#husserl

[weil-weil-lautre]

Husserl's Phenomenology - Marvin Farber (1959)

[calledbyflowers]

i feel like scanners is like pre-transcendental its like the philosophy of arithmetic or even the logical investigations as much as i luv them and then like videodrome is more like the ideas like its made that leep of stepping away from the natural attitude and turning thematic attention to consciousness itself as world-constituting

[heriugena]

"Eschatological time [...] defines the present as 'evil', [...] the situation of the 'fall'. It is supposed that in the future there will only be further tests and catastrophes, corrected by episodic periods of relative improvement, connected with the activity of religious devotees or new prophets. The past is thought of as 'Heaven', 'the Golden Age', a period for 'imitation'. Thus, time flows downward. The perfect, harmonious world belongs to the sacred past. The present is a fall and suffering, and ahead lie greater tragedies.

Religion sets in opposition to downward flowing time an alternate path, which we can call a 'vertical path', a 'path leading upward'. This vector opposes the inertia of time and strives to change the direction of its flow. As a result, a specific time emerges: the time of salvation, soteriological time or messianic time.

The world moves toward the end through descent. The faithful must move contrary to time, along the axis of a 'different time', which flows perpendicular to usual time or against it. Thus, alongside time as regression (a feature of the world as such), religion asserts another heroic dimension, projected onto a particular future and comprising the sphere of religious eschatology.

Eschatology is a distinctive feature of time in the society of the narod. [...] The characterisitic quality of the narod appears in it: the project, the will, the lunge into the future, the dialog with the forces of fate. Religious time sees in the future the denouement of the heroes' battle against evil. This denouement is an end, an 'eschaton'."

[the-framed-maelstrom]

The acts of cognition which underlie our experiencing posit the Real in individual form, posit it as having spatio-temporal existence, as something existing in this time-spot, having this particular duration of its own and a real content which in its essence could just as well have been present in any other time-spot; posits it, moreover, as something which is present at this place in this particular physical shape (or is there given united to a body of this shape), where yet the same real being might just as well, so far as its own essence is concerned, be present at any other place, and in any other form, and might likewise change whilst remaining in fact unchanged, or change otherwise than the way in which it actually does. Individual Being of every kind is, to speak quite generally, “accidental.” It is so-and-so, but essentially it could be other than it is. Even if definite laws of nature obtain according to which such and such definite consequences must in fact follow when such and such real conditions are in fact present, such laws express only orderings that do in fact obtain, which might run quite differently, and already presuppose, as pertaining ab initio to the essence of objects of possible experience, that the objects thus ordered by them, when considered in themselves, are accidental.

Edmund Husserl, Ideas

[bocadosdefilosofia]

«La categoría fundamental de ser-en-el-mundo, que Heidegger anuncia como uno de los grandes descubrimientos de su filosofía, es menos nueva y original de lo que él pretende, ya que, de hecho, no es más que una variante de la intersubjetividad husserliana y del “yo soy yo y mi circunstancia” de Ortega y Gasset, principio formulado años antes que Heidegger por nuestro filósofo, de la mano precisamente de Husserl. Eso no quiere decir en modo alguno que la filosofía orteguiana sea una anticipación cronológica y temática de la heideggeriana. No puede serlo por la simple razón de que ambos filósofos se mueven en perspectivas diametralmente opuestas y llegan, por ello, a resultados también diametralmente opuestos, lo que no excluye que entre ambos existan afinidades tangenciales, entre ellas el elitismo y la aversión a las masas. El raciovitalismo orteguiano es el antípoda directo del quietismo existencial de Heidegger; de ahí que Ortega rechazase de plano la concepción de la Existenzphilosophie sobre la muerte.»

Heleno Saña: La filosofía de Heidegger, un nuevo oscurantismo. Editorial Verbum, pág. 98. Madrid, 2016.

