#(something which was in-line with American and International policy)

[charlesoberonn]

It's called Accusation in a Mirror and it's very intentional as part of their propaganda, going back to Joseph Goebbels:

"Accuse the other of which you're guilty."

You can see a clear example of it in the Republicans' attempt to smear Biden for the kind of nepotism and corruption that Trump did openly during his presidency.

[mariacallous]

Wading through the latest dreck from the 2024 campaign, it seems that a racist congressman from Louisiana has demanded that the mythic dog-and-cat-eating, “vudu”-practicing Haitian immigrants of Springfield, Ohio, slurred by Donald Trump on the national debate stage earlier this month, “better get their mind right and their ass out of our country before January 20th.” Or else. Under pressure from colleagues in the House on Wednesday, the congressman, Clay Higgins, deleted the social-media post. Then hours later he told CNN that he stood by it anyway: “It’s all true. . . . It’s not a big deal to me. It’s like something stuck to the bottom of my boot. Just scrape it off.” Asked about the controversy, House Speaker Mike Johnson called Higgins “a dear friend of mine” and a “very principled man.” As for the tweet, Johnson, an ostentatiously devout Christian, replied, “We move forward. We believe in redemption around here.”

Outrage is an impossible emotion to sustain in this age of manufactured political outrage. I know it; Higgins and Johnson surely know it, too. Indeed, they are counting on it. Who, after all, will remember this particular bit of hate speech next week, when there will undoubtedly be so many newer, fresher outrages to be upset about? But still. Maybe pause a minute on this one. While Democrats agonize over the proper levels of policy detail required to prove Kamala Harris’s suitability for the Presidency, Trump and his acolytes have gone deep into the racist recesses of the American psyche to run a campaign meant to stir the passionate hatreds and deepest insecurities of their followers.

J. D. Vance recently made the mistake of publicly admitting the artifice inherent in all this. In an interview with CNN’s Dana Bash, the Republican Vice-Presidential candidate was asked about the alleged Haitian pet consumption and why he and the former President kept bringing up a story that had no basis in fact. “The American media totally ignored this stuff until Donald Trump and I started talking about cat memes,” he said. “If I have to create stories so that the American media actually pays attention to the suffering of the American people, then that’s what I’m going to do.” When Bash expressed shock at his admission, Vance backpedalled, but barely, claiming that he had, in fact, heard “firsthand accounts” from his constituents, causing him to spread the rumor, never mind that they were swiftly debunked. “But,” he concluded, “yes, we created the actual focus that allowed the American media to talk about this story and the suffering caused by Kamala Harris’s policies.”

Days of coverage ensued about what he did or did not admit in the interview, lost in which was the important point that this was not a “gotcha” story about a single errant statement from Vance but a core belief that has underpinned the MAGA approach to politics since Trump’s demagogic début, nine years ago. The jokes about Trump’s “they’re eating the dogs” debate line might have missed the point, which is that when the laughter fades, the slurs remain. This is how propaganda works. Ask Congressman Higgins.

I was reminded of this when I received a call from Fiona Hill, the top National Security Council aide on Russia for much of Trump’s Presidency. Hill told me that she was stunned by how similar Vance’s defiant embrace of the radicalizing power of stories, whether true or not, was to the views advanced by Vladimir Putin’s chief international propagandist, the Russia state-television personality Margarita Simonyan: So what, in effect, if we make stuff up? “I was just really struck: RT and VT—Vance-Trump—are the same,” she said. “It’s the same weaponization of migration and disinformation.”

The episode recalled for Hill an incident early in Trump’s Presidency, in November of 2017, when Trump tweeted out several inflammatory videos from a British far-right group purporting to show attacks carried out by Muslim immigrants. British officials contacted Hill, urging her to get the White House to have Trump pull down his tweets and disavow them. But, she said, when she brought the concerns to the White House press staff, which was then run by the current governor of Arkansas, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, she was rebuffed. Hill was told that Trump was simply using the videos to further his domestic political agenda. When Sanders was then asked about the tweets by reporters, her response was an uncanny preview of Vance’s recent remarks: “Whether it’s a real video,” she said, “the threat is real.”

Vance’s justification for the Springfield slur—that he was really making a point about “Kamala Harris’s policies”—is a reminder of another one of the big lies powering this election: the charade that Trump is actually an ideological MAGA warrior engaging in legitimate and substantive policy dispute, and that that policy agenda is what makes him appealing to his otherwise unrepresented followers. This canard has been one of the most persistent fallacies we’ve heard from Republicans about Trump, a category error that fundamentally misses what kind of politician he really is.

I was reminded of this often overlooked point while moderating a book launch for “The Origins of Elected Strongmen: How Personalist Parties Destroy Democracy from Within,” an important new academic work by Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former national-intelligence official covering Russia and Eurasia, and two academic colleagues, Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright. Their study places Trump in the international category to which he properly belongs—that of an aspiring autocrat who has taken over the Republican Party and turned it into a “personalist” vehicle for himself, the type of party that, in the authors’ words, exists “primarily to promote and further the leader’s personal political career rather than advance policy.” This is now a global phenomenon, the authors found—from Brazil under Bolsonaro and Turkey under Erdoğan to less cited cases in El Salvador, Georgia, Poland, Senegal, and Tunisia. Putin’s Russia, regrettably, is the modern archetype, a template going back more than two decades that the others have followed.

Where does all this leave the non-MAGA Republican? We actually know the answer to this one: they are hunkered down, still largely planning to vote the party line, averting their eyes, ignoring the slurs, and pretending that Trump and his campaign are something other than what they are. Nikki Haley offered a pretty clear version of the contortions required by the hard-core Republican partisan who both hates Trump and is voting for him anyway, because, well, the policy. During the début of Haley’s new Sirius XM radio show, on Wednesday, she struggled to explain why she was now publicly endorsing a man that she called “toxic” and “totally unhinged” just a few months ago. She said that she had not forgotten his campaign’s personal attacks on her—including, apparently, putting a bird cage outside of her hotel room to emphasize his insult of her as a “bird brain”—but that she was willing to overlook the insults now, because “politics is not for thin-skinned people” and she needed to think of “the good of our country.” She then listed the economy, the border, national security, and “freedom” as reasons why she would make such a sacrifice. Uh-huh.

To the extent that Trump is promoting policy in 2024 at all, his proposals largely revolve around a single theme: he will wave his magic wand and make problems go away. At the G.O.P. Convention in Milwaukee, he promised, “Under my plan, incomes will skyrocket, inflation will vanish completely, jobs will come roaring back, and the middle class will prosper like never, ever before.” In his rallies, he pledges to end the war in Ukraine “in twenty-four hours.” The Republicans’ all-caps political platform, which was approved at the Convention in Milwaukee after being personally dictated, in part, by Trump, contains planks such as vows to “STOP THE MIGRANT CRIME EPIDEMIC” and “MAKE OUR COLLEGE CAMPUSES SAFE AND PATRIOTIC AGAIN.”

Earlier this week in Georgia, Trump appeared at a campaign rally that was billed as a policy rollout for his plans to inaugurate “a new age of American industrialism.” In between extolling his proposed tariffs as a brilliant scheme to “take other countries’ jobs,” Trump, the policy maven, questioned Harris’s intelligence and patriotism, attacked electric cars (except those manufactured by his supporter Elon Musk), and said immigrants were “coming from all over the world” to ruin the country. Trump’s signature moment in this rally, as in other recent speeches, was when he recounted his takeaway from the two assassination attempts against him: “People say: It was God, and God came down and He saved you because He wants you to bring America back.” Still think this is about policy? Kamala Harris might need an eighty-two-page economic plan printed out on glossy paper, but not Trump. His was sent from Heaven above to rescue us. 

[justinspoliticalcorner]

Chris McGreal at The Guardian:

Jimmy Carter’s terminal illness reignited a bitter dispute over accusations the former president was antisemitic after he wrote a bestselling book likening the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to South African apartheid. Prominent American supporters of Israel lined up to denounce Carter and the book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, when it was published in 2006. Abe Foxman, director of the Anti-Defamation League, called the former president a “bigot”. Deborah Lipstadt, who is now the Biden administration’s special envoy against antisemitism, accused him of having a “Jewish problem”. Alan Dershowitz, the US constitutional lawyer and ardent advocate for Israel, said Carter set out to offend Israelis and Jews. “Jimmy Carter’s sensitivities seem to have a gaping hole when it comes to Jews. There is a term for that,” he wrote.

Others did not beat around the bush and called Carter an antisemite. Pro-Israel pressure groups placed ads in the New York Times accusing Carter of facilitating those who “pursue Israel’s annihilation” and claiming he was “blinded by an anti-Israel animus”. But nearly two decades later, the book looks prescient given that leading Israeli politicians and major human rights organisations now accuse Israel of imposing a form of apartheid on the Palestinians in breach of international laws. News that Carter had entered hospice care at the beginning of the year prompted calls for critics to apologise for the abuse, drawing an admission from at least one critic. Among those outraged by Carter’s book in 2006 were members of the former president’s own foundation, which has built an international reputation for its work on human rights and to alleviate suffering. Steve Berman led a mass resignation from the Carter Center’s board of councillors at the time. Earlier this year, Berman revealed that he later wrote to Carter to apologise and to say that the former president had been right. “I had started to view Israel’s occupation of the Palestinians as something that started in 1967 as an accident but was now becoming an enterprise with colonial intentions,” Berman said in his letter to Carter. Shortly before Carter’s death, Peter Beinart, described as “the most influential liberal Zionist of his generation”, said the time had come for the former president’s critics to apologise for the “shameful way that the book was received by many significant people”.

When the late Jimmy Carter released his Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid book in 2006, the book’s release drew a lot of controversy because it called out Israel’s occupation of Palestine and compared their situation to South Africa’s highly controversial and racist Apartheid policies aimed at non-Afrikaner South Africans, especially the Blacks.

Turns out that Carter was well ahead of his time in calling out Israel Apartheid before it became a mainstream issue in some parts of the left in the US.

[warsofasoiaf]

re: China/Taiwan

All of the examples of Chinese action you mentioned from the last 12 years were, as you pointed out with Joint Sword, in response to something from Taiwan or America (and I’ll own that I should have made Taiwanese agency here clearer - you’re correct that it isn’t solely America leading). Regardless of rhetoric from China it seems like the pace of change isn’t being set by China.

ADIZ incursions are nearly impossible to avoid given the overlapping areas - the Taiwanese ADIZ extends over the mainland, and Taiwan somewhat arbitrarily counts activities in the southwest zone outside or what most people would consider Taiwan as median line crossings. The pace has escalated over the last few years but as you pointed out it follows American and Taiwanese action like Pelosi’s visit.

With natalism, I’m again not clear what ‘investigation’ or ‘survey’ you’re referring to (and those terms aren’t interchangeable). There was a recent policy announced to lower the cost of raising children, but there’s also been a lot more work over the last two years to, for example, introduce vouchers for consumer goods upgrades/trade-ins. I’m not sure why you’re evaluating natalism as a top priority for the Chinese government when the Chinese government’s rhetoric and actual policy work seems to downplay it and treat it as an extension of cost of living challenges?

I’m not sure what other foreign policy has to do with anything - water rights negotiations, internal policing in Hong Kong, and the yes aggressive actions in relations to maritime border disputes in the SCS are very different from the sui generis relationship with Taiwan. That would be like saying we should treat America’s relation with Cuba as grounds for assessing Trump’s policy on Canada after his recent 51st state joke, which we hopefully agree would be deeply misguided.

I never said anti corruption was Xi’s primary focus, I said it was his top priority which legislatively it is. He’s promoted the previous head of party discipline, reiterated anti corruption rhetoric far more often than anything to do with Taiwan, and strengthened internal monitoring. He may well be doing it to strengthen his position, I won’t argue otherwise, but it’s definitely a much higher priority than anything Taiwan related.

You’re conflating cross strait relations with reunification rhetoric. Yes there have been swings in the relationship especially in 1996, but Beijing’s position has been consistent. Reunification is inevitable, peaceful reunification is preferred, force remains on the table. Xi hasn’t changed any of that. What has changed is that since the sunflower movement pro-mainland factions in Taiwan have been weakened and the hard greens have been emboldened, and more importantly Trump moved the Overton window to back Taiwan and challenge China more aggressively. In that framework China is the reactive party and unlikely to initiate an invasion in the near future - there’s nothing to suggest Taiwan has moved up the priority lists only that action/reaction framework is more active

Alright, wow, there's a lot to unpack there.

The idea that "pro-mainland factions have been weakened," as if by outside action, doesn't pass merit. Taiwan's democratic push came with a push against reunification because, having experienced decades of the Chiang dictatorship that repressed Taiwanese culture and having achieved a representative democracy, they were not eager to place themselves back under the boots of another dictator who would stamp out the island's heritage. This is a failure of China - they have made reunification unappealing. I'd argue that reunification rhetoric has changed from the Chinese side because it represents a much more drastic shift in the lives of the Taiwanese compared to decades prior. Moreover, I'd argue that Beijing has changed their position - they demanded that Tsai Ing-wen recognize the PRC's interpretation of the 1992 Consensus as opposed to the deliberate ambiguity of previous eras.

The idea that China has been a reactive player is again, completely wrong. Military drills are not cheap, and are not used as mere signaling devices. The first circumnavigation with fighter aircraft came after a statement saying "Our pledges have not changed and our goodwill has not changed." Somehow, though, that's aggression.

The Taiwanese rejection of the "one country, two systems" model is completely China's fault - they had espoused one country, two systems for Hong Kong only to completely brutalize the city. Much as we saw in Ukraine - the failure of the Budapest Memorandum to deter Russian violation of the Ukrainian border in the seizure of Crimea meant that Ukraine sought NATO membership as a deterrent. Taiwanese rejection of the one country, two systems model is because Beijing deliberately violated it.

Natalism, the about-to-go-into-effect pension reform, the relaxing of the previous one-child policy to a two and later three-child policy suggests that the demographic issues are actually of concern to Chinese lawmakers.

