#humanism

[robreyart]

Bioluminescence Oil, 18 x 24 in, 2015, First in the Bioluminescence series. The light of life and the natural world. In all the vastness of space, as of yet, we know of only one planet that supports life. At least within some great distance from here, life is rare. Each organism being the exquisite and detailed product of billions of years of evolution, life is precious. This point of light and inspiration stands in contrast to the lanterns and lights that are historically thought to be sources of illumination but are now dimmed; mythologies and superstitions humans have created as we struggled in the dark of ignorance to understand our world. But the process of science has revealed a luminous, living planet, more amazing than we could have ever imagined. Where the intricacies of biology are miracles of evolution and our consciousness is a gift of natural processes that allow us to experience what it is to be alive. Prints: https://robrey.storenvy.com

[jstor]

✨ New on the blog: If your heart is in the humanities, you may be discouraged in the face of other academic fields–but the humanities remain critical. Through a journey of loss, literature, and scholarly accounts, learn how the humanities are vital to human understanding. Read the blog post. Image: Charles Le Brun and William Hebert. A man whose profile expresses compassion. n.d. Wellcome Collection.

[apis-vergilii]

The study of the humanities is a training ground for the mind and the development of critical thought, self-knowledge, a deeper understanding of one’s own ethical values, and an appreciation of the shared humanity of those removed from oneself by either temporal or geographical distance. These are not idle theoretical fripperies: they are the foundation of curiosity, compassion, and responsible citizenship.

<piss on the poor>There are indeed many pathways to this knowledge. Yes, go to the library and the museum. No, not everyone needs to get a degree in medieval literature. Everyone SHOULD study at least some history and literature in high school and college.</piss on the poor>

The fact that the serious pursuit of humanist studies has been deliberately made *economically inaccessible* to something like 95% of the human population, and entirely generations of people have been deliberately trained to consider these subjects laughable and worthy only of mockery and disdain (and the first subjects to remove from formal curricula) is a catastrophic injustice on a planetary scale.

[juan-francisco-palencia]

For all mercy hearts please

Save us from the genocide

Share my post and donate if you can

I'm vitted by 90ghost and northgazaupdate

https://www.gofundme.com/f/save-mohamed-and-his-elderly-parents-from-genocide

Well, I think I understand that in some way you ask for help through me and everyone. Honestly, I don't have many resources, but I offer my help by providing first aid to injured people, since I have medical knowledge, and my specialty is channeling those who have suffered first and second degree burns. If you feel that my medical knowledge could be of use to you, I am more than willing to help.

I wish you good luck. ⚘👋

[liberalsarecool]

The Left wants a community where everyone is welcome to be who they want.

The Right wants 'lonerism' where everyone is grinding their lives for shareholders' crumbs.

[quasi-normalcy]

I know that this is the "Turning social problems into matters of individual virtue" website, but here's one change that you can make to yourself as an individual that I honestly think will have beneficial collective effects:

Stop Thinking You're Better Than Other People.

Do I mean that you should go through life thinking that you're the lowliest and most wretched scum who's ever lived? No. I mean that there exists no meaningful criterion by which one human being can be said to be absolutely 'better' than another. And even if there was, you don't know enough about other people's circumstances and interior thoughts to meaningfully judge them in these absolute terms. So don't even try! It's a futile endeavour.

"But what about fascists? Surely I'm better than them!"

Okay, so let me preface this by saying that fascists are dangerous, they're misguided, their acts and intentions are evil, and they need to be stopped, including through physical violence. But you're not better than them. I know that this is a difficult pill to swallow; I myself used to pat myself used to pat myself on the back because, well, at least I wouldn't have been a Nazi. But you know what? If the circumstances were right, I could have been. We all could have been, just as we all could have joined a cult at some point.

Looking at myself, for example: there was never any serious possibility that I could have been swept up into the alt-right movement. Why? Because I'm transgender, and I was raised to be a socialist. How easy it is to *not* become a fascist when you're one of their scapegoats! How much harder it would be to avoid if you're one of the people they flatter and groom, if you're raised by people who are sympathetic to fascist ideals, if you grow up in a community where such ideals are common! The fact that fascist movements can seemingly emerge amongst every nation and people--including those who have historically been victims of fascism--confirms this. What if I had lived a hundred years later, at a time when transgenderism was a complete non-issue, and they'd moved on to some new scapegoat? What if they had approached me on my absolute worst day and told me that all of my problems were caused by moochers and parasites, and that I could fight back and claim my birth right by joining them? Can I really say that I wouldn't? Can anyone?

