#Velyka Dymerka | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

mariacallous · 2 years ago

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When a Kh-22 missile slammed into a residential apartment block in the city of Dnipro on January 14, it killed nearly 50 civilians and wounded dozens more. It was one of the largest such attacks since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine which Russian President Vladimir Putin launched one year ago today. Russia’s destruction of residential buildings, hospitals, schools and power infrastructure have been widely reported in the period since.

Speaking at an awards ceremony on December 8 Putin, champagne glass in hand, acknowledged and sought to justify Russia’s campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in what was widely considered to be a bid to break the country’s resolve. So far, those ambitions have failed.

But as Bellingcat’s project to map and log incidents of civilian harm in Ukraine shows, many other facets of civilian life have also been attacked. They are the bus stops where people wait at the start of a working day, the playgrounds where they take their children and the post offices where mail parcels and letters are processed. Open source imagery – videos and photos from Ukraine, collected and verified by Bellingcat’s Global Authentication Project – tell the story of these key amenities and the citizens killed while using them. Each of the codes given in brackets corresponds to a verified incident on Bellingcat’s TimeMap, which you can explore further here. At the time of publication, more than a thousand incidents are recorded on the map.

Heading to Work

Ukraine’s metro systems, which tunnel deep beneath three of its largest cities, have sheltered thousands of civilians during Russian attacks. They’re emblematic of the country’s resilience, despite also being a target themselves on a number of occasions. But above ground, tram, trolleybus and bus stops can be far riskier – single strikes can and have killed dozens of commuters who congregate on the side of a street.

One small group was waiting outside Kharkiv’s Pedagogical University on the morning of July 20 (CIV1195). They stood at the Barabashova Street bus stop, at the intersection of two busy streets. They’d have had a view of the Vesuvalny canal, which flows into the Kharkiv River and then through the centre of Ukraine’s second-largest city. All were killed at 9:30 AM by what the authorities said was an ‘Uragan’ multiple launch system. According to the prosecutor, among the victims were a 72-year old woman, a 13-year old boy and his 15-year old sister. Photos shared by local media show the skeleton of the metal bus stop and a number of bodies.

Similar stories can be found across Ukraine.

For example, on the afternoon of March 15, three people sat in heavy coats in a bus shelter outside the town of Velyka Dymerka, just north of Kyiv (CIV0373). They were huddled in heavy coats, as is normal for Ukraine in March.

What happened next was captured on what appears to be CCTV footage. First, an orange flash can be seen behind a row of trees in the distance. The explosions come closer. One strikes just in front of the bus shelter and another behind. One of those waiting makes a move just before smoke fills the bottom half of the screen. Another figure runs out of sight.

This video was published on the InsiderUA Telegram channel. It is unclear whether any of the people featured survived. The local outlet BrovaryMedia commented under a Facebook post of the same footage that police had been unable to retrieve the bodies given that the town was occupied by Russian forces at the time of the event. According to reporting by Gazeta.UA, Velyka Dymerka was liberated on April 1.

The next month in an area of the Donetsk Region under government control, 10 workers stood in front of a bus at a platform at the massive Avdiivka Coke Plant. It was the end of their shift. CCTV footage shows an explosion almost directly in front of them. The screen soon fills with smoke. Citing police statements, the news website LB.UA wrote that seven workers were killed and 19 wounded in this May 4 attack. In press images, broken glass and bloodstains can be seen over the tarmac. Police shared an image of a munition fragment consistent with a BM-21 rocket.

As Russia’s invasion has dragged on, such attacks have continued. Extremely graphic images appeared online following an attack on a Mykolaiv bus stop on July 29 (CIV1235). Sevenwere killed and 19 hospitalised in this attack, according to the city’s mayor Oleg Senekevich.

On February 21 this year, as Putin gave a speech marking a year of his ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine, a rocket struck a bus stop in Kherson. Ukrainian officials said that it killed six people. All in all, at the time of publication, Bellingcat’s TimeMap has recorded 19 attacks on public transport and transport infrastructure. This number includes cases in territories controlled by Russia such as an attack on a Donetsk bus station on July 14 (CIV1193). The full number of deaths from these incidents is not known; Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure could not respond by press time.