You've failed to make your point on the ADIZ. I was using the USAF figures and again, as I've noted, the ADIZ violations have continued for years after the Pelosi visit. This suggests to me that the idea that they were due to Pelosi is false - she's long left the island and the ADIZ violations continue at a high pace. It's used as a continual excuse, thus it holds no meaning. Sorry, but you have failed to create a logical argument for that to be the case as opposed to what it is, a deliberate attempt to intimidate Taiwan into pro-mainland policies as opposed to a reaction.

Your use of the reducto ad absurdum straw man fallacy has been noted and cheerfully ignored. Pattern shifts are a real thing in geopolitics. I'd recommend against using logical fallacies to prove your point - they're quite ineffective.

Characterizing China's foreign policy actions as "water rights negotiations, internal policing in Hong Kong, and the yes aggressive actions in relations to maritime border disputes in the SCS" is not only dishonest, it's outright disgusting and laughably debunkable. The SCS is not a maritime dispute - it's an illegal claim contrary to all international law (UNCLOS), laws which China had signed. The Mekong River issue is not a water rights negotiation, it was an attempt to create an artificial drought downstream and force concessions on independent countries and prevent them from conducting their own independent foreign policy, again in contravention to international institutions already addressing the issue - the Mekong River Commission. Hong Kong was not an internal policing matter, it was a violent crackdown characterized by arbitrary arrests, police brutality, and confessions extracted via torture. To frame them as such is to minimize very real violations of international law and human rights.

I get it, you're trying to push PRC talking points. I'd suggest pushing them elsewhere.

-SLAL

[dailyanarchistposts]

On the Experience of Moral Confusion

debt: noun 1 a sum of money owed. 2 the state of owing money. 3 a feeling of gratitude for a favour or service. —Oxford English Dictionary

If you owe the bank a hundred thousand dollars, the bank owns you. If you owe the bank a hundred million dollars, you own the bank. —American Proverb

Two years ago, by a series of strange coincidences, I found myself attending a garden party at Westminster Abbey. I was a bit uncomfortable. It’s not that other guests weren’t pleasant and amicable, and Father Graeme, who had organized the party, was nothing if not a gracious and charming host. But I felt more than a little out of place. At one point, Father Graeme intervened, saying that there was someone by a nearby fountain whom I would certainly want to meet. She turned out to be a trim, well-appointed young woman who, he explained, was an attorney—“but more of the activist kind. She works for a foundation that provides legal support for anti-poverty groups in London. You’ll probably have a lot to talk about.”

We chatted. She told me about her job. I told her I had been involved for many years with the global justice movement—“anti-globalization movement,” as it was usually called in the media. She was curious: she’d of course read a lot about Seattle, Genoa, the tear gas and street battles, but … well, had we really accomplished anything by all of that?

“Actually,” I said, “I think it’s kind of amazing how much we did manage to accomplish in those first couple of years.”

“For example?”

“Well, for example, we managed to almost completely destroy the IMF.”

As it happened, she didn’t actually know what the IMF was, so I offered that the International Monetary Fund basically acted as the world’s debt enforcers—“You might say, the high-finance equivalent of the guys who come to break your legs.” I launched into historical background, explaining how, during the ’70s oil crisis, OPEC countries ended up pouring so much of their newfound riches into Western banks that the banks couldn’t figure out where to invest the money; how Citibank and Chase therefore began sending agents around the world trying to convince Third World dictators and politicians to take out loans (at the time, this was called “go-go banking”); how they started out at extremely low rates of interest that almost immediately skyrocketed to 20 percent or so due to tight U.S. money policies in the early ‘80s; how, during the ’80s and ’90s, this led to the Third World debt crisis; how the IMF then stepped in to insist that, in order to obtain refinancing, poor countries would be obliged to abandon price supports on basic foodstuffs, or even policies of keeping strategic food reserves, and abandon free health care and free education; how all of this had led to the collapse of all the most basic supports for some of the poorest and most vulnerable people on earth. I spoke of poverty, of the looting of public resources, the collapse of societies, endemic violence, malnutrition, hopelessness, and broken lives.

“But what was your position?” the lawyer asked.

“About the IMF? We wanted to abolish it.”

“No, I mean, about the Third World debt.”

“Oh, we wanted to abolish that too. The immediate demand was to stop the IMF from imposing structural adjustment policies, which were doing all the direct damage, but we managed to accomplish that surprisingly quickly. The more long-term aim was debt amnesty. Something along the lines of the biblical Jubilee. As far as we were concerned,” I told her, “thirty years of money flowing from the poorest countries to the richest was quite enough.”

“But,” she objected, as if this were self-evident, “they’d borrowed the money! Surely one has to pay one’s debts.”

It was at this point that I realized this was going to be a very different sort of conversation than I had originally anticipated.

Where to start? I could have begun by explaining how these loans had originally been taken out by unelected dictators who placed most of it directly in their Swiss bank accounts, and ask her to contemplate the justice of insisting that the lenders be repaid, not by the dictator, or even by his cronies, but by literally taking food from the mouths of hungry children. Or to think about how many of these poor countries had actually already paid back what they’d borrowed three or four times now, but that through the miracle of compound interest, it still hadn’t made a significant dent in the principal. I could also observe that there was a difference between refinancing loans, and demanding that in order to obtain refinancing, countries have to follow some orthodox free-market economic policy designed in Washington or Zurich that their citizens had never agreed to and never would, and that it was a bit dishonest to insist that countries adopt democratic constitutions and then also insist that, whoever gets elected, they have no control over their country’s policies anyway. Or that the economic policies imposed by the IMF didn’t even work. But there was a more basic problem: the very assumption that debts have to be repaid.

Actually, the remarkable thing about the statement “one has to pay one’s debts” is that even according to standard economic theory, it isn’t true. A lender is supposed to accept a certain degree of risk. If all loans, no matter how idiotic, were still retrievable—if there were no bankruptcy laws, for instance—the results would be disastrous. What reason would lenders have not to make a stupid loan?

“Well, I know that sounds like common sense,” I said, “but the funny thing is, economically, that’s not how loans are actually supposed to work. Financial institutions are supposed to be ways of directing resources toward profitable investments. If a bank were guaranteed to get its money back, plus interest, no matter what it did, the whole system wouldn’t work. Say I were to walk into the nearest branch of the Royal Bank of Scotland and say ‘You know, I just got a really great tip on the horses. Think you could lend me a couple million quid?’ Obviously they’d just laugh at me. But that’s just because they know if my horse didn’t come in, there’d be no way for them to get the money back. But, imagine there was some law that said they were guaranteed to get their money back no matter what happens, even if that meant, I don’t know, selling my daughter into slavery or harvesting my organs or something. Well, in that case, why not? Why bother waiting for someone to walk in who has a viable plan to set up a laundromat or some such? Basically, that’s the situation the IMF created on a global level—which is how you could have all those banks willing to fork over billions of dollars to a bunch of obvious crooks in the first place.”

I didn’t get quite that far, because at about that point a drunken financier appeared, having noticed that we were talking about money, and began telling funny stories about moral hazard—which somehow, before too long, had morphed into a long and not particularly engrossing account of one of his sexual conquests. I drifted off.

Still, for several days afterward, that phrase kept resonating in my head.

“Surely one has to pay one’s debts.”

The reason it’s so powerful is that it’s not actually an economic statement: it’s a moral statement. After all, isn’t paying one’s debts what morality is supposed to be all about? Giving people what is due them. Accepting one’s responsibilities. Fulfilling one’s obligations to others, just as one would expect them to fulfill their obligations to you. What could be a more obvious example of shirking one’s responsibilities than reneging on a promise, or refusing to pay a debt?

It was that very apparent self-evidence, I realized, that made the statement so insidious. This was the kind of line that could make terrible things appear utterly bland and unremarkable. This may sound strong, but it’s hard not to feel strongly about such matters once you’ve witnessed the effects. I had. For almost two years, I had lived in the highlands of Madagascar. Shortly before I arrived, there had been an outbreak of malaria. It was a particularly virulent outbreak because malaria had been wiped out in highland Madagascar many years before, so that, after a couple of generations, most people had lost their immunity. The problem was, it took money to maintain the mosquito eradication program, since there had to be periodic tests to make sure mosquitoes weren’t starting to breed again and spraying campaigns if it was discovered that they were. Not a lot of money. But owing to IMF-imposed austerity programs, the government had to cut the monitoring program. Ten thousand people died. I met young mothers grieving for lost children. One might think it would be hard to make a case that the loss of ten thousand human lives is really justified in order to ensure that Citibank wouldn’t have to cut its losses on one irresponsible loan that wasn’t particularly important to its balance sheet anyway. But here was a perfectly decent woman—one who worked for a charitable organization, no less—who took it as self-evident that it was. After all, they owed the money, and surely one has to pay one’s debts.

For the next few weeks, that phrase kept coming back at me. Why debt? What makes the concept so strangely powerful? Consumer debt is the lifeblood of our economy. All modern nation-states are built on deficit spending. Debt has come to be the central issue of international politics. But nobody seems to know exactly what it is, or how to think about it.

The very fact that we don’t know what debt is, the very flexibility of the concept, is the basis of its power. If history shows anything, it is that there’s no better way to justify relations founded on violence, to make such relations seem moral, than by reframing them in the language of debt—above all, because it immediately makes it seem that it’s the victim who’s doing something wrong. Mafiosi understand this. So do the commanders of conquering armies. For thousands of years, violent men have been able to tell their victims that those victims owe them something. If nothing else, they “owe them their lives” (a telling phrase) because they haven’t been killed.

Nowadays, for example, military aggression is defined as a crime against humanity, and international courts, when they are brought to bear, usually demand that aggressors pay compensation. Germany had to pay massive reparations after World War I, and Iraq is still paying Kuwait for Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1990. Yet the Third World debt, the debt of countries like Madagascar, Bolivia, and the Philippines, seems to work precisely the other way around. Third World debtor nations are almost exclusively countries that have at one time been attacked and conquered by European countries—often, the very countries to whom they now owe money. In 1895, for example, France invaded Madagascar, disbanded the government of then–Queen Ranavalona III, and declared the country a French colony. One of the first things General Gallieni did after “pacification,” as they liked to call it then, was to impose heavy taxes on the Malagasy population, in part so they could reimburse the costs of having been invaded, but also, since French colonies were supposed to be fiscally self-supporting, to defray the costs of building the railroads, highways, bridges, plantations, and so forth that the French regime wished to build. Malagasy taxpayers were never asked whether they wanted these railroads, highways, bridges, and plantations, or allowed much input into where and how they were built.[1] To the contrary: over the next half century, the French army and police slaughtered quite a number of Malagasy who objected too strongly to the arrangement (upwards of half a million, by some reports, during one revolt in 1947). It’s not as if Madagascar has ever done any comparable damage to France. Despite this, from the beginning, the Malagasy people were told they owed France money, and to this day, the Malagasy people are still held to owe France money, and the rest of the world accepts the justice of this arrangement. When the “international community” does perceive a moral issue, it’s usually when they feel the Malagasy government is being slow to pay their debts.

But debt is not just victor’s justice; it can also be a way of punishing winners who weren’t supposed to win. The most spectacular example of this is the history of the Republic of Haiti—the first poor country to be placed in permanent debt peonage. Haiti was a nation founded by former plantation slaves who had the temerity not only to rise up in rebellion, amidst grand declarations of universal rights and freedoms, but to defeat Napoleon’s armies sent to return them to bondage. France immediately insisted that the new republic owed it 150 million francs in damages for the expropriated plantations, as well as the expenses of outfitting the failed military expeditions, and all other nations, including the United States, agreed to impose an embargo on the country until it was paid. The sum was intentionally impossible (equivalent to about 18 billion dollars), and the resultant embargo ensured that the name “Haiti” has been a synonym for debt, poverty, and human misery ever since.[2]

Sometimes, though, debt seems to mean the very opposite. Starting in the 1980s, the United States, which insisted on strict terms for the repayment of Third World debt, itself accrued debts that easily dwarfed those of the entire Third World combined—mainly fueled by military spending. The U.S. foreign debt, though, takes the form of treasury bonds held by institutional investors in countries (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Gulf States) that are in most cases, effectively, U.S. military protectorates, most covered in U.S. bases full of arms and equipment paid for with that very deficit spending. This has changed a little now that China has gotten in on the game (China is a special case, for reasons that will be explained later), but not very much—even China finds that the fact it holds so many U.S. treasury bonds makes it to some degree beholden to U.S. interests, rather than the other way around.

So what is the status of all this money continually being funneled into the U.S. treasury? Are these loans? Or is it tribute? In the past, military powers that maintained hundreds of military bases outside their own home territory were ordinarily referred to as “empires,” and empires regularly demanded tribute from subject peoples. The U.S. government, of course, insists that it is not an empire—but one could easily make a case that the only reason it insists on treating these payments as “loans” and not as “tribute” is precisely to deny the reality of what’s going on.

Now, it’s true that, throughout history, certain sorts of debt, and certain sorts of debtor, have always been treated differently than others. In the 1720s, one of the things that most scandalized the British public when conditions at debtors’ prisons were exposed in the popular press was the fact that these prisons were regularly divided into two sections. Aristocratic inmates, who often thought of a brief stay in Fleet or Marshalsea as something of a fashion statement, were wined and dined by liveried servants and allowed to receive regular visits from prostitutes. On the “common side,” impoverished debtors were shackled together in tiny cells, “covered with filth and vermin,” as one report put it, “and suffered to die, without pity, of hunger and jail fever.”[3]

In a way you can see current world economic arrangements as a much larger version of the same thing: the U.S. in this case being the Cadillac debtor, Madagascar the pauper starving in the next cell—while the Cadillac debtors’ servants lecture him on how his problems are due to his own irresponsibility.

And there’s something more fundamental going on here, a philosophical question, even, that we might do well to contemplate. What is the difference between a gangster pulling out a gun and demanding you give him a thousand dollars of “protection money,” and that same gangster pulling out a gun and demanding you provide him with a thousand-dollar “loan”? In most ways, obviously, nothing. But in certain ways there is a difference. As in the case of the U.S. debt to Korea or Japan, were the balance of power at any point to shift, were America to lose its military supremacy, were the gangster to lose his henchmen, that “loan” might start being treated very differently. It might become a genuine liability. But the crucial element would still seem to be the gun.

