#Ahmed Madobe

[saxafimedianetwork]

Tensions Rise in Jubaland: Somalia's Government Challenges Madobe's Reelection

Tensions escalate in #Jubaland, #Somalia as federal gov't rejects Madobe's reelection, citing unconstitutionality. Military presence increases, raising concerns for regional stability & security. Kenya & #Ethiopia closely watching the dev'ts.

Continue reading Tensions Rise in Jubaland: Somalia’s Government Challenges Madobe’s Reelection

[capitalghost]

Around the Horn: Somalia Keeps Pressure on Jubaland and Articles of the Week

The question of the week: how would the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) respond to its embarassing defeat to Jubaland forces in Lower Jubba and continue efforts to isolate regional president Ahmed Madobe? The answer: By augmenting efforts in Gedo region, where there is a weaker concentration of Madobe’s troops and long-running angst against the regional leader. The FGS is flying more troops…

[somalilandsun1]

Somalia: FFS Requests Interpol to Arrest Jubaland's President Madobe

Somalilandsun: Somalia’s federal government has formally requested an Interpol Red Notice to arrest Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, also known as “Madobe.” The Banadir Regional Court in Mogadishu authorized the request, accusing Madobe of treason, collusion with foreign powers, and actions undermining Somalia’s national unity This move is the latest chapter in a bitter feud between the…

[somalilandcurrentnews]

Pitfalls of the Proposed Presidential System

By Dr. Abdinur Sheikh Mohamed This is an attempt to shed light on the complexities of the recent constitutional review proposal made on 27/05/2023 by the National Consultative Council (NCC) composed of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and three regional presidents namely, President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madobe), President Ali Abdullahi Hussein (Guudlawe) of Hirshabelle, President Ahmed Abdi…

[kwetunews]

Kenyan Ambassador to Somalia expelled

Kenyan Ambassador to Somalia expelled

Somalia has recalled its ambassador to Kenya and told Kenya’s envoy to leave over “continuous” interference in its internal affairs.

Mogadishu maintains that Nairobi is meddling in its upcoming elections by putting pressure on the regional president of Jubaland, Ahmed Mohamed Islaam Madobe to walk back on a poll agreement brokered two months ago.

Under the deal, Somalia leaders agreed on…

[khalilhumam]

Facing elections and a potential US troop withdrawal, risks to Somalia’s security abound

New Post has been published on http://khalilhumam.com/facing-elections-and-a-potential-us-troop-withdrawal-risks-to-somalias-security-abound/

Facing elections and a potential US troop withdrawal, risks to Somalia’s security abound

By Vanda Felbab-Brown With many focused on the dangerous conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia is facing a triple security crisis. If unaddressed, it could severely jeopardize the country’s halting progress. As I’ve written previously, the first crisis is that Ethiopia’s instability and ethnic strife harm Somalia’s security. The second, discussed here, is upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Somalia, scheduled for December 2020 and February 2021, which are raising tensions among and between Somalia’s federal government, Somalia’s federal member states, and clans. The third, also discussed in this piece, is the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the majority of U.S. special operations forces from Somalia by January 15, 2021, which will further weaken the various struggling anti-Shabab forces and strengthen the jihadists. Somalia should consider delaying the elections by two or three months, if it can reach consensus to do so among Somali politicians (rather than force a unilateral decision by Mogadishu); and Washington should keep U.S. special forces in Somalia through Somalia’s elections.

