#PSRM

[mariacallous]

Having lived in Britain for 12 years, I returned to my native Moldova in 2022 because I was worried that Russia’s war in Ukraine would spill into my country. Thanks to the Ukrainian resistance, the skies are still clear in Moldova. But in the past weeks leading up to the presidential runoff between the pro-European incumbent Maia Sandu and the Russian-supported former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo, I felt as if I might lose my country once again.

The scale of interference in these Moldovan elections has been unprecedented. As reported by excellent independent journalists in the country, our law enforcement agencies alleged the existence of a large-scale, vote-buying scheme in the first round, run by Ilan Shor – a Russian-backed fugitive oligarch, who denies any wrongdoing.

Before the second round, journalists and others reportedly received death threats in broken Romanian, pretending to be on behalf of Sandu’s team. On election day, the most popular polling stations across Europe for overseas Moldovans had their vote disrupted by bomb threats. The servers of the Central Electoral Commission experienced a temporary cyberattack. The police said they had “reasonable evidence” of illegal organised voter transportation in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Turkey; people from Transnistria, the region to the east of the country, bordering Ukraine and controlled by Russia, admitted to being transported.

In addition to the alleged rigging, the internet, especially TikTok, was flooded with anti-Europe disinformation before the EU referendum on 20 October.

Despite all this, Sandu won. “They cannot steal as much as we can vote” was one of the informal slogans of this campaign. In the run-up to the second vote, the police updated the country daily about their arrests and seizures of cash related to the vote-buying scheme. This helped some people realise that receiving payment for votes was illegal and not just a way of getting free money. It also helped mobilise 380,000 people in the capital city Chișinău – more than in 2020 – and an unprecedented 330,000 Moldovans in the diaspora, who amounted to almost 20% of the total number of voters, to come out and vote. Both electorates largely voted for Sandu.

The pro-Russian Socialist party (PSRM), which supported Stoianoglo, said that it did not recognise the election results and that Sandu would only be the “president of the diaspora”. Yet 70% of the votes she received came from within the country.

While I lived in the UK, I queued for hours in order to vote in Moldovan elections at the various polling stations the state opened across London. In 2016, when Sandu first ran against PSRM leader Igor Dodon and lost to him, with thousands of other fellow citizens, I was not able to cast my vote because the polling station ran out of ballot papers. Some people had come from hundreds of miles away in order to vote.

Moldova’s diaspora is relatively new and porous. People first started leaving in large numbers in the 2000s, when President Vladimir Voronin ruled the country with many leading members of the PSRM. Their first destinations were Russia, Italy or Portugal, where they did difficult jobs in construction or care, in order to provide for their families. (My history teacher went to look after the dogs of an Italian star in order to pay for her son’s university fees.) Since then, as many people’s parents and grandparents had been born when Moldova was part of Romania, about a million Moldovans obtained Romanian citizenship – including the two presidential candidates, Sandu and Stoianoglo.

EU passports opened the way for Moldovans such as myself to benefit from better study and work opportunities across Europe, sending vital remittances back home. At the moment, about 1 million Moldovans live abroad and 2.8 million live in the country. Everyone has family members working abroad.

Like me, a number of people have also returned from the diaspora to open their own businesses or join existing private or non-governmental organisations, as well as state institutions. Sandu did this in 2012, leaving her much better paid position at the World Bank in order to become minister of education. Natalia Gavrilița, whom I first met in 2018 in a Moldovan activist group called FreeMoldova in London, left development work to become minister of finance and then prime minister. The list goes on.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many Moldovans from the diaspora in Russia have returned home. In the more Russian-speaking regions of Gagauzia and Transnistria, people have started emigrating to Poland and the Czech Republic. As I was travelling on the Chișinău-Prague bus to the small Romanian town of Sibiu last week, in front of me a man was listening to Russian propaganda. The second driver, meanwhile, put on a speech by Sandu while resting. Social media have polarised Moldovan society – just like the entire world. Russian propaganda is good at enhancing these cleavages.

Moldova has shown resilience in the recent EU referendum and this presidential vote. But given the country is a parliamentary republic, the great battle will be next year in parliamentary elections. Until then, law enforcement has to get on top of vote-buying schemes. There must be better regulation of social media. And pro-European Moldovans have to collaborate and communicate better than the Russian propagandists.

