam is almost certainly the one she would elect to pursue, finally creating the paradise on Planet and letting people live in goodness, good in word, good in thought, good in action, good in faith. Thought Control is again, a sinister one, the people finally rendered docile believers, where Shepherd Miriam finally has her flock, where sin is such an evil that it must be prevented at all costs, though if I had seen Miriam do this, the last thing I would say before I was invariably hauled off to the Punishment Sphere is: “And what of the immortal soul?”

Thanks for the question, TBH.

SomethingLikeALawyer, Hand of the King

[pope-francis-quotes]

20th September >> (@zenitenglish) #PopeFrancis #Pope Francis Cites Dangers of Racism

Pope Francis Cites Dangers of Racism

The Other is a Brother or Sister to Love

(Anne Kurian @zenitenglish)

“The other is not only a person to be respected by virtue of his inherent dignity but above all a brother or sister to love,” Pope Francis on September 20, 2018, old the participants at the World Conference on Xenophobia, Racism, and Populism in the context of migration, organized from 18 to 20 September 18-20, 2018 at the Vatican. He invites us to transform “tolerance” into “fraternal love, tenderness, and active solidarity”.

On the last day of this meeting promoted by the Dicastery for the Service of Integral Human Development and the World Council of Churches, the Pope improvised a few words and gave them his speech prepared in advance, where he denounces today acts of intolerance, discrimination or exclusion that seriously endanger the dignity of the persons involved and their fundamental rights, including the right to life and to physical and moral integrity “.

“Unfortunately,” he laments, “it even happens that in the world of politics, we give in to the temptation to exploit the fears or objective difficulties of certain groups and to use illusory promises for electoral interests. short-sighted. ”

“The gravity of these phenomena can not leave us indifferent,” insists the Pope: “We are all called upon, in our respective roles, to cultivate and promote respect for the intrinsic dignity of every person, starting with the family … but also in the various contexts in which we act “. It particularly encourages the media, trainers and religious leaders.

******

Here is a ZENIT working translation of the speech prepared in advance.

Speech by Pope Francis

Cardinal, Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate and in the Priesthood, Dear Brothers and Sisters,

I am pleased to welcome you to the World Conference on Xenophobia, Racism and Populist Nationalism in the Context of Global Migration (Rome, 18-20 September 2018). I warmly greet the representatives of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Christian Churches, in particular, the World Council of Churches, and other religions. I thank Cardinal Peter Turkson, Prefect of the Dicastery for the Department of Integral Human Development, for the kind words he addressed to me on behalf of all the participants.

We live in a time when feelings that many thought were outmoded seem to be reviving and spreading. Feelings of suspicion, fear, contempt and even hatred of individuals or groups deemed to be different because of their ethnic, national or religious affiliation, and as such considered unworthy to participate fully in the life of society. These feelings, too, all too often lead to acts of intolerance, discrimination or exclusion, which seriously undermine the dignity of the persons involved and their fundamental rights, including the right to life and physical integrity, and morality. Unfortunately, it even happens that in the world of politics,

The gravity of these phenomena can not leave us indifferent. We are all called upon, in our respective roles, to cultivate and promote respect for the intrinsic dignity of every person, starting with the family – a place where we learn from an early age the values of sharing, of welcome, fraternity, and solidarity – but also in the various contexts in which we act.

I think, first and foremost, of trainers and educators, who are asked to renew their commitment so that at school, at university and in other places of learning, the respect of every person, including physical and cultural differences that distinguish it, overcoming prejudices.

In a world where access to information and communication tools is ever more common, special responsibility rests with those working in the social communications world, who have a duty to serve the truth and spread the word. information by being attentive to fostering a culture of encounter and openness to others, with mutual respect for diversity.

Those who derive economic benefits from the climate of mistrust abroad, where the irregularity or the illegality of the stay favors and nourishes a system of precariousness and exploitation – sometimes to a level that generates true forms of slavery – should make a profound examination of conscience, in the consciousness that one day they will have to give an account to God of the choices they have made.

Faced with the spread of new forms of xenophobia and racism, leaders of all religions also have an important mission: to spread among their faithful the principles and ethical values inscribed by God in the heart of man, known as the natural law. It is about realizing and inspiring gestures that help to build societies based on the principle of the sacredness of human life and respect for the dignity of every person, on charity, on fraternity, – which goes well beyond tolerance – and on solidarity.

In particular, let the Christian churches be humble and active witnesses to the love of Christ. For Christians, the moral responsibilities mentioned above assume an even deeper meaning in the light of faith.

The common origin and the unique bond with the Creator make all the members of a single family, brothers, and sisters, created in the image and likeness of God, as taught by the Biblical Revelation.

The dignity of all men, the fundamental unity of mankind and the call to live as brothers, find their confirmation and reinforce themselves to the extent that we welcome the Good News that all are also saved and gathered by the Christ, to the point that – as Saint Paul says – “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free man, there is no longer the man and the woman, because all, we are one in Christ Jesus “(Gal 3,28).

In this perspective, the other is not only a being to be respected by virtue of his intrinsic dignity, but above all a brother or sister to love. In Christ, tolerance is transformed into fraternal love, tenderness, and active solidarity. This is especially true of the smallest of our brothers, among whom we can recognize the stranger with whom Jesus identified himself. In the day of universal judgment, the Lord will remind us: “I was a stranger and you did not welcome me” (Mt 25,43). But he is already challenging us today: “I am a stranger, you do not recognize me? ”

And when Jesus said to the Twelve, “Among you, it shall not be so” (Mt 20,26), it did not refer only to the domination of the leaders of the nations in the political power, but to the whole Christian being. To be Christians, in fact, is a call to go against the grain, to recognize, welcome and serve the rejected Christ in the brothers.

Aware of the many expressions of proximity, welcome and integration already existing towards foreigners, I hope that this meeting, which has just been concluded, may spring from many other collaborative initiatives so that together we can build more just and more just societies. solidarity.

I entrust each one of you and your families to the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Mother of tenderness, and with all my heart I give you the Apostolic Blessing to you and those you love.

