#Euroskepticism

[a-typical]

Why is right-wing populism outmatching left-wing populism across the Globe?

It’s so much easier to make people feel afraid than it is to make them feel hopeful or safe or supported. Right wing populism preys on people’s fears and stokes pre-existing anxieties, while also providing an individual “strongman” that people can look to for resolution. Simple and effective.

If we look at left-wing policies or general ideological talking points, they require both:

an inherent empathy/sympathy for strangers and community alike

a strong persistence to work against pre-existing institutions/structures to achieve that which isn’t often simple

It requires more effort, more funding, and occasionally can’t be simplified into layman’s terms, which ostracizes those who can’t reach higher education. This, above all else, is what makes right-wing populist rhetoric so effective - it’s approachable. It doesn’t ask you to care for others (quite the opposite) outside of your own interests. It’s comforting to have a powerful leader who “isn’t afraid to speak the truth” or “tell it like it is”, when the preceding leaders have all spoken outside your comprehension and made you feel isolated from your country in their education, class, and/or status.

Really, right-wing populism is in vogue because it’s so much easier to understand and so much easier to exercise. It doesn’t ask for much - it certainly doesn’t ask for us to follow rules or facts. It’s chameleon, and its rhetoric shapes to what would reach the most people regardless of how plausible, reasonable, or respectable it is.

[xtruss]

The EU Doesn’t Know How to Not Be a Vassal of the US Anymore

Former Fox News host Tucker Carlson has tried to show Americans how Washington has exploited Western Europe

— Bradley Blankenship | RT | August 22, 2023

(From L to R) US President Joe Biden, Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Britain's Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the G7 Leaders' Summit in Hiroshima on May 19, 2023 © Kenny Holston/POOL/AFP

Tucker Carlson, of Fox News fame, recently met with Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic in Budapest, Hungary. The journalist pointed out that the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline has put a serious strain on the European Union’s economy and mentioned that the world was “resetting” in reaction to the conflict in Ukraine and the West’s pledged support for Kiev.

Carlson raises some good issues, and an important one to expand upon is the fact that the EU economy is lagging significantly since the outbreak of the war last year. A June piece by the Financial Times titled ‘Europe has fallen behind America and the gap is growing’ details how the EU is now considerably dependent on the US for its technological, security, and economic needs.

In terms of hard numbers, Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) think tank have stated: “In 2008, the EU’s economy was somewhat larger than America’s: $16.2tn versus $14.7tn. By 2022, the US economy had grown to $25tn, whereas the EU and the UK together had only reached $19.8tn. America’s economy is now nearly one-third bigger. It is more than 50 per cent larger than the EU without the UK.”

The article goes on to describe a European Union that is dragging far behind the US and China in terms of quality universities, a less-than-pristine start-up environment, and lacking key benefits from its transatlantic peer – namely cheap energy. The Ukraine conflict has impacted the latter to the point that EU companies are paying three or four times what their American competitors are, with Washington being energy-independent and enjoying great domestic supplies. Meanwhile, energy from Russia is waning, European factories are closing in droves, and industry leaders are worried about the region’s future competitiveness.

The ECFR issued its own report on the matter in April, which is far blunter in describing the situation as a kind of “vassalization.” The summary of that report notes that the Ukraine war has exposed the EU’s key dependencies on the US, that over the course of a decade, the bloc has fallen behind the US in virtually every key metric, that it is deadlocked in disagreement and is looking to Washington for leadership.

The ECFR noted two causes for this situation. Firstly, despite the widely understood decline of the US compared to the rise of China, the transatlantic relationship has been unbalanced in Washington’s favor over the last 15 years since the 2008 financial crisis. The Biden administration is keen to exploit this and assert itself in the face of a disjointed Europe. Secondly, no one in the EU knows what greater strategic autonomy could look like – let alone agree on it if they did. There exists no process to decide the EU’s future in an autonomous way given the current status quo, which means US leadership is necessary.

This paints quite an interesting picture. Many commentators, including myself, have long documented the decline of the US and attributed it to a number of factors: less of an attractive environment for foreign direct investment (FDI), financial instability, corruption, and internal political turmoil. This is, of course, relativized to China, which has seen immense economic growth since the founding of the People’s Republic and particularly over the past four decades. But under the smoke screen of a fumbling America and a growing China, the EU has likewise fallen in stature.

The Western Establishment just gave itself a ‘World Peace and Liberty’ Award! Ursula von der Leyen received the ‘Judicial Equivalent’. The Western Establishment just gave itself a ‘World Peace and Liberty’ Award. Ursula von der Leyen received the ‘Judicial Equivalent of the Nobel Peace Prize’ from Justin Trudeau in a perfect self-congratulatory orgy

As for the two causes noted by the ECFR, they seem to be intertwined. Many of the key issues that have faced the EU, from migration to the banking crisis to Covid-19, have stemmed directly from the non-federal nature of the EU. And the current political crises are a result of Euroskepticism, i.e. a backlash against what is perceived as an overreach from Brussels by some political organizations within the bloc. The EU is a complicated and sometimes cumbersome bureaucracy that is cherished by some, reviled by others, and, under these assumptions, is an impediment to strategic autonomy.

The ECFR essentially argues for the EU and Western European capitals to lean into the transatlantic partnership, but on terms favorable to themselves. This includes creating an independent security architecture within and complimentary to NATO, creating an economic NATO of sorts and even pursuing a European nuclear weapons program. At least the former two are acceptable, as abandoning the US outright would be politically foolish for the EU at this juncture. It certainly needs to develop a transatlantic free-trade agreement that puts an end to American trade protectionism.

However, the obvious point to help diversify the Western European economic portfolio, reduce genuinely problematic dependencies, and fuel growth is for the EU to develop peer-to-peer relations with the Global South. For one, the EU Parliament could right now ratify the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) to help their companies gain market access in China and tap into one of the world’s largest consumer bases. I would also argue, as I’ve done in the past, that the EU and China could cooperate – rather than compete – on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Global South because of Europe’s historical connections, due to its colonialist past.

What is clear is that the EU needs to diversify and back off from the transatlantic relationship. With much talk about ‘de-risking’, or even ‘de-coupling’, from China, Western Europe has actually gotten into the position where it is strategically dependent on Washington to the point of being outright vassalized. This is a bleak situation for the EU’s growth model and its hopes for strategic autonomy.

— Bradley Blankenship is an American Journalist, Columnist and Political Commentator. He has a syndicated column at CGTN and is a freelance reporter for international news agencies.

[taqato-alim]

Analysis of: Basic program of the German political party AfD ("Alternative für Deutschland" / "Alternative for Germany").

PDF-Download: https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Programm_AfD_Online_.pdf

Here is a summary of the key points discussed in bullet points:

Document promotes socially conservative, culturally homogeneous and nationalist policies

Prioritizes sovereignty and traditional values over diversity, multiculturalism and progressive reforms

Rhetoric appeals more to emotions than comprehensive evidence-based reasoning

Psychologically projects defenses against perceived failures of rivals rather than open debate

Limits some individual freedoms and rights depending on interpretation and implementation

Benefits socially conservative citizens and nationalists while potentially negatively impacting some minorities and progressive groups

Could contribute to less open, progressive and pluralistic culture in Germany over time

Questions consensus on issues from climate to migration that other democracies have accepted

Undermines existing forms of supranational cooperation like the EU and euro currency union

Departs significantly from rationalism and universalism of Enlightenment principles

In summary, the document proposes rolling back progressive reforms in favor of culturally homogeneous nationalism, with rhetoric prioritizing emotion over evidence-based policymaking. Impact depends on democratic process and balance in implementation.

Here is a summary of the key points from the AfD party program document in bullet points:

Demand direct democracy and referendums like in Switzerland to give citizens a direct say

Limit government powers and reduce state responsibilities to core areas like internal/external security, justice, foreign affairs, finance administration

Introduce a slimmer, less bureaucratic tax system with fewer tax brackets and a higher basic allowance

Abolish inheritance and wealth taxes, review and potentially abolish business tax

Introduce a binding spending/debt brake at the constitutional level to limit public debt

Return competencies to German states and promote subsidiarity (addressing issues at lowest level possible)

Strengthen federalism and autonomy for states and municipalities

Limit EU powers, return competencies to nation states, oppose idea of a "United States of Europe"

Pull out of Euro currency union if necessary, re-evaluate continued German participation

Oppose "open-door" refugee policy, distinguish between refugees fleeing conflict and economic migrants

Make asylum applications only possible at reception centres outside of Europe

Facilitate voluntary repatriation, reduce social welfare for rejected asylum seekers to encourage departure

Simplify citizenship process, reduce dual nationality, re-introduce jus sanguinis (nationality by descent)

End gender mainstreaming policies, reject quotas, oppose "gender ideology" influencing German language

Preserve Christian roots and Humboldt education ideals of Germany's academic system

Remove ideological influence from education, oppose political indoctrination of students

Strengthen traditional family model, facilitate work-life balance, support families and motherhood

Increase Germany's birth rate by supporting families rather than increasing immigration

Improve rural infrastructure to curb rural depopulation and support non-city livelihoods

Replace renewable energy subsidies with market-based energy production and consumption

Halt Energiewende policies like coal phaseout plans that increase energy prices and hurt industry

Reintroduce nuclear energy research as part of energy transition, allow lifetime extensions for plants

Modernize transport infrastructure like roads and rail while protecting natural landscapes

Simplify building codes, planning procedures and property taxes to facilitate housing construction

Reduce constraints on inner-city densification but avoid large-scale "Betonklotz" architecture

Re-evaluate EU's free movement rules and banking union plans, protect national sovereignty

Withdraw from Euro currency union if necessary, re-evaluate German participation conditions

Based on its content and style, this document appears to be a political party platform or manifesto.

