#it is a framework of moral calculus

[berl-balagula]

L

I think a lot of Jewish rhetoric, especially online, can make you forget that Orthodox Judaism is an exclusive ideology. It makes claims about the moral, metaphysical, and spiritual nature of reality, and believes these claims to be objectively true.

[max1461]

A political discourse thing that really annoys me is when the following happens:

Speaker: "I think X is good" Speaker's intended interpretation: "I think X, all else being equal, is a positive thing". For instance, if the speaker has a utilitarian moral framework or similar: "I think X contributes a positive term to the moral calculus a given situation". Interlocutor's interpretation: "[Speaker] thinks that all trade-offs which (according to [interlocutor]'s belief system) are required to produce the outcome X are justified". For instance, if the interlocutor has a utilitarian moral framework or similar: "[Speaker] thinks that the moral calculus in all or most situations in which X arises works out to be net positive".

Or even the less egregious case in which we have

Interlocutor's interpretation: "[Speaker] thinks that all trade-offs which (according to [speaker]'s belief system) are required to produce the outcome X are justified". For instance, if the interlocutor believes the speaker has a utilitarian moral framework or similar: "[Speaker] thinks that the moral calculus in all or most situations in which X arises works out to be net positive".

Obviously, the first scenario combines a failure of mind with a strawmanning tendency (interpreting [speaker] to be saying something stronger than they necessarily are, making them more likely to be wrong). The second scenario involves only the strawmanning tendency. Both of these are quite common and annoying as FUCK.

[azspot]

In fact, the notion that it’s imperative to increase the number of people in the world and that creating new lives is thus morally equivalent to preventing deaths is a key pillar of the techno-optimist worldview. This is the same formula by which Steven Pinker is able to declare that a world in which a growing absolute number of people face violence and starvation is nevertheless a desirable one as long as the proportion of such people in the overall population decreases—equivalent to claiming that a warlord who enslaves a hundred villagers but sires a thousand free children has made a net positive contribution to humanity. The presumption that perpetual population growth is self-evidently both desirable and inevitable, combined with a moral framework that assigns the same weight to potential lives as existing ones, results in a bizarre utilitarian calculus concluding that any action with the slightest chance of impacting the distant future carries a moral weight many magnitudes greater than any concern for the mere eight billion humans alive today. This conclusion forms the basis of longtermism—the L in TESCREAL.

Homo Algorithmicus

[oathbreakerapologist]

so how would the other companions react to ghost's return to orin?

hey, thanks for the question!!

I definitely think their reactions are colored by the fact that "trying to escape the control of an abuser/a high-control group" is basically the unifying narrative among the (especially but not exclusively origin) companions' backstories—Astarion is escaping from Cazador, Gale from Mystra, Karlach from Zariel, Lae'zel from Vlaakith & her followers, Shadowheart from Shar & her followers, Wyll from Mizora, and Minthara is escaping the Absolute & its followers—and I can't imagine that that wouldn't shape their read of his situation.

To a group of people that, as of the time in act 3 in which he'd probably be leaving the party, would certainly have realized that they've all been victimized by abusers that are skilled at keeping people in their clutches, Ghost's return to Orin and the Cult of Bhaal would probably look a whole lot like a return to a manipulative, controlling abuser. For that reason, I imagine his departure would strike a rather personal chord across the party, even for those that had a rather low opinion of him.

There's a handful of companions that would likely be able to read between the lines, despite how they're primed to see his departure through the lens of a return to an abuser. Shadowheart, Astarion, and Lae'zel are solid contenders here, as Ghost gets along well with them, but despite Ghost's personal distaste for Minthara, I think her combination of shared history and situational awareness makes her uniquely able to read him like a book no matter how little he opens up to her.

For those that know him or can otherwise read him well, it's obvious that the recapture-by-abuser narrative really doesn't fit that well.

Ghost is a deeply, deeply abnormal person (he doesn't even see himself as a person!). He thrives in deeply, deeply abnormal circumstances. Within Ghost's extremely limited and pleasure-driven moral framework, attempting to return to Orin is obviously the correct path to take in his current situation, because as far as he can tell, that path's possible outcomes are:

She rejects and kills him. Though he intends to be the last one alive, to die at her hands would be a fitting death, so this is an acceptable if not positive outcome.

