#chat control

[rosszulorzott]

kiszedtem a sztem leginformatívabb linket a twitter posztból ide

nekem az egész full nem volt meg, a baljós magyar érdekeltséggel együtt/dacára, most próbálom utolérni az eseményeket

CHAT CONTROL STILL ALIVE

Original tweet As more meetings are planned with the potential adoption of Chat Control (without any fixes!! Not even adressing the huge issue it is, like EU citizens not being allowed to send videos,pictures,or links anymore via their private messages/emails if they refuse to be scanned by artificial intelligence ??) We need help to help spread the word, as with recent snap elections among some EU countries,its unclear if some countries will keep opposing Chat Control. I'm in the process of building a Linktree to gather all useful links to help fight against it, its still a work in progress as of now. I am also looking for translation of scripts against Chat Control. https://linktr.ee/stopchatcontrol

You can also go to Patrick Breyer's website for more actions and infos https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/#WhatYouCanDo

Come join our Discord server against it,we are tyring to organize actions against it. Even if you don't speak english everyone is welcome,we need more people ! https://discord.com/invite/e7FYdYnMkS

[hamadisthings]

HELP US STOP CHAT CONTROL!

If you live in the EU, you absolutely need to pay attention to what's to come. What is Chat Control, you may ask? In a (failed) attempt to combat child abuse online the EU made Chat Control, Chat Control will result in getting your private messages and emails to be scanned by artificial intelligence aka AI to search for CSAM pictures or discussion that might have grooming in there. And on top of having your private conversations handed to AI or the police to snoop in, like your family pictures, selfies, or more sensitive pics, like the medical kind, only meant to be seen by your doctors, or the "flirtatious" kind you send to your partner, you either have to ACCEPT to be scanned...or else you will be forbidden from sending pictures, videos, or even links, as said here.

Kids should absolutely be protected online, without question, but the things that Chat Control gets wrong is that this is a blatant violation of privacy, without even considering the fact that AI WILL create tons of false positives, this is not a theory, this is a fact. And for all the false positives that will be detected, all of them will be sent to the police, which will just flood their system with useless junk instead of efficiently putting resources to actual protect kids from predators.

It also does not help that politicians, police officers, soldiers etc will be exempt from Chat Control if it passes. If it's for the sake of protection, shouldn't everyone get the same treatment? Which further prove that Chat Control would NOT keep your data of private life safe. Plus, bad actors will simply stop using messenger apps as soon as they know they're being tracked, using more obscure means, meanwhile innocent people will be punished by using those services On top of this, the EU also plans on reintroducing Data retention called "EU Going Dark". Both Chat Control and EU Going Dark are clear violation of the GDPR, and even if they shouldn't stand a chance in court, its not going to prevent politicians from trying to ram these through as an excuse to mass surveil European citizens, using kids as a shield. Even teenagers sending pictures to each other won't be exempt, which entirely goes against the purpose of protecting kids by retaining their private photos instead. Furthermore, once messaging apps are forced to comply with Chat Control, the president of Signal, a secured messaging app with encryption, have confirmed that they will be forced to leave the EU if this is enforced against them.

If Chat Control also ends up targeting any websites with the option of private messages, you better expect Europe to be geo-blocked by any websites offering such function. I would also like to add that EU citizens were very vocal in the fight against KOSA, an equally bad internet bill from the US-- and it showed! Which is why we heavily need the help of our fellow US peers to fight against Chat Control too, so please, because we all know if it passes, the US government will take a look at this and conclude "Ooh, a way to force mass surveillance on citizens even more than before? don't mind if I do!" It's always a snowball effect.

KEEP IN MIND THE EUROPE COUNCIL WILL LIKELY VOTE ON CHAT CONTROL THIS 19 JUNE OF NEXT WEEK TO SEE IF IT WILL ENTER TRILOGIES OR NOT. Even if it does enter Trilogues, the fight will only be beginning. Absentees may not count as a no, so it is crucial that you contact your MEPs HERE, as well as HERE, and you can also show your support for Edri's campaign against Chat Control HERE.

You can read more on Chat Control here as well, and you can find useful information as to which arguments to use when politely contacting your MEP (calling is better than email) here, and beneath you will find graphics you can use to spread the word!

