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What is reinforcement sensivity?  - Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Corr I 348 Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory/Corr: The #Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) of personality represents a bold attempt to account for the neuropsychological regulation of #behaviour, and how individual differences in neuropsychological systems give rise to what we commonly label ‘personality’. RST is based upon notions of central states of emotion and motivation that mediate the relations between stimulus input and behavioural response: here ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’ can be internal processes, processes, and only inferred from ingenious behavioural experiments (e.g., sensory preconditioning; see McNaughton and Corr 2008)(1). Corr I 349 RST encompasses a number of approaches that move at different paces. This point is well made by Smillie, Pickering and Jackson (2006, p. 320)(2), who note that, although RST is often seen as a theory of personality, it is ‘more accurately identified as a neuropsychology of emotion, motivation and learning. In fact, RST was born of basic animal learning research, initially not at all concerned with personality’. An (…) important aspect of RST is the distinction between those parts that belong to the conceptual nervous system (cns) and those parts that belong to the central nervous system (CNS) (a distinction advanced by Hebb 1955)(3). Def cns/conceptual nervous system/Hebb: The cns component of RST provides the behavioural scaffolding, formalized within some theoretical framework (e.g., learning theory; see Gray 1975(4); or, ethoexperimental analysis; see Gray and McNaughton 2000)(5); Def CNS/Central Nervous System/Hebb: the CNS component specifies the brain systems involved, couched in terms of the latest knowledge of the neuroendocrine system (see McNaughton and Corr 2008)(1). As noted by Gray (1972a)(6), these two levels of explanation must be compatible. Corr I 360 Post-2000 RST: see >Terminology/Corr, Anxiety/Corr. Corr I 371 RST/Corr: Of importance is the translational nature of this research: we can now go from basic non-human animal studies to human ones, armed with a rigorous theory to guide the difficult process of understanding the neuropsychology of human personality. As an example of such translational research, Perkins and Corr (2006)(7) confirmed that the basic defensive reactions of rodents to cats in ethologically-valid situations are found in human defensive reactions to a range of threatening situations. Remaining problems: a) how best to characterize BAS processes and how to measure them by questionnaire (Corr 2008a(8); Pickering and Smillie 2008)(9); b) what is the relationship between conscious awareness, its functions and emotion/motivation (Gray 2004(10); Corr 2006(11), 2008a)(12); c) how best to operationalize reward and punishment variables in the laboratory and what predictions we should make about their possible interaction (Corr 2002a(13), 2008a(12)); d) what is the most appropriate way to measure FFFS (Fight–Flight–Freeze System;>Terminology/Gray) , BIS (Behavioral Inhibition System, >Terminology/Corr) and BAS (Behavioral Approach system, >Terminology/Corr) in human beings, and how such measures can be validated; and e) are the principles of frustrative non-reward and relief of non-punishment useful in explaining counter-productive and paradoxical behaviour (McNaughton and Corr in press). On top of these problems are wider ones, ranging from the role of ‘free will’ in behaviour, and how individual behaviour is regulated by society (e.g., effective penal systems). 1. Corr, P. J. and McNaughton, N. 2008. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 155–87. Cambridge University Press 2. Smillie, L. D., Pickering, A. D. and Jackson, C. J. 2006. The new reinforcement sensitivity theory: implications for personality measurement, Personality and Social Psychology Review 10: 320–35 3. Hebb, D. O. 1955. Drives and the C. N. S. (Conceptual Nervous System), Psychological Review 62: 243–54 4. Gray, J. A. 1975. Elements of a two-process theory of learning. London: Academic Press 5. Gray, J. A. and McNaughton, N. 2000. The neuropsychology of anxiety: an enquiry into the functions of the septo-hippocampal system. Oxford University Press 6. Gray, J. A., 1972a. Learning theory, the conceptual nervous system and personality, in V. D. Nebylitsyn and J. A. Gray (eds.), The biological bases of individual behaviour, pp. 372–99. New York: Academic Press 7. Perkins, A. M. and Corr, P. J. 2006. Reactions to threat and personality: psychometric differentiation of intensity and direction dimensions of human defensive behaviour, Behavioural Brain Research 169: 21–8 8. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press 9. Pickering, A. D. and Smillie, L. D. 2008. The behavioural activation system: challenges and opportunities, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 120–54. Cambridge University Press 10. Gray, J. A. 2004. Consciousness: creeping up on the Hard Problem. Oxford University Press 11. Corr, P. J. 2006. Understanding biological psychology. Oxford: Blackwell 12. Corr, P. J. 2008a. Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST): Introduction, in P. J. Corr (ed). The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality, pp. 1–43. Cambridge University Press 13. Corr, P. J. 2002a. J. A. Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory: tests of the joint subsystem hypothesis of anxiety and impulsivity, Personality and Individual Differences 33: 511–32 Philip J. Corr, „ The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of Personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 348 -371