She accepts him and he retakes his place beside her at the head of the Cult of Bhaal. He gets his beloved back in his life, and he gets to return to a pleasurable life of sadistic debauchery, unceasing slaughter, and ultimate control. This is an exceptionally positive (if unlikely) outcome.

She takes him back as a subordinate to her. He gets his beloved back in his life, and he gets to return to a pleasurable life of sadistic debauchery and unceasing slaughter. He maintains a position of significant power, and he lives in service to the one person he considers superior to himself. This is a positive outcome.

Notably, his calculus here has almost nothing to do with Bhaal, and placating/appeasing Orin is little more than a means to an end. Aside from going back to her, his other options involve leading a close-to-immortal life without the person he sees as his soulmate and almost certainly without the steady stream of (pleasurable) violence he'd get from being back in the Cult of Bhaal, or possibly dying a nasty tadpole-related death along the way. From his hedonistic, self-centered, and amoral perspective, going back to Orin is a rational choice.

He's not returning to an abusive, controlling cult—well, he's not returning because of the abuse and control—he's taking a path that offers him the best possible shot at getting what he really wants: excitement, power, opportunities to enact violence, and proximity to Orin.

That doesn't make his departure any easier to accept, though. At the end of the day, a man with whom they'd bonded during one of the most harrowing periods of their lives abandoned them in the middle of the night to go probably get killed by his sinister ex-lover on the off chance she'd take him back and let him be at the head of a murder cult with her again. A man that they thought was on his way towards rescuing himself from his past, just like all of the rest of them were doing, had turned right around and marched back to the terrible home from whence he'd set out. A man they thought they were close with had forsaken them without so much as a goodbye.

Perhaps the most difficult part to accept was that the thing with which they'd been travelling was less like them—less of a single life than a force of nature, less of a person than an embodied disease—than they'd ever imagined.

[boredtechnologist]

Resident Evil Outbreak File #2 for Sony PlayStation 2, provides a fertile ground for exploring the philosophical concept of personal sacrifice, especially in the face of catastrophic events. The game’s narrative, which involves characters such as Kevin Ryman, Alyssa Ashcroft, and David King, among others, allows for a profound exploration of this theme through the lens of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics.

1. Utilitarianism and the Greater Good: John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian principle, which proposes that actions are right if they promote happiness and wrong if they produce the opposite, can be applied to analyze the decisions players must make in "Resident Evil Outbreak File #2." In scenarios where characters must decide whether to sacrifice themselves or others to save the group, utilitarian ethics would advocate for the choice that maximizes overall well-being, even at the cost of individual sacrifice. For example, the decision to hold back the undead to allow others time to escape reflects a utilitarian calculus of sacrificing one for the happiness and survival of many.

2. Kantian Ethics and the Respect for Persons: Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics, which emphasize duty and respect for individuals as ends in themselves, offer a contrasting perspective to utilitarianism. Kantian ethics would challenge decisions that treat individuals merely as means to an end, even in desperate times. The personal sacrifices characters might make, such as Kevin Ryman’s potential self-sacrificial acts to protect others, can be seen as embodying Kantian morality, where actions are motivated by duty and the recognition of the inherent worth of each person.

3. Virtue Ethics and Moral Character: Aristotelian virtue ethics focus on the development of good character traits that enable individuals to live and act rightly. The characters in "Resident Evil Outbreak File #2," through their experiences and choices, have opportunities to develop virtues such as courage, compassion, and loyalty. The various scenarios that test their limits can be seen as moments of moral and character education, where the right action is the one that expresses virtuous character. For instance, Alyssa Ashcroft's decisions could demonstrate courage and practical wisdom (phronesis), as she navigates the complexities of survival while considering the welfare of others.

4. Existentialism and Authentic Existence: Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialists assert that individuals are defined by their actions under pressure, emphasizing authenticity and the acceptance of one’s freedom and responsibility. In the dire context of "Resident Evil Outbreak File #2," characters are confronted with existential choices that test their authenticity. David King’s potential sacrifices, for instance, can be viewed through this lens—choosing to act in a manner consistent with his values and acceptance of his existential freedom, even when faced with death.

5. Feminist Ethics and the Ethics of Care: Feminist ethics, particularly the ethics of care as proposed by Carol Gilligan, stress the importance of context, relationships, and emotional engagement in ethical decision-making. This perspective can enrich the understanding of personal sacrifices within the game, emphasizing the relational and interconnected nature of the characters’ decisions. The care shown by one character to another, in risking their own safety, highlights the moral significance of empathy, care, and interdependence in ethical reasoning.