Posting a Letter

Even in the digital age in a country which has taken steps to digitise its bureaucracy, snail mail remains a vital mode of communication. Ukraine’s state postal service Ukrposhta has even issued stamps glorifying the country’s resistance to Russia’s invasion. Yet the service has, understandably, been severely impacted by the war. On the afternoon of April 15, a cruise missile struck a postal sorting centre in the Pivnichniyy District of Mykolaiv. For months, the southern Ukrainian port city was on the frontline as Russian forces attempted to advance west of Kherson (CIV0784). Mykolaiv was heavily bombarded; as Bellingcat has reported, at the start of the month a hospital and markets came under attack from rocket artillery stationed in the Russian-occupied Kherson Region. Images shared on Telegram by Mykolaiv Region Governor Vitaly Kim showed the aftermath. One picture from the scene showed the head of a cruise missile. Conveyor belts for letters and parcels are warped out of shape, with red metal sorting boxes strewn throughout a hall of twisted metal. It’s new equipment; according to a local news website, this postal logistics terminal had opened in 2021. The same day Volodymyr Popereshnyuk, co-owner of the Nova Poshta company which owned the facility, wrote on Facebook that no staff had been killed but three were hospitalised after the attack.

Ukrposhta’s General Director Igor Smelyansky told Bellingcat that he estimated more than 500 postal branches could have suffered anything from light damage or been entirely razed to the ground since February 24. “We can only guess about the number since we do not have access to those in occupied territories such as Mariupol”, he cautioned.

Postal workers face the same risks as the rest of Ukraine’s civilians, Smelyansky explained. “There are losses of life when people are in their homes. People are killed when they go home at night because there’s no light”, he explained, adding that only two postal staff have been killed in the line of duty.

He referred to a case on March 5 in the Zaporizhzhia Region. Two postal workers were driving around small villages delivering pensions to local people. According to Ukrainian media reporting, citing government sources, the postal workers had encountered a group of pro-Russian Chechen fighters who shot at their car before crushing it.

A single photo which is extremely graphic is the only open source evidence of these events. Two bodies lie on the roadside, surrounded by papers. A crushed car lies behind them. The image was reportedly taken by other postal workers who left before they could retrieve the bodies, due to the presence of Russian troops in the area. As the Ukrainian press’ account of these events could not be independently verified using open source research, it cannot be found in Bellingcat’s TimeMap.

Post offices, like many other commercial or administrative spaces, have also reportedly served as humanitarian centres since the start of the invasion. On March 24, Ukrainian media reported a Nova Poshta facility in Kharkiv’s Saltivka district had been hit alongside other buildings, which according to the local prosecutor killed three and injured eight (CIV0533). Bellingcat’s Michael Sheldon assembled a Google Map showing missile impacts related to this incident, in which the motor section of a rocket slammed into a crowd of people waiting for aid outside the postal building. The previous day, the Russian military blogger Rybar alleged in a Telegram post that a Ukrainian military presence had been sighted in the immediate area, later providing inconclusive evidence for the claim.

Ukraine’s postal infrastructure continues to suffer as Russia’s invasion grinds on. On February 12, Suspilne Media reported that a Nova Poshta depot near Kharkiv’s Balashivskyi railway station was struck by an S-300 surface to air missile (CIV1858).

Having Fun

“This playground had a castle and a locomotive. Now it has a rocket”, wrote the journalist Alec Luhn on Twitter. In the image he shared on February 27, the motor section of a rocket can be seen embedded inside a children’s playground in the Saltivka district of Kharkiv (CIV0448).

Just two days earlier, a 9M55K rocket was photographed stuck in the ground near a grove of trees just in front of another playground in Saltivka (CIV0460). And again on March 6, the playground of a courtyard in the same block as that referred to in Luhn’s Tweet was struck in the same manner; a rocket was photographed sticking out of the ground just metres away from another train-shaped climbing frame (CIV0266).

These are just three of the dozens of images of destroyed children’s playgrounds in Ukraine which have been shared online over the past year. It is hard to establish with any certainty whether these playgrounds were attacked deliberately. However, it is clear that they are not being excluded from Russia’s indiscriminate bombardment of Ukraine’s cities, from which the Kharkiv district of Saltivka has suffered particularly badly.

In Ukraine’s cities, children’s playgrounds are often situated in courtyards between large Soviet-era apartment blocks. Even if such rockets do not strike these residential buildings, impacts such as those seen here would also damage cars, local shops, residential buildings and kill or maim passing pedestrians. Detonating cluster munitions would harm civilians over a wide area, regardless of whether the rocket was aimed at a civilian building.

Indeed, the Smerch and Uragan rockets seen in these images are capable of carrying cluster munitions. This weapons system deploys a large number of smaller sub-munitions over a target, which in turn spread and explode over a larger area. This increases the potential for casualties as unsuspecting civilians – including children – trigger the devices.