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What does Developmental Psychology say on learning theories? – Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Upton I 6 Learning theories/Developmental psychology/Upton: the perspective of learning in developmental psychology perspective suggests that the key to understanding development lies in observable behaviour and an individual’s response to environmental stimuli. The assumption here is that behaviour is a learned response to reinforcement provided by the environment. The learning and conditioning principles described in the behavioural theories of B.F. Skinner (1936)(1) and John B. Watson (1913(2), 1924(3)) account for human development. >Behaviorism/Psychological theories, >Conditioning/Behaviorism, >Reinforcement sensivity.

1. Skinner, BF (1936) The Behavior of Organisms: An experimental analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 2. Watson, J.B. (1913) Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review, 20: 158–77. 3. Watson, J.B. (1924) Behaviourism, New York: Norton.

 Penney Upton 2011. Developmental Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  p. 6

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Was Piaget right in relation to learning? – Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Upton I 97 Learning/Piaget/Upton: Vygotsky (1962/1978)(1) believed that a child can be taught anything as long as the activity falls within the child’s ZPD ( >Terminology/Vygotsky). The teacher’s role is therefore to provide direct instruction. In one sense, Piaget and Vygotsky are both arguing for readiness to learn. However, the important difference is that for Piaget development leads to learning, while for Vygotsky learning results in development. If Vygotsky is right, could it be possible to teach a skill such as conservation to children who are not yet at the operational stage of development? Indeed, there is evidence that three- and four-year-old preschoolers who are not yet able to conserve can be taught this skill (Field, 1981)(2). VsPiaget: The short-term nature of the conservation shown by the younger children suggests that they had not actually learned a new thinking skill, but had simply rote learned the ‘correct’ answers. By the time of retesting, they had forgotten what the answers were. This is further evidenced by the finding that the children who retained the ability to conserve were those who had shown that they could generalise their conservation skills to untrained quantities. This suggests that Vygotsky was right – new ways of thinking can be taught, but a child has to be ready to learn those skills. 1. Vygotsky, LS (1930/1978) Mind in Society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Field, D (1981) Can preschool children really learn to conserve? Child Development, 52: 326–34

Penney Upton 2011. Developmental Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.97

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Self-Determination Theory on Learning – Psychology Dictionary of Arguments

Corr I 448 Learning/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: studies have examined student’s learning under conditions that are either controlling or supportive of their need satisfaction (see Reeve, Ryan, Deci and Jang 2007)(1). For example, Benware and Deci (1984)(2) did an experiment in which college students read a detailed article on neurophysiology under one of two learning sets. One condition was made controlling by telling students they would have a graded exam, whereas the other encouraged the students’ active involvement by offering them the opportunity to have a subsequent impact on their environment; that is, they would teach the material to others. (…+…) >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan. 1. Reeve, J., Ryan, R. M., Deci, E. L. and Jang, H. (2007). Understanding and promoting autonomous self-regulation: a self-determination theory perspective, in D. Schunk and B. Zimmerman (eds.), Motivation and self-regulated learning: theory, research, and applications, pp. 221–42 Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Benware, C. and Deci, E. L. 1984. Quality of learning with an active versus passive motivational set, American Educational Research Journal 21: 755–65 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 448

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Economic Theories on Environmental Goods – Dictionary of Arguments

