#hegelian dialectic

[theoptia]

Hegel’s logic deals with the development of God's thinking, prior to the creation of the world, and is called heavenly logic. However, unlike formal logic, it does not merely deal with the formal laws of thought. Although it holds itself to be the development of God's thinking, it attempts to deal with the most universal definitions and laws of reality.

[victusinveritas]

[facts-i-just-made-up]

gwf hegel

He wasn’t just “phenomenal” at Philosophy if you know what I mean…

[leftistfeminista]

The genealogy of feminist standpoint theory begins in Hegel’s account of the master/slave dialectic, and subsequently in Marx and, particularly, Lukacs’ development of the idea of the standpoint of the proletariat. Hegel argued that the oppressed slave can eventually reach a state of freedom of consciousness as a result of her/his realization of self-consciousness through struggles against the master, and via involvement through physical labor in projects that enable her/him to fashion the world—to affect it in various ways. Hegel’s analysis of the struggle inherent in the master/slave relationship gave rise to the insight that oppression and injustice are better analyzed and understood from the point of view of the slave than from that of the master. Marx and Engels, and, later, Lukacs developed this Hegelian idea within the framework of the dialectic of class consciousness, thereby giving rise to the notion of a standpoint of the proletariat (the producers of capital) as an epistemic position that, it was argued, provided a superior starting point for understanding and eventually changing the world than that of the controllers and owners of capital. The Hegelian and Marxist traditions, then, provide the genesis of standpoint theorists’ claim that the ‘double vision’ afforded to those who experience social relations from a position of marginality can, under certain circumstances, offer them epistemic advantage. Although their genealogy begins in the Hegelian and Marxist traditions, some current feminist standpoint theories are also located squarely within an empiricist tradition in epistemology. These feminist epistemologies extend the traditional empiricist commitment to experience and observation as the starting points for knowledge. Following Quine and his successors, they recognize and acknowledge that observation is theory-laden and that those theories themselves are artifacts of our making. They also draw on the insight that a set of observation-based data can serve as equally credible evidence for more than one of those theories.

[aressida]

[theidealistphilosophy]

Wickedness also resides in the gaze that perceives itself as innocent and surrounded by wickedness.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Source Unlisted.

[crumblinggothicarchitecture]

Does anyone here know anything about Queer theory?

I'm supposed to give a presentation of the Hegelian influences in the work of Judith Butler.

I think I'm cooked! I'm toast. I'm gonna get a bad yelp review. I'm not a scholar; I'm literally just a weirdo with a library card!

[airbrickwall]

[20y2]

I'm gonna recite the three parts of the Hegelian dialectic…

NORTHERN EXPOSURE 3.23 Cicely

[yorgunherakles]

tıpkı boş bir genişliğin olması gibi, boş bir derinlik de vardır.

hegel - tinin fenomenolojisi

[socialismo-en-un-solo-blog]

[victusinveritas]

[i-fucked-your-milkshake]

This is literally dialectic reasoning.

Thesis: Shampoo is better because it goes on first and cleans the hair.

Antithesis: Conditioner is better because it makes the hair silky and smooth.

Synthesis: Billy never makes the next leap but we can. The reality is that shampoo and conditioner work together to ensure proper hair care and should therefore be used in tandem as part of your hygiene routine.

Congrats, you understand Hegel.

[odettecarotte]

I am thus making an argument for limit consent, a type of consent that is conceptually grounded in negative dialectics. Affirmative consent emerges out of the tradition of reading the Hegelian dialectic as giving us an ethic of recognition, wherein wishes and boundaries are communicated and negotiated, recognizing each other's needs so as to reach a syntheic conclusion (for example, what kind of sexual contact both are assenting to). But in this volume, I explore a different ethical terrain than the one we are accustomed to, which arises in the confrontation with the irreducible opacity in oneself and in the other. Where affirmative consent imagines a subject that can be fully transparent to herself, the kind of psychoanalysis you will find in this volume acknowledges that the self cannot be fully known, that we are always somewhat opaque to ourselves, and, therefore, that consent negotiations always involve more than we think we bargained for: they involve the confrontation with what is irreducibly alien to us about ourselves.

