#she just continues to worship torrance

[lunaticobscurity]

some basic oc descriptions

king beetle: he's an immortal cosmic being who travels the omniverse in search of strong opponents to fight

marmanousa: a huge, super-strong amazon who loves to fight and eat monsters. somehow gets caught up in king beetle's omniverse-traversing shenanigens a lot

electrostansia: a wrestling android created by the soviet union to demonstrate communist superiority in both technology and sports. she mostly just participates in wrestling and other combat sports, but was also instrumental in the liberation of the former united kingdom

amelia lahane/barnfield: the illegitimate daughter of the silent movie actress cleopatra lahane and the private detective ralph barnfield. after her dad died, she took the opportunity to take his name and inherit his office, to escape the boring life of a rich girl in 1920s california. she ended up getting involved in protecting humanity and the earth from the great old ones. later in life, she founded the barnfield foundation to continue this work after her death.

isaiah torrance: a non-binary teen who ran away from home, only to get murdered and ressurected as a vampire. mostly amoral and cowardly, they use their good looks to manipulate people, but they're still secretly a scared kid deep down inside.

odsetseg: an adventurer from a tribe that lives high up in a remote mountain range. as other cultures were building the first ocean-faring ships in the age of discovery, odsetseg's tribe were building balloons filled with a mysterious lighter-than-air gas that comes from a certain vent in the mountain range. she travels the world in a balloon, looking for adventure and generally trying to do good and fight evil.

pharoah xiii: an alchemist from ancient egypt who harnessed the power of monstertronic particles (or "monstertrons") to greatly extend his lifespan. aspires to become a true immortal, like king beetle, and also sometimes attempts to take over the earth

the retromancer: an immortal who will be born at the end of time, and age backwards until he dies of extreme old age at the beginning. i can't remember what the point of him is lol

abilasha liyanarachi: currently a shadar-kai who was left behind on her first raid of the material plane as a kid, and then spent a few years making a living as a street urchin pickpocket, but later became an adventurer who fights evil. at some point, the parts of her story that are copyrights of wizards of the coast will be excised and replaced with something else.

laurence francios-dumont: a zoology professor who went on a long, worldwide series of expeditions after an affair with an assistant who also happened to be the daughter of a wealthy university donor and newspaper owner. during his travels, he encountered the dinosaur-like monster mokele-mbembe and came into conflict with various cults worshipping the great old ones

there's more but i've been typing for like half an hour now

[bettysbrewaa]

@cheertm   liked   for   a   starter   !

          chin   rests   on   bent   palm.   you   appear   DAZED---   truly   lost   in   the   sound   of   her   voice   and   animated   movements   of   hands   as   they   explain   current   situation.   girls   were   pretty   and   you   were   a   SUCKER   for   pretty   girls,          ‘     so   then   what   happened   ?     ‘

[cinebration]

The Darkest Shine (Dan Torrance x Reader) [Part 15]

You vs. the man in black.

Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Epilogue

Tagged: @blackeasteagle, @theblackmaskclub​

Warnings: none

Gif Source: misskamala

“I don’t like this,” Dan muttered, not for the first time. It had become something of a mantra, repeated nigh religiously.

It didn’t make him feel any better.

“I have to try,” you said. You couldn’t keep the desperate edge from your voice.

Not only did you have to try, but you had to believe the plan would work. If it didn’t…the thought was too unbearable to consider.

Dan struggled not to let his anxiety transfer to you. It was a struggle he wasn’t winning. He had lost too much in his lifetime to handle losing you, not after everything he had experienced and overcome. It didn’t seem fair.

“It’ll be alright,” you assured him. It has to be.

After the night at the hospice, you had carefully constructed a plan predicated on what you had seen and learned before the veil.

Death’s veil.

Meditation had never been your thing, your thoughts too jumbled and loud to clear out of your mind, the man in black’s susurrus voice slithering around in the silence between screamed thoughts. But you had spent the last week lying in bed or sitting upright, alone in both instances, trying to quiet your inner turmoil long enough to communicate with your Shine.

It was something you had discussed with Dan prior to attempting it.

“I’ve never thought of the Shining as a thing,” Dan had said. “It’s not what I would call living.” Even as he said it, the statement sounded false. He shook his head, shrugging helplessly. “It can’t hurt to try.”

You had even consulted Abra. With the bright-eyes conviction of a girl her age, she had answered, “I never had to do that. I would just know I could do it. Or I would try to see if I could.”

So try you did.