An example of this risk can be seen last April, when the prosecutor’s office in the Sumy Region shared an image of a rocket lying behind a tree in a playground in the town of Akhtyrka (CIV0754). The spent cargo section, which has deployed its submunitions, can clearly be seen. Submunitions were also attached to the Tochka ballistic missile which struck a playground, residential building and three cars in Mariupol in March (CIV0139)

At the time of writing, Bellingcat’s TimeMap database includes 13 incidents of attacks on children’s playgrounds across Ukraine, including one case from occupied Donetsk in August 2022 (CIV1242) and a cruise missile strike on Shevchenko Park in the very heart of Ukraine’s capital Kyiv in October (CIV1506).

The Human Toll

On February 21, the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said in a statement that the agency had verified 8,006 civilian deaths and 13,827 injuries in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion. “Nearly 18 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance and nearly 14 million have been displaced from their homes”.

Many of these deaths and injuries are documented in Bellingcat’s database. But it is important to note that open source imagery likely represents only a fraction of the harm caused to civilians by Russia’s invasion.

Other facilities to be struck, and included in Bellingcat’s civilian harm database, include psychiatric hospitals (CIV0445), fire stations (CIV1040), religious (CIV0370) and commercial sites (CIV0894). The prevalence of certain types of imagery online can also reflect what people on the ground in Ukraine feel is most important to share with the wider world. In the case of destroyed playgrounds, they are shared to demonstrate the attackers’ disregard for human life. The reception to Luhn’s Tweet is a case in point.

According to Yulia Gorbunova, Senior Researcher on Ukraine at Human Rights Watch (HRW), incidents of indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Ukraine could amount to war crimes.

“Under international humanitarian law, parties to an armed conflict must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants, between civilian objects and military objectives, and take precautions to protect civilians. Failure to observe this principle — either by directly targeting civilians or civilian objects or by conducting indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks — is a war crime when committed deliberately or recklessly. Unlawful and wanton excessive destruction of property that is not militarily justified is also a war crime,” said Gorbunova.

“Additionally, explosive weapons with wide-area effect should not be used in populated areas. Their use heightens the likelihood of unlawful, indiscriminate, and disproportionate attacks and civilian harm, including commuters,” Gorbunova added.

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fapangel · 3 years ago

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D+27, D+28 and D+29 (March 23/24/25) (Posted March 25th @ 4PM EST)

google docs Sitrep: Maneuver

Kyiv AAO:

Continued combat in Irpin. [1] [geolocated] [2] [geolocated] [3] The fact that Irpin is still contested even as Ukrainian forces take back territory elsewhere NW of Kyiv does not bode well for Russian forces.

Further evidence of the fighting in Makariv contines to trickle in; likely from the 23rd, 22nd or earlier: [1] [geolocated] [2]

A claim of the liberation of Lukyanovka, a village 40km east of Brovary. (Link provided because Google has the name as belonging to a district of Kyiv; the village’s “proper name” according to Google Maps is Luk’yanivka.) This is confirmed by the following:

Widely-circulating images of a destroyed church match photos of the Church of The Ascension in the village, from Google Maps. Note the fence, white cross on the top of the center gate, and the tree. The church is/was located at 50.49264762036238, 31.37645090438957.

This was a beautiful church.

This war memorial overlooking two destroyed Russian tanks is probably from the village but Google Earth imagery is too poor resolution in this area for me to geolocate it from overhead, and the village (like most of Ukraine) has no Street View data. I will try to locate this via the text on the monument’s plaque.

This video is from the same location is said to be Lukyanovka as well.

The video of pro-Ukrainian Chechens Aloha Snackbaring in combat on the 22nd has been geolocated to 50.571448, 30.904428, which is on the rail line that demarcates the south-southeastern border of the suburb city of Velyka Dymerka (see purple pin “Chechen attack.”) Compare this to my map from a few updates back:

I assume Velyka Dymerka is still enemy held as no news to the contrary has emerged. Thus this amounts to proof of a 4km advance into this Russian-held salient, one that threatens to cut the H07 east-west highway. Paired with the assault on Velyka Dymerka it shows that constant pressure is being applied to Russian forces in this area.

See also this reported destruction of a bridge over the Desna river just south of Cherenihiv by Russian airstrike. (Geolocation to 51.4584818,31.3004786) This is a serious attempt to interrupt communications between the city and the areas south of it, and there are no other bridges over the Desna other than one that is in Russian control. (A pontoon crossing is very possible but would have to be made further east to be safely out of Russian artillery range.)