Some clues that point to this genre:

It outlines the policy positions and objectives of a political party (the AfD) across a wide range of issue areas.

The language and structure are descriptive rather than analytical or persuasive. It presents the party's stances rather than arguing for them.

It references Germany's constitution, treaties, political context, and uses terminology like "we demand", "we oppose", etc. indicating a statement of intended governance.

It covers both domestic and international issues in a comprehensive manner typical of a party manifesto rather than focusing on a single topic.

It is published on the party's official website, identifying it as an authoritative source of their policy agenda.

So in summary, the way it covers many policy domains from the perspective of a political organization seeking to implement these stances suggests it is functioning as a party platform or manifesto document rather than another genre like a policy brief or academic paper.

Here is an evaluation of the document in relation to limiting government powers and reducing state responsibilities:

The document advocates for reducing the welfare state apparatus and public sector responsibilities, aligning with more libertarian stances.

It proposes privatizing publicly owned sectors, cutting subsidies, decentralizing powers, and limiting social benefits - all reducing the state's economic role.

Calls for cutting red tape and regulation would curb government interference in private business operations and citizen activities.

Limiting asylum rights and benefits, along with tougher migration and integration policies, arguably reduce the state's commitment to inclusive social policies.

However, some proposals like added cultural promotion and restrictive speech policies could paradoxically expand certain non-economic government powers.

Protections for Christian heritage and opposition to social changes prioritize tradition over individual liberties in select areas.

nationalism and restricting supranational governance aim to assert stronger national sovereignty but at the cost of cosmopolitan liberties.

So in summary, while aligning with libertarian ideals on economic freedoms, the document takes a nuanced stance - reducing social welfare commitments but potentially increasing cultural authority and control in some non-economic domains. Impacts on individualism depend on implementation.

Here is an evaluation of how limiting government powers and reducing state responsibilities per the document could potentially impact citizens' quality of life:

Positive impacts:

Lower taxes and less regulation could boost individual disposable income and business climate.

Privatizing public services may improve quality/choice through competition.

Strong national identity and Christian heritage potentially enhance social cohesion.

tightened borders and visas could curb pressures on welfare, housing from migration.

Negative impacts:

Cutting welfare and social insurance increases risks of poverty, inequality, insecurity in times of need.

Weaker labor protections and benefits could worsen conditions and pay for some workers.

Reduced public services hamper access to healthcare, education, infrastructure in parts of society.

Strong ethno-cultural nationalism and speech controls diminish individual freedoms.

Environmental deregulation threatens health and living standards long-term.

Local autonomy cuts isolate communities and weaken response capacity.

Mixed/uncertain impacts:

Economic growth depends on complex factors beyond scope of interventions outlined.

Impacts on communities are uneven - some faring better, others worse under new frameworks.

Overall social cohesion effects are difficult to definitively predict and would take years to manifest fully.

On balance, while promising individual economic benefits for some, reducing the welfare state carries clear risks to vulnerable populations' well-being and standards of living that would require mitigation. Net impact on quality of life is uncertain and complex to evaluate.

Evaluation of the document in relation to facilitating voluntary repatriation and reducing social welfare for rejected asylum seekers to encourage departure:

Facilitating voluntary repatriation for rejected asylum seekers aligns with states' right to control borders and resolve immigration cases. However, forcing return through benefit cuts could violate some rights.

Reducing welfare may incentivize some to depart, resolving their case, but risks worsening conditions for vulnerable individuals while appeals/obstacles to return remain.

Unless paired with robust support, forced hardship could violate humanity or dignity depending on circumstances of individuals affected.

May undermine Germany's reputation as upholding refugee conventions and risk non-compliance with international laws like non-refoulement.

Could set a precedent of using benefit changes punitively to indirectly remove those not technically authorized to remain, testing legal boundaries.

May damage societal cohesion and integration prospects for those permitted to stay by treating some migrants as a burden rather than potential contributors.

Effect on actual returns is difficult to predict - benefit reduction is a blunt and potentially inhumane tool that could galvanize opposition.

Overall, while aiming to resolve immigration cases, the proposed approach through benefit cuts seems a legally and ethically problematic way to encourage departure that risks harming vulnerable people and Germany's reputation as a rights-respecting country. The ends do not clearly justify the means proposed.

Evaluation of the document in relation to preserving Christian roots and Humboldt education ideals of Germany's academic system:

Preserving Christian roots:

Aligns with desire to retain culturally formative religious traditions in public life.

However, risks establishment of religion and reducing secularism important to religious freedom.

May indirectly discourage religious diversity and minority faith communities.

Humboldt education ideals:

Commitment to academic freedom and open debate matches core Humboldt principles.

However, document also promotes more patriotic, skill-based education.

Strict cultural assimilation for migrants may clash with tolerance of new ideas.

Need to ensure patriotism doesn't override critical thinking or plurality of views.

Overall:

Intentions to retain cultural heritage are understandable.

But preserving Christian roots and some education aims risk weakening secular, inclusive and cosmopolitan foundations of German academia.

More emphasis needed on how educational excellence and diversity of thought will be safeguarded from dominating cultural/political viewpoints.

Balance required between cultural preservation and principles of academic neutrality, innovation and intellectual freedom.

Implementation would strongly influence whether educational priorities uphold or compromise principles of enlightened, tolerant and evidence-based learning.

Evaluation of the document in relation to removing ideological influence from education and opposing political indoctrination of students:

Goal of removing overt political indoctrination from classrooms is reasonable and aims to uphold education quality standards.

However, determining what constitutes "indoctrination" can be subjective - views espoused by one side may seem neutral/objective to them but ideological to others.

stronger promotion of patriotism, assimilation and traditional values risks these very ideologies influencing curricula selection and teacher/textbook oversight in a one-sided way.

Strict limits proposed on covering gender/sexual diversity could curb neutral discussion of sociological issues and discourage critical thought.

Education systems inherently involve value judgements in priorities - complete removal of "ideology" is impossible and risks politicizing discipline selection.

Academic freedom principles require diversity of perspectives be heard, not just one approved approach as neutral/objective.

Oversight mechanisms must judiciously balance curbing overt activism with preserving discussion openness vital to learning.

Overall, while the goal of neutrality is valid, proposals risk replacing alleged indoctrination with a new ideology and lack reputable oversight/due process. True removal of bias requires more balanced, evidence-based solutions respecting expertise and dissent.

Evaluation of the document in relation to strengthening the traditional family model:

Positive aspects:

Supporting strong family bonds is important for child welfare and social cohesion.

Recognizing challenges facing families (costs, demographic pressures) has merit.

Potential issues:

Promoting only the nuclear family risks marginalizing other family forms now accepted.

Could indirectly pressure non-traditional lifestyles seen as threatening family "decline".

Reasons for changing family structures are complex, may discount personal choice.

Programs should empower all responsible caregivers rather than target social progress.

Outdated gender roles could compromise individual fulfillment and perpetuate inequities.

Implementation challenges:

How to define and prioritize the "traditional" family without ostracizing diversity?

Difficult to strengthen families without overreaching into private lives/preferences.

Targeting marginalized groups may do more harm than support those truly struggling.

Overall, while family support has benefits, an overly narrow definition and resistant attitude to social change carries risks of undermining individual freedoms, marginalizing citizens and driving reaction instead of cooperation on challenges all families now face.

Evaluation of the document in relation to increasing Germany's birth rate by supporting families rather than increasing immigration:

Increasing support for families to raise birth rates is a reasonable long-term strategy, but impact will take generations to be realized.

Strict limits on immigration proposed as alternative may disregard short-term labor needs and contributions of migrants to economy and demography.

Low birth rates stem from complex social and economic factors beyond any policy's quick control, like female empowerment and cost of living.

Support should focus on empowering parental choice and well-being rather than coercive pronatalism which may backfire or unfairly pressure subgroups.

Transitioning away from reliance on immigration requires careful management to avoid labor/skills gaps disruptive to society and business.

Promoting diversity and inclusion can itself make countries more attractive places to live and raise families long-term.

Reliance on a singular domestic solution risks becoming demographically and economically isolating in increasingly globalized world.

