#April 12 1462

[rygacripto]

12 aprilie 1457 a fost ziua în care, în urma bătăliei de la Doljești – județul Neamț, Ștefan cel Mare a devenit domnul Moldovei.

La data de 12 aprilie 1457 a avut loc Bătălia de la Doljeşti, în urma căreia Ştefan cel Mare ocupă tronul Moldovei, înlăturându-l pe Petru Aron, domnitorul care-l ucisese pe tatăl său, Bogdan al II-lea, la Reuseni.

Dorind să răzbune moartea tatălui său, tânărul Ştefan pătrunde în Moldova, în aprilie 1457, cu sprijinul lui Vlad Ţepeş domnul Valahiei şi ajutat de boierii din Ţara de Jos, adună sub steaguri circa 6 000 de oameni cu care se îndreaptă spre Suceava pentru a-l da jos pe Petru Aron, amintește preotul Florin Tuscanu.

În condiţiile compromiterii lui Petru Aron, în urma acceptării de către acesta a solicitării sultanului de închinare a Moldovei şi de plată a tributului (5 iunie 1456), Ştefan pătrunde în Moldova, în aprilie 1457, cu sprijinul lui Vlad Ţepeş (1456 – 1462) şi cu susţinători din Ţara de Jos (însumând c. 6 000 de oameni).

Confruntarea cu forţele lui Petru Aron are loc la Doljeşti [jud. Neamţ], pe pârâul Hresca, afluent al Siretului. Cronica moldo-germană arată că „în anul, cum se scrie de la naşterea lui Hristos, 1457, în luna april, în ziua 11, într-o marţi, în săptămâna mare, înaintea Paştilor, atunci a venit Ştefan voievod, un fiu al lui Bogdan voievod, care a venit cu putere mică, cu muntenii, cu ţările de jos, ca la 6 mii de oameni.

Şi au venit asupra lui Aaron voievod la o gârlă sau apă cu numele Hresca, lângă Doljeşti. Acolo a bătut Ştefan voievod pe Aaron voievod, alungându-l din ţară şi el însuşi a rămas stăpân cu putere”.

A doua zi, pe câmpul de la „Direptate”, de lângă Suceava, Adunarea Ţării îl aclama pe Ştefan, iar mitropolitul Teoctist îl ungea domn al Moldovei. În acest timp, Aron Vodă se retrage în Polonia, apoi în Ungaria, de unde va emite în continuare, pentru mai mult de un deceniu, pretenţii la tronul Moldovei.

Executarea sa, în timpul unei expediţii a lui Ştefan în Transilvania, în 1468 sau 1469, va contribui la consolidarea domniei acestuia.

[eliteworldtraveler]

Piero di Cosimo

The Building of a Palace

1515- 1520

Oil on Panel

83x197 cm

Ringling Museum of Art, Sarasota

Piero di Cosimo (2 January 1462 – 12 April 1522), also known as Piero di Lorenzo, was an Italian painter of the Renaissance. The subjects are the craftsman and townsmen making way for the beauty of the Renaissance. The essence of the Renaissance is displayed beautifully.

What is observed in this beautiful piece is a harmony between two schools of thought. There is a distinct line drawn in the sand between progress and the future. What stands out is a gradual fade from what was to what will be. The colors are tranquil, soft, comfortable, and soothing within the lower portion of the painting. However, the building representing progress has a more depressing, dark, and dismal feel to its representation. The light is emanating from below and casting a shadow on progress. This would signify that the artist delighted in his environment and the comfort of what he knew. His outlook on progress might not have been the most positive. It was almost as if his art was inspired by his own feelings of change.

            There is a balance that comes from the contrast between both worlds. Like a beam scale that measures justice. There is strength in the past and strength in the progress of the future. However, the scales are tilted toward the past. The detail of emotion on the faces of the craftsman signifies losing something dear to them. As if they are losing their identity. The dark figures of progress trample on history and identity while offering something new with structure. Faces of change seem to hold an almost sinister intent. The rhythm and repetition come from the workers. There is an intentionality and pride in the work of the past. The future offers something in stark contrast.

The Building of a Palace provokes an internal struggle in all of mankind. An internal struggle in myself. Progress means change, adaptation, and new beginnings. The past means comfort, complacency, and denial. The detail in the foreground of the image illustrates the Renaissance revival of classical-style buildings to grand palaces in prosperous cities like Florence. The artists’ message is clear. As we see the carts and animals along with the craftsman giving way for progress. Making way for major change. Piero di Cosimo is invested in the difficulty of change. I chose The Building of a Palace byPiero di Cosimo because of the message that is being presented. The story that is being portrayed provokes a nostalgic, sentimental, discontent with progress. Progress seems to overshadow the past and all that was invested to get to that defining moment.

By: Mike Brown

Virtual Sketchbook 3

[vladdocs]

Text and document courtesy of the authors Corpus Draculianum In January 1462 Vlad divided his army of some 5-6,000 men into six corps, letting them cross the Danube through his six most important fords: Isaccea, Hârșova, Silistra, Turtucaia, Ruse and Nicopole. In the last two cases, the corps were led by the Wallachian prince and his most important supporter, Neagoe de la Strehaia (or Neagoe Craiovescu), ancestor of the famous Craiovesști, the great later helpers of Michael the Brave. The six Vlach corps had attacked the Sultan's rapid reaction capabilities on the Danube, consisting mainly of the redoubtable Akıncı-i and the personal troops of the Bey of Nicopole and Silistra, in a very deliberate and well thought-out manner. The genius of the action lay not only in the rapidity of the execution of the attack, but above all in the nature of the targets destroyed. The Vlach armies did not attack the akıncı-i troops head-on, but only systematically destroyed their subsistence. The Akıncı-i were basically a kind of soldier peasants, who, when not looting, practised agriculture and other occupations typical of any local peasant. In addition, of the local communities that supplied akıncı-i, only a small proportion of the inhabitants were active soldiers. Most stayed at home and only had to logistically support the active soldiers, who went out on looting actions called akın. It was these who suffered most. That this tactic was entirely successful is shown by what followed two months later, as a new document discovered by the Romanian-German team of the Corpus Draculianum project, which aims to collect and edit all documents of any kind from and about Vlad Țepeș Drăculea (ca. 1435-ca. 1650). This document is a report drawn up by a Florentine merchant in charge of supplying sea delicacies to the house of the Duke of Mantua. After apologising for more than half of the letter for his failure to supply a long list of sturgeon, squid and many other such mouth-watering products, Caesar, the Florentine in question, brings up the reason for his failure: the over-abundant storms and the Vlach, who had wreaked mayhem on the Danube. And this is where the story begins, which could be reconstructed as follows. After the sacking in January 1462 of key Ottoman military logistics points on the Danube, the Vlach troops did not return home, at least not all of them, but continued to do what they did best. Unfortunately the troubled times have not preserved any further reports in our archives. We can, however, suspect that the targets attacked were more than likely in the same category as those already destroyed. Sometime in March 1462 Vlad surprised on the Danube, probably in the area of Dobrogea, a fleet of no less than 50 Ottoman transport ships arriving to load wood for the construction of galleys, the most feared warships of the time. For some time the Sultan had been preparing intensely for an armed conflict with his most important competitor in the Mediterranean, Venice, which was to last from 1463 to 1479. Vlad's men surprise the crews on sight, massacre them all, not forgetting the master builders, the most important in the equation, and set fire to the ships and their cargo. Of course the nearby Ottoman commanders don't sit idly by and summon their men. Only... no one comes. Caesar tells us why: "perche sono tutti fugit". Who would come, if the nearby villages, the hamlets from which the akıncıs were rising, had been completely ravaged by Vlad's men and Vlad himself in the last 2 months? The Akıncıs and those who economically supported them to go to war had also scattered like swallows all over the place... apart from the nearly 24,000 counted as dead before the voivode in early February and those whom he told the Hungarian king about being burned in their own homes, their bodies and especially their heads, noses or ears beyond recovery. The letter of Cesare of Florence: ____ Our most noble and excellent signor and further, I send to your eminent nobility a cargo of two barrels of gelatin of sea bass, mullet and river

flounder. To this I send you a keg of crabs fried and marinated in orange juice. There are four or five squid in said cargo. But I cannot supply more. I also send you another round basket full of sardines, and sardinellas, and eels. Also in said basket, next to said fish, one mackerel tuna, one small golden spar, and two moustache. They are all fried. I also send to your highest nobility five pieces of raw flounder and ten pieces of sea tongues, so that you may cook them all at your discretion. I draw your nobility's attention to the fact that due to bad weather and storm the sailors could not deliver the goods. Thus from Friday to Monday no fish could be bought. But this morning, as soon as the storm abated, some fish arrived, the one I sent to your nobility. It cost me much effort and expense* to buy it, but the fish is good. Of course, it would have been much better if I had been able to buy more garfish. The squid I could not find any more, as no more were brought in further. Moreover, I ask your greatest nobility to apologize for me to his majesty the margrave for the fact that I could not deliver to your excellency large octopuses and clams, because I could not get any in the whole world, and I never received the two large octopuses I was promised because of the raging storm. And all the fish and everything else listed cost me four and five ducats. As for the previously mentioned goods, if your nobility would like to give them to my messenger, I would be very happy, as I gave that servant the task. I have nothing more to add to the matter. In addition to what I have said, there is other news that the Walachians have burned about 50 Turkish transport ships*, the ones which came to deliver wood for building galleys. The Turks had everything ready. And the aforementioned Walachians were rejoicing at their victory. They came to the place where the same mentioned vessels were standing to load the wood. They burned them, not all of them, as was said. And they cut all the Ottoman seamen into pieces, and about 50 carpenters, and then they left, where they rejoiced over their victory and waited for them to join forces with the army of the king of Hungary from day to day. The latter, it was said, had already set out to find them. And it is also reported that the Turk was not even able to establish a military camp, because all ran away, and he began to fix various atrocities, so that people did not run away, but could not do anything about it and then. As soon as I hear any more of this, I will inform your nobility, before whom I always bow. Sent from Venice, April 12, 1462. Humble servant of your noble Excellency, Cesare of Florence, knight* et seq.

[orthodoxydaily]

Icon, Saints&Reading: Tue., Apr., 27, 2021

April 14/27

Holy Apostles Aristarcus, Puden and Trophimus of the Seventy

All three are mentioned by name by the Apostle Paul.   Aristarchus is mentioned in Acts 19:29, Colossians 4:10 and Philemon 24. He was bishop of Apamea in Syria; St Paul calls him 'my fellow-prisoner' and 'my fellow-laborer'.   Pudens is mentioned in 2 Timothy 4:21. He was a prominent Roman citizen who gave refuge to Christians; his house was first a place of refuge for the Apostles, then one of the first churches in Rome.   Trophimus is mentioned with Pudens in 2 Timothy 4:21, and in Acts 21:29, where we learn that he was from Ephesus. He accompanied the Apostle Paul on some of his missions.   All three, like St Paul, were beheaded during Nero's persecutions.

Apostle Aristarchus of the seventy

Apostle Trophimus of the seventy

Apostles Aristarchus, Puden and Trophimus

The Holy Martyr Ardalion (311)

     The Holy Martyr Ardalion accepted death for Christ under the emperor Maximian Galerius (305-311). Saint Ardalion was a talented mimic actor.      One time at the circus he played the rolй of a christian. The actor, on the intent of the play-author, was to at first refuse to offer sacrifice to idols, but later to consent to renounce Christ. Along the course of the action they suspended him upon a wooden torture device and tore at him with iron hooks. He so naturally depicted the suffering, that the spectators were delighted and loudly declared their praise of his artistry. Suddenly the saint ordered all to be quiet and declared, that he actually was a Christian and did not renounce the Lord. The governor of the city tried to explain the matter thus, that Saint Ardalion was continuing to play the rolй, and at the end of the show he would renounce Christ and offer sacrifice to the gods. But Saint Ardalion continued to confess his faith in Christ. Then the governor gave orders to throw the martyr onto a red-hot iron-pan. Thus did Saint Ardalion merit a martyr's crown.

all texts© 1996-2001 by translator Fr. S. Janos.

ICON:The Vilensk Icon of the Mother of God

     The Vilensk Icon of the Mother of God was written by the holy Evangelist Luke. For a long time it was in the family of the Greek emperors at Constantinople. In 1472 Sophia Paleologa, spouse of the Moscow GreatPrince Ivan III (1462-1505), transferred the icon to Moscow. In 1495 the GreatPrince blessed his daughter Elena with this icon before giving her in marriage to the Lithuanian king Alexander. In honour of the transfer of the icon to Vilna a feast was established 15 February. Later on they placed the holy icon in the John the ForeRunner church, in which princess Elena was buried. And afterwards they transferred the icon to the Vilensk Holy-Trinity monastery.

Matthew 24:36-26:2

36 But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, but My Father only. 37 But as the days of Noah were, so also will the coming of the Son of Man be. 38 For as in the days before the flood, they were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noah entered the ark, 39 and did not know until the flood came and took them all away, so also will the coming of the Son of Man be. 40 Then two men will be in the field: one will be taken and the other left. 41 Two women will be grinding at the mill: one will be taken and the other left. 42 Watch therefore, for you do not know what hour your Lord is coming. 43 But know this, that if the master of the house had known what hour the thief would come, he would have watched and not allowed his house to be broken into. 44 Therefore you also be ready, for the Son of Man is coming at an hour you do not expect. 45 Who then is a faithful and wise servant, whom his master made ruler over his household, to give them food in due season? 46 Blessed is that servant whom his master, when he comes, will find so doing. 47 Assuredly, I say to you that he will make him ruler over all his goods. 48 But if that evil servant says in his heart, 'My master is delaying his coming,' 49 and begins to beat his fellow servants, and to eat and drink with the drunkards, 50 the master of that servant will come on a day when he is not looking for him and at an hour that he is not aware of, 51 and will cut him in two and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

1Then the kingdom of heaven shall be likened to ten virgins who took their lamps and went out to meet the bridegroom. 2 Now five of them were wise, and five were foolish. 3 Those who were foolish took their lamps and took no oil with them, 4 but the wise took oil in their vessels with their lamps. 5 But while the bridegroom was delayed, they all slumbered and slept. 6 And at midnight a cry was heard: 'Behold, the bridegroom is coming; go out to meet him!' 7 Then all those virgins arose and trimmed their lamps. 8 And the foolish said to the wise, 'Give us some of your oil, for our lamps are going out.' 9 But the wise answered, saying, 'No, lest there should not be enough for us and you; but go rather to those who sell, and buy for yourselves.' 10 And while they went to buy, the bridegroom came, and those who were ready went in with him to the wedding; and the door was shut. 11 Afterward the other virgins came also, saying, 'Lord, Lord, open to us!' 12 But he answered and said, 'Assuredly, I say to you, I do not know you.' 13 Watch therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour in which the Son of Man is coming. 14 For the kingdom of heaven is like a man traveling to a far country, who called his own servants and delivered his goods to them. 15 And to one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one, to each according to his own ability; and immediately he went on a journey. 16 Then he who had received the five talents went and traded with them, and made another five talents. 17 And likewise he who had received two gained two more also. 18 But he who had received one went and dug in the ground, and hid his lord's money. 19 After a long time the lord of those servants came and settled accounts with them. 20 So he who had received five talents came and brought five other talents, saying, 'Lord, you delivered to me five talents; look, I have gained five more talents besides them.' 21 His lord said to him, 'Well done, good and faithful servant; you were faithful over a few things, I will make you ruler over many things. Enter into the joy of your lord.' 22 He also who had received two talents came and said, 'Lord, you delivered to me two talents; look, I have gained two more talents besides them.'23 His lord said to him, 'Well done, good and faithful servant; you have been faithful over a few things, I will make you ruler over many things. Enter into the joy of your lord.' 24 Then he who had received the one talent came and said, 'Lord, I knew you to be a hard man, reaping where you have not sown, and gathering where you have not scattered seed. 25 And I was afraid, and went and hid your talent in the ground. Look, there you have what is yours.' 26 But his lord answered and said to him, 'You wicked and lazy servant, you knew that I reap where I have not sown, and gather where I have not scattered seed. 27 'So you ought to have deposited my money with the bankers, and at my coming I would have received back my own with interest. 28 Therefore take the talent from him, and give it to him who has ten talents. 29 'For to everyone who has, more will be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who does not have, even what he has will be taken away. 30 'And cast the unprofitable servant into the outer darkness. There will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.' 31 When the Son of Man comes in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then He will sit on the throne of His glory. 32 All the nations will be gathered before Him, and He will separate them one from another, as a shepherd divides his sheep from the goats. 33 And He will set the sheep on His right hand, but the goats on the left. 34 Then the King will say to those on His right hand, 'Come, you blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: 35 'for I was hungry and you gave Me food; I was thirsty and you gave Me drink; I was a stranger and you took Me in; 36 I was naked and you clothed Me; I was sick and you visited Me; I was in prison and you came to Me.' 37 Then the righteous will answer Him, saying, 'Lord, when did we see You hungry and feed You, or thirsty and give You drink? 38 'When did we see You a stranger and take You in, or naked and clothe You? 39 Or when did we see You sick, or in prison, and come to You? 40 And the King will answer and say to them, 'Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these My brethren, you did it to Me.' 41 Then He will also say to those on the left hand, 'Depart from Me, you cursed, into the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels: 42 'for I was hungry and you gave Me no food; I was thirsty and you gave Me no drink; 43 'I was a stranger and you did not take Me in, naked and you did not clothe Me, sick and in prison and you did not visit Me.'44 Then they also will answer Him, saying, 'Lord, when did we see You hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to You?' 45 Then He will answer them, saying, 'Assuredly, I say to you, inasmuch as you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to Me.' 46 And these will go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.

1Now it came to pass, when Jesus had finished all these sayings, that He said to His disciples,2 You know that after two days is the Passover, and the Son of Man will be delivered up to be crucified.

[steves-on-a-plane]

Steves-On-A-Plane’s Chronological Best OF Masterlist

This is a collection of stories (written by me) that I really love for one reason or another. I’ve also updated almost all of them to have color coded banners and relevant info at the beginning (word count, pairing etc) Because back in the day I would just put a GIF at the top of the post and call it a day!

Just to set the scene, In 2017 the... Pantone color of the year was: Greenery Highest grossing film was: Beauty and the Beast (Live Action) #1 Song (Billboard Hot 100) was : Shape Of You, Ed Sheeran Most Viewed TV Show was: The Big Bang Theory  Most featured character on this list: Tony Stark ( 8 Fics made the list!)