Given a dearth of Russian bridging ability they have proven loath to destroy bridges themselves in most cases. Combined with the fact that their last reported positions should still invest the E95 highway from Kyiv, this attack is likely as much to deny the city’s defenders a supply route as it is to deny them the ability to supply forces fighting south of the city from supply dumps in the city.

Bearing in mind how little information we have on this area that is third-party verified, given what is in hand it seems that Russian forces are being hard-presssed on three sides in this area. (Remember, these forces main line of supply is from the east, as the only good crossings over the Dnieper are all either in Ukrainian hands, or within easy range of Ukrainian artillery.) If Russian forces are not retreating from this possible salient up to nine, perhaps more Battalion Tactical Groups will be encircled.

Drone footage showing the severity of flooding in the Moshchun area.

Presumably recent evidence of very heavy combat in Borodyanka, north of Makariv. [Gelocated.] [Second video, from a vehicle observer’s perspective.] [Geolocated] Remember, this is a crucial crossroads 20km north of Makariv.

On the eve of the 23rd I heard rumors of fighting near Teterivske on Twitter, which was later reinforced by this curious statement by UMoD regarding Russians trying to take that town back and failing. However, this village is a solid 15km east of the villages of Kropyvnya, Zakharivka, Oliva and Kukhari, which the UMoD previously reported as being Russian frontline defensive positions. Note this area is a good 40km north-west of Borodyanka, which is itself 20km north of Makariv. Previously, observing the map, I identified this general area – only slightly further north than Malyn’s latitude – as an ideal place to for a counter-attack to encircle and cut off the Russian forces NW of Kyiv. I didn’t even think to mention it in my prior analysis as I figured the specific UMoD mention of Russian defensive efforts in this region was reflective of Russian realizations of this. The reason it is a good place to attack is 1. it is roughly equidistant between the furthest southern Russian advances south and the Belorussian border; ergo it gives some space from the artillery concentrations of the main Russian assault on Kyiv and the airpower lurking over the Belorussian border, and 2. contains a main highway running east to the ever-important crossroads of Ivankiv. This also makes it crucial for Russians to defend – note the Teteriv river anchors the southern end of any line there, and the forests south/southeast of the river would make a good “rear” area for the forces pushing on Kyiv (out of artillery range of Kyiv and offering lots of cover from aerial observation.)

This would mean Ukrainian forces have advanced 13~km east of their previously reported frontline.

Teteriviske is only 15.5k due south-west of Ivankiv. That puts the crucial crossroads of Ivankiv well within 152mm range.

If these reports are true and Ukraine has the force to hold this town, they can interdict the P02 highway and Ivankiv crossroads with artillery quite easily. They can move around the Teteriv river using their own interior lines of communication further west. There is a real possibility they could push on to Ivankiv, and then along the river’s north bank clean to the Dneiper and effectively encircle the Russian force. This will be hard slow fighting but favors the advantages Ukraine has – more light infantry and good terrain in this AOO with which to use them.

Analysis (Kyiv AOO):

Russia has obvious and previously-described difficulty in conducting bridging operations due to ubiquitous drone surveillance and highly competent Ukrainian artillery employment. On the above map I have highlighted the course of local rivers of significance as well as the flooding north of Moshchun as well. Recall that Demydiv, north of Moshchun, the entire curve of the Teteriv river is within long Grad MLRS range (and is well within the range of 300mm systems like Smerch, of which Ukraine has some, already.) Gold arrows indicate known Ukrainian counterattacks against Berezivka, Makariv (taken,) Borodyanka, Irpin, Moshchun (taken) and likely counterattacks against Teterivske (allegedly taken, but at least indicates attacks in this direction even if not,) Horenychi and Hostomel (possibly from the east with light forces and swimming IFVs, if not then after (if?) Irpin is retaken.)

It should be obvious from this map what is happening – the rivers divide the AO into sections that are very problematic for an army fighting in an environment of heavy artillery usage and ubiquitous drone observation for both sides, that is also extremely vehicle-dependent due to their usage of “BTGs” which give a regiment’s worth of artillery to a battalion-sized maneuver force. Against this, they are fighting an enemy with a superiority in light infantry numbers in terrain that favors them, who are pressing them on all sides, pinning their forces and making the shifting of forces from one flank to another difficult. If Russia does not have the strength to rebuff this assault, they will have to shorten their lines; either giving ground on their western flank, and endangering their supply lines, or giving ground in the eastern flank, the suburbs of Kyiv they have fought so bitterly to take multiple times.