YOU CAN ALSO JOIN OUR DISCORD SERVER (linked here) TO HELP ORGANIZE AGAINST CHAT CONTROL NON EU PEOPLE ARE MORE THAN WELCOME TO JOIN TOO!

https://discord.gg/FPDJYkUujM

PLEASE REBLOG ! NON EU PEOPLE ARE ENCOURAGED TO REBLOG AS WELL CONTACT YOUTUBERS, CONTENT CREATORS, ANYONE YOU KNOW THAT MAY HELP GET THE WORD OUT ! Let's fight for our Internet and actually keep kids safe online! Because Chat Control and EU Going Dark will only endanger kids.

PLEASE REBLOG! NON EU PEOPLE ARE ENCOURAGED TO REBLOG AS WELL CONTACT YOUTUBERS, CONTENT CREATORS, ANYONE YOU KNOW THAT MAY HELP GET THE WORD OUT !

Let's fight for our Internet and actually keep kids safe online! Because Chat Control and EU Going Dark will only endanger kids.

[four-ravens-in-a-trenchcoat]

Fuck this shit

Now Sweden gives thumbs-up to chat control 2.0, an awful proposition which would require digital communication providers to allow government access to encrypted private messages ("but only photo, video and links now :):):) not literally every digital communication you do :):):)"). This is a massive invasion to personal integrity, a fucking data security risk and an "'accidentally' surveilled the groups I like to opress or my political opponents a bit, oops" risk, especially in the more authoritarian countries. All to find, you know it, child porn and grooming (this will of course not catch teens sending consensual nudes, vacation pictures of babies on beaches sent to family members or normal porn and waste massive resources on scanning and processing "suspect" content).

Did I mention this sucks yet? They didn't even ask the government people supposed to decide our stance on EU politics, just the justice committee. During a single meeting, no debate. Sweden's desicion means a larger probablility that this passes in EU.

And you know what? Two parties which my views generally align with, who before the election NOT EVEN TWO WEEKS AGO, one of which I voted for partly because of their stance on this (no to mass surveillance, personal integrity is important) BOTH DID A 180 AND VOTED FOR CHAT CONTROL. One thing if parties I don't like and don't vote for do this, but I trusted these fuckers to have at least a little backbone/common sense. Also why did the nationalistic and generally shitty party SD vote no to this. Why do only they and C think this is a bad idea.

In other news, I've written to my first representative today to express my disappointment. I hope this doesn't pass silently.

[eziojensenthe3rd]

So european peeps, remember chat control? Well consider making some noise atm and contacting your reps because it seems to be back on the agenda with october being a discussion on progress with december aiming to endorse it. Get cracking.

(Posting this under kosa tag cause its another bad internet bill)

[homucifer-ryotan]

For anyone who wants to know what the link says:

We also should focus on chat control (EU), Bill S-210 (Canada), UK's Online Safety Act, and Australia's version of KOSA. None of these are better the Kill Online Safety Act (KOSA). It's like Even also said here:

Plus this important to keep in mind when it comes to all of these bad internet bills (credit to NetChoice).

KOSA Update Dec. 2024

Pretty sure it's safe to say that KOSA is gone for now. We can breathe for a moment, but should stay aware of it's return and other harmful bills like HR 9495.

When/If KOSA returns it will have to start over in the legislative process, so just keep that in mind. And I think we should also be loud about who is opposing this bill because KOSA supporters are already trying to call us all Big Tech lobbyists, and we're not. We're a diverse group who care about our rights and the rights of us. We all understand that we support privacy and oppose censorship, and we did well in showing that this year.

There's a lot of chaos right now, with the world in general, attacks on different communities, and a looming government shut down, but I hope everyone stays safe, has a good rest of the month, and are ready for whatever our next fight is 😊

Here's Evan BlueSky Thread on everything:

(Also sorry this is late... things were moving so fast between yesterday and today that it was hard for me to follow and keep track 😅)

[mostlysignssomeportents]

Every internet fight is a speech fight

THIS WEEKEND (November 8-10), I'll be in TUCSON, AZ: I'm the GUEST OF HONOR at the TUSCON SCIENCE FICTION CONVENTION.

My latest Locus Magazine column is "Hard (Sovereignty) Cases Make Bad (Internet) Law," an attempt to cut through the knots we tie ourselves in when speech and national sovereignty collide online:

https://locusmag.com/2024/11/cory-doctorow-hard-sovereignty-cases-make-bad-internet-law/

This happens all the time. Indeed, the precipitating incident for my writing this column was someone commenting on the short-lived Brazilian court order blocking Twitter, opining that this was purely a matter of national sovereignty, with no speech dimension.