The election risks

After political deadlock during much of this year, Somalia is at the last minute organizing parliamentary elections for December 2020 and presidential ones for February 2021. Delayed by months of quarrels over process (more on that in a minute), the preparations now severely lag behind. Tensions are running high among the federal government of Somalia, federal member states, and Somalia’s various clans over the distribution of military, political, and economic resources between the capital and the regions. President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (known as “Farmajo”) is running for reelection, but many influential politicians — such as presidents of several federal member states and rival clan elders — do not want to see him reelected. Al-Shabab and even the far-less potent and more territorially-restricted Islamic State in Somalia can disrupt the elections. As before, there are risks of vote-buying and fraud. Most dangerously, there is a high possibility of violence both during the elections and after winners are declared. For years, many foreign donors as well as many Somalis have hoped that Somalia would move toward a direct one-person, one-vote system. Such direct elections would allow more inclusive political representation and enhance accountability. President Mohamed embraced that agenda in early 2020, persuading the lower chamber of Somalia’s parliament to pass a new electoral law to that effect. But the upper chamber and Somalia’s rival politicians demurred. Presidents of federal member states and politicians whom Mohamed has sought to weaken and/or remove from office —  and who have had explosive relations with Mogadishu — perceived the change as Mohamed’s last-minute ploy to extend his rule by preventing elections from taking place on time. Indeed, the organizational challenges of implementing any such new electoral system would be immense. So would the security obstacles, already threatening the current indirect electoral college design. Security in Somalia has been slowly but steadily deteriorating, with al-Shabab conducting attacks along major Somali roads and in major Somali cities across much of the country, including Mogadishu. Neither Somali security forces nor the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an international stabilization force, have mounted anywhere near adequate preparations for the elections. Fractious federal member states may not welcome Somali federal forces to secure the elections, but their state forces are also potentially biased and/or unprepared. Under pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, Mohamed gave up on the one-person, one-vote ambition in September 2020, and Somalia’s political leaders accepted the so-called Mogadishu Model: Clan elders, nominated by clans and verified by federal and state authorities, select electoral college delegates. These electoral colleges, set up for each lower-chamber parliamentary seat, select the parliamentary representatives; the parliamentary representatives then select the president. State assemblies select members of the upper chamber. Each step provides rife opportunities for bribery and patronage. The system reinforces clan identity, a fundamental but problematic cleavage of political and social life in Somalia.  Registration lists of the selectors, like clan elders, remain deficient and contested. At first glance, there appear to be several improvements on the similar 2016 model: Each electoral college will now have 101 members, larger than before. Altogether, there will be 27,775 delegates. Each federal member state now has two voting locations, instead of one. But will those changes make bribery more difficult, or merely more expensive? The quota of seats reserved for women increased to 30%, but will it be filled? Elections of state assemblies are also violence-prone, as they directly intersect the crucible of Somalia’s center-periphery tensions: President Mohamed will seek to promote his allies while his political rivals (such as Jubaland’s President Ahmed Madobe and Puntland’s President Said Abdullahi Dani) will perpetuate their iron-fist regimes and back their allies. Meanwhile, Somalia’s powerful clans are also mobilizing, and apparently arming, at local and national levels to attempt to sway the elections. There is potential for good news: In theory, Somalia’s civil society is for the first time given a chance to work with clan elders to select electoral college delegates, and might have a more formal monitoring role. But only weeks before elections, many key dimensions of the process are problematic: The exact civil society role is undefined, reducing its capacity to fight corruption and promote inclusion; electoral dispute-resolution mechanisms are incomplete; and authorities and procedures between the federal electoral commission and regional electoral commissions are murky. Perhaps the greatest danger is that losers and those opposed to Mohamed, should he be reelected, will simply reject the results. That could set off complex violent conflicts benefitting al-Shabab. Prior contested elections in the South West State and in Jubaland, where Mohamed sought to install his allies, led to violence. The post-election military skirmishes in Jubaland were particularly threatening as they brought two AMISOM members close to military blows: Kenya, supporting Jubaland’s president Ahmed Madobe, and Ethiopia, supporting Mohamed and his local allies.

The risks of a U.S. troop withdrawal

The Trump administration’s decision to rapidly withdraw U.S. soldiers from Somalia throws an additional wrench into the elections and Somalia’s security situation more broadly. Although it is not clear whether the policy, signaled since October and affirmed last week, has been transmitted as an order to military commanders in the field, its mere anticipation is destabilizing. The 700 U.S. Special Operations Forces in Somalia have several functions:

They train the most capable multi-clan unit of the Somali National Army — the 850-men strong Danab brigade — and support its anti-Shabab operations. While Danab has had only tactical successes and has not altered Somalia’s strategic security picture, it does disrupt devastating terrorist attacks. And it is an exemplar of capacities and cohesion for the Somali National Army. But there are fears that the U.S. withdrawal will lead to the unit’s collapse, raising questions about the sustainability of such U.S. training efforts.

S. soldiers on the ground strengthen air power targeting. The bombing has failed to crush al-Shabab as Washington had hoped. But it prevents al-Shabab from massing, thus complicating the jihadists’ attempts to overrun AMISOM and Somali bases. Under the new U.S. military plans, attack drones will still fly from Kenya and Djibouti. But the risks of tragic and politically-exploitable civilian casualties will grow, and the air strike frequency is likely to decrease. Fearing al-Shabab, AMISOM may bunker up in garrisons even more and reduce the number of bases, thus weakening anti-Shabab militias.

The presence of U.S. forces itself stiffens the spine of anti-Shabab militias. Many such militias are problematic and cause human rights abuses, but other than Danab and U.S. operations, they are frequently the only force fighting al-Shabab.