Kharkiv/Sumy AOO

UMoD says only that Sumy is under bombardment, but not ground attack yet. Kharkiv is noted to be under very heavy bombardment.

This tweet by UMoD offers a rare glimpse of frontline positions in this AO as it identifies the city of Okhtyrka as being in Ukrainian hands despite constant assaults. This city is about 70km directly south of Sumy. This serves as some confirmation that this part of the Finnish Scribblemap is still accurate:

See also this geolocated imagery of shelling in Okhtyrka that appeared on March 25th and this geolocated data (from the 25th as well) showing the village of Klymentove north of Okhtyrka leveled, and these photos (geolocated) showing the leveled train station in Okhtyrka.

Donetsk/Luhansk AOO:

Despite Russian claims to the contrary Izyum is likely still contested. See this image of shelling in the city seen on March 24th, easily geolocated to 49.1780045, 37.2788667 by the visible war monument. Note the terrain at this location (looking south-southeast here):

This hillside overlooking the Donets river is either wooded, or has significant structures all along its length; this would make it a very commanding position over not just the river, but the wooded areas north-west of it from which the Russians would have to attack. Shelling this area – a structure, specifically, as the post claims – strongly suggests that southern Izyum, where it’s protected by the curve of the Donets river, is still in Ukrainian hands.

Note also this video geolocated to 49.19721, 37.27790. Note the heavy concrete or brick apartment buildings here. Note that these overlook an open soccer field not 230 meters away from one of the bridge crossings (a footbridge, it seems) over the Donets river:

Obviously, an assault took place here. The fact that no defenders are still visible and civilians are filming the area could mean the enemy has withdrawn, or that the Russians were able to cross and take ground. Either way, the heavy shelling southward implies resistance continues along the road south out of the city, and/or attempts to cross at a point further south to flank defenders that are resisting assault in urban fighting in the city proper.

This propaganda broadcast has been geolocated to 49.034081, 38.373498 in northwesternmost Rubizhne. Presuming they wouldn’t let their canary too close to the frontline, this implies the Russians are (as UMoD has previously stated) established in north-west Rubizhne, but not in the center of the city yet.

See also this big explosion from the 23rd.

Fighting in Marinka continues, according to three geolocations done on damage to the city posted on the 24th. Prior video evidence of Russian troops probing here and UMoD statements of repelling assaults in this area make this no surprise, but indicate the Russians are not making much, if any, progress. Marinka is 20km south-west of Donetsk city proper.

Recent UMoD statement from the 24th simply says Izyum is still repelling Russian attacks. The night before (still the 24th in the US,) UMoD reported attacks in Donetske (a village 10km north of Slovyansk and in the general area along the Donets river that anchors the salient up to Rubizhne/Severodonetsk) and Kam’yanka, directly along the H20 highway 10km directly north of Donetsk city. They also noted that Russian forces are (still) concentrating their efforts on Popansa (which anchors the southern flank of said salient), Marinka, and Verkhnyoteretske, which is most likely what Google thinks is “Verkhoyanskaya Vu,” a southwestern suburb of Donetsk and up the road east of Marinka:

I can’t be sure that prior purple pins further east around Donetsk indicate the Russians have been gaining ground, because as long as I’ve been tracking UMoD statements the frontline has seemed to be right along the H20 highway, north of the city. Given the prior reporting by UMoD of Stepnoe being attacked (implying it’s being defended,) Marinka seems like the furthest thrust, but given the claimed attacks on Verkhnyoteretske it seems the Russian incursion into the line in this area isn’t so much south of the city as it is hugging the city limits as they advance along the furthest western extent of Donetsk’s suburbs – with those suburbs still being held by Ukrainian forces as stubbornly as they hold any urban area.

See also this claim making the rounds that a much-hated rebel was killed by a sniper, reportedly “Near Avdiivka in Donbas province,” which is just west of Kam’yanka.

No information I can find on Vugledar, where Russian forces were previously reported by UMoD as trying to turn the flank. This may be indication that the Russians are finally focusing their efforts more. Trying to break through north and south of Donetsk and around Izyum makes sense as these are the two pincers needed to encircle a large bulk of Ukrainian forces. However, continuing to smash their heads into Rbizhne/Severodonetsk in heavy urban fighting when this city could be encircled instead, then invested and assaulted, is moronic, esp. given that the eight-year occupation of the Donbas region means they should have fair control over those lines of communication, and thus don’t need to hold those cities like they do Sumy, Konotop etc.

Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol) AOO:

UMoD simply says that the “Tavriya direction” (village northwest of Tokmak, indicating the entire defensive southward facing line) is quiet.

Mariupol: I have made an attempt to quantify the distance Russian forces have pushed into the city with geolocated data: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] There is already a map being provided by this account, which you can view here, but I mapped it myself to utilize the most recent data that is evidence of direct fighting (direct fire, or artillery in support of units directly in contact):

As one can see, all that can be said for sure is that fighting has reached the interior of the city. Extrapolating from this how much of the city is truly controlled by either force is still an open question. Given the Ukrainians are apparently fighting for every block (given the thoroughness of destruction being seen in media) it’s clear that they have plenty more blocks to go before they'll be hard-pressed.

Watch for a Russian attempt to take, or at least control by fires, that center section of the city along the river. The bridge will likely be blown as well. The heavy shelling of the industrial area on the 21st was probably related to this; either suspicion of centrally located defender’s stockpiles, or in support of an assault from the north. The patrol boat that ate an ATGM was likely reconnoitering this area.

Kherson AOO

The last reported shelling in Mykolaiv was on March 21st. This strongly implies that Russian forces are no longer in artillery range (40~km for most MLRS) of the city – which, if you have been following me, is no surprise.

I have seen many claims that the Russians have moved helicopters into Kherson airbase and had them hit by MLRS fire by Ukrainians – not just the two confirmed incidents, but up to ten times. I doubted this. However it seems the airport has been hit a third, confirmed time on the 24th, given this video that certainly looks like MLRS (the bright flashes in the air might be unitary warhead rockets being engaged by surface-to-air missiles.) This has been tentatively geolocated as being in Kherson and looking towards the airport. There is also this video from outside the city, likely taken by Ukrainian soldiers. See also this second video from within the city that also shows the same pattern of detonations and lights/explosions higher in the sky. The audio/video of this one makes it very plausible that at least one attempted surface to air interception was attempted, but as you can tell from the weight of the barrage, it was a futile effort. I expect geolocation of this one will not take long.

This means Ukrainian forces are within 40~km of Kherson, so they’ve at least pushed out of Mykolaiv proper by 7~km or so, and have done so without (serious) worry about counter-battery attack. I strongly doubt that Russian forces are still investing Mykolaiv in any serious strength.

I am seeing strong rumors of a heavy Ukrainian counter-attack in this region, but as usual, there is nothing to back it up yet.

Sitrep: Operational

This New York Times article (best viewed on Youtube) combines crowd-sourced Russian radio intercepts with geolocation of areas mentioned in their transmissions in the clear to paint a very damning picture of Russian operational failures. For once, the New York Times has done excellent work. This information dates from around Feb. 27th, during the first assaults on Makariv. Some interesting observations:

Motyzhyn put up enough resistance that Russian troops retreated from it. UMoD’s statements gave this as the furthest-south area ever being held by Russian forces. This tracks very well with the radio intercepts indicating great resistance. More of a maneuver update but w/e

Communication difficulties do indeed make combined-arms efforts a real nightmare for Russian forces; calling in supporting fires is badly delayed when they need it the most.

The Russians (were) frequently giving away their positions and plans in the clear.

Note, Their frequent use of code-phrases and Chechen code talkers they now use to address their open communications are neither very effective (the Ukrainians have Chechens too) and further exacerbate the delays in calling in supporting fires.

Russian forces were taking heavy casualties at this time, and were frequently low or out of critical supplies, esp. fuel, with vehicles stalling in the road.

Russians are indeed using cell phones more.

I have confirmed that Russian military communications do, in fact, partly rely on fucking cell phone towers. Apparently their communication arrangements involved widespread use of encrypted cell phones. While these communications are secure, they are also useless against any non-braindead force, as cell phone towers only go about ten miles; the signals are pretty weak and many towers are needed for coverage. Any defending force could just send a man in a jeep to the local towers and unplug the damn things. Tom Clancy used this angle in his book “Rainbow Six” published in 1998. FUCKING 1998

Higher-ranking Russian officers confirmed to be getting boots on the ground in order to unfuck things. Given one general has already been killed by Ukrainian forces when his transmissions in the open were triangulated for artillery strike…

As one wag on my discord put it; “it’s like a video game; kill enough Russians and a Russian General appears to fight you like a boss battle!”