Avgi Saketopoulou, Sexuality Beyond Consent

What I appreciate about Saketopoulous's work, and what distinguishes her from so many analysts, is her humility. Her philosophy: You don't know yourself, and the analyst doesn't know you, either.

This is in no way an invitation to jettison affirmative consent in sexual encounters, nor to minimize harm from sexual assault. That would be totally contrary to this philosophy. Sexual assault is about one person trampling the other's subjectivity; this approach is about having some sort of awareness of or even reverence for the unknowable in the deep subjectivity of the other. Acknowledgement of this human fact requires us to assume even more responsibility for the consequences of our behaviors on others.

Avgi writes that "consent is an inside job." I find that the psychological response to both sexual assault and the Me Too response to sexual assault, and even the psychological response tot the "sex positive" movement itself, can be a desire to make desire and behavior simple, explainable, and justifiable to the community. This denies us our complex sexual agency, and the energy that emanates from opacity. I love this book as an intervention which opens us up to inquire, with humility and curiosity, about the complex worlds within us.

[lesewut]

Voyage of Discovery: Hegel and his philosophical work [Part II] “One cannot speak of an injustice of nature in the unequal distribution of possessions and resources, for nature is not free and is therefore neither just nor unjust.”

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) published „Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse“ in 1821. In the preface he describes the idea of justice, the term of right and it's realization. The concepts of free will and freedom are interlinked to underline the theory, that the free will can only realize itself in a (reasonable) legal system. Hegel defines “right” [Recht] as the existence of the free will in the world (PR §29). So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions.

“Once the state has been founded, there can no longer be any heroes. They come on the scene only in uncivilized conditions.”

During the last few years I have repeatedly come across Hegel and his dialectics. In the philosophy class we dealt with his dialectics in order to better comprehend Marx's understanding of history and historical materialism. To quote Lenin: "It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic." However, their approaches differ in certain respects, especially in their differing versions of the relation between consciousness and life. While Hegel formulates, that consciousness determines life, Marx, on the contrary, states "(...) life determines consciousness". So this is not only a central question of cognitive ability from an ontological point of view, but to truly understand the hierarchical opposition or relation of consciousness to the human being, vice versa. When I was devouring Schopenhauer three years ago, I often thought of Hegel, who was giving his lectures at the same time, which were attended far more frequently. When I was dealing with the biography of the poet Hölderlin, I found out that Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin shared a room in the Tübinger Stift. Imaging how these three high spirits inspired and strengthened each other. During my studies I encountered Hegel again in the philosophy of law and in criminal law. The spark jumped with the statement, that the criminal must be be honoured as a reasonable man, because

„Denn in seiner [des Verbrechers] als eines Vernünftigen Handlung liegt, daß sie etwas Allgemeines, daß durch sie ein Gesetz aufgestellt ist, das er in ihr für sich anerkannt hat, unter welches er also als unter sein Recht subsumiert werden darf." In brief: The "reasonable" criminal is breaking a rule, but at the same time, he is forming a new, possible right.

„Daß die Strafe darin als sein eigenes Recht enthaltend angesehen wird, darin wird der Verbrecher als Vernünftiges geehrt. – Diese Ehre wird ihm nicht zuteil, wenn aus seiner Tat selbst nicht der Begriff und der Maßstab seiner Strafe genommen wird; – ebensowenig auch, wenn er nur als schädliches Tier betrachtet wird, das unschädlich zu machen sei, oder in den Zwecken der Abschreckung und Besserung.“ Speaking of crime as an "evil" and punishment as a form of compensating "evil" falls too short and tempts to focus too much on the intention of the criminal and thus leads to "recharge" the punishment morally and psychologically, which has no fruitful function. Again for better understanding:

It is not the criminal who can question the law, but only Society that recognizes infringement as a new right. It therefore requires one clarification that the (new) law set by the criminal does not apply if it should not be recognised. Penal Theories are deffining penalty purposes, aspects of justice (cf. ius talionis "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth") and are also considering the soundness of mind and how crimes can be prevented. Hegel was a representative of Absolute Penal Theories like Kant, both advocated death penalty [!] and the central aspect "restoring justice", could not explain, why penalty is needed. Also the Absolute Penal Theory is forbidding considerations of utility and meaning of the punishment (e.g. therapeutic offers), explaining this view with incompatible with the "dignity and freedom of men". Continues in the second part.