There’s an old vaudeville gag that makes the same point even more elegantly—here, as improved on by Steve Wright:

I was walking down the street with a friend the other day and a guy with a gun jumps out of an alley and says “stick ’em up.”

As I pull out my wallet, I figure, “shouldn’t be a total loss.” So I pull out some money, turn to my friend and say, “Hey, Fred, here’s that fifty bucks I owe you.”

The robber was so offended he took out a thousand dollars of his own money, forced Fred to lend it to me at gunpoint, and then took it back again.

In the final analysis, the man with the gun doesn’t have to do anything he doesn’t want to do. But in order to be able to run even a regime based on violence effectively, one needs to establish some kind of set of rules. The rules can be completely arbitrary. In a way it doesn’t even matter what they are. Or, at least, it doesn’t matter at first. The problem is, the moment one starts framing things in terms of debt, people will inevitably start asking who really owes what to whom.

Arguments about debt have been going on for at least five thousand years. For most of human history—at least, the history of states and empires—most human beings have been told that they are debtors.[4] Historians, and particularly historians of ideas, have been oddly reluctant to consider the human consequences; especially since this situation—more than any other—has caused continual outrage and resentment. Tell people they are inferior, they are unlikely to be pleased, but this surprisingly rarely leads to armed revolt. Tell people that they are potential equals who have failed, and that therefore, even what they do have they do not deserve, that it isn’t rightly theirs, and you are much more likely to inspire rage. Certainly this is what history would seem to teach us. For thousands of years, the struggle between rich and poor has largely taken the form of conflicts between creditors and debtors—of arguments about the rights and wrongs of interest payments, debt peonage, amnesty, repossession, restitution, the sequestering of sheep, the seizing of vineyards, and the selling of debtors’ children into slavery. By the same token, for the last five thousand years, with remarkable regularity, popular insurrections have begun the same way: with the ritual destruction of the debt records—tablets, papyri, ledgers, whatever form they might have taken in any particular time and place. (After that, rebels usually go after the records of landholding and tax assessments.) As the great classicist Moses Finley often liked to say, in the ancient world, all revolutionary movements had a single program: “Cancel the debts and redistribute the land.”[5]

Our tendency to overlook this is all the more peculiar when you consider how much of our contemporary moral and religious language originally emerged directly from these very conflicts. Terms like “reckoning” or “redemption” are only the most obvious, since they’re taken directly from the language of ancient finance. In a larger sense, the same can be said of “guilt,” “freedom,” “forgiveness,” and even “sin.” Arguments about who really owes what to whom have played a central role in shaping our basic vocabulary of right and wrong.

The fact that so much of this language did take shape in arguments about debt has left the concept strangely incoherent. After all, to argue with the king, one has to use the king’s language, whether or not the initial premises make sense.

If one looks at the history of debt, then, what one discovers first of all is profound moral confusion. Its most obvious manifestation is that most everywhere, one finds that the majority of human beings hold simultaneously that (1) paying back money one has borrowed is a simple matter of morality, and (2) anyone in the habit of lending money is evil.

It’s true that opinions on this latter point do shift back and forth. One extreme possibility might be the situation the French anthropologist Jean-Claude Galey encountered in a region of the eastern Himalayas, where as recently as the 1970s, the low-ranking castes—they were referred to as “the vanquished ones,” since they were thought to be descended from a population once conquered by the current landlord caste, many centuries before—lived in a situation of permanent debt dependency. Landless and penniless, they were obliged to solicit loans from the landlords simply to find a way to eat—not for the money, since the sums were paltry, but because poor debtors were expected to pay back the interest in the form of work, which meant they were at least provided with food and shelter while they cleaned out their creditors’ outhouses and reroofed their sheds. For the “vanquished”—as for most people in the world, actually—the most significant life expenses were weddings and funerals. These required a good deal of money, which always had to be borrowed. In such cases it was common practice, Galey explains, for high-caste moneylenders to demand one of the borrower’s daughters as security. Often, when a poor man had to borrow money for his daughter’s marriage, the security would be the bride herself. She would be expected to report to the lender’s household after her wedding night, spend a few months there as his concubine, and then, once he grew bored, be sent off to some nearby timber camp, where she would have to spend the next year or two as a prostitute working off her father’s debt. Once it was paid off, she’d return to her husband and begin her married life.[6]

This seems shocking, outrageous even, but Galey does not report any widespread feeling of injustice. Everyone seemed to feel that this was just the way things worked. Neither was there much concern voiced among the local Brahmins, who were the ultimate arbiters in matters of morality—though this is hardly surprising, since the most prominent moneylenders were often Brahmins themselves.

Even here, of course, it’s hard to know what people were saying behind closed doors. If a group of Maoist rebels were to suddenly seize control of the area (some do operate in this part of rural India) and round up the local usurers for trial, we might hear all sorts of views expressed.

Still, what Galey describes represents, as I say, one extreme of possibility: one in which the usurers themselves are the ultimate moral authorities. Compare this with, say, medieval France, where the moral status of moneylenders was seriously in question. The Catholic Church had always forbidden the practice of lending money at interest, but the rules often fell into desuetude, causing the Church hierarchy to authorize preaching campaigns, sending mendicant friars to travel from town to town warning usurers that unless they repented and made full restitution of all interest extracted from their victims, they would surely go to Hell.

These sermons, many of which have survived, are full of horror stories of God’s judgment on unrepentant lenders: stories of rich men struck down by madness or terrible diseases, haunted by deathbed nightmares of the snakes or demons who would soon rend or eat their flesh. In the twelfth century, when such campaigns reached their heights, more direct sanctions began to be employed. The papacy issued instructions to local parishes that all known usurers were to be excommunicated; they were not to be allowed to receive the sacraments, and under no conditions could their bodies be buried on hallowed ground. One French cardinal, Jacques de Vitry, writing around 1210, recorded the story of a particularly influential moneylender whose friends tried to pressure their parish priest to overlook the rules and allow him to be buried in the local churchyard:

Since the dead usurer’s friends were very insistent, the priest yielded to their pressure and said, “Let us put his body on a donkey and see God’s will, and what He will do with the body. Wherever the donkey takes it, be it a church, a cemetery, or elsewhere, there will I bury it.” The body was placed upon the donkey which without deviating either to right or left, took it straight out of town to the place where thieves are hanged from the gibbet, and with a hearty buck, sent the cadaver flying into the dung beneath the gallows.[7]

Looking over world literature, it is almost impossible to find a single sympathetic representation of a moneylender—or anyway, a professional moneylender, which means by definition one who charges interest. I’m not sure there is another profession (executioners?) with such a consistently bad image. It’s especially remarkable when one considers that unlike executioners, usurers often rank among the richest and most powerful people in their communities. Yet the very name, “usurer,” evokes images of loan sharks, blood money, pounds of flesh, the selling of souls, and behind them all, the Devil, often represented as himself a kind of usurer, an evil accountant with his books and ledgers, or alternately, as the figure looming just behind the usurer, biding his time until he can repossess the soul of a villain who, by his very occupation, has clearly made a compact with Hell.

Historically, there have been only two effective ways for a lender to try to wriggle out of the opprobrium: either shunt off responsibility onto some third party, or insist that the borrower is even worse. In medieval Europe, for instance, lords often took the first approach, employing Jews as surrogates. Many would even speak of “our” Jews—that is, Jews under their personal protection—though in practice this usually meant that they would first deny Jews in their territories any means of making a living except by usury (guaranteeing that they would be widely detested), then periodically turn on them, claiming they were detestable creatures, and take the money for themselves. The second approach is of course more common. But it usually leads to the conclusion that both parties to a loan are equally guilty; the whole affair is a shabby business; and most likely, both are damned.

Other religious traditions have different perspectives. In medieval Hindu law codes, not only were interest-bearing loans permissible (the main stipulation was that interest should never exceed principal), but it was often emphasized that a debtor who did not pay would be reborn as a slave in the household of his creditor—or in later codes, reborn as his horse or ox. The same tolerant attitude toward lenders, and warnings of karmic revenge against borrowers, reappear in many strands of Buddhism. Even so, the moment that usurers were thought to go too far, exactly the same sort of stories as found in Europe would start appearing. A Medieval Japanese author recounts one—he insists it’s a true story—about the terrifying fate of Hiromushime, the wife of a wealthy district governor around 776 ad. An exceptionally greedy woman,

she would add water to the rice wine she sold and make a huge profit on such diluted saké. On the day she loaned something to someone she would use a small measuring cup, but on the day of collection she used a large one. When lending rice her scale registered small portions, but when she received payment it was in large amounts. The interest that she forcibly collected was tremendous—often as much as ten or even one hundred times the amount of the original loan. She was rigid about collecting debts, showing no mercy whatsoever. Because of this, many people were thrown into a state of anxiety; they abandoned their households to get away from her and took to wandering in other provinces.[8]

After she died, for seven days, monks prayed over her sealed coffin. On the seventh, her body mysteriously sprang to life:

Those who came to look at her encountered an indescribable stench. From the waist up she had already become an ox with four-inch horns protruding from her forehead. Her two hands had become the hooves of an ox, her nails were now cracked so that they resembled an ox hoof’s instep. From the waist down, however, her body was that of a human. She disliked rice and preferred to eat grass. Her manner of eating was rumination. Naked, she would lie in her own excrement.[9]

Gawkers descended. Guilty and ashamed, the family made desperate attempts to buy forgiveness, canceling all debts owed to them by anybody, donating much of their wealth to religious establishments. Finally, mercifully, the monster died.

The author, himself a monk, felt that the story represented a clear case of premature reincarnation—the woman was being punished by the law of karma for her violations of “what is both reasonable and right.” His problem was that Buddhist scriptures, insofar as they explicitly weighed in on the matter, didn’t provide a precedent. Normally, it was debtors who were supposed to be reborn as oxen, not creditors. As a result, when it came time to explain the moral of the story, his exposition grew decidedly confusing:

It is as one sutra says: “When we do not repay the things that we have borrowed, our payment becomes that of being reborn as a horse or ox.” “The debtor is like a slave, the creditor is like a master.” Or again: “a debtor is a pheasant and his creditor a hawk.” If you are in a situation of having granted a loan, do not put unreasonable pressure on your debtor for repayment. If you do, you will be reborn as a horse or an ox and be put to work for him who was in debt to you, and then you will repay many times over.[10]

So which will it be? They can’t both end up as animals in each other’s barns.

All the great religious traditions seem to bang up against this quandary in one form or another. On the one hand, insofar as all human relations involve debt, they are all morally compromised. Both parties are probably already guilty of something just by entering into the relationship; at the very least they run a significant danger of becoming guilty if repayment is delayed. On the other hand, when we say someone acts like they “don’t owe anything to anybody,” we’re hardly describing the person as a paragon of virtue. In the secular world, morality consists largely of fulfilling our obligations to others, and we have a stubborn tendency to imagine those obligations as debts. Monks, perhaps, can avoid the dilemma by detaching themselves from the secular world entirely, but the rest of us appear condemned to live in a universe that doesn’t make a lot of sense.

The story of Hiromushime is a perfect illustration of the impulse to throw the accusation back at the accuser—just as in the story about the dead usurer and the donkey, the emphasis on excrement, animals, and humiliation is clearly meant as poetic justice, the creditor forced to experience the same feelings of disgrace and degradation that debtors are always made to feel. It’s all a more vivid, more visceral way of asking that same question: “Who really owes what to whom?”

It’s also a perfect illustration of how the moment one asks the question “Who really owes what to whom?,” one has begun to adopt the creditor’s language. Just as if we don’t pay our debts, “our payment becomes that of being reborn as a horse or an ox”; so if you are an unreasonable creditor, you too will “repay.” Even karmic justice can thus be reduced to the language of a business deal.

Here we come to the central question of this book: What, precisely, does it mean to say that our sense of morality and justice is reduced to the language of a business deal? What does it mean when we reduce moral obligations to debts? What changes when the one turns into the other? And how do we speak about them when our language has been so shaped by the market? On one level the difference between an obligation and a debt is simple and obvious. A debt is the obligation to pay a certain sum of money. As a result, a debt, unlike any other form of obligation, can be precisely quantified. This allows debts to become simple, cold, and impersonal—which, in turn, allows them to be transferable. If one owes a favor, or one’s life, to another human being—it is owed to that person specifically. But if one owes forty thousand dollars at 12-percent interest, it doesn’t really matter who the creditor is; neither does either of the two parties have to think much about what the other party needs, wants, is capable of doing—as they certainly would if what was owed was a favor, or respect, or gratitude. One does not need to calculate the human effects; one need only calculate principal, balances, penalties, and rates of interest. If you end up having to abandon your home and wander in other provinces, if your daughter ends up in a mining camp working as a prostitute, well, that’s unfortunate, but incidental to the creditor. Money is money, and a deal’s a deal.

From this perspective, the crucial factor, and a topic that will be explored at length in these pages, is money’s capacity to turn morality into a matter of impersonal arithmetic—and by doing so, to justify things that would otherwise seem outrageous or obscene. The factor of violence, which I have been emphasizing up until now, may appear secondary. The difference between a “debt” and a mere moral obligation is not the presence or absence of men with weapons who can enforce that obligation by seizing the debtor’s possessions or threatening to break his legs. It is simply that a creditor has the means to specify, numerically, exactly how much the debtor owes.

However, when one looks a little closer, one discovers that these two elements—the violence and the quantification—are intimately linked. In fact it’s almost impossible to find one without the other. French usurers had powerful friends and enforcers, capable of bullying even Church authorities. How else would they have collected debts that were technically illegal? Hiromushime was utterly uncompromising with her debtors—“showing no mercy whatsoever”—but then, her husband was the governor. She didn’t have to show mercy. Those of us who do not have armed men behind us cannot afford to be so exacting.

