#Euroskepticism

[a-typical]

Why is right-wing populism outmatching left-wing populism across the Globe?

It’s so much easier to make people feel afraid than it is to make them feel hopeful or safe or supported. Right wing populism preys on people’s fears and stokes pre-existing anxieties, while also providing an individual “strongman” that people can look to for resolution. Simple and effective.

If we look at left-wing policies or general ideological talking points, they require both:

an inherent empathy/sympathy for strangers and community alike

a strong persistence to work against pre-existing institutions/structures to achieve that which isn’t often simple

It requires more effort, more funding, and occasionally can’t be simplified into layman’s terms, which ostracizes those who can’t reach higher education. This, above all else, is what makes right-wing populist rhetoric so effective - it’s approachable. It doesn’t ask you to care for others (quite the opposite) outside of your own interests. It’s comforting to have a powerful leader who “isn’t afraid to speak the truth” or “tell it like it is”, when the preceding leaders have all spoken outside your comprehension and made you feel isolated from your country in their education, class, and/or status.

Really, right-wing populism is in vogue because it’s so much easier to understand and so much easier to exercise. It doesn’t ask for much - it certainly doesn’t ask for us to follow rules or facts. It’s chameleon, and its rhetoric shapes to what would reach the most people regardless of how plausible, reasonable, or respectable it is.

[xtruss]

The EU Doesn’t Know How to Not Be a Vassal of the US Anymore

Former Fox News host Tucker Carlson has tried to show Americans how Washington has exploited Western Europe

— Bradley Blankenship | RT | August 22, 2023

(From L to R) US President Joe Biden, Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Britain's Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the G7 Leaders' Summit in Hiroshima on May 19, 2023 © Kenny Holston/POOL/AFP

Tucker Carlson, of Fox News fame, recently met with Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic in Budapest, Hungary. The journalist pointed out that the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline has put a serious strain on the European Union’s economy and mentioned that the world was “resetting” in reaction to the conflict in Ukraine and the West’s pledged support for Kiev.

Carlson raises some good issues, and an important one to expand upon is the fact that the EU economy is lagging significantly since the outbreak of the war last year. A June piece by the Financial Times titled ‘Europe has fallen behind America and the gap is growing’ details how the EU is now considerably dependent on the US for its technological, security, and economic needs.

In terms of hard numbers, Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) think tank have stated: “In 2008, the EU’s economy was somewhat larger than America’s: $16.2tn versus $14.7tn. By 2022, the US economy had grown to $25tn, whereas the EU and the UK together had only reached $19.8tn. America’s economy is now nearly one-third bigger. It is more than 50 per cent larger than the EU without the UK.”

The article goes on to describe a European Union that is dragging far behind the US and China in terms of quality universities, a less-than-pristine start-up environment, and lacking key benefits from its transatlantic peer – namely cheap energy. The Ukraine conflict has impacted the latter to the point that EU companies are paying three or four times what their American competitors are, with Washington being energy-independent and enjoying great domestic supplies. Meanwhile, energy from Russia is waning, European factories are closing in droves, and industry leaders are worried about the region’s future competitiveness.

The ECFR issued its own report on the matter in April, which is far blunter in describing the situation as a kind of “vassalization.” The summary of that report notes that the Ukraine war has exposed the EU’s key dependencies on the US, that over the course of a decade, the bloc has fallen behind the US in virtually every key metric, that it is deadlocked in disagreement and is looking to Washington for leadership.

The ECFR noted two causes for this situation. Firstly, despite the widely understood decline of the US compared to the rise of China, the transatlantic relationship has been unbalanced in Washington’s favor over the last 15 years since the 2008 financial crisis. The Biden administration is keen to exploit this and assert itself in the face of a disjointed Europe. Secondly, no one in the EU knows what greater strategic autonomy could look like – let alone agree on it if they did. There exists no process to decide the EU’s future in an autonomous way given the current status quo, which means US leadership is necessary.

This paints quite an interesting picture. Many commentators, including myself, have long documented the decline of the US and attributed it to a number of factors: less of an attractive environment for foreign direct investment (FDI), financial instability, corruption, and internal political turmoil. This is, of course, relativized to China, which has seen immense economic growth since the founding of the People’s Republic and particularly over the past four decades. But under the smoke screen of a fumbling America and a growing China, the EU has likewise fallen in stature.

The Western Establishment just gave itself a ‘World Peace and Liberty’ Award! Ursula von der Leyen received the ‘Judicial Equivalent’. The Western Establishment just gave itself a ‘World Peace and Liberty’ Award. Ursula von der Leyen received the ‘Judicial Equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize’ from Justin Trudeau in a perfect self-congratulatory orgy

As for the two causes noted by the ECFR, they seem to be intertwined. Many of the key issues that have faced the EU, from migration to the banking crisis to Covid-19, have stemmed directly from the non-federal nature of the EU. And the current political crises are a result of Euroskepticism, i.e. a backlash against what is perceived as an overreach from Brussels by some political organizations within the bloc. The EU is a complicated and sometimes cumbersome bureaucracy that is cherished by some, reviled by others, and, under these assumptions, is an impediment to strategic autonomy.