Overall, prudent family support can help address demographic challenges but unrealistic timelines and failure to consider short-term realities, migration's role, or benefits of diversity potentially undermine this goal's effectiveness. A nuanced, multipronged approach works best.

Evaluation of the document in relation to halting Energiewende policies like coal phaseout plans that increase energy prices and hurt industry:

Halting renewable energy expansion and coal phaseout could help industry by maintaining cheaper conventional options in the short term.

However, it risks Germany falling behind its peers in the global transition to clean technology, losing competitive edge and jobs in the growing green sector.

Retreating from climate commitments damages international credibility and trust in German policy stability which benefits investment and trade.

Fossil fuel dependence endangers progress on Paris Agreement goals which have widespread support, risking isolation.

Long-term energy price stability actually favors continued diversification away from volatile oil/gas imports.

Local renewable projects and new jobs could offset losses from earlier plant closures.

Public health and environment affect lives/cost of inaction on emissions in the long run.

Overall, while claiming to help industry, halting low-carbon progress arguably sacrifices much broader economic, social and geopolitical benefits to Germany over the crucial next decades. A more balanced approach transitioning collaboratively may better serve all interests in the long run.

Evaluation of the document in relation to EU's free movement rules and banking union plans, protecting national sovereignty:

Greater restriction of EU free movement aligns with goals of strengthened borders and reduced migration. However, it conflicts with core EU principles and benefits many businesses/individuals.

Withdrawing from EU banking integration protects some national oversight. But decoupling increases financial instability risks across the Eurozone in times of crisis.

Sovereignty concerns are understandable but unilateral actions to curb integration could prompt legal/trade clashes and isolate Germany within the EU.

Alternatives like renegotiation may be difficult given lack of consensus among other members on rolling back key projects.

Partial multi-speed integration presents coordination challenges versus clearer common rules.

Globalization trends make complete economic separation unrealistic and diminish German influence in EU affairs.

Overall, while sovereignty arguments have merit, unilaterally vetoing or exiting longstanding EU arrangements aimed at policy coordination and stability risks significant economic and political costs to Germany that may outweigh the gains from resisting integration on these issues. A negotiated, multilateral approach stands the best chance of balancing these priorities.

Here is an evaluation of the document in relation to benefits of cooperation and coordination:

There is recognition that some issues like security, trade and environment benefit from cooperative approaches. However, skepticism of supranational governance implies a view that national sovereignty should generally take priority over deep integration.

Proposals roll back many coordinated EU policies and initiatives, from the common currency and budget to renewable energy targets and asylum burden-sharing. This risks weakening established forms of cooperation.

Reduced supranational governance may please sovereignty advocates but increase difficulties for coordinated cross-border policymaking in areas like competition, digital regulation and foreign affairs.

Alternative models proposed like increased intergovernmentalism and cooperation on an à la carte basis could maintain some coordination, but potentially in a less stable, efficient and comprehensive way compared to current EU structures.

Cooperation through purely voluntary frameworks and bilateral treaties may struggle to replicate scope and benefits of coordination through binding institutions and legal mechanisms.

Coexistence of closely intertwined yet divergent national systems in areas like standards, social welfare and business regulation could complicate trade and movement within the EU/EEA.

So in summary, while recognizing limited benefits of cooperation, the document's Euroskeptic positions risk significantly weakening established policy coordination mechanisms across Europe in favor of stronger prioritization of unilateral national control. Balancing sovereignty and coordination challenges remain.

Here are some key points regarding how the document relates to the Euro currency union:

It advocates Germany exiting the Euro and reintroducing the Deutsche Mark, seeing the single currency as disadvantageous to Germany's economy.

Rejoining a reformed currency arrangement is suggested as an alternative, implying skepticism of deeper Eurozone integration under current structures and rules.

This position weakens commitment to the Euro project and establishes exiting as a realistic scenario, creating uncertainty around Germany's long-term participation.

Withdrawing Germany would undermine the Eurozone, being its largest economy and one seen as favoring fiscal discipline. This could destabilize the currency.

Coordinated economic and fiscal policies across members are seen as infringing on sovereignty, though the document acknowledges some shared policies increase stability.

A divisible Eurozone is proposed as an alternative, reducing cross-country risks but increasing complexity of economic management between currency blocs.

Overall the document conveys a perspective that sees more costs than benefits to Germany's participation at present, prioritizing national competitiveness over currency union stability and solidarity.

So in summary, the AfD's declared stance questions Germany's ongoing commitment to the Euro and pursues reforms that would likely disrupt and weaken the single currency project in its current form and level of integration.

Here are some potential contradictions I see in the document:

It promotes nationalism and sovereignty but also recognizes some issues like trade and security benefit from international cooperation. This poses a tension.

Deregulation and smaller government are advocated, yet restricting speech/culture and promoting Christianity involve greater state involvement in certain spheres.

Opposes political correctness but proposes culturally conservative positions that could themselves be viewed as politically correct by critics.

Decries EU overreach yet proposes stronger national cultural authority that risks limiting individualism for the sake of patriotism.

Rejects progressive values like diversity and multiculturalism but advocates Humboldt education ideals stressing open debate which progressivism facilitates.

Rejects climate science consensus while embracing national economic self-interest, but inaction on emissions damages long term economic competitiveness.

Reducing immigration is prioritized over workforce needs, despite population decline challenges faced.

Opposes supposed political indoctrination but introduces its own ideological stances in education and cultural policy.

Seeks to strengthen autonomy through sovereignty yet interdependence limits complete unilateral change per EU/global frameworks.

So in several issue areas, tensions seem to exist between the document's different goals of independence, traditionalism and economic interests that are not fully reconciled.

Here are some points regarding how the document relates to known scientific and social consensus:

On issues like human-caused climate change, the epidemiology of COVID-19, and gender and sexuality, the positions expressed diverge from scientific consensus.

Economically, rolling back the social welfare state and links between states are contradictory to models generally known to increase stability.

Tightly regulating migration and asylum systems works against consensus that moderate immigration has economic benefits and countries have humanitarian obligations.

Strong nationalism promoting an ethno-cultural identity as dominant goes against international consensus on principles of diversity, inclusion and non-discrimination.

Questioning well-established policies like renewable energy transition and multilateral trade frameworks departs from decades of policy lessons across democracies.

Views are often presented as the sole reasonable perspective without acknowledging alternative expert opinions also based on evidence and experience.

Comprehensive evidence counter to positions taken is not engaged with, undermining good faith participation in public debates informed by fact.

In many policy domains addressed then, the perspectives promoted diverge starkly from empirical research and cooperative frameworks that major countries have coalesced around, sometimes after extensive testing of alternatives. This raises issues around credibility and problem-solving approach.

Based on the policies outlined, the document could potentially contribute to:

More socially conservative and ethnically homogeneous culture, with emphasis on Christian-Western cultural roots. Policies may indirectly discourage some diversity and progressivism.

Stronger sense of national cultural identity and assertiveness on sovereignty issues vis-a-vis EU and intl governance bodies. Potential for more polarized atmosphere around debates of national interests.

Less multicultural ethos, with proposals reducing incentives and barriers to immigration. Proposed integration policies could diversify public spaces less over time.

Less globalized culture as EU, intl cooperation emphasized less. Trade more on bilateral vs. multilateral basis potentially.

Potentially more gender-traditional values promoted through policies like opposition to progressive gender policies, support for nuclear family model.

More socially stratified atmosphere as social democracy rollback proposed. Potential for gaps between socioeconomic classes.

Slightly more insular culture as foreign influences like from Islam proposed to be reduced and controlled more. National cultural promotion.

More self-reliant small business culture through proposed regulatory rolls backs aimed at boosting SME competitiveness.

So in summary, policies outlined would likely contribute incrementally toward a culture emphasizing conservative national identity and cultural roots over diversity and ties to supranational entities like the EU.

Here are some of the key stakeholders that would be affected by the policies outlined in the document and a brief evaluation of how they would be impacted:

Citizens: Would see expanded democratic participation but also potential restrictions on individual rights/freedoms depending on stances implemented.

Taxpayers: Would benefit from tax cuts and reduced government spending/subsidies but public services could potentially decline.

Businesses: May benefit from reduced regulations and taxes but energy transition policies could increase costs. Import/export policies could also impact some sectors.

Workers: Potentially helped by labor market reforms and reduced immigration but energy transition could also impact some jobs.

Local governments: May gain some autonomy from reforms but funding is also proposed to be adjusted which could reduce services.

Refugees/migrants: Would face significantly reduced rights and access under proposed asylum/integration changes.

Ethnic/religious minorities: Some policies could indirectly negatively impact certain groups by prioritizing dominant culture.

Climate activists: Would strongly oppose rollbacks of climate and renewable policies aimed at environmental protection.

Overall, while certain stakeholders like taxpayers and some businesses may benefit, many of the proposed reforms would also negatively impact stakeholder groups like governments, migrants, minorities and environmental advocates if implemented as written.