The way violence, or the threat of violence, turns human relations into mathematics will crop up again and again over the course of this book. It is the ultimate source of the moral confusion that seems to float around everything surrounding the topic of debt. The resulting dilemmas appear to be as old as civilization itself. We can observe the process in the very earliest records from ancient Mesopotamia; it finds its first philosophical expression in the Vedas, reappears in endless forms throughout recorded history, and still lies underneath the essential fabric of our institutions today—state and market, our most basic conceptions of the nature of freedom, morality, sociality—all of which have been shaped by a history of war, conquest, and slavery in ways we’re no longer capable of even perceiving because we can no longer imagine things any other way.

There are obvious reasons why this is a particularly important moment to reexamine the history of debt. September 2008 saw the beginning of a financial crisis that almost brought the entire world economy screeching to a halt. In many ways the world economy did: ships stopped moving across the oceans, and thousands were placed in dry dock. Building cranes were dismantled, as no more buildings were being put up. Banks largely ceased making loans. In the wake of this, there was not only public rage and bewilderment, but the beginning of an actual public conversation about the nature of debt, of money, of the financial institutions that have come to hold the fate of nations in their grip.

But that was just a moment. The conversation never ended up taking place.

The reason that people were ready for such a conversation was that the story everyone had been told for the last decade or so had just been revealed to be a colossal lie. There’s really no nicer way to say it. For years, everyone had been hearing of a whole host of new, ultra-sophisticated financial innovations: credit and commodity derivatives, collateralized mortgage obligation derivatives, hybrid securities, debt swaps, and so on. These new derivative markets were so incredibly sophisticated, that—according to one persistent story—a prominent investment house had to employ astrophysicists to run trading programs so complex that even the financiers couldn’t begin to understand them. The message was transparent: leave these things to the professionals. You couldn’t possibly get your minds around this. Even if you don’t like financial capitalists very much (and few seemed inclined to argue that there was much to like about them), they were nothing if not capable, in fact so preternaturally capable, that democratic oversight of financial markets was simply inconceivable. (Even a lot of academics fell for it. I well remember going to conferences in 2006 and 2007 where trendy social theorists presented papers arguing that these new forms of securitization, linked to new information technologies, heralded a looming transformation in the very nature of time, possibility—reality itself. I remember thinking: “Suckers!” And so they were.)

Then, when the rubble had stopped bouncing, it turned out that many if not most of them had been nothing more than very elaborate scams. They consisted of operations like selling poor families mortgages crafted in such a way as to make eventual default inevitable; taking bets on how long it would take the holders to default; packaging mortgage and bet together and selling them to institutional investors (representing, perhaps, the mortgage-holders’ retirement accounts) claiming that it would make money no matter what happened, and allow said investors to pass such packages around as if they were money; turning over responsibility for paying off the bet to a giant insurance conglomerate that, were it to sink beneath the weight of its resultant debt (which certainly would happen), would then have to be bailed out by taxpayers (as such conglomerates were indeed bailed out).[11] In other words, it looks very much like an unusually elaborate version of what banks were doing when they lent money to dictators in Bolivia and Gabon in the late ’70s: make utterly irresponsible loans with the full knowledge that, once it became known they had done so, politicians and bureaucrats would scramble to ensure that they’d still be reimbursed anyway, no matter how many human lives had to be devastated and destroyed in order to do it.

The difference, though, was that this time, the bankers were doing it on an inconceivable scale: the total amount of debt they had run up was larger than the combined Gross Domestic Products of every country in the world—and it threw the world into a tailspin and almost destroyed the system itself.

Armies and police geared up to combat the expected riots and unrest, but none materialized. But neither have any significant changes in how the system is run. At the time, everyone assumed that, with the very defining institutions of capitalism (Lehman Brothers, Citibank, General Motors) crumbling, and all claims to superior wisdom revealed to be false, we would at least restart a broader conversation about the nature of debt and credit institutions. And not just a conversation.

It seemed that most Americans were open to radical solutions. Surveys showed that an overwhelming majority of Americans felt that the banks should not be rescued, whatever the economic consequences, but that ordinary citizens stuck with bad mortgages should be bailed out. In the United States this is quite extraordinary. Since colonial days, Americans have been the population least sympathetic to debtors. In a way this is odd, since America was settled largely by absconding debtors, but it’s a country where the idea that morality is a matter of paying one’s debts runs deeper than almost any other. In colonial days, an insolvent debtor’s ear was often nailed to a post. The United States was one of the last countries in the world to adopt a law of bankruptcy: despite the fact that in 1787, the Constitution specifically charged the new government with creating one, all attempts were rejected on “moral grounds” until 1898.[12] The change was epochal. For this very reason, perhaps, those in charge of moderating debate in the media and legislatures decided that this was not the time. The United States government effectively put a three-trillion-dollar Band-Aid over the problem and changed nothing. The bankers were rescued; small-scale debtors—with a paltry few exceptions—were not.[13] To the contrary, in the middle of the greatest economic recession since the ’30s, we are already beginning to see a backlash against them—driven by financial corporations who have now turned to the same government that bailed them out to apply the full force of the law against ordinary citizens in financial trouble. “It’s not a crime to owe money,” reports the Minneapolis-St. Paul StarTribune, “But people are routinely being thrown in jail for failing to pay debts.” In Minnesota, “the use of arrest warrants against debtors has jumped 60 percent over the past four years, with 845 cases in 2009 … In Illinois and southwest Indiana, some judges jail debtors for missing court-ordered debt payments. In extreme cases, people stay in jail until they raise a minimum payment. In January \[2010\], a judge sentenced a Kenney, Ill., man ‘to indefinite incarceration’ until he came up with $300 toward a lumber yard debt.”[14]

In other words, we are moving toward a restoration of something much like debtors’ prisons. Meanwhile, the conversation stopped dead, popular rage against bailouts sputtered into incoherence, and we seem to be tumbling inexorably toward the next great financial catastrophe—the only real question being just how long it will take.

We have reached the point at which the IMF itself, now trying to reposition itself as the conscience of global capitalism, has begun to issue warnings that if we continue on the present course, no bailout is likely to be forthcoming the next time. The public simply will not stand for it, and as a result, everything really will come apart. “IMF Warns Second Bailout Would ‘Threaten Democracy’ ” reads one recent headline.[15] (Of course by “democracy” they mean “capitalism.”) Surely it means something that even those who feel they are responsible for keeping the current global economic system running, who just a few years ago acted as if they could simply assume the current system would be around forever, are now seeing apocalypse everywhere.

In this case, the IMF has a point. We have every reason to believe that we do indeed stand on the brink of epochal changes.

Admittedly, the usual impulse is to imagine everything around us as absolutely new. Nowhere is this so true as with money. How many times have we been told that the advent of virtual money, the dematerialization of cash into plastic and dollars into blips of electronic information, has brought us to an unprecedented new financial world? The assumption that we were in such uncharted territory, of course, was one of the things that made it so easy for the likes of Goldman Sachs and AIG to convince people that no one could possibly understand their dazzling new financial instruments. The moment one casts matters on a broad historical scale, though, the first thing one learns is that there’s nothing new about virtual money. Actually, this was the original form of money. Credit system, tabs, even expense accounts, all existed long before cash. These things are as old as civilization itself. True, we also find that history tends to move back and forth between periods dominated by bullion—where it’s assumed that gold and silver are money—and periods where money is assumed to be an abstraction, a virtual unit of account. But historically, credit money comes first, and what we are witnessing today is a return of assumptions that would have been considered obvious common sense in, say, the Middle Ages—or even ancient Mesopotamia.

But history does provide fascinating hints of what we might expect. For instance: in the past, ages of virtual credit money almost invariably involve the creation of institutions designed to prevent everything going haywire—to stop the lenders from teaming up with bureaucrats and politicians to squeeze everybody dry, as they seem to be doing now. They are accompanied by the creation of institutions designed to protect debtors. The new age of credit money we are in seems to have started precisely backwards. It began with the creation of global institutions like the IMF designed to protect not debtors, but creditors. At the same time, on the kind of historical scale we’re talking about here, a decade or two is nothing. We have very little idea what to expect.

This book is a history of debt, then, but it also uses that history as a way to ask fundamental questions about what human beings and human society are or could be like—what we actually do owe each other, what it even means to ask that question. As a result, the book begins by attempting to puncture a series of myths—not only the Myth of Barter, which is taken up in the first chapter, but also rival myths about primordial debts to the gods, or to the state—that in one way or another form the basis of our common-sense assumptions about the nature of economy and society. In that common-sense view, the State and the Market tower above all else as diametrically opposed principles. Historical reality reveals, however, that they were born together and have always been intertwined. The one thing that all these misconceptions have in common, we will find, is that they tend to reduce all human relations to exchange, as if our ties to society, even to the cosmos itself, can be imagined in the same terms as a business deal. This leads to another question: If not exchange, then what? In chapter five, I will begin to answer the question by drawing on the fruits of anthropology to describe a view of the moral basis of economic life; then return to the question of the origins of money to demonstrate how the very principle of exchange emerged largely as an effect of violence—that the real origins of money are to be found in crime and recompense, war and slavery, honor, debt, and redemption. That, in turn, opens the way to starting, with chapter eight, an actual history of the last five thousand years of debt and credit, with its great alternations between ages of virtual and physical money. Many of the discoveries here are profoundly unexpected: from the origins of modern conceptions of rights and freedoms in ancient slave law, to the origins of investment capital in medieval Chinese Buddhism, to the fact that many of Adam Smith’s most famous arguments appear to have been cribbed from the works of free-market theorists from medieval Persia (a story which, incidentally, has interesting implications for understanding the current appeal of political Islam). All of this sets the stage for a fresh approach to the last five hundred years, dominated by capitalist empires, and allows us to at least begin asking what might really be at stake in the present day.

For a very long time, the intellectual consensus has been that we can no longer ask Great Questions. Increasingly, it’s looking like we have no other choice.

[theculturedmarxist]

thoughts on the democrat party

Personally I think the Dems are doing "their best" with Biden. From what I can see the shape that American society has taken due to corporate monopolization has influenced the party in such a way that it has divested itself from the necessary talent to either govern or develop a new intellectual framework to deal with emerging circumstances. Biden is the best they've got because party power has been monopolized by all the geriatric party bosses, who have spent decades weeding out any potential party rivals and self selecting for mediocrity and the kind of intellectual narrowness necessary to carry the nebulous Dem party line.

The Dems have been outfoxed at every turn in spite of their comparative popularity to the Reps because as awful as it is, the Reps at least have a vision of the future and how to get their, which the Dems absolutely lack, and you can't beat something with nothing. So the Dems default to the "norms" set by the Republicans whenever the Ds manage to get power, which only serves the Republican agenda as eventually they'll just get in power again and pick up where they left off.

Biden is actually the best they can do, because they have no one of any vision to energize the base, and even if they did they don't have the clout to either direct the party or attract investment from donors. The fact that an octogenarian with dementia is at the head of the party and nothing can be done about it points to how serious the problems in the party have become.

>At what point do the Dems just collapse from the institutional rot you're describing?

I'm not sure, really. I haven't really thought about it.

I suppose we might be seeing the first indications of such a collapse now. I think the marks of a healthy institution are for it to a) be able to identify, incorporate, and cultivate new talent, b) to have an internal well of theoretical and practical knowledge to draw from, and c) to utilize the previous two in novel ways in order to work towards some kind of future ideal and/or to deal with novel circumstances, both benign and malignant.

It's much more complicated than just Trump as a person, but him and the circumstances surrounding him are a novel, malignant circumstance as far as the Democratic Party is concerned, and one that it had failed to deal with after 8 years of wrangling with it. Bernie Sanders is another facet of this malignant novelty, and the party's manner of dealing with him is ironically why they're incapable of dealing with Trump. As far as the party runners are concerned, Sanders and other members of the 'progressives" in the party are a tumor to be combated. Even their mild reforms run counter to party orthodoxy and are not to be tolerated, and anywhere they might seriously challenge that orthodoxy, like we saw when they prevailed in Nevada, they have to be crushed. They're allowed to showboat and make their little tirades, but when it comes to any sort of actual challenge to party policy there are various means of chastening them, like we saw recently with AIPAC crushing the "squad" and making AOC cry.

So this rigidity has made adaptation and innovation basically impossible. There's just the status quo, and if you want to get anywhere in the party you have to serve that status quo with a practically religious devotion. The party is now overflowing with empty suits like Kamala and Buttigieg, the sort of mediocrities that have no real values, no real intellect, and whose only talent is being able to say with some level of conviction whatever currently serves the party's interests. Unfortunately for them, the party's interests are diametrically opposed to the general population's interests, so while they might be able to get up in front of a tv and deliver a speech someone wrote for them which will make PMC types on twitter and the MSNBC hosts they follow swoon, there's nothing there to attract average people and convince them to vote for them. They've heard it all before and because there's very little material difference to them in being fucked by a Republican or Democrat president, they don't really care.

So the crisis now is that they have nothing to beat Trump with, and no way to fix this situation. Even if they had the talent to fall back on, Biden himself represents a significant amount of clout within the party itself, and the party's convention rules mean that all the delegates they gave him are his to do with as he pleases, and for whatever reason refuses to give them up, probably because he's a) a bastard and b) his progressing dementia is bringing out all his worst qualities, and making the magnanimous play for the benefit of others is not something that Biden would ever, ever do.

Right now we're witnessing all the powers and interests behind the party trying to come to grips with these circumstances. The young, attractive party members that would be worth funding like AOC are unacceptable because the donors won't accept their politics, so giving them actual power within and over the party is out of the question. The old party hacks like Clinton or Pelosi wouldn't accept this either because it would threaten their own power and security. Anyone that would be acceptable to the party bosses lacks the ability to attract enough sections of the party donors and voters to be viable. They lack the charisma to appeal to the people, and Obama's ability to line them up behind themselves with "it's me or the pitchforks" type of rhetoric.