The departure of U.S. forces from Somalia will further exacerbate a declining security picture in Somalia and strengthen al-Shabab. If President Trump’s plans proceed, the withdrawal will happen at the worst possible time, compounding the immense insecurity and uncertainty around Somalia’s elections.

What can be done?

The immediate priority for the international community is to prevent at least the violence around elections that Somali politicians can induce. The United States and partners should facilitate consensual political negotiations among Somali leaders to delay the elections somewhat — by a few weeks or a few months. Political opponents of President Mohamed may resent this proposal and oppose it at first. But such a short, mutually-agreed delay made good sense even before the announced withdrawal of U.S. special operations forces, given how unprepared both the election process and its security plans were. The deterioration of security due to the withdrawal of U.S. forces is an added reason. Second, the international community — particularly powerful donors such as the United States, the European Union, Turkey, Ethiopia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates — should engage Mohamed and his rivals to persuade them to accept the election outcomes and remain peaceful as legal processes take their course. Mobilizing such international pressure will not be easy, as the rifts and rivalries among international actors in Somalia often run as hot as among Somali politicians themselves. The United Arab Emirates, for example, does not wish for Mohamed to be reelected, while Qatar supports him. So does Ethiopia, but its voice may be undermined by its handling of its own internal crisis. Beyond the elections, the international community must rethink its stabilization efforts in Somalia. If the Trump administration withdraws U.S. special forces in the country before Biden takes office, the next administration should carefully consider whether to return them. Extending AMISOM’s presence again, beyond its December 2021 timeframe, is desirable and necessary. But so is demanding far more meaningful action from AMISOM. Efforts to build Somali federal and state forces need to be coupled with meaningful accountability measures, deep structural changes, and far more tough love. Some are calling for considering negotiations with al-Shabab — not rushed ones like the recent problematic U.S. wildcat effort, nor the opaque and fraught amnesty deals with so-called high-value defectors that Somalia has practiced for years. But any such negotiations would require that various parties — international donors, Somalia’s politicians (who mostly feel no desire to negotiate a national bargain with al-Shabab), civil society, and victims of al-Shabab violence — are prepared to swallow a very bitter pill. Like in Afghanistan, where the Taliban may well return to power, negotiations would bring al-Shabab into a coalition government. And like the Taliban, al-Shabab has not severed relations with al-Qaida. Moreover, unlike the Taliban, al-Shabab continues to conduct brutal terrorist attacks outside of Somalia, too. All of these factors underscore the challenges of a potential deal with al-Shabab. In the near term, keeping U.S. troops in Somalia’s through its elections at least is key.

[seneweb]

Ça chauffe entre le Kenya et la Somalie – Rewmi.com

Une fusillade a éclaté entre des soldats kenyans et somaliens samedi 26 septembre le long de leur frontière commune. Une manifestation était en cours pour dénoncer les violences des forces kenyanes à l’égard des Somaliens. Les soldats kenyans ont alors ouvert le feu pour disperser les manifestants.

Des échanges de tirs soutenus ont duré plusieurs minutes entre les forces armées des deux pays voisins, racontent des témoins. Cela se passe dans la ville de Bulo Hawo dans l’ouest de la Somalie, située juste à la frontière kenyane. Ce samedi, des habitants de cette localité manifestent contre les forces armées kenyanes accusées de procéder à des exécutions extrajudiciaires. La veille, la police antiterroriste kenyane aurait exécuté trois civils, membres présumés du groupe terroriste les shebabs.

La manifestation dégénère lorsque des habitants s’approchent des positions de l’armée kenyane qui ouvre alors le feu, entrainant la riposte des soldats somaliens. Pour l’heure, aucune victime n’est à déplorer.

L’incident ravive en tout cas les tensions entre le Kenya et la Somalie. Ces derniers mois, Mogadiscio ne cesse d’accuser Nairobi d’ingérence dans ses affaires politiques intérieures, notamment en soutenant le président du Jubaland, Ahmed Madobe, fervent opposant au président somalien Farmajo.

Mais le conflit entre les deux voisins ne date pas d’hier. Principal point d’achoppement : un territoire maritime riche en hydrocarbures que se disputent le Kenya et la Somalie depuis plusieurs années.