This is just profoundly wrong. Of course any rules about blocking a communications medium will have a free-speech dimension – how could it not? And of course any dispute relating to globe-spanning medium will have a national sovereignty dimension.

How could it not?

So if every internet fight is a speech fight and a sovereignty fight, which side should we root for? Here's my proposal: we should root for human rights.

In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the US government was illegally wiretapping the whole world. They were able to do this because the world is dominated by US-based tech giants and they shipped all their data stateside for processing. These tech giants secretly colluded with the NSA to help them effect this illegal surveillance (the "Prism" program) – and then the NSA stabbed them in the back by running another program ("Upstream") where they spied on the tech giants without their knowledge.

After the Snowden revelations, countries around the world enacted "data localization" rules that required any company doing business within their borders to keep their residents' data on domestic servers. Obviously, this has a human rights dimension: keeping your people's data out of the hands of US spy agencies is an important way to defend their privacy rights. which are crucial to their speech rights (you can't speak freely if you're being spied on).

So when the EU, a largely democratic bloc, enacted data localization rules, they were harnessing national soveriegnty in service to human rights.

But the EU isn't the only place that enacted data-localization rules. Russia did the same thing. Once again, there's a strong national sovereignty case for doing this. Even in the 2010s, the US and Russia were hostile toward one another, and that hostility has only ramped up since. Russia didn't want its data stored on NSA-accessible servers for the same reason the USA wouldn't want all its' people's data stored in GRU-accessible servers.

But Russia has a significantly poorer human rights record than either the EU or the USA (note that none of these are paragons of respect for human rights). Russia's data-localization policy was motivated by a combination of legitimate national sovereignty concerns and the illegitimate desire to conduct domestic surveillance in order to identify and harass, jail, torture and murder dissidents.

When you put it this way, it's obvious that national sovereignty is important, but not as important as human rights, and when they come into conflict, we should side with human rights over sovereignty.

Some more examples: Thailand's lesse majeste rules prohibit criticism of their corrupt monarchy. Foreigners who help Thai people circumvent blocks on reportage of royal corruption are violating Thailand's national sovereignty, but they're upholding human rights:

https://www.vox.com/2020/1/24/21075149/king-thailand-maha-vajiralongkorn-facebook-video-tattoos

Saudi law prohibits criticism of the royal family; when foreigners help Saudi women's rights activists evade these prohibitions, we violate Saudi sovereignty, but uphold human rights:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55467414

In other words, "sovereignty, yes; but human rights even moreso."

Which brings me back to the precipitating incidents for the Locus column: the arrest of billionaire Telegram owner Pavel Durov in France, and the blocking of billionaire Elon Musk's Twitter in Brazil.

How do we make sense of these? Let's start with Durov. We still don't know exactly why the French government arrested him (legal systems descended from the Napoleonic Code are weird). But the arrest was at least partially motivated by a demand that Telegram conform with a French law requiring businesses to have a domestic agent to receive and act on takedown demands.

Not every takedown demand is good. When a lawyer for the Sackler family demanded that I take down criticism of his mass-murdering clients, that was illegitimate. But there is such a thing as a legitimate takedown: leaked financial information, child sex abuse material, nonconsensual pornography, true threats, etc, are all legitimate targets for takedown orders. Of course, it's not that simple. Even if we broadly agree that this stuff shouldn't be online, we don't necessarily agree whether something fits into one of these categories.

This is true even in categories with the brightest lines, like child sex abuse material:

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/09/facebook-reinstates-napalm-girl-photo

And the other categories are far blurrier, like doxing:

https://www.kenklippenstein.com/p/trump-camp-worked-with-musks-x-to

But just because not every takedown is a just one, it doesn't follow that every takedown is unjust. The idea that companies should have domestic agents in the countries where they operate isn't necessarily oppressive. If people who sell hamburgers from a street-corner have to register a designated contact with a regulator, why not someone who operates a telecoms network with 900m global users?

Of course, requirements to have a domestic contact can also be used as a prelude to human rights abuses. Countries that insist on a domestic rep are also implicitly demanding that the company place one of its employees or agents within reach of its police-force.