1. January 10, 2017, - Ask Me Again Words: 1137  [Tony Stark x Reader]

2. January 14, 2017 - It’s Complicated  Words: 1220 [Bucky Barnes x Reader] / [Sam Wilson x Reader] Part Two (656) Warnings: *Hints of violence (choking), guns

3. January 18, 2017 - Secret, Secret Words: 1552 [Peter Parker x Male!Reader] W/ Dad!BruceBanner

4. January 22, 2017 - Wedding Day Worries Words: 943 Dad!Steve Rogers & Daughter!Reader

5. February 8, 2017 - Star Spangled Gal Words: 1233 [Steve Rogers x Reader] Part Two (1042) / Part Three (983)

6. February 9, 2017 - Flu Season  Words: 554 [Tony Stark x Reader]

7. February 14, 2017 - Han Solo Sews Well Words: 2013 [Han Solo x Reader]

8. February 26, 2017 - Bothersome Brothers Words: 976 [Clint Barton x Asgardian Reader]

9. March 3, 2017 - That’s A Really Big Cat Words: 1209 Mom!Reader, no pairing

10. March 19, 2017 - Beauty and the Beast  Words: 343 [Bruce Wayne x Reader]

11. March 25, 2017 - The Blind Date Words: 906 [Jim Gordon x Female!Reader or Male!Reader]

12. March 25, 2017 - Coffee Break Words: 695 [Bruce Wayne x Reader]

13. March 25, 2017 - High School Crush Words: 903 [Scott Lang x Reader]

14. April 6, 2017 - Ice Skates and Ice Cream Words: 927 [Bruce Banner x Reader]

15. April 6, 2017 - Spider Son Words: 997 Son!Peter Parker, Dad!Tony Stark x Mom!Reader

16. April 9, 2017 - I Need You. Words: 1828 [Bruce Banner x Reader]  *Warnings* Mentions of abusive relationship 

17. April 10, 2017 - Winter Soldier Set Up Words: 1131 [Bucky Barnes x Reader]

18. April 10, 2017 - Slump Day Words: 872, Bucky Barnes, Steve Rogers & Reader, No Pairing

19. April 17th, 2017 - Castle Kisses & A Princess Proposal  Words: 879 [Tony Stark x Reader]

20. April 24, 2017 - Jealous Eyes  Words: 1280 *This story has two possible endings*:  Words:1121  Part Two [ Steve Rogers x Reader] or Words:1203 Part Two [Tony Stark x Reader]

21. April 29, 2017 - Chasing Cars Words: 663 [Bruce Banner x Reader] 

22. May 6, 2017 - Imagine Tony Stark meeting Peter Quill for the first time with his Zune.  Words: 162

23. May 10, 2017 - The Trouble with T’Challa Words: 1003 [T’Challa x Reader] 

24. May 22, 2017 - The Last of the Jedi Words: 593 [Obi Wan Kenobi x Reader]

25. June 8, 2017 - Edna & Bucky  Words: 860 [Bucky Barnes x Reader] Part Two (715)

26. July 5, 2017 - Cap’s Gals Words: 1016 [Steve Rogers x Reader] 

27. July 15, 2017 - Cakes In the Rain Words: 750 [Tony Stark x Reader] Part Two (1204)

28. September 25, 2017 - Wishing On a Black Star Words: 1462 [Bucky Barnes x Reader] W/ Dad!Tony Stark

29. October 7, 2017 - Brother Banner Words: 2,754 Brother!Bruce Banner & Sister!Reader

Most Best Of... Best of 2016 Best of 2018 Best of 2019 Best of 2020

[thebritishmonarchycouk]

Historic Royal Signatures . Richard III . . 📜 Richard was named Duke of Gloucester in 1461 & made both a Knight of the Garter & a Knight of the Bath. In 1462, on his birthday, he was made Constable of Gloucester & Corfe Castles & Admiral of England, Ireland & Aquitaine & appointed Governor of the North, becoming the richest & most powerful noble in England. . ▪️ Edward appointed him the sole Commissioner of Array for the Western Counties in 1464 when he was 11. By the age of 17, he had an independent command. . 🏰 Richard spent several years during his childhood at Middleham Castle in Wensleydale, Yorkshire, under the tutelage of his cousin the Earl of Warwick, later known as ‘the Kingmaker’. Warwick supervised Richard’s training as a knight; in the autumn of 1465 Edward IV granted Warwick £1000 for the expenses of his younger brother’s tutelage. . ▪️ On 17 October 1469, he was made Constable of England. In November, he replaced William Hastings, 1st Baron Hastings, as Chief Justice of North Wales. The following year, he was appointed Chief Steward & Chamberlain of Wales. On 18 May 1471, Richard was named Great Chamberlain & Lord High Admiral of England. Other positions followed: High Sheriff of Cumberland for life, Lieutenant of the North & Commander-in-Chief against the Scots & hereditary Warden of the West March. Two months later, on 14 July, he gained the Lordships of the strongholds Sheriff Hutton & Middleham in Yorkshire & Penrith in Cumberland. . 👑 When his brother Edward IV died in April 1483, Richard was named Lord Protector of the realm for Edward’s eldest son & successor, the 12-year-old Edward V. Arrangements were made for Edward’s coronation on 22 June 1483. Before the king could be crowned, the marriage of his parents was declared bigamous & therefore invalid. Now officially illegitimate, their children were barred from inheriting the throne. On 25 June, an assembly of lords & commoners endorsed a declaration to this effect & proclaimed Richard as the rightful king. He was crowned on 6 July 1483. The young princes, Edward & his younger brother Richard, Duke of York, were not seen in public after August. . . . (at York) https://www.instagram.com/p/B_LTFAfDC6j/?igshid=6pfbkv4r8qvv

[evoldir]

Fwd: Job: EarlhamInst_Norwich.Bioinformatics

Begin forwarded message: > From: evoldir@web.rhpcs.mcmaster.ca > Subject: Job: EarlhamInst_Norwich.Bioinformatics > Date: 12 March 2022 at 05:19:09 GMT > To: rdmpage@gmail.com > > > > Bioinformatician > > Applications are invited for a Bioinformatician to join the Laboratoryof > Dr Falk Hildebrand at the Earlham Institute based in Norwich, UK. > > The Hildebrand group is researching bacteria and microeukaryotes > through metagenomics, having three research themes: the diversity, > community interactions, and evolution of microbes. The group develops and > maintains various metagenomics software tools, for further information > see www.falk.science. > > Background: > > Can we use genome resolved metagenomics to understand the evolution and > ecology of microbial communities? > > Characterizing the flexible bacterial pangenome and species > interactions is central to understanding microbial ecosystems > (doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0386-6, 10.1136/gutjnl-2018-317715). In > the Hildebrand group we combine strain resolved metagenomics with > reconstructions of sample specific microbial genomes, to understand > persistence, dispersaland evolution of microbes in the gut and other > ecosystems (doi:10.1016/j.chom.2021.05.008), with an interest in > interkingdom interactions (doi: 10.1111/1462-2920.15314).  The role of > community interactions and short-term evolution in maintainingresilient > ecosystems is so far unexplored, and requires novel bioinformatic > algorithms combined with emerging sequencing-based technologies. > > The role: > > This post requires an experienced bioinformatician with an interest > tostudy reconstructed microbial genomes in metagenomes (bacterial, > archaeal,fungal). The post-holder will be involved in conceptualizing > & implementing bioinformatic pipelines to analyse large time-series > metagenomes (human gut, soil, > ), based on data from 2nd and 3rd gen > sequencing platforms, such as illumina, PacBio, ONT, Hi-C & single cell > sequencing data. The analysis will be published in research papers that > the candidate should be leading.  The ideal candidate: > > To fulfil this role, we are looking for a research-focused > Bioinformatician, with experience in either metagenomics, population > genetics, GWAS, analysing genomes (eukaryotic or prokaryotic), > assembly/binning algorithms, single cell sequencing or genomics > technologies. The candidate will work independently, with other group > members, and with national and international collaborators to generate > and analyse data. > > Previous experience in publishing scientific work, developing and > optimising bioinformatic tools or numerical ecology is essential. Training > willbe available in all aspects of the work, although it is expected that > applicants will have a strong background in bioinformatics and genetics. > > Furthermore, good organisational skills and the ability to communicate > and work productively within a multidisciplinary team will be crucial. An > interest in community microbiology (such as gut microbiome) will be > advantageous, but prior experience or knowledge of metagenomics is not > a requirement. > > Additional information: > > Salary on appointment will be within the range 32,578 to 39,938 per > annum depending on qualifications and experience. This is a full-time > post for a contract of 3 years. > > Interview will be held on 25th April 2022. > > For further information and details of how to apply, please visit our > website https://ift.tt/V1lLXGI or contact the Human Resources team > on 01603 450462 or nbi.recruitment@nbi.ac.uk quoting reference 1004217. > > As a Disability Confident employer, we guarantee to offer an interview to > all disabled applicants who meet the essential criteria for this vacancy. > > The closing date for applications willbe 14th April 2022. > > > Kind regards, > > Georgina Roberts > HR Advisor (Recruitment) > Human Resources > > NBI Partnership, Norwich Research Park, Colney, Norwich, NR4 7UH > > I am sometimes working remotely but can be contacted as normal by: > Email: georgina.roberts@nbi.ac.uk > > Tel: 01603 450462 or Ext 2462 > > > The NBI Partnership Ltd provides non-scientific services to the John > Innes Centre, The Sainsbury Laboratory, the Earlham Institute and the > Quadram InstituteBioscience > > > "Georgina Roberts (NBI)" > via IFTTT

[vladdocs]

Vlad the Impaler between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire

Authors: Ileana Căzan, Eugen Denize

When discussing the complex personality of Vlad the Impaler, we believe that there are two fundamental issues that need to be addressed and two questions that require an answer based on a thorough analysis of the data and facts available to us. The first question is whether or not Vlad the Impaler was a bloodthirsty tyrant, ready to kill for the simple pleasure of seeing innocent blood spilled. We believe that this question can be adequately answered by looking at how his war with the Turks began in 1462. Was Vlad Țepeș, a bloodthirsty tyrant, acting under the blind impulses of unleashed instincts and unjustifiably provoking the Turks, or was he obliged to wage war against the great Ottoman power under conditions unfavourable to him but imposed on him by the course of events?

Secondly, despite his bravery and the sacrifices he made fighting for his own people and for Christianity, Vlad the Impaler fell victim to the propaganda and misinformation that Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary, unleashed in the West to justify his inaction in 1462. That the King of Hungary resorted to less than chivalrous methods, incited and supported by the Saxons who could not forgive the Highlander for his actions against them, is easy to understand. But how does one explain the great success of these lies, which have survived through the ages and helped Bram Stocker's literary creation and fantasy to transform the hero of the anti-Ottoman struggle into a true model of the vampire, the famous Dracula? Matia Corvin's propaganda power was not enough for this, but it received unexpected and essential help from the most informed power of the time in relation to the Ottoman Empire and the general political life of Europe, from Venice, a true bridge of contact between East and West, not only in economic terms but also in terms of information. The credit given by Venice to the untruths propagated by Matthias Corvinus, even though it knew exactly the political reality of the Lower Danube, ensured their particular success, because the other Christian powers were much less informed and interested in the situation in this part of Europe and therefore had no reason to dispute what the Venetians accepted as true. All these problems, questions and possible answers will be dealt with in the pages of this chapter, as far as the available documentation allows.

As far as Vlad Țepeș is concerned, whether he took over the reign between 15 April and 3 July [1] or in July-August [2] or at the end of August 1456 [3], the fact is that he did so with the help of Iancu de Hunedoara, at a time of maximum clash between his armies and those of Mehmet II, the conqueror of Constantinople, who was also preparing to conquer Belgrade, the key to Hungary and Central Europe. By ascending the throne of Wallachia at such a time, he could only be the exponent and continuator of the anti-Ottoman political line advocated by Iancu, as is clear from the act, dated 6 September 1456, in Targoviste [4], in which he offers to help, with all his powers, Hungary against the Turks, from the letter sent to the Brașovs from the same place on 10 September [5], and from the help he would give to Stephen the Great to take over the throne of Moldavia in the spring of the following year [6]. In spite of these intentions and deeds, due to the premature death of Iancu de Hunedoara, which significantly changed the political situation in the Romanian area and not only here, Vlad Țepeș was obliged to pay his tribute regularly to the Porte [7] , until 1459, when he stopped doing so, invoking to the Sultan the conflictual situation in which he found himself with the Saxons of southern Transylvania and the Hungarian king Matia Corvin [8] . The truth is that, obliged to respect the Turkish-Hungarian co-residence established over Wallachia by the armistice concluded by Iancu de Hunedoara with the Sultan on 20 November 1451-13 April 1452 [9] , Vlad Țepeș never reconciled himself to this situation and tried to manoeuvre between the two powers with the ultimate aim of opposing one another and easing the situation of his own country [10] .

Here we believe it is appropriate to bring into question the way in which the war between Vlad Țepeș and the Turks started, whether Vlad Țepeș started this war driven by reprehensible bloody instincts or whether he was forced by circumstances to accept a war with the great power south of the Danube, a war that could only be total, in the sense that this word can have for the time, if he wanted to achieve victory and save the country from total disaster. We believe that there are three essential aspects of the moment of the real rupture between Vlad Țepeș and the Ottoman Porte, aspects that must be analysed very carefully.

Of course, Vlad the Impaler was determined, right from his accession to the throne, as we have shown above, to pursue an anti-Ottoman policy of defending autonomy and state integrity, but this policy could not be pursued under any conditions and at any risk. Vlad Țepeș, as a good politician and a remarkable military commander, realised that to start the fight against the Ottoman colossus meant waiting for the most favourable moment, when his reign would be strengthened internally, and externally he could hope for help from other countries also interested in the anti-Ottoman struggle. But let's look at the three key aspects of this problem.

First of all, there is an alleged expedition of the vizier Mahmud Pasha against the Romanian Country, which two Italian sources place in 1458 [11], but, in fact, there is a chronological error [12], which excludes the hypothesis of a clash between Vlad the Impaler and the Ottomans before the winter of 1461-1462.

Secondly, in our opinion, the cessation of the payment of the tribute of 10,000 ducats per year [13] did not signify an immediate and irreparable rupture with the Porte as is considered in a number of more or less recent works [14] . If things had been different, if Vlad Țepeș had openly broken off relations with the Porte, Sultan Mehmet II, who wanted to mark each year of his reign with a new conquest, would probably not have hesitated to attack Wallachia. But what did he do until 1462? In 1458 he conquered a large part of Moreea [15] , in 1459, the year Vlad the Impaler stopped paying tribute, Mehmet II conquered Semendria and all that remained of the Serbian state [16] , in 1460 he completed the conquest of Moreea [17] , and in 1461 he conquered Sinope and Trapezunt [18] , the last remnants of the Byzantine Empire. In our opinion, the Sultan and the rulers of the Porte did not interpret the non-payment of tribute as an act of hostility, nor did Vlad Țepeș have any interest in deliberately provoking the Turks at a time when he was in open conflict with the Saxons of southern Transylvania and the Hungarian king, Matia Corvin [19] , who supported hostile claimants to the throne and Bohemian groups. Through this conflict, which was also determined by important economic aspects [20], but dominated, above all, by political causes [21], Vlad Țepeș sought to achieve two objectives that were absolutely necessary to be able to fight successfully against the Porte: the internal consolidation of the state and the institution of the reign and the affirmation of the independent position, de facto, of the Romanian Country against the claims of suzerainty of the Hungarian royalty. Both objectives were achieved by the treaty concluded with Brașov around 1 October 1460 [22] . The 1460 reconciliation between Vlad Țepeș and the Saxons unquestionably restored to them the commercial freedom in Wallachia suppressed during the conflict [23] . The reconciliation also took place in the context of Vlad Țepeș's return to the alliance with Hungary, in the preparation of the anti-Ottoman action, which remained, all along, the dominant direction of the Romanian prince's foreign policy.

Thirdly, in our opinion, the Turks begin to show distrust and hostility towards Vlad Tepes only in 1461, during or immediately after the end of the expedition against Trapezunt and, in this situation, having no other choice, the lord decides to take open action against them in the winter of 1461 and 1462 [24] . He considered himself to be fairly strong internally, he realised that a confrontation with the Porte had become inevitable, especially after the unsuccessful attempt to capture him at Giurgiu, and he was also counting on possible external support that could come either from the eastern enemies of the Ottoman Empire or from Matthias Crovin, or from Venice, because the time for the formation of an anti-Ottoman coalition including all these seemed very near, despite the failure of the Congress of Mantua in 1459, at which Pope Pius II (1458-1464) had hoped to set up a great anti-Ottoman league, with the broad participation of the Christian powers [25] . It was decided here, among other things, that the Christian army would be led by the Duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, and the Duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good [26], but the decision would have no effect.

The contemporary chronicler Laonic Chalcocondil states that Vlad Țepeș did not start the anti-Ottoman struggle until he felt that the situation in Dacia was secure, and this happened after the Sultan's campaign against Trapezunt in the winter of 1461 and 1462 [27] . But let us see what were the elements that led to this rupture and to the great confrontation of 1462.

In the second half of 1460, Vlad the Impaler re-established good-neighbourly ties with the Saxons of southern Transylvania, as we have shown above, and concluded a secret treaty with Matthias Crovin [28] , which provided, among other things, for his marriage to a relative of his [29] . Also in this year, a soldier of the eastern princes of Georgia, Mingrelia, Guria, Trapezunt and Uzun Hasan, the Turkoman ruler of Persia, crossed the Danube to Hungary, who were preparing to attack the Ottoman Empire and were looking for allies in Europe. They were accompanied by the monk Lodovico da Bologna [30] - the Pope's legate in Georgia - and held talks in Hungary [31] , with Emperor Frederick III [32] , in Venice, where they were received with great respect and politeness [33] , then in Florence, Rome and with Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, considered as the possible leader of the European anti-Ottoman coalition [34] . But the result of this veritable European tour of the Eastern solons was nil. The fact is that the 1458-1461 actions of the Eastern coalition under the leadership of the Turkmen state of Uzun Hasan, which included Trapezunt, Armenia, Georgia and Sinope, led to anti-Ottoman campaigns in northern Anatolia in 1459 and 1460. This was known to Vlad the Impaler, which leads us to believe that he also held talks with the Eastern soldiers in 1460, when they were travelling on the Danube. Although there is no evidence for this, it is unlikely that the lord of Wallachia, who was preparing for war with the Turks, did not take advantage of the presence of the soldiers of the Eastern Coalition, which already existed and was acting against the Ottoman Empire, while at the same time heading for Central and Western Europe, where they hoped to build a similar anti-Ottoman coalition. In this way, Vlad the Impaler hoped to receive important aid from both East and West, and that his anti-Ottoman action, simultaneous with the other two coalitions, would be successful. Vlad Tepes also realised that dispersing the Ottoman forces on several fronts, where they could be engaged in heavy fighting, would have favoured his own action [35] . But this did not happen, as the coalition in the East was dealt a heavy blow by the sultan's conquest of the cities of Sinope and Trapezunt in 1461, and the anti-Ottoman coalition in the West was not formed until 1463, after the Turks had started the war with Venice. Vlad the Impaler's attack in the winter of 1461-1462 therefore took place without any outside support, at the very moment when the Turks were free to act militarily as they wished, which leads us to believe that he did not want the attack and therefore the outbreak of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire at the very moment when it was under no outside pressure. But as we shall see below, the lord of Wallachia had no choice, the Turks did not let him choose the moment of the attack, but, on the contrary, by their actions and intentions they provoked him just when they knew they could strike a devastating blow.

