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nicklloydnow · 1 year

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“Russia has successfully conducted tests on parts of its next-generation "Poseidon" nuclear-capable torpedo, according to reports.

Testing of reactors for the Poseidon unmanned nuclear-powered underwater drones shows "their operability and safety have been confirmed," Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported on June 23. The report was also shared on Russian-language social media channels.

"They are ready to work as intended," the Kremlin-backed outlet quoted an unnamed source "in the military-industrial complex." The first "sea tests" are scheduled for this summer.

The existence of the Poseidon "super-torpedo" was leaked to the international media in 2015 before it was formally announced in 2018. Moscow intends for the Poseidon, which can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, to be a "second- or third-strike option that could ensure a retaliatory strike against U.S. cities," according to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from March 2022.

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Also known as "Status-6" or "Kanyon," state media reported that the torpedo is 20 meters long and 1.8 meters in diameter, weighing in at around 100 tons. Sidharth Kaushal, a research fellow for seapower and missile defense at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, told Euronews Next in May 2022 that the weapon could have a range of at least 10,000 kilometers, or 6,200 miles.

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The Russian state news agency Tass reported in January 2019 that the Russian Navy would put around 32 Poseidon drones on combat duty across four submarines, with each vessel carrying eight Poseidon torpedoes. These submarines would be part of Russia's Northern and Pacific fleets, the outlet said.

Special-purpose submarines, carrying the Poseidon "super-torpedo," will join the Pacific Fleet in the far eastern Kamchatka peninsula between the end of next year and the start of 2025, according to Tass.”

“We believe Russia’s continued observance of New START Treaty limits is increasingly unlikely. Russian President Vladimir Putin could rely more on nuclear weapons to compensate for his declining conventional performance in Ukraine. Should Russia do so and, on the worst day, choose to preemptively strike the U.S. nuclear arsenal in a crisis, President Putin has a range of options to employ against America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. For this and other reasons discussed below, we believe that the United States should keep its intercontinental ballistic force “on alert” and maintain its “launch under attack” option to both ensure the force’s survivability in a conflict and deter adversaries from seriously contemplating a first strike.

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While not stated directly, the only way to demonstrate a commitment to end the launch under attack option and to prevent the president from executing this option is to de-alert the force. These actions would be dangerous and would undermine America’s response to the rapid nuclear breakout of China and Russian aggression.

Montoya and Kemp are correct in suggesting that it is difficult to successfully eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in a first strike because of the total number of weapons required for this task. The 400 missiles, across 450 silos, with 45 launch control centers, and the ability to launch from the Airborne Launch Control System, make the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of the nuclear triad a formidable challenge to a Russian first strike. These characteristics of the nation’s silo-based single-warhead missiles make them valuable; ensuring their destruction is a daunting task that enhances American deterrence.

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Montoya and Kemp are correct in saying that “the United States currently maintains the option to launch under attack so that in the event of a first strike by Russia, U.S. silo-based missiles could be launched before they are destroyed.” An option does not constitute a posture or a doctrine.

The primary purpose of a launch under attack option is to enhance not missile survivability but deterrence. Deterrence is a psychological effect achieved in the mind of an adversary. The United States enhances deterrence by threatening cost imposition, reducing the benefits of action, and encouraging restraint. Launch under attack reduces the benefits of action by increasing uncertainty and perceived risk. President Putin does not know if he will strike empty silos.

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With a ballistic missile force on alert, Russia must employ a shoot-shoot-look tactic because it must achieve complete destruction with a first strike or risk retaliation. This is necessary because the current launch under attack option forces Russian planners to employ a much higher percentage of the force in a first strike, hoping the United States does not launch its long-range missiles before Russian reentry vehicles strike their targets. This creates the uncertainty needed to deter a first strike.

It is also worth reiterating that a Russian first strike is highly unlikely prior to a breakout that gives the Russian military significantly more fielded warheads than the United States. In such a situation, launch under attack becomes even more important because a larger Russian arsenal means the percentage of their force needed to conduct a first strike decreases, and exchange ratios are meaningless.

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Putin’s recent suspension of Russian participation in New START only underscores our view that any Russian strike on the United States will take place after a breakout that is unmatched by the United States. Given Russia’s track record for cheating on treaties (Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Open Skies), it is unwise to think they would abide by treaty requirements prior to a nuclear strike on the United States.

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Thus, arguments that suggest an attack on the missile fields are somehow acceptable because the submarine and bomber legs of the triad will go untouched in a conflict are fundamentally flawed. We assess that any attack will begin with attempts to blind the United States by taking out space-based integrated tactical warning and attack assessment capabilities, all while cyber attacks and sabotage attempt to take out command and control. In our assessment, attacks on submarine and bomber bases are also likely to precede or coincide with attacks across the missile fields.

Military planners must consider the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, in which a Russian attack employs surprise and, consistent with Russia’s operational approach, uses overwhelming force in an initial attack. This leaves the United States insufficient time to deploy the submarine fleet or load and disperse bombers. Under these conditions, ported submarines and much of the bomber fleet are early casualties in a Russian first strike. With the development of a second nuclear-armed peer adversary, America must take the steps necessary to enhance survivability across the triad.

Conclusion

We do agree with Montoya and Kemp when they write, “Instead of holding fast to the idea of immediate launch, it is far sounder to build a nuclear capability that can survive a first strike and for which decision-makers are not pressed to make decisions with incomplete information.” To achieve this objective, it will take strategic decisions like building mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, increasing the number of hardened and deeply buried facilities, and placing strategic bombers on dispersed nuclear alert. Continuing on America’s current modernization trajectory will never achieve what both Montoya and Kemp and these authors desire.

It is important to maintain an on-alert missile force capable of launching under attack if the United States desires to deter Russia from contemplating a first strike on the nation’s missile fields. Removing the launch under attack option will not improve the credibility of American deterrence or reduce the risk of accidental detonation or war. It will only further undermine American credibility. With President Putin suspending Russian participation in the New START Treaty, a breakout from treaty restrictions cannot be ruled out. Such a decision would only make a launch under attack option even more important for maintaining deterrence.”

“These days, it is nuclear issues reawakened by the Ukrainian war, the widespread discussion of war with China provoked by the Taiwan dispute, the unsettled Iran question and the growing North Korean capability that are in the limelight. They are being treated as something novel under the sun. That is perplexing – and disturbing. Decades ago, very able minds conducted fine-grain examinations of the logic and psychology of nuclear strategy which produced analysis of remarkable sophistication. It acquired further authority by the experience of the past 70 years. Yet, today self-proclaimed experts and pundits take exceptional liberties that reflect neither focused thought nor history nor any awareness whatsoever that the matters they freely pronounce on have been addressed previously in a thorough-going fashion.