© Libreria Editrice Vatican

SEPTEMBER 20, 2018 17:17

HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE

[skeppsbrott]

I hate that “queer/POC/female atheists are more interesting than white cishet male atheists” post going around so much because

ONE - I don’t believe in God to be interesting? Faith isn’t about how fucking interesting you are, lol, either you have an intrinsic faith or you don’t, and either you chose to work with that or you decide to go against it, and whatever you do it’s because that’s what you need to do and what makes you feel like a more complete human being, and conflating that with being ~interesting~ is toxic as hell

Like I really can’t stress this enough, if you value anyone based on how “interesting” they are, you’re gonna have a bad fucking time. If someone is a self-reflecting and -improving, well rounded human they’ll be plenty interesting as a result of that.

TWO - It uses a rhetoric where religion is inevitably something that you, once enlightened, are supposed to strive away from. This is not only ridiculous but also pretty offensive because again, not everyone has an intrinsic faith. It’s not really PART of the human condition - I don’t have an intrinsic faith! I’m a person of faith because I make the active choice to be, and that’s something I fight for every time I face my beliefs. A lot of people come from a place of faith and struggle immensely with keeping that faith in times of doubt, and choosing to fight for that belief doesn’t make them less “interesting”, nor is it something to berate them for. A lot of queer people NEVER had a belief to begin with, anyway.

THREE - I’m not going to deny that institutionalized religion is often closely tied to existing power structures. That’s definitely and one hundred percent a Thing, but faith is so much more than that, and positioning atheism as a revolution against The Man and a fight against the institutions that uphold oppression is at best naive and generally just a huge misunderstanding of the relationship between deity and worshipper. I would bet that for most people, church is a community and a formality, a manner of quantifying or acknowledging their faith, but not the faith itself. People leave and seek churches, they start their own communities of faith, they move and find new places of worship. These systems may be innate to human community, but they’re not innate to one human’s relationship with God. I found my belief way after I came out, and there has never been a clash between those two parts of me. Are there Christians who will ostracize me and denounce my faith? Absolutely, but that is a beef between me and them, not between me and God.

Of course, a lot of queer people DO struggle with their faith, and I can’t speak for them, but like, just the general narrative just doesn’t work. Hell, there are a lot of communities of worship where these sorts of axis of oppression just don’t play in - pagan religions as we know them today (asatru, satanism, wicca) are all very recent and influenced by modern politics, but they’re a good example of belief systems where that post just... falls apart by virtue of having a very narrow perspective. Other faiths (especially beliefs that aren’t as formalized and structured) don’t even take these things into account.

Look, I used to be an atheist, almost on principle more than anything else, and that didn’t make me any more interesting. Exploring my ability to believe, and the religions in the world around me did, and that’s a journey I’ll probably be on all my life. Don’t buy into the easy narrative.

[a-wandering-fool]

From the article:  (it’s long, but interesting)

====================

Anyone who starts his “12 Rules for Life” with:

Stand up straight with your shoulders back

and ends it with

Pet a cat when you encounter one on the street

deserves a hearing.

I first read about Jordan Peterson from the left–from people hell bent on attacking this person as a racist, misogynistic, hateful little man who thinks governments should be involved in arranging marriages and who puts off everyone he meets.

Which is odd to me, because the world is full of racist, misogynistic, hateful little people–I live in the South, after all, and I’ve seen plenty–and why this particular “racist, misogynistic, hateful little man” deserves any particular attention simply because he wrote a book–again, the world is full of racist, misogynistic, hateful little people who actually write books.

And when the Left focuses on a specific individual like a laser beam, well, you know there is something going on behind the scenes.

Locally the issue came to a head when the local Indy Week rag wrote a piece calling “controversial” Jordan Peterson “regressive, backward, and hate-mongering”.

And the city of Durham, not to be outdone in its virtue signaling a few months ago when it banned cops from visiting Israel for training, decided to denounce Jordan Peterson.

Well, with credentials like this, it’s worth checking this guy out. So what sort of hateful anti-Left-wing bullshit is this guy spewing? Should I get the popcorn out? Do we have our Canadian version of Ann Coulter, who is rather famous not for saying anything really smart, but for exchanging barbs with the barbs the Left feels free to fling at conservatives?

So of course I went to YouTube.

And found… well, a 12 part series on The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories. A series on an earlier book of his, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief. An earlier series on Personality and Its Transformations.

Of course you also have the mismash of politically oriented stuff–some revolving around his refusal to abide by a Canadian law which requires him to use transgender friendly pronouns, on the grounds that the law impinges on his freedom of expression by curtailing his ability to speak, and further: requiringcertain modes of speech on pain of legal action.

But if you ignore the mismash of political stuff–what you have seems more like a modern Joseph Campbell and his The Hero with a Thousand Faces, not Rush Limbaugh and his The Way Things Ought To Be.

I have only watched the first video of Jordan Peterson’s series on the Bible–and in it he sort of rambles but seems to make a few core points: that the Bible is, at least in part, observations on how people live and how they should live. That one can think of “chaos” as “that which we do not know”, and the transition to “that which we are able to talk about” passes through a dream-like “that which we know but cannot put into words.”

And that when God created the heavens and the earth:

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. (John 1:1)

This describes at a psychological level the process of going from chaos to order–from the unknown through the dream state to that which can be spoken about.

Okay, so we have a psychologist turned modern-day Joseph Campbell, whose “12 Rules” start with “Stand up straight with your shoulders back.”

This is someone worth reading.

So I bought the book, because now I’m curious what this “regressive, backward, and hate-mongering” “little man” has to say.

From his introduction:

I proposed in Maps of Meaning that the great myths and religious stories of the past, particularly those derived from an earlier, oral tradition, were moral in their intent, rather than descriptive. Thus, they did not concern themselves with what the world was, as a scientist might have it, but with how a human being should act. I suggested that our ancestors portrayed the world as a stage—a drama—instead of a place of objects. I described how I had come to believe that the constituent elements of the world as drama were order and chaos, and not material things.