The third night of intense focus had yielded some results. Enough for you to be convinced that you knew what to do when the time came.

It took you another two days to work up the nerve to tell Dan your plan. He had listened in silence until the specifics detailed the danger you would face, at which point the almost-mantra began falling from his lips.

“I had to pull you out last time,” he reminded you. “What if I’m not there?”

“Maybe I can pull myself out.”

He heard the lack of confidence in your voice and raked a hand through his hair. His mouth tasted dry, aching for liquid-gold relief. Pushing back against the urge, he faced you, struggling to find the right words, if there even were any.

You got up from the chair and went over to him, crouching before him with your hands on his knees. Staring down at you, he marveled at the determination in your eyes. The exhaustion on your face, the faint hope just below the surface, afraid to show itself for fear it would spook away the possibility of freedom—he saw it written plainly on your features. It broke his heart as much as letting you carry out your insane scheme.

Folding his hands over yours, he hung his head, letting the action speak louder than words.

“I have to do this,” you told him. “Look at me.”

He forced himself to meet your gaze.

“If this goes wrong, it goes wrong, and I get punished for it.”

His hands tightened on yours. “I—”

“Let me finish, please.” Inhaling deeply, you continued, “He’s never going to leave me alone. Not until he gets what he wants, whatever that is. And then he’ll kill me. That’s a guarantee. Death is inevitable when it comes to him.”

“Maybe if you can hide yourself—”

“Dan.”

He looked away from you, his vision wavering with tears. You reached up and brushed the stray tear slipping down his cheek. He leaned into your touch.

“It’ll all be over soon,” you whispered. “One way or the other.”

~~

It took four days for the man in black to appear. He arrived during the early evening. Dan had gone out a few minutes before to fix a problem with the Teenytown train.

The man in black’s low whistle alerted you to his presence. He stood just inside the doorway, as though the lock hadn’t been bolted shut. Lounging in that carefree but menacing way of his, he scrutinized you, a faint smile on his face.

He needs you to be alone, you told yourself, unable to prevent the momentary spike of fear piercing your chest. Alone, you’re vulnerable. Cut from the herd.

“Hello, sweetheart,” he purred.

Pushing himself from the doorway, he approached you slowly. Forcing yourself to keep still, you watched him circle you, a mouse trapped by a playful feline.

“A little birdie told me that you’ve been experimenting on your own,” he said, completing his circuit around you. “Care to share the data?”

“A little birdie?”

“Yes. I have plenty of little birdies. I may be far seeing, but I don’t have infinite eyes.”

You laughed humorlessly, a short chuff verging on derision. The man in black arched his meticulously shaped eyebrows.

“Caught a little spunk, I see. Wouldn’t have anything to do with that new toy of yours, would it?” He started circling again, this time more leisurely. “Daniel Anthony Torrance. A fucked up little boy trapped in an alcoholic’s body. I must say, I do love the irony. It’s got my own sense of morbid humor.”

Anxiety thrumming through you, mingling with fear and faint undercurrents of anticipation, you began emptying your mind. Slowly, avoiding the man in black’s sharp intuition.

“I can see the allure,” he continued, smiling humorlessly. “After all, nothing can quite get a person going like thanking their savior in all the ways they know how. It must be lovely to be worshiped.”

The split in your attentions as you wove the trap prevented you from considering his words. Though you felt their sting, you didn’t feel their venom.

The man in black frowned. “You don’t seem present with me today. You know how much I hate that.”

Your eyes unfocused, hands curling at your sides. For a moment, it felt like your fingers hooked into the edge of a coarse rug, heavy with the weight of its occupants.

The man in black called your name.

You barely heard it.

Striding forward, the man in black seized you by the throat, roaring something into your deaf ears, his voice replaced with that high-pitched ringing from before.

You tensed, readying yourself to pull.

Distantly, you saw the door to the apartment push open. You caught a glimpse of Dan’s shocked expression. The man in black glanced over his shoulder.

You yanked the metaphysical carpet out from under him.

Dan’s voice shouted your name as you tumbled.

~~

Darkness.

You blinked heavily, trying to orient yourself.

You’re standing on a floor of nothingness, you reminded yourself. Lifting your head, you found the veil exactly where you had left it, shimmering as ripples flowed across the unreal fabric.

You weren’t alone.

The man in black spun sharply on his feet, surveying the space with confusion. “Where the…?”

Can he see me? The question floated bright across your mind, the sun shining out from behind an ominous thundercloud.

Seizing onto that hope, you edged toward the veil.