The ECFR essentially argues for the EU and Western European capitals to lean into the transatlantic partnership, but on terms favorable to themselves. This includes creating an independent security architecture within and complimentary to NATO, creating an economic NATO of sorts and even pursuing a European nuclear weapons program. At least the former two are acceptable, as abandoning the US outright would be politically foolish for the EU at this juncture. It certainly needs to develop a transatlantic free-trade agreement that puts an end to American trade protectionism.

However, the obvious point to help diversify the Western European economic portfolio, reduce genuinely problematic dependencies, and fuel growth is for the EU to develop peer-to-peer relations with the Global South. For one, the EU Parliament could right now ratify the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) to help their companies gain market access in China and tap into one of the world’s largest consumer bases. I would also argue, as I’ve done in the past, that the EU and China could cooperate – rather than compete – on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Global South because of Europe’s historical connections, due to its colonialist past.

What is clear is that the EU needs to diversify and back off from the transatlantic relationship. With much talk about ‘de-risking’, or even ‘de-coupling’, from China, Western Europe has actually gotten into the position where it is strategically dependent on Washington to the point of being outright vassalized. This is a bleak situation for the EU’s growth model and its hopes for strategic autonomy.

— Bradley Blankenship is an American Journalist, Columnist and Political Commentator. He has a syndicated column at CGTN and is a freelance reporter for international news agencies.

[tanadrin]

obviously i would like to see U.S. military interventionism drastically reduced. but a world without the Status Quo Coalition in any form would be a disaster. great-power competition between nuclear states would be a calamity for the human race. you can sneer at the hypocrisy of the "rules-based international order," but even weak and hypocritical efforts toward such a thing are a good thing. the thing we should be working on is making them less weak and hypocritical, not burning it all down.

[female-malice]

When it comes to climate change, the potential for a dangerously delusive kind of nostalgia is clear. It may be easier to believe an eco-dictatorship is upon us than to accept the reality that life as we have known it is fundamentally threatened.

[newsnetwork24]

German Government Collapses at a Perilous Time for Europe

German Government Collapses Amid European Turmoil

Berlin, December 16, 2024

Germany, the largest economy in Europe and a key political stabilizer, plunged into uncertainty today as its coalition government collapsed after months of internal strife. Chancellor Olaf Scholz officially tendered his resignation, marking the end of the fragile three-party coalition between his Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP).

The collapse stems from deep divisions over Germany’s energy policy, defense spending, and migration. The infighting intensified following recent economic downturns and increasing public dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of these issues.

A Leadership Crisis Amid European Challenges

The timing of Germany's political turmoil comes at a critical juncture for Europe, which is grappling with several crises, including:

Economic Instability: Persistent inflation and slowing growth across the eurozone are threatening the region's financial stability.

Geopolitical Tensions: The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has strained Europe’s energy security and highlighted divisions within the EU over military support and sanctions against Russia.

Migration Pressures: A surge in asylum seekers and migrants has led to discord among EU member states, with Germany at the center of debates on equitable burden-sharing.

"Germany’s collapse leaves a leadership vacuum at a time when Europe needs unity and stability," said Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission.

What’s Next for Germany?

The collapse triggers a constitutional process to form a new government. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier is expected to hold talks with party leaders to explore potential coalitions. If no majority coalition can be formed, early elections could be called in 2025, potentially shifting Germany's political landscape further to the right.

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which has seen a surge in support, is likely to gain more influence in any upcoming election. Their stance on immigration and euroskepticism has raised concerns among pro-EU leaders.

European Reactions

Leaders across Europe reacted with concern to the news. French President Emmanuel Macron called for “calm and cooperation” to ensure the stability of the EU. Meanwhile, financial markets reacted sharply, with the euro falling against the dollar and German bonds seeing increased volatility.

Global Implications

Germany’s political instability could ripple beyond Europe. As a global economic powerhouse and NATO ally, its ability to manage crises directly affects transatlantic relations and global markets.

A Perilous Road Ahead

The collapse of Germany’s government signals a period of uncertainty and instability, not just for the nation but for Europe as a whole. With economic and geopolitical pressures mounting, all eyes are on Berlin to see how it navigates this unprecedented crisis.

[cyberbenb]

From F-16s to frozen assets - how Dutch far-right's win could impact Ukraine

Nearly two decades after launching his far-right political party, mixing xenophobia with Euroskepticism, Geert Wilders emerged as the winner of the Dutch parliamentary elections on Nov. 22. “The winds Source : kyivindependent.com/from-f-16…

[opinions-about-tiaras]

Benn's poisonous strain of Euroskepticism also deserves a lot of pillorying; it was never quite purged out of the Labour Party and while the lions share of the blame for Brexit lies at the feet of the Tories, let's not pretend that it wasn't a big problem.