But even beyond that, what is a fascist but the ultimate example of someone who needs to feel superior to others? What is scapegoating but the act of selecting an entire group of people and declaring them to be inferior to you? And if you just refuse to believe these things; if you refuse to accept the premise that some people are better than others, and call it out whenever it comes up; then you're cutting these movements off at knees! The ideological force of fascism comes from imagining humanity as a strict hierarchy, with the master race on top and the degenerates on the bottom. Simply refuse to believe in such a hierarchy! Refuse to even entertain it!

"But then how can I feel self-esteem? How can I feel that I matter and have value?"

You have value just by existing as a person! But if that's not enough for you, then try this: instead of trying to increase your sense of self-worth by finding people to feel superior to, increase it by being of value to others. Help them! Make their lives better! Contribute to society! Not even in a way that you can (necessarily) put a dollar value on, but in any way you can! Create art! Plant a pollinator garden! Tell a joke! Make someone happy! If nothing else, you can at least give someone love, and I guarantee you that that will be of value to them. The universe is so vast and we're all so small that any value we can ever have will only ever be to each other. And surely it beats spending your life trying to be king of the microbes.

[thepersonalwords]

I am not an atheist. But the religion that I do advocate is not of the Bible, Vedas, Quran or any other scripture. The religion I speak of, is what Christ talked about, it is what Buddha talked about, it is the religion of plain everyday kindness.

Abhijit Naskar

[unsolicited-opinions]

My eldest was nine years old and had questions, for the first time, about why we said Hamotzi over the Friday challah we'd picked up at the JCC.

"Blessed is God, ruler of the Universe, who brings forth bread from the earth." 

9yo:...but I don't believe in a ruler-of-the-universe kind of God...?

Me: I don't either- but I'm glad bread exists and I'm grateful that we have food to eat. Are you?

9yo: Yeah... 

Me: So I think of it as a way of remembering to be grateful. To remember how amazing it is that humans learned to cultivate wheat, to grind it, and make the flour into bread. A prayer like this is a way of remembering how fortunate we are instead of taking it for granted.

9yo: But it's amazing that HUMANS learned to grow wheat and bake bread. Why thank God? 

Me: Do you remember when we talked about Pesach and the Exodus story and the ancestors of the Israelites being slaves in Egypt? Do you remember what we learned about that? 

9yo: They were probably never slaves in Egypt, because there's no evidence for it where there should be. It's probably just an origin myth. 

Me: Pretty much, yeah. But if a people's origin myth includes escaping slavery, how are they likely to feel about slavery? 

9yo: They'll hate it

Me: And how will they hopefully feel when other people are enslaved?

9yo: They'll know it's wrong. 

Me: So even a story which isn't literally true...can still be good. Origin myths shape peoples. I like this one and I'm glad it's the origin myth for our ancestors.

9yo: Okay...but Hamotzi isn't about the Exodus story...?

Me: To me, Hamotzi is sort of like the Exodus story- it doesn't need to be literally true to be good. Since I don't believe in a creator-of-the-universe sort of God, I see the prayer as a way of remembering to be glad that we evolved the way we did to enjoy eating delicious bread, to be glad that humans learned to grow wheat, grind flour, domesticate chickens and bees, and make bread, and to be grateful that we have enough to eat, because many people in many times and many places, including today, don't have enough to eat.

We can see it as a way to remember to not take for granted that our bodies are healthy and we can enjoy eating bread which fuels our bodies. We're lucky to have this bread, and it is good for us to remember how lucky we are. It's bad for us to take our good fortune for granted.

9yo: Okay, being grateful is good. But why thank a God who we don't think is listening? Why do it in Hebrew? 

Me: Because expressing that gratitude, in Hebrew, towards God, is the way our ancestors remembered to be grateful for a very, very long time. When we do it the same way they did it, it's a way of remembering who they were, how hard they worked, and how much they struggled to enable you and I to be here, generations later, on the other side of the planet, healthfully and peacefully eating bread.

Sometimes, it's easier to remember to be grateful if the words for expressing that gratitude are pre-parepared. Sometimes, it's easier to feel gratitude if there's a direction in which to express it. I don't believe in a human-like God who cares at all about prayers or being thanked by humans in Hebrew or any other language. But I believe it is good for us to take moments, now and then, to appreciate the incredibly long chain of events which have resulted in you and I, sitting here, eating Challah, and talking about why we pray.