Environmental Goods/Preferences/Economic Theories: There are individual environmental areas in which the long-term effects of environmental impairments are not always fully assessed individually (e.g. preservation of mountain forests due to avalanche danger) and therefore an at least partial correction of individual preferences through so-called meritorial interventions by the state (e.g. prohibition of deforestation of "protective forests") is necessary (Zimmermann et al. 2012, p. 498) (1). For the vast majority of environmental goods, however, it can be assumed in principle that corresponding environmental protection preferences exist in society without, however, sufficient quantities and quality of these goods being offered via the market. Mause I 409 Environmental goods have the typical characteristics of public goods (see Public Goods) a) Non-rivalry in consumption: consumption by one citizen does not diminish that of another. Example air. This means that no market prices arise here. b) The exclusion principle cannot be applied: nobody can be excluded from the use by assignment of exclusive property rights. This means that a private supplier could not achieve cost-covering prices with these goods. Conclusion: Clean environment cannot be sold via a market. Common goods/Common: these are goods for which rival consumption may occur. Although there is no market here either, the lack of ownership rights means that there is no incentive to treat the environmental goods concerned with care. Example Overfishing (2). See Prisoner's Dielmma/Ostrom.

1. Horst Zimmermann, Horst, Klaus-Dirk Henke, und Michael Broer, Finanzwissenschaft. Eine Einführung in die Lehre von der öffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft, 11. ed. München 2012. 2. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge 1990.

Karsten Mause, Christian Müller & Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 pp 409-410

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Hannah Arendt on misinformation - Dictionary of Arguments

#Misinformation/Arendt: Hannah Arendt (...) claimed that totalitarian elites displayed an 'ability to dissolve every statement of fact into a declaration of Purpose(1), - implying that political freedom presupposes an ability to distinguish the desirable from the likely and to describe reality without twisting it to serve partisan or personal agendas. Fake News/Trump/Krastev: #Trump is no totalitarian, but Arendt's analysis can be fruitfully applied to his rhetorical style since he regularly reduces statements of fact, made by allies or adversaries, to declarations of political purpose or instruments in the service of ulterior motives. That, indeed, may well be the essence of his instinctual or intuitive illiberalism. >Fake News/Krastev, >Misinformation/Kennan. 1. Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (Meridian Books, 1958).

Krastev, Ivan & Stephen Holmes 2019. The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. London: Penguin books. P.173

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What is Biopolitics? – Dictionary of Arguments

Power analyses that make use of the concept of #biopolitics focus on the concept of life - and not on the citizen, the subject, the subserviant - and thus focus on the growing current "politicization of life". Brocker I 827 Agamben now combines Foucault's shifts to biopolitics (1) with Hannah #Arendt's shifts to the concept of life. (2) AgambenVsFoucault: he has failed to shift his field of activity to the policies of the great totalitarian states of the 20th century. (3) AgambenVsArendt: their analysis of totalitarian states lacks the aspect of biopolitics. Solution/Agamben: Agamben brings the two strands together in the terms "naked" and "holy" life. See Holiness/Agamben, Terminology/Agamben, Life/Agamben, Humans/Agamben. 1. Cf. Michel Foucault, Sexualität und Wahrheit, Bd. 1: Der Wille zum Wissen, Frankfurt/M. 1977. 2. Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder vom tätigen Leben, München 1960. 3. Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 127. Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

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Economic theories on misinformation – Dictionary of Arguments