In conclusion, "Resident Evil Outbreak File #2" not only provides a gripping survival horror experience but also serves as a profound narrative framework for exploring complex ethical dilemmas surrounding personal sacrifice. Through the decisions and sacrifices of its characters, the game invites players to engage with and reflect on various philosophical debates concerning utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, existentialism, and feminist ethics, making it a rich text for philosophical inquiry into the nature of moral decision-making in extreme situations.

[straightlightyagami]

effective altruism fails every criticism ever lobbed at utilitarianism and is headed by some of the most distasteful people you could find. not a fan. i think the pretty basic critique of "it's always concrete losses for abstract gains" is compelling enough. JohntheDuncan called "Bourgeois morality for the 21st century" which i find pretty accurate. it's moral calculus that somehow always ends up with the end result of "it is right for me to have my money. i know what is best for all of humanity. we in the present can somehow understand what is good for those far into the future" i think it's spineless, to be frank

yea honestly I agree that it’s bad how many people use it just to retroactively justify a status quo that benefits them (tho this is far from a problem unique to ea or utilitarianism…), and i agree that much of the longtermist stuff is basically meaningless. but in terms of base principles to me personally utilitarianism (or some variant of it) is far superior to other especially non-consequentialist ethical frameworks. and the basic idea of effective altruism, ie using resources in a way that maximally benefits others, is just like… obviously correct. also the mosquito nets thing is good. but yea the weird ai risk or longtermist aspects of it are likely to be a waste of resources that could be better used elsewhere

[intermundia]

i've gotten pushback on this post before about how inconsistent it is to claim nuance exists and then deny the sith (who canonically think in absolutes) that ambiguity. this is frustrating to me on so many levels. the way that star wars works is that the story is set within an explicitly defined framework of black and white morality, selfishness vs selflessness, the corruption of greed reflected in how the dark side disturbs the normal balance of the force.

where nuance is relevant to star wars is not in the morality, which is stark and clear (e.g. it's good to seek to help others instead of yourself, to respect life and only shoot when shot at, etc), or in the mechanics of the force, it's in how those moral stances operate inside a historical and political environment. there is nuance in how the jedi are trapped in a bind of having multiple obligations that can be contradictory, and they have to make judgement calls about how to serve as best as possible for the best possible outcome.

the sith's greed is simple, the jedi's altruism is complex. you can debate the moral calculus of the council when they made difficult decisions in lose-lose situations, without blaming the jedi and saying that 'evil is good actually' as if it's a valid take on the material. those who seek to read the order in bad faith (as a baby stealing cult) are not engaging with the version of star wars that exists anywhere other than the fanon funhouse mirror version in their minds.

all of these memes are a result of a conversation with an acquaintance at a friend's wedding. i knew this guy was a star wars super fan, and was excited to talk about the media i love so much. there was nothing worse than realizing his version of loving the material was the same as youtube theory bros who are high on their own "analytical skills" of completely ignoring genre and canon in order to be contrarian and superior to those who are so foolish as to care what the story actually says in the text.

Basically,

[so-true-overdue]

The Gallant Charade: Unmasking the Illusions of Effective Altruism

In a world where benevolence is often brandished as a badge of honor, the doctrine of Effective Altruism (EA) has emerged as the self-proclaimed paragon of philanthropic virtue. Yet, beneath its veneer of magnanimity lies a labyrinth of self-serving motives, authoritarian tendencies, and overly simplistic paradigms. Let us embark on a journey to unravel the intricacies of this ostensibly noble movement and explore more enlightened alternatives.

The Illusion of Altruistic Purity

At its core, Effective Altruism purports to maximize the impact of charitable endeavors through a calculated, almost mechanistic approach. However, this ostensibly altruistic pursuit is often marred by an insidious undercurrent of self-aggrandizement. Proponents of EA frequently bask in the glow of their own perceived moral superiority, as if their meticulously quantified benevolence elevates them above the common rabble of well-intentioned do-gooders. This self-congratulatory ethos, cloaked in the guise of altruism, is nothing short of a gallant charade.