A cold hand clamped down on your shoulder, spinning you around sharply. Curiosity warred with mild fear in the man in black’s face, poorly concealed behind irritation.

You shoved against him, trying to dislodge his grip. The action sent you stumbling backward toward the veil, tripping over your own feet. You seized onto the phantom fabric, pulling on it to keep your balance.

“What game is this, sweetheart?” he asked, a vicious edge to his voice.

“A new one,” you managed to say, lips curling back into a semi-snarl of triumph.

He nodded, harsh laughter spilling from his mouth. “You think this little parlor trick matters to me? Can do anything to me?”

He stepped closer, trying to crowd your space. You felt the veil give slightly beneath your back.

Cold breath rolled over the back of your neck.

Not yet, you thought, hoping whatever it was behind the curtain could hear you.

“Your power is nothing compared to mine,” the man in black hissed. “You are nothing but a blip on my radar, a doll I’ve gotten bored with.”

Hands curling into the veil, you inched it aside, staring down the man in black’s icy stare. Something deathly cold touched the side of your neck, sending frigid water into your veins. You gasped.

“I’m going to take what’s mine.”

A wide smile broke across your mouth, arresting the man in black in his tracks.

“Playtime’s over,” you hissed.

Yanking aside the curtain, you seized him by the black vest he wore and flung yourself backwards into death’s waiting grasp.

[maxwellyjordan]

Argument analysis: Argument analysis: Justices divided in debate over “ministerial exception”

This morning the Supreme Court heard oral argument in a pair of cases filed by two teachers in southern California, who sued the Catholic schools where they worked after they learned that their contracts wouldn’t be renewed. The Catholic schools have urged the courts to throw out the teachers’ cases, relying on a doctrine known as the “ministerial exception,” which bars ministers from suing churches and other religious institutions for employment discrimination. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the exception prohibited a lawsuit filed by a teacher at a Lutheran school who was also an ordained minister, but it expressly declined to provide a formula for courts to use to determine whether other employees qualify as ministers in future cases. The 2012 ruling was unanimous, but after over an hour and a half of oral argument today, it appeared less likely that the justices’ eventual decision in today’s cases would be.

One of the teachers, Kristen Biel, taught fifth grade at St. James School in Torrance, California, beginning in 2013. When the school did not renew her contract for the following year, Biel – who had told the school that she was being treated for breast cancer the following year – filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that she had been the victim of disability discrimination. Agnes Morrissey-Berru, who taught fifth grade at Our Lady of Guadalupe School in Hermosa Beach, California, from 1999 until 2015, filed an age discrimination lawsuit when she learned that her contract would not be renewed. In both cases, the schools argued, and the federal trial courts agreed, that the women’s suits were barred by the ministerial exception. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reinstated the suits, concluding that the ministerial exception normally requires the employee to play a “religious leadership” role, which in its view Biel and Morrissey-Berru did not.

Arguing for the schools, lawyer Eric Rassbach told the justices that, if the separation of church and state means anything, it means that the government cannot interfere with a church’s decisions about who is authorized to teach its religion. Because the teachers in these cases were the “primary agents” for teaching the Catholic faith to students “for hours on end over the course of a week,” Rassbach emphasized, they fall within the ministerial exception and their lawsuits should be dismissed. By contrast, Rassbach suggested, the teachers have urged the court to focus on their title, which would elevate “form over function” and “hopelessly entangle” courts in the affairs of religious institutions.

Some justices expressed concern that the schools’ interpretation of the exception would sweep too broadly. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg asked Rassbach to explain who would not be a minister in his clients’ view.

Rassbach responded that any school employees who were not performing important religious functions would not be covered by the exception – for example, a janitor or an IT professional. A coach, Rassbach suggested, would not necessarily be regarded as a minister unless he was performing religious functions.

Ginsburg pushed back, asking about a scenario in which a coach leads the players in an opening prayer.

If the only religious activity in which the coach engages is the opening prayer, Rassbach suggested, then the coach would not be a minister, because the religious role would be minimal. And more broadly, Rassbach sought to assure the justices that courts would not have to make such decisions often.

Justice Stephen Breyer chimed in. Federal laws, Breyer noted, allow employers to hire someone who belongs to a particular religion if there is a connection between the job and the religion. And the ministerial exception would apply to bar a lawsuit by someone in a leadership position in a church. Why, Breyer asked Rassbach, do you need more than that?