Misinformation/Fake News/Economic Theories: (the term “fake news” is not used by the quoted authors). In one set of models, opinions spread like diseases; that is, individuals become infected (adopt an opinion) by contact with another agent with that disease (see, e.g., chapter 7 of Jackson, 2008)(1). Such diffusion processes are also studied in computer science, statistical physics, and sociology. In such models, biased agents are always better off when there are more biased agents (…). In a second set of models, opinion formation in social networks builds on DeGroot (1974)(2). Agents, with possibly different initial priors, repeatedly “exchange” their beliefs with their neighbors and adopt some statistic (the weighted average, say) of their neighbors’ opinions. Such agents fail to take into account the repetition of information that can propagate through a network, leading to a persuasion bias as referred to by DeMarzo et al. (2003)(3). Golub and Jackson (2010)(4) find sufficient network conditions under which such a naive rule leads to convergence to the truth—there can be no prominent groups, for example, that have disproportionate influence. Research on Bayesian learning in networks (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 1998(5); Gale and Kariv, 2003(6); Acemoglu et al., 2011(7)) characterizes convergence or not to common opinions for different network architectures. A new literature studies individuals’ incentives to communicate private information to others. Niehaus (2011)(8) adds a cost to sharing information; an agent will weigh the benefits to her friends and neighbors against the personal cost. Other papers study influence in networks; agents all have private information and have an incentive to share their information because, for example, agents benefit when others’ adopt the same action (Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010(9); Galeotti et al., 2013(10); Calvo´ -Armengol et al., 2015(11)). Chatterjee and Dutta (2016)(12) [are probably the closest to the line of work by Bloch, Demange and Kranton 2018(13)]. [Their paper focuses] on the credibility of messages received by agents in a social network when the message can be false. Kranton I 424 (…) this article features a situation in which information is not widely held, and unbiased agents strategically spread information so that a correct public decision is taken. A large economic literature also studies the transmission and communication of information through the observation of other agents’ actions. Observation helps discern the true state of the world. Knowledge or information costlessly spreads (Banerjee, 1992(14), 1993(15); Bikhchandani et al., 1992(16)), or spills over, to others, as occurs when people observe others’ use of a new technology (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995(17); Conley and Udry, 2010(18)). In these models, though individuals influence others through their actions, they derive no benefit in influencing them and, contrary to [the article by Bloch, Demange, Kranton 2018 (13)], any decision to communicate is not strategic. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Kranton. 1. JACKSON, M., Social and Economic Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 2. DEGROOT,M. H., “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 69 (345) (1974), 118–21. 3. DEMARZO, P. M.,D.VAYANOS, AND J. ZWEIBEL, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3) (2003), 909–68. 4. GOLUB, B., AND M. JACKSON, “Naive Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (2010), 112–49. 5. BALA, V., AND S. GOYAL, “Learning from Neighbors,” The Review of Economic Studies 65 (3) (1998), 595–621. 6. GALE, D., AND S. KARIV, “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,” Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2) (2003), 329–46. 7. ACEMOGLU, D.,M.DAHLEH, I. LOBEL, AND A.OZDAGLAR, “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,” Review of Economic Studies 78 (2011), 1201–36. 8. NIEHAUS, P., “Filtered Social Learning,” Journal of Political Economy 119 (4) (2011), 686–720. 9. HAGENBACH, J., AND F. KOESSLER, “Strategic Communication in Networks,” Review of Economic Studies 77 (3) (2010), 1072–99. 10. GALEOTTI, A., C.GHIGLINO, AND F. SQUINTANI, “Strategic Information in Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5) (2013), 1751–69. 11. CALVO´ -ARMENGOL,A., J. DEMART´I, ANDA. PRAT, “Communication and Influence,” Theoretical Economics 10 (2015), 649–90. 12. CHATTERJEE, K., AND B.DUTTA, “Credibility and Strategic Learning in Networks,” International Economic Review 57 (3) (2016), 759–86. 13. BLOCH, F., G. DEMANGE, AND R. KRANTON, "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2)(2018), pages 421-448, May. 14. BANERJEE, A., “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (3) (1992), 797–817. 15. BANERJEE, A., “The Economics of Rumours,” Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993), 309–27. 16. BIKHCHANDANI, S., D. HIRSHLEIFER, AND I. WELCH, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992), 992–1026. 17. FOSTER, A., AND M. ROSENZWEIG, “Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture,” Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995), 1176–209. 18. CONLEY, T., AND C.UDRY, “Learning about a New Technology: Pineapple in Ghana,” American Economic Review 100 (2010), 35–69. Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