What are your thoughts on Tony Benn? Because much as I admire him in some ways he does come across as a bit impractical in an idealistic way, with his challenge to Healey and describing the 1983 general election as a triumph for socialism.

I'm of very mixed opinions about Tony Benn.

On the one hand, I think he was a very sincere and well-meaning man with fairly laudible beliefs (although he did I think have a problem where he would sometimes prioritize following a consistent ideological line over his personal moral instincts, which I think were more reliable).

On the other hand, I don't think he was very good at his job and would have done better as a social movement organizer than as a politician and government minister - or at the very least, I think he would have been better suited to a ministerial portfolio that spoke to his strengths, which were much more in the area of social policy rather than economic policy.

So as Minister for Technology or as Secretary of State for Industry or Energy, I'm sympathetic to his support for industrial democracy in and out of nationalized industries, but he wasn't ultimately very good at putting worker control into practice. And that's the thing; when you're in government, you have to be able to translate your beliefs into effective public policy.

Likewise, I think his Alternative Economic Strategy was just a bad strategy for achieving left-wing economic objectives:

it focused on the very blunt instruments of direct economic controls on prices and imports and finance rather than more flexible approaches that would have fewer negative side effects.

it had a heavy emphasis on issues that Benn cared about (like nationalization and industrial democracy) but weren't really relevant to how to deal with stagflation in the short term.

meanwhile, it under-emphasized policies to deal with unemployment and ironically relied on a rather standard "commercial Keynesian" solution for reflation rather than more social democratic alternatives.

the anti-European/autarkic emphasis of the AES was profoundly counter-productive, especially for the economic context of Britain in the 1970s.

finally, it really neglected the crucial question of how to develop state capacity. In part because Benn really didn't get along with the Civil Service and viewed them as essentially hostile, the AES didn't spend nearly enough time on how to develop the expertise, coordination, staffing, etc. needed to carry out economic policies that were very heavy lifts.

So yeah, "impractical in an idealistic way" is fair.

[a-typical]

Disillusionment with established parties provides fertile ground for radical right parties to exploit.

While centrist politicians may feel compelled to adopt anti-immigrant stances in response, copying the rhetoric of radical right parties risks alienating their base.

But once in office, and without clear solutions to the local economic and quality-of-life declines that emigration has set in motion, party officials will likely face the same voter discontent fueling their current success.

Ironically, the forces that have increased the appeal of the far right’s anti-immigrant ideologies – falling birth rates, labor shortages and a lack of new businesses and services – are most feasibly addressed by increasing immigration.

By following the right’s lead to tighten borders, parties closer to the center may condemn industrialized nations to a political doom loop.

Instead, centrist parties may find it pays more dividends to focus attention on addressing the root causes.

[elladastinkardiamou]

According to first wave exit polls published in Greece on Sunday evening, a Euroskeptic political newcomer may pass the 3 percent legal threshold needed to secure a place in European Parliament. The far-right, pro-Russian, Christian nationalist party Greek Solution (Elliniki Lisi) is projected to gain between 2.5 and 4.5 percent of the total vote, possibly squeezing into the next assembly with one seat.

The party was founded on June 28, 2016, by Kyriakos Velopoulos, a journalist and former MP of the nationalist populist Popular Orthodox Rally party. According to the party’s official website, it seeks to establish stronger relations with Russia, it is strongly opposed to the use of the word “Macedonia” in the name of the neighboring Republic of North Macedonia, and seeks to revive Greece’s heavy industry and reorient the educational system with an emphasis on nationalism and Orthodoxy.

In 2017, the party was close to recruiting Nikos Michos, an independent MP who was formerly affiliated with neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Michos eventually decided to not join Greek Solution, accusing Velopoulos of being unable to “distinguish politics from business.”

[mariacallous]

Europe has once again sleepwalked into an existential crossroad. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine challenged the liberal democratic order that the European Union champions and sparked a crisis many deemed unthinkable after decades of peace. Amid rising tides of Euroskepticism and ultranationalism across the continent, the new war seemed to create a perfect storm for the disintegration of the European project.

Perhaps unexpectedly, the EU pulled together, swiftly and collectively committing materiel and financial support to Ukraine. While there is little that the EU could have done to forestall Russia’s invasion, the bloc’s disinterest in Ukraine in the years following Putin’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula—a clear sign of his aggressive ambitions—has proved woefully misguided. Only now, more than a year into the war, are serious conversations about rebuilding and integrating Ukraine into the EU beginning to take place.

This is a familiar cycle for the EU: of apathy leading to crisis, and crisis leading to greater integration. It is one that has defined the European project since its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community of the 1950s. The physical and psychological destruction of World War II, dual crises of stagflation and energy insecurity in the 1970s, and financial crisis of the 2010s all led to more Europe rather than less, just as the war in Ukraine seems poised to do.

