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evidence-based-activism · 1 month ago

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taking care of your own house isn’t “unpaid labour” it’s called being an adult which y’all seem to understand just fine when you’re shaming men but not when you’re the ones doing the work. “most jobs” are not salary. And the only hourly jobs that pay overtime are agricultural positions. Which are male dominated. So if we are talking about unpaid labour that should be at the forefront of the discussion not household chores.

Unpaid labor refers to the massive amounts of work that is necessary for society to function but does not receive direct compensation and is therefore not registered in economic indicators like GDP.

The reason this is a feminist issue is because women are responsible for a disproportionate amount of unpaid work, which results in significant negative impacts both for individual women and women as a class.

Women around the world do three times as much unpaid care work as men [1-3]. A 2020 analysis [4] found that globally, all of women's unpaid work was worth almost 11 trillion dollars. A Pew Research analysis [5] found that when considering both paid and unpaid work, American women spend 2 to 3 times as much time on unpaid work as men, which corresponds to a proportional decrease in paid work and leisure time.

This work is absolutely vital for the continual functioning of society. As mentioned in [4], in "1975, 90 percent of Icelandic women refused to cook, clean, or look after children for a day. It brought the whole nation to a standstill," which is reiterated in [3].

And why does the gender gap matter? Because women's disproportionate burden limits their personal economic stability and advancement [3, 5]. It also has substantial, negative effects on their mental health [1].

With that context, here is my answer to your ask:

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"taking care of your own house isn’t “unpaid labour” it’s called being an adult"

Something can be both necessary and unjustly allocated. Yes, a functioning society requires people cook and clean and take care of children and elders. If it were equally divided across all sectors of society, then we may not have needed a specific term to describe the hidden – but vital – work that underlies our society.

However, in reality, women bear a disproportionate amount of this requirement. This results in gender-specific disadvantages which are most easily illustrated via the conceptualization of a specific term "unpaid work".

(Further, I'd point out that your statement here implies that men are failing to "be adults" by failing to perform their fair share of unpaid labor.)

"which y’all seem to understand just fine when you’re shaming men but not when you’re the ones doing the work"

See everything I wrote above. Further, note that women are doing the vast majority of this work. Men's failure to do their fair share is a reasonable basis for shame.

'“most jobs” are not salary.'

I mean, sure, in America about 56% of jobs are paid at an hourly rate according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics [6]. This is not really relevant to the matter at hand.

"And the only hourly jobs that pay overtime are agricultural positions."

I assume you mean hourly jobs that don't pay overtime. Either way, this isn't true. Anyone who is considered an "exempt" employee is not paid overtime, which can include hourly workers in some industries (e.g., railway workers, seasonal employees, etc.). And, again, this really isn't relevant to the matter at hand. The 44% of American jobs that are salaried also don't pay overtime, along with all the other carved-out exemptions for hourly employees.

"Which are male dominated"

In America, sure. Notably, however, when looking worldwide, women are "responsible for half of the world’s food production" and "60 and 80 percent" in "most developing countries" [7].

"So if we are talking about unpaid labour that should be at the forefront of the discussion not household chores."

The issues with America's labor policies are an important class issue that you are completely free to focus on. The existence of this issue, however, does not negate the widespread problem with women's unpaid labor.

And importantly, the BLS also shows that a greater proportion of female agricultural workers are unpaid (3%) compared to male agricultural workers (<1%) [8].

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In conclusion, women are burdened with a disproportionate amount of unpaid work, which causes significant negative impact on both individual women and women as a class.

References under the cut:

Seedat, S., & Rondon, M. (2021). Women’s wellbeing and the burden of unpaid work. BMJ, n1972. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n1972

Hanna, T., Meisel, C., Moyer, J., Azcona, G., Bhatt, A., & Valero, S. D. (2020.) FORECASTING TIME SPENT IN UNPAID CARE AND DOMESTIC WORK. UN Women.

Not all gaps are created equal: The true value of care work. (2022, May 25). Oxfam International. https://www.oxfam.org/en/not-all-gaps-are-created-equal-true-value-care-work

Wezerek, G., & Ghodsee, K. R. (2020, March 5). Opinion | Women’s Unpaid Labor is Worth $10,900,000,000,000. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/03/04/opinion/women-unpaid-labor.html

Parker, K. (2013, March 14). Chapter 6: Time in work and leisure, patterns by gender and family structure. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2013/03/14/chapter-6-time-in-work-and-leisure-patterns-by-gender-and-family-structure/

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2022, April). Characteristics of minimum wage workers, 2021 U.S. Department of Labor. https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum-wage/2021/pdf/home.pdf

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Fact Sheet: Food Security and Gender. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadr706.pdf

Employed persons in agriculture and nonagricultural industries by age, sex, and class of worker. (2024, January 26). Bureau of Labor Statistics. https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat15.htm

#feminism #patriarchal culture #economic inequality

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covid-safer-hotties · 4 months ago

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Also preserved on our archive

Scientists and doctors somehow: "Wow this is really widespread! We should make up a different definition to make the numbers of this problem smaller!"

Holy shit... I'm so tired...

By Dr. Sanchari Sinha Dutta, Ph.D.

New research highlights the need for a more specific definition of long-COVID, as nearly one in five SARS-CoV-2 negative patients also reported long-term symptoms, raising concerns about overdiagnosis.

A study published in the journal Nature Communications provides an overview of post-coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) symptoms among emergency department patients who tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection.

Background The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly burdened global healthcare and economic systems, with more than 775 million reported infections worldwide. A large proportion of COVID-19 survivors are still experiencing persistent or recurring symptoms, which the World Health Organization (WHO) collectively defines as the post-COVID or long-COVID condition.

According to the WHO definition, long-COVID occurs in individuals with a history of suspected or confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection. The long-COVID symptoms, which an alternative diagnosis cannot explain, typically appear three months after the onset of COVID-19 and last for at least two months.

The WHO has listed more than 50 symptoms of long-COVID, including dyspnea, post-exertional malaise (PEM), anosmia, and cough, among others. However, many of these symptoms could overlap with other viral infections or medical conditions, leading to diagnostic challenges. This makes it difficult to distinguish long-COVID from other health conditions, raising concerns about its diagnostic specificity.

In this study, scientists compared the proportion of emergency department patients who developed WHO-defined long-COVID symptoms between SARS-CoV-2-positive and SARS-CoV-2-negative patients. The study also evaluated whether the WHO’s current definition may be too broad, potentially leading to overdiagnosis in some instances.

Study design The study was conducted on patients registered in the Canadian COVID-19 Emergency Department Rapid Response Network (CCEDRRN), a pan-Canadian collaboration collecting data on patients who were tested for SARS-CoV-2 in 50 emergency departments in eight provinces.