This video showing Russian forces clearing IEDs was geolocated to 46.157853, 33.602842, which is nowhere fucking near Kherson, just in the oblast. It’s along the E97 highway out of Crimea, only 30km north of the peninsula proper! (This illustrates the importance of geolocating data!) This is indication that Territorial Defense Forces/local resistance is still active all along the Russian supply route, even in terrain that makes armed ambushes difficult.

As this photo shows, IEDs are now being seen/talked about more frequently. This is not the first IED I’ve seen. This style of IED – wiring two (or sometimes three) large-caliber artillery shells together has long been a staple of insurgency operations in the Middle East. The sheer weight of explosive is easily enough to destroy or at least mission-kill a tank – sometimes by flipping it clean over.

Continued Territorial Defense Forces’ activity against Russian supply lines in the North; likely around Sumy. See also this wiped convoy by direct TDF ambush (note their clothing.)

More direct evidence of Russia employing thermite-incendiary weapons against dense urban areas. Its use against Irpin makes sense, as such weapons are most effective against suburbs where most construction is of the light wood variety.

Naturally, this is a hideous warcrime.

These destroyed Russian vehicles have been described as an infiltration attempt, but given they were ambushed before the Z painted on the side was eliminated I suspect these civilian vehicles were commandeered simply because the Russians had no other vehicles to use.

This geolocated video of an S-300 TEL in Kyiv being found and engaged by a Russian drone surprised me – I’d have expected the Ukrainians to keep their S-300s further from the frontlines and use their long reach to threaten Russian aircraft at a distance. The fact the Ukrainians have gotten away with positioning theater-defense assets as far forward as Kyiv itself (using the city’s infrastructure to hide them) shows very bold and aggressive use of their assets. I say they have gotten away with it because, if the Russians had managed to find and attack an S-300 in or around Kyiv before this, they absolutely would have released this video sooner, given how much an impact the state of Ukraine’s air defense system has on public audiences in general (as you may recall from my D-Day/SAM posts.)

Smaller Ukrainian SAMs also very active.

Russian drone videos continue to be very jerkily cut, almost always refusing to let you see the actual impact of munitions cued by the drone. Failing that, they show you video with such fucking awful resolution you can’t tell if anything was actually present to be destroyed or not. They’re also typically very short. Compare to this glorious video showing unitary warhead MLRS hitting Russian (likely) Grad trucks; you can clearly tell kills are scored by heat signatures/secondaries. Or this video of of Ukrainian artillery fire being cued onto vehicles spotted at night on thermals.

The continued heavy editing of Russian releases strongly suggests to me their artillery has dogshit promptness and accuracy unless it’s laser-guided. And even the United States’ stockpile of Copperhead rounds was minuscule compared to its dumbfire stockpile... for a reason.

Sitrep: Materiel/Personnel/Logistical

Ukraine has successfully interdicted Russian supply efforts via ferry over the Sea of Azov. The big firey boom that hit some Russian LST’s unloading at the port of Berdyansk has been widely reported, but I can confirm the following:

At least one LST is absolutely and properly fucked. See these two videos in which very loud secondaries are quite clearly audible. Note also the second LST de-assing that pier for that exact reason. The burning LST was clearly filled with enough fuel and munitions for a decent party, meaning:

This vessel will soon be a fire-gutted total loss,

This vessel was sank at anchor by its crew to flood the lower hold and prevent catastrophic damage, in which case it’s probably still a total loss (saltwater in every machinery space + fire damage above) but will have to be re-floated before tugs can drag it away and open that berth for unloading activities again.

It was a Ukrainian Tochka-U/w sub-munitions strike that did this. This is very likely video of the strike. Note the primary target seems to be the larger tank farm further up the pier; you can clearly see a spread of sub-munitions going off, as well as the spent after section of the missile flopping into the water further on (the parent body will go long; it has more mass and isn’t slowed as much by wind resistance as the bomblet cloud.) While this seems like it hit too far forward to do the damage, if it caused a leak in the tanks at the more distant fuel farm, (as prior strikes with this weapon have reportedly done) there would be no immediate fire, but fumes that would likely ignite in a hurry. Or another weapon could have impacted shortly thereafter, or, incredibly, this could be an earlier strike and unrelated to the destruction on the 24th.

While US intel support would have definitely informed UMoD of these activities and the exact berths in use, Russian propaganda channels helpfully boasted about it and showed vehicles being unloaded from these ships, at these berths. They even helpfully showed APCs/IFVs lined up along the pier, which you will note has a few big fuel tanks located on it. Incredibly, this same Russian propaganda channel also posted video of the rear/steering section of a Tochka-U SRBM and boasted that it had been shot down by Russian air defenses. Even if the above video isn’t of a previously successful strike, Russian command both incentive the striking of this target and made it crystal clear that defense saturation by multiple weapons was required. Sasuga Russia.