Just as data localization can be a way to improve human rights (by keeping data out of the hands of another country's lawless spy agencies) or to erode them (by keeping data within reach of your own country's lawless spy agencies), so can a requirement for a local agent be a way to preserve the rule of law (by establishing a conduit for legitimate takedowns) or a way to subvert it (by giving the government hostages they can use as leverage against companies who stick up for their users' rights).

In the case of Durov and Telegram, these issues are especially muddy. Telegram bills itself as an encrypted messaging app, but that's only sort of true. Telegram does not encrypt its group-chats, and even the encryption in its person-to-person messaging facility is hard to use and of dubious quality.

This is relevant because France – among many other governments – has waged a decades-long war against encrypted messaging, which is a wholly illegitimate goal. There is no way to make an encrypted messaging tool that works against bad guys (identity thieves, stalkers, corporate and foreign spies) but not against good guys (cops with legitimate warrants). Any effort to weaken end-to-end encrypted messaging creates broad, significant danger for every user of the affected service, all over the world. What's more, bans on end-to-end encrypted messaging tools can't stand on their own – they also have to include blocks of much of the useful internet, mandatory spyware on computers and mobile devices, and even more app-store-like control over which software you can install:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/03/05/theyre-still-trying-to-ban-cryptography/

So when the French state seizes Durov's person and demands that he establish the (pretty reasonable) minimum national presence needed to coordinate takedown requests, it can seem like this is a case where national sovereignty and human rights are broadly in accord.

But when you consider that Durov operates a (nominally) encrypted messaging tool that bears some resemblance to the kinds of messaging tools the French state has been trying to sabotage for decades, and continues to rail against, the human rights picture gets rather dim.

That is only slightly mitigated by the fact that Telegram's encryption is suspect, difficult to use, and not applied to the vast majority of the communications it serves. So where do we net out on this? In the Locus column, I sum things up this way:

Telegram should have a mechanism to comply with lawful takedown orders; and

those orders should respect human rights and the rule of law; and

Telegram should not backdoor its encryption, even if

the sovereign French state orders it to do so.

Sovereignty, sure, but human rights even moreso.

What about Musk? As with Durov in France, the Brazilian government demanded that Musk appoint a Brazilian representative to handle official takedown requests. Despite a recent bout of democratic backsliding under the previous regime, Brazil's current government is broadly favorable to human rights. There's no indication that Brazil would use an in-country representative as a hostage, and there's nothing intrinsically wrong with requiring foreign firms doing business in your country to have domestic representatives.

Musk's response was typical: a lawless, arrogant attack on the judge who issued the blocking order, including thinly veiled incitements to violence.

The Brazilian state's response was multi-pronged. There was a national blocking order, and a threat to penalize Brazilians who used VPNs to circumvent the block. Both measures have obvious human rights implications. For one thing, the vast majority of Brazilians who use Twitter are engaged in the legitimate exercise of speech, and they were collateral damage in the dispute between Musk and Brazil.

More serious is the prohibition on VPNs, which represents a broad attack on privacy-enhancing technology with implications far beyond the Twitter matter. Worse still, a VPN ban can only be enforced with extremely invasive network surveillance and blocking orders to app stores and ISPs to restrict access to VPN tools. This is wholly disproportionate and illegitimate.

But that wasn't the only tactic the Brazilian state used. Brazilian corporate law is markedly different from US law, with fewer protections for limited liability for business owners. The Brazilian state claimed the right to fine Musk's other companies for Twitter's failure to comply with orders to nominate a domestic representative. Faced with fines against Spacex and Tesla, Musk caved.

In other words, Brazil had a legitimate national sovereignty interest in ordering Twitter to nominate a domestic agent, and they used a mix of somewhat illegitimate tactics (blocking orders), extremely illegitimate tactics (threats against VPN users) and totally legitimate tactics (fining Musk's other companies) to achieve these goals.

As I put it in the column:

Twitter should have a mechanism to comply with lawful takedown orders; and

those orders should respect human rights and the rule of law; and

banning Twitter is bad for the free speech rights of Twitter users in Brazil; and

banning VPNs is bad for all Brazilian internet users; and

it’s hard to see how a Twitter ban will be effective without bans on VPNs.