The Authoritarian Undertones

The authoritarian proclivities of Effective Altruism manifest in its prescriptive dogma, dictating not only the causes deemed worthy of support but also the methodologies by which aid should be dispensed. This top-down approach, reminiscent of a benevolent dictatorship, stifles the organic evolution of charitable endeavors and undermines the agency of those it purports to help. By imposing a rigid framework of utilitarian calculus, EA inadvertently reduces the rich tapestry of human compassion to a sterile ledger of cost-benefit analyses.

The Perils of Oversimplification

In its quest for efficiency, Effective Altruism often succumbs to the siren call of oversimplification. By distilling complex social issues into a series of quantifiable metrics, EA risks overlooking the nuanced realities that underpin human suffering. This reductionist approach, while appealing in its apparent clarity, fails to account for the multifaceted nature of global challenges and the myriad factors that contribute to their persistence. In doing so, EA inadvertently perpetuates a myopic worldview that prioritizes expediency over empathy.

A Call for Holistic Philanthropy

In light of these criticisms, it is imperative to explore more holistic alternatives to Effective Altruism. One such approach is the embrace of community-centric philanthropy, which prioritizes the empowerment of local actors and the cultivation of grassroots initiatives. By fostering collaboration and inclusivity, this model eschews the paternalistic tendencies of EA and champions the agency of those most affected by societal inequities.

Conclusion: Beyond the Illusions

In conclusion, while Effective Altruism may present itself as the epitome of philanthropic efficacy, its self-serving, authoritarian, and overly simplistic tendencies render it an inadequate paradigm for addressing the complexities of global suffering. By embracing more holistic and inclusive approaches to philanthropy, we can transcend the illusions of EA and forge a path toward a more equitable and compassionate world. Let us cast aside the gallant charade and strive for a future where altruism is not merely effective, but truly transformative.

[spectershaped]

Now I'm thinking about, like. Obviously "don't get your ethical framework from fiction" is a very sound proposition. But something about this whole discussion intrigues me?

If you look at something like a fable, which is kind of an almost elementary morality tale, the way it conveys morals is usually both reliant on the display of hypothetical consequences and on the assumption, a priori, of some sort of preexistent sense of rudimentary Good and Bad on the listener's part, even if it's something like "Pain/Death/Eternal Damnation = Bad". Like in all philosophy, there is no real argument that something is bad in this absolute, irreducible sense, only that some principle is incoherent or leads to something you have already accepted is bad

So, in a sense, the conversation is less about morality per se than it is about the factors involved in a moral calculus? For example, the arguments often made against revolutionary action end up having to reference either the unintended consequences of it - which is easy to do in a scenario you have more or less made up - or some deeper moral principle you trust the other party to already have accepted (such as "violence itself is bad"); conversely, one who argues in favor of revolutionary action needs to either point to its positive consequences or posit that society already is structured around violence and thus you can only really choose a violence that will lead to less violence. In all of those cases, you've only kinda kicked the can further down the road

But, if you're a historical/dialetical materialist (and, to be maybe a little pedantic, even if you're not), kicking the can down the road sorta is all you can do, because there is no concrete substance to morality itself other than its role as part of a larger process, which kind of also happen to be the case with everything, really. "Basing your morality on reality" really just means "analyzing the concrete conditions of the world around you in order to fulfill the principles you already possess due to various factors which are neither transcendent nor universal but historically contingent"

As always, thinking too much about this stuff just kinda makes me feel like Dr. Manhattan but without the cool reality bending powers. So more like a worm who knows too much for its own good

[conceptsnest]

EXPLORING SITUATIONAL ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR DYNAMICS: THE SENSITIVITIES OF MORAL COMPASS – CHAPTER -02

***Continued from Chapter 01 (Covered previously: What is Situational Ethics, The Meaning & Context of Agape, The Three Views Of Situational Ethics)

Link to Chapter 01:

The Four Working Principles of Situationism

Principle 1. Pragmatism

The situationalist follows a strategy, which is pragmatic. “Pragmatism” is a well worked-out philosophical position adopted by the likes of John Dewey (1859–1952), Charles Peirce (1839–1914) and William James (1842–1910). Fletcher does not want his theory associated with these views and rejects all the implications of this type of “Pragmatism”.

What makes his view pragmatic is very simple. It is just his attraction to moral views, which do not try to work out what to do in the abstract, but rather explores how moral views might play out in each real life situations.