After far-right parties catapulted to the fore of European politics in 2010, many conversations about the future of Europe focused on its imminent demise. As recently as January 2022, with many still wallowing in a post-Brexit malaise, there was little serious possibility of Ukraine acceding to the EU—or, for that matter, of Germany increasing its military spending and cutting its energy dependence on Russia.

Yet today, because of a crisis Europe neither wanted nor was prepared for, Ukraine seems poised to become an EU member upon the war’s resolution. Germany also reneged on its controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and Poland—previously an internal roadblock to European solidarity—has become an advocate for collective European defense. The newly war-torn continent looks poised to come out of this crisis more unified than before.

Now, as Europe begins to enter its latest integrative phase, there is an opportunity to break this reactive cycle in favor of a proactive and intentional expansion of European solidarity. The continent can do so by giving a greater voice to the first generation to have grown up entirely with the EU—whom we call the Maastricht Generation.

For the first time in history, there is a fully grown generation of Europeans who have only ever known a united Europe. In our recent edited volume, contributing author Floris Rijssenbeek dubbed members of this group the Maastricht Generation because they grew up after the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which formally created the EU as it exists in its current form. For members of the Maastricht Generation, a united Europe is not just a mechanism for peace and growth. The values that Europe embodies—such as democracy, the rule of law, and humanitarianism—are inherent to their identities in ways they were not for their forebears.

This matters because people fight for what they believe in, as well as for the identities they hold and value. Members of the Maastricht Generation will proactively work to make the European project better rather than waiting for a new crisis to fuel reactive integration.

Members of the Maastricht Generation tend to have a more pro-EU stance than do prior generations. Nowhere is this more evident than in Hungary. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has governed the country uninterrupted since 2010, Hungary has turned toward autocracy and become a vanguard of the global illiberal movement. Through it all, Orban has maintained remarkably broad public support, with approval ratings consistently at or above 50 percent.

But one group is notoriously absent from Orban’s base: 16- to 29-year-olds. In Hungary’s April 2022 parliamentary elections, fewer than 25 percent of first-time voters chose Orban and his party, reflecting a nearly decadelong trend of young voters turning away from far-right conservatism. As Orban consolidated power, Hungary’s Maastricht Generation expressed a growing preference for democracy and rejected the government’s authoritarian practices. They have also turned away from rising conservatism in Hungarian political culture, rejecting Orban’s Christian identity politics in favor of classical liberal concerns such as social welfare and economic growth.

It’s no surprise, then, that Hungary’s opposition is led by young people who deeply identify with Europe and its values. And despite government-led barriers to democratic engagement, such as voter intimidation and lack of media pluralism, this opposition is vibrant—just not in the places one might expect. Disillusioned with traditional politics, Hungary’s Maastricht Generation has turned away from the voting booth to alternative forms of democratic expression. They are engaging in political conversation on social media rather than through traditional (and now state-run) media outlets, participating in pro-democracy protest movements, and joining new parties in droves.

Hungary’s Maastricht Generation is not alone. Across Europe, young people consistently demonstrate high levels of support for liberal democracy and the universal values that the EU champions. Research by social scientist Jan Zilinsky shows that young Europeans express more faith in democracy than older generations. This is not simply a case of young people being more progressive on average than older citizens. As Pew Research Center data has shown, young Europeans express significantly more faith in the EU than any other age demographic, regardless of political affiliation. Rather than relying on disintegrative pressures—such as stagflation, recessions, or wars of aggression—to fuel the engine of European solidarity, the EU can leverage the creativity, ingenuity, and Euro-enthusiasm of youth to spring forward.

Doing so will require creative reforms to the EU’s institutional mechanisms. The EU’s policymaking processes and national electoral thresholds have not been built to incorporate the Maastricht Generation’s perspectives, and the bloc’s rigid policy agenda and consistent neutering of ambitious policy proposals do not adequately reflect young Europeans’ ideals. Nothing exemplifies this disconnect better than the failed promise of Volt Europa, a pan-European, pro-Europe party founded in 2017, largely by members of the Maastricht Generation. Volt promised a radically fresh approach to European politics and gained popularity among younger voters across the continent ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections, also performing well in 2021 general elections in the Netherlands. But Volt has failed to deliver on its promise so far, in part because its message does not resonate with voters outside of the Maastricht Generation.

Members of the Maastricht Generation are eager to support and defend Europe’s democratic values, but rightly express a frustration with the way the system functions today. The slowness of the European Parliament’s and Council of the European Union’s legislative processes, physical and psychological distance between Brussels and its constituents, and the arguably undemocratic system of indirectly appointing members of the European Commission prompt many to turn their backs to traditional politics in favor of protest movements, like those in Hungary, or transnational climate activism, such as Fridays for Future.

It is critical that the EU take proactive steps to reincorporate the Maastricht Generation into ongoing policy debates and discussions. Of course, all governments should work to include younger voices—but as a supranational entity that has long struggled to form a distinct identity, the EU especially would benefit from doing so.