Here is an analysis of who may potentially profit and not profit from the policy ideas in the document:

Potential Profits:

Conservatives and populists aligned with AfD's stances on issues like immigration, climate, EU skepticism

Taxpayers from proposed tax cuts and reduced government role/spending

Businesses from reduced regulations, taxes and energy transition costs

Nationalists promoting German sovereignty, culture and interests

Workers in sectors supported by changed immigration, trade policies

Rural populations if infrastructure improves livability outside cities

Potential Non-Profits:

Progressives and centrists favoring more liberal social policies

Migrant communities from tougher eligibility, benefit restrictions

Environmental advocates due to rollbacks of climate, green policies

Renewable energy firms facing subsidy, grid priority reductions

Local governments anticipating decreased autonomy, funding

Ethnic/religious minorities if some proposals indirectly impact them

Internationalist-leaning Germans supporting open markets, EU

Public sector unions given proposals for efficiency, privatization

Overall, the document aims to benefit socially/culturally conservative citizens as well as economically nationalist constituencies. Center-left, environmentalist, pro-EU and some minority stakeholders may view planks less positively depending on details and variable interpretations.

To evaluate the document in relation to Germany's supreme law, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz):

Many positions appear aligned with provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights like dignity, freedom of speech and religion.

Policies scaling back EU integration could conflict with Article 23 transferring sovereignty to supranational bodies.

Proposals questioning anthropogenic climate change may contradict environmental protection mandated under Article 20a.

Tight limits on asylum/migration could face challenges regarding Article 16a and non-refoulement principles.

Policies indirectly impacting ethnic/religious minorities risk straying from anti-discrimination Article 3.

Partisan rhetoric risks exacerbating social divisions when Basic Law aims for consensus in Article 20.

Increased regionalism may enhance subsidiarity but weaken national solidarity of Article 72.

Overall tone implying a singular orthodoxy risks straying from Basic Law's goal of open, pluralistic society.

While not overtly unconstitutional, some positions outlined would potentially face legal hurdles or tensions if strictly interpreted, especially without moderating implementation. German judicial review would likely evaluate any laws against rights, anti-discrimination and consensus-building principles enshrined in Basic Law.

Based on my analysis of the content, this document falls more on the subjective/opinion side of the scales than objective fact or empirical evidence:

Scientific/Fiction: While some sections discuss energy policies and cite research, much of it proposes ideological positions rather than scientific claims.

Empirical/Anecdotal: Limited citations or references are provided to substantiate assertions, relying more on anecdotal framing of issues.

Fact/Opinion: Beyond some statistical references, the majority presents desired policy reforms and critiques as a matter of partisan opinion rather than undisputed fact.

Objective/Subjective: The language, selection of issues, and stances demonstrate a clear subjective ideological perspective rather than striving for viewpoint neutrality.

Key signs pointing to a more subjective/opinion-based approach include:

Rhetorical language advocating positions rather than dispassionate analysis

Lack of substantive data/research backing most recommendations

Focus on framing debates and criticizing opponents' views

Presentation of debatable topics like climate/energy policies as settled matters

While some levels of subjectivity are natural and expected in a party's policy agenda, the document leans more toward expressing the AfD's preferred stances and interpretations rather than an impartial accounting of objective realities and empirical evidence. The genre necessitates some degree of political advocacy over strict neutrality.

Here are some examples of logical fallacies I identified in the document:

Appeal to tradition fallacy: Argues some positions should be accepted because "this is how things have always been".

Straw man fallacy: Misrepresents positions of other parties/arguments as exaggerated or oversimplified for easy rebuttal.

Composition/division fallacy: Treats concepts/groups as either all good or all bad without acknowledging complexities.

Black-or-white/false dichotomy fallacy: Portrays issues as having only two possible and diametrically opposed positions.

Slippery slope fallacy: Warns minor changes/reforms will inevitably lead to extreme hypothetical outcomes.

Anecdotal fallacy: Uses isolated examples to support claims rather than providing comprehensive quantitative evidence.

Bandwagon fallacy: Implies a position is more likely to be right because many/influential people support it.

Ad hominem fallacy: Attacks/discredits opponents or their character rather than addressing actual argument substance.

While not unprecedented in political discourse, overreliance on logical fallacies undermines strength/credibility of reasoning presented to substantiate policy stances. Could raise questions on intended audience - those already ideologically aligned or genuinely seeking sound evidence-based analysis. Overall quality/rigor of argumentation could potentially be improved in places.

Evaluating the quality and use of reason in the document:

Limited empirical evidence: Minimal data, sources or formal argument presented to back most policy positions.

Assertiveness over persuasiveness: Tends to state conclusions rather than build logical cases through facts/reasoning.

Cherry-picking: Cites studies selectively without addressing countervailing research/findings.

Overgeneralizing: Presents complex issues as having clear-cut, settled answers rather than nuanced debates.

Slippery slope: Warns of potential future threats without demonstrable proof risks will materialize as stated.

Anecdotal examples: Uses isolated cases rather than comprehensive trend data to shape issue narratives.

Implying consensus: Suggests AfD view is only reasonable standpoint without acknowledging alternatives.

Begging the question: Assumes truth of premises that opposition would reasonably reject or demand evidence for.

Overall, while not entirely devoid of reasons, the document relies more heavily on assertion, selective use of supportive details, emotive/moralistic arguments and anecdotal examples rather than rigorous, balanced, comprehensive and persuasive logical reasoning - diminishing quality and persuasiveness of alleged rationale presented.

Based on the content and stated positions, the perspective presented in this document can be characterized as:

Conservative/Traditionalist: There is a strong emphasis on traditional cultural values, institutions, and sovereignty over progressive reforms.

Euroskeptic: It advocates reclaiming national competencies from the EU and a loosening of economic/political integration.

Nationalist: German/European identity and interests are prioritized, with skepticism of some supranational bodies/agendas.

Market-Oriented: Support for free enterprise, privatization, and economic liberalization within reason.

Law & Order: Tough stance on law enforcement, sovereignty, and security issues regarding asylum/immigration.

Climate Skeptic: Rejects mainstream scientific consensus on climate risks/anthropogenic factors driving change.

Socially Conservative: Traditional nuclear family model promoted; opposition to gender/LGBTQ progressive stances.

The perspective presented leans most strongly toward culturally/fiscally conservative nationalism with a clearly Euroskeptic and climate-skeptical tint. While not overtly ideological, the policy positions outline a very recognizable political orientation within the broader German and European spectrums.

Based on its content and rhetorical style, this document would likely have the following effects on its readers:

Inform: It comprehensively outlines the AfD's policy stances across many issues, informing readers of their agenda.

Validate: Readers who identify with culturally conservative or nationalist perspectives may feel validated in their views.

Motivate: Strong position language aims to rally supporters behind the stated policy reforms and critiques of rivals.

Polarize: More progressive readers would likely take issue with many positions, further polarizing political viewpoints.

Simplify: Presenting debates as having clear "right" positions risks oversimplifying complex issues with nuanced factors.

Mislead: Lack of evidence cited for some stances and implications of consensus that don't exist could mislead some.

Overall, the intent seems to be clearly signaling policies to supporters, motivating them, while contrasting those stances against other major parties. Stylistically it adopts an assertive, straightforward communication approach, with risk this could come across overconfidently for neutral/opposing readers. Tone and framing choices could exacerbate political/social polarization effects for some.

Evaluating the ethics present in the document:

It focuses heavily on individual liberties and limiting government overreach, aligning with libertarian philosophies. However, some stances like limiting LGBTQ rights could be seen as restricting individual freedoms.

Nationalist and culturally conservative positions are promoted, but when taken to an extreme could enable or encourage intolerance, discrimination, or human rights issues depending on implementation.

Emphasis on sovereignty, security, and traditional values could be seen as virtuous by some, but comes with risk of deteriorating civic principles of diversity, progressivism or humanism if unbalanced.

There is an implicit prioritization of ethnic Germans/Europeans over some immigrant groups that could enable prejudicial othering if policymaking ignores universalist ethics.

Factual accuracy is sometimes questionable without cited evidence, risking propagation of misleading views. Some stances ignore scientific or social consensus.

Intent seems to inform and rally support for the party's democratic mandate, but polarized rhetoric could exacerbate tensions or discourage compromise/consensus-building.

Overall, while focusing on virtues like security, sovereignty and traditional communities, the document does not consistently promote a standardized ethical framework respecting individual rights, tolerance, and factual truth - opening door to potential issues depending on real-world implementation details and balance.

In evaluating the document in relation to principles of the Enlightenment culture, some assessments include:

Reason and science: While some policy positions reference research, many appear ideology-driven and lack substantive empirical evidence, contradictory to privileging reason over faith.

Skepticism of authority: Questioning establishment is consistent with Enlightenment skepticism, but document aims to gain authority itself without always acknowledging counterarguments merit consideration.

Individual liberties: Libertarian stances exist, but rolling back some social progress and tightly limiting discourse space risks diminishing individual freedoms of thought/identity.

Tolerance of diversity: Policies prioritizing dominant ethnic-cultural identity over inclusion could be viewed as constraining multiculturalism valued in Enlightenment.