9yo: Okay. It just felt weird to thank a God I don't believe in.

Me: Oh yeah. That felt weird to me for a long time too. You ask really good questions, though- and I like how you don't want to do or say things which don't make sense to you.

9yo: Someone at school told me it's bad to question God.

Me: Maybe that's what the religious tradition of their heritage teaches. In the religious tradition of our heritage, questions are not just okay, but good. You're supposed to question stuff.

9yo: Oh. So that makes me good at being Jewish?

Me: Absolutely.

[kyriefae]

Be it a hot-take or not, Demons of the Punjab, belongs in the Top 5 all time best stories in Doctor Who.

Instead of being about silly sci-fi monsters or the checkered inner-workings of the Doctor (two things I deeply enjoy btw), we spend the length of a very cinematic and beautiful episode witnessing a tragedy on a deeply human scale. Tragedy and hope intertwined; how else could one possibly cope...

Love to all the episodes everyone would likely place into contention to hypothetically keep this story at a lower rank...but I'm going to make space at the table for the spirit of 13's era.

The monsters of the week being humble servitors of the dead is such a sweet plot twist that deepens the extent of the narrative. The Doctor is powerful but she can't stop this event; or events like this. The tension that comes to a head in this episode represents a struggle far greater than any one battle or war. No sonic warbling can stop the tide of human pride; of our systems built to create 'order' that leave ruin and heartbreak.

Attempting to put it to words, even in summation, highlights the gravity of the subject matter this episode invokes. Instead of navigating those waters by diving in as I am inclined to do, the cast and crew highlight a beautiful and vibrant world for us to see and by story's end we watch that world be torn apart by an ultimatum unseen. A hatred that festers in people's hearts through fear of uncertainty and the corrosion that imperialism left in its wake.

But we witness love. However fleeting it may have been. We witnessed it and by seeing it, we're given the hope we so desperately need.

Death comes for us all but before it does we can make that choice to open our hearts to others. They may not be receptive to it...they may even fight us on it.

Even if our circumstances fail to afford us any other opportunity, love will always be a choice.

Yasmin succeeded at meeting her grandmother when she was young and learned why the story Nani Umbreen refused to tell her was being kept secret all these years. She witnessed the pain of that moment in a way words would never quite illustrate. Even the events Umbreen knew were not the complete story; even that which Yaz was able to see.

The Doctor couldn't stop those events from happening but helped to guide a path forward through the darkness in a way only she could.

Stories like this remind me of how powerful the medium of Doctor Who is...and how flexible it will always be.

It's not all mops of curly hair, long scarves, and Allons-y! Occasionally it's a clever way of reminding ourselves of the pain we cause, the pain we keep, the love we had, and the love we still have to give.

[recsspecs]

Might not shoot a person but kill an ant; is the value of life determined by the size of the body or human-centric understandings of social contributions or responsibilities?

[jesusinstilettos]

Your life gets significantly better the day you stop pretending you’re a robot. You’re a silly little mammal, act like it motherfucker. Your ancestors made tools with rocks and sticks, ran around a lot, had sex, lived in communities, ate when they were hungry, rested, chanted together, felt the sun, breathed outside air, listened to the trees and birds. You have biological needs bitch!!!

[robreyart]

Bioluminescence: Question, Hypothesis, Experiment Oil, 30 x 20 inches, 2020

The light of life and the scientific method. These points of light and inspiration stand in contrast to the lanterns and lights that are historically thought to be sources of illumination but are now dimmed; mythologies and superstitions humans have created as we struggled in the dark of ignorance to understand our world. But the process of science has revealed a luminous planet, glowing with the magic of biological reality, more intricate and amazing than we could have ever imagined.

Prints: https://robrey.storenvy.com

[bluelagoonsposts]

Playdates

[dailyanarchistposts]

III. Toward an Anarchist Film Theory

In his article “What is Anarchist Cultural Studies?” Jesse Cohn argues that anarchist cultural studies (ACS) can be distinguished from critical theory and consumer-agency theory along several trajectories (Cohn, 2009: 403–24). Among other things, he writes, ACS tries “to avoid reducing the politics of popular culture to a simplistic dichotomy of ‘reification’ versus ‘resistance’” (ibid., 412). On the one hand, anarchists have always balked at the pretensions of “high culture” even before these were exposed and demystified by the likes of Bourdieu in his theory of “cultural capital.” On the other hand, we always sought ought and found “spaces of liberty — even momentary, even narrow and compromised — within capitalism and the State” (ibid., 413). At the same time, anarchists have never been content to find “reflections of our desires in the mirror of commercial culture,” nor merely to assert the possibility of finding them (ibid.). Democracy, liberation, revolution, etc. are not already present in a culture; they are among many potentialities which must be actualized through active intervention.