However this election shakes out, it won't change the fact that the Democratic party is in the grip of a small number of extremely powerful party bosses that can't be dislodged for various reasons, and that as long as they're alive they're going to do whatever it takes to maintain their positions. As long as they do, no one of any real talent is going to make it anywhere in the party, and as long as that's true it's only going to continue to stagnate. And even if Obama, Pelosi, Biden, Clinton, and the rest of the bosses died tomorrow, that still wouldn't bring much effect because the ideology of the bourgeoisie behind the party is rigidly devoted to the status quo out of political and economic necessity. With all that said, their party remains viable only as long as the status quo remains viable, and that is quickly becoming not the case. They've been able to indulge in this stagnancy only because they've been able to minimize or externalize all the worst effects of it, but between climate change, the ascendancy of BRICS, the war in Ukraine they're losing, the war in Palestine they're losing, the cold war over Taiwan they're losing, the ongoing COVID pandemic, the incipient Avian Flu pandemic, and many, many other very severe problems developing in and around the country, that indulgence becomes increasingly untenable.

So to sum up, we might be witnessing the early stages of an ongoing and possibly irreversible collapse at this very moment.

[juliens-bakery]

hi sorry this is so long ! this question may seem out of the blue, apologies, but why are so many boygenius fans on here, like, shameless liberals who won't tolerate any criticism of Biden? to be clear I'm not talking about your blog, I scanned it and it was so refreshing to see someone actually critical of the Dems and their instrumental role in the genocide. like, I see popular blogs in the fandom making aggressive posts that are basically “you HAVE to vote blue” and *yet, crucially*, they haven't reblogged anything actually critical of Biden? it seems the only time they talk about politics is to proselytise about how you HAVE to vote blue despite the *genocide*, and nothing negative about the actual policies, just scolding anyone to the left of them and saying hey biden's actually not that bad domestically !

i'm a POC boygenius fan from the global south and it's just something I've been observing keenly knowing that the external policies of that country will always hang over my head like a looming threat, whether blue or red is in power internally. and when young voters in that country do, for once, take cognizance of the devastation enacted on *our* countries by their govs, these liberals crawl out of the woodwork to scold them, then go back to posting about the latest julien-lucy sighting or whatever. it's surreal to see.

again, sorry for the unprompted rant, it's just been eating at me for so long and this blog just seems like one in the fandom that I can still trust. I just needed to get this off my chest. i fell in love with bg in 2020 I'll go back to streaming them now <3.

hi! thank you for this ask, it's been very thought-provoking for me, and i really do appreciate the trust. and no worries about the length, i'm about to one-up this shit.

it is a little hard for me to answer this question fairly. for one, the boygenius-sphere has changed a LOT since i started here (7 years! it's a long time!), and so a lot of my mutuals that i've had since are no longer here (shoutout @remembermydog though, we still here <3) and a bunch of new people have come through. so i'm really not as plugged in with the broader fandom space as i used to be, and i don't really follow a ton of new blogs these days, so i can't really say that i've seen everything that you've seen for myself.

that being said, even if i've had less ability to share your experiences, i do think what you're saying has a lot of truth to it. the obvious thought is that boygenius fans are disproportionately white, which naturally lends itself to that sort of optimism about the extant systems of power. fundamentally, i think, it is very difficult for a white person in that country to reconcile themselves with the idea that the extant systems of power were always bad to begin with and have never been fit for purpose, b/c they've always worked well enough for them. like, there's no innate moral value with being white or not, but it's not the most surprising correlation either. (and yes, i'm aware that boygenius fans are also disproportionately queer women, which counterbalances that optimism to a very real degree).

the frustrating thing is that there are so many people who refuse to even entertain the idea that some people have a moral line over which they will not cross. and i do think that there can be a moral obligation to do an unpleasant distasteful or "bad" thing in order to achieve better ends. but there's always balance between the depth of the wrong and the value of the ends. and everyone has to decide for themselves where that balance lies for them. if i was american, i don't think i would vote this year, for a bunch of reasons. i don't think i would begrudge anyone voting for biden, especially if they thought that trump would send even more bombs (although frankly i have no fucking idea what trump would do). i've voted for trudeau in years when i really didn't want to because of the voting patterns of my particular district. i am about to be an extension of the canadian legal system, which has inflicted incredible amounts of harm to indigenous people and many others.

voting for biden and not voting for biden are both moral compromises. the only question is: how much blood are you willing to get on your hands as you fight for a better world? everyone's line is different (and not everyone's line is acceptable). i think i'd be more comfortable with not voting, because i think joe biden is among the very guiltiest people for this genocide. so maybe i don't want to support and reinforce that guy! and fundamentally, a party that wins elections has much less incentive to change. and the thoughtless and condescending dismissal of these ideas that really infuriates me. so i am really sorry that your experiences of this space have been tainted in this way. there are lots of good and thoughtful people, and these years have been the most fulfilling period of my internet life. but it's a space full of people on the internet just like any other, and so i don't really think it's uniquely bad, but neither is it uniquely good. i've made a nice little space for myself, and i really hope you can find that too <3.

thanks for the ask. there were a lot of things i needed to get off my chest.

[phoenixyfriend]

International Taxes

Ko-Fi prompt from Ethan:

All I know about tariffs is that they're special taxes for international trade but people talk about them all the time. Please help explain

So we are going to talk about three things here:

Tariffs

VAT

Customs/Duties

I'll be using the US for most of my examples, because that's what I know best... and also because it's a very convenient example for the way VAT works on an international level.

Tariffs

You are correct that tariffs are special taxes for international trade. These are essentially fees that are applied to products being shipped in and out of a country in order to promote domestic product or impact a foreign one.

A common example is US steel. The United States has a fairly robust steel industry, and the government promotes that industry domestically by applying tariffs to imports. Back in 2018, Trump imposed a 25% tariff on steel imports and 10% on aluminum (something that the WTO said was illegal, but that's not relevant right now). The steel tariff had previously been a range of 8-30%, implemented by Bush in 2002. Prior to that, the steel tariff had generally been under 1%.

In applying that tariff, the federal government prioritized domestic purchasing. If domestic product is nominally $90 for one unit, and foreign product is $80, then it is cheaper and more appealing to buy from a foreign producer. With a 25% tariff, the foreign product is now functionally $100 per unit, making it more appealing to buy domestically. While the actual cost of the tax is born by the producing country, in the case of import tariffs, the result is the raising of costs when selling internationally.

Tariffs are also applied to specific countries. Once again using a Trump example, a $50 billion tariff was applied against China in 2018. This had negative impacts on the economy, as it led to worries of a trade war; China did retaliate by applying tariffs directly to specific products from the US, including wine and pork.

High tariffs theoretically lead to an increase in domestic trade, but they also lead to higher rates of smuggling. They are also a form protectionist policy, which was at its height in the 19th century for the US.

VAT - Value Added Tax

If you look up VAT, you get a lot of explanations that talk about how it is a tax that is levied against the consumer on the basis of the cumulative value of the product, and generally things are confusingly worded, so I'll save you some time:

It's sales tax.

If you are American like me, that's all it is. It's a different name for sales tax.

You get something for $8 at the store, but the final cost is $8.42? Those 42 cents are the VAT.

What does that have to do with international trade? Isn't that a domestic thing?

Well, yes and no. We'll start by comparing the US to most European countries.

See, the US has a different application of VAT than a lot of other places. In the US, sales tax is added at the very end of a purchase for the vast majority of places. This is because there is no federal sales tax. Instead, taxes are set by the state, county, and city governments. Take a look at this map of New York, and you'll see how much sales tax varies by just a few miles.

Given how much a pricing can vary from one town to the next, large corporations generate a greater profit by listing prices in their pre-tax form, and then adding that tax at the end. The consumer knows that there will be a higher price at the counter than is listed, because the standard in the US is to not include that tax. So your Arizona Iced Tea will be a $1 in Portland and $1 in Queens County, matching that promise on the can... but you'll still be paying $1 in Portland and $1.09 in Queens, because only one of those areas has sales tax, despite both being in the same country.

This works out for the retailer, because the consumer does not blame them for raising prices across county lines, if there is a sales tax hike. The thought of "it's cheaper ten miles down the road, I'll get to it later," followed by never getting to it and thus never making a purchase, is rarer, because the listed price is still the same. It also means having to print or design fewer price tags; imagine having to manually change every price in a supermarket magazine! Every coupon needs to have its price changed by a few cents, to account for tax!

...or you can just print the same magazine with the same prices and write "plus tax" after the listed cost.

All this to say, Americans are used to adding sales tax at the end, and knowing that the price they see is not the price they'll pay.

Other countries Do Not Do This.

I mean, some do. But we're talking about the ones that don't, which includes the entirety of the EU, India, some of Japan, and the country I actually have extensive experience with: Serbia.

I am currently in Serbia, which means I'm in a country with a sales tax/VAT that is higher than I'm used to (20% on most goods, 8% on essentials). In every store I've been to, the tax is included in the listed price. If it says 87 rsd on a carton of milk, I will be paying 87 rsd at checkout. The baseline price is 80 rsd, and then there's the 8% tax, and the final price is 86.4, which gets rounded up to the 87 that is listed on the tag.

If you aren't accustomed to thinking about VAT like in the US, online shopping can be... a trial.

If I purchase something from, say, Canada, and have it mailed to the US, I am given the sales tax as part of the purchasing process. It will format the receipt as the product plus sales tax. This is familiar to me.

To someone from the EU who does not purchase internationally (specifically from the US, Canada, or other countries that don't include sales tax in the sticker price), this tax can often come as a surprise.

And, finally, in some cases... the will be paid at the very end, at the point of pickup, along with customs. I recently purchased something from an English creator that was manufactured in Germany and then shipped to Serbia. I anticipated that I had paid the VAT for Serbia when purchasing the product. It was instead added at the point of purchase, as Serbia is neither in the EU nor in a trade agreement with the relevant countries that would allow for me to pay the VAT online, I had to pay the 20% in addition to customs when picking up the package from the postal office.

Despite not being a tariff or customs/duty payment, VAT can have a direct impact on international purchasing.

Customs/Duties

Customs and duties are taxes applied to products based on those product characteristics.

There is overlap with tariffs. As a consumer, you are... not going to be very affected by the difference between customs and tariffs.

Customs are like VAT, in that they are paid by the consumer rather than by the manufacturer.

You can think of tariffs as a fee that a manufacturer pays to sell something internationally (though that cost is often passed on to the consumer), and customs as a fee paid by a consumer to receive that good.

Hope this helps!

(And if anyone here is more familiar with the subject than I am, please feel free to add on or correct me! I'm generally pretty good about international policy, but I'm not an expert, and this subject can be a complicated one.)

(Prompt me on ko-fi!)

[compacflt]

okay "normie median Biden voter ice" got me. That's funny. But also so true! It prob took him a bit to vote dem too (though I believe that Ice would have never voted for Trump). Would love to hear more thoughts on Ice and Mav's politics. Also the list of who they would have voted for if you're willing to share.

i do worry that posting my extremely in-depth headcanons about some of this stuff will have the JKR “wizard shit” effect on my writing and ruin it a little, but ask and ye shall receive

copy-pasted straight from my list of “unhinged compacflt!top gun headcanons” that ive been keeping since september: on ice & mav's politics

16. Since their friendship began, Ice has always told Maverick who to vote for, since Maverick doesn't care enough to pay attention to national politics. They are begrudging ConservaDems (conservative political views, would vote conservative every election if Republicans weren’t actively sending them to war/actively promoting fascism). Ice’s voting record (and after 1988, Mav’s too) 1980-2020—note that he has always considered himself an “educated moderate”: 1980: Reagan. 1984: Reagan. 1988: Bush. 1992: Bush. 1996: Clinton (reaction to aftermath of PGW. Doesn’t care that Clinton enacted DADT because “I’m not [redacted], so it doesn’t apply to me”). 2000: Gore (refusal to vote for another Bush). 2004: Kerry (Mav votes Bush this year out of spite as he and Ice are going through their break-up). 2008: McCain (Navy loyalty). 2012: Obama (liked him as a person/worked closely with him, didn’t like his policies so much). 2016: Clinton (no other alternative). 2020: Biden (actually liked/previously worked with Biden, and now actively married to another man and therefore had to make some liberal concessions). 2024-onwards they will vote for any Democrat as long as they aren’t a “socialist.”

17. Also, Maverick didn’t vote in 2016. Partially because in my universe the TGM mission takes place that November, very near the election, and he has bigger fish to fry (something Ice will later take him to task for), and partially because I genuinely think he wouldn’t be able to stomach either mainstream candidate and probably would’ve voted for Libertarian Gary Johnson, which might have torn his relationship with Ice to shreds a few days before schedule. “Are you fucking kidding me? Johnson? Pete, this moron’s moronic party wants to abolish the driver’s license—” / “—Yeah, and then I could ride your sweet wheels with no problem whatsoever—maybe he’ll abolish pilots’ licenses, too, I’d like to see that—” / “If you vote for Gary fucking Johnson, I will very happily stop footing the bill for your piece-of-shit airplane, and you can see how useful your pilot’s license is then—” / So Mav didn’t vote in 2016. 