Secularism: Document promotes preserving Christian heritage, implying less philosophical independence from theological institutions/doctrine.

Progressivism: Ideas aim to curb social and environmental changes embraced as progressive reforms during Enlightenment era.

Internationalism: Strong nationalist/populist stances diverge from Enlightenment's cosmopolitan view promoting global cooperation/understanding.

Overall, while retaining Enlightenment skepticism of overreaching authority, the perspectives outlined depart significantly from Enlightenment's universalist ideals by emphasizing national-conservative identity politics and curbing diversity/progressivism contradicting reason and individualism.

Analyzing the psychology present in the document:

Us vs. Them Mentality: Focuses heavily on asserting AfD positions against perceived failures of other parties, political establishment.

Defensiveness: Tone suggests reacting defensively to criticism of some prior AfD stances rather than purely presenting positions.

Authority: Asserts AfD position as certain and correct without often acknowledging alternative perspectives hold merit.

Certainty: Conveys message that AfD has definitive answers to complex issues despite limited empirical evidence cited.

Distrust: Undercurrent that current systems/powers cannot be trusted, need overhaul dominated by AfD vision.

Persecution: Suggests AfD/supporters feel unable to freely express views due to "political correctness", marginalization.

Overall, the psychology projected is one of a party seeking to firmly establish their authority and vision against perceptions of a repressive status quo. Tone suggests defensiveness and distrust of rivals despite being in a position of government influence. Lack of nuance in portraying issues and acknowledging alternative views could exacerbate polarized political climate in Germany.

Here is an analysis of which personality types may potentially profit and not profit from the ideas in the document:

Personality Types that May Profit:

Conservative - Aligns with traditional, cautious stances

Nationalist - Prioritizes nation over globalism proposed

Authoritarian - Skeptical of progressive reforms discussed

Introverted - Insular cultural focus could suit private natures

Optimistic - Believes goals outlined could solve issues faced

Personality Types that May Not Profit:

Progressive - Opposes rolling back reforms addressed

Internationalist - Critical of nationalism emphasized

Agreeable - Polarizing rhetoric unsuitable for harmony needs

Neurotic - Heightened fears/anxieties not assuaged by policies

Open - Restrictive migrant policies opposed by open-minded

Conscientious - Empirical evidence lacking for fact-focused types

In summary, personality types commonly associated with conservatism, nationalism and skepticism of change may connect strongly with proposals, while progressive, globalist, harmonious and fact-driven personality orientations may be less aligned or supportive of stances and proposals put forward. Impacts are interpretive rather than definitive.

Evaluating the emotions conveyed in the document:

Pride: In German culture/identity, desire to protect traditions and assert national sovereignty.

Anxiety: Over perceived threats like immigration, loss of control, cultural change, economic challenges.

Frustration: With failures of other parties to address concerns, perceived censoring of valid perspectives.

Optimism: That under AfD rule promised reforms could solve problems and return prosperity/security.

Patriotism: Appeal to nationalist sentiments through emphasis on German interests and empowerment.

Outrage: At perceived injustice of status quo on issues like asylum system, Euro currency, energy transition.

Righteous indignation: Tone suggests moral authority in casting self as defender of traditions/German people.

Overall, the document seems carefully crafted to stir emotions of pride, anxiety, frustration and moral outrage at the current situation while fueling optimism and patriotism around the AfD's vision. This emotional slant may help galvanize core supporters but could also risk further polarizing political debates. Notable lack of empathy for alternative perspectives.

Here are some common criteria for evaluating a political party platform document along with an assessment of this document based on each criterion:

Breadth of issues covered: The document addresses a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues, suggesting it comprehensively outlines the party's overall agenda.

Clarity of positions: Most stances are clearly defined through direct language, though some could be more specifically action-oriented.

Feasibility of implementation: Some positions may face challenges to implement, but most appear reasonably achievable if the party gains government control.

Alignment with party values: The positions outlined are consistent with the overall positioning and rhetoric of the AfD party.

Accessibility of language: The language, while direct, may be difficult to understand for those without political background or context.

Basis in evidence and research: Some but not all policy recommendations appear to be grounded in factual evidence or citation of sources and studies.

Balance of specific and general policies: Appropriately strikes a balance between broader objectives and more detailed initiatives or reforms.

Overall, the document demonstrates most of the key attributes expected of a party's governing agenda or program. Clarity, specificity and research basis could potentially be enhanced in some sections, but it serves its purpose of outlining the AfD's vision across its priority policy spheres.

[female-malice]

When it comes to climate change, the potential for a dangerously delusive kind of nostalgia is clear. It may be easier to believe an eco-dictatorship is upon us than to accept the reality that life as we have known it is fundamentally threatened.

[trmpt]

“‘The AfD really taps into the fears of loss; loss of status, loss of identity, loss of prosperity, wealth, and comfort,’ said Joe Düker, who analyzes far-right online discourse at the Berlin-based Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy. ‘The AfD comes in and says, “Well, we want to go back to how it was. We want to maintain the status quo.”’l

“There’s a thin but sturdy thread that runs from Schick and the other radicals in Schnellroda to the wealthy curmudgeons and political glad-handers I met in Wiesbaden: the resistance to change, the desire to seek safety in a shared embrace of retrograde fantasies about an idealized past — an alternative reality — rather than grapple with the challenges of the world as it is.”

“When it comes to climate change, the potential for a dangerously delusive kind of nostalgia is clear. It may be easier to believe an eco-dictatorship is upon us than to accept the reality that life as we have known it is fundamentally threatened by global warming.”

Sound familiar? It could happen here

[hellshee]

of course austria decided not to allow us in schengen. of fucking course. i mean why did i even have a smidge of hope to begin with when i knew it was coming considering these countries always play good cop bad cop with us and every time this one says no or that one says no.

austria can suck it and so can spineless european union influential politicians who are not standing up for romania and bulgaria as they should, knowing that denying us further is absolutely gross and based on a bs rhetoric.

honestly... how can you not see how the people here are tired of it? how this will be a boost of euroskepticism in dangerous ways? i am so tired. i am so so tired of the way we're always treated as secondhand citizens. fuck this

[mariacallous]

Europe has once again sleepwalked into an existential crossroad. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine challenged the liberal democratic order that the European Union champions and sparked a crisis many deemed unthinkable after decades of peace. Amid rising tides of Euroskepticism and ultranationalism across the continent, the new war seemed to create a perfect storm for the disintegration of the European project.

Perhaps unexpectedly, the EU pulled together, swiftly and collectively committing materiel and financial support to Ukraine. While there is little that the EU could have done to forestall Russia’s invasion, the bloc’s disinterest in Ukraine in the years following Putin’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula—a clear sign of his aggressive ambitions—has proved woefully misguided. Only now, more than a year into the war, are serious conversations about rebuilding and integrating Ukraine into the EU beginning to take place.

This is a familiar cycle for the EU: of apathy leading to crisis, and crisis leading to greater integration. It is one that has defined the European project since its origins in the European Coal and Steel Community of the 1950s. The physical and psychological destruction of World War II, dual crises of stagflation and energy insecurity in the 1970s, and financial crisis of the 2010s all led to more Europe rather than less, just as the war in Ukraine seems poised to do.

After far-right parties catapulted to the fore of European politics in 2010, many conversations about the future of Europe focused on its imminent demise. As recently as January 2022, with many still wallowing in a post-Brexit malaise, there was little serious possibility of Ukraine acceding to the EU—or, for that matter, of Germany increasing its military spending and cutting its energy dependence on Russia.

Yet today, because of a crisis Europe neither wanted nor was prepared for, Ukraine seems poised to become an EU member upon the war’s resolution. Germany also reneged on its controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and Poland—previously an internal roadblock to European solidarity—has become an advocate for collective European defense. The newly war-torn continent looks poised to come out of this crisis more unified than before.

Now, as Europe begins to enter its latest integrative phase, there is an opportunity to break this reactive cycle in favor of a proactive and intentional expansion of European solidarity. The continent can do so by giving a greater voice to the first generation to have grown up entirely with the EU—whom we call the Maastricht Generation.

For the first time in history, there is a fully grown generation of Europeans who have only ever known a united Europe. In our recent edited volume, contributing author Floris Rijssenbeek dubbed members of this group the Maastricht Generation because they grew up after the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which formally created the EU as it exists in its current form. For members of the Maastricht Generation, a united Europe is not just a mechanism for peace and growth. The values that Europe embodies—such as democracy, the rule of law, and humanitarianism—are inherent to their identities in ways they were not for their forebears.

This matters because people fight for what they believe in, as well as for the identities they hold and value. Members of the Maastricht Generation will proactively work to make the European project better rather than waiting for a new crisis to fuel reactive integration.

Members of the Maastricht Generation tend to have a more pro-EU stance than do prior generations. Nowhere is this more evident than in Hungary. Under Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who has governed the country uninterrupted since 2010, Hungary has turned toward autocracy and become a vanguard of the global illiberal movement. Through it all, Orban has maintained remarkably broad public support, with approval ratings consistently at or above 50 percent.