If Cohn’s general view of ACS is correct, and I think it is, we ought to recognize its significant resonance with the Foucauldian tertia via outlined above. When Cohn claims that anarchists are “critical realists and monists, in that we recognize our condition as beings embedded within a single, shared reality” (Cohn, 2009: 413), he acknowledges that power actively affects both internal (subjective) existence as well as external (intersubjective) existence. At the same time, by arguing “that this reality is in a continuous process of change and becoming, and that at any given moment, it includes an infinity — bounded by, situated within, ‘anchored’ to the concrete actuality of the present — of emergent or potential realities” (ibid.), Cohn denies that power (hence, reality) is a single actuality that transcends, or is simply “given to,” whatever it affects or acts upon. On the contrary, power is plural and potential, immanent to whatever it affects because precisely because affected in turn. From the standpoint of ACS and Foucault alike, then, culture is reciprocal and symbiotic — it both produces and is produced by power relations. What implications might this have for contemporary film theory?

At present the global film industry — not to speak of the majority of media — is controlled by six multinational corporate conglomerates: The News Corporation, The Walt Disney Company, Viacom, Time Warner, Sony Corporation of America, and NBC Universal. As of 2005, approximately 85% of box office revenue in the United States was generated by these companies, as compared to a mere 15% by so-called “independent” studios whose films are produced without financing and distribution from major movie studios. Never before has the intimate connection between cinema and capitalism appeared quite as stark.

As Horkheimer and Adorno argued more than fifty years ago, the salient characteristic of “mainstream” Hollywood cinema is its dual role as commodity and ideological mechanism. On the one hand, films not only satisfy but produce various consumer desires. On the other hand, this desire-satisfaction mechanism maintains and strengthens capitalist hegemony by manipulating and distracting the masses. In order to fulfill this role, “mainstream” films must adhere to certain conventions at the level of both form and content. With respect to the former, for example, they must evince a simple plot structure, straightforwardly linear narrative, and easily understandable dialogue. With respect to the latter, they must avoid delving deeply into complicated social, moral, and philosophical issues and should not offend widely-held sensibilities (chief among them the idea that consumer capitalism is an indispensable, if not altogether just, socio-economic system). Far from being arbitrary, these conventions are deliberately chosen and reinforced by the culture industry in order to reach the largest and most diverse audience possible and to maximize the effectiveness of film-as-propaganda.

“Avant garde” or “underground cinema,” in contrast, is marked by its self — conscious attempt to undermine the structures and conventions which have been imposed on cinema by the culture industry — for example, by presenting shocking images, employing unusual narrative structures, or presenting unorthodox political, religious, and philosophical viewpoints. The point in so doing is allegedly to “liberate” cinema from its dual role as commodity and ideological machine (either directly, by using film as a form of radical political critique, or indirectly, by attempting to revitalize film as a serious art form).

Despite its merits, this analysis drastically oversimplifies the complexities of modern cinema. In the first place, the dichotomy between “mainstream” and “avant-garde” has never been particularly clear-cut, especially in non-American cinema. Many of the paradigmatic European “art films” enjoyed considerable popularity and large box office revenues within their own markets, which suggests among other things that “mainstream” and “avant garde” are culturally relative categories. So, too, the question of what counts as “mainstream” versus “avant garde” is inextricably bound up in related questions concerning the aesthetic “value” or “merit” of films. To many, “avant garde” film is remarkable chiefly for its artistic excellence, whereas “mainstream” film is little more than mass-produced pap. But who determines the standards for cinematic excellence, and how? As Dudley Andrews notes,

[...] [C]ulture is not a single thing but a competition among groups. And, competition is organized through power clusters we can think of as institutions. In our own field certain institutions stand out in marble buildings. The NEH is one; but in a different way, so is Hollywood, or at least the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. Standard film critics constitute a sub-group of the communication institution, and film professors make up a parallel group, especially as they collect in conferences and in societies (Andrews, 1985: 55).

Andrews’ point here echoes one we made earlier — namely, that film criticism itself is a product of complicated power relations. Theoretical dichotomies such as “mainstream versus avant-garde” or “art versus pap” are manifestations of deeper socio-political conflicts which are subject to analysis in turn.

