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warsofasoiaf · 7 years ago

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Medium Cavalry Continued

Continued from here

Thanks for letting me post my little essay and for your reply. This has helped me get put a few half-baked thoughts into words and look at them.

I’d agree with you that a lot of our disagreement is over terminology rather than actual history, with only some minor disagreements about interpretations of history, which I’ll get to a little later.

Regarding terminology, what do you consider the “battlefield”? If most actions are small scale raids, where one side has stopped to put on mail before ambushing or surprising another side who are riding without armour, does that conflict take place on a battlefield? Are the skirmishes between scouts taking place on a battlefield? These scenarios constitute the largest part of medieval cavalry warfare in the period under discussion, with full scale battles being relatively rare. Even then, in the lead up to them the scouting continues, and the rearguard or a flying vanguard might be unarmoured. In these scenarios the knights are acting as light cavalry, and yet they are capable of donning armour, getting into formation and making a disciplined charge on the enemy.

I think this is our key element of disagreement. You see the knight’s primary purpose as acting as heavy cavalry, while I think that the primary purpose of a knight was to do whatever was required of him, which included acting as light cavalry almost as often as acting like heavy cavalry.

Regarding infantry, I definitely agree that large elements of it were frequently of poor quality, especially if there weren’t any dismounted knights there to stiffen them. Mostly these were town militias or peasants raised in defence of their county, but the experienced mercenary infantry and the knights themselves in some cases (especially in early Anglo-Norman warfare) could also form large parts of an infantry force and stand ready. That they might only need to stand two deep in order to stop a head on cavalry charge speaks volumes for the inability of the period’s cavalry to break through in a direct attack, unlike other contemporary heavy cavalry or much later heavy cavalry.

In some rare cases the infantry could even attack with some effect - at Hastings, for example, the Anglo-Saxon infantry (I generally disagree with the use of the term huscarl to describe them, but that’s a topic for another discussion) very nearly defeated the Norman cavalry after their feigned flight. Bishop Guy of Amiens' Carmen de Hastingae Proelio, the source written soonest after the battle, mentions that the Anglo-Saxons advanced mostly in good order and that William’s cavalry were only able to pick off those who had broken away from the formation. The cavalry was unable to sustain them and were in danger of fleeing once the rumour of William’s death went around. Only the renewed attacks following William rallying his men again managed to turn things around again and destroy the infantry which had come forward. This record has led to some speculation that the Anglo-Saxon advance might have been less of a headlong rush than a planned maneuver that was either executed too soon or which wasn’t fully supported by the center.

Of course, Hastings is something of an exceptional example. Almost all infantry of the period was defensive in nature, using natural barriers (or “crown” formations) where possible to offset their obvious weaknesses.

As to training, there’s recently been some dispute over that. Aldo A. Settia has recently shown evidence of the Italian militias training, and casts doubt on whether the militias north of the Alps were any different (JMMH vol. 11). Infantry were also a big part of tournaments, and while we don’t have much information on how often they actually fought in them and whether they were used against cavalry or infantry most often, I don’t see why they can’t have trained through these less lethal battles as knights were*. The battlefield is a third, harsher method of training and, quite apart from mercenaries who went from war to war, we see those towns more involved in warfare develop quite a bit of skill in war craft.

*I only just now realised the potential implications of this. I’m so glad we had this conversation!

Regarding how knights attacked, while I agree with the idea that, when they could they looked for weak points or attacked on the flank, but disagree in that I think this was not universal. At Bourgtheroulde, for example, the rebels charged straight on against what was a force of mostly dismounted knights with a forward line of archers. Other battles have conflicting or unclear descriptions. The Battle of the Standard might have seen a successful flank attack that failed by be followed through, or it might have seen an unsuccessful charge against one wing. It all depends on which author you read.

I’m looking forward to your further thoughts!

I’m actually going to tag this “hergrim” along with the other aspects of this discussion. It’s a fine one and I want people to be able to find it quickly and have it all on one page for easier consumption.

I actually don’t see our disagreement as a major thing. You are saying that a knight was capable and often did perform a light infantry role when the objectives demanded as such, and I don’t deny that. All units are meant to fulfill the strategic and tactical objectives set out at the initial level. Knights were often exceptional horsemen, and they might need to perform scouting in an era where riders were the primary method of reconnaissance. Just like any other unit, all were subject to the whims and needs of the mission. Knights often charged in gaps or on flanks, and I agree this wasn’t universal, simply a common technique and a good best practice. Even Alexander’s Companions looked to charge and exploit gaps. At least from what I understand which may be wrong or right, your designation of medium cavalry is to denote that they were often called upon to perform light cavalry, and that their armor and barding wasn’t heavy enough with the later-era plate or the Byzantine cataphractoi so as to warrant a new term, to help draw a distinction. I certainly can appreciate the idea and effort, anything that makes the study more precise is welcome. I consider though, the knightly role in European combat, this heavy cavalry role, to be so critical to the function of the knight that the term is sufficient, and that the light cavalry functions that the knight could carry out were simply part of the nature of war; all things must bow before the need to accomplish the objective.

The issue of “what is the battlefield” is a question that frustrates much, and the answers have a lot of implications for modern warfare from a tactical and moral standpoint. It almost feels like the Potter Stewart standard at times, it’s clear what a battle is when we see one, with lines being drawn up and armies moving into position. Ambushes are battles, merely not setpiece ones.

While I agree that a good infantry formation can avoid a head-on charge with discipline, training, and equipment, there was also flanking, gaps to be exploited, sudden movements or collapses, that did make even experienced infantry lines vulnerable to exploitation by cavalry, and we do see plenty of examples in history of a successful, well-positioned knightly charge causing enough disruption to force a rout. Depending on the specific type of battle, the proportion of levy troops versus professional, semi-professional, and quasi-professional troops in the composition of infantry would have vastly differing levels of drill, control, and morale.

I’m not sure about the objection of huscarl, I’ve always heard the term used as a personal infantry retainer of a landed noble, which was what the Anglo-Saxons used as their experienced infantry core along with their thegns. supplemented by the less-experienced fyrdsmen. As always with everything, reality is far more complex, but that can be handled at another time.

As for the infantry and training, it primarily comes down to the economics and structure of the medieval government. The knight’s fees to support the knight and the personal retinues could get full training, and then depending on the strength of the government, there were efforts to fund training and equipment with varying degrees of success. The Asize of Arms, for example, was a great idea though the training component was not very well-enforced, simply because the royal government lacked the ability to inspect the use of the practice ranges. Medieval governments were much better at ad hoc initiatives, securing goose feathers from the people to make arrows for a war effort and the like. So we see, as far as infantry is concerned, a sliding scale of readiness and equipment based on holdings and wealth, with again, the Asize being a wonderful tool to help break it up for the time period. My own personal scale, professional, semi-professional, and quasi-professional, I’ve discussed shortly here. Not an official designation that I’ve made into categories, that would be a hefty project requiring so much investigation into kingdoms and eras, but a nifty short-hand I use on this blog to help explain that any random dude pulled off the medieval battlefield and examined could be quite different than the next random dude.

At Hastings, I’ve heard that theory that the good order suggests that it was an advance that was either prompted too early, or a signal was misinterpreted somewhere. I’ve also heard that it was an early move that later turned into a too-far advance, Godwinson wanted them back on the good ground and took the bait. Sadly, I’ve not seen enough compelling evidence for any theory to be more true than another.

-SLAL

#medium cavalry #hergrim #tactics #strategy #cavalry #submission

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