TGO

@bocadosdefilosofia

@dias-de-la-ira-1

[orbis-tertius]

The fact that the experiences analyzed [in phenomenology] are often vague does not diminish their certainty. We can deny neither the existence nor the importance of these experiences. The world in which I live, my Lebenswelt, may contain extremely vague clusters of experiences; yet these experiences exist, are important, and lend themselves to descriptions with ever-increasing precision, accuracy, and reliability. The meaning and value of literature, poetry, and the other arts are predicated on the same assumption. Art explores experiences that are as vague as they are certain and important. Metaphors and numerous other devices are thus needed to effect communication and expression in art. The fourth premise, therefore, is that certain vague experiences must and can be analyzed because they are both certain and important. The tendency in non-phenomenological approaches has been to ignore any experience that cannot be placed into sharp focus by terming these meaningless, or relegating these to the status of "mere" emotive ejaculations.

Edmund Husserl, "Introductory Essay" in The Paris Lectures, p. XIII (1964)

[arguablysomaya]

ngl husserl popped off with phenomenology. yes king the subjective is inextricable from the objective because the act of observation is a reciprocal relationship and the cartesian dichotomy of body and mind is but an illusion preach king

[fieriframes]

[Magnetic figure, drawing Husserl’s protégés away.]

[dog-uncrushed]

Passivity in general is the realm of things that are bound together and melt into one another associatively, where all meaning that arises is put together passively. What often happens here is that a meaning arises which is apparently possible as a unity –i.e., it can apparently be made self-evident through a possible reactivation–whereas the attempt at actual reactivation can reactive only the individual members of the combination, while the intention to unify them into a whole, instead of being fulfilled, comes to nothing; that is, the ontic validity is destroyed through the original consciousness of nullity.

[bananartista]

Spruzzò heikel xafava vesikas rêvera - Entity N° 16042

Mixed media on A4 paper (21 x 29,7 cm , 350 gr.)

[starry-ace]

Oh my god oh my god oh my god

In a world of rapidly devolving privacy in which the more we get to know people for what they are and therefore what we are not, constantly othering one another to the point of violence, as privacy breaks down and the barriers between self and other dissolve so far that all others become one self, the oneself shares one conscious containing all that is and all that is not to a point where the oneself becomes god. When the oneself becomes god, the oneself creates existence. To create existence, there must have been nothing. To identify nothing is to already know of everything. Everything implies an already existence.

[laurelesdetonia]

El mundo no es un objeto cuya ley de constitución yo tendría en mi poder; es el medio natural y el campo de todos mis pensamientos y de todas mis percepciones explícitas.

[philosophybitmaps]

[heriugena]

Heidegger identifies three categories of time, which he calls ecstasies; the past, the present and the future. The present is the experience of the moment becoming history, and of the future becoming known to us by the past, which necessarily creates a determinate path, and the logic of time is only broken by our inattention. When this happens we are attacked by the novum; The new moment, which is the entrail of the future speeding ahead of us, shocks us with itself.

Thus the present is the constant privation of the moment by the past, and the future by the moment, and vice versa; The future steals the context and history of the present and past to create itself, it is the phenomenon of time.

To Heidegger, this category is rigid and within his hermeneutic cycle, though he doesn't explore it too much, unbreakable.

To Husserl, time is self-referential; the present is only the perception of being as the presence of the subjectivity of consciousness. This is a constant cycle of interpretation, whose articulation is, to us, violent; Time becomes consciousness fleeing itself.

The subject, through time, perceives the world beyond presenced perception, and so the world-as-it-is becomes intrasubjective, viewed through the lens of time. Thus, the objectivity of the present is questioned, and reduced to the level of gnosis; "Time is man's ultimate identity."

But in Sámi eschatology, this morphology does not apply; Upon death, the present doesn't self-arrest in the moment, lacking a future to ebb itself into, it doesn't retract into the now-petrifying source of itself and die, rather the dead sublates time and bloats past its own logos to have presentness in all time and every moment. It isn't the anamnesis, the placenta or tree of knowledge whose fruit is bitten out of by the Traditionalists of today or pagans of old Hellas and of Northern Europe, only listening to a conch shell echoing the principles of the distant past, emanating into the future from before as memory; rather, the world comes to encompass the subject, at all points in time, and everything of it is known, understood and lived by the dead: Sein-jenseits-des-Tode, being beyond death, and, seemingly paradoxically, Sein-davor-dem-Leben, being before life. This permeant being was accessed by the living actively, as the veil between death and life was thin and filmy, so an active dialogue was held with one's ancestors, and thus the world was opened to them entirely. Many pagans believe history lives on in their blood, and that it can be affirmed and continued through this acknowledgement. Not to the Sámi. Blood memory was not how they learned of the world, rather through first-hand knowledge acquired of always.