Principle 2: Relativism

Even with his rejection of Antinomianism and his acceptance of one supreme principle of morality, Fletcher, surprisingly, still calls himself a relativist. It is just an appeal for people to stop trying to “lay down the law” for all people in all contexts. If situations vary then consequences vary and what we ought to do will change accordingly. This is a very simple, unsophisticated idea and just means that what is right or wrong is related to the situation we are in.

Principle 3: Positivism

His use of “positivism” is not the philosophical idea with the same name but rather is where any moral or value judgment in ethics, like a theologian’s faith propositions, is a decision — not a conclusion.It is a choice, not a result reached by force of logic or reasoning, rather it is a decision we take.

Principle 4: Personalism

Love is something that is experienced by people. So Personalism is the view that if we are to maximize love we need to consider the person in a situation — the “who” of a situation.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 05

Conscience as a Verb not a Noun

“Conscience” plays a role in working out what to do. Conscience is not the name of an internal faculty nor is it a sort of internal “moral compass”.

Fletcher refers to conscience as a verb. Imagine we have heard some bullies laughing because they have sent our friend some offensive texts and we are trying to decide whether or not to check his phone to delete the texts before he does. The old “noun” view of conscience would get us to think about this in the abstract, perhaps reason about it.

Instead, we need to be in the situation, and experience the situation, we need to be doing (hence “verb”) the experiencing. Maybe, we might conclude that it is right to go into our friend’s phone, maybe we will not but whatever happens the outcome could not have been known beforehand. What our conscience would have us do is revealed when we live in the world and not through armchair reflection.

The Six Propositions of Situation Ethics

1: Only one ‘thing’ is intrinsically good; namely, love, nothing else at all

There is one thing which is intrinsically good, that is good irrespective of context, namely love. If love is what is good, then an action is right or wrong in as far as it brings about the most amount of love.

Agapeic Calculus is a moral framework rooted in the pursuit of maximizing neighbor welfare for the greatest number of individuals within a community. Unlike conventional notions of love centered on emotional attachment or desire, this concept emphasizes the broader notion of concern for the well-being of others. In this context, "welfare" encompasses not only material prosperity but also factors such as health, happiness, and overall quality of life. By prioritizing the collective welfare of the community over individual interests, Agapeic Calculus seeks to foster a society characterized by compassion, empathy, and a commitment to the common good. In essence, it advocates for a calculus of altruism and ethical decision-making that aims to uplift and support as many neighbors as possible, thereby cultivating a more just and harmonious social order.

2: The ruling norm of decision is love, nothing else

Given our modern context and how people typically talk of “love” it is probably unhelpful to even call it “love”. For instance, we will all recall the following news item. In February 1993, Mrs Johnson’s son, Laramiun Byrd, 20, was shot in the head by 16-year-old Oshea Israel after an argument at a party in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mrs Johnson subsequently forgave her son’s killer and after he had served a 17-year sentence for the crime, asked him to move in next door to her. She was not condoning his actions, nor will she ever forget the horror of those actions, but she does love her son’s killer. That love is agápē.

Reference:

3: Love and justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else

Practically all moral problems we encounter can be boiled down to an apparent tension between “justice” on the one hand and “love” on the other. Consider a recent story:

This could be expressed as a supposed tension between “love” of family and doing the right thing — “justice”. Imagine we are trying to decide what is the best way to distribute food given to a charity, or how a triage nurse might work in a war zone. In these cases we might put the problem like this. We want to distribute fairly, but how should we do this? To act justly or fairly is precisely to act in love. “Love is justice, justice is love”.

4: Love wills the neighbor’s good when we like him or not

Agápē is in the business of loving the unlovable. So related to our enemies. Love does not ask us to lose or abandon our sense of good and evil, or even of superior and inferior; it simply insists that however we rate them, and whether we like them nor not, they are our neighbors and are to be loved.

5: Only the ends justify the means, nothing else

Any action we take, if considered as an action independent of its consequences, is literally “meaningless and pointless”. An action, such as telling the truth, only acquires its status as a means by virtue of an end beyond itself.

6: Love’s decisions are made situationally, not prescriptively

Ethical decisions exist in a grey area most of the time. No decision can be taken before considering the situation. Consider the example of a woman in Arizona who learned that she might “bear a defective baby because she had taken thalidomide”. What should she do? The loving decision was not one given by the law, which stated that all abortions are wrong. However, she travelled to Sweden where she had an abortion. Even if the embryo had not been defective according to Fletcher her actions were “brave and responsible and right” because she was acting in light of the particulars of the situation to bring about the most love.