A total of 6,723 emergency department patients were recruited for the study, of which 58.5% were SARS-CoV-2 positive.

The study's primary outcome was to determine the proportion of patients reporting at least one WHO-defined long-COVID symptom at three months. Secondary outcomes included the proportion of patients with persistent symptoms at 6 and 12 months.

The study also used mixed-effects multivariable models to identify key risk factors for developing long-COVID symptoms, adjusting for various covariates such as age, sex, comorbidities, and hospital admission. The proportion of patients who were tested for SARS-CoV-2 and met the WHO long-COVID criteria at 6 and 12 months was determined in the study.

Important observations The proportion of SARS-CoV-2 positive patients who reported at least one long-COVID symptom at three months was 38.9%, compared to 20.7% of SARS-CoV-2 negative patients. Among SARS-CoV-2 positive patients, 45.5% of females reported long-COVID symptoms compared to 32.8% of males, indicating a significant gender disparity.

The proportions of SARS-CoV-2 positive patients who reported at least one long-COVID symptom at 6 and 12 months were 38.2% and 33.1%, respectively, compared to 19.5% and 17.3% of SARS-CoV-2 negative patients. The proportions of test-positive and test-negative patients with at least one ongoing long-COVID-consistent symptom at 12 months were 5.8% and 3.4% lower, respectively, than the proportion of symptomatic patients at three months.

The most significant risk factor for reporting long-COVID symptoms at three months was testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 during an emergency department visit (adjusted odds ratio, aOR = 4.42, 95% CI: 3.60–5.43). Other risk factors included ICU admission (aOR = 1.84, 95% CI: 1.34–2.51), female gender (aOR = 1.51, 95% CI: 1.33–1.73), and presenting with loss of taste or smell (aOR = 1.38, 95% CI: 1.03–1.85) during the emergency department visit.

Further risk analysis showed that patients reporting "managing well" at baseline were at higher risk of developing long-COVID symptoms than those reporting "fit and well" (aOR = 1.31, 95% CI: 1.14–1.52). Notably, a lower risk of symptom development was observed in patients with lower educational backgrounds (aOR = 0.75, 95% CI: 0.58–0.97).

Study significance The study finds that more than one-third of emergency department patients with a laboratory-confirmed acute SARS-CoV-2 infection exhibit long-COVID symptoms three months after their initial emergency department visit. The researchers also highlight that one in five patients who tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 infection met the WHO criteria for long-COVID, raising concerns about the broad scope of the clinical definition.

A key finding is that the high rate of long-COVID symptoms observed in SARS-CoV-2 negative patients suggests that the current WHO definition may lead to overdiagnosis. The overlap of non-specific symptoms with other conditions presents a challenge for accurately diagnosing long-COVID.

Furthermore, the study finds that about one in five patients with no history of SARS-CoV-2 infection also exhibit long-COVID symptoms, complicating distinguishing true long-COVID cases.

A high rate of long-COVID symptoms observed in SARS-CoV-2 negative patients at three months indicates that the development of long-COVID after suspected but not confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection is non-specific and can occur in SARS-CoV-2 naïve patients.

According to the WHO definition, long-COVID is a non-specific syndrome that occurs in many patients who present to the emergency department for an acute illness requiring SARS-CoV-2 testing. However, the current study findings highlight the need for a more specific WHO definition, potentially used in combination with serology or biomarker testing to identify the underlying processes that contribute to the development of long-COVID.

The study finds that SARS-CoV-2 positive patients more frequently exhibit three or more symptoms or certain symptoms, such as loss of taste and smell, dyspnea, and newly persistent cough, as compared to SARS-CoV-2 negative patients.

Existing evidence indicates that most COVID-19 patients experience olfactory symptoms (loss of taste and smell) during the acute infection phase. These symptoms typically subside within one month of infection. However, the persistent presence of olfactory symptoms observed in this study indicates that the presence of these symptoms during acute infection may predict long-COVID.

The scientists highlight the need for future studies to more conclusively understand long-COVID pathophysiology and develop more specific diagnostic criteria.

Study Link: www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-52404-4

#mask up #covid #pandemic #covid 19 #wear a mask #public health #coronavirus #sars cov 2 #still coviding #wear a respirator

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darkmaga-returns · 28 days ago

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The next German election will be held on February 23, and if recent polls are of any indication, Chancellor Olaf Scholz may be out of work. The Social Democrats (SPD) are part of a global trend of political parties that have pushed their nations so far to the left that the people are voting to the right.

Bild newspaper believed SPD’s favorability declined one point to 15.5% since December. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and sister party the Christian Social Union (CDU) are leading the polls at 31%. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party rose in popularity by one percentage point to 21.5%.

The Greens did see a 1.5 percentage point rise but they are only standing at 13.5% favorability, which marks their highest support level since 2023. All other parties are beneath the 5% level as people are completely done with the direction of the left.

Open borders, climate change, the woke agenda, and endless wars have pushed citizens worldwide to a breaking point. Progressive policies have failed. We saw the celebrated shift in Italy when Giorgia Meloni and the Brothers of Italy Party took office in 2022. Marine Le Pen of France won a majority of seats with the National Rally. The Netherlands saw Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom win a large portion of seats in the House of Representative. The tide is shifting across Europe.

The German government basically collapsed under Scholz’s watch. He left a massive hole in their budget and sacrificed economic sovereignty for Brussels. The left also lost America’s protection of Germany now that Biden is leaving office. The left is simply losing internationally as the people can no longer tolerate the failing Marxist agenda.

We had a directional change in 2024 and should see a recession sharply into 2026 into 2028. Marxism should end in Europe by 2037 but it will be a long road to get there. In the short term, all incoming governments will be forced to undo the mistakes of prior regimes while accepting that some of the damage cannot be undone.

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zeldahime · 8 months ago

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Zelda Liveblogs a Lancet Paper

Following this post, I am now going to liveblog reading the Lancet paper cited by the Economist article to predict worldwide fertility to drop by 3/4s of its current position if current demographic trends continue. It is an Open Access article, so the entire thing is open for anyone on the internet to read.

Citation:

GBD 2021 Fertility and Forecasting Collaborators (March 20, 2024). Global fertility in 204 countries and territories, 1950–2021, with forecasts to 2100: a comprehensive demographic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2021. The Lancet, 403(10440), 2057-2099. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(24)00550-6.

I refuse to use Chicago style. This is mostly because I memorized APA and don't want to learn a new one.