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Fake News

Krastev I 173 Fake News/Krastev: Hinter [Trumps] ständigen Beschwerden über "Fake News" lässt sich eine sehr spezifische und sehr eigentümliche Haltung gegenüber der Wahrheit erkennen. Auch hier hilft es, Trump mit postkommunistischen Staatsoberhäupten wie Putin in Verbindung zu bringen, die dafür bekannt sind, leicht überprüfbare Tatsachen öffentlich zu leugnen, um Verhalten aufzuzeigen, das sonst anomal erscheinen würde. >Falschinformation/Politik Russlands. Gessen: Wie die in Russland geborene amerikanische Journalistin Mascha Gessen argumentiert, teilen Trump und Putin eine ähnliche Verachtung für die objektive Wahrheit. "Lügen ist die Botschaft", schreibt sie. Es geht nicht nur darum, dass Putin und Trump lügen, sondern auch darum, dass sie auf die gleiche Art und Weise und aus dem gleichen Grund lügen: unverhohlen, um Macht über die Wahrheit selbst zu erlangen(1). Krastev: Merkwürdigerweise erzählen beide Lügen, die schnell und mühelos als falsch entlarvt werden können. Der Zweck ihrer Lügen kann angesichts der Tatsache, dass ein Großteil ihres Zielpublikums Zugang zu alternativen Informationsquellen hat, nicht darin bestehen, zu täuschen. Zumindest ein Ziel ist es, zu zeigen, dass Führungspersönlichkeiten ausweichen können, ohne ungewollte Konsequenzen zu erleiden. Keinen Preis dafür zu zahlen, dass man leicht aufzudeckende Unwahrheiten erzählt, ist ein wirksames Mittel, um seine Macht und Straflosigkeit zu demonstrieren. Motivation: Bei der Entscheidung, was zu sagen ist, fragt Trump immer, ob Wahrheiten oder Unwahrheiten ihm eher helfen, "zu gewinnen". Seiner Meinung nach gibt es offensichtlich keinen Grund zu glauben, dass Personen, die die Wahrheit erzählen, eher als Lügner bekommen, was sie wollen. Aber wenn seine unverhohlenen Lügen das Schuldbewusstsein verraten, dann tun seine manchmal überraschenden Wahrheiten (dass z.B. gewählte Politiker im Besitz ihrer Geldgeber sind)(2) das Gleiche, denn er verkauft solche Wahrheiten nicht, weil sie wahr sind, sondern nur, um seine Missachtung der politischen Korrektheit zu dramatisieren und seine Feinde aus dem Gleichgewicht zu bringen. Krastev I 174 Personen, die die Wahrheit erzählen, können ihren Feinden unbeabsichtigt Hilfe und Trost spenden. Deshalb verlieren sie oft, wohingegen Lügner oft gewinnen. Krastev I 175 [Trump] glaubt auch, dass seine Feinde nicht deshalb Wahrheiten aussprechen, weil sie eine Art unparteiische Hingabe an die Wahrheit haben, sondern weil (und wann) es ihrem Interesse dient, dies zu tun. Indem er opportunistisch zwischen dem Sagen von Wahrheiten und dem Erzählen von Lügen wechselt, "projiziert er immer seine eigene Widerspenstigkeit" auf andere(3), was bedeutet, dass er davon ausgeht, dass alle anderen dasselbe tun. Vgl. >Ernsthaftigkeit/Bernard Williams. Putin: Wenn Putin leugnet, dass Moskau etwas mit der Vergiftung des ehemaligen Spions Sergej Skripal und seiner Tochter in Salisbury zu tun hatte, verteidigt er offensichtlich die Souveränität seines Landes, wozu auch das Recht gehört, die Gültigkeit von "Wahrheiten" zu leugnen, die von politischen Gegnern benutzt werden, um Russland anzugreifen. >Ernsthaftigkeit/Bernard Williams. Krastev I 177 Loyalität: (...) Die tief empfundene Loyalität gegenüber einem Führer oder einer Bewegung kann nicht durch offizielle Dokumente oder andere bürokratische Feinheiten erschüttert werden. Die Bereitschaft, solche faktischen Unwahrheiten zu wiederholen, ist ein Test der Loyalität. 1. Masha Gessen, 'The Putin Paradigm', New York Review of Books (13 December 2016). 2. 'As a businessman and a very substantial donor to very important people, when you give, they do whatever the hell you want them to do.' Peter Nicholas, 'Donald Trump Walks Back His Past Praise of Hillary Clinton', Wall Street Journal (29 July 2015). 3. Nancy Pelosi, cited in Jennifer Rubin, 'Trump's Fruitless Struggle to Stop Transparency', Washington Post (7 February 2019).

Aus:

Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019

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Martin Schulz

Colored Pencil on paper

21 x 29 cm

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Martin Schulz

Colored pencil on paper

21x29cm

[marion-aschendorff]

Martin Schulz

Pencil on paper

21x29cm

[marion-aschendorff]

Martin Schulz

Pencil on paper

21x29cm

[marion-aschendorff]

Martin Schulz

Pencil on paper

21x29cm

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Philosophische Themen und wissenschaftliche Debatten. – Wissenschaftliche Lager – Autorenübergreifende Register und Glossare – Gegenüberstellung von wissenschaftlichen Positionen und Thesen – Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften - Analytische Philosophie. Start des Projekts: März 1998

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What is the Dictionary of Arguments? This website compares theories and counter-positions and shows their origin. 

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Berlin Wall 25 Years