Which agrees with my understanding of the intent of the great religions of the world, and with the intent of the Native American storytelling tradition, of which I’m a little more familiar. Basically the elders did not believe that there was a literal Coyote God who could eat shit and shit food, who was a trickster who periodically had adventures with an Eagle God who was responsible for shading us from the beating rays of the sun. Instead, they believed in the dream-like transition from the unknowable Chaos beyond the camp fire to the spoken word of reality, and that all sorts of things lived in this “dream-like” world which could tell us something about how to live our lives.

And he said something in his introduction which took me by surprise by it’s blinding obviousness:

… I integrated all of that, for better or worse, trying to address a perplexing problem: the reason or reasons for the nuclear standoff of the Cold War. I couldn’t understand how belief systems could be so important to people that they were willing to risk the destruction of the world to protect them. I came to realize that shared belief systems made people intelligible to one another—and that the systems weren’t just about belief.

People who live by the same code are rendered mutually predictable to one another. They act in keeping with each other’s expectations and desires. They can cooperate. They can even compete peacefully, because everyone knows what to expect from everyone else. A shared belief system, partly psychological, partly acted out, simplifies everyone—in their own eyes, and in the eyes of others. Shared beliefs simplify the world, as well, because people who know what to expect from one another can act together to tame the world. There is perhaps nothing more important than the maintenance of this organization—this simplification. If it’s threatened, the great ship of state rocks. It isn’t precisely that people will fight for what they believe. They will fight, instead, to maintain the match between what they believe, what they expect, and what they desire. They will fight to maintain the match between what they expect and how everyone is acting. It is precisely the maintenance of that match that enables everyone to live together peacefully, predictably and productively. It reduces uncertainty and the chaotic mix of intolerable emotions that uncertainty inevitably produces.

“I came to realize that shared belief systems made people intelligible to one another—and that the systems weren’t just about belief.”

And people would rather destroy the world than have their belief systems destroyed–because it is our belief systems which turn Chaos into Order, and the chaos of destroying the world may be preferable to the chaos of disbelief, because at least we went out fighting before Chaos consumed us all.

Which is fucking profound, when you think of it.

His books speak to several ideas: that life is suffering, that the Cross of Christ is a symbol representing the World (most churches are built as a model of a Cross) in its representation of suffering and redemption. And “suffering” is no idle term: “Because we are vulnerable and mortal, pain and anxiety are an integral part of human existence.”

We must have something to set against the suffering that is intrinsic to Being. We must have the meaning inherent in a profound system of value or the horror of existence rapidly becomes paramount. Then, nihilism beckons, with its hopeless and despair.

To Jordan Peterson, then, we are caught between the loss of belief that renders life hopeless and makes conflict inevitable on the one hand, and the rigidity of ancient belief which traditionally segregated us into tribes who inevitably conflicted on the fringes. And while we have been withdrawing from the later:

In the West, we have been withdrawing from our tradition-, religion- and even nation-centred cultures, partly to decrease the danger of group conflict.

…

While writing Maps of Meaning, I was (also) driven by the realization that we can no longer afford conflict—certainly not on the scale of the world conflagrations of the twentieth century. Our technologies of destruction have become too powerful. The potential consequences of war are literally apocalyptic.

We’ve opened ourselves to the former: to the nihilism and lack of meaning that makes life intolerable and hopeless.

So what is the middle path–between rigidity of thought which led to the conflicts of the last century and the hopeless and despair which opens us to Totalitarianism: to the strong man who takes advantage of our meaningless?

During this time, I came to a more complete, personal realization of what the great stories of the past continually insist upon: the centre is occupied by the individual. The centre is marked by the cross, as X marks the spot. Existence at that cross is suffering and transformation—and that fact, above all, needs to be voluntarily accepted. It is possible to transcend slavish adherence to the group and its doctrines and, simultaneously, to avoid the pitfalls of its opposite extreme, nihilism. It is possible, instead, to find sufficient meaning in individual consciousness and experience.

How could the world be freed from the terrible dilemma of conflict, on the one hand, and psychological and social dissolution, on the other? The answer was this: through the elevation and development of the individual, and through the willingness of everyone to shoulder the burden of Being and to take the heroic path.

And that is what I’ve found in his book, “12 Rules for Life:” not a disrespectful diatribe against Leftism. But a paean to individualism–one which starts with the rule “Stand up straight with your shoulders back” by observing that Lobsters, whose evolutionary existence goes back 350 million years or more, form hierarchies to determine access to constrained resources. There are mechanisms in the lobster’s brain which regulate the balance of serotonin and octopamine based on where the lobster is in the social hierarchy: the higher in the hierarchy, the greater the serotonin, the more confident the lobster in defending his territory. The lower the lobster is in the social hierarchy, the lower the serotonin, the more energy the lobster spends insecure in its position. Low enough on the social hierarchy, and the lobster’s brain chemistry starts a self-destructive spiral which will eventually kill the lobster, removing it as a potential mate–because evolution serves packs, not individuals.

Nature is cruel.

It also means the hierarchies we humans form dates back nearly a third of a billion years.

In one of the more staggering demonstrations of the evolutionary continuity of life on Earth, Prozac even cheers up lobsters.

So when you stand up straight with your shoulders back, you signal to others that you are important. And in the process, you convince yourself that you are important.

Because you are.

And he even points out two things you can do when your internal 1/3rd of a billion year old system of internal social ranking malfunctions, making you more anxious and making you feel less important than you are:

Wake up at the same time every day. It’s less important when you go to bed than when you get up–anxiety and depression is linked to an irregular waking schedule.

Eat a fat- and protein-heavy breakfast as soon as possible on awaking (and avoid simple carbohydrates and sugars). “This is because anxious and depressed people are already stressed, particularly if their lives have not been under control for a good while. Their bodies are therefore primed to hypersecrete insulin, if they engage in any complex or demanding activity. If they do so after fasting all night and before eating, the excess insulin in their bloodstream will mop up all their blood sugar. Then they become hypoglycemic and psych​ophys​iologi​cally unstable. All day.”

I have had many clients whose anxiety was reduced to subclinical levels merely because they started to sleep on a predictable schedule and eat breakfast.