Substrate life was Sáivu, the transcendent realm, from which all being was derived. It dictated the flow of time, which was seen as oscillating according to it, contrary to the ideas of people like Debord where time was something imposed on the individual, a rigid thing that directed movement and thought, the individual only a passive victim to an alien force, rather than a creative agent partaking in its shape. Thence many Sámi shunned watches, under the philosophy that ‘it takes as long as it takes’.

This lack of linearity was displayed also in their spatial understanding; rather than a definite, striated space of borders, streets, grids and buildings, the Saami adhered to a nodal geography, composed of holy sites (sieidi), campsites (gohttensadji), grazing grounds (guohtun) and seasonal settlements (báiku, dálvaddis, geasseorohat). They didn't set trails often, and rather moved either by their own inclination or to the rhythm of the reindeer.

The Same knew intuitively of the landmarks, but might not necessarily have visited them, or would only be familiar in a temporal manner, whereas they might be known in a more holistic manner by the shaman (noaidi) or the father (ahčči) of the family. The noaidi had the ability to transcend space entirely and enter with the essence of his being the pre-extant reality of Sáivu, where spatiality and temporality were both unreal, or rather hyperreal, meaning every moment of time and every place in space was contained within Sáivu in its wholeness, by means of intense contemplative prayer, drum journeys and rituals, and therefore the noaidi had a more complete knowledge of this nodal geography and the premises from which it manifested temporally, and they moved according to these organico-spiritual patterns across the vast expanses, as was reflected in their spirit; Bounded only by the blue sky above, everything on the horizon theirs to tread and subject to ranging boots and the pounding roar of reindeer flocks. Like spring floods or brooding storms on the distant sky, the Saami roved far across their lands, as was their inclination, out and beyond the waning skyline, and this was the telos of their people, to actualize their boundless spirit, and affirm that they would soon wander among the stars

Will write more about Sámi and Uralic metaphysics

[bocadosdefilosofia]

«Pongámonos esto en claro con detalle. En la actitud natural llevamos a cabo pura y simplemente todos los actos mediante los cuales está ahí para nosotros el mundo. Vivimos ingenuamente en el percibir y experimentar, en estos actos téticos en que se nos aparecen unidades de cosas, y no sólo aparecen, sino que se dan con el carácter de lo “ahí delante”, de lo “real”. Cultivando la ciencia natural, llevamos a cabo actos de pensamiento ordenados según la lógica de la experiencia, en que estas realidades, tomadas así como se dan, son determinadas por el pensamiento, y en que sobre la base de tales trascendencias directamente experimentadas y determinadas se concluyen nuevas. En la actitud fenomenológica sofrenamos, con universalidad de principio, la ejecución de todas esas tesis cogitativas, es decir, “colocamos entre paréntesis” las llevadas a cabo; “no hacemos estas tesis con lo demás” a los fines de las nuevas indagaciones; en lugar de vivir en ellas, de llevarlas a cabo, ejecutamos actos de reflexión dirigidos a ellas, y aprehendemos estos actos como el ser absoluto que son. Ahora vivimos íntegramente en estos actos de segundo grado, en que se da el campo infinito de las vivencias absolutas -el campo fundamental de la fenomenología.»

Edmund Husserl: Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y una filosofía fenomenológica. Fondo de Cultura Económica, pág. 116. México, 1962.

TGO

@bocadosdefilosofia

@dias-de-la-ira-1

[dialmforolrik]

The "end of the world" as a copernican revolution of the way in which we understand what the world is – it's ontological status rather than it's cosmological position.