First, my background: I am not a demographer; I am not trained as a demographer; I have studied it auxiliarily to my other academic pursuits. I fall in a sort of educated in-between. I am currently a Master's student in library and information sciences, and my undergraduate degree was in political science, both at USAmerican universities. However, the field of economics is also very close to my heart, and I would have double-majored in it if the opportunity and financial costs had not been too high to justify it. During the five years I was a college drop-out, I studied economics independently, reading broadly within the field and taking non-certificate courses online. I've been taking non-certificate courses in economics through correspondence or online since I was about nine. I'm not an expert! I do, however, think I'm a fairly well-informed amateur.

And a note on language. This paper refers to birthing parents as mothers and to the demographic that gives birth interchangeably as female and women. I acknowledge that this is a cissexist patriarchical viewpoint that erases transmen, nonbinary and intersex people, and probably others I'm not thinking of. For consistency between my reflections and the paper and ease of reading, I will do the same. I'm conscious I'm part of the problem here, but don't see a way around it without making my bits harder to understand than they have to be.

With that out of the way, here we go:

Methodology (Summary)

This is where me not being a demographer is an important thing to know. I neither know nor normally care about the statistical methods used to determine demography, just that the demographers aren't retracting papers over it. However, I do know that in general the CCF50 (total cohort fertility before the age of 50) is a neater and more accurate measurement to build projections on than the TFR (total fertility rate by year) and that's the methodology the paper's authors went with. This is good and promising. TFR for known years and CCF50 projections sounds like a solid method. 👍

We additionally produced forecasts for multiple alternative scenarios in each location: the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) for education is achieved by 2030; the contraceptive met need SDG is achieved by 2030; pro-natal policies are enacted to create supportive environments for those who give birth; and the previous three scenarios combined.

I'm very hopeful about these forecasts! They'll show a few different hopeful scenarios.

To evaluate the forecasting performance of our model and others, we computed skill values—a metric assessing gain in forecasting accuracy—by comparing predicted versus observed ASFRs from the past 15 years (2007–21). A positive skill metric indicates that the model being evaluated performs better than the baseline model (here, a simplified model holding 2007 values constant in the future), and a negative metric indicates that the evaluated model performs worse than baseline.

This is a very responsible thing for the authors to have done, and I am interested to see how this is reflected in the models.

Findings (Summary)

During the period from 1950 to 2021, global TFR more than halved, from 4·84 (95% UI 4·63–5·06) to 2·23 (2·09–2·38). Global annual livebirths peaked in 2016 at 142 million (95% UI 137–147), declining to 129 million (121–138) in 2021. Fertility rates declined in all countries and territories since 1950,

(Emphasis mine. The numbers in parentheses are the confidence interval.) I think this is the most important takeaway from the whole damn paper. Makes sense, since it's the first line of the findings. If you read nothing else, read these three sentences. Global birthrates are barely above replacement (which, if you recall from my other essay, is generally considered to be ~2.1). To me, this implies lot of problems that traditionally have been considered solvable with population redistribution (meaning, mostly, immigration) may not be solvable that way even if fertility were to stop declining today and hold constant for the rest of the century.

Future fertility rates were projected to continue to decline worldwide, reaching a global TFR of 1·83 (1·59–2·08) in 2050 and 1·59 (1·25–1·96) in 2100 under the reference scenario. The number of countries and territories with fertility rates remaining above replacement was forecast to be 49 (24·0%) in 2050 and only six (2·9%) in 2100, with three of these six countries included in the 2021 World Bank-defined low-income group, all located in the GBD super-region of sub-Saharan Africa.

Holy shit. I cannot emphasize enough how low a TFR of 1.59 is. This is approximately the current TFR of the United Kingdom, and they're beginning to freak out even though they have relatively easy sources of additional replacement recruitment through the Commonwealth. Imagine that for the whole Earth. With only six countries as a potential source of surplus population to be redistributed.

Funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Makes sense. This is the kind of thing that foundation funds.

Introduction

Low levels of fertility have the potential over time to result in inverted population pyramids with growing numbers of older people and declining working-age populations. These changes are likely to place increasing burdens on health care and social systems, transform labour and consumer markets, and alter patterns of resource use.

Oh man, I wish I'd gone through this paper earlier, I could have just quoted this bit and been done instead of trying to explain it from scratch! 😂

The UN Population Division estimates of past fertility are not compliant with the Guidelines on Accurate and Transparent Health Estimates Reporting (GATHER) statement in important respects; notably, they do not provide all code for statistical models or explicit details on criteria for exclusion or adjustment of primary data sources. Furthermore, the validity of UN Population Division projections has been questioned due to the assumptions applied in countries experiencing low post-transition fertility dropping below replacement level.

YES GO OFF 👏 The UN Population Division is so much more cagey about their data than the World Bank, it's so annoying, and they keep predicting increases that don't happen. I thought it was so weird as an undergrad but figured it was because of ~bureaucracy~ or privacy laws or whatever. It's nice to be vindicated [redacted] years later.

Our forecasts also suggest that, by 2100, the largest concentrations of livebirths will shift to low-income settings, particularly a subset of countries and territories in sub-Saharan Africa, which are among the most vulnerable to economic and environmental challenges. Extreme shifts in the global distribution of livebirths can be partially ameliorated by improved female education and met need for modern contraception. Outside of this subset of low-income areas, most of the world's countries will experience the repercussions of low fertility, with ageing populations, declining workforces, and inverted population pyramids, which are likely to lead to profound fiscal, economic, and social consequences. National policy makers and the global health community must plan to address these divided sets of demographic challenges emerging worldwide.

This is such an important point for them to make. Demography isn't a vacuum; it has significant real-world effects. By 2100, most babies born will be born in Africa, and we need to plan for that now. By 2100, most countries will not have enough workers, and we need to plan for that now. 2100 is not that far into the future. I, personally, will live to see the beginnings of the effects of this demographic shift, and I'm an adult who pays taxes and has a college degree and shit.

The Data Sources and Processing section is pretty standard and unremarkable. Good job.

Fertility Forecasting

We produced forecasts of fertility using an updated modelling framework (appendix 1 section 3) that improved on the methods in the 2020 study by Vollset and colleagues. In our updated methods, we used not only estimates of female educational attainment and contraceptive met need as covariates, but also estimates of under-5 mortality and population density in habitable areas to account for a larger variation in CCF50 across all countries in the sub-models (appendix 1 section 3.1, appendix 2 figure S2). Similar to Vollset and colleagues, we continued to forecast fertility with CCF50 rather than TFR, because modelling in cohort space is more stable than in period space.

Niiiiice. Covariates are things that, well, vary, alongside the thing you're trying to measure. For fertility, the most obvious one might be age of the mother at first birth; if someone is 16 at first birth, she probably will have more kids than someone who is 30 at first birth, for example. This model also includes how much schooling the mother gets, whether she has contraception, the mortality rate (that is, how many of them die) of children under five, and population density! That's a lot of statistical crunching and their model will be more precise for it. Precise isn't the same as accurate, but I think that with the variables they selected, they will travel in the same direction.