There's no such thing as an internet policy fight that isn't about national sovereignty and speech, and when the two collide, we should side with human rights over sovereignty. Sovereignty isn't a good unto itself – it's only a good to the extent that is used to promote human rights.

In other words: "Sovereignty, sure, but human rights even moreso."

If you'd like an essay-formatted version of this post to read or share, here's a link to it on pluralistic.net, my surveillance-free, ad-free, tracker-free blog:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/11/06/brazilian-blowout/#sovereignty-sure-but-human-rights-even-moreso

Image: © Tomas Castelazo, www.tomascastelazo.com (modified) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Border_Wall_at_Tijuana_and_San_Diego_Border.jpg

CC BY-SA 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

[mapsontheweb]

Country Stance on the EU "Chat Control" Proposal as of June 2024

[channeledhistory]

The highly controversial indiscriminate child sexual abuse regulation (so-called chat control) could still be endorsed by EU governments after all, as France could give up its previous veto. This is reported by Euractiv and confirmed by internal documents. France considers the new “upload moderation” proposal in principle as a viable option. According to the latest draft regulation dated 28 May (Council document 9093/24), which is presented as “upload moderation”, users of apps and services with chat functions are to be asked whether they accept the indiscriminate and error-prone scanning and possibly reporting of their privately shared images, photos and videos. Previously unknown images and videos are also to be scrutinised using “artificial intelligence” technology. If a user refuses the scanning, they would be blocked from sending or receiving images, photos, videos and links (Article 10). End-to-end encrypted services such as Whatsapp or Signal would have to implement the automated searches “prior to transmission” of a message (so-called client-side scanning, Article 10a). The initially proposed scanning of text messages for indications of grooming, which is hardly being used to date, is to be scrapped, as is the scanning of voice communication, which has never been done before. Probably as a concession to France, the chats of employees of security authorities and the military are also to be exempted from chat control.

During the last discussion on 24 May, the Council Legal Service made it clear that indiscriminate chat control scanning of non-suspects is still envisioned and remains a violation of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, most EU governments are determined to go ahead. EU governments plan to continue their discussions on June 4th. “The Belgian proposal means that the essence of the EU Commission’s extreme and unprecedented initial chat control proposal would be implemented unchanged,” warns MEP and most prominent opponent of chat control Patrick Breyer (Pirate Party). “Using messenger services purely for texting is not an option in the 21st century. And removing excesses that aren’t being used in practice anyway is a sham. Millions of private chats and private photos of innocent citizens are to be searched using unreliable technology and then leaked without the affected chat users being even remotely connected to child sexual abuse – this would destroy our digital privacy of correspondence. Our nude photos and family photos would end up with strangers in whose hands they do not belong and with whom they are not safe. Despite lip service being paid to encryption, client-side scanning would undermine previously secure end-to-end encryption in order to turn our smartphones into spies – this would destroy secure encryption. [...]

[commiepinkofag]

Take action now

These are ideas for what you can do in the short-term or with some preparation. Start with:

Ask you government to call on the European Commission to withdraw the chat control proposal. Point them to a joint letter that was recently sent by children’s rights and digital rights groups from across Europe. Click here to find the letter and more information.

Check your government’s position (see above) and, if they voted in favour or abstained, ask them to explain why. Tell them that as a citizen you want them to reject the proposal, that chat control is widely criticised by experts and that none of the proposals tabled in the Council of the EU so far are acceptable. Ask them to protect the privacy of your communication and your IT security.

Share this call to action online.

When reaching out to your government, the ministries of the interior (in the lead) of justice and of digitisation/telecommunications/economy are your best bet. You can additionally contact the permanent representation of your country with the EU.

It can also be useful to reach out to Members of your national Parliament who can determine your country’s vote. Talk to your political representatives. Whether it is the newly elected MEPs of the European Parliament or local groups of the political parties: make sure everyone is aware of what chat control is about and that you expect politicians to defend your fundamental rights against the proposal!

When contacting politicians, writing a real letter, calling in or attending a local party event or visiting a local office to have a conversation will have a stronger impact than writing an e-mail. You can find contact details on their websites. Just remember that while you should be determined in your position, remain polite, as they will otherwise disregard what you have to say. Here is useful argumentation on chat control. And here is argumentation for why the minor modifications so far envisioned by EU governments fail to address the dangers of chat control: by us, by EDRi, by CDT.

