#views of Crimea
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postcard-from-the-past · 3 months ago
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View of Balaklava, Crimea, Ukraine
Russian vintage postcard
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peaceinthestorm · 2 years ago
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Boris Anisfeld (1878-1973, Russian/American) ~ Clouds over the Black Sea--Crimea, 1906
[Source: brooklynmuseum.org]
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mesetacadre · 2 months ago
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There is today one state in which at least weak beginnings toward a better conception [of citizenship laws] are noticeable. Of course, it is not our model German Republic, but the American Union, in which an effort is made to consult reason at least partially. By refusing immigration on principle to elements in poor health, by simply excluding certain races from naturalization, it professes in slow beginnings a view which is peculiar to the folkish state concept.
Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler (1925)
The struggle we are waging [in Crimea] against the Partisans resembles very much the struggle in North America against the Red Indians. Victory will go to the strong, and strength is on our side. At all costs we will establish law and order there. […] Saxony, for example, will enjoy an unprecedented trade boom, and we shall create for her a most profitable export market, which it will be the task of Saxon inventive genius to develop.
Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-1944, H. R. Trevor-Roper (1953).
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mapsontheweb · 9 months ago
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Two years of Russian invasion of Ukraine
by theflagmapguy_2.0
On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. The invasion has caused tens of thousands of deaths on both sides and instigated Europe's largest refugee crisis since World War II. About 8 million Ukrainians were displaced within their country by June, and more than 8 million fled the country by February 2023. After the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and Russian-backed paramilitaries seized the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts of Ukraine's Donbas region, sparking a regional war. In March 2021, Russia began a military build-up, amassing up to 190,000 soldiers at Ukraine's borders. Russian government officials denied plans to attack Ukraine until the day before the invasion. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognised the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic, two self-proclaimed breakaway quasi-states in the Donbas. The next day, the Federation Council of Russia authorised the use of military force and Russian soldiers entered both territories. The invasion began the morning of 24 February 2022 upon Russian president Vladimir Putin's announcement of a "special military operation" seeking the "demilitarisation" and "denazification" of Ukraine. In his address, Putin espoused irredentist views, challenged Ukraine's right to statehood, and falsely claimed that Ukraine was governed by neo-Nazis who persecuted the ethnic Russian minority. Minutes later, Russian air strikes and a ground invasion were launched along a northern front from Belarus towards Kyiv, a north-eastern front towards Kharkiv, a southern front from Crimea, and a south-eastern front from Donetsk and Luhansk. In response, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy enacted martial law and a general mobilisation.
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thisprettyukrainianletter · 11 months ago
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From the boulevard Yalta, the Crimea , Ukraine
2. The gulf, Yalta, the Crimea, Ukraine
3. Gurzuf from the Yalta Road, the Crimea, Ukraine
4. Gurzuf, the Crimea, Ukraine
5. The Crimea, Alupka. The Imperial palace, Ukraine
6. The church, Baidar, the Crimea, Ukraine
7. Gurzuf, from the Park, the Crimea, Ukraine
8. The gulf, Sebastopol, Ukraine
9. The Khan's palace, Bakhchysaraĭ, Ukraine
10. The harem, Bakhchysaraĭ, Ukraine
Photos were published between 1890 and 1900 and are part of The Photochrom Print Collection, which has almost 6,000 views of Europe and the Middle East and 500 views of North America. Published primarily from the 1890s to 1910s, these prints were created by the Photoglob Company in Zürich, Switzerland, and the Detroit Publishing Company in Michigan. The richly colored images look like photographs but are actually ink-based photolithographs, usually 6.5 x 9 inches.
Source https://www.loc.gov
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ivan-aivazovsky-paintings · 11 months ago
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-View of the Sea from the Mountains at Sunset, Crimea-
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dontforgetukraine · 4 months ago
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Illia Ponomarenko shows us one of the many gems Kyiv has to offer: The Kyiv Pechersk Lavra (or the Kyiv Lavra of the Caves). It is considered the most significant and holiest of places in Eastern Slavic Orthodox Christianity. This is an example of what is at stake for Ukraine as Russia continues its efforts to eradicate Ukrainian history and identity.