[sdae]

PSRM observation ride 1/22/23

[espee-southernpacifc]

SP 3709 Idling in the Campo Yard - PSRM - 10/15/2023 - ex US Army 1401

[hotnew-pt]

Presidente da Moldova vence na segunda volta das eleições presidenciais | Moldova #ÚltimasNotícias #Portugal

Hot News A Presidente da Moldova, Maia Sandu, foi reeleita para um segundo mandato nas eleições presidenciais realizadas no país neste domingo. De acordo com os resultados divulgados pela comissão eleitoral moldava, com 99,86% dos votos contados, a Presidente recebeu 55,35% dos votos, superando Alexandr Stoianoglo, apoiado pelo Partido dos Socialistas da República da Moldávia (PSRM),…

[cengish05]

Moldova'daki cumhurbaşkanı seçiminin ikici turunda adaylar oylarını kullandı

Kişinev Cumhurbaşkanı Maya Sandu’un görev süresinin sona ermesi nedeniyle düzenlenen seçimin ikinci turunda oy verme işlemi devam ediyor. Moldova’da cumhurbaşkanı seçimi ikinci tura kaldı Seçimin 20 Ekim’deki ilk turunda en fazla oy alan iktidardaki Eylem ve Dayanışma Partisinden (PAS) Sandu ile PSRM adayı Stoyanoglo da başkent Kişinev’de oylarını kullandı. Oyunu kullandıktan sonra gazetecilere…

[democraticelectorateoflivonia]

Diplomatic relations

[alexwinterbear]

Todavía tengo presente en mi memoria recuerdos vívidos de aquella tarde. Una tarde hermosa del dulce noviembre en la que nuestros cuerpos y almas se volvieron uno.

Una tarde de ensueño, colgado de tu profunda mirada que llegaba a tocar mi corazón; siendo testigo de la radiante hermosura y perfección etérea de tu cuerpo.

Momento en el que me volví adicto a tu calor, al sabor de tus labios en los míos... Adicto al dulce rocío que emana de ti...

Me volví esclavo de tus caricias, de tu aroma...

Aquella tarde en la que nuestro amor se consumó.

PSRM ♥️.

[chu2002]

How does the media influence people's thinking?

Essentially, the media is a medium platform for transmitting information that has been produced almost along with mankind. In the beginning, people gathered fruits, ate, and chatted in the sun under a big tree, and the shaded area under this tree was a media platform, and then the media evolved into a stagecoach station, a tavern, and finally our current mobile phones, computers, and social software.

Individual mechanisms will have an impact in the information age regardless of the method of communication, but social mechanisms are stronger when communication has a public component (Arias, 2019). Therefore, I believe that information has a different effect when it is disseminated individually and privately than when it is disseminated through more social or collective channels (Arias, 2019). By now, everyone basically has a mobile phone, dealing with the Internet every day, the daily contact with information comes from the network, whether it is to manipulate the hearts and minds of people or public opinion direction, just have a large number of self-published articles can do, this is the influence. Whether in reality or on the internet, a lot of things are wrong, most people will only follow the crowd, without the ability to think independently. When you have your thinking, and your ideas, only then will you have the ability to judge right and wrong.

Reference:

Arias, E. (2019). How Does Media Influence Social Norms? Experimental Evidence on the Role of Common Knowledge. Political Science Research and Methods, 7(3), 561-578. doi:10.1017/psrm.2018.1

[mariacallous]

As Moldovans prepare to go to the polls on Oct. 20, it looks like another round of the familiar geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West over the countries in Moscow’s former empire and sphere of influence. In a crucial referendum, Moldovans will vote on whether to pursue membership in the European Union. They must also choose between Maia Sandu, the pro-EU incumbent president with a reformist agenda, and a cohort of pro-Russian candidates of varying degrees of radicalism.

Russia is deploying its usual catalog of influence operations as it tries to undermine the small country’s path toward Western institutions. The evidence of Russian meddling is abundant, and the sums Moscow is funneling to its proxies are unprecedented in Moldovan politics. Besides paying tens of thousands of Moldovans to vote against joining the EU and financing pro-Moscow candidates, Russia has also doubled down on its usual tactic of using shady oligarchs to try to capture the state. Finally, there is Transnistria—a Russian-occupied sliver of Moldova next to Ukraine. It is a typical frozen conflict, and it is another tried-and-true strategy for Moscow to assert pressure on countries it wants to control. Although the threat of a Russian invasion of Moldova from Transnistria is currently extremely low because Russia is busy fighting Ukraine, that could always change in the future.