35. In terms of what he Tweets: I do foresee, post-retirement, Ice basically becoming a neoliberal military intellectual type on Twitter a la Mark Hertling (look him up on Twitter). Bio: “Retired @SECNAV. Advisor @WhiteHouse and @VoteVets. Contributing writer @TheAtlantic. Interested in geopolitics & modern warfare. Aviator, husband, Padres fan. [American flag emoji]” Only posts pictures of himself and Maverick at three specific annual events: 1. their wedding anniversary (“36 years with this fool and he’s still surprised to find out that I like the F-5 better than the A-4 #happyanniversary”), 2. every EAA Airventure (huge airplane convention), 3. San Francisco’s Fleet Week (which of course they MUST attend, they even headline it in 2018). Informative, analytical, highly-respected. Maybe goes on CNN or NBC all the time to talk about civil-military relations shit (aversion to FOX since the start of the Iraq War). Gonna say he had like four really viral threads about Russia and Ukraine in April or May and so has 300k followers or something like that. He has a personal website that links back to his Twitter and every essay he writes for international publications, with a pretty braggadocious bio (something along the lines of “Tom Kazansky has directly almost started global nuclear war twice in his life, and in the thirty-year gap in between, sold the Swiss half their entire goddamn Air Force and directed an entire Fleet during the Iraq War”). Lots of tweets like “Military aviation hot take: Compared to the F-22, the F-35 is a waste of money. Source: husband with 400+ hours of F-35 experience.” / “[Quote tweet of Russian Foreign Minister boasting about Su-57 production lines] Oh, so you guys finally figured out how to make more than one every other year?” / “Analysis of the failure of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine, from an ex-US Pacific Fleet Commander’s perspective: a short [thread emoji] [This thread gets 26k likes and 4k retweets]” / “This weekend my husband & I flew in to @EAA Oshkosh #OSH19 & took home first place for best P-51. Not to brag, but.” (A reply to this tweet: “Sir, you really know how to bury the lede that your husband is Adm. Pete ‘Maverick’ Mitchell. I had to look it up on Wikipedia.” / @TKazansky: “What, was it not obvious? Who else could it have been?”) Also, I see him writing a whole bunch of op-eds for international political magazines a la Tom Nichols (look him up on Twitter too). Writing analyses of recent geopolitical/military events for the New York Times, the New Yorker, the Bulwark, the Navy Times, the Atlantic, Bellingcat, etc. Not so much focused on domestic issues (but VoteVets [socially progressive vets’ group] board member, and ardently pro-democracy, yay!). He’s a smart guy.

37. This is not a headcanon, just kind of a… a real-life implication. My Ice was Deputy Commander of Third Fleet in 2003, meaning he’d have been there in command of the USS Abraham Lincoln when President Bush gave his “Mission Accomplished” speech aboard that ship in May less than 2 months after the initial American invasion of Iraq. Very premature & embarrassing. Ice would’ve been in direct contact with Bush/Cheney/NSC bureaucrats many, many times during the war. I genuinely believe this is what pushed him over the edge into firm liberal territory.

[man-and-atom]

As much as we hear about the “anti-nuclear Left”, we have long cherished suspicions that there is nothing particularly “Leftist” about antinuclearism. Indeed, it seems generally opposed to the top-level goals espoused by the international labour movement, of less work and more of the good things of life for everyone.

This one-sided focus on the costs of action without considering the costs of inaction runs throughout Ramana’s book. His priority is proving why nuclear is no solution, not in proposing what could be a solution. He emphasizes the cost of doing something but totally neglects the cost of not doing it.

In that vein, it is good to see a dismantling of anti-nuclear positions from a publication which sees itself as a voice for the radical Left. The writer is not as strong as one might wish on certain factual points — most notably, fast-neutron reactors are so far from being a novel approach to atomic power, that the first power-generating reactor was of this type — but is very well-equipped to show just how bad is the fit between the anti-nuclear cause and the ideology some of its most vocal proponents attach themselves to, as well as how incoherent their positions really are.

Rutgers anthropology professor David McDermott Hughes concedes that if we give up both fossil fuels and nuclear power (and presumably large-scale hydro, too), it will indeed be difficult if not impossible to maintain a reliable grid. However, Hughes argues that this isn’t a problem — it’s a solution. He suggest that society needs to simply stop expecting constant electricity. Rather, Zimbabwe and Puerto Rico, home to regular interruptions to the power supply, provide models of “just and feasible ways of living amid intermittency.”

Professor Hughes’ ideas of social justice are… well, something else, to put it politely.

If we want to speed up decarbonization while delivering a prosperous, high-energy, egalitarian reindustrialization that will heal the economic wound that has driven the rise of global Trumpism, the Left must abandon outdated, evidence-free 1970s antinuclear ideology, neo-Malthusian degrowth rhetoric, and other eco-austerity politics. It is an insult to the millions of Americans who are living paycheck to paycheck to be told by middle-class intellectuals that they consume too much. Instead, climate activists need to align with the industrial trade unions on the front lines of the clean energy transition, which strongly support nuclear energy and industrial policy for the high-quality, unionizable jobs they provide. Antinuclear politics, along with its technophobia, and antipathy toward industry, has been a colossal mistake. We need to rediscover the Left’s commitment to defending industrial modernity against counter-Enlightenment nostalgia and promising a far superior industrial modernity than capitalism could ever deliver.

Now the question : will this message be heard?

[nicklloydnow]

“While China celebrates its victory over fascism, perhaps it would be helpful to discuss exactly what sort of benefits China has gained from victory over the “fascists.” This requires us to take a look at what “fascism” actually is.

Key characteristics of fascism include strong, often belligerent, nationalism; corporate organization of state, economy and society; and either state-­sponsored socialism or heavy state investment in the economy.

A look at these key characteristics of fascism and comparing them to China’s current political, economic and social systems, one would have to ask which conquered which: Did China conquer fascism, or did fascism conquer China?

China has certainly not been lacking in nationalist bellicosity since 1945. And as China’s military capabilities and economic clout have grown, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, experts and politicians alike have expressed concern over China’s increasingly vocal discontent with the international system in general and US policies in particular. China’s continuing claims to Taiwan, as well as its growing adventurism in the South China Sea and the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, further demonstrate China’s growing assertiveness.

The corporate organization of state, economy and society in China almost goes without saying. Although economic reforms beginning in the late 1970s attempted to create a sense of local economic initiative and decentralization of authority, the latest reports show Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) gaining market share in China and edging private enterprises out.

(…)

Moreover, anyone who believes that the CCP is no longer a Marxist-Leninist organization is only partly correct: China is no longer ideologically Marxist, but it is certainly Leninist. The top-down Leninist party structure and its concentration of power among a group of top party members resembles more closely a CEO and board of directors of a corporation than it does any other authority structure. Indeed, authoritarianism in any form, regardless of economic organization, strongly resembles fascism.

Even though Beijing has in the past touted “greater democratization,” that democratization occurs within the CCP itself and not within greater Chinese society.

What “greater democratization” within the CCP has amounted to, it seems, is that individual party members and certain groups within the party are allowed to express their ideas to some extent. However, in the end they must toe the party line after the party leadership makes decisions. This still demonstrates a strong downward flow of authority. This is still a Leninist-style corporatist state.

Taking these developments into account — China’s growing nationalism, increasing government involvement in the economy (while still paying lip service to Marxist socialism) and the corporate organization of the state, economy and society — one has to wonder exactly what the Chinese government is celebrating. Are they celebrating China’s victory over fascism, or are they celebrating fascism’s victory over China?”

“To the casual observer it didn't appear a steep sum. It was less than the cost of a single modern fighter jet. Taiwan already has on order more than $14bn worth of US military equipment. Does a miserly $80m more matter?

While fury is Beijing's default response to any military support for Taiwan, this time something was different.

The $80m is not a loan. It comes from American taxpayers. For the first time in more than 40 years, America is using its own money to send weapons to a place it officially doesn't recognise. This is happening under a programme called foreign military finance (FMF).

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine last year, FMF has been used to send around $4bn of military aid to Kyiv. It has been used to send billions more to Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel and Egypt and so on. But until now it has only ever been given to countries or organisations recognised by the United Nations. Taiwan is not.

After the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, it continued to sell weapons to the island under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. The key was to sell just enough weapons so Taiwan could defend itself against possible Chinese attack, but not so many that they would destabilise relations between Washington and Beijing. For decades, the US has relied on this so-called strategic ambiguity to do business with China, while remaining Taiwan's staunchest ally.

But in the last decade the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has tipped dramatically in China's favour. The old formula no longer works. Washington insists its policy has not changed but, in crucial ways, it has. The US State Department has been quick to deny FMF implies any recognition of Taiwan. But in Taipei it's apparent that America is redefining its relationship with the island, especially so given the urgency with which Washington is pushing Taiwan to re-arm. And Taiwan, which is outmatched by China, needs the help.

(…)

He says the $80m is the tip of what could be a very large iceberg, and notes that in July President Biden used discretionary powers to approve the sale of military services and equipment worth $500m to Taiwan. Mr Wang says Taiwan is preparing to send two battalions of ground troops to the US for training, the first time this has happened since the 1970s.

But the key is the money, the beginning of what, he says, could be up to $10bn over the next five years.

Deals involving military equipment can take up to 10 years, says I-Chung Lai, president of the Prospect Foundation, a Taipei-based think-tank. "But with FMF, the US is sending weapons directly from its own stocks and it's US money - so we don't need to go through the whole approval process."

This is important given that a divided Congress has held up billions of dollars worth of aid for Ukraine, although Taiwan appears to have far more bipartisan support. But the war in Gaza will undoubtedly squeeze America's weapons supply to Taipei, as has the war in Ukraine. President Biden is seeking war aid for Ukraine and Israel, which includes more money for Taiwan too.

(…)

The assessment of long-time observers is blunt: the island is woefully under-prepared for a Chinese attack.

The list of problems is long. Taiwan's army has hundreds of ageing battle tanks, but too few modern, light missile systems. Its army command structure, tactics and doctrine haven't been updated in half a century. Many front-line units have only 60% of the manpower they should have. Taiwan's counter-intelligence operations in China are reportedly non-existent and its military conscription system is broken.

In 2013 Taiwan reduced military service from one year to just four months, before reinstating it back to 12 months, a move that takes effect next year. But there are bigger challenges. It's jokingly referred to as a "summer camp" by the young men who go through it.

(…)

In Washington there is a strong sense that Taiwan is running out of time to reform and rebuild its military. So, the US is also starting to retrain Taiwan's army.

For decades, the island's political and military leaders have leant heavily on the belief that invading the island is much too difficult and risky for China to attempt. Rather like Britain, Taiwan prioritised its navy and air force - at the expense of its army.

(…)

But now China has the world's largest navy and a far superior air force. A war-gaming exercise conducted by a think-tank last year found that in a conflict with China, Taiwan's navy and air force would be wiped out in the first 96 hours of battle.

Under intense pressure from Washington, Taipei is switching to a "fortress Taiwan" strategy that would make the island extremely difficult for China to conquer.

The focus will switch to ground troops, infantry and artillery - repelling an invasion on the beaches and, if necessary, fighting the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the towns and cities, and from bases deep in the island's jungle-covered mountains. But this puts the responsibility for defending Taiwan back on its outdated army.

"After the US cut relations in 1979 our army experienced almost complete isolation. So they are stuck in the Vietnam War-era of US military doctrine," Dr Lai says.

This didn't worry Taipei or Washington until more recently. Through the 1990s and 2000s Taiwanese and US companies were building factories across China. Beijing was lobbying to join the World Trade Organization - and did. The world embraced the Chinese economy, and the US thought trade and investment would secure peace in the Taiwan Strait.

But the rise of Xi Jinping, and his brand of nationalism, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have blown apart those comforting assumptions.

(…)

Taiwan's vulnerability is forcing Washington to act. It's why Taiwanese ground troops are being dispatched to the US to train and US trainers are coming to Taipei to embed with Taiwan's marines and special forces.

But William Chung, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research in Taipei, says Taiwan still cannot hope to deter China by itself. This is the other lesson from the war in Ukraine.

"International society has to decide whether Taiwan matters," he says. "If the G7 or Nato think Taiwan is important for their own interests, then we have to internationalise the Taiwan situation - because that's what will make China think twice about the cost."

Dr Chung says China's behaviour has, unwittingly, been helping Taiwan do just that.

"China is showing it is expansionist in the South China Sea and the East China Sea," he says . "And we can see the result in Japan where the military budget is now being doubled."

(…)

There is now fierce debate in Washington about how far the US should go in supporting Taiwan. Many long-time China watchers say any public commitment from the US said would provoke Beijing rather than deter it. But Washington also knows that Taiwan cannot hope to defend itself alone.

As one long-time China watcher put it: "We need to keep quiet on the whole issue of strategic ambiguity, while arming Taiwan to the teeth."”

[mariacallous]

The fundamental problem for American presidents who have attempted to work with Benjamin Netanyahu is that Benjamin Netanyahu does not care what American presidents think. An exceptional English orator who was raised in Philadelphia, Netanyahu believes that he can outmaneuver and outlast American politicians on their own turf. “I know America,” he said in a private 2001 conversation that later leaked. “America is something that can easily be moved.” This attitude constituted a sharp break; in the past, even hard-line politicians like the maverick general turned premier Ariel Sharon responded to pressure from American presidents.

But during Bill Clinton’s presidency and again during Barack Obama’s, Netanyahu changed the equation. He repeatedly blew off American entreaties on issues including the peace process and Iran, and turned his willingness to stand up to U.S. presidents into an electoral selling point with his base. Faced with this unprecedented recalcitrance, different Democratic administrations tried different tactics for wrangling Bibi. Some attempted to compel his compliance with hard public pressure, only to have Netanyahu wait out a U.S.-imposed settlement freeze, then agitate against the Iran nuclear deal in Congress and the American media. Others attempted to settle disputes privately with Netanyahu, on the assumption that the Israeli leader would respond better if not openly antagonized.

None of this worked and none of it arrested Netanyahu’s drift further to the right. As both vice president and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joe Biden had a front-row seat to these failures. So did his close-knit foreign-policy team, including longtime staffers such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. Recognizing the errors of the past, they have charted a different course aimed at outmaneuvering Netanyahu, seeking to succeed where their predecessors did not. This approach predates the current Gaza conflict, but has reached full expression in the past months. It explains why Biden has full-throatedly supported Israel against Hamas while simultaneously assailing the country’s hard-right governing coalition. And it offers a glimpse at the administration’s intended endgame for the war—and for Netanyahu himself.

In 2015, I visited another country with an ascendant right-wing populist leader: Hungary. Today, the country is essentially aligned with Russia against America and its allies. At the time, its prime minister, Viktor Orbán, was escalating his rhetoric against the European Union and the West. As part of the trip, my group met with officials at the American embassy, who explained their impossible predicament: Whenever Western countries would publicly pressure Orbán on his policies, he would refashion that pressure into electoral support, leaving his critics with no good options. Stay silent and he would win; speak up and he would also win.