So, about 1,000 years ago, Kyiv was living its golden age as the center of a large medieval kingdom of Rus under Prince Yaroslav the Wise—very possibly the greatest ruler of Kyiv ever. The official residence of the rulers of Kyiv Rus was located in the town of Berestove outside Kyiv (it's now where Kyiv's Park of Eternal Glory is). The Berestove priest Illarion sought comfort and solitude, so he dug a lonesome cave in the hills at the Dnipro riverside, where he could spend his time alone in prayers. That happened around 1051 A.D. That guy soon became the head of the Kyiv Church and left, but more hermits followed his suit and established their shelters in those caves. Over many years, they burrowed long mazes of catacombs and established churches and monastic cells. The monastery gradually became a grandiose Lavra, a magnificent center of religious and cultural life, the greatest in this corner of human civilization. As early as 1073 A.D., the Cathedral of the Dormition (or the 'Great Church') was established (and you can see the modern iteration of it, the magnificent white cathedral bearing images of the saints on its walls. Just like Kyiv, the Lavra was ruined and resurrected from ashes several times over its 1,000-year history. Mongolians seized and desolated Kyiv in 1240, and the Lavra was devastated so hard that it spent well over a century in empty ruins. Yet, it would always rise again in all of its glory. During WWII, the Great Church was blown up just as many other iconic locations of Kyiv, such as Kherschatyk Street (in my opinion, what happened was that the Soviets planted bombs at the Lavra upon their withdrawal from the city in 1941 and failed to detonate them on time; and Nazis took out the treasures of the Lavra and got rid of the Soviet bombs by blowing up the cathedral. Like many other significant treasures of Kyiv, the Great Church of the Lavra was resurrected by independent Ukraine by the 2000s. The Lavra is indeed a city within a city—I'm only showing you a tiny part of it that is popular with tourists. Unfortunately, the ancient monastery caves have been closed to visitors for over a year. Technically, the Lavra is a giant museum with many art exhibitions, collections of historical artifacts, and recreation zones for anyone. Right now, for instance, the Lavra Historical Museum exhibits ancient Scthyntian gold from Crimea that was recently returned to Ukraine. At the Lavra, you can easily find the resting places of many historical figures of the past, such as the one of Kostiantyn Ostrozky, the legendary ultra-rich magnate of the 15th and 16th centuries and the Lavra's lavish sponsor, or Petr Stolypin, the Russian imperial prime minister who was assassinated at the Kyiv Opera House in 1911. Of course, the Lavra is about the iconic Great Bell Tower, one of Kyiv's most legendary landmarks. The tower is 96 meters high and can be seen from around 30 kilometers away from the Lavra. It takes over 370 stairs to reach the tower's top -- but I'm telling you, it's 100% worth it as the Great Bell Tower shows you a truly stunning view of Kyiv, especially when the weather is fine. Fucking legend. For centuries, until recently, the Lavra was under complete control by the Russian Orthodox Church, which is fundamentally loyal to Russia. In 2023, amid the war against Russia, Kyiv authorities and the Zelensky administration tried (and failed) to terminate the Moscow clergy's legal presence at the Lavra in 2023. Currently, the Russian church and its monks remain in control of the so-called Lower Lavra. In the Upper Lavra, which has most of the iconic places and locations, the recently re-established Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the de-facto successor of the old original Christian church of the Kyiv Rus, now has its divine service again. Welcome to the beautiful ancient Kyiv.
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warsofasoiaf · 13 days ago
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who would be a better pick for director of national intelligence? as far as im aware Tulsi doesnt have experience in positions of that level, im not sure what to think about her views on Russia given she takes nuclear war seriously but also she was slandered by Shillary
Frankly speaking, any number of intelligence professionals would be more qualified than Tulsi Gabbard. She has no experience in the intelligence field, neither her assignments nor her Senate career saw her exposed to anything, so her lack of experience should be an automatic disqualifier, even if her trafficking in Russian and Syrian conspiracies didn't already demonstrate that she is manifestly unfit for the position. But let's embark on a thought exercise, just so I can illustrate my point a bit more clearly.