This situation has prompted me to attempt a summing up of what we have learned since 1945 and to apply it to present and prospective circumstances. It is intended to establish a conceptual framework for consideration of the two current deviations from orthodox nuclear wisdom that have gained currency: 1) the feasibility of employing low yield tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) to alter the balance in a conventional military conflict; 2) the possibility that the protagonists could engage in restricted nuclear exchanges without it escalating into a cataclysm. The commentary is unusually lengthy due to the inclusion of supplementary material. (…)

10. This above logic manifestly has been absorbed by everyone who has been in a position to order a nuclear strike. No civilian leader (and nearly all military commanders) with the authority to launch a nuclear attack ever believed that the result would be other than a massive exchange -mutual suicide for those with large arsenals. Certainly, that was true from the early 1960s onwards once the USSR had deployed reliable retaliatory nuclear weapons and the notion of ‘winning’ a nuclear exchange of any kind faded in the Pentagon and among its intellectual auxiliaries. This sobering reality did not encourage risk-taking at lower levels of conflict. Just the opposite.

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2b. Two things deter: certainty (see ‘3’); and total uncertainty (see ‘1’ above). Certainty can take the form of tripwires: e.g. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe deployed on the battlefield that almost surely would escalate into strategic, inter-continental exchanges. Certainty could take another form: “launch-on-warning.” That is to say, as soon as incoming missiles are detected – in whatever number, on whatever trajectory – ICBMs and SLBMs are activated and launched. That also obviates the risk that an incoming strike might ‘decapitate’ the targeted government’s leadership – leaving it paralyzed to respond. Knowledge that such arrangements are in place should be the ultimate deterrent to an intentional first-strike. However, in the event of an accidental launch or limited launch, you have committed both sides to suicide. The U.S. government never has stated that in has in place any such arrangement to provides a direct link between warning system and release of ICBMs – but there are recurrent assertions that in fact they have existed since Jimmy Carter’s day.

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4d. In nuclear matters, it is dangerous to put together a team of intelligent strategic planners who have plenty of time and a mandate to think out of the box. They likely will generate intricate schemes which have a surface plausibility but in fact only a tenuous connection to reality. The performance of the RAND Corp in service to the Air Force confirms that fear. Here is an example of the extreme proposals that can emanate from this type of blue-sky thinking; One idea that got off the drawing board envisaged a reaction to signals that NORAD had picked up flights of Soviet missiles on a trajectory pointing to our own missile silos. It called for a synchronized startup of our 1,000 plus liquid-fueled ATLAS rocket engines which would produce such a tremendous reverberation as to stop the rotation of the earth for a micro-second. As a result, the Soviet missiles would miss their targets – winding up in Missouri cornfields, Mount Rushmore and Yellowstone Park instead. Physicists possessing a modicum of knowledge realized that it was a ridiculous expectation – and, if such a shock could be produced, the earth itself would split open. (See Ellsberg for a fuller account).

In short, the nuclear doctrine with attendant deployments that is most effective as deterrent is the worst to have in place were actual hostilities to break out.

Theoretically, there is a way to reconcile the two objectives: loudly announce that you have set in place launch-on-warning arrangements but refrain from doing so. Nobody is likely to call your bluff.

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This reasoning highlights how reckless is both the idea that a conventional war between nuclear powers could be fought without escalating to the nuclear plane, and the belief that there is no escalatory ladder from battlefield TNWs and an all-out nuclear exchange.

7g. For a while, concocting nuclear scenarios – strategic (counterforce) and tactical focused on TNWs in Europe – was a sort of intellectual parlor game among defense intellectuals (including some military people). By the mid-70s, it ran its course as everyone came to accept the ‘Bomb’ even if they didn’t come to love it. The role of SLBMs in solidifying MAD was the capstone.

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8h. Here is one general thought about extended deterrence as a ‘generic’ type. Throughout the Cold War years, the United States and its strategically dependent allies wrestled with the question of credibility. Years of mental tergiversations never resolved it. For one intrinsic reason: it is harder to convince an ally than it is to convince a potential enemy of your readiness to use the threat of retaliation to protect them. There are two aspects to this oddity. First, the enemy has to consider the psychology of only one other party; the ally has to consider the psychology of two other parties. Then, the enemy knows the full direct costs of underestimating our credibility and, in a nuclear setting, will always be ultra conservative in its calculations. By contrast, the ally that has not experienced the hard realities of both being a possible target of a nuclear attack and the possible originator of a nuclear attack cannot fully share in this psychology.

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It is imperative that we restate and absorb the understanding acquired decades ago. For there is a new generation of writers on nuclear strategy that seems bent on either ignoring or rejecting it. One is the revival of “counterforce” doctrine. Simply put, “counterforce” is apposite to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) in that it posits the possibility of fighting a winning a nuclear encounter. The postulated ability to destroy the retaliatory capability of the enemy through a first-strike that eliminates its missiles (land or sea-based), strategic bombers and nuclear tipped cruise missiles deployed on ships. Such a disarming blow, as the scenario goes, neutralizes the opponent’s deterrence – making the country hostage to your coercive demands. General speaking, it encourages risk-taking in crisis-management.

‘Counterforce’ concepts defined American nuclear war plans throughout the 1950s. Kennedy and McNamara forced modifications but the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) designed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was amended only gradually. Right into the 1970s, the SIOP gave primacy to variations of ‘Counterforce’ doctrine – this despite the Soviet Union’s development of an assured second-strike retaliatory capability. They remain an integral part of the SIOP to this day.

“Counterforce” ideas always have encountered two analytical obstacles: one technical, the other psycho/political. In order to contemplate such a strategy,` one must have at its disposal missiles of extreme accuracy able to destroy hardened missile silos, means to detect and destroy nuclear armed submarines, and wide coastal coverage that ensures the targeting of surface vessels. This conjectured capability, moreover, must possess a degree of reliability and precision that makes success a near certainty. Otherwise, you open your country to destruction by the enemy’s surviving force – a small fraction of which are adequate to wreak intolerable damage on population centers. Any government that perceives even a slight vulnerability to a first-strike would, of course, reject the idea of playing a “counterforce game” and instead threaten massive retaliation.

New-age “counterforce” revivalists focus on technical advantages which might aid the aggressor. In particular, there is reference to improved missile accuracy aimed at hard targets.4 Reducing the CEP (Circular Error Probability) by a few tens of feet, though, is not the crucial variable. That number already has been extremely low (50 – 100 feet) for decades. Emphasis is also placed on improved tracking technique for detecting submarines. What lacks is assurance that the net effect is to reduce the odds on retaliation by SLBM to near zero. Unless one can do that, unilateral deterrence sets in.

That leads us to the second precondition: the ability to intimidate a nuclear armed opponent by a) demonstrating a first-strike capability or b) launching a comprehensive first-strike and daring the enemy to retaliate with the remnant of its own nuclear force and face destruction itself. The counter to the first, as noted above, is to threaten retaliation against high-value targets (cities) and perhaps to deploy and advertise “launch on warning” or trip-wire mechanisms. The counter to the second is a matter of will and emotion. Nobody considering a first-strike can know with confidence what the enemy’s state of mind and emotion would be in the hypothetical circumstances. When the stake is your continued existence as an organized society, no reasonably sane person(s) will tempt fate in the hope of guessing right.