Right-wing populists such as Orbán and Netanyahu thrive on posturing against outside antagonists, using external criticism to bolster their bona fides as strongmen who can stand up to the international community. This insight has shaped Biden’s approach to Netanyahu—not by preventing the president from publicly fighting with the prime minister, but by influencing which fights he picks. Simply put, Biden has opted to challenge Netanyahu on issues that splinter his support rather than consolidate it. In practice, this means strategically targeting policies where Netanyahu is on the wrong side of Israeli public opinion and forcing him to choose between his hard-right partners and the rest of the country.

Netanyahu’s disastrous attempt to overhaul the Israeli judiciary offers a case in point. The proposed legislation was drafted by right-wing hard-liners with no opposition input and would have subordinated Israel’s courts to its parliament. The attempted power grab provoked the largest sustained protest movement in Israeli history. Polls repeatedly showed that most Israelis opposed the overhaul and wanted lawmakers to come up with new compromise reforms conceived by consensus. And so that’s precisely what the Biden administration began calling for.

“Hopefully, the prime minister will act in a way that he is going to try to work out some genuine compromise,” Biden told reporters in March. “But that remains to be seen.” In July, he repeated the same point to Netanyahu, then reiterated it to the press: “The focus should be on pulling people together and finding consensus.” As the State Department emphasized at the time, “We believe that fundamental changes should be pursued with the broadest possible base of support.” By placing himself firmly on the side of the Israeli majority, Biden was able to prevent Netanyahu from turning his criticism into an electoral asset. After all, it’s hard to paint someone as anti-Israel, as Netanyahu once did with Obama, when they are expressing the opinion of most Israelis.

Biden understands that Netanyahu’s position is a precarious one. His governing coalition received just 48.4 percent of the vote, and took power only because of a quirk of the Israeli electoral system. The coalition relies on an alliance of unpopular far-right parties to stay afloat, whom Netanyahu must appease to remain in office. Biden has exploited this weakness and repeatedly poked at it. Rather than directly confronting Netanyahu, he has called out his extremist partners and in this way heightened the contradictions within Netanyahu’s coalition, undermining its stability and gradually eroding its support in the polls.

In July, Biden told CNN’s Fareed Zakaria that Netanyahu’s government has “the most extremist members of cabinets that I’ve seen” in Israel, noting that “I go all the way back to Golda Meir.” This past week, at a campaign event hosted by a former chair of AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobbying group, Biden went even further, singling out a far-right minister by name. “This is the most conservative government in Israel’s history,” the president said. Itamar “Ben-Gvir and company and the new folks, they don’t want anything remotely approaching a two-state solution.” This was Biden’s approach in action: criticizing Israel during wartime in front of a pro-Israel crowd, and doing so in a way that nonetheless denied Netanyahu any opening. As long as it’s Biden versus Ben-Gvir, rather than Biden versus Bibi, the president holds the upper hand.

Biden has brought the same strategy to bear on the issue of settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, which has accelerated under the cover of Israel’s campaign in Gaza. Netanyahu’s coalition is unable to clamp down on these extremists and their terrorism because it is beholden to these extremists. But most Israelis have no desire to mortgage the security of Israel and its indispensable relationship to the United States in favor of some far-flung hilltop settlers in West Bank regions that few Israelis could locate on a map.

Knowing this, Biden has begun unrolling a series of unilateral measures intended to raise the price of settler violence and pit Netanyahu and his allies against the Israeli public. Earlier this month, the administration announced visa bans on those implicated in settler violence, spurring similar actions by the EU, Britain, and France. “We have underscored to the Israeli government the need to do more to hold accountable extremist settlers who have committed violent attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank,” Blinken said. “As President Biden has repeatedly said, those attacks are unacceptable.” This past week, the U.S. froze the sale of more than 20,000 M16 rifles to Israel over concerns that they might find their way into the hands of violent settlers.

Hamas’s October 7 slaughter has put Biden’s approach to the ultimate test. Like most Israelis, he wants to see Hamas vanquished. And like most Israelis, he does not trust Netanyahu and his far-right allies to do it. This has left the president with few appealing options. Publicly denying Israel support during what it sees as an existential war wouldn’t just go against Biden’s personal values. It would collapse all the credibility he has accrued with the Israeli public through his careful diplomacy during his presidency. And it would give Netanyahu the American antagonist he desperately craves, providing the floundering premier with a lifeline he would use to reunite the right behind him.

To avoid this outcome, Biden has backed Israel’s military campaign, but worked nonstop to shape its contours and limit its fallout on civilians and the rest of the region, tapping into the reservoir of goodwill he has built with the Israeli public. The president has also upped the pressure on Netanyahu by assailing his coalition partners and explicitly calling for a new, more moderate Israeli government. U.S. officials have leaked that they think Netanyahu will not last, and Biden has told the Israeli leader to think about what lessons he’d impart to his successor.

In other words, Biden has once again placed himself on the side of the Israeli majority, in order to undermine Netanyahu and shape the political future of the entire country. It’s one of the biggest bets of his presidency, and when the guns finally fall silent, it could determine the fate of the broader Middle East.

[newstfionline]

Friday, November 29, 2024

“It’s a bird! It’s a plane!” In Alaska, it’s both. (AP) Thanks to the Alaska Turkey Bomb, people living in the rural areas of Alaska will still be able to enjoy turkey on Thanksgiving day. For the third straight year, a resident named Esther Keim has been flying low and slow in a small plane over rural parts of south-central Alaska, dropping frozen turkeys to those who can’t simply run out to the grocery store. Alaska is mostly wilderness, with only about 20% of it accessible by road.

Two Presidents, Two Policies: America in Transition (NYT) The old adage about the interregnum between an election and an inauguration is that there is only one president at a time. Try telling that to the rest of the world now. While one president, the one actually still living in the White House, attends international summit meetings and brokers a Middle East cease-fire to cap his tenure, another president, the one who has not actually taken office yet, is busy conducting a foreign policy of his own from his Spanish-tiled Florida estate. Without waiting to be sworn in, President-elect Donald J. Trump effectively declared a trade war this week by announcing that he would impose tariffs on America’s friends, Canada and Mexico, as well as its rival China on Day 1 of his administration. The next day, President Biden strode into the Rose Garden to announce an agreement to end more than a year of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. This is America in the time of transition, making peace and declaring war, all in the same 24-hour news cycle—two presidents leading the country in two different directions, one officially, the other unofficially; one representing the past and present, the other the future. Whipsawed and maybe just a little confused, foreign leaders are left to calculate whether it makes sense to try to get something done with the outgoing leader or brace for the reality of his successor.

Several Trump Administration Picks Face Bomb Threats and ‘Swatting’ (NYT) Several of the people President-elect Donald J. Trump has picked to be cabinet nominees or for White House positions received threats on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, a transition spokeswoman said. The spokeswoman, Karoline Leavitt, said several cabinet nominees and others were targeted with “violent, un-American threats to their lives and those who live with them.” Law enforcement and other authorities “acted quickly to ensure the safety of those who were targeted,” she added. The F.B.I. said in a statement it was aware of the bomb threats and so-called swatting calls, which entail contacting law enforcement to falsely claim a dangerous person is at a particular address. Such calls are designed to create a frantic armed police response to frighten, harass and endanger someone at their home. Bomb threats and swatting calls are a growing problem for American law enforcement, as it has become easier to anonymously contact the authorities or leave threatening messages. Prominent public officials, schools and celebrities are often victims.

‘Everything is expensive!’ Bolivia faces a shocking economic collapse (AP) Fuel is rapidly becoming one of Bolivia’s scarcest commodities. Long lines of vehicles snake for several kilometers outside gas stations all over Bolivia, once South America’s second-largest producer of natural gas. Some of the queues don’t budge for days. While frustration builds, drivers like Victor García now eat, sleep and socialize around their stationary trucks, waiting to buy just a few gallons of diesel—unless the station runs dry. Bolivia’s monthslong fuel crunch comes as the nation’s foreign currency reserves plummet, leaving Bolivians unable to find U.S. dollars at banks and exchange houses. Imported goods that were once commonplace have become scarce. The fuel crisis has created a sense that the country is coming undone, disrupting economic activity and everyday life for millions of people, hurting commerce and farm production and sending food prices soaring. Protesters shouting “Everything is expensive!” marched through the streets of the capital, La Paz, last week.

Europe Set for Coldest Winter Since Ukraine War, Posing Energy Risk (Bloomberg) Europe is set for the coldest winter since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pushing up already elevated energy costs as the continent dips into its gas reserves at a faster-than-usual rate. Temperatures between now and March are set to remain mostly below levels seen in the last two years, according to data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts compiled by Bloomberg. That’s likely to push heating demand to the highest level since the start of the war in Ukraine, according to data from Maxar Technologies Inc. A cold winter would put more pressure on already elevated gas and power prices. This could coincide with a halt in gas flows through Ukraine from Jan. 1, when temperatures typically fall to their lowest levels. Freezing weather and low-wind conditions have already resulted in faster-than-usual withdrawals from gas storage sites this month.

White House pressing Ukraine to draft 18-year-olds so it has enough troops to battle Russia (AP) President Joe Biden’s administration is urging Ukraine to quickly increase the size of its military by drafting more troops and revamping its mobilization laws to allow for the conscription of those as young as 18. A senior Biden administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the private consultations, said Wednesday that the outgoing Democratic administration wants Ukraine to lower the mobilization age to 18 from the current age of 25 to expand the pool of fighting-age men available. White House National Security Council spokesman Sean Savett in a statement said the administration will continue sending Ukraine weaponry but believes “manpower is the most vital need” Ukraine has at the moment. A senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian officials see the push to the lower the draft age as part of an effort by some Western partners to deflect attention from their own delays in providing equipment or belated decisions.

India's parliament suspended temporarily after row over allegations against Adani group (Reuters) Both houses of Indian parliament were suspended temporarily on Thursday within minutes of opening as opposition lawmakers disrupted proceedings for the third day this week seeking a discussion on allegations against the Adani Group. U.S. authorities have accused Gautam Adani, his nephew Sagar Adani and managing director of Adani Green, Vneet S. Jaain, of being part of a scheme to pay bribes of $265 million to secure Indian solar power supply contracts.

Pakistan’s Capital Is Turned Upside Down by Unending Protests (NYT) Another anti-government protest had come and gone in Pakistan’s once peaceful capital, and Saira Bano was ready to get her city back. For four days, Islamabad had been a tense battleground after supporters of a jailed former prime minister, Imran Khan, marched into the city. The capital, home to 2.4 million people, became a “container city” as the authorities stacked more than 700 shipping containers to block key routes and maintain order. Schools and shops closed, internet service was cut, and roads teemed with thousands of police officers scrutinizing passers-by. “This is not the Islamabad I grew up in,” said Ms. Bano, a schoolteacher who had to cancel her classes for three consecutive days. “Everywhere I looked, there were barricades and containers. We feel isolated and anxious in our own city.”

ICC prosecutor seeks arrest warrant for Myanmar military leader over Rohingya campaign (Reuters) The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) said on Wednesday he would seek an arrest warrant for Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing for crimes against humanity in the alleged persecution of the Rohingya, a mainly Muslim minority. A million Rohingya fled, most to neighbouring Bangladesh, to escape a Myanmar military offensive launched in August 2017, a campaign that U.N. investigators have described as a textbook example of ethnic cleansing. Soldiers, police, and Buddhist residents are alleged by U.N. investigators to have razed hundreds of villages in Myanmar’s remote western Rakhine state, torturing residents as they fled, carrying out mass-killings and gang-rapes. Most refugees now live in squalor in camps in Bangladesh.

China Has a New Playbook to Counter Trump: ‘Supply Chain Warfare’ (NYT) In the world of cheap drones, Skydio was the great American hope. Its autonomous flying machines gave the U.S. defense and police agencies an alternative to Chinese manufacturers, free from the security concerns tied to dependence on Chinese supply chains. But Skydio’s vulnerabilities came into sharp focus days before the U.S. presidential election, when the Chinese authorities imposed sanctions and severed the company’s access to essential battery supplies. Overnight, the San Mateo, Calif.-based Skydio, the largest American maker of drones, scrambled to find new suppliers. The move slowed Skydio’s deliveries to its customers, which include the U.S. military. Behind the move was a message from China’s leaders to Donald J. Trump, who would go on to win the election with a promise of new China sanctions and tariffs: Hit us and we’ll strike back harder. In the first Trump administration, the Chinese government took mostly symbolic and equivalent measures after U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions. This time, China is poised to escalate its responses, experts say, and could aim aggressive and targeted countermeasures at American companies.

Thousands Stream Homeward as Fragile Peace Begins in Lebanon (NYT) Thousands of civilians began the journey back to their war-ravaged, mostly abandoned communities around Beirut and in southern Lebanon on Wednesday, as a U.S.-backed cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah took tenuous hold after more than 13 months of bloodshed. Vehicles stuffed with whatever items people took as they fled Israeli bombing crawled bumper to bumper on roads heading south from Beirut, the capital. For the people in them, elation, relief—and, for Hezbollah supporters, defiance—vied with grim knowledge: They might not have homes to return to, and the 60-day truce might not hold or bring the hoped-for end of the deadliest, most destructive war their nation has suffered in decades. But it was not clear when the people of southern Lebanon, bordering Israel, could go back, as the Israeli military said it would not yet permit residents in an area that had been a Hezbollah stronghold. About one-quarter of Lebanon’s more than five million people have been forced from their homes by the war.

The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire quiets one front but Gaza sees no end to war (AP) For many across the Middle East, the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire came as a relief: the first major sign of progress in the region since war began more than a year ago. But for Palestinians in Gaza and families of hostages held in the territory, the news appeared only to inaugurate a newer, grimmer period of the conflict there. For them, it marked yet another missed opportunity to end fighting that has stretched on for nearly 14 months. Palestinians had hoped that any ceasefire deal with Hezbollah would include a truce in Gaza as well. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been resolute in insisting that Hamas must be completely destroyed and Israel must retain lasting control over parts of the territory. Months of talks have failed to get Netanyahu to back down from those demands—or to convince Hamas to release hostages under those terms. For Palestinians in Gaza, that means continuing misery under an Israeli campaign that has demolished much of the territory and driven almost the entire population from their homes. Hundreds of thousands are going hungry while living in squalid tent cities as the second winter of the war brings cold rains and flooding.