I hate steelmanning, but let's steelman her actions. Let's say that she's not a Russian stooge or a pet, and that her statements come from a place of deep personal conviction against US foreign entanglements. Let's assume she is not being coerced or compensated to repeat Russian propaganda, and say that she's a true believer. Her statements on the Russo-Ukrainian War would already render her unfit. As I've mentioned before, the idea of "NATO encroachment" on Russia doesn't suit the facts of what actually occurred in Ukraine. Russia was the primary breacher of the Minsk Accords (over 80% of ceasefire breaches were performed by Russian or pro-Russian separatist movements), and Ukraine didn't pivot toward NATO membership until after the seizure of Crimea (well-documented by reliable polling). These are not opinions, but facts. Just as how she made statements that Bashar al-Assad did not use chemical weapons despite the actual *physical* evidence that he did. This means that Tulsi Gabbard ignores objective reality to find a narrative that suits her - and then uses it to inform her conclusions, and thus, her decisions. This is *not* someone suited to lead any intelligence-gathering apparatus. Ignoring what *is* for what is *desired* does not lead to rational decision-making.
So even by the most generous of graces, Tulsi Gabbard is at best, a moron who looks to justify her own pre-conceived conclusions. And that's not someone I'd want in charge of intelligence.
Thanks for the question, Anon.
SomethingLikeALawyer, Hand of the King
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mariacallous · 1 day ago
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In Ukraine’s prolonged struggle against Russia, the election of Donald Trump as the next U.S. president was a black swan event.
Among other positions, Trump ran on the promise of extricating the United States from the conflict in Ukraine. His closest allies have openly disparaged Kyiv and made overtures to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Thus, with this transition of power begins a new chapter of the war in which Western support for Ukraine could fall by the wayside.
Outgoing U.S. President Joe Biden’s belated decision to allow Ukraine to use U.S. missiles to strike targets deep within Russian territory, a critical condition of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “victory plan,” is hardly a godsend. These missiles cannot singlehandedly change the course of the war, and they put Zelensky in an awkward position. Striking Russian targets will trigger not only the wrath of Putin, but also that of Trump, who will undoubtedly view any escalation as a shot against his own prospects for dealmaking.
With Trump making threats to pull out of NATO and cut a deal with Putin, Europe is also having second thoughts on backing Ukraine. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke with Putin on Nov. 15 about bringing an end to the war, while Czech President Petr Pavel announced plans in October to send a new ambassador to the Czech Embassy in Moscow in early 2025.
Meanwhile, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres recently attended the annual summit of the BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and several recently added members—hosted in Kazan, Russia. The U.N.’s involvement in an event hosted by a country engaged in a war of aggression, whose president is wanted under an International Criminal Court warrant, sends a disheartening message.
Almost three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the West is tired. It no longer has the political will to help Ukraine win by military means and is seeking a settlement with the aggressor instead.
The U.S. shift toward isolationism may hasten the inevitable: Ukraine and the West will soon find themselves negotiating with Russia to define the terms of a settlement—and, by extension, shaping a new world order. This emerging order will not be the rules-based system established after World War II, but one driven by idiosyncratic dealmaking among strongmen.
The problem is that any deal will amount to Ukraine’s—and the West’s—capitulation to Russia.
A bad peace is better than a good quarrel, according to a Russian proverb. If the West is set on securing this “bad peace,” then it must have a negotiating strategy along four critical parameters: territories, security guarantees for Ukraine, reparations, and sanctions.
Even before Trump’s election, some of Ukraine’s staunchest allies began expressing the view that Ukraine would have to accept some loss of land. The most obvious settlement strategy, then, would likely involve buying Ukrainian and European security with territory—possibly including Donetsk; large chunks of the Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions; and the peninsula of Crimea, which Russia first seized in 2014.
This outcome is a far cry from the Western leaders’ earlier commitments to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and hopes for regime change in Russia, but realpolitik leaves little room for moral considerations.
Should Zelensky agree to this loss of territory, the only realistic security guarantee for Ukraine would be membership in NATO. Yet this runs counter to what U.S. Vice President-elect J.D. Vance has lobbied for: a demilitarized zone along the current front lines and an enduring commitment to Ukraine’s neutrality.
The next White House does not seem to have a plan for what happens to Europe in a few years, when it would face a revanchist Russia with a subdued Ukraine at its Western borders. Such an outcome is not in Trump’s best interest. Another option, therefore, may have Trump concede to Ukraine’s membership in a new NATO—one without the United States, perhaps—leaving Europeans to be the masters of their own security.