The negotiations with Matthias Corvinus and the Saxons of southern Transylvania, as well as the possible negotiations with the soldiers of the anti-Ottoman eastern coalition, naturally provoked the displeasure of the Porte, for whom continued non-payment of tribute was beginning to be considered a sign of insubordination. The vast majority of narrative sources agree that this change of attitude of the Porte towards Vlad Țepeș occurred in 1461, either during the campaign against Trapezunt or immediately afterwards [36] and do not suggest any previous disagreements regarding the non-payment of tribute. On learning of the agreement between Vlad Țepeș and Matia Corvin [37] , the sultan sent, for a start, a message to Wallachia in order to ask the prince to abandon the alliance with Hungary and the planned marriage [38] , but the expected results were not obtained. Vlad Țepeș accepted to pay the haraci, but refused to give children for the janissaries, a blood tribute that his country had never given [39] and refused to appear in person at the Porte [40] .

This time, the reasons given, among which the threat from Hungary was the most important, could no longer be believed by the Sultan [41], who decided to replace Vlad Țepeș from his reign. Mehmet II, however, sought to avoid a major campaign against Wallachia, whose chances of success were doubtful, and therefore tried to capture Vlad Țepeș by deception, but the trap set for the prince by Hamza bei and the Greek Catabolinos, near Giurgiu, ended in disaster, the two being captured and impaled [42] . Now appear in the Turkish chronicles the most serious accusations against Vlad Țepeș, accusations that justify the action and failure of Giurgiu, but also the sultanal campaign of 1462 [43] .

However, after the execution of the two Ottoman rulers, things had become very clear for Vlad Țepeș. There was no way back and the only plausible option, with some chance of success, remained war, a war that had to be fought with all determination and harshness, given the huge disproportion of forces in favour of the Turks.

In the political context created by the Congress of Mantua (26 September 1459-14 January 1460) [44] , by the coalition of states on the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire [45] and by the Moreea uprising [46] , by the Venetian preparations for a decisive conflict with the Porte for predominance in the eastern Mediterranean [47] , the war waged by Vlad the Impaler in the winter of 1461-62 against the Ottoman Empire was undoubtedly the first major military action in Europe that preceded the great Turkish-Venetian war of 1463. Unfortunately for the lord of Wallachia, his action came at a time of calm on all the anti-Ottoman fronts, with the coalition of Eastern states in a period of ebb and the Western, Christian coalition not yet formed. In fact, the latter coalition was never formed and was only replaced by a system of alliances that revolved around Venice, but this from 1463 onwards. So, as we have already pointed out, Vlad the Impaler found himself alone against the Ottoman Empire, not because he wanted it out of an uncontrolled warlike impulse, but because he was forced, we repeat, by circumstances.

Vlad the Impaler was fully aware of this fact and that is why, in his famous letter of 11 February 1462 to the King of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, after detailing the results of his expedition south of the Danube that winter, he emphasises his adherence to and identification with the Crusader ideal and consequently asks for the absolutely essential help he needed to face the huge Sultan expedition that was preparing against him. But let the Lord of Wallachia himself speak: "For we do not want to leave what we have started on the road, but to see it through to the end. For if the Almighty God will hear the prayers and desires of Christians and incline His ear with kindness to the prayers of His poor, and thus give us victory against the heathen, enemies of the cross of Christ, it will be the greatest honor and use and help of soul to thy great and holy crown and to all true Christendom.... And if, God forbid, we should come to an evil end and our country should perish, neither will your highness have any use or help in this matter, for it will be to the detriment of all Christendom" [48] .

It must be pointed out, however, that Vlad the Impaler, as a skilful politician and military commander, like Stephen the Great a little later, understood to fight against the Turks as a modern monarch, which in fact he was, a monarch who had the interests of his state at heart and not as a medieval crusader who threw himself headlong against the infidels. His adherence to the crusading ideal at this time can only be explained by a desire to gain support from other Christian powers, but he was aware that they too were far removed from the medieval crusading ideal and were fighting, if they decided to do so, only for their own interests. This explains the quite clear threat to the Hungary of Matthias Corvinus, who, in the event of the collapse of the Romanian Country or the installation on its throne of a prince allied to the Porte, would have found himself alone, face to face with the Ottoman Empire.

In launching his anti-Ottoman action in the winter of 1461 and 1462, because he had no other choice but to strike first and with all his might, Vlad the Impaler therefore counted on possible help from his ally, Matthias Corvinus, or even Pope Pius II [49] and on the fact that the main Ottoman forces were still dispersed in several directions (Sinope, Trapezunt, Moreea, etc.) [50] . Unfortunately, as we have already pointed out, his action was at odds both with that of the Turks' Asian enemies, defeated in 1461, when Sinope and Trapezunt were occupied by Mehmet II, and with that of Venice, which would not enter the fray until 1463, after the Turks had attacked first and taken Argos by surprise. As for the King of Hungary, despite the alliance he had with the voivode of Wallachia, his requests for help in his letter of 11 February 1462, the subsidies he had received from the papacy and the promise he had made to go in person against the Turks [51] , he had no intention whatsoever of confronting them [52] , for two main reasons: on the one hand he was still caught up in the conflict with Emperor Frederick III [53] , and on the other hand, from the beginning of his reign he was determined to direct his main efforts towards Central Europe and not against the Ottoman Empire [54] . The only concrete measure taken by Matthias Corvinus was to strengthen only the defence of Transylvania [55] .

In fact, the King of Hungary, from presumed ally, became Vlad the Impaler's enemy, whom he arrested on November 26, 1462, at a time when no one expected such a thing, tried to take credit for the summer victory against the Sultan and, in order to justify his action before Europe, which expected great feats of bravery from him in the anti-Ottoman struggle, he launched a veritable propaganda campaign to slander the brave prince of Wallachia, accused of treason, of collusion with the Turks and of abominable cruelties [56] . All this served, we repeat, as a pretext and justification before the Pope, Venice and the whole of Christian Europe for his own renunciation of the anti-Ottoman campaign he had promised to undertake.

So, if we were to formulate a few conclusions up to this point we have reached with our analysis, they might be as follows: Vlad Țepeș was forced to attack the Ottoman Empire in the winter of 1461 and 1462 due to the manifest hostility of the Sultan, who refused to accept on the throne of Wallachia a lord considered rebellious, the cessation of the payment of tribute in 1459 not having, in our opinion, the significance of an open break with the Porte. The voivode of Wallachia did not receive any concrete help from anyone, because the enemies of the Porte and his potential allies had either been defeated or had not yet entered the battle [57], his main ally, Matthias Corvinus not only did not help him but, probably reaching an agreement with the Porte regarding Wallachia in order to have peace on its southern borders, arrested him and threw him in prison where he stayed for almost 13 years. Because of this, the great victory achieved by Vlad Țepeș in 1462, when the Sultan was forced to retreat south of the Danube without having achieved any of his original objectives, could not be exploited in any way by the European powers, especially Venice, which in a year's time would go to war with the Turks, a decisive war for the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. It should also be borne in mind that the expulsion of Vlad Țepeș from his reign, just after his victory, can also be explained by the attitude of part of the nobility, of the political class, which was willing to fight only in moments of great hardship that threatened its own existence. When these times passed, it preferred to reach compromise solutions with the great power south of the Danube [58] . This was also the case with the accession of Radu the Handsome. Nevertheless, Vlad Țepeș's victory over the Sultan was of particular importance, as it managed to save the existence of the Romanian state and made it possible to reach a compromise with the Porte, which would have been impossible in the event of defeat. Basically, Vlad Țepeș saved his country from being turned into a pashas.

However, it is also interesting to note how Venice, the main Christian power in the Mediterranean at that time interested in the anti-Ottoman struggle, followed the events of the Lower Danube [59], how it knowingly became the mouthpiece of Matthias Corvinus, even though it was well aware of the political reality in the area. In 1459, in the year of Vlad Țepeș's supposed open break with the Porte through non-payment of tribute, Venice was not very interested in the events in this area, which, moreover, did not herald anything special. This may be one of the explanations for the permanent obstacles to Pius II's crusading plans, as set out at the Congress of Mantua. Thus, in exchange for her participation in a possible anti-Ottoman coalition, Venice demanded 8,000 men to equip her fleet, payment of all expenses incurred for war preparations, and the organisation of an army of 50,000 horsemen and 20,000 foot soldiers to go to the borders of Hungary [60] , conditions impossible to achieve. Moreover, after the peace concluded on 23 April 1454 [61] by Bartolomeo Marcello with the Sultan, the Republic of the Lagoons did its utmost to preserve the status quo in relations with the Turks, to reduce any of their sensitivities, to avoid at all costs the outbreak of a new war with the Ottoman Empire. Such a war was regarded as inevitable, sooner or later, by Venice, which had begun to realise that the Turks were gradually becoming a formidable maritime power,[62] but it should not be started before the Republic was fully prepared. Of course, the Republic was never fully ready, so after a nine-year peace, the war would be triggered, somewhat surprisingly for the Venetians, by the Turks.

Until then, however, the Venetians sought to spare the Sultan as much as possible and at the same time avoid papal invitations to join the preparations for an anti-Ottoman crusade. Thus, on 2 December 1456, in the instructions that the Senate sent to Lorenzo Vitturi, the Bailiff of Constantinople, he was asked to tell the Sultan that he had no reason to fear Venice [63] , and on 3 September 1459, in the instructions given to the new Bailiff Domenico Balbi, he was asked to resolve the conflicts and commercial disputes that had arisen in the meantime with great diplomacy, without reaching a rupture [64] .

On the other hand, the instructions that the Senate gave on 21 June 1458 to Niccolň Sagondino, envoy to Pope Calixtus III (1455-1458), are particularly significant. He was to show the Holy Father that the accusations levelled in Rome against Venice were intolerable, since Venice had always done its duty to Christianity. In this regard, Sagondino was to insist on the victory of Gallipoli in 1416, where a Turkish fleet was completely crushed, he was to show that in 1423 Salonium was occupied and held for seven years with great effort by the Venetians, that in 1444-1445 Venice armed galleys that fought all winter, while Pope Eugenius IV did not pay what he had promised. And all this while the other Christian powers did not respond to Venice's requests for help. Rather than listen to its accusers, the pope should consider the fact that the Turks are closely surrounding the Venetian possessions and that Venice's situation is therefore totally different from that of the other Christian states. For this reason, Venice cannot think of attacking the Turks in the given circumstances, because it would be premature, but it defends the island of Negroponte and maintains 12 galleys in the Aegean Sea to guard the Straits, and no Christian state can boast of comparable efforts [65] . It must be admitted that these instructions, intended to reach the ears of the pope, faithfully respected both the historical truth and the present situation, ruthlessly debunking all the accusations that could be levelled at Venice at that time. Due to the death of Calixtus III, a letter, almost identical, was also sent to the new Pope Pius II, on 30 October 1458[66] .

About a year later, on 11 October 1459, the Venetian Senate gave a very interesting reply to the delegates of Pope Pius II, who insisted that Venice participate in the preparations for the crusade. It was thus pointed out that the battle plans proposed by the pope were grandiose, but it was doubtful that the Italian states would find the necessary resources to maintain a sufficient army capable of defeating the Turks, who were very powerful [67] . The adversary should not be underestimated, especially now that Mehmet II is much more powerful than Murad II because he rules Constantinople. It is recalled that Murad defeated at Varna and the Christian powers hardly fought back, and that a long war is now to be foreseen, which will need financing without hesitation. Thus, thorough preparations must first be made and then war can be launched. As far as it was concerned, Venice was making such preparations [68] , but wondered what the other Christian powers were doing [69] . On 10 November 1459, about a month later, the Senate addressed a new letter to the Pope. In it the Venetians were more than surprised at the extent of the preparations for the crusade. They asked the pope how he could believe that the 240,000 ducats needed to arm 50 galleys could be raised quickly, and pointed out that it would be preferable to draw up plans for a crusade that were really feasible and not mere utopias [70] .

From all that has been said so far it is clear that in the years following 1454 the Venetians pursued a policy of obvious undermining of the Ottoman Empire and rejection of the Crusade, but we cannot but agree that, to a large extent, the arguments they used were fair and hard to refute. Everyone was aware, despite the pope's efforts, of the disappearance of the crusading ideal and the ideal of the unity of the Christian world, and no one could accuse the Venetians, with real grounds, of not wanting to fight the Turks. It would have meant asking them to commit a real act of suicide, which neither they nor the other Christian states were willing to do.

It seems that it was not until 1460, when the Turks attacked Moreea again and reached the borders of the Venetian possessions here, that Seria really began to worry about the intentions of the Ottoman Empire towards it[71] . So in 1461, the year in which we consider that the rupture between Vlad Țepeș and the Turks really took place, the situation of Venice was completely different, which explains its increased interest in the events of the Lower Danube.

In April 1460, after having noticed suspicious preparations by the Turks, the Senate ordered the captain of the Gulf, Antonio Loredan, to leave with the greatest haste for Negroponte [72] . On 20 May, the military preparations of the Turks became so worrying that Venice was forced to take several preventive measures: it requested the preparation of 300 crossbowmen in Crete, so that they could be sent to Negroponte if necessary, it decided to send supplies of wheat to Modon and Negroponte, and to arm three new galleys [73] . On the same day, the new captain of the Gulf, Giacomo Barbarigo, was ordered to leave immediately for Negroponte and to make short calls at Corfu, Modon and Nauplia [74] . On 16 June, instructions to Lorenzo Moro, who had replaced Barbarigo as captain of the Gulf, required him to first of all put Coron, Modon and Nafplio in a state of defence, and if he found out that the Sultan was heading for Albania or Negroponte to take the necessary measures [75] . Finally, on 1 August, the information received by Lorenzo Moro and the castellan of Modon and Coron proved very clearly that the Sultan intended to establish his authority over the whole of Morea and that he was the enemy of Venice. The Turks had reached the borders of the Venetian territories in the Peloponnese and, in order to better probe the Sultan's intentions, the Senate decided on 9 August to send an extraordinary ambassador to the Porte in the person of Niccolň da Canale [76] .

In 1461 the tension generated by the Ottoman military preparations persisted in Venice. On 28 April, the Senate sent its instructions to Vittore Capello, supreme commander of the Venetian fleet (Captain of the Sea), asking him to visit all Venetian ports in Romania, to watch the movements of the Ottoman fleet, but with great discretion, and not to attack Turkish ships leaving the Dardanelles. Such actions would be dangerous at a time when Venice was holding talks with the Sultan [77] . On 21 July the same Vittore Capello was asked to disarm part of the fleet, the Ottoman danger being less pressing after the Sultan left for the Black Sea [78] . But Venetian fears were far from being allayed. In the autumn, on 18 October, the Senate came to the conclusion that, owing to the general circumstances and the dangers threatening the territories of Romania, it was more than ever essential that men of merit should be elected as governors, and that they should be given all the necessary advantages [79] . Only two days later, on 20 October, although it had learned that the Turkish fleet had disarmed, Venice could not be reassured about the Sultan's intentions, and so Capello was asked to keep watch, with the galleys that remained at his disposal, over the waters of the Aegean archipelago [80] . On 9 December, the Senate also decided that the fortifications of Negroponte should be strengthened, that arms should be sent to them and that a detailed defence plan should be drawn up [81]. At the end of the same year, Venice also alerted the King of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, to the imminence of war with the Turks [82] and also tried to bring about a reconciliation between him and Emperor Frederick III [83], but without success.

However, on 4 March 1462, the Venetian envoy to Buda, Pietro Tomasso (Petrus de Thomassis), announced to the Senate that he had been summoned by the king, who gave him to read some letters he had received from one of his soldiers to Vlad the Impaler, informing him of the damage he had caused to the Turks, of the multitude of those killed whom he had seen "according to the number of heads depicted, apart from those who were burned in those places". From this letter, which in fact refers to the one sent by Vlad Țepeș on 11 February, it appears that Matia Corvin used the results of the victorious expedition of the prince of Wallachia - whom he considered his vassal - in order to obtain funds from Italy, the Venetian envoy asking for "denarij per sovvene" [84] . It is also noted that the echo of Vlad Țepeș's deeds of bravery was quickly received in Venice, which, almost immediately, on 20 March, made them known in Rome [85] .

Having reached this point in our investigation, we feel that we must highlight a particularly important aspect that we will find again in Venice's attitude towards Vlad Țepeș until the end. Namely, it is the fact that, although it knew very well who was the author of the victory against the Turks in the winter of 1461-1462, i.e. Vlad Țepeș [86] , Senioria accepted all the propaganda of Matia Corvin and acted to help him and not the brave prince of the Romanian Country. Thus, on 20 March 1462, the Venetian Senate wrote to the Pope, as we have shown above, explaining the critical situation of Hungary and not of the Romanian Country, as if Hungary had entered into battle with the Turks and not the Romanian Country. Moreover, the Senate proposed to the Pope to send monthly the 10-12,000 florins to Hungary for the maintenance of 400 horsemen. This project was also presented to Matthias Corvinus on 29 March [87] . Pope Pius II knew as well as the Venetians who was the real winner over the Turks. This was because he had been informed by the Venetians themselves, but also from a letter of the Cardinal of Mantua, dated April 1462, who informed him of the following: ,,Adi 29 di Marzo venne nuova come li Valacchi chi hevevano dato una rotta al Turco nelle paesi della Va(la)cchia, e morti di loro piu di vintimilla soldati..." [88] . But for the pope, as for the Venetians, the Catholic king of Hungary had to be the hero of the anti-Ottoman struggle, and therefore he had to be helped.