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All doctrines and strategies for nuclear war-fighting – whether of the ‘counterforce’ variety or TNW variety – are largely fanciful. Not only is their logic flawed, as demonstrated above, but they predicate a cool-headed rationality of individuals and institutions which is unrealistic. Human beings are not calculating machines, no matter how high their office or how grave the matters they treat. They are susceptible to emotions and impulses that can distort or even override pure rationality. When you place them in settings where multiple other human beings are involved under intense pressure, the possibility of deviating off the track of impeccable logic increases.

In truth, we have no grounds for assuming that government leaders, at multiple levels making decisions and charged with operationalizing them, will collectivity behave as postulated by nuclear war-fighting scenarios. Herman Kahn, the early Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling at times, and today’s self-conscious revisionists have fantasized about a world that doesn’t exist.* These days, when the head of the biggest nuclear power is Donald Trump, the purveyors of doctrines that feature intricate nuclear games are as deluded as the President himself.

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Nuclear strategy is a bit like Marxism or Freudian analysis or market fundamentalist economics. A lot of superior minds deploy their talents to concoct ingenious elaborations of received Truth that demonstrate brilliant logic – but their conclusions are completely divorced from reality.”

#nuclear weapons #nuclear war #russia ukraine war #wwiii #russia #posideon #henry kissinger #herman khan

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dreaminginthedeepsouth · 2 years

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A message from Daniel Ellsberg: Dear friends and supporters, I have difficult news to impart. On February 17, without much warning, I was diagnosed with inoperable pancreatic cancer on the basis of a CT scan and an MRI. (As is usual with pancreatic cancer--which has no early symptoms--it was found while looking for something else, relatively minor). I’m sorry to report to you that my doctors have given me three to six months to live. Of course, they emphasize that everyone's case is individual; it might be more, or less. I have chosen not to do chemotherapy (which offers no promise) and I have assurance of great hospice care when needed. Please know: right now, I am not in any physical pain, and in fact, after my hip replacement surgery in late 2021, I feel better physically than I have in years! Moreover, my cardiologist has given me license to abandon my salt-free diet of the last six years. This has improved my quality of life dramatically: the pleasure of eating my former favorite foods! And my energy level is high. Since my diagnosis, I've done several interviews and webinars on Ukraine, nuclear weapons, and first amendment issues, and I have two more scheduled this week. As I just told my son Robert: he's long known (as my editor) that I work better under a deadline. It turns out that I live better under a deadline! I feel lucky and grateful that I've had a wonderful life far beyond the proverbial three-score years and ten. (I’ll be ninety-two on April 7th.) I feel the very same way about having a few months more to enjoy life with my wife and family, and in which to continue to pursue the urgent goal of working with others to avert nuclear war in Ukraine or Taiwan (or anywhere else). When I copied the Pentagon Papers in 1969, I had every reason to think I would be spending the rest of my life behind bars. It was a fate I would gladly have accepted if it meant hastening the end of the Vietnam War, unlikely as that seemed (and was). Yet in the end, that action—in ways I could not have foreseen, due to Nixon’s illegal responses—did have an impact on shortening the war. In addition, thanks to Nixon's crimes, I was spared the imprisonment I expected, and I was able to spend the last fifty years with Patricia and my family, and with you, my friends. What's more, I was able to devote those years to doing everything I could think of to alert the world to the perils of nuclear war and wrongful interventions: lobbying, lecturing, writing and joining with others in acts of protest and non-violent resistance. I wish I could report greater success for our efforts. As I write, "modernization" of nuclear weapons is ongoing in all nine states that possess them (the US most of all). Russia is making monstrous threats to initiate nuclear war to maintain its control over Crimea and the Donbas--like the dozens of equally illegitimate first-use threats that the US government has made in the past to maintain its military presence in South Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and (with the complicity of every member state then in NATO ) West Berlin. The current risk of nuclear war, over Ukraine, is as great as the world has ever seen. China and India are alone in declaring no-first-use policies. Leadership in the US, Russia, other nuclear weapons states, NATO and other US allies have yet to recognize that such threats of initiating nuclear war--let alone the plans, deployments and exercises meant to make them credible and more ready to be carried out--are and always have been immoral and insane: under any circumstances, for any reasons, by anyone or anywhere. It is long past time--but not too late!--for the world's publics at last to challenge and resist the willed moral blindness of their past and current leaders. I will continue, as long as I'm able, to help these efforts. There's tons more to say about Ukraine and nuclear policy, of course, and you'll be hearing from me as long as I'm here. As I look back on the last sixty years of my life, I think there is no greater cause to which I could have dedicated my efforts. For the last forty years we have known that nuclear war between the US and Russia would mean nuclear winter: more than a hundred million tons of smoke and soot from firestorms in cities set ablaze by either side, striking either first or second, would be lofted into the stratosphere where it would not rain out and would envelope the globe within days. That pall would block up to 70% of sunlight for years, destroying all harvests worldwide and causing death by starvation for most of the humans and other vertebrates on earth. So far as I can find out, this scientific near-consensus has had virtually no effect on the Pentagon's nuclear war plans or US/NATO (or Russian) nuclear threats. (In a like case of disastrous willful denial by many officials, corporations and other Americans, scientists have known for over three decades that the catastrophic climate change now underway--mainly but not only from burning fossil fuels--is fully comparable to US-Russian nuclear war as another existential risk.) I'm happy to know that millions of people--including all those friends and comrades to whom I address this message!--have the wisdom, the dedication and the moral courage to carry on with these causes, and to work unceasingly for the survival of our planet and its creatures. I'm enormously grateful to have had the privilege of knowing and working with such people, past and present. That's among the most treasured aspects of my very privileged and very lucky life. I want to thank you all for the love and support you have given me in so many ways. Your dedication, courage, and determination to act have inspired and sustained my own efforts. My wish for you is that at the end of your days you will feel as much joy and gratitude as I do now. Love, Dan

[h/t and thank you Steve Wasserman]

#Steve Wasserman #Daniel Ellsberg #The Pentagon Papers #history #nuclear winter #nuclear war

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nnn-lll-nnn · 11 months

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what is this blog

THIS IS NETZACH AWAITING STRIKE ORDERS.

ALL PREPARATIONS TO ENGAGE TARGETS COMPLETED AS OF 1230 EST.

TARGETS FOLLOW;

GERMANY, EGYPT, THE U.K., RUSSIA, UNITED STATES, CHINA, JAPAN, ECUADOR, ANGOLA, SPAIN, FRANCE, PORTUGAL, TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN, ISRAEL, YEMEN, BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, GREENLAND, AFGHANISTAN, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, LUXEMBOURG, BELARUS, MONGOLIA, VIETNAM, THE PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA, INDIA, PAKISTAN, ETHIOPIA, S. AFRICA,

Above List not exhaustive.