Crédit: Lien source

The post Ça chauffe entre le Kenya et la Somalie – Rewmi.com appeared first on Seneweb.fr.

source https://seneweb.fr/ca-chauffe-entre-le-kenya-et-la-somalie-rewmi-com/

[letscreateafricaorg]

New post in LET'S CREATE AFRICA (L.C.A.): Ahmed Madobe Sworn In As Jubbaland President In Hotly Contested Polls https://ift.tt/2KPzRTe https://ift.tt/2ziTOuZ

[politiciandirect]

Briton Among Several Killed in Islamic Extremist Attack on Somalia Hotel

Briton Among Several Killed in Islamic Extremist Attack on Somalia Hotel

MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) – Somali forces Saturday morning ended an all-night siege on a hotel in the southern port city of Kismayo, in which the death toll has risen to 26 people, including a prominent Canadian-Somali journalist and several foreigners, officials say.

Those killed include three Kenyans, three Tanzanians, two Americans, one Canadian and one Briton, said Ahmed Madobe, the president…

[afroinsider]

Somalia: Jubbaland President Unveils Election Officials

Somalia: Jubbaland President Unveils Election Officials

Jubbaland President Ahmed Madobe has unveiled the officials who will take charge of the semi-autonomous region’s elections set for July.

The President through a decree made the decision, setting the stage for early preparation for the elections.

The committee members are Hamza Abid Barre, Ahmed Omar Mohamed, Samsam Farah Abukar and Mursal Siyaad Mohamed.

Other members of the committee are…

[annafricatv]

Southern Somali State Shutters Main City, Airport Ahead Of Election

Southern Somali State Shutters Main City, Airport Ahead Of Election

In preparation for Thursday’s vote to elect a president, the semi-autonomous southern Somali state of Jubbaland has blocked access to the capital city, Kismayo, and its main airport.

The move underscores escalating tensions between Jubbaland authorities and the federal government in Mogadishu, who have been seeking to exert control over the election process in the last month.

On Saturday the…

[somalilandcurrentnews]

AU Special Representative assures of security during Somali leaders' meeting on elections

AU Special Representative assures of security during Somali leaders’ meeting on elections

Mogadishu – March 21st 2021; The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Francisco Madeira, met, today, with the former Presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) of Jubaland, President Ali Abdullahi Hussein (Guudlawe) of Hirshabelle, former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, and…

[oeildhumanite]

Somalia’s political stakeholders  signed on Thursday a definitive agreement that paves the way  to  indirect elections likely to take place before August this year.

The decision followed a marathon week-long talks led by Prime Minister Hussein Roble. This allows the country to go ahead with the delegate system of voting ,earlier arguable, ending weeks of uncertainty.

Mr Roble signed for the Federal Government and Federal States leaders Said Abdullahi Deni (Puntland), Ahmed Abdi Qoorqoor (Galmudug), Ali Hussein Gudlawe (Hirshabelle), Abdulaziz Mohamed Laftagareen (South West) and Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe (Jubbaland) signed for their respective Federal States. The Governor of Banadir region and Mayor of Mogadishu, Omar Mohamed Filish,  was among the signatories  for his metropolis.

[nabyyle]

via

[hkformalengwriting]

Somalia: Madobe Acts First, Beats Farmajo With 'Unity' Deal

Somalia: Madobe Acts First, Beats Farmajo With ‘Unity’ Deal

https://ift.tt/eA8V8J [Nation] Jubaland President Mohamed Ahmed Madobe has inked a ‘unity’ deal with his arch-rivals, stealing a march on the Federal Government of Somalia.

Vía AllAfrica News: Latest https://ift.tt/2xUW3aT

[khalilhumam]

What Ethiopia’s crisis means for Somalia

New Post has been published on http://khalilhumam.com/what-ethiopias-crisis-means-for-somalia/

What Ethiopia’s crisis means for Somalia

By Vanda Felbab-Brown With many around the world focused on the dangerous military confrontation in Ethiopia, Somalia too is facing a triple security crisis that can jeopardize the country’s halting progress. Ethiopia’s instability and ethnic strife are producing security repercussions in Somalia. Somalia’s upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections are the second component of the emerging security storm. And the Trump administration’s plan to withdraw U.S. special operations forces from Somalia in the next two months will further weaken the various struggling anti-Shabab forces and strengthen the militants. Here, I spell out the implications of the Ethiopian crisis for Somalia. In a forthcoming post, I’ll deal with the latter two issues.