What a pretty equation. I don't understand it, but it's got a certain je ne sais quois.

For the education SDG scenario, the forecasts assume that by 2030, all people will have 12 years or more of education by the age of 25 years and then maintains the same rate of change as the reference scenario up to 2100. For the contraceptive met need scenario, to reflect the SDG scenario of universal access, the forecasts assumed a linear increase in contraceptive coverage to reach 100% by 2030 and then stay constant up to 2100.

I love how optimistic these scenarios are 😂 This truly is the best-case scenario for both the education forecast and the contraceptive forecast! I do hope everybody has 12+ years of education and 100% contraceptive coverage by 2030. Make it happen, António!!!!

(Joke explained: António Guterres is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations, and these goals are absolutely not going to be met by 2030.)

In the pro-natal scenario, we assumed a country will introduce pro-natal policies, such as childcare subsidies, extended parental leave, insurance coverage expansion for infertility treatment, 33 and other forms of support for parents to afford high-quality child-care services, once TFR decreases to less than 1·75. We then made three assumptions on the effects of such policies. First, we assumed the full effect of pro-natal policies will be to increase TFR by 0·2. Second, it will take 5 years after the policy is introduced for the full increase in TFR to occur, and TFR will rise linearly over that time span. Last, we assumed that both the policies and the increase in TFR by 0·2 will endure for the remainder of the century.

The pro-natal scenario is also incredibly optimistic. This kind of response simply hasn't happened in any country that's tried pro-natal policies as envisioned by the authors (my reference cases, just off the top of my head: Japan and France).

The optimism makes sense. They represent extreme cases, in order to contrast possible outcomes versus the reference case. This is good practice! It's just also funny.

Results

The Reference Case

I hate the embedded tables. They have the confidence interval in the same cell as the estimate. How very dare they, that's incredibly inconvenient for me personally.

The chart in Figure 1, however, I think speaks volumes:

It speaks so many volumes that I'm gonna go up and put it above the cut, brb. This chart shows the reference case; that is, it shows the fertility rate if the fertility trends of 1950-2021 continue into the future.

At the national level, estimates of TFR in 2021 ranged from 0·82 (95% UI 0·75–0·89) in South Korea to 6·99 (6·75–7·24) in Chad, with below-replacement levels of fertility (TFR <2·1) in 110 of 204 countries and territories (table 1, figures 2A, 3).

I think this range is neat and goes to show that while the trend is world-wide, it's still not even. Chadian women still give birth to about 7ish kids on average. That's more than 3x replacement, and more than 8.5x the average fertility of South Korea. South Korea is going to have different problems than Chad; Chad probably doesn't have to worry as much about their workforce being unable to sustain a large elderly population. (Don't look so cheerful about it. They've got lots of other stuff to worry about. 😬)

These charts are fascinating to look at to me. I think this really showcases just how dramatic the projected decline is. It's not just the Europe, it's not just wealthy post-industrialized countries, but everywhere. It's in Eswanti, it's in Indonesia, it's in Burkina Faso, it's in China. It really shows just how much Chad is an outlier (adn should still be counted, btw, just because it's an outlier doesn't mean we should discard it; it's dependent on study structure and you can't just throw out entire countries because they have high birth rates on a study of birth rates).

Our estimates indicate that there is approximately a 30-year gap between the time when TFR falls below 2·1 and when the natural rate of population increase turns negative. We forecast that 155 (76·0%) countries and territories will have fertility rates below replacement level in 2050; by 2100, we project this number will increase to 198 (97·1%), with 178 (87·3%) having a negative natural rate of increase (figure 3).

A 30-year gap sounds reasonable. That's about how long it takes for people to have/not have kids, and for their own parents to potentially die, in about equalish numbers (on a global scale, anyway). I do think this gap number is likely to increase as healthcare improves in places that are worse today and as fertility technology increases the age at which people can become pregnant, but 30 is a perfectly respectable number with actual statistical backing.

Alternative scenario fertility forecasts

This is the part I'm really excited about!!!

The first scenario, which assumes meeting the SDG education target by 2030, is estimated to result in global TFRs of 1·65 (95% UI 1·40–1·92) in 2050 and 1·56 (1·26–1·92) in 2100 (table 2). The second scenario, which assumes meeting the SDG contraceptive met need target by 2030, will produce global TFRs of 1·64 (1·39–1·89) in 2050 and 1·52 (1·21–1·87) in 2100. The third scenario, which incorporates pro-natal policy implementation, is forecast to yield global TFRs of 1·93 (1·69–2·19) in 2050 and 1·68 (1·36–2·04) in 2100. The combined scenario, in which all three other alternative scenarios are applied, is projected to result in a global TFR of 1·65 (1·40–1·92) in 2050 and 1·62 (1·35–1·95) in 2100.

So recall the reference scenario projections: 1·83 (1·59–2·08) in 2050 and 1·59 (1·25–1·96) in 2100.

I find it interesting that all cases are so incredibly close to reference, with overlapping confidence intervals. Functionally, there's not a lot of difference between a TFR of 1.68 and 1.52. They're both still well below replacement. It's about the difference between Sweden (1.67) and Russia (1.51). Russia, you may have noticed, is waging war about it.*

*This is not a stated goal of the Russian Federation in the Ukraine War. This is me personally making an assertion that the shifting demographics of the Russian population, including the below-replacement birthrate beginning to put pressure on their lacking social safety networks, has contributed to the many complicated and interconnected reasons why the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, but please do not take me to be the final authority on the matter or interpret this statement as implying that demography of all things is the sole or primary reason for the war.

Discussion

The aforementioned changes in fertility over the coming century will have profound effects on populations, economies, geopolitics, food security, health, and the environment, with a clear demographic divide between the impacts on many middle-to-high-income locations versus many low-income locations. For nearly all countries and territories outside of sub-Saharan Africa, sustained low fertility will produce a contracting population with fewer young people relative to older people before the end of the 21st century. These changes in age structure are likely to present considerable economic challenges caused by a growing dependency ratio of older to working-age population and a shrinking labour force. 42 Unless governments identify unforeseen innovations or funding sources that address the challenges of population ageing, this demographic shift will put increasing pressure on national health insurance, social security programmes, and health-care infrastructure. These same programmes will receive less funding as working-age, tax-paying populations decline, further exacerbating the problem.

This is why the Economist article talks about birthrates the way it does. It's not about white babies or whatever people in the notes are sarcastically ascribing to an article they haven't read. It's about the whole world. There are 150 countries outside of the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and 44 of the 46 countries within Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to feel the many or all of the same effects as well.