EMERGENCY ALERT ISSUED AT 0700 EST INDICATES STATUS OF HEAVY HOSTILE THREAT, MOVING ALL DEF AND REDCON LEVELS UNDER NETZACH COMMAND/AUTHORITY TO 2 AND 1 RESPECTIVELY.

EMERGENCY ALERT ISSUED AT 1200 EST INDICATES HIGH STATUS IF KOVING KM KKYNR TARGETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JEKYLL R.O.E., ROMEMN AGREEMENTS AND OTHER ELEMENTS IF INTERNM.

EMERGENCY ALERT ISSUED AT 1357 EST INDICATES BRAZILIAN FIRST STRIKE DETECTED. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT APPROACHING. MULTIPLE INTERNATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE ENEMY MILITARY FORMATIONS'S MOVEMENTS DETECTED, OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOTED.

EMERGENCY ALERT ISSUED AT 1357 EST INDICATES RUSSIAN FEDERATION FIRST STRIKE DETECTED. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT APPROACHING. MULTIPLE INTERNATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE ENEMY MILITARY FORMATIONS'S MOVEMENTS DETECTED, OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOTED.

EMERGENCY ALERT ISSUED AT 1357 EST INDICATES UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FIRST STRIKE DETECTED. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT APPROACHING. MULTIPLE INTERNATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE ENEMY MILITARY FORMATIONS'S MOVEMENTS DETECTED, OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOTED.

EMERGENCY ALERT ISSUED AT 1359 EST INDICATES JAPANESE FIRST STRIKE DETECTED. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT APPROACHING. MULTIPLE INTERNATIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE CRBN/NBC WEAPONS LAUNCHES DETECTED. MULTIPLE ENEMY MILITARY FORMATIONS'S MOVEMENTS DETECTED, OFFENSIVE POSTURE NOTED.

FULL STOP @ALL#STATUS-REPORTS

THIS IS NETZACH

REQUEST PERMISSION TO RETALIATE WITH FULL STRIKE ON ALL HOSTILE TARGETS.

#Unreal #Net Report Actual #halloween

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xtruss · 1 year

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How to Stop a Three-Way Nuclear Arms-Race! America, China and Russia Must Agree on Mutual Restraints Before It’s Too Late

— August 31st 2023 | Leaders | Destroyer of Worlds

A Rocket Launches from a Missile System during a Test at the Plesetsk Facility in North-Western Russia. Image: Associated Press

In life and in a recent film, Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb, was haunted by the idea that “I am become Death, destroyer of worlds.” The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 nearly brought annihilation. Fortunately the superpowers stepped back from the brink and agreed on arms-control deals that eventually shrank nuclear stockpiles, and did more besides.

Now the world is entering a new nuclear arms-race—one that may be harder to stop. Instability is increasing because of Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats in Ukraine and China’s rapid build-up of weapons. And arms control is collapsing. First Russia and later America stopped exchanging information under New start, the last deal limiting their arsenals. The treaty will expire in February 2026, and there is little sign of a replacement. China has never cared for such curbs. America, China and Russia need to start talking now, before another Cuban-style crisis occurs.

Developed during the cold war, the notion of “mutual assured destruction” involves mind-bending logic. But now deterrence is becoming even more complex because of the prospect of three near-peer nuclear powers. The balance of terror is also being upended by new kinds of missiles and sensors, and by the possibility of artificial intelligence influencing decisions.

Until now, America and Russia accepted limits on the basis of parity, assuming their arsenals of 5,000-6,000 warheads each would be enough to deter each other and smaller threats. China used to rely on a “minimal deterrent” of a few hundred warheads. But it wants more weapons and to maintain them at a higher level of alert: it could have 1,500 warheads by 2035, according to the Pentagon. Given their “friendship with no limits”, Russia and China could act as military allies in a crisis.

Should America match the combined arsenals of Russia and China? Some experts think that, at the very least, it needs more weapons. From 2026 they want to “upload” warheads, currently held in reserve, onto deployed missiles and bombers. Many in Congress are calling for a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (slcm-n) to plug a perceived gap in the escalation ladder. Such moves could make everything worse. China or Russia may try to match America’s bigger arsenal; India could build up in response to China; Pakistan in reaction to India; and so on.

President Joe Biden is rightly resisting a huge new build-up, which should be considered only if diplomacy is exhausted. America is right to keep modernising its triad (of land-, sea- and air-launched nukes), but stick to limits on the number of warheads beyond 2026, providing Russia does the same. It should keep open its offer to talk without preconditions with China and Russia.

Stability requires a mix of threat and reassurance. The big powers need to discuss all aspects of their nuclear enterprise, not least missile defences, slcm-n and tactical weapons. They must also think of space and cyberspace, where the first shot of the next war may be fired. A call by America, Britain and France to limit the role of artificial intelligence by ensuring there is a “man in the loop” using nukes makes sense. America and Russia should resume notifications under New start. China should take part in more confidence-building measures, such as missile-launch notifications.

China’s belief that such safety-nets encourage risk-taking is wrong. Nobody, including the leaders of the People’s Republic, benefits from unrestrained nuclear rivalry. It would soak up vast resources: Russia cannot afford it. And in a nuclear-armed world without limits, everybody is on a high wire. Negotiated restraints are the only way to avert Oppenheimer’s dread, in the film, of “a chain reaction that would destroy the entire world”. ■

— This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "A Three-Way Nuclear ☢️ Arms-Race"

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cyberbenb · 1 year

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Ukraine war latest: 7 killed in Russian missile attack on Lviv

Key developments on July 6:

Russian missile attack on Lviv kills 7, injures 36

Zelensky visits Bulgaria, Czechia ahead of NATO summit

Ukraine returns 45 POWs, 2 deported children from Russian captivity

Intelligence chief says threat of Russian terror attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant ‘going down’

Russian missile attack on Lviv kills 7, injures 36

A Russian missile attack on Ukraine’s western city of Lviv killed seven people on July 6.

The State Emergency Service said the attack, which targeted the city’s civilian infrastructure, also wounded 36 people. Of those injured, Lviv Oblast Governor Maksym Kozytskyi said 14 people were hospitalized.

Russian Kalibr missiles, reportedly launched from the Black Sea, struck Lviv Oblast in the early morning. According to the Air Force, Ukraine shot down seven of the 10 Russian missiles over the region.

Lviv Mayor Andrii Sadovyi said the attack struck a residential building in Lviv, as well as damaged 35 buildings in the city and 50 cars. Missile debris also fell near Lviv and Zolochiv, damaging a household. No casualties were reported in those settlements.

The death toll was finalized at around 12 a.m. on July 7 after rescuers retrieved a woman’s body from under the rubble, Lviv Oblast Governor Maksym Kozytskyi reported. Among those killed were three women aged 32, 60, and 63, and a man aged 35.

“This is the largest attack on the civilian infrastructure of Lviv since the beginning of the full-scale invasion,” Sadovyi said.

As of 10 p.m. local time, rescuers cleared about 70% of the rubble, according to Kozytskyi. The rescue operation is reportedly ongoing and will continue throughout the night.