But one group is notoriously absent from Orban’s base: 16- to 29-year-olds. In Hungary’s April 2022 parliamentary elections, fewer than 25 percent of first-time voters chose Orban and his party, reflecting a nearly decadelong trend of young voters turning away from far-right conservatism. As Orban consolidated power, Hungary’s Maastricht Generation expressed a growing preference for democracy and rejected the government’s authoritarian practices. They have also turned away from rising conservatism in Hungarian political culture, rejecting Orban’s Christian identity politics in favor of classical liberal concerns such as social welfare and economic growth.

It’s no surprise, then, that Hungary’s opposition is led by young people who deeply identify with Europe and its values. And despite government-led barriers to democratic engagement, such as voter intimidation and lack of media pluralism, this opposition is vibrant—just not in the places one might expect. Disillusioned with traditional politics, Hungary’s Maastricht Generation has turned away from the voting booth to alternative forms of democratic expression. They are engaging in political conversation on social media rather than through traditional (and now state-run) media outlets, participating in pro-democracy protest movements, and joining new parties in droves.

Hungary’s Maastricht Generation is not alone. Across Europe, young people consistently demonstrate high levels of support for liberal democracy and the universal values that the EU champions. Research by social scientist Jan Zilinsky shows that young Europeans express more faith in democracy than older generations. This is not simply a case of young people being more progressive on average than older citizens. As Pew Research Center data has shown, young Europeans express significantly more faith in the EU than any other age demographic, regardless of political affiliation. Rather than relying on disintegrative pressures—such as stagflation, recessions, or wars of aggression���to fuel the engine of European solidarity, the EU can leverage the creativity, ingenuity, and Euro-enthusiasm of youth to spring forward.

Doing so will require creative reforms to the EU’s institutional mechanisms. The EU’s policymaking processes and national electoral thresholds have not been built to incorporate the Maastricht Generation’s perspectives, and the bloc’s rigid policy agenda and consistent neutering of ambitious policy proposals do not adequately reflect young Europeans’ ideals. Nothing exemplifies this disconnect better than the failed promise of Volt Europa, a pan-European, pro-Europe party founded in 2017, largely by members of the Maastricht Generation. Volt promised a radically fresh approach to European politics and gained popularity among younger voters across the continent ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections, also performing well in 2021 general elections in the Netherlands. But Volt has failed to deliver on its promise so far, in part because its message does not resonate with voters outside of the Maastricht Generation.

Members of the Maastricht Generation are eager to support and defend Europe’s democratic values, but rightly express a frustration with the way the system functions today. The slowness of the European Parliament’s and Council of the European Union’s legislative processes, physical and psychological distance between Brussels and its constituents, and the arguably undemocratic system of indirectly appointing members of the European Commission prompt many to turn their backs to traditional politics in favor of protest movements, like those in Hungary, or transnational climate activism, such as Fridays for Future.

It is critical that the EU take proactive steps to reincorporate the Maastricht Generation into ongoing policy debates and discussions. Of course, all governments should work to include younger voices—but as a supranational entity that has long struggled to form a distinct identity, the EU especially would benefit from doing so.

To start, politicians at the EU and domestic levels must begin taking protests movements seriously as means of democratic expression. Legislators need to spend more time engaging with young activists, whose visions for the future can help guide innovative policies in the realms of climate, defense, and migration. In countries within the EU suffering from democratic backsliding, engagement with and support for nontraditional democratic activists from EU institutions is arguably more likely to lead to substantive political change than sanctions or legal proceedings.

More active engagement of young voices can take a variety of forms, from lowering age minimums for holding elected office in both the European and national parliaments to instituting local, national, and European-wide youth councils that can develop policy recommendations for national and EU legislative bodies. The European Parliament, for its part, should create a special parliament that represents the Maastricht Generation in European political debates.

Perhaps most importantly, the EU needs to invest in the political and leadership potential of its younger generations. It already does so successfully in the education sphere with its Erasmus+ study abroad program, which helps to create a network of young Europeans connected by a common understanding of the world. The European Parliament also makes this type of investment with political activists from non-EU countries through its Young Political Leaders Programme, which connects democratic activists from Europe’s neighborhood to develop their potential as future leaders for lasting peace.

The EU should burnish the same attention and investment on its own emerging leaders and create a program that will allow them to design policy initiatives to deepen European unity. Young leaders would ideate concrete policy proposals for the EU, and selected proposals would then be presented to EU officials. Such a program would cost just a fraction of the European Commission’s annual budget and could be appropriated from the existing funds that support Erasmus+ as part of the next budgetary package, which begins in 2028.

None of this can happen without acknowledging that the EU’s Maastricht Generation brings a unique perspective to—and has a unique stake in—the bloc’s future. That future will be stronger, better, and less prone to crisis if this generation is allowed to push European integration forward. Recognizing the Maastricht Generation’s ingenuity and potential is an essential first step to a more resilient Europe.

[cyberbenb]

From F-16s to frozen assets - how Dutch far-right's win could impact Ukraine

Nearly two decades after launching his far-right political party, mixing xenophobia with Euroskepticism, Geert Wilders emerged as the winner of the Dutch parliamentary elections on Nov. 22. “The winds Source : kyivindependent.com/from-f-16…

[opinions-about-tiaras]

Benn's poisonous strain of Euroskepticism also deserves a lot of pillorying; it was never quite purged out of the Labour Party and while the lions share of the blame for Brexit lies at the feet of the Tories, let's not pretend that it wasn't a big problem.

What are your thoughts on Tony Benn? Because much as I admire him in some ways he does come across as a bit impractical in an idealistic way, with his challenge to Healey and describing the 1983 general election as a triumph for socialism.

I'm of very mixed opinions about Tony Benn.

On the one hand, I think he was a very sincere and well-meaning man with fairly laudible beliefs (although he did I think have a problem where he would sometimes prioritize following a consistent ideological line over his personal moral instincts, which I think were more reliable).

On the other hand, I don't think he was very good at his job and would have done better as a social movement organizer than as a politician and government minister - or at the very least, I think he would have been better suited to a ministerial portfolio that spoke to his strengths, which were much more in the area of social policy rather than economic policy.

So as Minister for Technology or as Secretary of State for Industry or Energy, I'm sympathetic to his support for industrial democracy in and out of nationalized industries, but he wasn't ultimately very good at putting worker control into practice. And that's the thing; when you're in government, you have to be able to translate your beliefs into effective public policy.

Likewise, I think his Alternative Economic Strategy was just a bad strategy for achieving left-wing economic objectives:

it focused on the very blunt instruments of direct economic controls on prices and imports and finance rather than more flexible approaches that would have fewer negative side effects.

it had a heavy emphasis on issues that Benn cared about (like nationalization and industrial democracy) but weren't really relevant to how to deal with stagflation in the short term.

meanwhile, it under-emphasized policies to deal with unemployment and ironically relied on a rather standard "commercial Keynesian" solution for reflation rather than more social democratic alternatives.

the anti-European/autarkic emphasis of the AES was profoundly counter-productive, especially for the economic context of Britain in the 1970s.

finally, it really neglected the crucial question of how to develop state capacity. In part because Benn really didn't get along with the Civil Service and viewed them as essentially hostile, the AES didn't spend nearly enough time on how to develop the expertise, coordination, staffing, etc. needed to carry out economic policies that were very heavy lifts.

So yeah, "impractical in an idealistic way" is fair.

[a-typical]

Disillusionment with established parties provides fertile ground for radical right parties to exploit.

While centrist politicians may feel compelled to adopt anti-immigrant stances in response, copying the rhetoric of radical right parties risks alienating their base.

But once in office, and without clear solutions to the local economic and quality-of-life declines that emigration has set in motion, party officials will likely face the same voter discontent fueling their current success.

Ironically, the forces that have increased the appeal of the far right’s anti-immigrant ideologies – falling birth rates, labor shortages and a lack of new businesses and services – are most feasibly addressed by increasing immigration.

By following the right’s lead to tighten borders, parties closer to the center may condemn industrialized nations to a political doom loop.

Instead, centrist parties may find it pays more dividends to focus attention on addressing the root causes.

[elladastinkardiamou]

According to first wave exit polls published in Greece on Sunday evening, a Euroskeptic political newcomer may pass the 3 percent legal threshold needed to secure a place in European Parliament. The far-right, pro-Russian, Christian nationalist party Greek Solution (Elliniki Lisi) is projected to gain between 2.5 and 4.5 percent of the total vote, possibly squeezing into the next assembly with one seat.

The party was founded on June 28, 2016, by Kyriakos Velopoulos, a journalist and former MP of the nationalist populist Popular Orthodox Rally party. According to the party’s official website, it seeks to establish stronger relations with Russia, it is strongly opposed to the use of the word “Macedonia” in the name of the neighboring Republic of North Macedonia, and seeks to revive Greece’s heavy industry and reorient the educational system with an emphasis on nationalism and Orthodoxy.