Battered and curtailed but still sovereign, Ukraine would gain a nuclear umbrella against future Russian aggression, and Europe would fund the postwar reconstruction. There would be no international tribunal and no reparations. (Putin won’t be negotiating his own sentence.) Sanctions against Russia would remain for the time being. Europe would accept the occupation de facto, but it wouldn’t de jure recognize the territory as Russian land.
It will be difficult to come up with a deal that satisfies all parties. But in any negotiation, reaching a mutually satisfactory outcome depends on the motivation and constraints of those involved. The West is motivated to settle in Ukraine because it is tired of war, and because Trump is uninterested in leading the existential fight for democracy. Ukraine, understanding that it cannot win on its own, can be motivated to settle in order to stop the now-pointless bloodshed.
Putin’s motivations are murkier. In fact, a closer look would reveal that Putin has no need for lasting peace.
Putin’s megalomaniacal intransigence is now reinforced by his perception that he is winning, even if it is taking longer than he hoped. Piecemeal shipments of Western military aid have made Russian advances slow and painful—but they have been advances nevertheless. While Ukraine’s ability to affect Russian military logistics was until recently severely hampered by Western restrictions, the Russian army has faced no such limitations, regularly bombing civilian infrastructure and military targets alike.
In wars of attrition, the side with more resources is poised to win, and Russia still mobilizes resources with frightening force. Russia has activated the economic and cultural mechanisms necessary for around-the-clock military production—bread-making factories churning out drones, schoolchildren making camouflage nets, and old Soviet tanks hauled out of Siberian forests and shipped to Ukrainian front lines.
Now that the economy has been switched on to military footing, there is no shortage of munitions. Meanwhile, government payouts ensure an ample supply of volunteers to enlist in the military, meaning Russia does not have a manpower crisis like Ukraine does.
No human toll is too high for Russia. During World War II, Russia lost more than 27 million people—the largest number of fatalities of all involved. Peter the Great’s 18th-century Great Northern War, which established Russia’s power in the Baltics, lasted 21 years and incurred enormous casualties, as did the 25-year-long Livonian War fought by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century.
Russia has already suffered upward of 700,000 people dead or wounded during the Ukraine war, according to estimates from the National Interest. But with families of dead soldiers mollified by the “coffin money” they receive, society writ large has not budged in its support for the war. It will likely stay that way short of another mobilization.
It certainly helps that the brunt of the war is borne by recruited volunteers, who sign up to fight to improve their and their family’s economic standings, and by convicts—both groups making up a significant number of those killed and wounded in Ukraine. Another large constituency fighting Russia’s war is national minorities, often from depressed economic areas and the lowest strata of society. And now, those minorities are joined by North Korean soldiers and potentially by citizens of the other dictatorships that Putin courts.
Contrast this low visibility of Russia’s war toll, further obscured by Kremlin propaganda, to its loudly celebrated nativist successes. In the last two years, not only did Russia fail to fold under the weight of Western sanctions, but it also managed to build parallel economic, financial, and cultural structures that are independent of the West.
Economically, Russia has reoriented itself toward the East, increasing trade with China, India, and other countries in Asia and the Middle East. It has shifted its energy exports away from Europe and developed domestic production capabilities. Despite sanctions, oil money—the main source of Russia’s war financing—keeps flowing, albeit from a different direction than before. Cross-border payments are now handled through SPFS, a homegrown alternative to the SWIFT global financial system, and the Mir payment system that replaced Visa and MasterCard. Russia touts these systems to its BRICS partners as alternatives to “Western financial hegemony.”
If anything, the war in Ukraine has given Putin more money to play with than before. Assets belonging to Western companies exiting Russia have been nationalized or bought for cheap and redistributed to businesses with ties to the Kremlin—one of the largest property transfers in Russia’s history. Cut off from Western banks, Russian oligarchs must invest their money domestically. Sanctions evasion schemes protect Russians’ access to Western consumer goods, creating enormous enrichment opportunities for Russian and Western business agents alike. Tankers shuttle Russian oil with payments cleared through offshore shell companies. Putin’s personal wealth, estimated at somewhere between $70 billion and $200 billion, remains safe. Though he is a product of a socialist state, the Russian leader is a master of capitalism.