Venice, although it probably wished to do so, avoided entering into direct contact with Vlad Țepeș, thus seeking to play down the sensitivities of Matthias Corvinus [89] , who claimed to be his suzerain and thought himself entitled to deal on behalf of the man he considered his vassal. Therefore, all Venetian information comes from the Hungarian court, some from Constantinople as well, but it proves that the events of the Lower Danube were followed with great attention in the "fortress of the lagoons", the political factors here seeking to find out their true significance and extent.

A second letter, known to us, sent by Pietro Tomasso to Venice, is dated 27 May 1462. In it, the ambassador describes to his superiors the situation on the Lower Danube as it was on the eve of the outbreak of the great Sultan campaign. First of all, he talks about Mehmet II's huge army, which, according to some rumours, he considers to number 200 000 men, including 20 000 janissaries, and points out that there could be three areas of attack: Wallachia, Transylvania and Belgrade, the first two being the most likely. Then a river fleet of 300 ships is mentioned, which the Sultan introduced on the Danube to help him cross the river. This is followed by information about Vlad the Impaler, who is said to have sent all his women and children to the mountains while he and his army guarded the Danube. It is also said that everyone at the court in Buda was surprised that Vlad Țepeș had not sent for help, and that the king was determined to go and fight the Turks [90] . At the end of the letter the ambassador makes some considerations about the future course of events as he envisaged them, some of which will be refuted, but others confirmed. Thus, he believes that either Vlad Țepeș will be easily defeated by the huge Ottoman army, which will not happen, after which the Hungarian kingdom will be defeated just as easily, which again will not happen precisely because Vlad Țepeș will not let himself be crushed, or King Matthias will reach a shameful agreement for the whole of Christendom [91] , which will indeed happen, despite the splendid victory of the Romanian lord [92] . From this letter it can be seen that the Venetian ambassador in Buda had become quite familiar with Hungary's military capability and her king's "desire" to confront the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, he did not doubt that Vlad the Impaler was determined to make every sacrifice to defend his country but, not knowing the military situation of the Romanian Country, he believed that a possible success would have been impossible in the face of the Ottoman onslaught.

More than two weeks later, on 14 June, the same Pietro Tomasso wrote again to the Doge, showing him that the Turks led by a Pasha, probably Mahmud Pasha, had crossed the Danube with 60 000 men, including 25 000 janissaries. In fact, this is the closest figure to the truth for the entire Ottoman army led by Mehmet II himself [93]. The Venetian ambassador went on to say that the prince of Transylvania was preparing for battle, and that Matthias Corvinus had told him that the Sultan was in camp and would probably attack Belgrade. He also indicated that the king had ordered the general assembly of the army at Seghedin, from where it could move either to Belgrade or to Transylvania and Wallachia, depending on Mehmet II's intentions. It can be seen that with this news Matthias Corvinus was trying to create confusion in Venice and probably in Rome about the Sultan's intentions. He spoke of the possibility of attacking Belgrade at a time when it was very clear that the Sultan intended to attack with all the forces at his disposal, precisely because he did not intend to support Vlad Tepes and openly confront the Ottomans. At the same time, however, he asked Venice to call on the Pope and other Christian princes to send him aid, showing that his treasury was empty. The ambassador said that Vlad Țepeș, unable to stop the Turks at the Danube, had retreated to the mountains and predicted his complete defeat, feared by the court of Buda, which could have led to the loss of Transylvania [94] .

Some of this information, however, was contradicted by other information from different sources. Thus, regarding the fact that Vlad Țepeș had not asked for help from the King of Hungary, information transmitted by Tomasso on 27 May [95] , another letter, that of Ladislau de Vesen, also addressed to the Doge, indicated that the lord of the Romanian Country "... every day asks to be helped, because he will not be able to support such a strong attack alone" [96] . Even Pietro Tomasso, in his letter of 15 June, indicated that the Sultan had already entered Wallachia, but, under the influence of the court of Buda, he maintained his opinion that from here he could move against Belgrade and continued to express doubts about Vlad Țepeș's ability to resist [97] . Of course, all this information, although some of it was contradictory and could leave room for justified suspicions, turned Venice's attention primarily on Matthias Corvinus and less on Vlad Tepes, with whom it avoided, as we have already shown, to enter into direct links.

But the reality was different, and the one who knew it best was the King of Hungary himself. Thus, after having tried to demonstrate to Venice that Vlad Țepeș was incapable of resisting the Turks and after having received subsidies from the latter for the anti-Ottoman struggle, [98] Matthias Corvinus tried to make the most of the splendid victory of the Romanian prince, to which he had contributed nothing. Immediately after learning of the victory and the Sultan's retreat, he sent a message to Venice announcing the crushing of the Sultan by "Hungarians and Romanians", the echo of which was recorded by the Milanese ambassador in the lagoon city, A. Guidobonus, on 30 July 1462 [99] .

But in spite of these attempts, which in today's terms we might call intoxication and misinformation, Venice, whose diplomacy was very skilful in such matters, could not be misled. It gathered its information not only from Buda, but also from elsewhere, and was thus able to form a picture very close to the real course of events in the Lower Danube. Particularly significant in this respect is the letter of the Constantinopolitan bailiff Domenico Balbi, who, on 28 July 1462, gave an almost complete and truthful picture of Mehmet II's campaign in Wallachia. He showed that, once north of the Danube, the Sultan found the country empty of men and provisions, all retreating to fortified places in the mountains. He then tells of the harassing war waged by Vlad Țepeș, of the night attack against the Sultan's camp, of the great losses suffered by the Turks, which finally forced them to retreat, Mehmet II being already at Adrianopol on 11 July. It is also mentioned that the Sultan left his brother, none other than Radu the Handsome, with some Ottoman troops near Wallachia, to try to overthrow the prince with the help of possible internal complicity: ,,... lasso al fradello de Dracuglia cum alcume bandieri dei Turchii per tentar li animi de Valachi de quanto volesserro lassar al Dracuglia convenir de quest altro" [100] thus, an accurate picture of the 1462 campaign and Vlad the Impaler's victory, but not a word about the so often mentioned help of Matthias Corvinus, which of course made the Senate, the Doge and the other ruling factors of the Republic realize also the real position of the Hungarian king.

True information about what happened in Wallachia in 1462 reached Venice through other channels, probably letters from its representatives in the Balkans and the Aegean islands, echoed in several chronicles of the time, which also reveal the opinion of Venetian public opinion, i.e. the informed circles of the Republic, about the events of that year at the Lower Danube. Thus, an anonymous Italian chronicle, also circulating in Venice, which goes on to narrate events up to 1481, records, under the year 1462, that '... the Turks who had gone against Dracula in Wallachia were beaten and chased away" [101] , the chronicle of Domenico Malipiero also states that the lord of the Romagna region met the Turks with a strong army and defeated them with mighty will [102] , and the Venetian Annals (1433-1477) of Stefano Magno wrote that in 1462 Mehmet II, "emperor of the Turks and Greeks", sent ,,... a strong army into Wallachia; but the Wallachians rising against it were defeated..." [103] . We note, therefore, that in all these sources, which refer to the great confrontation that took place in Wallachia in 1462, there is no mention of any contribution by Matthias Corvinus, whose claims, brought to the knowledge of the Republic by the July solia, are appreciated at their fair value, i.e. at their rhetorical-propagandistic value, without any real support.

The suspicions that Venice had about the intentions of Matthias Corvinus also result from the fact that when he left Buda on his so-called campaign to help Vlad the Impaler, arriving only at the beginning of November 1462 in Brasov, he was accompanied by the Venetian ambassador Pietro Tomasso. His mission was to inform the Senate about the evolution of the conflict and other important events [104] . Unfortunately, the only information that the ambassador sent and of which we are aware was that of 26 November, concerning the arrest of Vlad Țepeș, after some time the leadership of the Republic confirmed the receipt of this letter, as well as that of the King of Hungary about the "case" Vlad Țepeș [105] .

We suspect that the Venetian authorities, usually very well informed about events, especially if they were of direct interest to them, had found out by the end of the year the truth about the relations between Matthias Corvinus, Vlad the Impaler and the Turks, because as early as 9 November it was known in Vienna that the King of Hungary had concluded a secret treaty with the Sultan [106] . As relations between Frederick III and Matthias Corvinus were tense, we do not see what obstacle could have prevented Venetian diplomacy from finding out everything that might interest it about this treaty. But, although it knew the truth, Venice continued to undermine Matthias Corvinus in the hope that he would eventually decide to attack the Turks. This was at a time when Venetian-Ottoman relations were becoming increasingly tense, with Venice's preparations for war intensifying especially after the appointment of a new Captain General of the Sea (supreme commander of the Venetian fleet) in December 1462, an appointment that did not become effective until 31 January the following year, with the election of Alvise Loredan to the post [107] .

Thus, on 15 January 1463, the Venetian Senate confirmed to the Hungarian King the receipt of letters informing him of "... the enmity case of the former Montenegrin lord, who tried to commit such a great crime against Your Majesty and the kingdom" [108] . Matthias was also praised for having taken some timely defensive measures [109] . This was, however, we repeat, a diplomatic language that Venice used against Hungary only because it needed to ally itself with it at a time when a major confrontation with the Ottoman Empire seemed unavoidable and Vlad Tepes had lost his reign. In fact, despite the letters and 'proofs' of treason sent by Matthias Corvinus, the Venetian Senate could not be convinced of Vlad the Impaler's guilt.

Five months after his arrest, on 18 April 1463, it asked the new ambassador in Buda, Giovanni Aymo, to discover the truth about Vlad Țepeș, to find out about the relations between the King of Hungary and the new ruler of the Romanian Country and to find out whether a peace had been or could be made between Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, in which case it had to do everything possible to prevent it [110] . Two important things emerge from these instructions: on the one hand, Venice's distrust of the political and military intentions of Matthias Corvinus, and on the other, its imperative need to establish an alliance with Hungary in the face of the growing Ottoman threat. The information she possessed about the secret treaty between Matthias Corvinus and the Sultan, probably obtained through Vienna but also through her diplomatic agents in the Balkans, she wanted to have confirmed or refuted by investigations on the spot and, if possible, to turn the situation in her favour. For this reason she was willing to accept the explanations and arguments of the Hungarian king, the veracity of which she doubted, but she did not derive much benefit from the hoped-for alliance with him, since Matthias had his sights set on Central Europe, preferring to maintain a situation of military balance and territorial-political status quo on the borders with the Ottoman Empire [111] . On the Lower Danube, the main de facto allies of Venice in the long war with the Ottoman Porte between 1463 and 1479 were the Romanians and not the King of Hungary. The Romanians led by Vlad Tepes defeated the Sultan in 1462, they too, but led by Stephen the Great, would achieve the brilliant victory of Vaslui in January 1475, a victory which for a time eliminated Ottoman pressure on the Venetian possessions on the Balkan coast of the Adriatic, and in 1476 a new Sultan expedition would crush their fierce resistance. In this period, as in others of the Middle Ages, the main factor of resistance to Ottoman pressure on Central Europe was the Romanian countries and much less the feudal Hungarian kingdom. It is true that the Hungarian royalty tried to take credit for all the major victories achieved against the Turks on the Lower Danube, but this could not hide the undeniable truth of the facts. For the ruling politicians in Vienna, Venice, Rome and others, Matthias Corvinus' behaviour in 1462 was very clear, his treachery was obvious, but the hopes, unrealised, moreover, that he would change his attitude and fight the Turks led them, like the Venetians, to give him credit, undeservedly, for it.

How, however, can this attitude be explained? We believe that two factors played a primary role, both for Venice and for the papacy. The first is Hungary's status as a great power, recognised throughout Europe. So, in comparison with the Romanian countries, which had a much lower political and military potential, Hungary was preferable, from which they expected not only a defensive confrontation policy towards the Turks, but also important offensive actions against them. For this reason the papacy intervened energetically to conclude a peace treaty between Matthias Corvinus and Frederick III [112] , after which it played an essential role in the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between Venice and Matthias Corvinus, a treaty concluded on 12 September 1463 [113] . But it seems that this alliance with Hungary was already too late. By that time Hungarian foreign policy had already changed direction and Hungary was no longer aggressive towards the Turks [114] . After Matthias Corvinus had secured his hold on the Jajce region of Bosnia and after the failure of the papal crusade project in 1464, he abandoned the anti-Ottoman struggle for a long time and, at the urging of Pope Paul II (1464-1471), turned his forces against George Podiebrad (1458-1471), king of Bohemia, his former ally and father-in-law, but who had meanwhile become a heretic and enemy [115] . The situation could not be prevented or changed by the agreement signed on 19 October 1463 between Pope Pius II, Venice and Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy [116], which provided for an anti-Ottoman alliance for three years.

Secondly, it is the fact that Matthias Corvinus was the Catholic king of a Catholic state, Hungary. For the Pope it was essential that the anti-Ottoman crusade be led by Catholics and that it be carried out with the participation, first and foremost and on a large scale, of Catholic forces, Catholic states. For this reason, one of the constants of papal anti-Ottoman crusade policy was to seek participants within Catholic Europe. Once they had offered their services or refused to take part in the crusade, papal diplomacy turned its attention to the Orthodox world and even to the Asian world, from where formidable enemies of the Ottoman Porte could emerge. This is why Venice, which desperately needed the help of the papacy, did not dare to bypass the Catholic Matthias Corvinus and enter into direct contact with Vlad Tepes. For Pope Pius II, all the victories of Vlad the Impaler were, in fact, victories of this Catholic king of Hungary. Nor could the pope have conceived of an anti-Ottoman crusade being started by an Orthodox prince, and of his placing himself at its head. That is why there was not even the question of helping, even symbolically, the brave prince of the Romanian Country. All eyes were on Matthias Corvinus, the only leader capable, in the Pope's view, of leading the anti-Ottoman forces. Significant in this respect is the firm rejection by Pius II in 1462 of a project for an anti-Ottoman crusade, which had been initiated by the Bohemian king George Podiebrad, suspected of heresy. The latter, through a Frenchman from Dauphiné, Antonio Marini, who had arrived in unclear surroundings at his court, proposed an anti-Ottoman alliance to Venice, Burgundy and France. But Podiebrad wanted to bypass the pope, to leave him out of the alliance, which, as Venice pointed out to him, was an impossibility [117] . And indeed, absolutely nothing came of this project.

We believe that these are the two main reasons why the Italian powers, in particular Venice and the papacy, avoided engaging in direct relations with Vlad Țepeș, leaving him to the good pleasure of Matia Corvinus, who threw him into prison for more than 13 years without anyone holding him to account.

Things would become very clear towards the end of Matthias Corvinus' reign, however, when he repeated his behaviour, in a similar situation, towards Stephen the Great, Lord of Moldavia. Although he had an alliance with the latter, which provided for mutual aid in the event of Ottoman attacks, Matthias Corvinus did not hesitate to conclude a treaty with the new sultan, Baiazid II (1481-1512), in 1483. Thus, while the Turks attacked and captured by surprise the two key cities of southern Moldavia, Chilia and the White Fortress, he launched a major campaign against Frederick III in the summer of 1484, which resulted in the occupation of Vienna the following year, where he remained until his surprising death in 1490 [118] . The "champion of Christianity", the "defender of Europe" thus ended his days in "glory" in Vienna, having conquered, in hard and bloody battles, almost all the hereditary possessions of the Habsburgs, and not in the anti-Ottoman struggle as he had promised throughout his reign.

In fact, in our view, Hungary was not and could not be that "wall of defence" of Europe against the increasingly insistent Ottoman assaults, for two main reasons. The first, less important, is that Matthias Corvinus, its last great king, deliberately turned his efforts to a policy of expansion in Central Europe, the exact opposite of what his father, the great Iancu of Hunedoara, had done, a policy which necessarily involved the maintenance of the Ottoman Porte. The second and most important reason is that the overall development of Hungarian society in the 15th century and at the beginning of the following century led to an intensification of feudal anarchy, through the increase in the power of the great magnates and a corresponding weakening of state structures and the strength of the state, which explains why a single battle (Mohács, 1526) was enough for this state to disappear from the political map of Europe. The same was not true of the Romanian countries, which have experienced uninterrupted state continuity and have recorded in history numerous glorious feats of anti-totalitarian struggle.

At the end of these brief considerations, we believe that a few conclusions are in order regarding Vlad Țepeș in the context of the anti-Ottoman struggle. First of all, it is noted that there was no direct link between him and Venice, this being impossible due to the claims of suzerainty manifested by Matthias Corvinus towards Wallachia, theoretical claims, but which Venice, for the reasons indicated above, did not want to contest. Secondly, we can say that Venice, in spite of Matia Corvin's disinformation action, knew, even with very significant details, the heroic struggle of Vlad Țepeș, as well as the less than chivalrous behaviour of the Hungarian king, in contradiction with the medieval obligations of a suzerain towards his vassal, as Matia Corvin claimed to be towards Vlad Țepeș. But, thirdly, Venice preferred to turn a blind eye to the evidence, hoping to obtain the effective collaboration of Matthias Corvinus in the anti-Ottoman struggle. The result was that it passively witnessed the downfall of a sure ally, Vlad the Impaler, and in return obtained only a very inadequate amount of help from Hungary, which at the time did not have, even if it wanted to, the capacity to wage a major offensive war against the Ottoman Empire.