But the jostling of pro-Russian political forces in Moldova ahead of the election is hardly a sign of Moscow’s strength and sophistication. Instead, the Kremlin seems to have failed to adapt its election interference strategies to the new realities of Moldovan politics—particularly, the decline in support for Russia since its invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Today, even some of the pro-Russian politicians support EU membership and try to avoid being too closely associated with Moscow.

Long after Moldova gained its independence during the Soviet Union’s breakup in 1991, the Kremlin remained a potent force in its former possession’s politics. It awards its minions with generous financing and receptions in Moscow while punishing unfavorable Moldovan governments with trade bans and gas price hikes. Today, Russia still looms large in Moldovan public opinion, even though Moldova has severed most official ties between the two countries since the start of the invasion. According to a 2024 poll by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 71 percent of Moldovans surveyed said relations with Russia are currently very bad or somewhat bad, compared to only 11 percent who said that about the EU. But only 46 percent of Moldovans see Russia as a moderate or great threat to their country, while 53 percent rank it among the country’s most important economic partners—behind only the EU at 66 percent and neighboring Romania at 69 percent. Similarly, half of the people polled saw Russia as one of the country’s most important political partners, as well.

It is doubtful, however, whether Moscow can take advantage of this lingering popularity to turn around this weekend’s vote, which is expected to come out in favor of Sandu and EU membership. Moldova’s left-leaning parties, which have historically been pro-Russian, still command around 40 percent support. But they have struggled to adjust their narratives to Russia’s brutal war next door.

Since the invasion started, many on the Moldovan left have worked to cast off their image as Russian stooges. Some, like the popular mayor of Chisinau, Ion Ceban, and former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, have tried to reinvent themselves as centrist pro-Europeans. They have abandoned their former party, the powerful Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), which is much tainted by past cooperation with the Kremlin, and founded their own political movements. Their new pro-EU views have elicited much skepticism, but they have already captured around 10 percent support, principally among Moldovans who are both unhappy with Sandu and disenchanted with Moscow.

The rest of the PSRM has proved less agile. The party’s leader, former Moldovan President Igor Dodon, is notorious for his close ties to Moscow. But with the presidential election looming, the party tried to adapt to Russia’s waning sway by sidelining Dodon and nominating former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo as a candidate. Stoianoglu, while also stressing the need for cooperation with Moscow, has a record of supporting EU integration and is widely perceived as a moderate figure. It is difficult to determine the real state of his relations with the Kremlin, but his cautious rhetoric and low-budget campaign suggest that Russia is not fully behind him.

Russian money appears to be channeled elsewhere this time. Moldovan police recently stated that during September alone, more than $15 million was transferred from Russia to bank accounts connected to the fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor.

Shor, who was sentenced to prison in absentia for his role in a scam involving almost $1 billion extracted from Moldovan banks, embodies another typical Kremlin strategy: influence a country through Russia-friendly oligarchs. This has long been an important part of Russia’s strategy for gaining control of Ukraine, Georgia, and other countries.

But betting on Shor, who holds Russian citizenship and resides in Moscow, suggests that the Kremlin has reached the limits of its oligarch strategy. Indeed, it would be hard to find a more inept figure to have entrusted with winning over Moldovan voters. Shor is widely seen as a corrupt crook; at 58 percent, he has the highest unfavorable rating among a long roster of politicians in the IRI poll. He is so unpopular that researchers noted that his activities actually boost support for Sandu. His talking points—lambasting the EU and touting the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union—seem more attuned to appeal to his friends in the Kremlin than to most Moldovan voters.

For Moscow, Shor is a reliable proxy because he is well-versed in the shady side of Moldovan politics, structures his campaign in a way that corresponds to the Kremlin’s world outlook, and is such a toxic figure that he couldn’t betray Russia even if he wanted to. This latter quality—absolute loyalty—has become Moscow’s key and almost only criterion for choosing allies.

The few elections Shor’s movement has won—such as regional votes in Gagauzia and Orhei—came with accusations of massive vote-buying. If current reports of vote-buying are true, it’s unclear how effective that tactic will be. Most of the 130,000 Moldovans that have reportedly been bribed by Shor’s associates to vote against EU membership were, in all likelihood, already favorably inclined toward Moscow. In the presidential election, neither Shor’s candidate Vasile Bolea nor Shor’s Victory bloc were permitted to register due to financial irregularities.