The Criticism of Situational Ethics

John Robinson, an Anglican Bishop of Woolwich and Trinity College started as a firm supporter of situational ethics referring to the responsibility it gave the individual in deciding the morality of their actions. However, he later withdrew his support for the theory recognizing that people could not take this sort of responsibility, remarking that "It will all descend into moral chaos."

The central focus on agape as the moral guide for behavior allows to claim that an action might be right in one context, but wrong in a different context — depending on the level of agape brought about. Despite how popular the theory was it is not philosophically sophisticated, and we soon run into problems in trying to understand it.

Another problem with teleological or consequential theories is that they are based on the future consequences, and the future is quite hard to predict in some cases. For example, it may be easy to predict that if we harm someone, then it will make them and those around them sad and/or angry. However, when considering more tricky situations such as an abortion, it is impossible to tell how the child's life and its mother's will turn out either way.

Specifically Christian forms of situational ethics of placing love above all particular principles or rules were proposed in the first half of the twentieth century by liberal theologians Rudolf Bultmann, John A. T. Robinson, along with Joseph Fletcher. These theologians point specifically to agape, or unconditional love, as the highest end. Other theologians who advocated situational ethics include Josef Fuchs, Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich.  Tillich, for example, declared, "Love is the ultimate law."

Content Curated by: Dr Shoury Kuttappa

[words-of-wonderland]

utilitarianism & taurek's "should the numbers count"

I found Taurek's appeal to personal property and ownership an odd angle. Taurek's goal is to argue for space for personal preference as morally permissible in a utilitarian framework, and this one ploy for special obligation has left me puzzled. Taurek states on pages 300-301 that if David chooses to save his own life with the drug he owns, he violates no one's rights. Additionally, if the drug belonged to Taurek, he would violate no one's rights by deciding who within his preference to bestow the life-saving drug. This line of reasoning branches from personal ownership over the drug; none of the five other people who could benefit from the drug have an ownership claim over it. While this makes sense logically, I am not sure if there is a specific space within the utilitarian framework for the concept of ownership to have moral rights.

The way I understand ownership implies a special duty or obligation to the thing under someone's dominion. One has responsibility for its outcome, usage, well-being, etc. This view is similar to the view Taurek expresses in the case of the captain's contractual ownership over the resources needed to save islanders from a volcano (311). For me, the use of ownership in utility calculus within the utilitarian framework raises many questions because I do not believe that ownership in every case is supported by the intrinsic good of pleasure (ie "ownership" over another person or ownership over a pen). 

1) does ownership have a different intrinsic value that should lend itself to moral consideration? 

2) is ownership, because it is duty-bound, a motivational difference instead of a value contributor, so it should not count towards utility calculus but could render utilitarianism inapplicable? 

My line of thinking stands that utilitarianism does not provide specific ethical protections for rights (ie right to life, right to privacy, right to vote, etc). They seem to possess an intrinsic quality (or multiple) that lay outside the scope of pleasure. 

This plays into one of my main objections to utilitarianism: that it cannot uphold the rights we hold as necessarily good to respect.

[questcult]

You ever wonder what food you'd be if you magically transformed into food?

Like would it be based on your personality, body type, or some combination of factors?

Is a sweet person Sweet and a sour person Sour?

Would your diet affect the magic?

Do skinny people become lean low-fat dishes?

Is weight given to your favorite food?

Does your morality affect the quality of the food you become?

What moral calculus would the magic itself use?

I'd argue that magic would be Kantian, as that's the only moral framework that's nonsense enough to seem magical.

Maybe magic is nihilistic as it's a semi-sentient force that's lived across all the time and space and grown tired?

Or perhaps age and perspective have given it utilitarian leanings?

But consider, what if magic just likes to fuck with people?

Perhaps magic simply obeys the principles of its wielder?

Are there Axiomatic principles for magic itself handed down by some higher power akin to a God?

Anyway I'd be a cheeseburger.