Vlad the Impaler tried to break out of the system of Hungarian-Ottoman co-occupation established over the Romanian Country in 1451-1452, but without adequate external support he was unable to do so. His action showed that this system could not be removed, that, overcoming mutual hostility, the two great powers intended to keep it in place, which would happen until the disappearance of Hungary in 1526. At the same time, however, his action also brought to light a particularly important fact, namely that the balance of power in this system was increasingly tilted in favour of the Ottoman Empire. This also explains Stephen the Great's repeated failures to bring Wallachia into his sphere of influence and to oppose the Turks, the victim of which was Vlad the Great himself in 1476. However, his struggle was not in vain. It showed the Turks that Wallachia could be defeated but not destroyed. ___________ Sources: [1] Ioan Bogdan, Vlad Țepeș and the German and Russian narrations about him, Bucharest, 1896, p. 11; Ștefan Andreescu, Vlad Țepeș (Dracula) between legend and historical truth, Bucharest, 1976, p. 59; Manole Neagoe, Vlad Țepeș, heroic figure of the Romanian people, Bucharest, 1977, pp. 21-22. [2] Nicolae Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, Bucharest, 1976, pp. 33-37; Radu Ștefan Ciobanu, Pe urmele lui Vlad Țepeș, Bucharest, 1979, p. 95. [3] History of Romania, vol. II, Bucharest, 1962, pp. 465-466. [4] Hurmuzaki, Documents concerning the history of Romanians, vol. XV, 1, Bucharest, 1911, p. 45, doc. LXXIX. [5] Ibidem, pp. 45-46, doc. LXXX. [6] Olgierd Górka, Cronica epocei lui Ștefan cel Mare, 1457-1499, Bucharest, 1937, p. 110; see also Ion Const. Chițimia, Cronica di Ștefan cel Mare (Schedel's German version), Bucharest, 1942; Slav-Romance chronicles of the 16th century, Bucharest, 1942. XV-XVI published by Ioan Bogdan, revised and completed edition by P. P. Panaitescu, Bucharest, 1959, pp. 28, 49, 61 and 178; Grigore Ureche, Letopisețul Țării Moldovei, edition P. P. Panaitescu, 2nd edition, Bucharest, 1958, p. 90. [7] See in this regard the statements of Critobul of Imbros, From the reign of Mohammed II. Anii 1451-1467, edited by Vasile Grecu, Bucharest, 1962, p. 290; Laonic Chalcocondil, Expuneri istorice, edited by Vasile Grecu, Bucharest, 1958, p. 283; Tursun-bei, ,,Tarih-i Ebu-l Fath-i Sultan Mehmed han" (History of Sultan Mehmed-han, the conquering father), in Cronici turcești privind țările române. Extracts, vol. I, Sec. XV-mid sec. XVII, ed. Mihail Guboglu and Mustafa Ali Mehmet, Bucharest, 1966, pp. 67-68; Șemseddin Ahmed bin Suleiman Kemal-pașa-zade, ,,Tevarih-i al-i Osman" (Histories of the Ottoman Dynasty) in ibidem, p. 198; Constantin Mihailovici de Ostrovița's account in Foreign Travellers about Romanian Countries, vol. I, Bucharest, 1968, p. 126. [8] The hostile attitude of Matthias Corvinus towards Vlad Țepeș is confirmed by the order he issued from Buda on 10 April 1459, forbidding the Brașovs to sell arms in Wallachia (Hurmuzaki, Documents, XV, p. 52, doc. XC). [9] See Chapter I of this work, note 124. [10] In support of this assertion, we believe that the historian Șerban Papacostea comes to the conclusion he reaches after a meticulous research of the causes that generated the conflict between Vlad Țepeș and the Saxons of southern Transylvania. Here is what he says: "The fierce confrontation between Vlad Țepeș and the cities of Brașov and Sibiu was therefore not a commercial war with political manifestations, but a political conflict with commercial excesses" (Șerban Papacostea, ,,Începuturile politica commerciale a Țării Românești și Moldovei (secolele XIV-XVI). Road and State", in Studies and Materials of Medieval History, X, Bucharest, 1983, p. 30. [11] This is an anonymous history up to 1500, La progenia della cassa de' Octomani, apud Nicolae Iorga, Acte și fragmente cu privire la istoria românilor, vol. III, București, 1897, p. 13 and Donado da Lezze's chronicle, Historia turchesca (1300-1514), ed. I. Ursu, Bucharest, 1909, pp. 24-25, which

indicates the year 1458 for Mahmud Pasha's expedition against Vlad Tepes, information considered true by N. Iorga in Istoria Românilor, vol. IV, Bucharest, 1937, pp. 130-131. [12] The chronological error of the two Italian sources, which place the events of the beginning of the 1462 campaign four years earlier, is demonstrated with solid arguments by Ștefan Andreescu, op. cit., pp. 91-92 and idem, ,,Războiul cu turcii din 1462", in Revista de istorie, tom 29, nr. 11, 1976, pp. 1673-1674. See also Const. A. Stoide, ,,Vlad the Impaler's battles with the Turks (1461-1462)", in Anuarul Institutulului de istorie e arheologie "A. D. Xenopol", XV, 1978, pp. 16-17. We share this opinion. The confusion in the two Italian sources may also derive from the fact that in early October 1458 Hungarian troops led by Mihail Szilagyi defeated an Ottoman army commanded by Mahmud Pasha near Belgrade (I. A. Fessler, E. Klein, Geschichte von Ungarn, III, Leipzig, 1876, p. 16; N. Iorga, Geschichte des osmanische Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt, vol. II, Gotha, 1909, pp. 107-108; C. Jireček, Geschichte des Serben, II, 1, Gotha, 1918, p. 213; Franz Babinger, Mahomet II le Conquêrant et son temps. 1432-1481. La grande peur du monde au tournant de l'histoire, Paris, 1954, pp. 189-190). [13] For the haraciul of Wallachia during Vlad Țepeș's reign see M. Berza, ,,Haraciul Moldovei și Țării Românești în sec. XV-XIX", in Studii și materiale de istorie medie, II, București, 1957, pp. 28-29. [14] Istoria României, II, p. 470; N. Stoicescu, op. cit., p. 86; idem, ,,La victoire de Vlad l'Empaleur sur les Turcs (1462)", in Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, XV, no. 3, 1976, p. 377; Șt. Andreescu, Vlad Țepeș (Dracula)..., p. 99; R. Șt. Ciobanu, op. cit., pp. 170-171; Emil Stoian, Vlad Țepeș. Myth and historical reality, Bucharest, 1989, p. 79; Constantin Rezachevici, ,,Vlad Țepeș - chronology, bibliography", in Revista de istorie, tom 29, nr. 11, 1976, p. 1748; idem, ,,Vlad Țepeș - Chronology and historical Bibliography", in vol. Dracula. Essays on the Life and Times of Vlad Țepeș. Edited by Kurt W. Treptow, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 257; Kurt W. Treptow, Aspects of the Campaign of 1462, in ibid, pp. 123-124. Matei Cazacu considers that Vlad Țepeș stopped paying tribute to the Turks in 1460 and links this decision to the work of the Congress of Mantua in 1459 (Matei Cazacu, L'histoire du prince Dracula en Europe Centrale et Orientale (XVe siècle), Geneve, 1988, p. 📷. [15] In this year Mehmet II undertook an important campaign in Moreea, succeeding in conquering a third of the Peninsula, with the cities of Corinth, Patras, Vostitza, Kalavryta. The two despots of Morea, Thomas and Demetrios, are obliged to pay an annual tribute of 3,000 ducats (Denis A. Zakythinos, Le Despotat grec du Morée. Historie politique, London, 1975, pp. 256-260). [16] F. Babinger, op. cit., pp. 199-201. [17] Ibidem, pp. 210-215; D. A. Zakythinos, op. cit., pp. 267-274. On 1 August 1460, the Captain of the Gulf, the title borne by the commander of the Venetian fleet in the Adriatic, Lorenzo Moro, as well as the castellan of Modon and Coron, received very clear information that the Sultan intended to establish his authority over the whole of Morea, that he was the enemy of Venice and that he had already reached the borders of the Venetian territories in the Peninsula (F. Thiriet, Régestes des délibération du senat de Venise concernant la Romanie, tome III, 1431-1463, Paris, The Hague, 1961, pp. 233-234, no. 3118). [18] F. Babinger, op. cit., pp. 228-238; Ș. Papacostea, ,,Relațiile internazionali în răsăritul și sud-estul Europei în secolelele XIV-XV", in Revista de istorie, vol. 34, no. 5, 1981, pp. 916-917; Tahsin Gemil, Românii și otomanii în secolelele XIV-XVI, București, 1991, p. 140. 19] For this conflict see Hurmuzaki, Documents, XV, 1, pp. 50-51, doc. LXXXIX; I. Bogdan, Documente privitoare la relațiile Țării Românești cu Brașovul și cu Țara Ungurească în sec. XV-XVI, vol. I, 1413-1508,

Bucharest, 1905, pp. 101-103; C. C. Giurescu, Istoria românilor, vol. II, 1, 3rd ed., Bucharest, 1940, pp. 43-49; Istoria României, II, pp. 468-469; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, pp. 70-73; Șt. Andreescu, Vlad Țepeș (Dracula)..., pp. 66-77; R. Șt. Ciobanu, op. cit., pp. 150-159; E. Stoian, op. cit., pp. 60-70. Tursun bei shows that Vlad Țepeș ,,... trusting in the High Porte, overcame the Hungarians, killing many of them..." (op. cit., ed.cit., p. 68), and Chalcocondil also states the following: "And the Peons (Hungarians - n.n.), not a few, whom he believed to have some interference in public affairs, not killing any of them, killed them in very great numbers" (op. cit., ed.cit., p. 283). In fact, Vlad Țepeș's incursions into Transylvania were directed against all those who were working against him, hostile boyars or pretenders to the reign, and who were thus violating the country's aspirations for independence (Pavel Binder, ,,Itinerarul transilvănean al Vlad Țepeș", in Revista de istorie, tom 27, nr. 10, 1974, pp. 1537-1542).

[20] One of the reasons for the hostility of the Saxons, craftsmen and merchants par excellence, was probably the adoption of protectionist trade measures by Vlad Țepeș (Gustav Gündisch, ,,On Vlad Țepeș's relations with Transylvania in 1456-1458", in Studies. Revistă de istorie, vol. 16, 1963, pp. 684-686; Radu Manolescu, Comerțul Țării Românești și Moldovei cu Brașovul (secolelele XIV-XVI), Bucharest, 1965; Dinu C. Giurescu, ,,Relațiile economice ale Țării Românești cu paesi de Peninsulei Balcanice din secolul al XIV-lea până la mediados la XVI-lea", in Romanoslavica, XI, 1965, pp. 167-201; M. Cazacu, ,,L'impact ottoman sur les pays roumains et ses incidences monétairs (1452-1504)", in Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, XII, no. 1, 1973, pp. 188 ff.).

[21] We find the opinion of the historian Șerban Papacostea particularly interesting, who considers that Vlad Țepeș did not pursue a protectionist policy towards the Saxon merchants of Brașov and Sibiu: "Vlad Țepeș's relations with Brasov and Sibiu, the meaning of his conflict with the two cities, as well as his entire personality and activity are distorted in historiography, partly because of some of the sources that recorded his deeds, stories in Slavonic and German, a mixture of reality and legend, partly because of an historiographical approach that placed the thesis before the source and research" (Ș. Papacostea, ,,The Beginnings of Commercial Politics...", p. 27). In the continuation of the argument of this point of view it is pointed out that it is certain that Radu the Handsome, brother and successor in the reign of Vlad the Impaler, instituted the obligatory deposit, which considerably restricted the activity of the Brașovs in Wallachia and at the same time intercepted their direct link with the Lower Danube (Ibidem, p. 28). Returning to the throne in 1476, and with the assistance of the Hungarian royal armies, Vlad Țepeș undertook, in fact, to annul the measures of Radu the Handsome: ,,... that from now on the scale of what was shall be nowhere in the land of my reign" (I. Bogdan, Documents concerning the relations of Wallachia with Brasov..., I, pp. 95-97; Ș. Papacostea, ,,The beginnings of commercial policy...", p. 29). If this is the case, and it is very probable, it follows that Vlad the Impaler's war with the Saxons of southern Transylvania and with King Matthias Corvinus was purely political (Ș. Papacostea, ,,The beginnings of commercial politics...", p. 30; G. Gündisch, ,,Vlad Țepeș und die Sächsischen Selbstverwaltungsgebiete Siebenbürgens", in Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, VIII, no. 6, 1969, pp. 981-992). It is also possible that the payment of tribute to the Porte, which Vlad Țepeș made regularly in the first years of his reign, until 1459, was interpreted by the King of Hungary and the Transylvanian Saxons as a gesture of hostility (M. Cazacu, L'histoire du prince Dracula..., p. 5). Also, as Matthias Corvinus had been holding secret talks with the Turks since the end of 1458 to conclude an armistice (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, vol IV, Budapest, 1875, pp. 36-40; Lino Gómez Canedo, Un español al servicio de la Santa Sede. Don Juan de Carvajal, Cardinal of Sant Angelo, legate in Germany and Hungary (1399? - 1469), Madrid, 1947, p. 199), it is quite possible that the Sultan saw Vlad Țepeș's action as an act of pressure on the King of Hungary, that he even gave his approval for the military actions in southern Transylvania and that he accepted, as something absolutely normal, the non-payment of tribute from 1459.

[22] G. Gündisch, ,,Vlad Țepeș und die Sächsischen...", p. 992. It seems that this peace and alliance agreement was a direct consequence of an earlier agreement with Matthias Corvinus (N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p.89, n. 17; Radu Lungu, ,,À propos de la campagne antiottomane de Vlad l'Empaleur au sud du Danube (hiver 1461-1462)", in Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, XXII, no. 2, 1983, pp. 149-150).

[23] Ș. Papacostea, ,,The beginnings of commercial policy...", p. 29.

announced the crusade on 14 January 1460 (N. Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, IV, Bucharest, 1915, pp. 166-168). Also, on 20 February 1460, Pius II offered Matthias Corvinus 40,000 ducats in case of war with the Turks, on condition that he did not conclude a separate peace with Mehmed II (Augustino Theiner, Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, vol. II, Rome, Paris, 1860, pp. 351, 356-357). In turn, during the Congress of Mantua, Matthias Corvinus promised through his soldiers that he would participate in a possible crusade with a contingent of 12,000 soldiers (L. Gómez Canedo, op. cit, p. 212).

[24] The opinion that Vlad Țepeș openly took action against the Turks in 1461 and not in 1459 was expressed by Nicolae Iorga: "Only in 1461 does he change his behaviour: he returns to the traditional policy that had been his father's" (Scrisori de boieri. Scrisori de domni, 3rd ed., Vălenii de Munte, 1931, p. 163) and repeated by Sergiu Iosipescu, ,,Conjunctura și condiționarea internazionale politico-militare a cea seconda domnii a Vlad Țepeș (1456-1462)", in Studii și materiale de muzeografie e istorie militară, nr. 11, 1978, București, 1978, pp. 179-180. However, in the case of the two historians this opinion is not sufficiently scientifically substantiated. That is why we, being in agreement with this point of view, will try to support it with all the arguments at our disposal. 25] G. B. Picotti, La dieta di Mantova e la politica de'Veneziani, in Miscellanea di storia veneta, seria terza, tomo IV, Venezia, 1912. Pope Pius II, who was preparing the anti-Ottoman league, appealed for peace in Hungary, torn by fighting between the partisans of Matthias Corvinus and those of Frederick III of Habsburg (I. A. Fessler, E. Klein, op. cit., III, pp. 20-21; K. Nehring, Mathias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III und das Reich. Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum, Munich, 1975, pp. 15-16) and, despite the opposition of Venice and the imperial delegates, read the bull announcing the crusade on 14 January 1460 (N. Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, IV, Bucharest, 1915, pp. 166-168). Also, on 20 February 1460, Pius II offered Matthias Corvinus 40,000 ducats in case of war with the Turks, on condition that he did not conclude a separate peace with Mehmed II (Augustino Theiner, Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, vol. II, Rome, Paris, 1860, pp. 351, 356-357). In turn, during the Congress of Mantua, Matthias Corvinus promised through his soldiers that he would participate in a possible crusade with a contingent of 12,000 soldiers (L. Gómez Canedo, op. cit, p. 212).

[26] Luigi Bignami, Francesco Sforza (1401-1466), Milan, 1938, pp. 275-276.

[27] L. Chalcocondil, op. cit. ed., pp. 283-284.

[28] I. Bogdan, Documente privitoare la relațiile Țării Românești cu Brașovul..., I, p. 107; Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen, VI, București, 1981, pp. 90-91, doc. 3237; G. Gündisch, Vlad Țepeș und die Sächsischen..., pp. 986-992; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 89, n. 17; Șt. Andreescu, ,,En marge des rapports de Vlad l'Empaleur avec l'Empire ottoman", in Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes, XIV, no. 3, 1976, p. 374; S. Iosipescu, art. cit., p. 182; R. Lungu, art. cit., pp. 149-150.

[29] I. Bogdan, Vlad Tepes and the German and Russian narratives..., p. 78.

[30] Lodovico da Bologna is one of the most controversial figures of the age, who undertook numerous journeys to the East, as a soldier or papal legate, almost always with the mission of making anti-Ottoman alliances with the Eastern powers. His missions of 1437, 1454-1455, 1460-1461, 1465, 1472 and 1477 are well known. For his life and work see, among others, Moriz Landwehr von Pragenau, Ludwig von Bologna. Patriarch von Antiochien, in Mitteilungen des Österreich Instituts, Wien, 1901, p. 293; B. Bughetti, ,,Nuovi documenti intorno a Fr. Lodovico da Bologna O.F.M. (1460-1461)", in Studi Francescani, series 3 a, 10, 1938, pp. 128-134; Angelo Bargellesi Severi, ,,Nuovi documenti su fr. Lodovico da Bologna, al secolo Lodovico Severi, Nunzio Apostolico in Oriente (1455-1457)", in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, annus 69, fasc. 1-2, 1976, pp. 3-22; Richard J.Walsh, ,,Charles the Bold and the Crusade: politics and propaganda", in Journal of medieval history, III, 1977, pp. 70-72, Jean Richard, La Papauté et les misisions d'Orient au Moyen Âge (XIIIe - XVe siècles), Paris, Torino, 1977, pp. 274-278.

[31] I. A. Fessler, Die Geschichte der Ungarn und ihrer Landsassen, V, Leipzig, 1822, p. 77; A. Bryer, ,,Lodovico da Bologna and the Georgian Embassy of 1460-1461", in Bendi Kartlisa. Revue de kartvelologie, XIX-XX, 1965, Paris, p. 181; Lajos Tardy, ,,Il ruolo di Venezia nei rapporti persiani e georgiani dell'Ungheria", in vol. Rapporti veneto-ungheresi all'epoca del Rinascimento, edited by Tibor Klaniczay, Budapest, 1975, p. 258.

[32] L. Tardy, art. cit.

[33] Ibid; A. Bryer, art. cit., p. 184.

[34] A. Bryer, op. cit. p. 191; L. Tardy, op. cit. p. 258.

[35] Ș. Papacostea, ,,Die politischen Voraussetzungen für die Wirtschaftliche Vorherrschaft des osmanischen Reiches Schwarzmeergebiet (1453-1484)", in Münchner Zeitschrift für Balkankunde, 1, Münich, 1978, p. 230; R. Lungu, art. cit., p. 151.