Shor may still throw his support behind one of the opposition candidates by this weekend’s vote, but that is unlikely to make much of a difference. The election promises to deal a major blow to Russia’s lingering influence in Moldova. Recent polls suggest that the referendum will confirm majority support for EU integration, while the presidential election will see Sandu reelected by a wide margin, with the moderate left opposition prevailing over pro-Russian radicals.

In freeing itself from Russian influence, Moldova still faces the hurdle of next year’s parliamentary elections, where a clear and overwhelming victory by Sandu and her allies is not guaranteed. But Russia’s war has brought Moldovan politics closer to the point where all major forces agree that integration with the West is good for the country, an evolution many other post-communist states have already undergone.

This reality dooms pro-Russian string-pullers like Shor to languish on the fringes of political life, even if Moldova one day permits him to return without serving his prison sentence. But the ossified leadership in the Kremlin doesn’t seem to care. Moscow prefers loyal minions and familiar methods, even if they end up driving Moldovans even farther away from Russia.

[sdae]

PSRM 4/22-23/23

[artistslashperfectionist]

Progress before I go to art fair 2023 tomorrow #wip #artph #acrylicph #canvasph #artnight https://www.instagram.com/p/Cozp2x-pSrM/?igshid=NGJjMDIxMWI=

[marketingstrategy1]

Ex-Moldovan President Dodon Says He Could Establish New Political Party

Ex-Moldovan President Dodon Says He Could Establish New Political Party

CHISINAU (UrduPoint News / Sputnik – 23rd December, 2022) Igor Dodon, a former president of Moldova and the honorary president of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), said on Thursday that he may establish a new political party in the republic. “There is an option that I will create my own party, a movement that will not be tied to a geopolitical vector. The party would be…

[mubashirnews]

Ex-Moldovan President Dodon Says He Could Establish New Political Party

Ex-Moldovan President Dodon Says He Could Establish New Political Party

CHISINAU (UrduPoint News / Sputnik – 23rd December, 2022) Igor Dodon, a former president of Moldova and the honorary president of the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), said on Thursday that he may establish a new political party in the republic. “There is an option that I will create my own party, a movement that will not be tied to a geopolitical vector. The party would be…

[fuckyeahmarxismleninism]

Urgent appeal from antifascist prisoner Pavel Grigorchuk:

We agreed to create an association of political prisoners -- victims of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM). We welcome the creation of a new parliamentary majority, we support all the decisions of Parliament on de-oligarchization and the liberation of the country from the Plahotniuc regime. 

We hope that the new Minister of Justice, Stanislav Pavlovsky, will visit Detention Center PU-13 after receiving real authority in order to stop all human rights violations that are taking place here. 

I urge the MPs of the Socialist Party (PSRM) and AKUM bloc to come to the court and act as my guarantors ... so that we together -- both deputies and political prisoners – can continue in a figurative sense to finish off the accomplices of the oligarchic regime.

[alexwinterbear]

Un par de días sin verla y el tiempo se hace eterno.

Y es que no hay nada como las conversaciones que tenemos y la intimidad de cada momento a su lado.

No hay nada como la dulce suavidad de sus labios besándome hasta atravesar todo mi ser, hasta mi alma. No hay mejor sensación que sus manos en mi cabello mientras me besa y me lleva al cielo cada vez que lo hace.

Extraño la sensación de su cuerpo entre mis brazos y el olor de su perfume...

Cada vez que nos despedimos algo de mí siempre se queda a su lado, y con cada paso que doy las ansias de volver y abrazarla se vuelven más fuertes.

Te extraño.

Quiero verte otra vez.

Aunque el momento sea breve...

Te extraño, mi kookie.

PSRM ❤️. 27|03|23.

- Winter Bear.

[lavozdemurcia]

PSRM-PSOE y Ciudadanos negocian los gobiernos de cinco municipios de la Región, entre ellos el de Murcia

PSRM-PSOE y Ciudadanos negocian los gobiernos de cinco municipios de la Región, entre ellos el de Murcia

Las agrupaciones del PSRM-PSOE y Ciudadanos negocian los gobiernos de cinco municipios de la Región de Murcia, después de que ambos partidos se unieran para presentar una moción de censura destinada a desbancar al PP tras 26 años en el Ejecutivo autonómico. En una rueda de prensa, Conesa ha explicado que estos municipios son Murcia, donde las negociaciones están muy avanzadas, Fuente Álamo,…