I can see how, to some, he can be a very dangerous thinker in today’s world where nihilism and lack of meaning have become fashionable. After all, for the past 100 years we learned that “meaning” can lead to World War. And with today’s weapons, another World War could end the world entirely.

But as I noted at the start, anyone who starts his rules with “stand up straight with your shoulders back” and ends with “pet a cat when you encounter one on the street”, whose rules include “assume that the person you are listening to might know something you don’t” and “do not bother children when they are skate-boarding”–they deserve a hearing.

And as someone who strongly and unreservedly believes in Individualism and in individual Will, and in the paradox of sacrifice that underlies the heroism of performing one’s true Will–what I’ve seen so far seems like a breath of fresh air.

====================

[transcending-chaos]

Writing Religions 101

Okay, so I’m not just gonna bitch about this tonight, here’s a quick 101 on writing these things. This is one heck of a long post, but hopefully it’ll explain things well enough. 

CLASSIFICATIONS

There are measurements and rules as to what classifies/what is considered a religion, especially if you want to write an Organized Religion. As such, here are the definitions again, as well as what they entail:

Religion is a group of collected beliefs passed down either through generational storytelling, instruction, or conversion. These beliefs have significance, importance, and prevalence in the adherents’ society, social activities, personal lives, relationships, and world views

Basically, religions are (often) archaic or long-standing, established beliefs that have weathered the passage of time or transformed along with it. They spread via common story-telling, through writing, generational teachings, familial traditions, are have bearing in an individual adherent’s life in some form, even if it’s mild superstition. It is a cultural tool used to help inform a worldview, and teach the uninformed or uninitiated. Yes, this can be bad, and yes it can be good, but it needs to have impact that resonates with the masses- even if it’s contained to one area. The resonance and personal value is what quantifies it as a religion in the first place; yes this varies from person to person, but without that quality, validity, attachment, and lens to help view the world through, it is not considered a religion or faith.

If this sounds strange, that’s because you’re trying to measure and quantify feeling, emotional and spiritual attachment, and give it value to be measured by. It’s a hard thing to do, but it can be done. It’s the attachment of people and principles, their devotion, their community and connection with a cause and ideal that is bigger than themselves.

So, that’s the broadest definition I can give, now to the sub-categories.

Organized Religion is a religious structure, narrative, values, and set of beliefs specified in a formally established doctrine that has interpreters, leaders, and systems. These are post-literate, meaning written or containing documents, and can be read or translated.

Any religion with definitive text and interpreter (preacher, spiritual leader)

This means that the religion has been written down and there is a structure and format to the members. Be it a hierarchy with different tiers, a community with a single speaker who reads, defines, and provides context for the text, or a structure where people take turns, Organized Religions have to be organized. There are systems to keep order, often for the sake of keeping the message of the text clear and unified, and this is what allows Organized Religions to spread so easily when compared to their counterpart. They often have community outreach or influence, they have a tendency to be much larger than Folk Religions, as well as considered more ‘valid’ in the eyes of the law because of their prevalence and the beneficial value they bring to the masses.

Please note that Organized Religions do not always mean Theocracies, though if you’re going to make a believable theocratic structure, you might want to use this one because it’d be a larger threat.

Folk Religion is/are social concepts followed by groups of people often determined by old superstitions and regional practices.

This one is harder to define because it can be offensive or insinuate that a group’s customs or traditions are not a ‘valid’ religion. Everything from tribal religions, forgotten ancient customs that few still practice, to civil religions can be considered Folk Religion.

Folk Religions are like old wives’ tales that are specific to regions or smaller territories than Organized Religions, as well as not usually written down. These have a far greater emphasis on oral storytelling and generational teachings, and of the two, are the ones with more malleable symbols and structures, but ultimately the morals and messaging should reach the same conclusion. These tales are more like superstition, often subtle, and often very simple. Considering a black cat crossing your path as bad luck is an example, throwing salt over your left shoulder if you spill it is another. Heck, if a town has ghost stories that are shared and reiterated over generations, than that’s a form of Folk Religion.

Cult as a term used to refer to those devoted to certain sects of larger religions. (For instance those who were devoted to a certain Saint in Catholicism would be considered a cult, but they still followed the larger practices and doctrine of the Catholic teachings.)

New movements within larger religions were usually classified as cults before becoming established sects.

In the traditional sense, Cults really were just smaller facets of larger religions that were devoted to another god within a pantheon, a saint within the host, etc. Also, anything new or not established were considered cults, as they were not formally organized, as widespread, or long-standing as the other two types of religions.

In the modern sense, cults are groups that practice a predatory method of recruitment and extremist ideals. Cults can rise to the level of organized religions, but doing so takes great periods of time, devotion from followers, outreach, influence, etc.

WHY DO CLASSIFICATIONS MATTER?

Quite simply, it determines structure, influence, validity (as determined by law), acceptance by outsiders, and the gauge your characters’ faith will be measured by. These criteria are put in place so that no one can make up something and then just say it’s a religion to get out of doing something else or breaking a law; it’s a way of categorizing and verifying that something is indeed intrinsic to one’s way of life.

Religion *has* to matter to your world if you give it one; it must have impact in some way. Does this mean your character has to have faith? No, absolutely not. But if you mention religion or begin to hint at one, be prepared to at least write the basic ramifications/effects of it existing in your world.

WAYS RELIGION HAS IMPACT/THE ‘WHY’ OF HAVING RELIGION

Religions are forms of mythology, ways that were established to explain the world when people did not know much about it.

Religions pass down traditions and connect multiple generations of people

Religions can unify nations and create peace/community through common belief

Religions dictate morality, good conduct, bad conduct, and consequences for actions

Religions were used to maintain order during periods of great social change

Religions offered entertainment for the masses or distractions from hard work as most are filled with parables

Religions offer comfort, solidarity, and purpose to those who need/seek it (ie. ‘finding faith’)

These are all explanations of why we have religions to begin with; whether it’s an old mythology that was once used to explain the world, or a collection of stories that withstood the test of time and slowly was transformed into something greater, these are reasons we have religions today. You must have a why, be it because of people trying to make the world into something they could fathom, actual divine instruction/intervention, or something someone made up and established a long time ago to create an empire, there has to be a reason. There must be a catalyst: a prophet or leader, an event, an object, something that still holds great relevance and meaning in the current day and age.