[newsource21]

What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? And what has the Department of Education to do with the classical education movement? For Tertullian, the second-century church father, the question was whether Hellenic culture and philosophy might divert Christians from the truth revealed in scripture and the incarnation. Of course, as reflected today in classical education itself, historical Christianity has long used the tools of Athenian wisdom in the work of theology, as faith seeks understanding. But the tension remains, between man’s rationalizing and the gift of faith. 

The contemporary classical education movement was birthed in renunciation of all the Department of Education stands for. Indeed, nothing about the timing should be thought of as merely coincidental. The ED was signed into law on October 17, 1979, and began operations the next year. As I discovered during my year as a Novak Journalism fellow researching the history of the classical education movement, the earliest schools we can put in that category were founded around exactly the same time. 

In January of ’79, National Review reprinted Dorothy Sayers’s “Lost Tools of Learning” (1947). The essay inspired John Schmitt to establish the Trivium School in Lancaster, Massachusetts, in October of that year and Douglas Wilson to found Logos School in Moscow, Idaho, in 1981. In between, Cair Paravel Latin School was independently established in 1980 in Topeka, Kansas. And in 1981 — imitating Schmitt’s Trivium — the Trinity School at Greenlawn in South Bend, Indiana, opened its doors. 

So it must seem strange to look to the movement these four schools started for inspiration when considering reforms of ED, representing as the department does all their founders sought to escape. But today, more than four decades on for each, classical education has grown into a great force of cultural revival in this country; while ED has, like the cancer cell, only grown for growth’s sake — a failure. One enlargement may, in fact, have something to teach the other, in particular about the end of formal education.

We must bring our aim a little lower than the reader likely hopes, in line with a closer target than the ideal universal public education of the American people. The Department of Education, as part of the administrative state, is an effort at the rationalization of human life and centralization of civil society totally at odds with the highest aspirations of contemporary classical schools. One cannot be made into the facilitator and manager of the other. What ED does, and what it is, is totally modern. What the classical education movement seeks to do, and what it is, is a postmodern project of recovery and construction — dwarves on the shoulders of giants — bringing a pre-modern inheritance forward to the present, past a century of positivism and progressivism. 

Moreover, we must acknowledge that the classical appellation is a contested one, that this movement and project is alive with debates internal to itself as it seeks its own essence and more fully developed excellences — classically, virtues. Even if ED could be made a fit vehicle for the spread of “classical schools,” it would only elevate this lively conversation into policy negotiations among bureaucrats. Classical education is not a method. 

At the simplest, some argue, classical education is an acculturation, familiarizing ourselves (Americans, Westerners) with that which was familiar to our ancestors: Latin and Greek, classical literature and history. Perhaps it is also, derived from Latin studies, apprenticeship to the trivium: the grammar, logic (or dialectic), and rhetoric of language and therefore of intellectual knowledge and thought. It is a liberal education, fit for free people, and so, in the American sense, democratic. Yet the humanist tradition it springs from finds its roots in hero worship and the schooling of princes, and so is aristocratic, too. Is a classical education essentially Christian? It is necessarily political. Do classical schools form hearts as well as minds? They are, in many ways, still far too modern. 

All of this and more like it makes up the vital ferment that shows that “classical education” is in fact a movement, that the growth and multiplication of the schools that claim that title is something alive. How different is discussion of our public schools. But there is one more theme — not a dichotomy, but a matter of emphasis — which could be taken up whole by any future secretary of the Department of Education in administering the nation’s schools. The pioneers and principals of classical schools often speak of two academic purposes for their institutions: they offer a “terminal education,” and they aim to shape “lifelong learners.” Taking only the tools already at its disposal, with some modest construal, so too could ED. 

What do the classical school educators mean by this? A terminal education describes a complete formal education; it recognizes that schooling must end, even if education never does. And so schooling must include everything necessary to equip students to live a virtuous life without the guidance of their teachers. A terminal education is ordinary. Lifelong learning, then, is what follows from a complete formal education; a student makes his way through life adding to his education, incorporating new knowledge into that which he carries with him. It is limited only by the capacities of the individual—his abilities, his continued wonder, and his desire to know. Placed on top of basic schooling, lifelong learning is extraordinary.

The task of the public school, and thus the task of the Department of Education, is this same task. To have a functioning republic, in which political equality is upheld by law and social practice, the normative public school must provide an ordinary education that is sufficient for living the life of a just citizen. The standard K-12 program must set out to be enough, terminal, an end of its own. The expectation that every student apply for college, let alone go, has been a disaster, as, on the tacit expectation of remedial courses later, it has freed teachers and school systems of their obligation to give pupils the building blocks of a decent life. 

Perhaps, too, the only way to end the so-called school-to-prison pipeline would be to take the idea of compulsory education, standardized testing, and public schooling at face value, to treat this fundamental education as not just limited but limiting: A student cannot and will not graduate — will not be freed from truancy law — until a certain competency is demonstrated on a standardized test, marking this terminal education’s completion.

All lifelong learning is extraordinary in that it goes beyond the basic standard. ED and the public school teacher have an obligation to the extraordinary student, too, as they prepare for higher education and an intellectual life beyond that, too. While tracking is inimical to the formative spirit of a classical school’s terminal education for lifelong learning, under the quantitative management of a government department it is the tool ready at hand. Moreover, it is the only instrument fit to the preservation of the civic equality or democratic ideal that public education is meant to protect: unless even the poorest brilliant student can test out of the chaos of the common classroom, only the wealthiest zip codes will provide a public school that readies its students for lifelong learning. 

Even with conservatives returning to power in Washington, the intellectual and spiritual chasm between the classical education movement and the Department of Education is in no danger of closing soon; it is the product of essential divisions not only in our national political culture but in our historical epoch. That being the case, far more likely is that fissures split along similar fault lines among the institutions of classical education, as people grow complacent in the countercultural aspect of cultural renewal. But maybe, still, Athens can learn something from Jerusalem.

[locustheologicus]

The choice in the election is not between two competing blueprints for border management. Harris is proposing practical reforms to fortify the border and overhaul the immigration process in line with the nation’s labor needs and humanitarian aspirations. Trump proposes an exclusionist project that would not only bring turmoil and hardship to communities across the country but would also do long-term damage to the U.S. economy and undermine the United States’ global reputation as a place of opportunity and freedom.

This is a good and thorough article on the actual policy choice that we can expect from candidates Trump and Harris on immigration. The author’s ultimate assessment is this.

Trump’s purge does not offer functional solutions to a broken system that would make the border more secure. Instead, his nativist agenda would spread divisive conflict and mainly serve to fortify his presidential powers and enhance his image as the leader of an incipient authoritarian project. Harris offers something entirely different, a pragmatic program based on respect for immigrants, in which she rejects “the false choice” between securing the border and creating an immigration system that is “safe, orderly, and humane.”

If you can read the article (you may need a subscription) I suggest you do so because it is very thorough. If not here is what the bottom line is regarding the policy we can expect.

Harris said she would impose new penalties to ban unlawful crossers from any access to asylum, speed up deportations, and bar deportees from returning for five years. Repeat offenders would face severe criminal charges, Harris also said she would work to open legal pathways for undocumented immigrants, especially the farm workers who make up nearly half of the nation’s agricultural labor force and those who came as children, known as Dreamers. But the core of her program is one frequently repeated commitment: if elected president, she will resurrect and sign the border security bill. In its current form, the bill is heavy on Republican enforcement priorities and does not address Democrats’ most long-standing reform demands, particularly for pathways to citizenship for Dreamers, farm workers, and spouses of American citizens. The bill stops short of building out an asylum system that would provide timely but also fair decisions, ensure due process, and support lasting resettlement for migrants who are legitimately fleeing persecution. If Harris wins the White House and takes up the bill, it will be only the starting point for intense negotiations in what will inevitably still be a closely divided, bitterly polarized Congress.

In comparison this is what the author suggest about Trump’s policy.

Trump promises a massive operation. He says he will invoke an obscure statute, the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, to mobilize multiple law enforcement agencies, the National Guard, and U.S. military troops to repel the “predatory incursion.” Miller speaks of setting up “vast holding facilities” along the border, reminiscent of the internment camps where Japanese American citizens were confined during World War II. Trump has made it clear the roundup could be violent. Many of the immigrants Trump has vowed to deport are in the United States legally. To achieve the scale of deportations he envisions, Trump’s plan calls for a far-reaching countrywide dragnet. Agents would go house to house and raid workplaces in an offensive that would sweep up many people who are not criminals, disrupt businesses and schools, and forcefully separate families. They would go hunting among the 11 million undocumented people in the country. Nearly three-quarters of those immigrants have been settled in the United States for more than a decade, long since gaining steady work, paying taxes, buying homes, and melding productively into the society.

Immigrants are unfortunately easy to vilify these days. Candidate Trump has created a very negative image that is terribly inaccurate but with the failed policies and tremendous swell of immigration into this country the image has endured. It is woefully inaccurate and illogical portrayal of this community but logic and accuracy are not so much a priority these days.

So these are the policies we can expect from our two candidates. Immigrants will need to brace for a stricter procedure after November 5th, that is inevitable. Yet the difference between these two positions are very stark.

[cherryblossomshadow]

The Rashida Tlaib For President Scenario

There is more than one way to win leverage for Palestine.

Hamilton Nolan

Dec 16, 2023

As 2023 draws to a close, the left wing of American politics finds itself in its most familiar position:

being told to suck it up and fall in line.

An election year looms. The Democratic president faces a far worse fascist Republican rival … Even as protesters fill the streets around the country, the Left finds itself mostly ignored in Washington. Their objections are met with the classic sneer:

What are you gonna do, vote for Trump?

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Joe Biden’s 2020 election, and at least the first couple of years of his administration, are notable for the fact that he did open the door to the left wing of the party, giving it significant influence—something that was not often true with his Democratic predecessors. In May of 2020, after Biden had more or less clinched the nomination, he formed a “Unity Task Force” in which his people came together with people picked by Bernie Sanders to create a set of policy recommendations that definitively set the White House on course left of where it would have gone otherwise. Likewise, Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and their allies had a hand in the selection of personnel that resulted in some picks that have been meaningfully more progressive than Biden-world would have naturally been. In a vacuum, if you had asked me in 2019, I would have expected the Biden administration to suck in the same basic ways the Clinton and Obama administrations did.

That has not been the case, and it is because Biden allowed himself to be pulled left. That stuff matters.

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Things are looking grimmer going into 2024. The relevant question for us now is: Why did the Left manage to get real influence with Biden four years ago, and how can we make that happen again, fast?

The simple answer is that in 2020, Bernie was running for president.

Even though he lost, he ran a very competitive campaign. He had a large base of support. He had significant political capital. Biden, a man with little internal ideology, is a pragmatist, and recognized that a coalition approach would be stronger than waging an intra-party battle with disgruntled progressives.

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It is true that a Biden loss to Trump would be a catastrophe, and should not be brushed off idly; on the things that Biden is good on, Trump is bad, and on the things that Biden is bad on, including Israel, Trump is worse. That doesn’t mean, though, that there is no political room for the Left to maneuver.

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I do not believe it would be possible to mount and run a successful primary challenge to Biden at this point. It would be possible, however, for a left wing candidate to launch an independent presidential campaign explicitly designed to suck votes away from Biden in key swing states—Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Georgia, Nevada, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, etc.

Any member of “The Squad” could launch such a campaign, but the most obvious candidate would be Rashida Tlaib, the only Palestinian-American in Congress, and the loudest and bravest voice speaking out against US policy on Palestine.

So I will refer to this as the Tlaib Scenario, as shorthand. It would be a campaign created not to win the presidency, but to create negotiating leverage inside of the Democratic Party. “Listen to us,” it would say to Biden, “or we’re all going to hell together.”

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Politics is not just a two-dimensional winner-take-all game between red and blue teams. When evaluating proposals like this, it can be useful to think less like a political pundit and more like someone who is negotiating a union contract. (Please unionize your workplace in order to understand this comparison.) One interesting feature of contract negotiations is that

when the union rep walks into the room with the employer to negotiate, the ideal position for them to be in is that of the person saying, “I can only hold these maniacs back for so long!”

In other words, it is valuable for the employer to believe that the workers themselves are a bunch of angry, irrational zealots, bent on retribution against the evil boss, who should be pacified at once before they do something crazy. Then, the union negotiator becomes the voice of reason, trying to help the boss navigate a safe path away from potential chaos. “I know the workers are asking for a lot of money here,” the union rep can say sympathetically, “but they’re pissed. They’re ready to strike. They don’t care if this whole damn company fails. Help me help you.”

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Today, the proposition to the Left is: Vote for Biden, as is, because your only alternative is worse. With a left candidate in the race, that proposition would no longer apply. You can be sure that a significant enough number of leftist voters would gravitate to a candidate like Tlaib. The relationship between the Democratic Party and the Left would then change. It would go from, “Biden is the best you have, so accept it,” to, “Biden needs to do something to earn the votes of those on the Left.” That change is significant.

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Likewise, the negotiating leverage of Rashida Tlaib would change drastically. Today, she and her allies are relatively isolated, a minority inside the Democratic Party. (A growing minority, yes, but not growing fast enough to stop the bombs.)

As a presidential candidate, she would become someone who held Biden’s reelection in her hands.

Her ability to play spoiler would mean that somehow talking her down would become a necessary step in the Biden’s campaign success. He would be forced to deal with her.

If Candidate Tlaib could extract a positive policy change that could save thousands of Palestinian lives, she could end her threat to undermine Biden and consider it a success.

And what would be the rational response from Biden, in this scenario? The rational response, with his own future on the line, would be to negotiate a meaningful enough change in his policy towards Israel and Palestine to convince Tlaib not to torpedo his reelection. Democrats could get mad about a left wing challenger to Biden, but ultimately math is math. If Tlaib could credibly threaten to pull five percent away from Biden in those swing states—and I think that she could—then

they would need to negotiate with her or lose.

And, after a lot of screaming, they would.

The beneficiaries of those negotiations would be the Palestinians.