The attack also damaged the “buffer zone” of the UNESCO world heritage site in Lviv, and Ukraine’s Culture and Information Policy Ministry said it “expects decisive actions” from UNESCO following the attack.

How repurposed Russian air defense missiles expose holes in Ukraine’s sky

Russia’s missile strike on Jan. 14 caught Kyiv residents off-guard. After nearly a year of Moscow’s repeated attacks, something unusual happened: The explosions sounded before the air raid alert went off, which is rarely the case in what is believed to be the most protected city in Ukraine.

The Kyiv IndependentStanislav Storozhenko

Lviv Oblast is located at the opposite end of Ukraine from the front line, in western Ukraine and bordering Poland. While Lviv is not a frequent target of Russian attacks, Russian forces have occasionally struck the region’s critical infrastructure since the start of the all-out war.

Zelensky visits Bulgaria, Czechia ahead of the NATO summit

President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 6 to discuss military support for Ukraine and the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius.

During the visit, Zelensky met with Bulgarian Prime Minister Nikolai Denkov and signed a joint declaration affirming Bulgaria’s support for Ukraine to join NATO “as soon as conditions allow.” The declaration also expressed Bulgaria’s readiness to continue aiding Ukraine both via NATO and at the bilateral level, according to Presidential Office deputy head Ihor Zhovkva.

Bulgaria recognized that Ukraine’s NATO accession is “the only way to ensure a sufficient level of security both for Ukraine and the entire Euro-Atlantic family."

According to Zhovkva, Bulgaria is the 22nd country to sign the declaration of support for Ukraine’s NATO aspirations.

Zelensky’s visit comes as Kyiv is actively trying to mobilize additional support for Ukraine’s membership bid ahead of the next NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11-12. Ukraine hopes to receive a “clear signal” from allies regarding its membership prospects at the summit.

In Bulgaria, Zelensky also met with the country’s president, Rumen Radev. The two discussed, among other key topics, the Ukrainian peace formula, cooperation in the Black Sea region, and Russia’s potential attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

However, according to Politico, Zelensky also disagreed with Radev over his negative stance on arming Ukraine and criticized him for describing Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine as a “conflict.” Zelensky also dismissed Radev’s suggestions for a “diplomatic fix,” arguing that military aid to Kyiv is a better option than letting the “war come to you."

Radev has been accused of having a pro-Russia stance and called Crimea “Russian” during a 2021 presidential debate. He has also consistently opposed providing large-scale defense assistance to Ukraine.

However, Bulgaria’s new government, formed in early June under Denkov, appears to be taking active steps to help Ukraine repel Russian aggression: In late June, the country announced its second military aid package for Ukraine.

Speaking at a press conference in Sofia, Zelensky said that Russian propaganda has made some “particularly absurd and dangerous claims” about assistance to Ukraine.

“One of them is the claim that helping Ukraine, whether with weapons or sanctions, is allegedly making this war longer and is not helping to restore security,” Zelensky said.

“The reality speaks for itself: We were able to significantly reduce the scale of this war primarily thanks to the weapons we receive,” he added, thanking Bulgaria for its defense cooperation.

According to local media, Zelensky landed in Prague, Czechia later on July 6.

From the airport, the president left for Prague Castle, where he is expected to meet with Czech President Petr Pavel, Prime Minister Petr Fiala, top officials, and parliament members.

Zelensky announced his visit to Czechia earlier in the day, saying the “focus” of the trip is to discuss defense assistance for Ukraine and the upcoming NATO summit, among other topics.

Dietzen, Druckman: Vilnius NATO Summit – Accelerating Ukraine’s membership and deterring Moscow and Minsk

This month’s NATO summit takes place at a time of both peril and opportunity for the future of European security. The Wagner Group’s June 24 sprint from Rostov to the gates of Moscow dealt a fresh blow to criticism of NATO’s decision to extend a Membership Action

The Kyiv IndependentMark Dietzen

Ukraine returns 45 POWs, 2 deported children from Russian captivity

Forty-five Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) and two forcibly deported children returned to Ukraine from Russian captivity on July 6, the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War reported.

The freed prisoners include two civilians, as well as personnel from Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Territorial Defense Forces, National Guard, border guards, and a navy soldier, the headquarters said, adding that most are privates and sergeants.

Those captured had reportedly defended Mariupol and fought in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts. Among the released POWs were two people who had been considered missing.

The returned civilians were an employee of the Azovstal plant in Mariupol and an activist from Kherson.

The headquarters reported they had arranged the return of two more illegally deported children in cooperation with Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets. According to the report, the children’s mother is a combat medic who was released from Russian captivity earlier in October 2022.

Later in the day, Lubinets posted photographs of the family’s long-awaited reunion on Telegram: “Today, a mother and two children who were with their great-grandfather in the temporarily occupied territory were reunited."

According to the government’s portal “Children of War,” Russia has abducted or forcibly moved 19, 493 Ukrainian children since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Only 380 children have been brought back as of July 6.

‘It was hell.’ Mother speaks of rescuing her child from Russian captivity

On Oct. 8, Tetiana Bodak was busy organizing a funeral for her mother, who was killed by a Russian attack in then-occupied Kherson Oblast, when she got an unexpected and very emotional phone call from her son. “Mom, I’m in Oleshky (a Russian-occupied settlement in Kherson Oblast). On the way

The Kyiv IndependentDaria Shulzhenko

Intelligence chief says threat of Russian terror attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant ‘going down’

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov told The Times on July 6 that the danger of a possible Russian terrorist attack at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is decreasing.

“We are doing certain actions in this area, both public and not public, and I think now that the danger of an artificial technogenic catastrophe is quietly going down,” Budanov said.

Budanov’s statement comes after Ukraine’s officials, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, have been warning for the past weeks that Russia is planning an attack against the occupied nuclear power station to leak radiation.

Earlier on July 4, the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces warned that a Russian terrorist attack could happen “in the near future,” adding that Russian forces have possibly planted explosive devices on the roofs of the third and the fourth reactors.

After inspecting parts of the station, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said they had not yet found any explosives. However, on July 5, IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said that the experts have yet to be granted access to the reactors’ rooftops.

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest nuclear power station in Europe, has been under Russian occupation since March 2022. Russian forces have since been using Europe’s largest nuclear power plant as a military base to launch attacks against Ukrainian-controlled territory.

On July 4, Zelensky said that the international leaders should show Moscow they are ready to respond to Russia’s potential attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

“Now the whole world must realize that common security depends entirely on global attention to the occupiers' actions at the station,” he said.

On the edge of disaster: What could really happen if Russia destroys Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant?