[nagasakidivision]

Haruto Hirabayashi: Bio

Haruto Hirabayashi (平林 陽翔)

“To build a better world, we need to build a better man.” —Paul Tillich

MC Name: Phoenix Age: 26 Height: 5’2” Occupation: Philosopher (PhD candidate) (handsome layabout, if you ask Shirou) Birthday: November 25th Zodiac: Sagittarius Blood Type: AB Rap Ability: Resurrection (Can bring himself back from an unconscious state once per battle)

A vain if not competent philosophy student, he has designs on becoming the greatest mind of his generation. This path to greatness has been somewhat stymied by his inability to settle on a topic for his PhD dissertation. He’s claimed in interviews he wants to join the Division Rap Battle because it “will give him a new angle to look at the purpose of argumentation in rhetoric,” whatever that might mean.

He’s been accused of being mulish and stubborn once he settles on an ideal, but he prefers to say that he’s “a man of action.”

Tag: #metaxu

(Further details below the cut!)

Would you know him?: As a philosopher, his major breakthrough was a paper entitled Cold Equations: Moral Frameworks in the Modern Era, a particularly scathing takedown of utilitarianism based on the presupposition that the moral calculus necessary for utilitarianism is now impossible in an era where a single person’s actions inexorably impact every person outside of them. This leaves ethical intuitionism as the only viable moral framework left. He’s written for a few other academic journals and makes regular appearances at academic conferences across Japan. He’s made implications that he wants to make a book but has so far done zero effort into tracking down a publisher and the transcript that is allegedly “mostly done” has yet to manifest.

His family was involved in a major lawsuit against a company called Solaris Biomedical in regards to a treatment for neurodegenerative illnesses that they claimed would stop the onset of neuron damage. While their claim was that it actually accelerated the process, they were determined to have inconclusive evidence and the civil suit was ruled in Solaris’s favor. The case garnered some attention amongst anti-corporate activists and got some news coverage before slipping beneath the undertow of the 24-hour news cycle.

First Impressions: Though personable and extroverted, it doesn’t take long before Haruto’s arrogance starts to come out. His primary impulse is trying to show he’s the smartest person in the room, meaning he’s prone to namedropping abstract academic concepts in the hopes someone will ask about them so he can show off how he knows. He manages to be somewhat smooth about it but it’s still a bit obnoxious, especially if you’re socially aware enough to tell what he’s doing.

Notes: His name is spelled with the kanji for “peace,” “grove,” “sun,” and “soaring” in that order!

His saint medallion is of Saint Catherine, the patron saint of philosophers.

He uses the personal pronoun of “oidon,” which is a...very rare personal pronoun characteristic of the Kyushu dialect! My research indicates this is basically completely out of use but like, we’ve got someone who uses “sesshou” and “shoukan” so weird ones are just back in fashion after World War III I guess.

He has a very pronounced Nagasaki-ben accent. Like. Painfully so. He is comprehensible but he cannot pretend to be anything other than someone from Kyushu.

[fatehbaz]

What beings exist, such that they can be harmed? […] What are the harms that register as significant, and to whom? [...]

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In 2014 in Santa Cruz, California, the science fiction author Ursula K. Le Guin gave a striking keynote at the conference “Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet.” Le Guin [...] began with a passage from her 1974 short story “The Author of the Acacia Seeds,” which consists of selections from the (fictional) journal of the (fictional) Association for Therolinguistics, a scholarly society dedicated to the study of nonhuman art and languages. In the passage the chairman of the association explores the limits of his field, venturing the possibility that undiscovered arts and language might lie beyond even the realm of nonhuman animals – in the sphere of plant life, in the slow morphic poetry of lichen or zucchini. In closing, the chairman ventures further: “May there not come even that bolder adventurer – the first geolinguist, who, ignoring the delicate, transient lyrics of the lichen, will read beneath it the still less communicative, still more passive, wholly atemporal, cold, volcanic poetry of the rocks: each one a word spoken, how long ago, by the earth itself, in the immense solitude, the immenser community of space.” 

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If extractive resource capitalism is a sort of ontological machine – an engine that continuously remakes the world and its entities as already-given […] then it is all the more vital to question the paradigms that subtend it and produce not just nonhuman life but also nonlife as domains of control, use, modification, and productive investment. […]

Umberto Eco once warned against the “excess of wonder” – but again, I wonder. [...] I write this on a heating planet, marked – scorched – in the triumphant elevation of capitalism from a system of production to a system of reality: a framework of givenness, of “business as usual.” Is the problem of wonder, here and now, really one of excess? Is it not rather a deficit, a crisis of imagination that preempts the otherwise possible? [...]