Cultural shifts in Russia increase Putin’s confidence in victory. What little dissent remained before the war has largely been rooted out, with Russians closing ranks around their leader. According to a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center in September and October, more than two-thirds of Russians who said they want the war to end are against returning Russian-occupied territories to Ukraine.
On the global stage, Russia has managed to upgrade its status from a regional power to a leader of the anti-Western coalition. These coalition members have their own stakes in Ukraine. A Russian victory would embarrass the United States, weakening its influence in Asia and helping China. North Korea has found exports—bad shells and soldiers—that it can exchange for food, money, and energy. And Iran is happy to keep the United States distracted from the Middle East.
Even if Putin wanted to end the war, it would entail serious risk for his regime. Drones, shells, and missile production would have to be scaled down, ending the economic boom. The sudden drop in government spending would create real prospects of an economic collapse. Around 1.5 million veterans would have to be pulled out of Ukraine to find new roles in a corrupt Russian society. The manufactured sense of national unity would give way to envy that beyond the border, on Russia’s “ancestral lands,” Ukrainians are thriving under European Union and NATO banners.
Taken together, in a country reacclimatized to grand-scale violence, the prospect of revolt becomes clear and present. To find an outlet for that aggression, Putin would have to start a new war not long after agreeing to settle for peace.
Ultimately, the status quo—an ongoing border squabble with conventional weapons—suits all but Ukraine and Europe, for which security deteriorates in direct proportion to Putin’s success.
The Putin that the West would face at the negotiating table is a former underdog—a man on a mission to free the world from what he has characterized as Western “hegemony,” his economy thriving, his new and old friends paying court, and his people unified behind him.
He is not, however, as invincible as he seems. The BRICS countries are not rushing to replace SWIFT with the Russian alternative. By putting all his economic eggs into the military basket, Putin has siphoned off resources from everywhere else, an unsustainable move. Inflation is real, and the ruble is weakening. Even the overheated military sector can’t keep up with demands. Moreover, as a student of Russian history, Putin knows that the support and adoration of the Russian masses can turn on its head overnight.
But Putin also knows how to keep a poker face. Having staked his survival on this war, Putin would be negotiating from the position of strength and with obligations to his domestic and international stakeholders in mind.
He has already shot an opening volley at the U.S. president-elect: After a call during which Trump told the Russian leader not to escalate in Ukraine, Russian state television released a special on Melania Trump’s modeling career, including nude photos of the once and future first lady.
The West, meanwhile, will be negotiating from a position of inherent weakness. After tiptoeing around the Kremlin’s red lines throughout the war, Western leaders have signaled their readiness to consider cessation of a large chunk of Ukrainian territory, wishing away what little leverage they had.
There is nothing stopping Putin from believing that he can’t get more. Unless Russia is decisively defeated on the battlefield or Putin is given precisely what he wants, he will not stop.
Of the options put forward for a negotiated solution, the only one that Putin would agree to is the one that gives him Ukraine’s capitulation on a platter. He will never agree to a thriving, independent, armed, and Western-aligned Ukraine on his border, because he would lose too much face. Putin will therefore demand an unviable Ukraine—without an army and without NATO membership—and, in effect, a Western surrender.
The issue of European security cannot be solved by a settlement with Moscow because appeasement only increases the aggressor’s appetite. Only the containment of Putin’s expansionism by military means will remove the existential threat to his neighbors. So long as there is an aggressive, revanchist Russia in the picture, lasting peace is an illusion.
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postcard-from-the-past · 8 months ago
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View of Yalta, Crimea, Ukraine
Russian vintage postcard
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arkhyp-kuindzhi-paintings · 8 months ago
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-View of the beach and sea from the mountains, Crimea-
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odinsblog · 2 years ago
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Thousands of Ukrainian children put through Russian ‘re-education’ camps
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New report details network of dozens of Russian camps aimed at giving children pro-Moscow views, with some children detained indefinitely
At least 6,000 children from Ukraine have attended Russian “re-education” camps in the past year, with several hundred held there for weeks or months beyond their scheduled return date, according to a new report published in the US.
Russia has also unnecessarily expedited the adoption and fostering of children from Ukraine in what could constitute a war crime, the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab report found. The report was funded by the US state department.
Since the start of the war nearly a year ago, children as young as four months living in the occupied areas have been taken to 43 camps across Russia, including in Moscow-annexed Crimea and Siberia, for “pro-Russia patriotic and military-related education”, said the report.