To start, politicians at the EU and domestic levels must begin taking protests movements seriously as means of democratic expression. Legislators need to spend more time engaging with young activists, whose visions for the future can help guide innovative policies in the realms of climate, defense, and migration. In countries within the EU suffering from democratic backsliding, engagement with and support for nontraditional democratic activists from EU institutions is arguably more likely to lead to substantive political change than sanctions or legal proceedings.

More active engagement of young voices can take a variety of forms, from lowering age minimums for holding elected office in both the European and national parliaments to instituting local, national, and European-wide youth councils that can develop policy recommendations for national and EU legislative bodies. The European Parliament, for its part, should create a special parliament that represents the Maastricht Generation in European political debates.

Perhaps most importantly, the EU needs to invest in the political and leadership potential of its younger generations. It already does so successfully in the education sphere with its Erasmus+ study abroad program, which helps to create a network of young Europeans connected by a common understanding of the world. The European Parliament also makes this type of investment with political activists from non-EU countries through its Young Political Leaders Programme, which connects democratic activists from Europe’s neighborhood to develop their potential as future leaders for lasting peace.

The EU should burnish the same attention and investment on its own emerging leaders and create a program that will allow them to design policy initiatives to deepen European unity. Young leaders would ideate concrete policy proposals for the EU, and selected proposals would then be presented to EU officials. Such a program would cost just a fraction of the European Commission’s annual budget and could be appropriated from the existing funds that support Erasmus+ as part of the next budgetary package, which begins in 2028.

None of this can happen without acknowledging that the EU’s Maastricht Generation brings a unique perspective to—and has a unique stake in—the bloc’s future. That future will be stronger, better, and less prone to crisis if this generation is allowed to push European integration forward. Recognizing the Maastricht Generation’s ingenuity and potential is an essential first step to a more resilient Europe.

[mistfunk]

Mistigram: in today's panel of our daily serialised #TurnerTheWorm #teletext fancomic, this screen again drawn by TitaniumDave, the Turner-of-2020 despairs at not having any good news to share with his audience of 2003: Caller: "This Euroskepticism won't ever amount to anything will it?" Turner: "I can't take it any more cut the line!" (POOP, a not uncommon Digitiser sound effect) Oddly Familiar Voice: "I'll cut something alright!" https://instagr.am/p/CS2RfBHgyS7/

[bustedbernie]

I cannot speak for Corbyn but Mélenchon's eurospecticism has never been motivated by not wanting to pay for central and eastern Europe. It is motivated by the fact the EU (especially the court of justice whose legitimacy as a political force is dubious) imposes a liberal/ultraliberal economy on its members (especially in regards to privatisation Vs public monopolies) which would hinder the implementation of his economic program. And considering the US extreme patriotic values and nationalism 1/2

(pledge of allegiance at school, thinking the US is the BEST country on earth (a though not limited to trump supporters) , etc) combined with the remnants of the red scare I'm not surprised that American sociology is promoting this concept to delegitimize leftists and their ideas. No country on earth should be idealised, not the US and no European one, but comparisons are going to occurre on specific point and this looks like the academic version of 'you don't love your country enough, traitor'.

Yes, partly on your first point that is true. But when pointed out that his euroskepticism would in turn be bad for France and the economy, he didn’t care. As for the lack of care for Eastern Europe, this is simply a talking point I encountered among Mélenchon’s supporters I talked with in the 2017 election (young anarchocommunists/uni students lol) - who had (have) a lot in common with the American stereotype of the Bernie Bro (champagne socialists, etc). 

The critique of the EU in that capacity is at times valid, but it’s also a critique I think France has a lot of weight in shifting. For all his faults (and his somewhat ultra liberalism), Macron has demonstrated that France can use that weight to create a big shift in EU policy - fiscal and otherwise. I think Mélenchon and the left in France would be better served to use that weight and the positive power it could create. I think similarly to Corbyn and Sanders, Mélenchon has a vision of the world/France that is a bit outdated. I’ve found Hamon to have the most forward-thinking agenda of the main French candidates and also like his focus on ecology (and hope his polls can continue improving, I’d prefer the next election be Macron vs Hamon than Le Pen...). With Merkel’s term soon coming to an end, I hope France can choose a leader that can leverage that power to benefit a better economic model. It’s clear that the current model was shaken by 2008 and I hope the response to COVID and the softening of the German stance leads to a more elastic, empathetic system that doesn’t employ models of austerity which just don’t seem to work. I think this is part of what is hard, the frustrations channeled by Mélenchon (and Sanders/Corbyn) are often valid and important, but I fear that they are so reactive and destructive that they would in fact worsen conditions. Reforming the EU seems tough and it is tough, but it is likely to be a more beneficial thing long-term than bringing back the Franc and doing a Frexit. Maybe you might say his “EU - change it or leave it” is just that, but I think it’s a dangerous form of brinkmanship that would be a destabilizing force through the world. 