Anti-Shabab operations

The escalating military confrontation between the federal government of Ethiopia and the political leadership of the Tigray region has produced a worrying humanitarian situation. It also threatens to plunge the Tigray region into prolonged violent strife, ensnarl regional actors, and exacerbate ethnic violence across the country. In addition, the crisis has potentially grave consequences for stability and security in neighboring Somalia. It hurts counterinsurgency efforts against the potent jihadi terrorist group al-Shabab and exacerbates Somalia’s existing tensions between its capital and regions. Ethiopian forces, whether operating under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) or independently, are a powerful actor in Somalia. Their military heft significantly surpasses that of the Somali National Army (SNA) or Somali National Police (SPN). Despite years of international training and payments, the SNA and SNP remain predominantly conglomerations of clan-based fractious militias, with little independent capacity even for defensive operations against al-Shabab. Somali federal forces and AMISOM rely on militias for rare offensive operations against al-Shabab and defense of bases. But although AMISOM has not conducted major offensive operations against al-Shabab since 2016 and remains hunkered down in garrisons, its presence and that of non-AMISOM Ethiopian forces stiffen the militias’ morale. Wherever Ethiopian troops have withdrawn, al-Shabab attacks against local militias, leaders, and populations ensued; in most cases, the group has eventually taken over those territories. Somalia’s security has been slowly deteriorating since 2016. Formally, al-Shabab controls less territory than at the height of its power in 2011. But its reach has been expanding, including into Puntland and Somaliland. It regularly mounts terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, levies taxes throughout the country, and enjoys significant freedom of movement, including on major roads. It extorts Somali businesses, some of which hire al-Shabab to eliminate business competition. Al-Shabab also deliverance governance, such as by holding shariah courts. In response to the Tigray revolt, the Ethiopian federal government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed resorted to intense military operations in the Tigray region and to purges of ethnic Tigray from Ethiopia’s military and government offices. Tigray soldiers and commanders in Somalia have been disarmed, confined to barracks, or sent to Ethiopia. These purges weaken the morale, cohesion, and capacity of anti-Shabab forces. Should the Tigray military confrontation escalate and spill into other Ethiopian regions — and should Ethiopia’s government withdraw more forces from Somalia — AMISOM will be severely weakened. The African Union’s force is dependent on the Ethiopian contingent. Its other members, such as Djibouti, Burundi, and Uganda, may start withdrawing too, not halted even by the inducement of the AMISOM salaries paid for by the European Union (EU).

AMISOM is formally slated to end its mission in Somalia by the end of 2021, but Somalia is unprepared for the security transition.

AMISOM’s end could set off major security and humanitarian challenges beyond al-Shabab’s onslaught in Somalia. Returning Burundian forces, for example, could exacerbate the risk of severe ethnic violence in Burundi, bubbling close to the surface in recent years. AMISOM is formally slated to end its mission in Somalia by the end of 2021, but Somalia is unprepared for the security transition. The international community will again seek to extend the AMISOM mandate and ask the EU to reauthorize AMISOM payments expiring in December 2020. But the presence of a robust Ethiopian deployment remains a lynchpin of any meaningful AMISOM extension.

Rivalries between the center and periphery

Ethiopia has also provided crucial support to the federal government of Somalia in its rivalry with Somalia’s federal member states. Like in Ethiopia, center-periphery tensions over economic resources and political power have been at the core of Somalia’s instability since the collapse of the Siad Barre authoritarian regime in 1991. In recent years, stabilization efforts in Somalia have centered on devolving power from Mogadishu to Somalia’s regions and transforming the previously centralized Somalia into a federation. While the formation of the new states and a new constitution are incomplete and halting, Somalia’s current government of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (known as “Farmajo”), which is backed by Ethiopia, wants to recentralize power. Mohamed has aggressively meddled in the political affairs of Somalia’s new states. In 2018, he prevented the victory of Mukhtar Robow in presidential elections in Somalia’s South West State. Although Mohamed orchestrated Robow’s high-profile defection from al-Shabab and granted him amnesty, he could not sit by while Robow eclipsed Mohamed’s preferred candidate in the state; Mohamed had Robow arrested. Ethiopian forces were essential for Robow’s arrest and were implicated in bloody repression of Robow’s supporters. Yet without Ethiopian forces, al-Shabab’s reach across the South West State, including its capital of Baidoa, would be even more pronounced. Ethiopian forces have been similarly key in Mohamed’s rivalry with Ahmed Madobe, the president of Jubaland, another federal member state. An early al-Shabab defector and leader of an anti-Shabab militia, Madobe became Jubaland’s president in 2013 after wresting the crucial port of Kismayo and surrounding areas from al-Shabab and rival clans. Ruling Kismayo with an iron fist, Madobe has been at loggerheads with Mohamed for years. Those tensions escalated in 2019, when Mohamed tried to orchestrate Madobe’s electoral defeat and the installation of Mohamed’s proxy as Jubaland president. After months of economic pressure on Madobe by Mogadishu, and various political maneuvers and countermaneuvers, Mohamed’s ploy failed and Madobe retained Jubaland’s presidency. However, not before Ethiopian troops backing Mohamed almost came to blows in the spring of 2020 with a fellow (reluctant) member of AMISOM, Kenya, that has long backed Madobe. Any intense confrontation between Ethiopian and Kenyan forces could sound the death knell of AMISOM. With the backing of Ethiopia and Mogadishu, another part of Jubaland, the region of Gedo operates essentially independently of and in opposition to Madobe. Its independence is a thorn in Madobe’s side. Again, the presence of Ethiopian forces is critical for this arrangement.