Justice Sonia Sotomayor echoed Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s questions. You are asking, she told Rassbach, for an exception that is broader than the ministerial exception and broader than what is needed to protect the church. Biel (who died last year, but whose husband has continued the lawsuit) and Morrissey-Berru aren’t claiming that they were fired because the school thought they were teaching religion wrong; they are claiming that they were the victims of discrimination based on their disability and age. You are asking, Sotomayor continued, for an exemption from a variety of laws, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act and “all sorts of laws, including breach of contract.”

Justice Elena Kagan fired a series of hypotheticals at Rassbach, ranging from a math teacher who teaches “something about Judaism for ten minutes a week” to a nurse at a Catholic hospital who prays with sick patients and an employee at a soup kitchen who leads grace before meals. What’s the connection, Kagan asked Rassbach, between the employees who would or would not fall under the exception, in your view?

Kagan’s questions embodied the apparent concerns of several justices on the court: How exactly should the court draw the line to determine which employees are “ministers” for purposes of the exception? For Rassbach, this meant answering questions like the one he received from Justice Clarence Thomas, who pressed him to explain how a court would determine whether an employee performs an important religious function.

Rassbach pointed to some of the roles described in the court’s 2012 ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church v. EEOC, such as preaching, teaching and leading worship. And if other roles are at issue, Rassbach suggested, courts should give some weight to the church’s understanding of the employee’s role.

Justice Neil Gorsuch was skeptical. Even when courts defer to the religious institution, Gorsuch told Rassbach, you are still asking us to make some decision about what is important and what is not. Gorsuch envisioned a hypothetical school in which everyone pledged to try to help kids be part of the faith. What, Gorsuch asked, do we do about that?

Justice Brett Kavanaugh also worried aloud about how to distinguish between different kinds of teachers. Would an English teacher “who sprinkles in references to Matthew 25 and ‘feed the hungry’” or an art teacher who discusses art in the Vatican be covered by the ministerial exception? Rassbach responded that they would not be, but Kavanaugh seemed unconvinced. Are we going to have litigation, Kavanaugh queried, over what particular students take away from particular coaches or students if you win this case?

Arguing for the federal government, which filed a “friend of the court” brief supporting the schools, Morgan Ratner, an assistant to the U.S. solicitor general, faced similar questions, including one from Chief Justice John Roberts: Is a court supposed to look at what is a significant religious function and what is an insignificant one?

Ratner sought to reassure the court that looking at the functions described in Hosanna-Tabor – such as whether the employee engaged in preaching, teaching and leading worship – would address most ordinary cases in this area. This standard been around since the 1980s, Ratner reminded the justices; it is not something that the federal government is inventing, nor is it a rule that courts will struggle with.

But Ginsburg disagreed, describing the breadth of exemption that Ratner was proposing as “staggering.” What about a lay teacher, with job duties similar to those of Biel and Morrissey-Berru, who is fired after she reports a student’s complaint that she has been sexually harassed by a priest. She has no remedy?

In his questions for Ratner, Gorsuch seemed to suggest that the government’s position doesn’t go far enough. In other contexts, Gorsuch observed, the Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that courts shouldn’t examine how central someone’s religious beliefs are; it is enough that the beliefs are sincerely held. But here, he told Ratner, the government is asking the court to decide who is playing an “important” religious role and who has a minimal one. Doesn’t that create, Gorsuch asked, the same kind of entanglement that we have tried to avoid elsewhere? Why can’t we just say that a church’s sincerely held religious belief about who is a minister should decide the case?

Arguing for the teachers, lawyer Jeffrey Fisher told the justices that they were “absolutely right” to be concerned that a focus on whether an employee serves an “important religious function” would result in courts’ being enmeshed in the affairs of religious institutions. Instead, Fisher argued, the Supreme Court should rule that courts should look at “objective factors,” such as an employee’s title. Such a rule, Fisher contended, would be consistent with how the lower courts had been applying the ministerial exception in the decades leading up to Hosanna-Tabor, when they consistently held that lay teachers were not covered by the exception even if they taught religion. Fisher cautioned the justices that if the court were to rule that all “important religious functions” trigger the ministerial exception, it would see a flood of cases, involving employees at all kinds of workplaces operated by religious institutions. We are talking, Fisher emphasized, about hundreds of thousands of nurses’ being stripped of employment protections, for example. Moreover, Fisher added, the schools’ rule would call into question things like credentialing requirements and criminal background checks for teachers at religious schools.