In at least two of the camps, the children’s return date was delayed by weeks, while at two other camps, the return of some children was postponed indefinitely.
Russian authorities sought to provide a pro-Moscow viewpoint to children through school curricula as well as through field trips to patriotic sites and talks from veterans, the report found.
Videos published from the camps by the occupying regional authorities show children in the camps singing the Russian national anthem and carrying the Russian flag. In separate videos, teachers, employed to teach the children, talk about the need to correct their understanding of Russian and Soviet history.
Children were also given training in firearms, although Nathaniel Raymond, a Yale researcher who oversaw the report, said there was no evidence they were being sent back to fight.
“Mounting evidence of Russia’s actions lays bare the Kremlin’s aims to deny and suppress Ukraine’s identity, history, and culture,” the US state department said in a statement. “The devastating impacts of Putin’s war on Ukraine’s children will be felt for generations.”
There is little information on the explanation given to children regarding delays in their return. An official at the Medvezhonok camp told a boy from Ukraine that his return was conditional: the children would be returned only if Russia recaptured the town of Izium, the report said. Another boy was told he wouldn’t be returning home due to his “pro-Ukrainian views”, the report said.
Some parents were told that their children will be released only if they physically come to pick them up. Relatives or people given power of attorney were not allowed to pick up the children. Travel from Ukraine to Russia is difficult and expensive, and men between the ages of 18 and 60 are forbidden from leaving the country, in effect meaning only the mothers of the children may retrieve them.
“A significant portion of these families are low-income and have not been able to afford to make the trip. Some families were forced to sell belongings and travel through four countries to be reunited with their child,” the report found.
One of the camps is located in Magadan oblast, roughly 6,230km (3,900 miles) from Ukraine. This puts it “roughly three times closer to the United States than it is to the border of Ukraine,” the report said.
Raymond said that Russia was in “clear violation” of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the treatment of civilians during war and called the report a “gigantic Amber alert” – referring to US public notices of child abductions.
The Russian activity “in some cases may constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity”, he told reporters.
Ukraine’s government recently claimed that more than 14,700 children had been deported to Russia, where some had been sexually exploited.
(continue reading)
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perrysoup · 10 months ago
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Jewish State Ideas BEFORE Palestine
CRITICAL PREAMBLE: It is important to keep in mind that the idea of building a Jewish State is Zionist. It does not reflect the views of Judaism as a whole, and any antisemetic actions will result in blocking and banning. It is critical now more than ever that we recognize that there is a different. Your issues in Palestine are with ZIONISM, not Judaism. Do NOT associate them as the same. Doing so is a common Zionist tactic to make comments or opinions against Israel be rebutted that it is antisemetic purely because it comments on actions by Israel and their Zionist government and military.
Again, Zionism and Judaism are NOT one in the same, and should not be treated that way.
Anywho, timeline time!
1820 - Ararat City - Grand Island Niagara River in Western New York. Considered a precursor to Zionism as known today.
1902 - Leaugue of Eastern European States - "would entail the establishment of a buffer state (Pufferstaat) within the Jewish Pale of Settlement of Russia, composed of the former Polish provinces annexed by Russia."
Date Unsure - Herzl Plan - "The Jews who wish for a State will have it. We shall live at last as free men on our own soil, and die peacefully in our own homes." His proposed location? Cyprus 1903 - British Uganda Program - Rejected after (shocker) there were lions in Africa. Also "it was populated by a large number of Maasai people, who did not seem at all amenable to an influx of people coming from Europe." fuckin wonder why. Note that some Zionists were concerned it would "make it more difficult to establish a Jewish state in Palestine in Ottoman Syria, particularly the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem" 1928 - Jewish Autonomous Oblast in USSR - Proposed by Russia specifcally to prevent a State of Israel AND done because it viewed Judaism as a threat to the state. "In that sense, it was also a response to two supposed threats to the Soviet state: Judaism, which ran counter to official state policy of atheism; and Zionism, the creation of the modern State of Israel, which countered Soviet views of nationalism. Yiddish, rather than Hebrew, would be the national language, and a new socialist literature and arts would replace religion as the primary expression of culture." Also included the idea of a JSR in Crimea or "part of Ukraine, however these were rejected because of fears of antagonizing non-Jews in those regions."