In late June, 16 months into the full-scale Russian invasion, President Volodymyr Zelensky alerted his nation of an unprecedented threat. Russia, the president said, had rigged the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant with explosives, and was ready to set off the charges and cause radiation to…

The Kyiv IndependentFrancis Farrell

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eagletek · 1 year

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Risk of nuclear conflict at highest level in decades, Russian minister says

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Wednesday it was distressing to see the aftermath of Russian bombardments after he made an unannounced visit to the eastern Donbas region. “It is distressing to look at the cities of Donbas, to which Russia has brought terrible suffering and ruin,” Zelensky said in his nightly address. “The almost constant, hourly air-alert siren in Kramatorsk, the…

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hostor-infotech · 1 year

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Risk of nuclear conflict at highest level in decades, Russian minister says

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blakhanside00 · 2 years

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Watch "MAJOR ALERT! UK Sends EMERGENCY Messages, Russias HIGHEST Level of Nuclear Alert, USA Warns China" on YouTube

youtube

#Youtube

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greyssingapore · 2 years

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Are we at defcon 3

Only Russia has said that it has put its deterrent forces, including its nuclear arsenal on high alert at this time. In total there are nine countries that possess nuclear weapons. White House press secretary Jen Psaki told ABC's George Stephanopoulos on "This Week" that it’s part of a pattern by Putin of “manufacturing threats that don't exist in order to justify further aggression.” US government officials have said that this is just another unnecessary escalation of the crisis. Republican senators criticised for potentially endangering President Zelesnkyy.Vladimir Putin lookalike: the innocent man scared for his life.American veterans fighting Russia in Ukraine.Watch Zelensky documentary 'Servant of the People'.So far, senior US defense officials have said they “do not talk about our strategic posture as a matter of policy.” Also see: The directive by the Russian leader is “unprecedented in the post-Cold War era," Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association, told NBC News something no leader has done in the middle of a crisis from either country since. This was in response to NATO powers’ making what he called “aggressive statements” and calling the sanctions imposed on Russia “illegal.” Russian president Vladimir Putin escalated the current tensions with NATO over his decision to send troops into neighboring Ukraine on Sunday when he told his military commanders to put his nation’s strategic nuclear forces on “special alert,” their highest level.

#Are we at defcon 3

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nicklloydnow · 2 years

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“If the war continues to move against the Russians, and particularly if the Ukrainians begin to invade Crimea, they will reach ever greater levels of fear that the future of the Russian regime is at stake. Some genius within the Russian leadership will then put forward the idea that they can reverse the momentum and demonstrate their greater willingness to accept Armageddon by a nuclear demonstration. As Michael Kofman and Anya Lukianov Fink have noted, Russian military analysts have long believed in “a demonstrative use of force, and could subsequently include nuclear use for demonstration purposes.” The West, this Russian optimist will argue, doesn’t really care about Ukraine and will recoil at the real prospect of nuclear war. Lacking better options, or really any other options at all beyond surrender, Russian President Vladmir Putin (or his successor) will seize on this deus ex machina. Such thin hopes of turning defeat into victory are the most effective enemies of peace.

Russian forces will launch a small number of tactical nuclear attacks against Ukrainian troop concentrations or NATO supply lines within Ukraine. If they can’t find any of those, they will use them against Ukrainian civilian targets. The target is not essential because the point of this attack will be to destroy Western will to continue supporting Ukraine, not to directly reverse the military situation. They would additionally put their strategic nuclear forces on alert and begin “unusual movements” of nuclear assets in an effort to warn the United States against responding to the attack.

The United States government has certainly considered this contingency, which is why both National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken were recently dispatched to warn the Russians they would suffer “horrific” and “catastrophic” consequences if they used nuclear weapons in Ukraine. In the event, however, the U.S. government will struggle to find a response that reflects the gravity of the Russian use of nuclear weapons but does not represent further escalation toward direct confrontation and all-out nuclear war.

The American equivalent of the Russian genius will argue that a direct, proportionate response aimed at the attack itself will send a signal to the Russian leadership that the United States is seeking to punish the crime of nuclear use, not escalate the war or overthrow the Russian regime. They will see the Russian strategic nuclear alert as a bluff, arguing that to follow through with a strategic nuclear attack would be suicide. Lacking better options, the U.S. leadership will seize on the idea of such a finely calibrated response and launch a conventional NATO attack on Russian troop formations in Ukraine or the military base in Russia where the Russian nuclear strike originated from. As a precaution, they will also put U.S. nuclear forces on alert, put more U.S. nuclear submarines to sea and recommend to the British and French that that they also put their forces on alert — if these two independent powers had not done so already.

Unfortunately, such a subtle message is likely to be lost on a paranoid Kremlin. They will see a direct NATO attack on Russia or Russian forces as confirmation of their view that the West intends to destroy the Russian regime and kill all its leaders. For Russian leaders this is an ever-present reality: Putin reportedly obsessively watches the video of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi’s death after he was overthrown by NATO forces. Facing the prospect of death if they do not act to save their regime, Russian leaders will risk launching further conventional and tactical nuclear strikes on NATO troop formations and Ukrainian supply operations in bordering NATO states such as Poland and Estonia to signal that Russia is willing and able to defend itself despite the risk of strategic nuclear escalation.

The attacked NATO states will invoke Article 5 and NATO will begin a conventional operation to eliminate Russia’s offensive capability to make such attacks. Fearing that those attacks will destroy the Russian strategic nuclear capability and thus leave them defenseless against NATO conventional forces, the Russians will launch a first-strike strategic nuclear attack on the slim hope that it will weaken the Western resolve or capability to respond and save their regime. I will then have something in the order of a few minutes to send out an email to my colleagues saying, “I told you so.”

This is only a scenario. None of it is inevitable, of course. But this is the path that we are currently on and the likelihood of it coming to pass grows by the day as one side or the other becomes more desperate.”

“Russian nuclear strategy has been the subject of vigorous debates in recent years. Some believe it hides a plan to compel war termination through early use of nuclear arms after a case of aggression, i.e., escalate to de-escalate; others see it primarily as a defensive deterrent to be used in exigent circumstances. Analysts have argued that Russia’s lowered nuclear threshold is a myth, a temporary measure born out of conventional inferiority. Others believe that “escalate to de-escalate” does not exist as a doctrine, or that the term itself should be terminated because the real strategy is escalation control.

(…)

CNA’s Russia Studies Program recently concluded a study on Russia’s strategy for escalation management, or intra-war deterrence, across the conflict spectrum from peacetime to nuclear war. The research consulted a representative sample of over 700 Russian-language articles from authoritative military publications over the past three decades. Delving into the current state of Russian military strategy and thinking on these subjects, we found that the Russian defense establishment has developed a mature system of deterrence and a coherent escalation management strategy, integrating conventional, strategic, and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Russian thinking on deterrence and escalation management is the result of decades of debates and concept development. Official policies, strategies, and doctrines offer glints of the thinking behind Russian nuclear strategy, using refereed terms and concepts whose actual contents are discussed extensively in military writings.