It's about the way social security nets are structured and how they're going to fail. It's about the way that elderly people are going to be treated by our societies. It's about me, and it's about you, and it's about making sure that there are enough humans to take care of the other humans that need taking care of.

If we don't increase global fertility rates above replacement, which it increasingly looks like we won't, we need other solutions. The fertility one is easy fuckin' pickings compared to a complete overhaul of society, and you saw how little difference it actually makes. So did the authors:

To date, one strategy to reverse declining fertility in low-fertility settings has been to implement pro-natal policies, such as child-related cash transfers and tax incentives, childcare subsidies, extended parental leave, re-employment rights, and other forms of support for parents to care and pay for their children.49, 50 Yet there are few data to show that such policies have led to strong, sustained rebounds in fertility, with empirical evidence suggesting an effect size of no more than 0·2 additional livebirths per female. [...] Moreover, although pro-natal policies primarily aim to increase births, they also offer additional benefits to society, including better quality of life, greater household gender equality (ie, more equal division of household labour),53 higher rates of female labour force participation,54 lower child-care costs,55 and better maternal health outcomes,56 depending on policy design and contextual factors. In the future, it will be beneficial to perform an in-depth analysis on varying impacts of pro-natal policies in selected countries that have a meaningful impact on population. [...] Importantly, low fertility rates and the modest effects that pro-natal policies might have on them should not be used to justify more draconian measures that limit reproductive rights, such as restricting access to modern contraceptives or abortions.

I just want to highlight that the study authors explicitly argue for certain pro-natal policies that increase quality of life and caution against pro-natal policies that limit rights. These people aren't heartless.

They also discuss at some length the implications of the changing distribution of live births, where by the end of the century most live births will take place in the poorest nations, which are also the ones that will be hardest-hit by climate change. These nations already face famines, military rule, civil wars, terrorism, and climate changed-caused severe heatwaves, droughts, and floods. They advise politicians to take this into account when making policy decisions but don't go into what policy decisions should be made, which is wise since they're demographers and not political scientists, but disappointed me, the political scientist reading the demography paper and hoping to find something to criticize.

My takeaway:

Incredibly interesting paper. As a non-demographer, I think it's very convincing and hope that it sparks a serious conversation about the paths we need to take forward, in our own countries and as a global community. I especially hope that it inspires us to take bold action to drastically change our systems of elder care, which are already being pushed to the limit and will simply break under pressure if fertility rates continue to fall.

#economics tag #demography #the lancet #this is my idea of a fun saturday night #fun with statistics

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rjzimmerman · 4 months ago

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Notes: The electricity generation trajectories for wind and solar PV indicate potential generation, including current curtailment rates. However, they do not project future wind and solar PV curtailment, which may be significant in some countries by 2028.

Excerpt from this story from EcoWatch:

With solar leading the way, renewables are on track to generate nearly 50 percent of global electricity this decade. But green energy is still predicted to fall short of the United Nations target of tripling capacity, according to Renewables 2024: Analysis and forecast to 2030, a report from the International Energy Agency (IEA).

More than 5,500 gigawatts (GW) of global renewable capacity is set to be added between now and 2030, which is nearly three times the growth from 2017 to 2023, the report said.

“Renewables are moving faster than national governments can set targets for,” said Fatih Birol, IEA’s executive director, as Reuters reported. “This is mainly driven not just by efforts to lower emissions or boost energy security: it’s increasingly because renewables today offer the cheapest option to add new power plants in almost all countries around the world.”

Based on today’s governmental policy settings and current market trends, of the world’s renewable capacity installed between 2024 and 2030, almost 60 percent will come from China, a press release from IEA said.

That would mean nearly half the total global renewable power capacity would be in China by 2030, up from a third in 2010.

“Due to supportive policies and favourable economics, the world’s renewable power capacity is expected to surge over the rest of this decade, with global additions on course to roughly equal the current power capacity of China, the European Union, India and the United States combined,” the press release said.

This decade, solar PV is projected to account for 80 percent of worldwide renewable capacity growth. This is due to the construction of large solar plants and an increase in installations of rooftop solar by households and companies.

The expansion of wind is forecast to double between now and the end of the decade, compared with the period 2017 to 2023.

In nearly every country in the world, solar PV and wind are the least expensive options for adding new electricity generation.

Because of these trends, almost 70 countries that together make up 80 percent of renewable capacity around the world are set to meet or exceed their current renewable goals for 2030.

“The growth is not fully in line with the goal set by nearly 200 governments at the COP28 climate change conference in December 2023 to triple the world’s renewable capacity this decade – the report forecasts global capacity will reach 2.7 times its 2022 level by 2030,” the press release said. “But IEA analysis indicates that fully meeting the tripling target is entirely possible if governments take near-term opportunities for action.”

#renewable energy #International Energy Agency

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collapsedsquid · 11 months ago

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This helps to unravel at least some of the enigmas raised by the farmers’ protests of recent months. Instead of the classical alliance between workers and peasants proposed by Lenin, are we witnessing the formation of a new historic bloc? With tractors, combine harvesters and all the other machinery, the technological revolution wiped out the peasant masses Lenin was describing. Today’s peasants (at least those who have been protesting in Europe in recent months, and certainly not the labourers – often immigrants, even more often illegal ones – who work in their fields) are small landowners, similar to independent truck drivers, the small self-exploiting capitalists described by the Italian sociologist Sergio Bologna (one cannot help but remember the independent Chilean truck drivers who contributed so much to the fall of Salvador Allende). Along with nutritional sustenance, peasants provide global capitalism with ideological support. This abstract financial system needs to anchor itself deep in our psyches in order to effectively govern at the level of the nation-state. Capital’s political representatives do not need farmers’ votes, nor their economic output, as much as they need the ‘imagined community’ that is created around the potato, the grape or the white asparagus. A representative of Dutch farmers remarked in 2019, ‘If there will soon be no more farmers, don’t say “wir haben es nicht gewusst”’. That he was unafraid of ridicule in making a comparison with the Holocaust is an indication of how far symbolic investment in the figure of the farmer can go.

Yet more groping towards the question "Why do farmers have so much political power, when they have neither the votes nor the economic power of sectors governments worldwide are happy to piss on?"

#Also yeah “peasants” is a bit much here

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1238855 · 3 months ago

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What’s Next for BPO: Market Trends and Solutions

The future of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) is set to be transformative, with projections indicating an exceptional growth rate of 6.69%, aiming for $450 billion by 2024. This growth signals an increasing demand for outsourcing solutions, reshaping business operations worldwide. However, the BPO sector faces significant challenges that could obstruct its progress.