Even if there is or was such a thing as “avant-garde” cinema, it no longer functions in the way that Horkheimer and Adorno envisaged, if it ever did. As they themselves recognized, one of the most remarkable features of late capitalism is its ability to appropriate and commodify dissent. Friedberg, for example, is right to point out that flaneurie began as a transgressive institution which was subsequently captured by the culture industry; but the same is true even of “avant-garde” film — an idea that its champions frequently fail to acknowledge. Through the use of niche marketing and other such mechanisms, the postmodern culture industry has not only overcome the “threat” of the avant-garde but transformed that threat into one more commodity to be bought and sold. Media conglomerates make more money by establishing faux “independent” production companies (e.g., Sony Pictures Classics, Fox Searchlight Pictures, etc) and re-marketing “art films” (ala the Criterion Collection) than they would by simply ignoring independent, underground, avant-garde, etc. cinema altogether.

All of this is by way of expanding upon an earlier point — namely, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the extent to which particular films or cinematic genres function as instruments of socio-political repression — especially in terms of simple dichotomies such as “mainstream” versus “avant-garde.” In light of our earlier discussion of Foucault, not to speak of Derrida, this ought not to come as a surprise. At the same time, however, we have ample reason to believe that the contemporary film industry is without question one of the preeminent mechanisms of global capitalist cultural hegemony. To see why this is the case, we ought briefly to consider some insights from Gilles Deleuze.

There is a clear parallel between Friedberg’s mobilized flaneurial gaze and what Deleuze calls the “nomadic” — i.e., those social formations which are exterior to repressive modern apparatuses like State and Capital (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 351–423). Like the nomad, the flaneur wanders aimlessly and without a predetermined telos through the striated space of these apparatuses. Her mobility itself, however, belongs to the sphere of non-territorialized smooth space, unconstrained by regimentation or structure, free-flowing, detached. The desire underlying this mobility is productive; it actively avoids satisfaction and seeks only to proliferate and perpetuate its own movement. Apparatuses of repression, in contrast, operate by striating space and routinizing, regimenting, or otherwise constraining mobile desire. They must appropriate the nomadic in order to function as apparatuses of repression.

Capitalism, however one understands its relationship to other repressive apparatuses, strives to commodify flaneurial desire, or, what comes to the same, to produce artificial desires which appropriate, capture, and ultimately absorb flaneurial desire (ibid., esp. 424–73). Deleuze would agree with Horkheimer and Adorno that the contemporary film industry serves a dual role as capture mechanism and as commodity. It not only functions as an object within capitalist exchange but as an ideological machine that reinforces the production of consumer-subjects. This poses a two-fold threat to freedom, at least as freedom is understood from a Deleuzean perspective: first, it makes nomadic mobility abstract and virtual, trapping it in striated space and marshaling it toward the perpetuation of repressive apparatuses; and second, it replaces the free-flowing desire of the nomadic with social desire — that is, it commodifies desire and appropriates flaneurie as a mode of capitalist production.

The crucial difference is that for Deleuze, as for Foucault and ACS, the relation between the nomadic and the social is always and already reciprocal. In one decidedly aphoristic passage, Deleuze claims there are only forces of desire and social forces (Deleuze & Guattari, [1972] 1977: 29). Although he tends to regard desire as a creative force (in the sense that it produces rather than represses its object) and the social as a force which “dams up, channels, and regulates” the flow of desire (ibid., 33), he does not mean to suggest that there are two distinct kinds of forces which differentially affect objects exterior to themselves. On the contrary, there is only a single, unitary force which manifests itself in particular “assemblages” (ibid.). Each of these assemblages, in turn, contains within itself both desire and various “bureaucratic or fascist pieces” which seek to subjugate and annihilate that desire (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986: 60; Deleuze & Parnet, 1987: 133). Neither force acts or works upon preexistent objects; rather everything that exists is alternately created and/or destroyed in accordance with the particular assemblage which gives rise to it.

There is scarcely any question that the contemporary film industry is subservient to repressive apparatuses such as transnational capital and the government of the United States. The fact that the production of films is overwhelmingly controlled by a handful of media conglomerates, the interests of which are routinely protected by federal institutions at the expense of consumer autonomy, makes this abundantly clear. It also reinforces the naivety of cultural studies, whose valorization of consumer subcultures appears totally impotent in the face of such enormous power. As Richard Hoggart notes,

Studies of this kind habitually ignore or underplay the fact that these groups are almost entirely enclosed from and are refusing even to attempt to cope with the public life of their societies. That rejection cannot reasonably be given some idealistic ideological foundation. It is a rejection, certainly, and in that rejection may be making some implicit criticisms of the ‘hegemony,’ and those criticisms need to be understood. But such groups are doing nothing about it except to retreat (Hoggart, 1995: 186).