As we continue the fight against against chat control, we need to expand the resistance:

Explain to your friends why this is an important topic. This short video, translated to all European languages, is a good start – feel free to use and share it. Also available on PeerTube (EN) and YouTube (DE).

Taking action works better and is more motivating when you work together. So try to find allies and form alliances. Whether it is in a local hackspace or in a sports club: your local action group against chat control can start anywhere. Then you can get creative and decide which type of action suits you best.

Take action now. We are the resistance against chat control!

[clatterbane]

EU users: ChatKontrol is back. here's a step by step on how to fight it

By Wednesday, politicians will resume work on it (https://digitalcourage.social/@echo\_pbreyer/113055345076289453)

Please help fight that thing back.

Here's the step by step:

https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/

[ortie-pnk]

EU new Chat Control proposal puts the security of everyon at risk in search of an non-existent magic tool.

Since it was first proposed, the EU’s Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse (aka Chat Control) has gained the attention of security experts, academics, civil society, and the private sector for all the wrong reasons.

Early versions of the Commission's proposal included requirements for media scanning and effectively entail the mass surveillance of Europeans.

Plainly, end-to-end encryption cannot survive this type of requirement. As so many others have said before, as a society we cannot compromise the integrity of end-to-end encryption for the entire population to be able to stop the minority of criminals. All it will do is to encourage criminals to use genuinely secure platforms, while leaving the good actors vulnerable to attack. Introducing a scanner into an encrypted system is essentially introducing a vulnerability waiting to be exploited by bad actors at the expense of everyone’s security and privacy.

via Element

How to take action

[taikeero-lecoredier]

CHAT CONTROL TO BE VOTED ON THIS THURSDAY

Original tweet

I know americans are busy with fighting KOSA but I urge you to please help us by spreading the word about this, I can't say this enough, if chat control passes, citizen's private messages will be scanned via artifical intelligence,and they must comply,otherwise theyre not allwoed to send pictures,videos,or links anymore. We have a discord server made to organize against it,with emails scripts you can use when contacting your meps : https://discord.com/invite/e7FYdYnMkS

Find your meps and tell them to vote no on this :

[imagineforeststudio]

Please don't panic… We will really stop this Chat Control, just like we will stop the Kosa bill.We can still stop this!!

Please..We must do everything we can to stop this.Say a firm «NO» to the government against Chat Control.

[transparentgentlemenmarker]

Nouveau peu en parle, info à qui de droit. L'Union européenne veut lire vos messages privés et analyser vos fichiers. Vos WhatsApp, Telegram, courriels, fichiers dans le cloud, tout. La vie privée appartiendrait au passé. La proposition de la Commission européenne s'intitule : "Chat Control" ou contrôle des conversations

Les messages privés doivent rester secrets votez contre le contrôle des chats par l'UE. Cliquez pour signer la pétition sur: cgo.ac/scpeJ4vl

[regsagc]

EU mass surveillance law has been put back on the drawing board

(source)

This Thursday, (20.6.24) a vote was supposed to take place on a law package that would mandate surveillance of all EU chat services. The law wasn't struck down, but simply withdrawn by the proposers because they wouldn't have gotten a majority. It's going to come back in the future, and that is why it is important that people are aware of this.

Under the guise of "saving the children" the law would require the setting up of infrastructure to scan all communications between people in the EU. Actual child protection organisations have described the law as disproportionate and unhelpful. Regardless of suspicion, it would scan and send automatically flagged content to law enforcement.

This would make all chat inherently insecure, as adding a back-door that one party can snoop through, is an obvious point of attack for hackers. Lawmakers seem aware of this, as drafts of the law have included exemptions for military, intelligence agencies and police.

Not to mention the times stuff will be flagged in error, and then end up on the desk of some law enforcement officer or other.

Once this infrastructure is in place, it could easily be adapted to scan for anything else. Allow me to speculate wildly: monitoring drug trades, cracking down on activists, creating a list of queer people in a country, etc. All it would take is another law on top of the first, and experience shows that when the technology is already there, it is a much smaller step to broaden its scope.

Luckily, the law has been put back in a drawer right now, but there are EU countries such as Hungary and Belgium who are still actively re-working it and looking to propose it again at a time when they think it is likely to pass.

[eziojensenthe3rd]

Can we please go 5 minutes without some internet censorship law popping up? Please?

Eu people, please call your relevant reps.