[36] L. Chalcocondil, op. cit., ed. cit., pp. 283-284; Critobul of Imbrosa, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 290; Ducas, Turkish-Byzantine History (1341-1462), ed. V. Grecu, Bucharest, 1958, p. 430; Tursun-bei, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 68; Șemseddin Ahmed bin Suleiman Kemal-pașa-zade, op. cit., ed. cit, p. 200; Enverî, Düsturname (Book of the Wazir), in Turkish Chronicles, I, p. 42, Asîk-pașa-zade, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman (Histories of the Ottoman Dynasty), in ibid, p. 92; Mehmed Neșri, Djihannuma. Tarih-i al-i Osman (History of the Ottoman Dynasty), in ibid, p. 125; Sa'adeddin Mehmed hodja efendi, Tadj-ut-Tevarih (Crown of Histories), in ibid, pp. 317-318; Mehmed bin Mehmed, Nuhbet-ut-tevarih ve'l ahbar (Chosen and Informative Chronicle), in ibid, pp. 406; Kodja Husein, Beda'i ul-veka'i (Wonderful Events), in ibid, p. 455; Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi, Tarih-i Solakzade (Chronicle of Solakzade), in ibid, vol. II, sec. XVI - early sec. XVIII, ed. Mihail Guboglu, Bucharest, 1974, p. 139. It should be noted that all the Ottoman chronicles we have been able to consult place the time of Vlad Țepeș's battle in 1461 and do not mention any previous suspicion that the sultan may have had about him regarding non-payment of tribute. [37] Probably from spies infiltrating Hungary (F. Babinger, op. cit., pp. 246-247). [38] These details are known from the famous letter sent by Vlad Țepeș to Matia Corvin on 11 February 1462, after the attack on the Ottoman positions on the Danube (I. Bogdan, Vlad Țepeș și narațiunile germane și rusești..., p. 79; N. Iorga, Scrisori de boieri. Scrisori de domni, ed. cit., p. 165; Andrei Corbea, ,,Cu privire la corespondența lui Țepeș cu Matia Corvin", in Anuarul Institutului de istorie e arheologie ,,A. D. Xenopol", XVII, 1980, p. 677). Without these details the solia is also mentioned by L. Chalcocondil, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 282; Ducas, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 430; Enverî, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 42; Tursun-bei, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 68. Asîk-pașa-zade states that the sultan's message was preceded by one of Vlad Țepeș (op. cit., ed. cit., p. 92), the same statement can be found in Mehmed Neșri (op. cit., ed. cit., p. 125). [39] For this blood tribute ("devșirme") see B. D. Populia, Ursprung und Wesen der "kuabeulese" im osmanischen Reich, Munich, 1963, with the mention on p. 58 of Vlad Țepeș's justified refusal, apud N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 91, n. 24. [40] Ducas, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 430; Tursun-bei, op. cit., ed. cit., p. 68. [41] Radu Florescu, Raymond T. Mc. Nally in Dracula. A Biography of Vlad the Impaler (1431-1476), New York, 1973, argue that Vlad the Impaler's refusal to appear at the Porte is evidence of Turkish suspicion of his improving relations with Matthias Corvinus (pp. 90-91). [42] Most of the Ottoman chronicles I have been able to consult, of course, accuse Vlad Țepeș of cunning and deceit, showing that Hamza bei and Catabolinos had no hostile intentions. That this is not the case we can learn from the Turkish chroniclers, namely from Kodja Husein and Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi, who show that the Sultan, before sending the two in solie, gave the order for the gathering of the armies (Turkish Chronicles, I, p. 455 and II, p. 139). [43] An eloquent example of this is Enverî, op. cit. ed. cit. p. 42, but also many other Turkish chroniclers to whom we do not return. But here is what Enverî says: "After the Shah conquered Trapezuntul/ He set out from here to Rumelia/ He filled that land with great riches/ And the enemies on all sides were punished// While the Shah was on that side/ And the Rumanian on this side,/ He made so many uprisings, that whoever saw them was astonished/ Ishak-pasha sat in residence/ He did not go out of the word of the Shah by heeding his advice/. The Shah summoned the viceroy/ Then Iunus left on his solie/ Iunus-bei and Hamza-bei died like martyrs/ And that unworthy man also scorched the banks of the Danube/ When the year reached 866 (1461-1462 - ed.)/ The Pashah began a holy expedition against him". [44] The

Congress of Mantua was one of the main initiatives of Pope Pius II to organize an anti-Ottoman crusade, an idea that was dominant throughout his pontificate but never materialized. See, among others, G. B. Picotti, op. cit.; A. S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, London, 1938, pp. 236-240; R. Eysser, ,,Papst Pius II und der Kreuzug gegen die Türken, in Mélanges d'Histoire Générale", published by C. Marinescu, vol. II, Bucharest, 1938, pp. 1-138; Giacchino Paparelli, Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pius II), Bari, 1950, pp. 210-222; G. Valentini, ,,La crociata di Pio II dalla documentazione veneta d'archivio", in Archivum historiae pontificiae, XIII, 1975, pp. 249-282; K. M. Setton, The papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), II The Fifteenth Century, Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 196-270; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 87; Șt. Andreescu, War with the Turks in 1462, p. 1677; S. Iosipescu, art. cit. See also note 25 above. [45] Pius II's crusading aspirations were also based on possible collaboration with the Ottoman Empire's Asian neighbours (the Turkmen state of Ak-koiunlu in Persia, Uzun Hasan, Sinope, Trapezunt, Georgia, Armenia), who had already in 1458-1459 concluded an anti-Ottoman alliance and forced Mehmet II to turn his main forces eastwards where, in 1461, he conquered Sinope and Trapezunt (The Cambridge Modern History, vol. I, The Renaissance, Cambridge, 1931, p. 78; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 89; Ș. Papacostea, ,,Caffa et la Moldavie face à l'expresion ottomane (1453-1484)", in Romanian-Italian Colloquium Genovesii la Marea Neagră în secolele XIII-XIV, București, 27-28 March 1975, București, 1977, pp. 139-140; Șt. Andreescu, War with the Turks in 1462, p. 1677; S. Iosipescu, art. cit. [46] Ducas, op. cit. ed., p. 422 et seq.; E. Stoian, op. cit. p. 79. [47] Freddy Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Âge. Le dévélopement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XIIe - XVe siècles), Paris, 1959, pp. 384, 385. [48] I. Bogdan, Vlad Țepeș și narațiunile germane și rusești..., p. 81; N. Iorga, Scrisori de boieri. Scrisori de domni, ed. cit., p. 166; A. Corbea, art. cit., p. 678. [49] In Pius II's crusading plans, Matthias Corvinus, the Catholic king of Hungary, was to play a leading role. Thus, on 18 January 1460 he urged him to continue his military preparations (Hurmuzaki, Documente, II, 2, Bucharest, 1891, pp. 128-129; A. Theiner, op. cit, p. 329), and in the course of that year he sent him as a subsidy the sum of 40,000 ducats (Monumenta Vaticana, Mathiae Corvini Hungariae regis epistolae ad Romanos Pontifices datae et ab eis acceptae, Budapest, 1891, p. 13; Stephan Kaprinai, Hungaria Diplomatica temporibus Mathiae de Hunyad Regis Hungariae, II, Vienna, 1771, p. 393). With this money 12,000 men and 10 ships could be armed (Hurmuzaki, Documente, II, 2, pp. 130-131; A. Theiner, op. cit., II, pp. 351, 356-357), and the king promised 40,000 men and his personal participation in the anti-Ottoman struggle (N. Iorga, Notes et extraits, IV, p. 182; St. Kaprinai, op. cit., pp. 354-355), but none of this happened. [50] Ș. Papacostea, ,,Die politischen Voraussetzungen...," p. 230. [51] See notes 48 and 49 above. [52] The very fact of the capture (in the autumn of 1460) and execution of his uncle Mihail Szilágyi (5 February 1461) (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, p. 67; L. Gómez Canedo, op. cit., pp. 215-216), although it caused a certain tension in relations with the Turks (F. Babinger, op. cit., pp. 443-444), did not lead Matthias Corvinus to go to battle against them. [53] In 1462 he was still in conflict with Emperor Ferdinand III (1440-1493) who, on 17 February 1459, had been elected king of Hungary by a group of magnates from the western and north-western counties, headed by the palatine Ladislaus Garai. The conflict was not resolved, following papal mediation, until 19 and 26 July 1463, when, in Buda and Wiener Neustadt, the two sovereigns ratified a treaty concluded the previous year (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera,

IV, p. 143; Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, Historia rerum Friderici III Imperatoris, Helmstadt, 1700, p. 49; A. Theiner, op. cit., II, pp. 382-391; I. A. Fessler, E. Klein, op. cit., III, p. 31, A. Hoffmann, Kaiser Friedrichus III. Beziehungen zu Ungarn in dem Jahren 1458-1464, Breslau, 1877, p. 16; V. Fraknói, Mathias Corvinus König von Ungarn 1458-1490, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1891, p. 95; K. Nehring, op. cit. pp. 209-213; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 128; Șt. Andreescu, En marge des rapports..., p. 508). [54] The foreign policy of King Matthias Corvinus was strongly influenced throughout by the dynastic struggles with the Habsburgs and the Jagiellons, each of whom sought to expand their influence and power in Central Europe as much as possible (Lajos Elekes, La politica estera di re Mattia e gli Stati italiani nella seconda metà del secolo XV, in vol. Rapporti veneto-ungheresi all'epoca del Rinascimento, edited by Tibor Klaniczay, Budapest, 1975, p. 246). [55] V. Fraknói, Mátyás kiraly levelei (Correspondence of King Matthias), I, Budapest, 1893, pp. 18-19. [56] Ș. Papacostea, ,,Cu privire la genza și spreaddirea povestirilor escritas despre faptele lui Vlad Țepeș", in Romanoslavica, XIII, București, 1966, pp. 159-167. This study shows that the appearance, at the end of 1462 and during 1463, of the first texts recounting the deeds of Vlad Țepeș (the Vienna manuscript, incorporated in Thomas Ebendorfer's chronicle, Enea Silvio Piccolomini's Commentaries and Michael Beheim's Povestirea in verse) is only one aspect of the propaganda campaign intended to cover the abandonment by the King of Hungary of the anti-Ottoman action to which he had committed himself (p. 162). The testimony of the papal legate Nicholas of Modrussa, who carried out an important mission for Matthias Corvinus at the end of 1462 and the beginning of 1463 (p. 163; G. Mercati, ,,Notizie varie sopra Niccolò Modrusiense", in Opere minori, vol. IV, Città del Vaticano, 1937, pp. 217-218, text of the account on pp. 247-248. For stories about Vlad Țepeș see also Ion Stăvăruș, Povestiri medievale despre Vlad Țepeș - Dracula, Bucharest, 1978. [57] Vlad Țepeș also tried to obtain help from the Genoese of Caffa, one of his soils being recorded in the town's accounts on 17 and 20 May 1462 (N. Iorga, Acte și fragmente, III, p. 39; idem, Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe, București, 1899, p. 124; Sergiu Columbeanu, ,,Acțiuni navale în timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare", in Revista de istorie, tom 28, nr. 1, 1975, p. 76; Șt. Andreescu, War with the Turks in 1462, p. 1685), but here too he was not successful. [58] Barbu T. Câmpina, ,,Complotul boierilor și "răscoala" din Țara Românească din iulie-noiembrie 1462", in Studii și referate privind istoria României, parte I, București, 1954, pp. 599-624; E. Stoian, op. cit., p. 116; the sources even show the existence of a group of philoturci boyars, who betrayed Vlad Țepeș and demanded an intervention of the sultan against him (I. Bogdan, Documente privitoare la relațiile Țării Românești cu Brașovul..., I, pp. 149-150; see also the account by Nicolae de Modrussa in Ș. Papacostea, Cu privire la genza..., pp. 163-164, Șt. Andreescu, En marge des rapports..., pp. 377-379). [59] The attitude of Venice towards Vlad Țepeș's anti-Ottoman struggle was analysed in general terms by Șerban Papacostea in his study ,,Venise et les pays roumains au Moyen Âge", in vol. Venezia e il Levante fino al sec. XV, Firenze, 1973, pp. 608-611. In the present chapter we intend to provide only a few additions and developments. [60] N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș..., p.87. [61] J. de Hammer, Histoire de l'Empire ottoman, tome III, Paris, 1836, translated from the German by J. J. Hellert, p. 17; Samuele Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia, II edizione, tomo IV, Venezia, 1913, pp. 261-262; N. Iorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, II, pp. 45-46; F. Thiriet, La Romanie..., pp. 383-384; W. Heyd, Histoire du commerce de Levant au Moyen Âge, translated by Furcy Raynaud, vol. II, Leipzig,

1886, p. 318; G. I Brătianu, La Mer Noire. Des origines à la conquête ottomane, Monachii, 1969, p. 320; William H. Mc. Neill, Venice, the hinge of Europe (1081-1797), The University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 86-88. The new peace guaranteed the Venetians freedom of trade in Ottoman territories in return for a 2% customs tax on the value of goods. [62] Andrew C. Hess, ,,The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic Discoveries. 1453-1525", in The American Historical Review, LXXXV, num. 7, 1970, pp. 1900-1903. [63] F. Thiriet, Régestes..., III, p. 227, no. 3088; F. Babinger, ,,Jaqubpascha, ein Leibarz Mehmed's II", in Rivista degli studi orientali, 26, 1951, pp. 87-113. [64] F. Thiriet, Régestes..., III, p. 227, no. 3088. [65] Ibid, p. 221, no. 3059. [66] Ibidem, pp. 223-224, no. 3071. [67] The Venetians were not wrong in their assessment, since scientific research today will confirm that the Ottoman army can be considered as the most developed form of the horsemen armies of the steppe, benefiting also from a strong artillery support, which made it particularly feared during sieges of various types of fortifications (A. S. Atiya, op. cit., p. 329). [68] Indeed, on 7 December 1458, 16 February and 7 May 1459, the Senate had adopted measures to reinforce the military positions at Modon, Lepanto and Nauplia (F. Thiriet, Régestes..., III, pp. 224-225, nos. 3073, 3075 and 3081). [69] Ibid, p. 227, no. 3090. [70] Ibid, p. 227, no. 3091. [71] Gyula Rászó, ,,A strange alliance. Some thoughts on the military and political history of the alliance against the Turks (1440-1464)", in vol. Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento, edited by Vittore Branca, Florence, 1973, p. 98. [72] F. Thiriet, Régestes..., III, p. 230, no. 3101. [73] Ibidem, p. 231, no. 3106. [74] Ibid, p. 231, no. 3107. [75] Ibid, p. 232, no. 3110. [76] Ibid, pp. 233-234, No 3118. [77] Ibid, p. 236, No 3129. [78] Ibid, p. 238, No 3137. [79] Idem, Déliberations des assamblées vénitiennes concernant la Romanie, tome II, 1364-1463, Paris, 1971, pp. 229-230, no. 1598. [80] Idem, Régestes..., III, p. 239, no. 3141. [81] Idem, Délibérations..., II, p. 231, no. 1604. [82] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 92-93; Ș. Papacostea, Venice and the Romanian countries..., p. 608. [83] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 111 and 120.For the diplomatic action of Venice in this period and at the beginning of the war with the Turks see, among others, Roberto Lopez, ,,Il principio della guera veneto-turca nel 1463", in Archivio Veneto, serie V, XV, 1934, pp. 45-131. [84] Ioan Bianu, ,,Ștefan cel Mare. Câteva documente din Arhivele de stat de Milano", in Columna lui Traian, January-February 1883, pp. 34-35. [85] On 20 March 1462, the Venetian Senate sent to Rome the report of its ambassador to Buda and a copy of what might be called a real war bulletin sent by Vlad Tepes to Matia ,,... simul cum certis exemplis litterrarum per vaivodam Valachiae scriptarum Regi Hungariae nonnulla nova felicita continentium" (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 121-122; Ș. Papacostea, Venise et les pays roumains..., p. 608; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 95). [86] This is clear from Pietro Tomasso's report of 4 March 1462 and is recorded just as clearly by Domenico Malipiero, with reference to the Sultan's campaign of the same year, in his famous Venetian annals: "Ma'l Turco e sta chiama in Valachia in difesa del fratello del Signor Viacola, che e sta scazzado da esso Signor Viacola; e condutto l'esercito in quella provincia, Viacola se ghe ha opposto con potente esercito, e l'ha rebatudo gagiardamente" (Domenico Malipiero, ,,Annali veneti dall'anno 1457 al 1500", in Archivio storico italiano, tomo VII, parte I, Firenze, 1843, pp. 11-12): also an anonymous Italian chronicle, up to 1481, probably also known in Venice, mentions in 1462, also referring to the Sultan's campaign: ,,... Turco andato contra Dracula in Valachia: sonno fugati Turci e malmenati" (N.