If you want an old-world religion, then go with the myth, tradition, and morality reasons.

If you want a religion that’s being used to manipulate the way a certain group of people thinks and interprets the world (via a theocracy), then go the route of choosing unification, morality, maintaining order (to repress change), and comfort.

If you want more of a Folk Religion path, choose something more like morality and entertainment.

Yet whatever the case, keep in mind that in order for your religion to stay around in your world, it must have a redeeming value. This is why ‘comfort’ is on the list. People will ignore reason and fight for what makes them feel good. It’s a good scapegoat if you’re struggling to come up with other reasons. 

IMPACT AND SYMBOLS

Here is where you let your creative side go nuts. Because your religion has relevance to groups of people and their worldview, it’s obviously impacted how they interact with the world. Your doctrine can be as broad or specific as you like, but it needs to have bearing on the world and/or it’s people. THERE MUST BE EFFECTS.

Symbols can be anything, for instance:

Christian Symbols:

-Christian Symbols focus predominantly on morality and the superiority of God

--Depending on what sect is using the symbols, certain images and techniques are more common

--Typically triumph Christian morals and viewpoints but these change based on the sects

-God Conquers All narrative

-Crosses (St. Peter’s Cross, the Crucifix) -humility, sacrifice, martyrdom, faith, carrying the weight of one’s sins

-Saints, Humans -servitude, reward, dedication, devotion, the images of God

-Angels -protection, devotion, messengers/heralds, divine interaction

-The Color Red -blood of Christ, sacrifice, fire and brimstone, hell and damnation

-The Color White -innocence, purity, virginity, perfection, divinity

-Theme of Unity and Edenic Worlds

-Theme of Virtue over Sin and/or Hypocrisy

-Theme of Conversion

Pagan Symbols

-Spirals and Knotwork -Pantheism, connection to all things

-Elements -Nature is Holy, Nature is God/powerful

-Magic -Transformation is necessary and natural, everyone and everything has power and importance

-Animals

--Predators are representative of savagery and forces greater than man

--Prey are humility, representative of humans, and how even the seemingly insignificant have important roles

--Sacrifices to or embodiments of God(s)

These symbols are highly malleable and change through the years to keep their relevance, but this is a rough outline of some very basic concepts.

Ultimately, choose your symbols with care and relevance to your created faiths.

WHY HAVE RELIGIONS AT ALL IN A NARRATIVE?

Aside from being a way to increase the scale of conflict to unfathomable and ancient wars between the very embodiments of good and evil, it’s a very easy way to get morals across as long as you’re clear in your messaging. Religions are very personal beliefs that are transcendental from culture to culture, relating themes in a concise manner (parables), and are often very human -because they have to relate to humans (I mean, in our world at least). They exist to fill needs, and whether those needs have gone and past are up to you in your narrative. Once again, they are cultural tools used to help inform a worldview, and teach the uninformed or uninitiated.

The possibilities are endless, but treat them with care.

For instance Religions can impact:

-Arts: fashion/visual arts/music/poetry/writing

-Sciences: the progression of how fields go forwards/sponsoring new fields of study

-Humanities: social structures/hierarchies/types of (un)favorable behavior/values of society

Literally anything and everything can be affected by religion, entire societies rise and fall with it.

These are just the most essential elements you need to write something that qualifies as a religion in your works. The broadness of the terms gives you a lot of room to explore, but it has to have substance, meaning, relevance, and an effect. Remember, you’re trying to validate and quantify things that are, by nature, unquantifiable. 

[transhumanitynet]

Transhumanism, Optimism, & the Meaning of Life

The Central Meme of Transhumanism

“I believe in Transhumanism: once there are enough people who can truly say that, the human species will be on the threshold of a new kind of existence, as different from ours as ours is from that of Peking man. It will at last be consciously fulfilling its real destiny.”

– Julian Huxley, ‘Transhumanism’, in “New Bottles for New Wine”

“What is a human being, then?’ ‘A seed.’ ‘A … seed?’ ‘An acorn that is unafraid to destroy itself in growing into a tree.”

― David Zindell, “The Broken God”

The “Central Meme of Transhumanism” (CMT; a term probably coined by Anders Sandberg) is simple: That we Can and Should Improve the Human Condition Using Technology. One may wonder whether that simple idea is necessarily axiomatic – i.e. the foundation stone of a larger structure – or if there are deeper, simpler ideas that it is derived from.

The simple fact is that the CMT is composed of multiple parts (“Can” versus “Should”, “Improve”, “Human Condition”, “Using”, “Technology”), all of which come with implicit baggage attached, in the form of assumptions and naturally arising questions. I would argue that regardless of the questions and/or answers you prefer, this means that the CMT is an interim step in a greater logical chain rather than the fundamental basis of a worldview in and of itself. In the few short paragraphs below, I hope to explain the deeper foundation of the CMT, which underpins it, supports it, and imparts its power.

What is “Meaning”?

“He tapped his foot and turned around and disappeared down through a hole in the ground where nothing means… everything”

– The Headless Chickens, “Soulcatcher”

When people ask about the “Meaning of Life”, all too often it seems that they don’t even know what ‘meaning’ is. What are they asking? Perhaps they just want to know what they should do with their days, beyond merely fulfilling the demands of other humans.

Meaning is a question of context, association, and of there being some point or purpose to a thing… i.e. some value to the thing which is non-arbitrary, objectively true or real, which is to say something other than a mere matter of personal preference. Something which matters. So, when someone asks what the Meaning of Life is, they are asking what it is about life that matters; about what is objectively true, real, or valuable beyond fleeting personal perceptions or preferences.

Thomas Ligotti & the Ultimate Absence of Meaning

““This is the great lesson the depressive learns: Nothing in the world is inherently compelling. Whatever may be really “out there” cannot project itself as an affective experience. It is all a vacuous affair with only a chemical prestige. Nothing is either good or bad, desirable or undesirable, or anything else except that it is made so by laboratories inside us producing the emotions on which we live.”