In 2017, the party was close to recruiting Nikos Michos, an independent MP who was formerly affiliated with neo-fascist Golden Dawn. Michos eventually decided to not join Greek Solution, accusing Velopoulos of being unable to “distinguish politics from business.”

[mistfunk]

Mistigram: in today's panel of our daily serialised #TurnerTheWorm #teletext fancomic, this screen again drawn by TitaniumDave, the Turner-of-2020 despairs at not having any good news to share with his audience of 2003: Caller: "This Euroskepticism won't ever amount to anything will it?" Turner: "I can't take it any more cut the line!" (POOP, a not uncommon Digitiser sound effect) Oddly Familiar Voice: "I'll cut something alright!" https://instagr.am/p/CS2RfBHgyS7/

[bustedbernie]

I cannot speak for Corbyn but Mélenchon's eurospecticism has never been motivated by not wanting to pay for central and eastern Europe. It is motivated by the fact the EU (especially the court of justice whose legitimacy as a political force is dubious) imposes a liberal/ultraliberal economy on its members (especially in regards to privatisation Vs public monopolies) which would hinder the implementation of his economic program. And considering the US extreme patriotic values and nationalism 1/2

(pledge of allegiance at school, thinking the US is the BEST country on earth (a though not limited to trump supporters) , etc) combined with the remnants of the red scare I'm not surprised that American sociology is promoting this concept to delegitimize leftists and their ideas. No country on earth should be idealised, not the US and no European one, but comparisons are going to occurre on specific point and this looks like the academic version of 'you don't love your country enough, traitor'.

Yes, partly on your first point that is true. But when pointed out that his euroskepticism would in turn be bad for France and the economy, he didn’t care. As for the lack of care for Eastern Europe, this is simply a talking point I encountered among Mélenchon’s supporters I talked with in the 2017 election (young anarchocommunists/uni students lol) - who had (have) a lot in common with the American stereotype of the Bernie Bro (champagne socialists, etc). 

The critique of the EU in that capacity is at times valid, but it’s also a critique I think France has a lot of weight in shifting. For all his faults (and his somewhat ultra liberalism), Macron has demonstrated that France can use that weight to create a big shift in EU policy - fiscal and otherwise. I think Mélenchon and the left in France would be better served to use that weight and the positive power it could create. I think similarly to Corbyn and Sanders, Mélenchon has a vision of the world/France that is a bit outdated. I’ve found Hamon to have the most forward-thinking agenda of the main French candidates and also like his focus on ecology (and hope his polls can continue improving, I’d prefer the next election be Macron vs Hamon than Le Pen...). With Merkel’s term soon coming to an end, I hope France can choose a leader that can leverage that power to benefit a better economic model. It’s clear that the current model was shaken by 2008 and I hope the response to COVID and the softening of the German stance leads to a more elastic, empathetic system that doesn’t employ models of austerity which just don’t seem to work. I think this is part of what is hard, the frustrations channeled by Mélenchon (and Sanders/Corbyn) are often valid and important, but I fear that they are so reactive and destructive that they would in fact worsen conditions. Reforming the EU seems tough and it is tough, but it is likely to be a more beneficial thing long-term than bringing back the Franc and doing a Frexit. Maybe you might say his “EU - change it or leave it” is just that, but I think it’s a dangerous form of brinkmanship that would be a destabilizing force through the world. 

To your second point, I still find it hard to separate a certain nativist streak in Mélenchon’s platform or from the other leftists on this topic. PM Frederiksen in Denmark might be another example. Compared to other leftists, I think Mélenchon actually speaks so much more nicely about migrants and immigration - but - he still channels the idea that immigrants are a capitalist mechanism used to suppress wages of the homeland while increasing bourgeois gains and he continues to enforce the myth that the EU and France are incapable of supporting immigration. He speaks of the sécurité-sociale being ruined by immigrants, the need of immigrants to love France (as if they don’t), so idk. 

I also don’t know that your point about American patriotism being an instrument against progressive/leftist ideologies is totally apt. In fact, many of the most successful progressives underline the idea that due to America’s greatness, it MUST provide better for its people. This is even seen often in the progressive refrain of “the wealthiest nation should provide the best healthcare” - “the USA must be the world leader in green energy” - “the USA must lead the world on human rights and individual freedom.” If anything, the patriotic organ of American social life is used on the left as well in my opinion. But I also don’t think this is unique to the USA, in fact it is present in France, Canada and the UK in my personal experience. It may not be routine to sing La Marseillaise but French exceptionalism still manifests in its own ways as well. But you are right with your central point that no nation ought to be idealized though I think when comparisons are appropriate, they can be good for cultural exchange, sharing and education. I tend to think the more societies share, the better. 

[tanadrin]

@jadagul and you’re right that “representativeness” isnt’ a virtue because the representative nature of democracy was a way the landholding economic aristocracy could gerrymander the political system in their favor; democracy is just a system, it doesn’t have any kind of inherent telicity or purpose except the one we want to apply it to (originalism is fake, etc etc). The question is, what is the most useful application of democracy? And your version to me seems like it’s always going to be one step away from crisis, because people notice when the political class doesn’t give a shit about their wants and needs and pursues its own goals instead: that’s why the EU has struggled to achieve the closer integration it desires, bc Europeans notice when the EU is acting in their interests, and when it’s a neoliberal pet project that’s about making life easier for capital holders.

People don’t always know what the obvious answer is, and right-wing Euroskepticism is one response, but so are left-wing movements like Corbynism. Nothing saves you from having to do the work of translating people’s disaffection into good policy instead of bad policy, because nothing saves us from having to do the work of actual democratic politics. Insulating decisionmaking within a political class that doesn’t have any idea what’s going on in the world around it--in a political class that’s shocked and surprised and appalled by the rise of a politician like Trump, because it doesn’t understand where this kind of thing could have come from, and spends years after the fact flailing around trying to come up with the perfect thinkpiece explanation--and which thinks it can skip the work of democratic politics by fiat, is no solution at all.

[antoine-roquentin]

For decades, purveyors of the rhetoric of technocratic stability have outsourced their and their voters’ most sadistic and unpalatable beliefs and impulses to the far right. But Schäuble’s career suggests that, while technocratic governance has countless mechanisms to repress its own inherent cruelty and outsource them to the fringes, there is a kind of cruelty that comes from, and is enjoyed at, the center rather than the fringes. To many of its subjects—refugees being told that persecution without torture isn’t enough to win them asylum, unemployed workers being forced to provide all their rejection letters to prove they’re actively looking for work, Greek politicians being told to cut loose the country’s pensioners in the order to reassure investors—this inherent cruelty is wholly self-evident.

Schäuble himself understood early on that technocracy has its sadistic side, and he has embraced it. Both major German parties have in the last thirty years occasionally lapsed into a politics of administered cruelty. The Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency) that privatized the state-owned companies in East Germany, the safety-net cuts of “Agenda 2010,” and the draconian austerity measures after the financial crisis of 2008—all of these were approached by serious old men in smart suits in boardrooms with a kind of resigned shrug. We don’t like it either, they seemed to say, but this is what needs to happen. Schäuble, however, didn’t shrug at all—he seemed to feel genuine glee at the dictates that everyone else pretended to accept only reluctantly. Politicians of his type have been adept at making sound quantitative and objective what ultimately boils down to a demand for suffering, for mortification.

The success of the AfD suggests that Schäuble shares the recognition that alternativelessness has its religious, sacrificial dimension with a growing segment of voters in Germany. These voters have long recognized the carefully sublimated cruelty of alternativelessness; in many cases they’ve been at the receiving end of it. They accepted some of that cruelty for themselves, although very little—nothing more than a light paddle and an available safe word. But above all they demanded that, whatever cruelty the system meted out to them or people like them, it visit ten times that onto the Other. The AfD began as a party of technocrats, and its founders frequently seem surprised by how it sleepwalked from deficits and Euroskepticism to overt racism and illiberalism. One of the movement’s forerunners was Thilo Sarrazin, once an economist at Germany’s central bank, who at some point went from prognosticating that runaway deficits would spell Germany’s doom to prognosticating that runaway procreation by “hijab-girls” would spell Germany’s doom.

It’s a trajectory that isn’t actually all that surprising. Thanks to politicians like Schäuble, for decades now these voters have become used to being applauded for this perspective. Their coldness was reconceptualized as maturity, realism, steeliness of resolve. As the refugees arrived in 2015, CSU’s Secretary General worried that society would “implode” and “the people” would rise up. “Anyone who doesn’t recognize this,” he added about his bit of apocalyptic fan fiction, “ignores reality.” Pragmatic positions were recast as “political correctness,” as “failed multiculturalism,” while bizarre fantasies about racial civil war could stake a claim to being the “realistic” or “serious” position. This is how documents like the German Basic Law, with its talk about “the dignity of man,” or international asylum conventions, could seem to them like softhearted hippie tracts. The only realistic way of looking at the world was looking to make it hurt.