To your second point, I still find it hard to separate a certain nativist streak in Mélenchon’s platform or from the other leftists on this topic. PM Frederiksen in Denmark might be another example. Compared to other leftists, I think Mélenchon actually speaks so much more nicely about migrants and immigration - but - he still channels the idea that immigrants are a capitalist mechanism used to suppress wages of the homeland while increasing bourgeois gains and he continues to enforce the myth that the EU and France are incapable of supporting immigration. He speaks of the sécurité-sociale being ruined by immigrants, the need of immigrants to love France (as if they don’t), so idk. 

I also don’t know that your point about American patriotism being an instrument against progressive/leftist ideologies is totally apt. In fact, many of the most successful progressives underline the idea that due to America’s greatness, it MUST provide better for its people. This is even seen often in the progressive refrain of “the wealthiest nation should provide the best healthcare” - “the USA must be the world leader in green energy” - “the USA must lead the world on human rights and individual freedom.” If anything, the patriotic organ of American social life is used on the left as well in my opinion. But I also don’t think this is unique to the USA, in fact it is present in France, Canada and the UK in my personal experience. It may not be routine to sing La Marseillaise but French exceptionalism still manifests in its own ways as well. But you are right with your central point that no nation ought to be idealized though I think when comparisons are appropriate, they can be good for cultural exchange, sharing and education. I tend to think the more societies share, the better. 

[tanadrin]

@jadagul and you’re right that “representativeness” isnt’ a virtue because the representative nature of democracy was a way the landholding economic aristocracy could gerrymander the political system in their favor; democracy is just a system, it doesn’t have any kind of inherent telicity or purpose except the one we want to apply it to (originalism is fake, etc etc). The question is, what is the most useful application of democracy? And your version to me seems like it’s always going to be one step away from crisis, because people notice when the political class doesn’t give a shit about their wants and needs and pursues its own goals instead: that’s why the EU has struggled to achieve the closer integration it desires, bc Europeans notice when the EU is acting in their interests, and when it’s a neoliberal pet project that’s about making life easier for capital holders.

People don’t always know what the obvious answer is, and right-wing Euroskepticism is one response, but so are left-wing movements like Corbynism. Nothing saves you from having to do the work of translating people’s disaffection into good policy instead of bad policy, because nothing saves us from having to do the work of actual democratic politics. Insulating decisionmaking within a political class that doesn’t have any idea what’s going on in the world around it--in a political class that’s shocked and surprised and appalled by the rise of a politician like Trump, because it doesn’t understand where this kind of thing could have come from, and spends years after the fact flailing around trying to come up with the perfect thinkpiece explanation--and which thinks it can skip the work of democratic politics by fiat, is no solution at all.

[antoine-roquentin]

For decades, purveyors of the rhetoric of technocratic stability have outsourced their and their voters’ most sadistic and unpalatable beliefs and impulses to the far right. But Schäuble’s career suggests that, while technocratic governance has countless mechanisms to repress its own inherent cruelty and outsource them to the fringes, there is a kind of cruelty that comes from, and is enjoyed at, the center rather than the fringes. To many of its subjects—refugees being told that persecution without torture isn’t enough to win them asylum, unemployed workers being forced to provide all their rejection letters to prove they’re actively looking for work, Greek politicians being told to cut loose the country’s pensioners in the order to reassure investors—this inherent cruelty is wholly self-evident.

Schäuble himself understood early on that technocracy has its sadistic side, and he has embraced it. Both major German parties have in the last thirty years occasionally lapsed into a politics of administered cruelty. The Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency) that privatized the state-owned companies in East Germany, the safety-net cuts of “Agenda 2010,” and the draconian austerity measures after the financial crisis of 2008—all of these were approached by serious old men in smart suits in boardrooms with a kind of resigned shrug. We don’t like it either, they seemed to say, but this is what needs to happen. Schäuble, however, didn’t shrug at all—he seemed to feel genuine glee at the dictates that everyone else pretended to accept only reluctantly. Politicians of his type have been adept at making sound quantitative and objective what ultimately boils down to a demand for suffering, for mortification.

The success of the AfD suggests that Schäuble shares the recognition that alternativelessness has its religious, sacrificial dimension with a growing segment of voters in Germany. These voters have long recognized the carefully sublimated cruelty of alternativelessness; in many cases they’ve been at the receiving end of it. They accepted some of that cruelty for themselves, although very little—nothing more than a light paddle and an available safe word. But above all they demanded that, whatever cruelty the system meted out to them or people like them, it visit ten times that onto the Other. The AfD began as a party of technocrats, and its founders frequently seem surprised by how it sleepwalked from deficits and Euroskepticism to overt racism and illiberalism. One of the movement’s forerunners was Thilo Sarrazin, once an economist at Germany’s central bank, who at some point went from prognosticating that runaway deficits would spell Germany’s doom to prognosticating that runaway procreation by “hijab-girls” would spell Germany’s doom.