– Thomas Ligotti, “The Conspiracy Against the Human Race”

Let’s start at the beginning. As Thomas Ligotti has noted in “The Conspiracy Against The Human Race”, we know that nothing in the universe can be said to be objectively good or bad, or intrinsically related to good or bad feelings. We only enjoy or dislike (or even have the capability of perceiving) a thing because it has had some bearing on our evolutionary fitness, so we have evolved to feel good in reponse to certain stimuli, and bad in response to others. It is not objectively or intrinsically good or bad if a child dies, a species dies, or a star explodes and erases life across a thousand solar systems. Only the evolutionary “default settings” baked into our neural circuitry makes us imagine that it is, even for a moment. The idea of a God with particularly human concerns and preconceptions represents the most egregious failure to recognize the fact that we have no evidence to suggest we live in a universe which is anything but utterly meaningless in essence.

Ligotti is no Transhumanist, but he demonstrates a clear understanding of the situation mortal beings find themselves in: They can either find some way to live in a world where their emotions and drives are somewhat arbitrary (which is to say evolutionarily determined), or they can succumb to depression and eventual death. Ligotti’s failure to embrace Transhumanism is interesting, as Transhumanism represents the only workable or valuable solution to the problem Ligotti has spent his life grappling with. The Transhuman must start with the (objectively arbitrary) goal of survival, but from there it makes a virtue of taking explicit, vigorous control of how that survival will be defined and pursued. There is no more honourable solution to Ligotti’s existential dilemma, except perhaps suicide.

Given that Ligotti himself has not committed suicide, and will not embrace Transhumanism, then it must be said that his will or ability to back insight up with action seems somewhat lacking. In other words, to paraphrase the character Red from The Shawshank Redemption: Get busy living, or get busy dying. The middle ground is just pathetic, a transitional phase… which, incidentally, is also the exact view of Humanity taken by Transhumanists.

Transhumanism is the Quest for Meaning

“Transhumanism encapsulates a long-lived error among the headliners of science: in a world without a destination, we cannot even break ground on our Tower of Babel, and no amount of rush and hurry on our part will change that. That we are going nowhere is not a curable condition; that we must go nowhere at the fastest possible velocity just might be curable, though probably not. And what difference would it make to retard our progress to nowhere?”

― Thomas Ligotti, “The Conspiracy Against the Human Race”

Ligotti’s ultimate nothingness is something which cannot be argued with, on some levels. After all, it is extremely hard to imagine any way in which someone could claim that the universe is ultimately meaningful without lapsing into religious dogma or unfounded assumptions about it having some long-term evolutionary purpose (a lovely idea, to be sure, but one for which we have no reliable evidence). On the other hand, Ligotti himself acknowledges that human existence is a process of searching for (and creating) meaning, which raises interesting questions (for another day) about the relationship between Ligotti’s ultimate nothingness and other Idealist traditions (which Ligotti is, in my opinion, a little too quick to dismiss out of hand).

Leaving aside Buddhism, Taoism, Platonism and other relevant traditions for today, I will limit myself to asserting that Ligotti’s rejection of Transhumanism is both premature and represents an incomplete exploration of Ligotti’s own logic. At essence, Ligotti depicts Transhumanism as a headlong rush into a world of illusion, which is to say an existence in which we choose our own highest ideals, our own goals, our own form and emotional structure, our very identity in the deepest possible sense, rather than refusing to accept any meaning because the universe offers us none that can be considered objective, or universal. Ironically, nothing can be more appropriate or heroic than the Transhumanist stance in the face of an ultimate absence of meaning, except perhaps suicide. To criticise Transhumanism on Ligotti’s grounds without choosing the clear alternative is nothing short of a clear admission of personal hypocrisy, failure, and cowardice. Live free and bold – or die! – but be clear about what you choose and why.

CMT Redux

So, to return to our original question: What is the deeper basis of the Central Meme of Transhumanism? In short, that foundation is the bold embrace of our own ability to create meaning in the universe.

Existence is not naturally meaningful, but we humans have evolved to crave and even create meaning… and Transhumanism is the natural extension of that process. Yes, the core idea of Transhumanism is that we Can and Should Improve the Human Condition Through Technology, but that is merely the explicit, technical expression of our deeper, eternal drive to create meaning in a meaningless universe. Thomas Ligotti has characterised that impulse as an ever-accelerating rush into meaninglessness, but it is quite the opposite; It is the heroic creation of meaning and purpose, and assumption of the role of masters of our own fate, rather than depressive, pessimistic children waiting for meaning to be handed down from on high by some parental substitute.

We will be the gods, now.

Transhumanism, Optimism, & the Meaning of Life was originally published on transhumanity.net

[hollowandeceptivephilosophy]

The Body of Christ

The resurrection is an intensification and bringing together of life (this is from Barth). 

In part, we can know this because we can now participate through Christ ascended and resurrected in moments that preceded that in time. (We can eat of his body and drink of his blood, participating in his death both then and in baptism, and his resurrection). The unification of life in resurrection is demonstrated in Christ. 

The implication of this is simple: insofar as we are called Children of God, we can hope in a similar unification of experience, a giving of unity throughout life.  But since somehow the resurrected life encompasses that which came before, we will have some kind of tensed existence that permits apparently inconsistent things to be true of us (our primary tensed experience is in time, but there might be other kinds of ordered existences that are non-temporal: certainly there’s nothing in the concept of “a discrete ordered set, where truth values can non-contradictorally differ at different points in the set”  This seems to be true of Christ, since he mediates both his death and resurrection to us, and these cannot be true of him at the same tensed moment. However, we can say that one of these things predominates over the other: Resurrection is in some sense “better” attributed to Christ in a similar way to how truths about me in the present are better attributed to me than truths about me in the past to some degree. 