Key challenges include global economic fluctuations, which can lead to reduced demand for outsourcing as businesses looking to cut costs. However, the industry faces with a shortage of skilled workers, particularly in specialized areas and languages. Rising inflation contributes to increased operational costs, making it difficult for BPO companies to maintain competitiveness.

To address these obstacles, BPO firms can invest in advanced technologies like automation and AI to boost efficiency. Promoting employee development through training can reduce the skills gap, while flexible business models allow companies to adapt to changing market conditions. Building up client relationships and focusing on quality customer experiences are crucial for retaining clients.

Exploring new markets can further diversify client bases, reducing reliance on specific industries. By managing these challenges and adopting innovation, BPO companies can play an important part in upcoming global business.

#Business Process Outsourcing (BPO)

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allthebrazilianpolitics · 30 days ago

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Nine out of ten Brazilian firms want workers with new skills by 2030, report says

In Brazil, companies to enhance workers’ skills by focusing on AI, technological literacy, according to The Future of Jobs Report

The transformations brought about by new technologies, particularly digital ones, have reshaped the global job market, including in Brazil, demanding that both workers and companies quickly adapt for employability on one hand, and productivity on the other. According to the The Future of Jobs Report 2025, developed globally by the World Economic Forum in partnership with Fundação Dom Cabral (FDC) in Brazil, this trend will result in the end of certain professions. However, the balance between job loss and the creation of more modern positions leaves a positive net gain of 78 million jobs worldwide.

In Brazil, the report’s data indicates that nine out of ten companies plan to enhance workers’ skills by 2030, focusing on artificial intelligence (AI), big data, critical thinking, technological literacy, and general logic.

“The report is not catastrophic; we are stating that this demand for technology will create more jobs [than it will destroy],” noted Hugo Tadeu, professor and director of the Innovation and Digital Technologies center at Fundação Dom Cabral, responsible for the report in Brazil.

However, Mr. Tadeu points out that companies will have to sponsor adequate training to qualify and requalify the workforce to meet their own demands. He notes that basic education and universities in Brazil have not yet sufficiently modernized to train workers for an already existing demand that will significantly grow over the next five years.

#brazil #brazilian politics #politics #economy #image description in alt #mod nise da silveira

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procelibacyactivism · 2 months ago

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People become vegetarians for a variety of reasons. Some do it to alleviate animal suffering, others because they want to pursue a healthier lifestyle. Still others are fans of sustainability or wish to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. No matter how much their carnivorous friends might deny it, vegetarians have a point: cutting out meat delivers multiple benefits. And the more who make the switch, the more those perks would manifest on a global scale. But if everyone became a committed vegetarian, there would be serious drawbacks for millions, if not billions, of people. “It’s a tale of two worlds, really,” says Andrew Jarvis of Colombia’s International Centre for Tropical Agriculture. “In developed countries, vegetarianism would bring all sorts of environmental and health benefits. But in developing countries there would be negative effects in terms of poverty.”

'if widespread animal cruelty and exploitation end, poor ppl will suffer :(' is a legitimately retarded take. feels like something you'd hear before slavery was abolished -- 'if slavery is abolished poor hard working plantation owners won't be able to make a living :('

but black people could advocate for themselves. animals cannot. not that ppl would be ethical enough to avoid animal products on a large scale anyway.

[...]

Jarvis and other experts at the centre hypothesised what might happen if meat dropped off the planet’s menu overnight.

First, they examined climate change. Food production accounts for one-quarter to one-third of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, and the brunt of responsibility for those numbers falls to the livestock industry. Despite this, how our dietary choices affect climate change is often underestimated. In the US, for example, an average family of four emits more greenhouse gases because of the meat they eat than from driving two cars – but it is cars, not steaks, that regularly come up in discussions about global warming.

“Most people don’t think of the consequences of food on climate change,” says Tim Benton, a food security expert at the University of Leeds. “But just eating a little less meat right now might make things a whole lot better for our children and grandchildren.”

Marco Springmann, a research fellow at the Oxford Martin School’s Future of Food programme, tried to quantify just how much better: he and his colleagues built computer models that predicted what would happen if everyone became vegetarian by 2050. The results indicate that – largely thanks to the elimination of red meat – food-related emissions would drop by about 60 percent. If the world went vegan instead, emissions declines would be around 70 percent.

“When looking at what would be in line with avoiding dangerous levels of climate change, we found that you could only stabilise the ratio of food-related emissions to all emissions if everyone adopted a plant-based diet,” Springmann says. “That scenario is not very realistic – but it highlights the importance that food-related emissions will play in the future.”

[...]

“There are over 3.5 billion domestic ruminants on earth, and tens of billions of chickens produced and killed each year for food,” says Ben Phalan, who researches the balance between food demand and biodiversity at the University of Cambridge. “We’d be talking about a huge amount of economic disruption.”

if 3.5 billion people were reproductive and domestic slaves, we would be horrified. and yet

enjoy the next zoonotic pandemic you lil aholes

https://chuangcn.org/2020/02/social-contagion/

#go vegan #animal agriculture #animal rights #animal cruelty

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dertaglichedan · 2 months ago

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European Police Pull Plug On 'Largest' Illegal Streaming Service

An international police operation has shut down "one of the world's largest" illegal online streaming services, used by some 22 million people worldwide and causing billions of euros in copyright damages, EU law agencies said on Wednesday.

Police from nine EU countries and Britain swooped on suspects on Tuesday, shutting down servers and carrying out searches, Eurojust and Europol said in separate statements.

"In a large-scale operation, over 100 searches were carried out against 102 suspects. Eleven suspects were arrested in Croatia," the EU's judicial cooperation arm Eurojust said.

The suspects "illegally distributed material from streaming services online, including films and series", it added, saying that "the illegal service served more than 22 million users worldwide".

The suspects also pirated more than 2,500 television channels including sports channels.

"They were able to make over 250 million euros in illegal profits per month. The economic damages to the copyright holders of the material is estimated at 10 billion euros," Eurojust said.

To evade authorities, the suspects allegedly used encrypted messaging services to communicate and false identities to register phone numbers, credit cards, server rentals and television subscriptions.

The Hague-based Eurojust coordinated the operation by British, Croatian, Dutch, Italian, Romanian, Swedish and Swiss law authorities, while Europol supported the operation by deploying experts and analysing the available intelligence during the investigation phase.

"In addition to intellectual property crime (copyright infringement), there are indications of further crimes, such as money laundering and cybercrime, which are currently under investigation," Europol said.

Illegal streaming of films and TV programmes reached some 215 billion illegal site visits in 2022, said Britain-based MUSO, which claims to have the most comprehensive data on piracy websites.