It’s a trajectory that isn’t actually all that surprising. Thanks to politicians like Schäuble, for decades now these voters have become used to being applauded for this perspective. Their coldness was reconceptualized as maturity, realism, steeliness of resolve. As the refugees arrived in 2015, CSU’s Secretary General worried that society would “implode” and “the people” would rise up. “Anyone who doesn’t recognize this,” he added about his bit of apocalyptic fan fiction, “ignores reality.” Pragmatic positions were recast as “political correctness,” as “failed multiculturalism,” while bizarre fantasies about racial civil war could stake a claim to being the “realistic” or “serious” position. This is how documents like the German Basic Law, with its talk about “the dignity of man,” or international asylum conventions, could seem to them like softhearted hippie tracts. The only realistic way of looking at the world was looking to make it hurt.

Adorno once spoke of the “categorical imperative of ‘never again’,” and the anxiety with which people watch unemployment figures in Germany is all about this “again”—about fascism as relapse, as repetition. It is against this background that the 12.6 percent of the vote the AfD won nationally in last year’s elections constitutes an incredible shock. Against the easy sociology and the old stories, what the result actually highlights is that Germany now specializes in a fascism in the midst of satiety. Perhaps even a fascism of satiety. And that this, rather than some vague revival of Nazism, is the shape that far-right populism has long taken in the country. As the historian Birte Förster put it on Twitter: “It’s not like Weimar, it’s not like 1933, it’s like Germany, 2018.”

After World War II, German nationalism became an impossibility. It survived largely by being refracted through economics, above all exports. Affluence at home gave people the feeling that “we are somebody again,” as the saying went. The wave of German cars, wares and weapons washing over Europe and the world took the place of German troops. Germans have long moralized economics (not for nothing did Max Weber write The Protestant Ethic in Heidelberg), but after World War II economics to some extent replaced politics: it reconciled Germany with its neighbors and former victims, it finally integrated Germany in an interconnected Europe, and eventually it dismantled the Iron Curtain and unified the country.

But in hindsight it is hard to miss the fact that this economic system, for all its technocratic mousiness, was suffused with displaced affective energy. And not just pride in one’s own wealth, but also a sadistic glee over the misery of others, which is interpreted in similarly moral or theological terms as Germany’s postwar economic success. This was true both between Germany and its neighbors and within Germany itself. Nachtwey probably underplays the ethnic dimension of what he calls “social modernity.” Unlike the New Deal in the United States, postwar affluence in Germany was not explicitly premised on racial stratification. Nevertheless, it’s hard not to sense a connection between the kind of solidarity that underpinned the postwar system of “social market capitalism” and the fact that the massive amounts of wealth created never went to the new arrivals in the country—the Turks, Italians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs who were at any rate still referred to as “guest workers,” even after decades in the country, sometimes even after obtaining German citizenship.

The righteous fury with which Germans have voiced their suspicion that most immigrants aren’t “really” refugees, but are, horror horrorum, motivated by hopes for a better life, is of a piece with this moralization. Germans have become good at denying others what they take to be their own birthright: they are terrified of foreigners taking their jobs, and then inundate Austrian medical schools and Swiss hospitals. They demanded that Greece put its pension system on a sustainable footing, but managed no such thing themselves during decades of affluence. In an infamous 2009 interview that prefigured the rhetoric of the AfD, Sarrazin claimed that “70 percent of Turkish and 90 percent of the Arab population of Berlin . . . live off the state but reject that state.” The irony is that, from retirees via the underemployed rural voters to professionals getting rich off subventions and the dividends of the social safety net, this describes pretty much the average AfD voter.

[newstfionline]

U.K., Land of ‘Brexit,’ Quietly Outsources Some Surgeries to France

By Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, NY Times, March 17, 2018

CALAIS, France--Serge Orlov, a 62-year-old Briton, likes to rail against what he calls the tyranny of the European Union. Like most supporters of his country’s withdrawal from the bloc, he wants Britain to strike out on its own, a fully sovereign state unshackled from Europe’s pettifogging rules and the Continent’s overweening state.

But faced with excruciating pain and a seemingly endless wait for a knee replacement, Mr. Orlov temporarily shelved his euroskepticism to take advantage of a little known National Health Service program and jump to the head of the line--in France.

After waiting a year just for the possibility of the knee replacement he badly needed, he turned to Calais Hospital in northern France, where in a matter of 10 days he found himself on the operating table for the three-hour procedure, he said in an interview. He plans to get his second knee replaced in a few weeks’ time. Back home, it took him a year to receive a letter informing him when he might have the operation.

“Waiting, it’s just miserable,” he said, describing how he had been shuttled to five different hospitals in Britain over more than eight months. Waiting rooms are “full of sick people,” he said, adding swiftly, by way of explanation, “I can be a grumpy old git.”

Mr. Orlov, who has Russian-Italian ancestry, is among a rapidly growing number of British patients who are crossing the English Channel to seek medical treatments--mostly elective surgeries--in France.