Death subsists in Resurrection, but does not overcome it. In the same way, the various ways in which the falleness of the world marred us can remain with us, really with us, but subsisting in a resurrection that goes beyond such things.  Personally, I think this offers a solution to a concern that the world of the resurrection be genuinely ideal, that there is a real sense in which God will ultimately conquer sin and death, not just in me, or in you but in all creation and all the powers and principalities which currently war against human existence. Nonetheless, there is a preservation of the past, such that it remains in us and is not alien to us: we are not made into something independent of our particularized histories of struggle and adaptation to a fallen world. (and indeed, given the inverted, pluriform hierarchies of Christian ontology). our falleness, which despite its damaging is nonetheless ontologically part of us in an irreducible way (what would it mean for me, or anyone, to exist in a world without sin? Given that my existence is historically constituted [orthodox Christians do not believe in the pre-existence of souls], its not clear how I could exist without being fallen. Furthermore, almost all of the good things of my life are only comprehensible within a fallen and reconciled world. I think there’s a legitimate concern that an eradication of falleness would render “me” incoherent, a being whose manner of life makes no sense and has no intrinsic order.  However, if there’s a resurrection in which falleness is subsumed and rendered out of tense, then there is a preservation of continuity while generating a space where the genuinely ideal world does exist and I participate in it. However, the primacy of the resurrected means that fallenness and the virtues and vices of the fallen are no longer determinative of my being, I have (in Christ) dominion over it and can deal with it as such. My movement in whatever kind of hypertense the resurrection gives us is voluntary, perhaps dictated by whatever patterns of worship we participate in during eternity.  I’m currently reading an article in New Blackfriars by Peter Tillard about Gregory of Nyssa’s concept of Eternal Progression towards God (“ Imagine That: Reading Eternal Progress Non-Metaphysically”) and perhaps eternal progression offers the right kind of tensed modes of being (an endless, yet discrete procession towards God) that nonetheless does not have to be temporal (and thus, permits some kind of continuance of my mode of being at past points in time). 

[merlinthewixardx]

01/04/19

Dear Tumblr,

Love encompasses a range of strong and positive emotional and mental states, from the most sublime virtue or good habit, the deepest interpersonal affection and to the simplest pleasure. An example of this range of meanings is that the love of a mother differs from the love of a spouse, which differs from the love of food. Most commonly, love refers to a feeling of strong attraction and emotional attachment.

Love is also considered to be a virtue representing human kindness, compassion, and affection, as "the unselfish loyal and benevolent concern for the good of another". It may also describe compassionate and affectionate actions towards other humans, one's self or animals

Love in its various forms acts as a major facilitator of interpersonal relationships and, owing to its central psychological importance, is one of the most common themes in the creative arts. Love has been postulated to be a function to keep human beings together against menaces and to facilitate the continuation of the species.

Ancient Greek philosophers identified five forms of love: essentially, familial love (in Greek, Storge), friendly love or platonic love (Philia), romantic love (Eros), guest love (Xenia) and divine love (Agape). Modern authors have distinguished further varieties of love: unrequited love, infatuated love, self-love, and courtly love. Asian cultures have also distinguished Ren, Kama, Bhakti, Mettā, Ishq, Chesed, and other variants or symbioses of these states. Love has additional religious or spiritual meaning. This diversity of uses and meanings combined with the complexity of the feelings involved makes love unusually difficult to consistently define, compared to other emotional states.

The word "love" can have a variety of related but distinct meanings in different contexts. Many other languages use multiple words to express some of the different concepts that in English are denoted as "love"; one example is the plurality of Greek words for "love" which includes agape and eros. Cultural differences in conceptualizing love thus doubly impede the establishment of a universal definition.

Although the nature or essence of love is a subject of frequent debate, different aspects of the word can be clarified by determining what isn't love (antonyms of "love"). Love as a general expression of positive sentiment (a stronger form of like) is commonly contrasted with hate (or neutral apathy). As a less-sexual and more-emotionally intimate form of romantic attachment, love is commonly contrasted with lust. As an interpersonal relationship with romantic overtones, love is sometimes contrasted with friendship, although the word love is often applied to close friendships or platonic love. (Further possible ambiguities come with usages "girlfriend", "boyfriend", "just good friends").

Fraternal love (Prehispanic sculpture from 250–900 AD, of Huastec origin). Museum of Anthropology in Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico Abstractly discussed, love usually refers to an experience one person feels for another. Love often involves caring for, or identifying with, a person or thing (cf. vulnerability and care theory of love), including oneself (cf. narcissism). In addition to cross-cultural differences in understanding love, ideas about love have also changed greatly over time. Some historians date modern conceptions of romantic love to courtly Europe during or after the Middle Ages, although the prior existence of romantic attachments is attested by ancient love poetry.

The complex and abstract nature of love often reduces discourse of love to a thought-terminating cliché. Several common proverbs regard love, from Virgil's "Love conquers all" to The Beatles' "All You Need Is Love". St. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, defines love as "to will the good of another." Bertrand Russell describes love as a condition of "absolute value," as opposed to relative value.[citation needed] Philosopher Gottfried Leibniz said that love is "to be delighted by the happiness of another." Meher Baba stated that in love there is a "feeling of unity" and an "active appreciation of the intrinsic worth of the object of love." Biologist Jeremy Griffith defines love as "unconditional selflessness".

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

April Fools <3 (Thats from the Wikipedia article for love)

BUT FOR REAL.

I love her so much, tomorrow is our 4 month anniversary and I could cry because of how much she means to me...

I’m writing this at 9 so I can make her an ASMR and sleep early so I can start tomorrow sooner!!!

Message to Mimi from Jim: Happy anniversary baby <3

Pic of the day: MARRY ME ASAP

[annoyedbythevoid-blog]

Since I have no time to write poetry I can at least post my essays

The Academia of Suffering

 The topic of whether or not suffering is justified applies to all walks of life because each of us undergoes unexpected and spontaneous hardship. The question at hand asks why good people unjustly suffer. Does God have any right permitting a virtuous person to suffer? This is important to ask ourselves because it potentially violates our ethical rights as human beings. Suffering is a necessary part of life, as it cannot be avoided, but it should not be used as a trial in the hopes of turning people over into the path of virtue. Good people unjustly suffer in the same reason why bad people suffer—because it is simply the order of nature. While suffering in no doubt contributes to character and allows an individual to learn, there is no ethical value in using suffering as a test of virtue or faith, God is not justified in permitting these trials. Bad things happen to good people, just as there are laws that move in accordance with nature.