Adorno once spoke of the “categorical imperative of ‘never again’,” and the anxiety with which people watch unemployment figures in Germany is all about this “again”—about fascism as relapse, as repetition. It is against this background that the 12.6 percent of the vote the AfD won nationally in last year’s elections constitutes an incredible shock. Against the easy sociology and the old stories, what the result actually highlights is that Germany now specializes in a fascism in the midst of satiety. Perhaps even a fascism of satiety. And that this, rather than some vague revival of Nazism, is the shape that far-right populism has long taken in the country. As the historian Birte Förster put it on Twitter: “It’s not like Weimar, it’s not like 1933, it’s like Germany, 2018.”

After World War II, German nationalism became an impossibility. It survived largely by being refracted through economics, above all exports. Affluence at home gave people the feeling that “we are somebody again,” as the saying went. The wave of German cars, wares and weapons washing over Europe and the world took the place of German troops. Germans have long moralized economics (not for nothing did Max Weber write The Protestant Ethic in Heidelberg), but after World War II economics to some extent replaced politics: it reconciled Germany with its neighbors and former victims, it finally integrated Germany in an interconnected Europe, and eventually it dismantled the Iron Curtain and unified the country.

But in hindsight it is hard to miss the fact that this economic system, for all its technocratic mousiness, was suffused with displaced affective energy. And not just pride in one’s own wealth, but also a sadistic glee over the misery of others, which is interpreted in similarly moral or theological terms as Germany’s postwar economic success. This was true both between Germany and its neighbors and within Germany itself. Nachtwey probably underplays the ethnic dimension of what he calls “social modernity.” Unlike the New Deal in the United States, postwar affluence in Germany was not explicitly premised on racial stratification. Nevertheless, it’s hard not to sense a connection between the kind of solidarity that underpinned the postwar system of “social market capitalism” and the fact that the massive amounts of wealth created never went to the new arrivals in the country—the Turks, Italians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs who were at any rate still referred to as “guest workers,” even after decades in the country, sometimes even after obtaining German citizenship.

The righteous fury with which Germans have voiced their suspicion that most immigrants aren’t “really” refugees, but are, horror horrorum, motivated by hopes for a better life, is of a piece with this moralization. Germans have become good at denying others what they take to be their own birthright: they are terrified of foreigners taking their jobs, and then inundate Austrian medical schools and Swiss hospitals. They demanded that Greece put its pension system on a sustainable footing, but managed no such thing themselves during decades of affluence. In an infamous 2009 interview that prefigured the rhetoric of the AfD, Sarrazin claimed that “70 percent of Turkish and 90 percent of the Arab population of Berlin . . . live off the state but reject that state.” The irony is that, from retirees via the underemployed rural voters to professionals getting rich off subventions and the dividends of the social safety net, this describes pretty much the average AfD voter.

[newstfionline]

U.K., Land of ‘Brexit,’ Quietly Outsources Some Surgeries to France

By Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, NY Times, March 17, 2018

CALAIS, France--Serge Orlov, a 62-year-old Briton, likes to rail against what he calls the tyranny of the European Union. Like most supporters of his country’s withdrawal from the bloc, he wants Britain to strike out on its own, a fully sovereign state unshackled from Europe’s pettifogging rules and the Continent’s overweening state.

But faced with excruciating pain and a seemingly endless wait for a knee replacement, Mr. Orlov temporarily shelved his euroskepticism to take advantage of a little known National Health Service program and jump to the head of the line--in France.

After waiting a year just for the possibility of the knee replacement he badly needed, he turned to Calais Hospital in northern France, where in a matter of 10 days he found himself on the operating table for the three-hour procedure, he said in an interview. He plans to get his second knee replaced in a few weeks’ time. Back home, it took him a year to receive a letter informing him when he might have the operation.

“Waiting, it’s just miserable,” he said, describing how he had been shuttled to five different hospitals in Britain over more than eight months. Waiting rooms are “full of sick people,” he said, adding swiftly, by way of explanation, “I can be a grumpy old git.”

Mr. Orlov, who has Russian-Italian ancestry, is among a rapidly growing number of British patients who are crossing the English Channel to seek medical treatments--mostly elective surgeries--in France.

Given that the Brexit vote was largely won on highly emotive issues surrounding British sovereignty and a misleading promise by politicians that leaving the bloc would free up 350 million pounds, or about $490 million, a week to fund the N.H.S, the paradox of Britain seeking aid from France is not lost on the French hospital, nor on Mr. Orlov.

“I find something quite ironic about it,” he readily admitted. “I think it’s hilarious, actually.”

After years of austerity, Britain’s lumbering National Health Service is under enormous strain, with severe shortages of beds and medical staff, all of which is producing waiting times for nonemergency procedures to stretch over months, and sometimes beyond a year.

To cope, the N.H.S has been quietly outsourcing some surgeries to three hospitals in France for the last year or so. It is a little-known partnership, because the N.H.S. is not eager to advertise the measures it is being forced to take.

But as more people join Mr. Orlov in crossing the English Channel--and with a predictable but particularly severe “winter crisis” this year, forcing the cancellation of tens of thousands of elective surgeries--word is spreading.

Mr. Orlov was only Calais Hospital’s 15th patient under the program, but it has received 450 inquiries from British patients over six weeks, after fielding fewer than 10 a month previously. With 500 beds and a surgery ward with an occupancy rate of 70 percent, the hospital could treat as many as 200 N.H.S patients a year, officials said.

Mr. Orlov marveled that he had a spacious private room in the French hospital, with a window looking out on some greenery and a television set that offered the BBC. Parking is free, he exclaimed several times. “And the food is pretty good,” he said as an afterthought. “I’ve got to say, I’m not averse to French cooking.”

Hospitals in Britain “are so old they should be museums,” he said. “It’s shocking what’s going on.”

N.H.S. England’s outsourcing deal has technically little to do with Britain’s decision nearly two years ago to leave the European Union, a process known as Brexit. Rather, it has more to do with the myriad ways that countries across Europe are tied together, but that are often ignored in public discussions about Britain’s relationship with Europe.

“Let’s hope the talks don’t speed up too quickly though, I want to get this done first, and ideally the second one,” Mr. Orlov added, half seriously, referring to negotiations about the terms of Britain’s departure.

He asked that his surgeon not be told that he had voted for Brexit--just yet. “I’m happy to tell him when he’s finished carving me up, but certainly not beforehand,” he whispered. “I do have my second knee.”

(“Oh, la la,” Martin Trelcat, the director of Calais Hospital, groaned in mock outrage when he heard he had a Brexit supporter on his hands. “It’s time for a new vote,” he joked.)

Britain has about 340 available beds per 100,000 inhabitants, compared with a European Union average of 515, according to Eurostat, the European statistics agency. France has 706 beds for every 100,000 people, and Germany 813. Only three countries--Denmark, Ireland and Sweden--have lower rates of available beds than Britain does.

Britain spends almost 8 percent of its gross domestic product on health care, slightly less than France and Germany, and the share is forecast to fall to about 6.8 percent by 2020, according to the Office for Budgetary Responsibility.

Estimates from the King’s Fund, an organization that researches the British health care system, suggest that N.H.S. England funding is at least $5.6 billion below what is needed this year, and that the shortfall will rise to around $30 billion by 2023.

But Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt argues that pressures on the N.H.S are increasing not because of a lack of funding but partly because people are going to emergency rooms when they have bad colds or other minor afflictions.

This winter, people have been left on trolleys in corridors, in scenes of chaos some have likened to “war zones.” Patients in emergency wards sometimes waited up to 12 hours to get treated. The situation generally comes to a head every winter--so much so that the “winter crisis” has almost become an annual tradition. But even Mr. Hunt admitted that this year’s was the worst, and the British Red Cross declared the situation a “humanitarian crisis.”

Mr. Trelcat, the hospital director, said that the most likely explanation is that Britons are more patient than the French. “We don’t understand how you can delay so many operations that make many patients suffer,” he said. “A knee replacement that is delayed for one year--in France, it just can’t happen. It takes a maximum of one month here.”

The N.H.S insists that the outsourcing partnership is “purely about patient choice.” Officials declined to comment for this article, despite repeated requests.

But Calais Hospital representatives said that in private meetings, N.H.S officials had told them they wanted to enter a partnership because many of its hospitals were old but had little chance of being refurbished or improved soon.

The delays are a “sign of failure” of the N.H.S, Britain’s national pride, Mr. Trelcat said. The limited publicity about the deal may stem from an “embarrassment that most certainly comes from the fact that our hospitals are so reliable,” he added.

N.H.S officials who visited Calais Hospital were probably “not aware of the gap between a standard British hospital and a standard French hospital,” he continued.

Mr. Orlov proffered his own explanation for the N.H.S.’s reticence to advertise the possibility of treatment abroad. “I don’t know if it’s a breakdown in communication,” he said, “or because the N.H.S doesn’t like the idea of parting with the hard cash and bringing it to France.”

Either way, he said, “it’s shocking.”