Given that the Brexit vote was largely won on highly emotive issues surrounding British sovereignty and a misleading promise by politicians that leaving the bloc would free up 350 million pounds, or about $490 million, a week to fund the N.H.S, the paradox of Britain seeking aid from France is not lost on the French hospital, nor on Mr. Orlov.

“I find something quite ironic about it,” he readily admitted. “I think it’s hilarious, actually.”

After years of austerity, Britain’s lumbering National Health Service is under enormous strain, with severe shortages of beds and medical staff, all of which is producing waiting times for nonemergency procedures to stretch over months, and sometimes beyond a year.

To cope, the N.H.S has been quietly outsourcing some surgeries to three hospitals in France for the last year or so. It is a little-known partnership, because the N.H.S. is not eager to advertise the measures it is being forced to take.

But as more people join Mr. Orlov in crossing the English Channel--and with a predictable but particularly severe “winter crisis” this year, forcing the cancellation of tens of thousands of elective surgeries--word is spreading.

Mr. Orlov was only Calais Hospital’s 15th patient under the program, but it has received 450 inquiries from British patients over six weeks, after fielding fewer than 10 a month previously. With 500 beds and a surgery ward with an occupancy rate of 70 percent, the hospital could treat as many as 200 N.H.S patients a year, officials said.

Mr. Orlov marveled that he had a spacious private room in the French hospital, with a window looking out on some greenery and a television set that offered the BBC. Parking is free, he exclaimed several times. “And the food is pretty good,” he said as an afterthought. “I’ve got to say, I’m not averse to French cooking.”

Hospitals in Britain “are so old they should be museums,” he said. “It’s shocking what’s going on.”

N.H.S. England’s outsourcing deal has technically little to do with Britain’s decision nearly two years ago to leave the European Union, a process known as Brexit. Rather, it has more to do with the myriad ways that countries across Europe are tied together, but that are often ignored in public discussions about Britain’s relationship with Europe.

“Let’s hope the talks don’t speed up too quickly though, I want to get this done first, and ideally the second one,” Mr. Orlov added, half seriously, referring to negotiations about the terms of Britain’s departure.

He asked that his surgeon not be told that he had voted for Brexit--just yet. “I’m happy to tell him when he’s finished carving me up, but certainly not beforehand,” he whispered. “I do have my second knee.”

(“Oh, la la,” Martin Trelcat, the director of Calais Hospital, groaned in mock outrage when he heard he had a Brexit supporter on his hands. “It’s time for a new vote,” he joked.)

Britain has about 340 available beds per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with a European Union average of 515, according to Eurostat, the European statistics agency. France has 706 beds for every 100,000 people, and Germany 813. Only three countries--Denmark, Ireland and Sweden--have lower rates of available beds than Britain does.

Britain spends almost 8 percent of its gross domestic product on health care, slightly less than France and Germany, and the share is forecast to fall to about 6.8 percent by 2020, according to the Office for Budgetary Responsibility.

Estimates from the King’s Fund, an organization that researches the British health care system, suggest that N.H.S. England funding is at least $5.6 billion below what is needed this year, and that the shortfall will rise to around $30 billion by 2023.

But Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt argues that pressures on the N.H.S are increasing not because of a lack of funding but partly because people are going to emergency rooms when they have bad colds or other minor afflictions.

This winter, people have been left on trolleys in corridors, in scenes of chaos some have likened to “war zones.” Patients in emergency wards sometimes waited up to 12 hours to get treated. The situation generally comes to a head every winter--so much so that the “winter crisis” has almost become an annual tradition. But even Mr. Hunt admitted that this year’s was the worst, and the British Red Cross declared the situation a “humanitarian crisis.”

Mr. Trelcat, the hospital director, said that the most likely explanation is that Britons are more patient than the French. “We don’t understand how you can delay so many operations that make many patients suffer,” he said. “A knee replacement that is delayed for one year--in France, it just can’t happen. It takes a maximum of one month here.”

The N.H.S insists that the outsourcing partnership is “purely about patient choice.” Officials declined to comment for this article, despite repeated requests.

But Calais Hospital representatives said that in private meetings, N.H.S officials had told them they wanted to enter a partnership because many of its hospitals were old but had little chance of being refurbished or improved soon.

The delays are a “sign of failure” of the N.H.S, Britain’s national pride, Mr. Trelcat said. The limited publicity about the deal may stem from an “embarrassment that most certainly comes from the fact that our hospitals are so reliable,” he added.

N.H.S officials who visited Calais Hospital were probably “not aware of the gap between a standard British hospital and a standard French hospital,” he continued.

Mr. Orlov proffered his own explanation for the N.H.S.’s reticence to advertise the possibility of treatment abroad. “I don’t know if it’s a breakdown in communication,” he said, “or because the N.H.S doesn’t like the idea of parting with the hard cash and bringing it to France.”

Either way, he said, “it’s shocking.”

[coronavirusnewslive]

Coronavirus in Italy has led to 30,000 deaths, recession and soaring euroskepticism