In addition to establishing that Russian forces in every Area Of Operations continue to have supply lines interdicted, and for establishing that Ukraine has even more reloads for their captured TOS-1, these images of a destroyed truck and captured thermobaric MLRS rockets somewhere in Chernihiv oblast make it obvious just how bulky MLRS rockets are. They impose an even greater burden on the supply chain than tube artillery does, both in the bulkiness of their ammo and the speed with which they can dispense of it.

Did I mention the Russians seem to be leaning very heavily on MLRS?

Given the terrain this seems to be yet another example of lost rear-echelon equipment in the Kherson AOO. Recovery/engineering vehicles like this are ones Russia can scarce afford to lose.

Izyum area continues to eat Russian engineering officers. Note this is the third engineering officer, the second in the Izyum area, and the second colonel to be lost; this one was likely killed overseeing pontoon bridging operations just like the other two.

More confirmation that Naval Infantry are being deployed by Russia as reinforcements – these have been seen in action in Mariupol.

To the shock of nobody, NATO officials have confirmed (~anonymously~) that no, the Russians did not “get hacked, bro” and the likely figure of 30-40,000 battlefield casualties for Russia so far seems to be in the ballpark. Reminder, that would be about 1/3rd of their frontline combat troops, given a very generous tooth-to-tail ratio (and given how shittily supported their logistics are, their having it at only 1:1 seems to check out.)

Further reminder that Ukrainian SOF are getting extremely nice toys from the US.

Some hints that Zelinsky’s recent request for anti-ship missiles may be entertained, which would be a massive boost to their combat potential and could end the de-facto blockade of Ukrainian ports, allowing for more food shipments to enter the country in bulk. Indeed this may be the motivating factor behind NATO’s consideration of the request.

And just for fun, another win for the tractor brigades.

UMoD has recently alleged that Russian forces are seizing trucks and “special agricultural machinery” from civilians in occupied areas, so, hilariously, they are learning to use tractors as well.

Less hilariously, expect them to also prioritize earth-moving equipment whenever possible. Also expect local operators to be competent at sabotaging this equipment in ways that are reversible – if you fix it before you turn it on. Oil-soaked rags wrapped around an engine block that will get hot, etc.

Note that UMoD has again stated that Russia is trying to seize in-situ fuel supplies whenever possible.

Sitrep: Strategic

NATO is nervous.

President Biden has openly put retaliatory WMD strikes on Russian forces on the table. This is a massive escalation in stance and follows over a week of constant warnings by NATO nations that Russia was clearly preparing an excuse for use of chemical weapons, and there has been growing disquiet over the possibility of tactical nuclear employment.

NATO has openly stated that it has activated its “chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense elements” for the first time.

French media openly reported (i.e. on behalf of their government) that three of France’s four SSBNs have been deployed, and its nuclear forces have been placed on higher alert.

NATO has announced it will deploy four new NATO battlegroups to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. This is in addition to the ones already in the Baltics in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Poland, for a total of 8 multinational battalion-sized forces in total.

Note these amount to about two regiments of troops in total, but 1. they are in addition to the native forces, 2. will possess technology and capabilities the native troops often don’t have and 3. with 75% of Russia’s combat power tied up in Ukraine and garrisons being robbed to pour the rest of it in, there’s no serious land threat to these nations that these forces, plus the locals, could not repel.

Russia seems to be getting the message as they made a surprising statement that they would “only use nuclear weapons if faced with an existential threat.” The problem is that Putin has made it clear that he views the Ukrainian situation as an existential threat.

See also this (recent) discussion from a Russian TV show (i.e. state approved media) which makes the same argument. Unfortunately there is more truth to this than not; assuming Russia’s stated policy goal is to confront NATO for regional dominance, then failure to take Ukraine will mean the failure of the Russian state. In case it still isn’t obvious, this is, in fact, Putin’s stated goals, and it remains to be seen whether he will recalculate and accept a guarantee of existential survival as provided by Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

Sympathies/biases of the source aside, this article is both unsurprising and bears serious implications vis a vis the long-occupied Donbas region. A lot of people in that region have family who, even if they survived eight years of low-intensity war, are now dead due to indiscriminate Russian attacks. Donbas is unlikely to be a compliant Russian puppet state, occupation or no occupation.

#ukraine #russo ukrainian crisis #russo ukrainian war

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