Even if we overlook the Deleuzean/Foucauldian/ACS critique — viz., that cultural studies relies on a theoretically problematic notion of consumer “agency” — such agency appears largely impotent at the level of praxis as well.

Nor is there any question that the global proliferation of Hollywood cinema is part of a broader imperialist movement in geopolitics. Whether consciously or unconsciously, American films reflect and reinforce uniquely capitalist values and to this extent pose a threat to the political, economic, and cultural sovereignty of other nations and peoples. It is for the most part naïve of cultural studies critics to assign “agency” to non-American consumers who are not only saturated with alien commodities but increasingly denied the ability to produce and consume native commodities. At the same time, none of this entails that competing film industries are by definition “liberatory.” Global capitalism is not the sole or even the principal locus of repressive power; it is merely one manifestation of such power among many. Ostensibly anti-capitalist or counter-hegemonic movements at the level of culture can and often do become repressive in their own right — as, for example, in the case of nationalist cinemas which advocate terrorism, religious fundamentalism, and the subjugation of women under the banner of “anti-imperialism.”

The point here, which reinforces several ideas already introduced, is that neither the American film industry nor film industries as such are intrinsically reducible to a unitary source of repressive power. As a social formation or assemblage, cinema is a product of a complex array of forces. To this extent it always and already contains both potentially liberatory and potentially repressive components. In other words, a genuinely nomadic cinema — one which deterritorializes itself and escapes the overcoding of repressive state apparatuses — is not only possible but in some sense inevitable. Such a cinema, moreover, will emerge neither on the side of the producer nor of the consumer, but rather in the complex interstices that exist between them. I therefore agree with Cohn that anarchist cultural studies (and, by extension, anarchist film theory) has as one of its chief goals the “extrapolation” of latent revolutionary ideas in cultural practices and products (where “extrapolation” is understood in the sense of actively and creatively realizing possibilities rather than simply “discovering” actualities already present) (Cohn, 2009: 412). At the same time, I believe anarchist film theory must play a role in creating a new and distinctively anarchist cinema — “a cinema of liberation.”

Such a cinema would perforce involve alliances between artists and audiences with a mind to blurring such distinctions altogether. It would be the responsibility neither of an elite “avant-garde” which produces underground films, nor of subaltern consumer “cults” which produce fanzines and organize conventions in an attempt to appropriate and “talk back to” mainstream films. As we have seen, apparatuses of repression easily overcode both such strategies. By effectively dismantling rigid distinctions between producers and consumers, its films would be financed, produced, distributed, and displayed by and for their intended audiences. However, far from being a mere reiteration of the independent or DIY ethic — which, again, has been appropriated time and again by the culture industry — anarchist cinema would be self — consciously political at the level of form and content; its medium and message would be unambiguously anti — authoritarian, unequivocally opposed to all forms of repressive power.

Lastly, anarchist cinema would retain an emphasis on artistic integrity — the putative value of innovative cinematography, say, or compelling narrative. It would, in other words, seek to preserve and expand upon whatever makes cinema powerful as a medium and as an art-form. This refusal to relegate cinema to either a mere commodity form or a mere vehicle of propaganda is itself an act of refusal replete with political potential. The ultimate liberation of cinema from the discourse of political struggle is arguably the one cinematic development that would not, and could not, be appropriated and commodified by repressive social formations.

In this essay I have drawn upon the insights of Foucault and Deleuze to sketch an “anarchist” approach to the analysis of film — on which constitutes a middle ground between the “top-down” theories of the Frankfurt School and the “bottom-up” theories of cultural studies. Though I agree with Horkheimer and Adorno that cinema can be used as an instrument of repression, as is undoubtedly the case with the contemporary film industry, I have argued at length that cinema as such is neither inherently repressive nor inherently liberatory. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the politics of cinema cannot be situated exclusively in the designs of the culture industry nor in the interpretations and responses of consumer-subjects. An anarchist analysis of cinema must emerge precisely where cinema itself does — at the intersection of mutually reinforcing forces of production and consumption.

[basedandlainpilled]