The figure showed an 18-percent increase between 2021 and 2022, covering 480,000 films and TV shows, MUSO said last year.

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evidence-based-activism · 14 days ago

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Hi! I don't know how researched this topic is, I couldn't find any article tackling specifically what I wanted to know, so I apologize if this ask gives you a lot of trouble.

Can you find any statistics regarding the exploitation of men in gay porn? Specifically those on the 'receiving' end. Are they also being trafficked, forced, coerced, threatened into it, or are they mostly opting for it of their own volition? If they're forced, is it by partners or people they know, or strangers? And are violence and degradation as prevalent in gay porn as they are in hetero porn?

Thank you in advance!

Hi!

Can you find any statistics regarding the exploitation of men in gay porn? Specifically those on the 'receiving' end.

There's less research on this topic, but I did find some!

(I cannot find anything for those on the penetrating end, however!)

I'll expand below, but first I should note that some of this research is about men in prostitution. However, given the overlap between the two, this likely also applies to men in pornography.

Are they also being trafficked, forced, coerced, threatened into it, or are they mostly opting for it of their own volition? If they're forced, is it by partners or people they know, or strangers?

According to the International Labor Office, 99% of worldwide victims of sex trafficking are women and girls [1].

It's unclear what percent of "voluntary" prostitutes are women – although it is certainly the majority.

For one specific group, a report on youth "involved" in the USA "sex trade", indicates 36% of the youth involved are boys and 4% are trans girls. (To be clear, youth make up a relatively small proportion of all "voluntary" prostitutes.)

Demographics differed slightly between groups, but the average age of entry was under 18 for each group. Male prostitutes were substantially less likely to have a pimp. Despite this, 57% of boys and 78% of trans girls tried (and presumably failed) to "leave the life", suggesting a high level of economic and/or social coercion.

Further, one of the most heavily cited articles in feminist spaces is "Prostitution and trafficking in nine countries" [3], which included men (3% of the total sample) and/or trans women (5% of the total sample) in three of the countries. The countries including these male prostitutes don't differ substantially in their responses from the other countries, indicating that the same conclusions drawn from the sample as a whole (e.g., 89% of prostitutes want to leave prostitution, 50+% of prostitutes meet the criteria for PTSD, etc.) may be the same for male prostitutes. (This would need to be confirmed by other work, but is a reasonable hypothesis from the current data.)

This 2023 global, qualitative meta-synthesis of 66 studies [4] attempts to review the research on prostitutes. Their overall conclusion was that "male sex workers (MSWs) encounter many of the same experiences that have been previously documented by female sex workers" but "MSWs also experience areas of privilege and discrimination unique to their lived experiences ... particularly ... for men who sold sex in countries where sexual minorities are criminalized or decriminalized but not legalized".

In addition, although they usually were not "coerced by romantic partners or pimps" (which is common for women), their participation was not "completely consensual" as many "cite abusive childhoods, no opportunity to acquire legitimate marketable skills, days or months of living on the street, and a choice of sex work or starvation are their primary reasons for entering the industry". This is similar to the experience of many female prostitutes.

In addition, they "experience high levels of physical and sexual violence", much like female prostitutes, although they are "less likely to be pimp-controlled" and therefore "experience less violence than female sex workers".

So, in summary, male prostitutes are both similar and different from female prostitutes. While they are less likely to experience overt forms of force and coercion (i.e., trafficking, coercion from pimps, etc.), they face many of the same indirect forms of coercion (i.e., poverty, history of abuse, etc.) that women do.

And are violence and degradation as prevalent in gay porn as they are in hetero porn?

They are similar, but possibly not exactly the same.

This 2023 study [5] documented sexual aggression in 31% of gay male pornography scenes and 45% of heterosexual pornography scenes.

This review article [6] discusses various issues with gay male pornography, indicating "the gay pornography industry risks placing its 'models' in situations, which promote and hence are violence, cruelty, degradation, dehumanization, and exploitation" and suggests men in pornography face the same issues as women in pornography. (I should note that they, too, seem focused on "receptive" actors here.)

While there's less evidence on this topic overall, there is some indicating that gay male pornography actors "begin to see themselves in the same ways that they are viewed and sexualized by the industry ... [which] eventually results in considerable harm" along with some documented cases of physical and emotional abuse. (They also discuss the prevalence of eroticized racism.)

I'd argue that there is also an argument to be made about how any coerced sex (including economic coercion, as experienced by almost every prostitute and pornography actor) is a form of violence. (See my #sex industry tag for more on this.)

Ultimately, there is little evidence specifically examining the prevalence of violence in gay porn. Based on the evidence we do have, it looks like overt violence in gay male porn may be somewhat less frequent than in heterosexual porn, but is still frequent in absolute terms. In addition, less overt violence (i.e., coercion) is definitely common among male prostitutes, including those who engage in pornography.

I hope this helps Anon!

References under the cut:

International Labour Organization. (2017). Global estimates of modern slavery: Forced labour and forced marriage. Geneva: Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf

Swaner, R., Labriola, M., Rempel, M., Walker, A., & Spadafore, J. (2016). Youth involvement in the sex trade: A national study.

Farley, M., Cotton, A., Lynne, J., Zumbeck, S., Spiwak, F., Reyes, M. E., ... & Sezgin, U. (2004). Prostitution and trafficking in nine countries: An update on violence and posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of trauma practice, 2(3-4), 33-74.

Curtis, M. G., & Boe, J. L. (2023). The lived experiences of male sex workers: A global qualitative meta-synthesis. Sexes, 4(2), 222-255.

Fritz, N., & Bowling, J. (2023). Sexual behaviors and aggression in gay pornography. Journal of homosexuality, 70(14), 3353-3373.

Kendall, C. N., & Funk, R. E. (2004). Gay male pornography's “actors” when “fantasy” isn't. Journal of Trauma Practice, 2(3-4), 93-114.

#feminism #sex industry

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covid-safer-hotties · 5 months ago

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Long Covid could be costing NZ $2 billion a year in lost productivity: Experts urge preventive action - Published Sept 9, 2024

Long Covid could be costing the economy of Aotearoa New Zealand at least NZ$2 billion per year from reduced worker productivity, and that’s excluding health costs.

In the latest Briefing from the Public Health Communication Centre – Long Covid: High economic burden justifies further preventive efforts – researchers summarise local and international evidence about the impacts of Long Covid on productivity.

University of Auckland health economist Professor Paula Lorgelly highlights estimates from a recently-published economic analysis in Australia that modelled the effects of Long Covid on productivity and GDP. “The research suggests that Long Covid is likely costing the Australian economy approximately AU$9.6 billion, equivalent to 0.5% of Australia’s GDP. And that’s a conservative estimate.”