Roberts characterized the teachers’ position as more “formalistic” – that is, more focused on titles than on whether the teachers are performing religious functions. My concern, Roberts told Fisher, is that different faiths may put different stock in titles, and that such standard would be “pretty manipulable”; religious institutions could simply shield themselves from liability by giving everyone a title.

Fisher explained that titles are an important first factor to consider, but that courts should generally follow the multi-factor test that the justices outlined in Hosanna-Tabor. Courts should look not only at the title but also at whether the employee had specific training or needed to belong to the same religion, Fisher noted.

Thomas highlighted what he saw as a contradiction in the teachers’ argument. Biel and Morrissey-Berru, he recounted, sometimes led their students in prayer or took them to church services, which they could not do at the local public school. Fisher responded that although such actions would indeed cross the line for public school teachers, the distinction doesn’t shed any light on what makes someone a minister. But Thomas countered that he found it a “bit odd” that something that would violate the Constitution when done in a public school would not be enough to qualify for constitutional protection in a religious school.

Although his colleagues had earlier expressed concerns about how to draw the line between different kinds of religious functions, including different roles for teachers, Justice Samuel Alito seemed more sympathetic to the schools’ argument. He asked Fisher whether the ministerial exception would apply to a middle- or high-school teacher who taught only religion all day. Fisher did not concede that a teacher in that position was a “minister,” but he seemed to suggest that it would be a closer case than those of his clients, elementary school teachers who taught all subjects and just happened “to pick up the workbook for 40 minutes a day and teach religion.”

Alito did not appear to agree that the two kinds of teachers should be treated differently. “For a school that is set up by a religious body,” Alito emphasized, “the teaching of religion is central.” Otherwise, Alito suggested, the students could simply go to public school.

In his rebuttal, Rassbach warned the justices that upholding the 9th Circuit’s decision would “replace Hosanna-Tabor’s well-designed framework for deciding delicate church/state questions with a constitutional thicket.” Virtually all of the justices appeared to share concerns about avoiding a constitutional thicket, but it was far less clear that there was any consensus on the best way to do so.

A decision in the case is expected by summer.

This post was originally published at Howe on the Court.

The post Argument analysis: Argument analysis: Justices divided in debate over “ministerial exception” appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

from Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/argument-analysis-argument-analysis-justices-divided-in-debate-over-ministerial-exception/ via http://www.rssmix.com/

[maxwellyjordan]

Argument preview: Justices to consider what makes a minister a minister (Corrected)

Eight years ago, in a case called Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court recognized a “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws, reflecting the idea that religious institutions normally have the sole right to determine who can act as their ministers. The justices ruled in that case that the exception barred a lawsuit brought by a teacher and ordained minister at a Lutheran school who challenged the school’s decision to fire her. However, they declined to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a min However, they declined to “adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister” in future cases. Next week, in a pair of cases involving teachers at Catholic elementary schools in California, the Supreme Court will consider how courts should determine when an employee is a “minister” for purposes of the exception.

Our Lady of Guadalupe

The first lawsuit was filed against Our Lady of Guadalupe School, a Catholic parish school in Hermosa Beach, California, by Agnes Morrissey-Berru, who taught fifth grade at the school from 1999 until 2015. When the school informed her that her contract would not be renewed, Morrissey-Berru went to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that she had been the victim of age discrimination. After the EEOC gave her permission to sue, she filed a lawsuit in federal district court in California in 2016. The school argued that the lawsuit was barred by the ministerial exception, and the district court agreed.

The second lawsuit was filed against St. James School, a Catholic parish school in Torrance, California – just a few miles away from Our Lady of Guadalupe School – by Kristen Biel, who began teaching fifth grade full-time at the school in 2013. In April 2014, Biel announced that she was being treated for breast cancer. When the school did not renew her contract for the following year, Biel filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming that the school had discriminated against her because she had cancer. The EEOC gave her permission to sue, and she went to court in 2015. The district court agreed with the school that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception.

Both women appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, which heard Biel’s case first and reversed. The court of appeals concluded that the ministerial exception normally applies when the employee plays a “religious leadership” role, while Biel’s role “was limited to teaching religion from a book.” Relying on that analysis, a different panel ruled for Morrissey-Berru a few weeks later. The schools asked the Supreme Court to weigh in, which it agreed to do last December.

In their brief in the Supreme Court, the schools explain that a unanimous Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor cited four different considerations in concluding that the teacher in that case was a “minister”: her title; the “substance reflected in that title”; her use of her title and the “important religious functions that she performed.” In employment discrimination cases since Hosanna-Tabor, the schools argue, lower courts have generally focused on the functions that an employee carries out, particularly whether the employee conducts worship services and teaches religion. But the 9th Circuit ruled that the “important religious functions” factor, standing alone, is not enough to make someone a minister – even if she has “significant religious responsibilities.”