1940 - British Guiana - "the British Government decided that "the problem is at present too problematical to admit of the adoption of a definite policy and must be left for the decision of some future Government in years to come""
The Madagascar Plan and the Italian East Africa plans were both efforts by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to "solve Jewish problem" (YES THIS IS BAD). "Jews from Europe and Palestine would be resettled to the north-west Ethiopian districts of Gojjam and Begemder, along with the Beta Israel community."
1989 - Plans for the West Bank - Contemplation of a Second Jewish State - "Israeli settlers in the West Bank have mulled declaring independence as the State of Judea should Israel ever withdraw from the West Bank. In January 1989, several hundred activists met and announced their intention to create such a state in the event of Israeli withdrawal."
So yea, don't tell me about "homeland" when there were a shit ton of other ideas accepted within the Zionist ideal prior to SETTLING on Palestine. It's "homeland" cause that's where the British Empire could throw Israel. Not because they though it was the "right thing to do" or whatever thing Zionists claim now a days.
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legalkimchi · 1 year ago
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Geopolitics is not what you think.
It is interesting to me that how we view issues of global politics and how academics and certain political actors view the issues have such a huge separation.
For instance, when people view the russian invasion of ukraine, they think of a simple power grab, or they don't understand why russia would want to do that.
When i was talking to a friend, who is a geopolitical expert, about the russian war against ukraine, he pulled out a topographical map of europe. Geopolitics is the study of how geography affects politics. it is NOT a general term for international politics.
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The easy answer is Russia's need for a warm water port. If you know russia's borders, you would know that all of it's major ports are in the north and they freeze in the winter. They don't have a good port in the black sea that stays unfrozen. Sevastopol is the port in Crimea. While technically Ukrainian territory, it has been controlled by Russia since 2014.
The second point he made was looking at the moutains. See the map above. Then let's look at a map of the warsaw pact
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Understanding moutain ranges and how they are defensible, you start to see why NATO and the Warsaw pact involved those specific countries. it creates a natural bottle neck in Germany. This also goes into why Poland gets invaded so much. it is a flat territory without natural boundaries that makes it easy to attack, and if you want your border to be a mountain you have to go through Poland. Without the countries to make up its borders anymore, Russia lacks natural boundaries. Instead of the carpathian mountains, they have simple grassland.
Then you talk to demographers as to why russia is aggressive, you see that since the end of the cold war, russia's death rate has exceeded it's birth rate. this causes a decline in population and a "demographic crisis." the average age in russia is over 40 years old. this stagnation has rippling effects throughout the country. with an older workforce, they don't have a surplus younger generation to pay for the care of the older generation. they are experiencing migration out of the country of individuals with experience and education needed in the country. They are, in short, a nation in panic.
In the international relations field, you see discussions of the lack of political influence. Russia once held a spot as one of two superpowers in the world. a regional giant who's influence shook the way international politics operated. From 1950-1989 there were really only two countries in the world that everyone needed to pay attention to: the Soviet Union and the United States. everyone else was a pawn. There was the First world, the US and her allies, the Second World, the Soviet Union and her allies, and the Third world, the non-aligned nations. (which, by the way, is where that phrase came from. a "third world" country was thought as a country so unimportant, neither the US or USSR cared about you.) in this climate, Russian, who still held what was considered the second most powerful military in the world (though... not so much now) felt they were under appreciated. China was the emerging economic powerhouse.
This is something i went into in my IR video. (as i have an IR background)
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What is amazing about all this analysis is that different fields point to different reasons as to why russia invaded. and similar analysis could be done other regions. any conflict can be analyzed in this manner. the disputes in africa are interesting because the easy answer to why there are so many wars in africa is "colonialism." and i think it does make a useful, simplified solution. but it foregoes the other realms of analysis as to why these conflicts are happening.
not sure what made me procrastinate on making a video and writing this out. i needed a break from editing. I hope you found this interesting.
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ivan-aivazovsky-paintings · 4 months ago
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-Night at Crimea View on Ayu-Dag-
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classicalcanvas · 1 year ago
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Title: View Of The Ayu Dag Crimea
Artist: Ivan Ayvazovsky
Date: 1868
Style: Romanticism
Genre: Marina
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