(…)

Russian strategy, integrating nonnuclear and nuclear deterrence, is intended to solve a straightforward escalation dilemma stemming from a lack of force flexibility and capability in the 1990s: The United States could inflict unacceptable damage on Russia with conventional capabilities and attain victory with precision-guided weapons in the initial period of war while making minimal contact with Russian forces. Moscow’s answer would necessitate large-scale use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in theater. This was an untenable situation, which led to the Russian military’s quest for both the ways and means to build a “deterrence ladder” with multiple rungs, and flexibility in conventional and nuclear options, to manage escalation. Conventional force modernization has not altered Russian thinking on the importance of nuclear weapons at higher thresholds of conflict, for intra-war deterrence, and ultimately for warfighting.

The Russian military sees an independent conventional war as possible, but believes conflict is unlikely to remain conventional as it escalates. This is not a departure from late-Soviet military thought. The military expects a great-power war between nuclear peers to eventually involve nuclear weapons, and is comfortable with this reality, unlike U.S. strategists. However, in contrast with Soviet thinking, the Russian military does not believe that limited nuclear use necessarily leads to uncontrolled escalation. The Russian military believes that calibrated use of conventional and nuclear capability is not only possible but may have decisive deterrent effects. This is not an enthusiastically embraced strategy, but an establishment’s answers to wicked problems, in the context of a great-power conflict, which have no easy or ideal solutions.

(…)

Russian stratagems can be divided up into phases of demonstrative actions operating under the principle of deterrence by fear-inducement (устрашение), and progressive infliction of damage, which is deterrence through limited use of force (силовое сдерживание). Deterrence by fear-inducement operates through demonstrative acts, which, during peacetime or a period of perceived military threat, communicate that Russian forces have the means and resolve to inflict damage against an opponent’s vitally important targets. These objects — for example, nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, chemical and petroleum industry facilities, and others — are those that might lead to significant economic losses or loss of life, or impact the target nation’s way of life.

(…)

If escalation cannot be managed, then capabilities are employed en masse for warfighting and retaliation. Generally, the Russian military sees escalation management as possible up to larger-scale employment of nuclear weapons. Subsequent use of force falls primarily into the retaliation category.

As a regional or large-scale conflict escalates, the Russian military could follow the employment of nonnuclear capabilities with single and grouped nuclear strikes using nonstrategic nuclear weapons, either for the purposes of demonstration; against a target in a third country; or against deployed adversary forces. As prospects for managing escalation decline, use of force intensifies with extensive use of precision-guided conventional weapons in a regional war. In a large-scale war, the Russian military expects that its forces will use nonstrategic nuclear weapons in warfighting, together with limited use of strategic nuclear weapons.

The purpose of limited strikes is to shock or otherwise stun opponents, making them realize the economic, political, and military costs they will pay for further aggression, but also to offer them off-ramps. The approaches described above are not mechanistic. Military science may give the impression that these actions are preprogrammed, but much depends on the context and what Russian political leadership authorizes (and the manner in which that authority is given). The figure below offers one representation of the potential courses of action.

(…)

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has largely disarmed of tactical nuclear weapons save the B-61 variants of gravity bombs, while Russia reduced its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal by about 75 percent. However, the Russian military has been modernizing and expanding nonstrategic nuclear weapons alongside strategic conventional ones. This suggests a different philosophy at work in terms of the balance between conventional and nuclear capabilities in Russian military strategy. Russia sees nuclear weapons as essential because their psychological impact, and deterrent effect, cannot be supplanted by conventional capabilities. They are an asymmetric investment to neutralize U.S. conventional advantages, representing a competitive strategy. Simply put, conventional weapons cannot match the deterrence bang for the ruble spent on nuclear weapons.

No less important is the theory that binds Russian conventional, nonstrategic, and strategic nuclear weapons. Limited use of conventional weapons has added coercive effect if nuclear use is expected to follow, and it lends credibility to follow-on nuclear threats, which by themselves might prove unconvincing in early phases of escalation. A large strategic nuclear arsenal is not just important as a survivable nuclear deterrent. It raises the fear of uncontrolled nuclear escalation once nuclear weapons are used. This nuclear dread generates psychological pressure on the elites and population of a targeted state to avoid escalation once nuclear weapons are used.

(…)

Compared to Russian military considerations of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the criteria for use of nuclear forces remains unchanged, and if anything the thinking has been refined over the last two decades, as has declaratory policy. The role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons has been pushed further into regional or large-scale war, with Russia preferring conventional options in a crisis and the initial period of conflict. What has changed in the last two decades is not so much the threshold, but more so the timing when nuclear weapons might come into play. There is strong doubt in Russian military circles that political leadership will authorize early, preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In general, despite some marginal voices who consistently call for early nuclear use, the consensus is that attempts to coerce with nuclear weapons early on will not be credible. This is precisely why the Russian military invested in complementary means of nonnuclear deterrence. However, Russia’s strategy of deterrence by fear-inducement when under military threat makes heavy use of nuclear signaling, which serves to create the impression that the country is far looser with its thinking on nuclear use than is actually the case.

Important differences exist between Russian military thinking on escalation management and what some have characterized as Russia’s early war-termination strategy, nicknamed “escalate to de-escalate,” where Moscow acts aggressively and seeks to terminate the war with preemptive nuclear use. De-escalation as envisioned by the Russian military means escalation management, which includes containing conflict to a specified threshold — for example, keeping a limited war from becoming a regional war — or deterring other states from becoming involved; containing the war geographically; attaining a cessation of hostilities on acceptable but not necessarily victorious terms; or simply generating an operational pause. It includes more than simply war termination. Successful escalation management results in escalation control, because escalation control is not something you do, but something you get as the result.

Single or grouped strikes may or may not result in follow-on nuclear escalation, but widespread use of nuclear weapons is not about escalation management. It is for general warfighting as a last-ditch effort in cases where the military is losing a war and the state is under threat. Can Russia find itself fighting a war that it perceives to be defensive in nature, and then resort to nuclear first use as the conflict escalates? Absolutely, but this proposition assumes a host of military and nonmilitary actions taken on both sides prior to nuclear escalation, rather than an attempt at preemptive nuclear coercion. There is no gimmicky “escalate to win” strategy, in which military strategists believe they can start and quickly end a conflict on their terms thanks to the wonders of nuclear weapons. The U.S. defense strategy community needs to put away this boogeyman and stop telling this scary tale like some kind of nuclear ghost story. The Russian military has a visibly different comfort level with nuclear weapons than the United States, and arguably always will, but it does not write of nuclear escalation in recklessly optimistic terms, incognizant of the associated risks.

(…)

The challenge posed by Russian nuclear strategy is not just a capability gap, but a cognitive gap. The Russian military establishment has spent decades thinking and arguing about escalation management, the role of conventional and nuclear weapons, targeting, damage, etc. In the United States, precious little attention has been paid to the question of escalation management, which is overshadowed by planning for warfighting. Thinking on escalation management and limited nuclear war should take priority, because the political leadership of any state entering a crisis with a nuclear peer will inevitably wish to be assured that a plausible strategy for escalation management and war termination exists. Otherwise, leaders may back down because the risks may simply outweigh U.S. interests at stake, and the defense establishment’s ideas for managing that potential escalation prove unconvincing.