The 9th Circuit’s rule, the schools assert, is inconsistent with Hosanna-Tabor and the court’s decision to eschew a “rigid formula.” The test should remain flexible, the schools acknowledge, to permit courts to address all the different cases that they may encounter. But in most cases, the “religious functions” factor will be enough to determine whether someone is a minister, “because it most directly reaches the animating purpose of the ministerial exception.” Religious institutions should control religious functions, such as determining or teaching religious doctrine; to do so, the schools reason, the institutions “must control who performs them,” without interference from the government. “The Court gave no indication that these functions must come packaged with a formal title or extensive training for the ministerial exception to apply,” the schools stress.

When the focus is on the functions that the teachers perform, the schools continue, the teachers’ cases are “easy” ones, because Morrissey-Berru and Biel “exercised important religious functions of worship, ritual, and expression.” Both teachers carried out the mission of the Catholic church by communicating its faith to young people: They taught religion to their students “for more hours per week than most parish pastors” and for more hours than the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, who was deemed a “minister.”  They “accompanied their students to and in worship” and led them in prayer every day, but they also “personified Catholic values and imbued every subject they taught with Catholic beliefs.” And even if the court looks beyond the teachers’ functions at the other factors cited in Hosanna-Tabor, the teachers in this case also had substantive titles weighing in favor of deeming them ministers: They were described as teachers and catechists and had “training designed to make them more effective in those roles.”

The federal government, which filed a “friend of the court” brief supporting the schools, tells the justices that the ministerial exception should bar a lawsuit by “any employee who preaches a church’s beliefs, teaches its faith, or carries out its religious mission, because the independence of virtually all religious groups depends on the government’s avoiding interference in those matters.” But if a case is close, the federal government argues, courts should defer to the institution and find that the exception applies as long as the institution “sincerely regards its employee as performing such important religious functions.”

In their brief in the Supreme Court, Morrissey-Berru and Darryl Biel (Kristin’s husband, who took her place in the lawsuit after she passed away last year) stress that a rule that hinges on whether an employee performs “important religious functions” “would turn the [ministerial] exception inside out” because so many employees at religious institutions, from “nurses in hospitals” to “counselors in summer camps,” play roles that are considered critical to the institutions’ religious missions. To put it another way, either everyone working for those institutions would be an essential employee, or courts would have to dig deep to distinguish between employees who serve critical religious functions and those who do not, which would be contrary to the purpose of the ministerial exception.

Instead, Morrissey-Berru and Biel explain, the framework that the court outlined in Hosanna-Tabor, which draws on “lower courts’ decades of experience with the issue,” looks primarily for official and objective signs that the institution regards the employee as a minister – for example, the employee’s title, whether the employee was trained as a minister and whether the employee represented herself as a spiritual leader. Focusing on all of these factors together, rather than solely on the functions that an employee performs, avoids the practical problems that the schools’ test would create, Morrissey-Berru and Biel suggest, by allowing courts not to probe the inner workings of religious institutions. The bright lines that would be established by focusing on an employee’s designated title and training would benefit both the employee and the institution: They would put the employee on notice that secular employment discrimination laws may not apply to her, while at the same time sending a “clear and powerful message that the church has put its faith in” that employee’s hands.

When the proper framework is applied, Morrissey-Berru and Biel continue, it is clear that the teachers in this case were not “ministers.” They were not designated as spiritual leaders – their contracts simply described them as “teachers” – and they did not have any religious training before beginning their jobs at the schools; indeed, they didn’t even have to be Catholic. They spent “the overwhelming majority of their time” teaching subjects that had nothing to do with the Catholic faith; when they did teach religion, it was from a workbook. Moreover, Morrissey-Berru and Biel emphasize, they are asking the justices for a narrow ruling that would not “disturb other legal protections that generally insulate religiously motivated employment decisions from judicial scrutiny.” “There is no doubt,” they concede, “that religious employers have special concerns and should often be treated differently from other employers.”

A decision in the case is expected by summer.

This post has been corrected to describe more accurately the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.

This post was originally published at Howe on the Court.

The post Argument preview: Justices to consider what makes a minister a minister (Corrected) appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

from Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-what-makes-a-minister-a-minister/ via http://www.rssmix.com/