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Invariably, corporate impact projections posit that the nonhuman life destroyed through marine disposal will “bounce back” within a certain time frame after cessation […]. Only permanent eradication registers as significant; temporary population losses – that is, a sort of “temporary” killing – are acceptable. Harm to nonhumans is understood primarily as a moral externality, relevant only where it lead (in documentable ways) to certain (limited) kinds of harm to humans: economic, physiological. The negative social, psychological, and emotional consequences of destructive environmental interventions […] are notable by their absence in the calculus of “social benefits” that underpins government support […].

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In Santa Cruz, Le Guin put the matter quite simply: “One way to stop seeing trees and rivers and hills only as natural resources is to class them as fellow beings [...]” [...] Conviviality takes work and – particularly where it is denied, not just absent – it has to start somewhere, with a first move: an opening, a decision, a gesture, an offering. A child, waving to a stone from the back of a car.

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All text above by: Hugo Reinert. “About a Stone - Some Notes on Geologic Conviviality.” 2016. [Some paragraph breaks/contractions added by me. Presented here for commentary, teaching, criticism purposes.]

[thedreadvampy]

thoughts under the cut to not bias results

Yeah I mean I think to be fair it is a utilitarian statement to a degree and that's why it falls down the first big hole in utilitarianism which is how you measure relative hedonic good.

now full disclosure, in what I think is my personal visceral moral model (which is not necessarily aligned with my intellectual moral model) as described above, I shortcut through that problem through the easy application of double standards (ie everything I want is a want; anything anybody else wants is a need)

but even then, taking my own needs as a moral actor out of the equation, there is still a level of hedonic calculus required to triage where and how I put my main attention. and that continues to butt up against that fundamental issue in utilitarian morality that it's all incredibly nuanced and relative how positive results are weighted.

(now what I will disagree with is, in my personal experience, it isn't quite about not wishing to be seen as selfish. there definitely is a self-serving motive underlying the development of this as a deep-seated moral model but it's less about being well thought of and more about becoming indispensable, which I think might be generally speaking somewhat worse in terms of manipulative and self-serving behaviour. but that is just me and isn't intrinsic to the model I don't think, and it's a fairly minimal distinction tbf)

ultimately I do think though there's a contextual difference between 'what do you believe is definitionally good' and 'how do you make moral decisions' - this isn't an attempt to change your position or anything but I think whether you think a moral framework is realistically applicable is the step after whether you think it's theoretically accurate.

ie I do definitely think that a good action is am action which causes a net rise in wellbeing and a bad action is one which knowingly prioritises a negligible benefit over a more significant need. and I also agree that I don't have a way to meaningfully ascertain the moral weight of any given action. but whether I think the moral precept is right defines whether the next step for the system not working is 'keep looking for ways to make discernments that make you more likely to make decisions based on intensity of need' or 'rethink the basic principle of what makes an action good or bad'

mostly though it's just that people keep joining some dots between my fundamental idea of good and evil and my deeply self-destructive behaviours and I'm trying to triangulate how true that is.

testing something from a conversation with my therapist

how do you feel about the definition of what makes an action morally bad being "when your comfort or desires take precedence over others' needs"?

like to be clear, not when your needs take precedence over someone else's needs, but when you readily sacrifice someone's survival or wellbeing for a slight increase in comfort, or a marginal benefit.

oh also if you answer 'no' I would really like to hear about your feelings on it

[fierceawakening]

Regarding the empathy discourse: I actually think that my sense of people who *just don't get* the purity-instinct or the virtue-instinct or consider them important for ethics is kind of similar.

I’m not sure what a “purity-instinct” is, and depending on what it means I could agree (though dislike the name, probably) or wildly disagree. But I do feel like... there’s so much emphasis here on Tumblr about performing the correct moral action, but so little discussion of how we tell what the correct moral action is.

Like, we all agree “oppression is bad,” and shame one another intensely for anything we interpret as going against this, even unintentionally, but... why do we all think (or, honestly, I’d say feel too) that oppression is bad?

It seems like the only framework people allow for deciding that is some variant of the utilitarian calculus, and everything else is labeled as mean or cruel or prejudicial somehow, and I’m just... very baffled by this.