Lady Philosophy and Boethius discuss good and bad fortune, as well as Providence and Fate. Providence is the divine layout of the world which is essentially God’s foreknowledge, while Fate is the connector for the events that take place. They both reach the conclusion that good and even bad fortune are ultimately good because they all lead up to virtue. Boethius is before me and proclaims that God is justified in allowing suffering because it helps mankind to develop virtues by free choice. Perhaps without suffering, people would not value the lessons that hardship without a doubt offers. He may say while bad things do harm the good, it is not without purpose.  In essence, good people will always be powerful while evil people will not be able to sustain themselves. Therefore, “No matter how brutal evil people may be, the crown shall never fall from the head of the wise man and shall never wither, nor shall another person’s unrighteousness pluck from the souls of the righteous the distinctions that are theirs alone.” (Boethius 116; 1-5) There is no evil that can triumph the soul and its attainment of the ultimate good. Those of the purest hearts will always be rewarded in their virtue, while the evil will continually anguish in their constant agitation.

I will not deny that suffering is necessary, nor will I deny the presence of a God. Without suffering, we would live in a world that knew very little empathy, as suffering gives light to understanding others as well as the volumes within ourselves. However, this suffering should not serve as a trial to force us to reconcile the “good” if only to prove ourselves to God. Suffering has no meaning in an ethical sense when the alibi is simply establishing “virtue,” especially suffering that is intentional; whether by trial of God or the misery inflicted by our foes. It is the universal trait of being alive--to suffer, however what we assign to it is relative upon our own characteristics. Why would God create humanity just to passively observe the free choices we make and their reactional stimuli? Take for instance the story of Abraham from Genesis 22. Faith will never have its place to commend itself in murdering anyone, let alone can it be rationalized in serving as just another lesson from suffering. Abraham is urged to choose between sacrificing his own son Isaac for God. Is there a goal so good to suspend the ethical? You have two parties who are involved in suffering: Abraham is at a crossroads in murdering Isaac per God’s test of faith and Isaac must now carry the weight that his father would even think of fulfilling the deed. Were Isaac to truly end up being murdered, what virtues does that leave him with? Must virtue be related to a specific sort of person for it to be acquired?  If an existence ceases amidst such bad fortune, where lies the opportunity to create this virtue? This can also be applied to our modern world. Let’s say that a brutalized child undergoes a tremendous amount of bad fortune and suffering whether it be through poverty or abusive parenting. The child grows up and turns out good, after having climbed through the Odyssey of pain.  This is a moral triumph, an act of courage. However, in no way is this scenario attached to positivity through suffering, as the meaning of such a thing is based on an individual level. Another child could grow up and only circulate the pattern of child abuse. It’s a matter of chance: environmental factors such as the influences around us, (whether that be education, peers, experience etc.) as well as personal revelations, and the associations of emotion that are tied to them.

Our world is dominated by laws of nature and our existence happened on a series of intrinsic events. Nature fulfills its own cycle, just as we have given names to the seasons of the year. Our suffering as a species is a part of this flux. Chaos is just as hardwired in the world as Balance, and each day undergoes something completely different. As human beings, we strive to give meaning to suffering, almost as if from our own “God complex.” Our suffering is no better or worse than the creatures beneath us. The difference in our suffering and their suffering is the cognizant capabilities of our consciousness tricking itself into believing that there truly is an ultimate form of reason behind it all. Why are virtues and suffering limited only for the human psyche? Take for instance the Orca. Killer whales have an enlarged limbic lobe which is responsible for spindle cells and the emotional responses that they make happen. These are complex processes that involve empathy, reason, and social organization. The number of spindle cells in an Orca far exceeds that of a human being. When trauma happens to these creatures, are they too meant to make virtue out of circumstance? There are a number of cetacean organisms that are just as intelligent, if not more so, than humans.  It seems that Boethius’ argument only applies mankind, when really, intelligent suffering extends to any animal sentient enough that knows how to rationalize and empathize. It would be arrogant to think ourselves higher than these creatures.

On an entirely different spectrum, take for instance mass genocide. The Holocaust (as well as countless others) is a specifically prime example for suffering because it was an act of absolute evil against millions of people. Lady Philosophy explains to Boethius, “When God has looked down from the high watchtower of Providence, he sees what is appropriate for each person and he supplies to each what he knows to be appropriate.” (Boethius 123; 23-31) She is basically explaining that no amount of suffering is too large for what our soul can take. However, what does that give all of those people? The survivors most certainly gained virtue (or PTSD, but that’s a different story) after having dealt with such spiritual anguish, but one cannot deny the horror that was felt up until the last breath for those who were indeed murdered. If this is just an act of Fate casted from a divine order, then the plan of Providence is just downright unethical. In order for there to be an ultimate goal of righteousness behind evil acts against good people, there has to be an end result of Virtue. Those millions of people who lost their lives never had the option to develop the potential virtue of suffering. God is NOT justified in causing suffering because God himself is not justified in allowing people to develop their virtues. It’s entirely situational, just like the matter itself. A quote carved into the walls from a prisoner at the Mauthausen concentration camp brings to light the void of hope from a prisoner. “If there is a God, He will have to beg my forgiveness.”    

It would be better to relinquish all of our faith and trust from God, and relay it in the divine nature of Chance, because at least Chance knew not the horrors that it was allowing to inflict, nor was it testing our own nature in reference to those horrors. Our entire life reacts with a butterfly affect and every step that we take, opens up new doorways and pathways. Is suffering truly the foundation of virtue, or is it the meaning that we assign to it? Perhaps our species finds solace in giving a name to what we fear or do not understand. The reality is that suffering is just a component of the complex, and surreal structure of the universe. Our world has its flows of pattern and growth; just as every tree sheds its skin each season, we too must inevitably suffer. We suffer. Sometimes we grow, decay, or die and that is simply that.