Iorga, Acts and Fragments, III, p. 39). [87] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 122, 127 and 131; L. Gomez Canedo, op. cit., pp. 222-223. [88] Bucharest State Archives, Microfilme Italia, roll 57, frames 501-502. [89] Ș. Papacostea, Venice and the Romanian countries..., p. 609. [91] It is interesting to note that the Venetian Senate had shared this opinion for some time, from the beginning of 1462. On 22 January this year, in the instructions it sent to its ambassadors in France, the Senate asked them to show King Louis XI (1461-1483) that, without effective help, Matthias Corvinus was on the point of being crushed, since he was fighting simultaneously on two fronts, against the Emperor Frederick III and against the Turks. It was pointed out that only a shameful peace would bring him glory. Obviously these arguments were of no value to the French king, who was more interested in Italian affairs than in fighting the Ottoman Empire (P. M. Perret, Histoire des relations de la France avec Venise du XIIIe siècle a l'avenement de Charles VIII, vol. I, Paris, 1896, pp. 381-384). [92] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 142-143. [93] The Venetian ambassador here confuses two distinct actions, namely: the attack of Mahmud Pasha, which occurred in May and was a prelude to the Sultan's campaign (Sts. Andreescu, Vlad Țepeș (Dracula)..., p. 107), with the campaign itself, attributing to the former the number of troops with which Sultan Mehmed II himself came. [94] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 146-147. [95] The court of Buda, by supplying this information to the Venetian ambassador, as well as that concerning the weakness of Vlad Țepeș's forces and, therefore, his probable defeat, sought, of course, to prepare the ground for Matia Corvin's future explanations of his apathy in the face of the Ottoman offensive and to cast a shadow of doubt on the Romanian prince's sincere desire to fight. See also note 90. [96] "Vajvoda quotidie hic sollicitat ut adjuventur, quia solus tantos impetus sustinere non valet" (Epistolae Mathiae Corvini regis Ungariae, ed. Johannes Hajdo-Michael Kuun, vol. I, Claudiopoli, 1745, p. 74). Here we would like to point out that the Sultan, before setting out on his campaign, had asked Matthias Corvinus to leave him the Romanian Country and Bosnia (the latter he would indeed conquer the following year, in 1463), offering him peace for his kingdom in return and threatening that if he did not accept these conditions, he would invade Hungary with his large army (Pius II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini), Comentarii, ed. G. Bernetti, vol. III, Vienna, 1973, p. 176). This threat, in addition to the conflict with Frederick III, which was still unresolved, led the King of Hungary, who did not even have large forces at his disposal, not to intervene, in fact not to respect the terms of the agreement he had concluded with Vlad Țepeș, not to respect his obligations as his suzerain as he claimed to be. He was content only to take some measures to defend Transylvania and did not leave Buda until August, when the defeated sultan had long since left Wallachia (see notes 55 and 90 above). [97] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, p. 147. [98] Ș. Papacostea, Venise et les pays roumains..., p. 610. [99] Barbu T. Câmpina, ,,Victoria oștirii lui Țepeș asupra sultanului Mehmed al II-lea" (On the occasion of the 500th anniversary), in Studii. Revistă de istorie, vol. 15, no. 3, 1962, p. 550; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 117; idem, La victoire de Vlad L'Empaleur sur les Turcs (1462), p. 395. [100] Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 167-168. [101] N. Iorga, Acts and Fragments, III, p. 39; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 118; Șt. Andreescu, Vlad Țepeș (Dracula)..., p. 119. [102] D. Malipiero, op. cit. [103] N. Iorga, Acts and Fragments, III, p. 86; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 118; Șt. Andreescu, Vlad Țepeș (Dracula)..., p. 120. [104] "... dando nobis notitiam per litteras tuas quanto diligentius

poteris de successibus Majestatis suae in illis partibus Valachiae et de omnibus que occurent" (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, p. 181; Ș. Papacostea, Venise et les pays roumains..., p. 610; N. Stoicescu, Vlad Țepeș, p. 128). [105] "Casum retentionis Draguli olim voivode..., circa quam rem idem serenissimus Rex etiam per suas littetras nobis scripsit" (I. Nagy, B. Nyáry, Magyar diplomacziai emlékek. Matyás király korobol. 1458-1490 (Sources of Hungarian Diplomacy. The Age of King Matthias), vol. I, Budapest, 1875, p. 172). [106] Fontes rerum Austriacarum, II, Diplomataria et acta, 42 (Urkunden und Aktemstüke zur ósterreichischen Geschichte im Zeitalter Friedrichs III und König Georg von Böhmon (1440-1471), ed. A. Bachmann, Wien, 1879, p. 442, no. 329 (9 November 1467): 'Nich lanngt an, wie sich, nein gnädiger Herre (Johann von Mergenthal, chancellor of the emperor - n.n.) der König zu Hungern mit dem Turcken fünff Jär die nächsten, in Besicht vertragen habe, und in die Walachey zuziehen in Furnemen angetzogen sey, das ich euch zu verkunden nicht verhalten kan wollen'. This is the renewal of Turkish-Maghreb pacts every five years, including those of 1452, 1457 and 1462. See also Radu Constantinescu, Codicele Altenberger, Bucharest, 1988, p. 15. However, the peace with the Turks may have been concluded even earlier, in 1461. The fact that the Hungarians did not attack the Turks in this year, when the Danube line was poorly defended due to the campaign in Asia, fuelled rumours of a possible secret Turkish-Hungarian peace (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, pp. 101-105; N. Stoicescu, La victoire de Vlad L'Empaleur sur les Turcs (1462), p. 383, n. 23, R. Lungu, art. cit., pp. 147-158; M. Cazacu, L'histoire du prince Dracula..., p. 10). Ileana Căzan considers that Matia Corvin's first armistice with the Turks was concluded only in 1468, "Matia Corvin, securing the Danube frontier and the Turkish-Hungarian armistice of 1468", in Revista istorica, Seria Nouă, vol. 3, no. 7-8, 1992, pp. 769-782). [107] F. Thiriet, Régestes..., III, p. 247, no. 3171. [108] "Libuit Serenitati Regie Vestre litteris ejus super ad nos delatis, significare infestum casum Vaivode olim Valachie, qui adversus Mejstatem Vestram, regnumque vestrum tantum facimus perpetrare molitus erat..." (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, p. 171). [109] Ibid. [110] "Studiosus eris intelligere conditiones regni illius et in specie volumus, quod nos advises, qualiter se habuit negocium Dragulli Vallachie, dando etiam nobis administrationem de illo, qui in presentiarum reperitur Vaiovoda in partibus illis et qualiter se intelligit aut non intelligit cum Rege Hungarie. Significabis quoque nobis provisiones factas, etque de cetero fient in Regno illi. Et si sentires, quod teneretur aliqua praticha, vel tractatus pacis, aut sufferentiarum inter Regem et Turcum diriges spiritus et cogitamina queque tua ad obviandum et turbandum tractatus hujusmodi per omnes illos prudentes, bonos et acommodator modos, qui videnbuntur tibi" (Ibidem, IV, p. 202; Sime Ljubić, Listine o odnosajh izmedju juznoga slavenstva i mletačke republike, vol. X, in Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium XXII, Zagreb, 1891, p. 241, doc. CCXXXVIII; Ș. Papacostea, Venise et les pays roumains..., p. 611). [111] Ferenc Szakály, ,,Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács (1365-1526)", in Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, tomus XXXIII, fasciculus 1, 1979, p. 109. [112] The peace treaty was drawn up in 1462 by Bishop Ion Vitez and the papal legate Geronimo Landus, Bishop of Crete, but was not concluded until 19 July 1463 (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Acta extera, IV, p. 143; I. A. Fessler, E. Klein, op. cit., III, p. 31; K. Nehring, op. cit., pp. 18-19 and 202-217). [113] A. Theiner, op. cit., II, pp. 380-382; N. Iorga, Acts and Fragments, III, p. 40; Hurmuzaki, Documents, II, 2, pp. 149-151. [114] G. Rászó, art. cit. [115] L. Elekes, art. cit., p. 249;

L. Ernest Denis, Fin de l'indépendance boheme. Georges de Podiebrad. Les Jagellons, Paris, 1890, p. 152. It should be noted that between 1464 and 1466, although he had abandoned the fight with the Turks and had not yet entered into war with Podiebrad, Matthias Corvinus continued to receive important subsidies from the papacy (I. A. Fessler, E. Klein, op. cit., III, p. 43; G. Valentini, ,,La sospensione della crociata nei primi anni di Paolo II (1464-1468) (Dai documenti d'archivio di Venezia)", in Archivum historiae pontificiae, XIV, 1976, pp. 71-101; K. M. Setton, op. cit, pp. 273 ff.) and even of Venice (I libri commemoriali della republica di Venezia, V, Venezia, 1901, pp. 153 and 155, apud M. Cazacu, L'histoire du prince Dracula..., p. 14). It seems, according to some calculations, that the total amount of papal subsidies during the reign of Matthias Corvinus amounted to 300,000 ducats (A. Kupelwieser, Ungarns Kämpfe gegen die werdenden Macht der Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, Wien-Leipzig, 1895, p. 149). [116] P.M. Perret, op. cit., I, p. 409; L. Gómez Canedo, op. cit. [117] For Podiebrad's crusade project and the work of his soil Antonio Marini see E. Denis, De Antonio Marini et de Bohemiae ratione politica, eo oratore, Angouleme, 1878; idem, Fin de l'independance boheme..., pp. 112 and 115; P.M. Perret, op. cit., I, pp. 391-393. [118] For this major conflict between Matthias Corvinus and Frederick III see, among others: V. Fraknói, Mathias Corvinus König von Ungarn 1458-1490; pp. 208-212; Peter Rassow, Histoire de l'Allemagne des origines à nos jours, vol. I, Lyon, 1969, p. 285; L. Elekes, art. cit., p. 249; I. Barta, T. Berend, P. Hanák, Histoire de la Hongrie des origines à nos jours, publié sous la direction de E. Pamlényi, Budapest, 1974, p. 130; K. Nehring, op. cit. pp. 163-164

[orthodoxydaily]

Saints&Reading: Sat., Sept. 12, 2020

Commemorated on August 30, November 23_Old Julian Calendar

The Holy NobleBorn Prince Alexander Nevsky( 1263)

     The Holy NobleBorn Prince Alexander Nevsky (in monastic-schema Alexei) died on the return journey from the Horde at Gorodtsa on the Volga, on 14 November 1263, and on 23 November (under this day is located the account about him) in 1263 he was buried in the Cathedral Church of the Nativity Monastery in the city of Vladimir (there is set up there now a memorial to the holy prince; yet another memorial is set up in the city of Pereslavl'-Zalessk). Veneration of the nobleborn prince started right at his burial, whereof was a remarkable miracle: the saint himself extended his hand for the absolving prayer. Great Prince Ioann Ioannovich (1353-1359) in his spiritual testament written in the year 1356, left to his son Dimitrii (1363-1389), the future victor of the Battle of Kulikovo, "an icon of Saint Alexander". The undecayed relics of the nobleborn prince were opened, on account of a vision, before the Kulikovo Battle – in the year 1380, and then were set forth for local feast-celebration. For the prayers of the holy prince, glorified by defense of the Fatherland, Russian commanders resorted to in all the following times. On 30 August 1721 Peter I, after a lengthy and exhausting war with the Swedes, concluded the Nishtad Peace. This day was decided upon to hallow by the transfer of the relics of the NobleBorn Prince Alexander Nevsky from Vladimir to the new northern capital, Peterburg, arranged on the banks of the Neva. Withdrawn from Vladimir on 11 August 1723, the holy relics were greeted at Shlissel'burg on 20 September of that year and remained there until 1724, when on 30 August they were placed in the Trinity Cathedral of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra (Monastery), where now also they rest. By an edict/ukaz  on 2 September 1724 there was established a feastday on 30 August (in 1727 the feast was discontinued by reason of non-church matters, and involved clique-struggles at the imperial court. In 1730 the feast was again re-established).      Archimandrite Gavriel Buzhinsky (later Bishop of Riazan, + 27 April 1731) compiled a special service in remembrance of the Nishtad Peace, combining with it a service to Saint Alexander Nevsky.      The name of the Defender of the borders of Russia and the Patron of Soldiers is famous far from the regions of our Native Land. The testimony to this: the numerous temples dedicated to Saint Alexander Nevsky. The most famous of them: the Patriarchal Cathedral at Sofia, the Cathedral church in Talinin, and a church in Tbilisi. These churches are a pledge of friendship of the Russian National-Liberator with brother nations.

© 1996-2001 by translator Fr. S. Janos.

NobleBorn Prince Daniel of Moscow (1652)

Holy Nobleborn Prince Daniel (Daniil) of Moscow was born at Vladimir in the year 1261. He was the fourth son of Saint Alexander Nevsky (Comm. 30 August and 23 November) and Righteous Vassa. Two years after birth he lost his father. The date of his mother's repose is not indicated in the chronicles; it is known only, that she was buried in the church in honour of the Nativity of Christ at the Vladimir Uspenie monastery (the Princess monastery), and the people in the surroundings venerated her as "Righteous" ("Pravedna").      In 1272 holy Prince Daniel received as his allotted portion the city of Moscow with its adjacent lands. The holy prince built on the banks of the River Moskva (Moscow) a church (and alongside it a monastery) in honour of his same-name patron saint, the Monk Daniel the Pillar-Dweller (Comm. 11 December). The Moscow principality was during this period small and unobtrusive. While growing up, holy Prince Daniel strengthened and expanded it, not in manners unjust or coercive, but instead benevolent and peace-loving. In Rus' it was a time of unrest. Fratricidal strife amongst the appanage princes was rife. And often, thanks to holy Prince Daniel, and his incessant striving for unity and peace in the Russian Land, bloodshed was averted. In 1293 his brother, the Great-prince Alexander Alexandrovich, together with Tatars summoned from the Horde and headed by Diuden ("the Diudenev Host"), laid waste to Russian cities: Murom, Suzdal', Kolomna, Dmitrov, Mozhaisk, Tver'. Prince Daniel decided to adjoin them to Moscow, to save their people from perishing. There was not the strength for resistance. Together with his people, the prince braced himself for terrible destruction and pillaging. Standing up for his rights, Saint Daniel was compelled to come out against his brother near a place, called Yur'evo Tolchische ("Yur'evo Threshing-Mill"), but here also the yearning for peace won out in him, and bloodshed was averted.      In 1300, when the Ryazan prince Konstantin Romanovich, having summoned Tatars to his aid, was occupied in secret preparations for a sudden assault on the lands of the Moscow principality, Prince Daniel went with an army to Ryazan, and beating the enemy, he took captive Konstantin and destroyed a multitude of Tatars. This was a first victory over the Tatars, though not a tremendous victory, but it was noteworthy nonetheless – as a first push towards freedom. Having beaten the Ryazan prince and scattered his confederates the Tatars, holy Prince Daniel did not take advantage of his victory to seize foreign lands or take booty, as was the accepted custom during these times, but rather he displayed an example of true non-covetousness, love and fraternity. The holy prince never resorted to arms to seize the lands of others, nor did he ever snatch away the property of other princes either by force or by treachery. And for this the Lord saw fit to expand the boundaries of his princely realm. Ioann Dimitrievich, prince of Pereslavl'-Zalessk, a nephew of Daniel, was gentle and pious and benevolent towards the poor, and he esteemed and loved his uncle; dying childless in 1302, he bequeathed his principality to Saint Daniel. The Pereslavlsk lands together with Dmitrov were, after Rostov, foremost in number of inhabitants, with corresponding fortification befitting a major city. Pereslavl'-Zalessk was well protected on all sides. But the holy prince remained faithful to Moscow and did not transfer the capital of his princedom to the stronger and more significant seat of the Pereslavl' of this period. This annexation moved Moscow up to be numbered as the most significant principality. And here was set in place the principle of the unification of the Russian Land into a single powerful realm.      How wondrous over the expanse of ages was clearly manifest the Providential Will of God concerning the Russian Land and its destiny!      Grateful in remembrance of the constant Blessing of the Hodegetria ("Way-Guide Mother of God) both in his personal life, and also in the life of the Russian realm, Saint Daniel's father – Saint Alexander Nevsky, had expressed it in the words: "God is not in might, but in right!".      In 1303 Saint Daniel fell seriously ill. He assumed the monastic great-schema and commanded that he be buried at the Danilov monastery. Through deep humility he wanted to be buried not within the church, but in the common monastery cemetery. The holy prince died on 4 March.      Within the passage of less than 30 years after the repose of holy Prince Daniel, the Danilov monastery founded by him was transformed into the Moscow Kremlin, the church was transformed into a parish church, and the cemetery became non-monastic. During the time of Great-prince Ivan III (1462-1505), the Monk-prince Daniel gave reminders of himself to his forgetful descendents. As a stranger he appeared to a youth attendant on the great-prince and said: "Be not afraid of me – I was a Christian and the master of this place, my name is Daniel Prince of Moscow, and by the will of God I am here. Tell about me to Great-prince Ioann (Ivan) saying: thou delightest thyself while yet having forgotten me, but God hath not forgotten me". And after this it was that the great-prince established the singing of cathedral panikhidas for his ancestral princes. During the time tsar Ivan the Terrible, at the grave of Saint Daniel was healed the dying son of a barge merchant. The tsar, struck by the miracle, renovated the ancient Danilov monastery and established a yearly church procession, made by the metropolitan to the place of burial of the holy prince, serving there a panikhida.      In 1652 holy Monk-prince Daniel was glorified with the uncovering of his incorrupt relics, which on 30 August were transferred to the church in honour of the Holy Fathers of the Seventh OEcumenical Council.      The holy relics were placed in a reliquary "to the glorifying of the Holy Trinity and for the healing of the infirm". The Moscow metropolitan Platon (+ 1812), in the Vita of the holy prince compiled by him, writes: "This original founder laid the foundation of present-day majestic Moscow, going about this with quiet steps upon a small foot-path. And thus as with any edifice, built not with extreme haste but the rather instead with great artifice and skill, doth receive a particular solidity and doth stand indestructible for a long time; and just as a tall tree growing for many a century, and having started first of all with a small sprout, and thickeneth little by little, with its branches spreading about far around, so also was it needful for this city to grow from the small, but solid root, in order that its first glimmer not beshadow the eyes of the envious, and that initially it not be disturbed or felled early on, but rather grow up to its true height. Thus did this founder prepare the great city given him; though small, but shining uninterrupted by any wafting of the wind, he did bequeathe the great glory of its rise to his son Great-prince Ioann (Ivan) Danilovich, called Kalita".

© 1996-2001 by translator Fr. S. Janos.

Matthew 23:1-12

1Then Jesus spoke to the multitudes and to His disciples,2saying: "The scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses' seat.3Therefore whatever they tell you to observe, that observe and do, but do not do according to their works; for they say, and do not do.4For they bind heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on men's shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers.5But all their works they do to be seen by men. They make their phylacteries broad and enlarge the borders of their garments.6They love the best places at feasts, the best seats in the synagogues,7greetings in the marketplaces, and to be called by men, 'Rabbi, Rabbi.'8But you, do not be called 'Rabbi'; for One is your Teacher, the Christ, and you are all brethren.9Do not call anyone on earth your father; for One is your Father, He who is in heaven.10And do not be called teachers; for One is your Teacher, the Christ.11But he who is greatest among you shall be your servant.12And whoever exalts himself will be humbled, and he who humbles himself will be exalted.

Galatians 5:22-6:2 (St. Alexander Nevsky)

22But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness,23gentleness, self-control. Against such there is no law.24And those who are Christ's have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.25If we live in the Spirit, let us also walk in the Spirit.26Let us not become conceited, provoking one another, envying one another.

1Brethren, if a man is overtaken in any trespass, you who are spiritual restore such a one in a spirit of gentleness, considering yourself lest you also be tempted.2Bear one another's burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ.

[steves-on-a-plane]

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[widvile-blog]

Joanna la Beltraneja, Queen of Portugal (21 February 1462 - 12 April 1530)

[ivraeas]

E L I S A B E T H   OF   L U X E M B O U R G   2/?

Elisabeth was the only daughter of Sigismund, the Holy Roman Emperor, with his second wife, Barbara of Cilli. Elisabeth’s mother was very unpopular with the nobility, thus they accused her of adultery. Subsequently, her mother was sent into exile, and Elisabeth accompanied her.

This could possibly point to the fact that during this time period Emperor Sigismund might’ve doubted her legitimacy as his own daughter, even though at the time she was considered heiress presumptive. Sigismund and Barbara eventually reconciled in 1419.