Professor Lorgelly says it is likely that Long Covid is having a comparable economic impact in NZ where a 0.5% reduction in GDP translates to approximately NZ$2 billion per year. “While this is an estimate, it’s plausible that Long Covid significantly impacts productivity here. Further evidence of productivity harm comes from the Long COVID Registry Aotearoa which recently reported that individuals with Long Covid are working between seven and ten fewer hours a week than before the pandemic.”

Lead author Associate Professor Amanda Kvalsvig from the University of Otago says the NZ Government needs to respond with urgency to worldwide evidence of ongoing harms from Covid-19. “High year-round infection and reinfection rates mean that each week, another cohort of New Zealanders enters the Long Covid lottery.”

She says NZ needs to step up preventive action, including improving the air quality in schools and other workplaces to stop the virus from spreading so easily indoors. “Covid-19 vaccines are proven to reduce the risk of Long Covid and that knowledge should be reflected in NZ’s vaccine strategy. Eligibility for boosters should be expanded to younger age groups with a strong emphasis on occupations at increased risk such as teachers.”

Dr. Kvalsvig also emphasises the need for occupational and social support, including extended sick leave policies and comprehensive rehabilitation programs.

Professor Lorgelly says that while the Australian research has given us an indicator of the huge productivity loss NZ is facing, robust local studies are needed to quantify the true cost.

“Without accurate data, it will be difficult for policymakers to make informed decisions about how to efficiently and equitably protect New Zealanders from the health and economic harms of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.”

#mask up #covid #pandemic #covid 19 #wear a mask #coronavirus #public health #sars cov 2 #still coviding #wear a respirator #long covid

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unpluggedfinancial · 5 months ago

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Why Bitcoin Will Outlast Other Cryptocurrencies

In the ever-expanding universe of cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin continues to stand out as the gold standard, while many of its peers falter. With thousands of altcoins vying for attention, one might wonder why Bitcoin remains the dominant force. The answer lies in its unique characteristics, unparalleled security, and the unfortunate reality that a vast majority of other cryptocurrencies are little more than scams. In this post, we'll explore why Bitcoin’s foundational strengths ensure its longevity and why it’s poised to outlast the vast majority of other digital assets.

1. The First-Mover Advantage

Bitcoin’s early emergence gave it a significant edge over all other cryptocurrencies. Being the first to solve the double-spend problem, Bitcoin cemented its place as the pioneer of digital currency. This first-mover advantage has led to widespread recognition and adoption, something that no other cryptocurrency has managed to replicate. While many altcoins have tried to copy or improve upon Bitcoin's model, none have been able to dethrone it as the king of cryptocurrencies.

2. Decentralization and Security

At the heart of Bitcoin’s success is its decentralization. Unlike many altcoins that rely on a centralized figure or entity, Bitcoin operates on a truly decentralized network, with thousands of nodes worldwide verifying transactions and securing the network. This decentralization makes Bitcoin incredibly resistant to attacks and manipulation. In contrast, many other cryptocurrencies are more centralized, making them vulnerable to attacks or corrupt practices, which further diminishes their long-term viability.

3. Network Effects

Bitcoin’s large and growing user base strengthens its network in a way that few altcoins can match. The value of a cryptocurrency is, in part, determined by the number of people using it. Bitcoin’s network effects make it increasingly valuable as more people adopt it. Every new user, miner, and node adds to Bitcoin’s resilience and value, creating a positive feedback loop that solidifies its dominance.

4. Limited Supply and Store of Value

One of Bitcoin’s most compelling features is its fixed supply of 21 million coins. This scarcity creates a strong store of value, akin to digital gold. As inflation erodes the value of fiat currencies and the supply of altcoins continues to grow unchecked, Bitcoin’s limited supply makes it a reliable hedge against economic instability. Many other cryptocurrencies do not have the same level of scarcity, making them less attractive as a long-term store of value.

5. Institutional Adoption

The growing trend of institutional adoption is a clear indicator of Bitcoin’s staying power. Companies like MicroStrategy, Tesla, and even traditional financial institutions are increasingly integrating Bitcoin into their balance sheets and offerings. The approval of Bitcoin ETFs has further legitimized Bitcoin as a mainstream asset. In contrast, very few altcoins have achieved the same level of trust and integration into the global financial system.

6. The Harsh Reality: 90% of Cryptocurrencies Are Scams

Here’s where the harsh truth comes into play: the cryptocurrency market is flooded with projects that range from speculative ventures to outright scams. With the lack of regulation and the anonymity provided by blockchain technology, bad actors have found fertile ground to launch fraudulent projects. These so-called “pump-and-dump” schemes, where the creators artificially inflate the price of a new coin only to sell off their holdings and disappear, are all too common.

The reality is that about 90% of cryptocurrencies are either poorly conceived, have no real use case, or are designed with malicious intent. This environment creates a treacherous landscape for investors and tarnishes the reputation of the entire industry. Bitcoin, however, stands apart as a beacon of trustworthiness. Its decentralized nature, robust security, and proven track record make it a safe haven in a sea of uncertainty.

7. Bitcoin’s Community and Development

Bitcoin’s strong community and continuous development ensure its ongoing improvement and adaptation. The Bitcoin network benefits from an active global community of developers who work tirelessly to enhance its features and security. This open-source nature allows Bitcoin to evolve and stay ahead of emerging threats. Unlike many altcoins that are dependent on a small group of developers or a central authority, Bitcoin’s community-driven approach ensures that it remains robust and innovative.

8. The Future of Bitcoin in Finance

As the global economy becomes increasingly digital, Bitcoin is poised to play an even more significant role. Its potential as digital gold, a global reserve currency, or even a foundation for a new financial system is becoming more apparent. The robustness of Bitcoin makes it a reliable store of value, particularly in times of economic uncertainty.

In contrast, many other cryptocurrencies lack the necessary infrastructure, trust, and user base to survive in the long term. As regulations tighten and the market matures, we can expect many of these projects to fade away, leaving Bitcoin as the ultimate victor.

Conclusion

Bitcoin’s unique characteristics – its first-mover advantage, decentralization, network effects, limited supply, and institutional adoption – ensure its dominance in the cryptocurrency market. When we add to this the fact that a staggering 90% of cryptocurrencies are scams or speculative bubbles, the case for Bitcoin’s longevity becomes even clearer. Bitcoin is more than just a digital asset; it’s a movement, a revolution, and the future of money.

Call to Action

What do you think about the current state of the cryptocurrency market? Have you encountered scams or speculative projects? Share your thoughts and experiences in the comments below, and let’s keep the conversation going about why Bitcoin is here to stay.

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