(…)

Any conflict with Russia will always be implicitly nuclear in nature. If it is not managed, then the logic of such a war is to escalate to nuclear use. The United States needs to develop its own strategy for escalation management, and a stronger comfort level with the realities of nuclear war.”

“The president is the ultimate decision maker when it comes to using Russian nuclear weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, according to Russia's nuclear doctrine.

The so-called nuclear briefcase, or "Cheget" (named after Mount Cheget in the Caucasus Mountains), is with the president at all times. The Russian defence minister, currently Sergei Shoigu, and the chief of the general staff, currently Valery Gerasimov, are also thought to have such briefcases.

Essentially, the briefcase is a communication tool which links the president to his military top brass and thence to rocket forces via the highly secret "Kazbek" electronic command-and-control network. Kazbek supports another system known as "Kavkaz".

Footage shown by Russia's Zvezda television channel in 2019 showed what it said was one of the briefcases with an array of buttons. In a section called "command" there are two buttons: a white "launch" button and a red "cancel" button. The briefcase is activated by a special flashcard, according to Zvezda.

If Russia thought it faced a strategic nuclear attack, the president, via the briefcases, would send a direct launch order to general staff command and reserve command units which hold nuclear codes. Such orders cascade swiftly down different communications systems to strategic rocket force units which then fire at the United States and Europe.

If a nuclear attack were confirmed, Putin could activate the so-called "Dead Hand" or "Perimetr" system of last resort: essentially computers would decide doomsday. A control rocket would order nuclear strikes from across Russia's vast armoury.

(…)

To prepare a TNW strike, it is likely that Putin would consult with senior allies from the Russian Security Council before ordering, via the general staff, that a warhead be joined with a delivery vehicle and prepared for a potential launch order.

These steps could be picked up by Western intelligence, as would unusual Russian troop movements away from any potential target in Ukraine or change to Russia's nuclear posture.

"I think Putin would signal and would want us to see that he was moving towards nuclear weapons because he would like to get whatever he wants for free," said Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control expert at The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

"If you are going to use a nuclear weapon to send a very costly signal, the first thing you do is say: ‘You know what I am going to do, right?’. And then you might get what you are asking for and if you don’t then you go through with it."

Because Putin could not predict the U.S. response, Russia's entire nuclear posture would change: submarines would go to sea, missile forces would be put on full alert and strategic bombers would be visible at bases, ready for immediate takeoff.

Then, at his leisure, Putin could use his nuclear briefcase to give, or not to give, a launch order.

"You can imagine that Putin might want to have a slow process so that Ukraine and West would sweat as they watched the preparations," said Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists.”

“'It is a common joke among nuclear experts that the best advice in the event of a strike is to make sure you die in the first wave,' Dr Lewis says, grimly.”

#war #nuclear war #nuclear weapons #russia #ukraine #america #nato #armageddon #putin #jeremy shapiro #michael kofman #anya loukianova fink #jeffrey lewis #middlebury #middlebury institute

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infoidiots · 3 years

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Russian President Vladimir Putin Puts Nuclear Forces On Extreme Alert

Russian President Vladimir Putin puts nuclear forces on extreme alert; Western Region squeezes Russia’s economy KYIV/MOSCOW, Feb 27 – President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear forces on extreme alert on Sunday in the side of a blast of Western payback for his fight on Ukraine, which said it had opposed Russian field troops fighting with its biggest cities. President Vladimir Putin…

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#infoidiots #infoidiots.com #nuclear deterrence forces meaning #putin new nuclear weapons #russia nuclear alert levels #russia nuclear high alert meaning #russia nuclear reddit #russia-ukraine #Russian President Vladimir Putin Puts Nuclear Forces On Extreme Alert #what are russian nuclear deterrent forces #what is nuclear deterrence forces

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incarnateirony · 3 years

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Good(ish? in war news?) news

The tides may actually be turning.

Grim as it is to see, the images of the smoking Russian tank, and the body abandoned in the snow for about 12 hours, signal a change for the battle within.

Russian troops generally carry like, portable cremation. Leave no trace of any loss or failure behind. Absolute victory is the only image Putin wants presented. For their posts to be devastated, their equipment shattered and yes, bodies left out like that--they were DECIMATED. If anyone survived, they fled, from the strength of Ukraine's resolve.

This is unsurprising. Putin tricked many of these poor men that they were going as a "training exercise." A Russian special forces team even surrendered when they realized they were. You know. There to invade Ukraine and kill Ukranians. That man is being given more honor by Ukraine than his own "leader" is.

So it's tough to look at. But we have to understand what that means, just as much as the Ghost of Kyiv.

And also why the putinbots are swarming twitter right now yelling "FAKE", vaguely questioning if someone made it up, never answering what makes them think it's fake, except this one subset of bots, that keep yelling it's not snowing in Ukraine and it's sunny, and no amount of Ukranians showing their weather report that it is very very much snowing has stopped them.

Putin cares. Not about the loss. But about his image of absolute power.

Ukraine. Is. Standing.

Putin sent young men to die who had no idea. The Ukranians are fighting for their home. Who among them do you think has the resolve?

And now, in true sign of Putin's struggles, He asked Kazakhstan--one of his closest allies-- to send reinforcements.

Kazakhstan declined.

While this is probably partially due to Kazakhstan's own instabilities being unable to yield troops for Putin, the second part of the statement says they still don't support it--they do not recognize the Russia-created "breakaway republics" as the pretext for aggression in Ukraine

This is good news. First, Putin tried to make the rebel breakaways. The Russian people rejected months of propaganda of "attackers". The world sanctioned. His seats were lost. Soldiers fleeing. HE IS LOSING. Kazakhstan saying "no." What's he got left? China?

And what of his obsession with the image of power? He needs help. His own allies are going "nah, that ain't my wank, man. That's your circus."

and the real question is, while China has the manpower and the control of their media better than russia had over its genpop, China's already playing teeter totter with the UNGA thing about Sec Seat position making its relationship with Russia #awkward

After all. Ukraine has issued challenge to who is the inheritor of the USSR, because it was never formally outlined/updated as Russia, there is no documentation. Ukraine has its papers to exist, and frankly, the original capitol. Ukraine, when this all started, essentially challenged that it should have the security seat that Russia occupies.

And China? Well. China won the seat from Taiwan the same way. So if they like. try to back russia up on that verse. then they lose THEIR seat. So like. they might. want to play nice with the likely new security seat, Ukraine. After all, again, Putin's obviously floundering. Does he even have a direction right now? They told their people on the Propaganda News it was just a minor Ukraine crisis, not an invasion. Everyone can just stay at home, and they move on. It would be outright cartoon villain plot level for China to randomly onboard for an already waffling coup.

As long as Europe stays resolved, NATO stays on alert, everyone's aware counter-nuclear options are in range with the US air and special forces there... we may actually be able to de escalate this.

It will still be rough for a while. Blood probably isn't over being spilled. But there's a chance we've actually passed the darkest point and may be able to turn this ship around from here. y'know. not mutually assured destruction. that's good news, right?

#ukraine

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