Regional entanglements

Mohamed has also antagonized the leadership of Puntland, another federal member state, as well as of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) when he sought to prevent the UAE’s investment in Puntland’s port of Bosaso. First, he saw any such initiative to be Mogadishu’s prerogative, and second, he did not want the deal to become another source of Puntland’s economic power and autonomy ambitions. In April 2018, Mohamed seized $10 million from an Emirati plane, claiming the money was meant as anti-Mogadishu bribes for federal member states. Alleging that Mohamed is on the payroll of rival Qatar, the UAE has actively worked against Mogadishu, indeed supporting Somalia’s federal member states in opposition to Mohamed. For years, the UAE has also sponsored one of the two most potent militias in Puntland, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Although originally stood up as an anti-piracy force, the PMPF serves as a de facto pretorian guard of Puntland’s presidents and a hedge against Mogadishu and Somali federal forces. But the regional entanglements are complex. Mohamed has built close relations not just with Abiy, whom he sees as a kindred centralizer disinclined to power devolution, but also with Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki. Federal member states fear that the allegedly hundreds of Somali forces who have been trained in Eritrea will become Mohamed’s personal force. Yet Isaias and Abiy are close with the UAE. In any escalating internal conflict in Somalia in which the UAE sides with the federal member states against Mogadishu, Abiy and Isaias might feel compelled to abandon Mohamed. That would significantly weaken Mogadishu and likely strengthen Somalia’s fissiparous dynamics. These dynamics may intensify even if Mohamed is not reelected Somalia’s president in February 2021. If violence were to explode between Mogadishu and federal member states, it would also rapidly suck in local militias: clan-based, belonging to powerbrokers, or sponsored by external actors. Madobe could be emboldened to move against Gedo or try to force out Somali federal forces from Jubaland, potentially triggering also military confrontations among Kenya, Mogadishu, and leftover Ethiopian troops. Puntland — which is anti-Mohamed and close to Madobe — could intensify its anti-Mogadishu moves and resurrect provocative measures, such as tightening an alliance with the UAE. (Qatar may be tempted to counter such moves through its proxies in Puntland.) Both al-Shabab and the Islamic State in Somalia, located in Puntland, would take advantage. In the South West State, clans supporting Robow could seek to move against Mohamed’s political allies and federal forces, whether or not Mohamed remains in power next year. In all these potential layered conflicts, al-Shabab would be the (indirect) winner, with its capacities against a wide set of actors and visible territorial control significantly augmented. Somalia could easily topple into a complex civil war involving al-Shabab, clans, the federal member states, and Mogadishu. Years of state-building efforts could be rapidly wiped out.

Why de-escalation in Ethiopia is needed to stabilize Somalia

In short, any weakening of the presence of Ethiopian forces in Somalia could set off the explosion of Somalia’s center-periphery tensions into complex violent conflicts. These tensions are already at their highest point in years. A rapid de-escalation of the violent conflagration in Ethiopia is thus vital not just for stabilizing Ethiopia, but also Somalia. Conversely, a long-term destabilization of Ethiopia will worsen many dangerous security trends in Somalia. If de-escalation in Ethiopia can be achieved through political negotiations leading to equitable power-sharing, Somalia will have a useful model. If the de-escalation emerges as a result of the Ethiopian federal government crushing the Tigray political leadership and subjecting the region to a painful humanitarian crisis and other punishments, both Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal member states will learn the wrong lessons. Meanwhile, however, the international community should seek to discourage Somalia’s federal member states, as well as Mohamed (and potentially his successor), from taking advantage of the instability in Ethiopia by launching political provocations and trigger-happy maneuvers.