Her own father’s claim to the Kingdoms of Hungary and Croatia were in fact quite slim. Elizabeth married Albert of Hapsburg, then the fifth Duke of Austria, in 1422 with a lavish formal ceremony. A treaty brought up by the Hapsburgs and her father concluded that Elisabeth would remain the heiress presumptive as long as she was her father’s only child. If she should have a sister, Elisabeth would choose one of her father’s kingdoms (Bohemia & Hungary) and the younger sister would inherit the other.

However, the treaty also stated that if Sigismund would have a male child before his death, Elisabeth would inherit none of her father’s kingdoms or domains, they would all go to the male heir. Sigismund died 9th December 1437 without having had any more issue.

By the time her father had died Elisabeth had had two daughters by Albert named Anne and Elizabeth.

Anne of Austria (12 April 1432 - 13 November 1462)

Elizabeth of Austria (1436/1439 - 30 August 1505)

Upon her father’s death, the Diet said that Elisabeth’s husband should govern only "with her consent and approval.” Elisabeth and her husband accepted the conditions on 18 December, thereafter they were elected Queen and King of Hungary. 

Her husband was quick to die, being laid to rest in late 1439. Elisabeth was pregnant at this time and she believed this child was to be a boy. She acted as de-facto ruler of Hungary and Bohemia until 1st January 1440 when the council elected Vladislaus of Poland. Elisabeth seemed to accept this decision, that is until she crowned her son, now born, Ladislaus V with the stolen Holy Crown of Hungary. 

Elisabeth left her youngest daughter and her son in the care of Frederick III. In 1442 a negotiation was attempted by Cardinal Cesarini. Elisabeth and Vladislaus of Poland met and exchanged gifts. Vladislaus gave her fur, Elisabeth died shortly after. Rumors spread like wildfire about her being poisoned.

Her only son, Ladislaus, didn’t make it to the age of 18 and died three months short of his majority. His sisters, on the other hand, had issue and in their descendants, some of these kingdoms the family lost tragically were restored to them. I have barely touched the surface about the history of this Empress and her family because many of her descendants heavily influenced European politics during the Renaissance. Thus, the next one of these that I shall make will be about one of her two daughters, Anne or Elizabeth.

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most family feuds start off, as conspiracy cases whether to homicide pretating to defraud cases

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 1318 Â  Â  Â  Â  Â  Â April 12, 1904

PRISCA NAVAL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FRANCISCO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Alfredo Chicote and Allison D. Gibbs for appellants. Montagne and Dominguez for appellees.

MAPA, J.:

November 14, 1885, Don Jorge Enriquez, as heir of his deceased parents, Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva, whose estates were at that time still undistributed, by public instrument sold to Don Victoriano Reyes his interest in both estates, equivalent to a tenth part thereof, for the sum of 7,000 pesos. The deed was executed in this city before Don Enrique Barrera, a notary public, who certified in the document that the vendor received the said consideration at the time of the execution of the instrument.

By another instrument executed April 15, 1886, before the same notary, Don Enrique Barrera y Caldes, Don Victoriano Reyes sold to Doña Carmen de la Cavada this interest in the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva, which by the deed above referred to, he had acquired from Don Jorge Enriquez for the same consideration of 7,000 pesos, which money he received from the purchaser in the presence of the notary, who so certifies in the deed itself.

The purchaser, Doña Carmen, was the wife of Don Francisco Enriquez, who was the executor and administrator of the testamentary estate of Don Antonio Enriquez at the dates of the execution of the two above mentioned.

The plaintiffs demand that these deeds be declared null and void, as well as the contracts evidenced thereby, apparently solely so far as they refer to the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez, no mention being made of the estate of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva in the complaint. This relief is prayed for upon the following grounds:

(1) Because the said contracts were executed without consideration, it being alleged with respect to this matter that Don Jorge Enriquez did not receive any consideration for the sale made by him in favor of Don Victoriano Reyes, and that the latter did not receive any sum whatever as a consideration for the sale in turn executed by him in favor of Doña Carmen de la Cavada. Upon this ground the plaintiffs contend that the deeds in question were consummated and were executed for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding Don Jorge Enriquez and his family.

(2) Because Don Victoriano Reyes, the purchaser under the first deed, merely acted as an intermediary at the request and instance of Don Francisco Enriquez for the purpose of subsequently facilitating the acquisition by Doña Carmen de la Cavada, his wife, of the hereditary share of Don Jorge Enriquez, the real acquirer being Don Francisco Enriquez, the executor and administrator of the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez. The conclusion of the plaintiffs is that as such executor Don Francisco Enriquez was unable to acquire by his own act or that of any intermediary the said hereditary portion of Don Jorge Enriquez under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1459 of the Civil Code.

(a) The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to authorize the conclusion that there was no consideration for the sales referred to in the complaint. It is true that Victoriano Reyes testified that he paid nothing to Don Jorge Enriquez, and received nothing from Carmen de la Cavada as consideration for either of the sales. But against this statement is the testimony of the notary, Don Enrique Barrera y Caldes, before whom both contracts were executed, and that of the defendants Francisco Enriquez and Doña Carmen de la Cavada, who expressly affirm the contrary; and more especially the statement is contrary to the recitals of the deeds themselves, which confirm the statements of the witnesses last referred to. The deeds clearly and expressly recite the fact of the receipt by the respective purchasers of the stipulated price or consideration of 7,000 pesos at the time and place of the execution of the deeds.

These instruments having been executed with all the formalities prescribed by the law, they are admissible as evidence against the contracting parties and their successors with respect to recitals made therein by the former (Art. 1218, Civil Code.) Their evidentiary force can not be overcome except by other evidence of greater weight, sufficient to overcome the legal presumption of the regularity of acts and contracts celebrated with all the legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate. This presumption has not been rebutted in the present case, in which the evidence against it, consisting of the sole testimony of Don Victoriano Reyes, which, moreover, is expressly controverted by that of the other witnesses at the trial, involves the improbable conclusion that the witness, as well as Jorge Enriquez, from whom the plaintiffs derived title, the notary public, and the attesting witnesses to both instruments consented to the commission of the grave crime of falsification of public documents — for this would be the result were the statements of the said Victoriano Reyes true — without having any interest in so doing or expecting to derive any benefit from the commission of the crime, the plaintiffs not having alleged or proven the existence of such an interest on their part. It appears, on the contrary, from the testimony of Victoriano Reyes himself that he received no compensation for his participation in the matter.

With respect to Jorge Enriquez, the conclusion, still more improbable if possible, would be that he had voluntarily and spontaneously taken part in the commission of a grave crime, which not only was not of the slightest benefit to himself, but the commission of which is supposed to have had for its object the causing of harm to him. The allegation is that the purpose of the crime was to deprive him, without the slightest compensation, of his paternal and maternal inheritance, which according to the complaint was the only possession of himself and his numerous family. This is the most inexplicable and improbable aspect of the facts alleged in the complaint. It is beyond comprehension, and we can not believe that Jorge Enriquez, who according to the plaintiffs was absolutely without means of support for himself and his family, would convey to another his large interest in the estate without receiving any consideration therefor, and that to do this he would commit the grave crime of falsification. To justify this conclusion it would be necessary to suppose that Jorge Enriquez was absolutely devoid of intelligence or that he was the victim or error, violence, intimidation, or fraud. But these are circumstances which counsel for the plaintiffs have not demonstrated or even sought to demonstrate.

An examination of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the payment of the consideration of 7,000 pesos expressed in the two deeds in question was actually and really made, and that the allegation of the plaintiffs that the contracts of sale evidenced by these deeds were made without consideration is unfounded.

At all events the action of which the plaintiffs might have availed themselves for the purpose of having those contracts declared void upon the ground, even admitting hypothetically that there was no consideration, is barred by the statute of limitations, inasmuch as from the date of those contracts down to the death of Jorge Enriquez, which occurred July 6, 1891, more than five year had passed and more than fifteen before the filing of the complaint on January 9, 1902, nothing having been done in the meantime on the part of the plaintiffs or the person under whom they claim to interrupt the running of the statute. The action of nullity only lasts four years, counted from the date of the consummation of the contract, when the action is based, as in this case, upon the absence of consideration. (Art. 1301 of the Civil Code.)

The contract of sale is consummated by the delivery of the purchase money and of the thing sold. "When the sale is made by public instrument the execution of the instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, unless from the instrument itself the contrary intention clearly appears." (Art. 1462, par. 2, Civil Code.) And article 1464 provides that "With respect to incorporeal property [to which class the hereditary right which was the object of the contracts in question pertains], the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 1462 shall govern." In the deeds of sale executed by Victoriano Reyes in favor of Doña Carmen de la Cavada we find the following: "In consequence he (the vendor) by virtue of this title cedes and conveys all rights which he has or may have to the part of the inheritance which is the object of this sale, to the end that the purchaser, in the place and stead of the vendor, may exercise all the acts of ownership corresponding to her right, to which end by means of the delivery of this instrument and of his other title deeds he makes the transfer necessary to consummate the contract, which upon his part he declares to be perfect and consummated from this date."

In view of this clause and for the legal provisions above cited, it is evident that the delivery of the things sold was effected by the mere execution of the deed of sale; and it appearing from the deed itself that the consideration was delivered to the vendor at the time, and the contrary not having been sufficiently proven, the conclusion follows that the sale was consummated them and there, and that from that time the period of four years fixed by law for the prescription of the action of nullity must be counted in this case.

(b) The thing sold in the two contracts of sale mentioned in the complained was the hereditary right of Don Jorge Enriquez, which evidently was not in charge of the executor, Don Francisco Enriquez. Executors, even in those cases in which they administer the property pertaining to the estate, do not administer the hereditary rights of any heir. This right is vested entirely in the heirs, who retain it or transmit it in whole or in part, as they may deem convenient, to some other person absolutely independent of the executor, whose authority, whatever powers the testator may have desired to confer upon him, do not and can not under any circumstances in the slightest degree limit the power of the heirs to dispose of the said right at will. That right does not form part of the property delivered to the executor for administration.

This conclusion having been reached, we are of the opinion that article 1459 of the Civil Code, cited by the plaintiffs to show the alleged incapacity of Don Francisco Enriquez as executor of the will of Don Antonio Enriquez, to acquire by purchase the hereditary right of Jorge Enriquez, has no application to the present case. The prohibition which paragraph 3 of that article imposes upon executors refers to the property confided to their care, and does not extend, therefore, to property not falling within this class. Legal provisions of a prohibitive character must be strictly construed, and should not be extended to cases not expressly comprised within their text.

Consequently, even upon the supposition that the executor, Don Francisco Enriquez, was the person who really acquired the hereditary rights of Jorge Enriquez, the sale in question would not for that reason be invalid, the executor, Don Francisco Enriquez, not being legally incapable of acquiring the hereditary right in question as the plaintiffs erroneously suppose.

This being so, the question as to whether the money paid by Doña Carmen de la Cavada for the purchase of the said right was her sole and exclusive property, or whether it was the property of her husband Don Francisco Enriquez, or whether it was the property of the community of goods existing between them, is absolutely unimportant, for, be the fact as it may, the conclusion must always be that the incapacity to purchase, alleged as one of the legal grounds upon which the complaint rests, does not exist.

Enough has been said to show that the action brought by the plaintiffs is devoid of foundation. It is not, therefore, necessary to decide the other questions raised by the parties at the trial.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs in either instance. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

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VLAD DRACULEA OR VLAD THE IMPALER? The Lord of Wallachia in documents issued between 1457-1462, called himself "Vlad, son of the old Vlad Voievod", as well as his father Vlad Dracul, who signed himself in the documents of the royal chancellery as "Vlad, son of Mircea Voievod". In letters to the Lord of the Romanian Country, Matthew Corvinus called him "Wlad Voievod". In a letter dated 2 April 1459, Dan the Younger, pretender to the throne of Wallachia, writing to the people of Brasov, calls Vlad simply "Dracul Voievod"! In a report written by Ladislaus, Vlad's courtier, on 7 August 1476, following his journey to Moldavia on the eve of the Battle of Valea Albă (26 July 1476), he calls the ruler "Draculea". The Greek chronicler Mihail Ducas (b.ca.1400-d.ca.1470), writing about Vlad Dracul's accession to the throne of Wallachia in 1437, calls him Dragulios: "For the name Dragulios is also translated as evil and cunning" [Scriptores Byzantini I: DUCAS - Istoria turco-bizantina (1341-1462), (translation Vasile Grecu), Ed.Academiei R.S.R., 1958, p.252]. Why was Vlad The Dragon evil and cunning? Because he had the courage to rise up against Sultan Murad II (1421 - 1451). The chronicler Nicolaos (Laonic) Chalcocondil (b.ca.1430-d.ca.1470), a contemporary of Vlad, calls him "Vlad, son of Dracula". The Turkish chronicler Tursun-bey (b.ca.1420-d.ca.1500) calls Vlad 'Kazikli', i.e. 'The Impaler', from the stake he used to execute his enemies. Another Turkish chronicler, Asîk-pașa-Zade, calls the Lord of the Romanian Country "Voievod Kazîklî" or "Dracul-oglu", i.e. "son of the Devil". The Turkish janissary Constantine Mihailovich (b.1435-d.1501), a participant in the campaigns of Mehmed II in Wallachia, in his memoirs written after 1490, calls Vlad "the Young Dracul" or "Dracula". Years later, the Archbishop of Strigonium and Viceroy of Hungary, Antonio Verancsics (b.1504-d.1573 ) calling Vlad Draculea, "the brave prince Dragula", tried to explain the etymology of this word: "Thus Dragula is also a diminutive of Drago, which means <<the dear one>> from which cause, if it were allowed, in Latin it should be said Charulus (carus=Dear)" [Călători străini despre țările române, vol.1, Ed.Științifică București, 1968, p.400]. Verancsics, a good connoisseur of the Romanian language, and of the brilliant deeds of Vlad Draculea, related also to the accusations made against the ruler by the Saxons and Catholic Christians, refuses to equate his name with the term "drac", insinuating, in a subtle way, that the name of the prince was actually "Vlad the Dear"! He is the first defender of the memory of Vlad Draculea, and perhaps the only one, for an extremely long time. The great Romanian humanist himself, Nicolae Olahus (b.1493-d.1568) considered Vlad Draculea a "tyrant", even if in a confusing way, later on he would say that he was related to Mihnea the Evil (1508-1509), Vlad Draculea's son! In reality the name "Dracul" with the later variant "Dracula" comes from a knightly order. The Order of the Dragon was founded in 1408 (12 December) by Sigismund of Luxembourg, with the main role of protecting Christianity from the Ottoman threat. The symbol of the Order was a dragon with its tail curled around its neck, with a leaf-armour on its back whose ribs are stylised in the shape of a cross. The adoption of the graphic image of the dragon is somewhat strange in the Christian faith, especially as St George, one of the Order's patrons, is depicted slaying a dragon. It is possible that the dragon was derived from the battle standard of the Dacians, later adopted in northern European countries, including Germany and England. The adopted motto of the Order was: q[uam] misericors est deus iustus patient (O how patient is our god). The founding members of the Order of the Dragon were: Sigismund of Luxembourg, Eberhard of Lorraine, Bishop of Zagreb, Stephen Lazarevich of Serbia, Alfons of Aragon and Naples, Vladislav II Iagello, Vitold, Ernest of Austria, Christopher III of Denmark, Pippo Spano, Perényi Emeric, Chancellor of the University of

Prague and Baron Mihail Garai. On 8 February 1431, in Nuremberg, Vlad, son of Mircea the Elder, was received into the Order of the Dragon, following the recommendations of Sigismund of Luxembourg.Members of the Order wore two distinctive cloaks, one red, over which was another green, and around their necks - a collar, from which hung a gold medallion on which was engraved the dragon-symbol of the Order. The impressive attire, for those times in Wallachia, of Vlad, son of Mircea the Elder, and especially the Latin name of the Order, Societas Draconistrarum, as well as the fact that some of the nobles considered that the ruler had adopted an esoteric Catholic religion, leaving Orthodoxy, made them secretly call him "The Dragon"! This name also spread among the people, under which he would later be mentioned in all documentary sources, both he and especially his son Vlad Draculea. From the time of his imprisonment by Matthew Corvinus, Vlad Draculea began to refer to himself as "Wladislaus Dragwlya" (letter of 4 August 1475) or "Ladislaus Drakulya" (letter of August 1476); in turn, the King of Hungary referred to him in letters as "Drakwlye" (letter of 21 September 1475). On 21 July 1476, the Vice-Vivoivode of Transylvania, Stefan Erdélyi, asked the people of Brasov to send their military contingent to Turda under the command of Stefan Báthory and Ladislaus Drakula! In 1477, on 5 January, Stephen the Great, requests military aid from the Brașovs for "our magnificent brother from Great Wallachia, Ladislao" [HURMUZAKI, EUDOXIU DE - Documents concerning the History of the Romanians, vol.XV, Acts and letters from the archives of the Ardelene (Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu) published after the copies of the Romanian Academy by N.Iorga, part I, 1358-1600, Bucharest, 1911, p.96 ] which was in full conflict with the Turks. However, Vlad Draculea did not need any help, being killed on the battlefield at the end of December 1476, or at the beginning of January 1477. We don't know if the name "Impaler" was used in the Carpathian-Danube and Western European area during his lifetime, perhaps only as a nickname, in secret, due to his predilection for executing enemies by impaling them. In contrast, Turkish chroniclers for the most part used the term "Impaler=Kazîklî". The first mention of the name "Vlad The Impaler" appears in 1505 in a document of gift issued by Radu cel Mare, on 21 January 1506: "Vladul Voievod The one named Impaler" [Documenta Romaniae Historica, B, Țara Românească, vol. II (1501-1525), Editura Academiei R.S.R., Radu the Great, ruler of Romanian Country between 1495-1508, was the son of Vlad the Monk, brother and enemy of Vlad Draculea. The next historical mention of the name "Vlad The Impaler" is made by Mircea Ciobanul, in a document of gift, issued on May 11, 1550: "Vlad voievod Impaler" [Documenta Romaniae Historica, B, Țara Românească, vol. IV (1536-1550), Editura Academiei R.S.R., 1981, p.344] Mircea Ciobanu was the son of Radu cel Mare, and great-great-grandson of Vlad Draculea's brother. By an irony of fate, the name of Vlad III, "Vlad the Impaler", has been passed down to us over time, precisely the mocking nickname used by his brother, Vlad the Monk, and his descendants! It would be correct to identify him in history by the name he himself used, Vlad Draculea!