#lexi-618

[jazzstarrlight]

So I know wig option 1 has the polls favor, but after careful consideration otion 2 is most suited for the story.

I now introduce to you, my OC Lexi-618! I've also decided to change her eyes to a more blue hue of light. (Also, that pickaxe is collapsible for pocketing.)

Let me know what you think!

[shadowanndeath]

My sister Heidi Steiger (406-490-0896), my cousins Robert Bruner (406-595-3931) and John Bruner (406-498-6681), Whitehall, my ex Josh Dax Lossy (719-210-2563), Idaho, Sam Gunningham (406-994-5358), Anna Schenfisch (https://www.facebook.com/share/bgJmq1dmLaTPy5GT/?mibextid=qi2Omg), Rex Wu (312-806-6825), Charley of Doom (603-995-6639), Blair Davey (406-994-3123), Addie (406-850-9302), CJ Smith (406-404-4856), Bozeman, Aaron Walley (406-927-9100), Rachel Trinder (406-230-0565), Emily Lasha (406-579-6844), Kate Künst (406-600-1075) my coworkers, Lexi Ray (406-899-8994), Texas, Emily Sam McCrossins partner (303-618-2314), are the children who are stalking me just because they don't want me to win my equality argument. They are apparently really jealous that I think they make bad life choices and didn't listen to them about what I "should be doing" because it sounded like just let them abuse me. Which is what they are currently doing much worse now. Apparently, that made them really unhappy. So they decided to put cameras in my house so they could beet me better, because they don't think I deserved to win this debate of pleasure just stop stalking me and leave me alone, because they think I only care about being pretty "for attention," they apparently consider me to be considerably more attractive than them, so they are forcing me to perform for their "attention." They just finished up their new masterpiece; they put brand new cameras in my brand new room, which is now finally ready for me after over a month since I moved in. I need this conspiracy of Spiders and Snakes to be devolved. I want none of them looking at me "that way" anymore. Sawyer Payne Son of Allen Payne is their ring leader (406-443-2211) (https://doneylaw.com/team/r-allan-payne/) I want them all to just go away.

My coworkers have been following along with harassing and taunting me constantly at work too just so they can all preserve the right to keep causing me pain and calling me stupid for running away from away from them, the monsters, because they didn't understand that I was doing it because they were making me freaky uncomfortable. Do not be listing to any of these people about me. They have never been my friends and they only know really superficial things about me

None of you are in love with me

You don't deserve to be here

Beth Pland it all (406) 994-3604

#OnlyinBozeman

[cathygeha]

REVIEW

Once Upon a Haunted Romance

An Historical Romance Collection

Ten haunted historical romance novellas collected in one volume are a perfect way to get to know new authors or spend time with the writings of already favorite authors. Whether you sit down to read the book straight through or read them spaced out over time you will be in for a treat as you find a haunting of one sort or another in this collection.

The stories include ghosts ranging from angry to helpful with some from the distant past and others more recently departed. I have listed the stories with the authors who wrote them below and have included a short note with the stories I completed reading.

Once Upon a Haunted Cave by Meara Platt – A house party that sees a Duke and his odious elderly aunt’s paid companion falling in love as they solved the mystery of the young female ghost in nearby caves.

Once Upon a Haunted Gardy by Chasity Bowlin

Once Upon an Enchanted Well by Mary Wine

Once Upon a Haunted Haven by Lexi Post: A widow ousted from her home with nothing but a haunted house she inherited will find true love with the assistance of her ghostly relative.

Once Upon a Haunted Romance by Mary Lancaster: Iwo people that have had difficult pasts find one another as a traveler is given shelter, provides protection, they fall in love with the blessing of the widow’s son and the ghost of her husband

Once Upon a Highland Mist by Maeve Greyson

Once Upon a Haunted Scottish Cottage: To inherit a Scottish cottage a set of terms must be fulfilled and in so doing a ghost assists a couple to find their happily ever after.

Once Upon a Haunted Hillfort by Mia Pride

Once Upon a Haunted Knight by Elisa Braden

Once Upon a Haunted Horn and Hoof by Elizabeth Rose: A secret recipe for whiskey, a ghost who cannot rest, and a sudden betrothal might or might not be enough to align to clans and see a ghost finally rest.

Thank you to NetGalley and Dragonblade for the ARC – This is my honest review.

4-5 Stars

BLURB

When spooky manors and or ghostly coastlines call, this stunning collection of haunted Historical Romance novellas is sure to leave you breathless with ethereal, romantic tales… Welcome to ONCE UPON A HAUNTED ROMANCE anthology! Many of your favorite Historical Romance authors have come together for a collection of never-before published stories inspired by legendary hauntings in the British Isles. A derelict old castle? A spectral lady wandering the forests? These tales will give you a chill, a thrill, and have you reading them over and over. From the moors of Devon to the ballrooms of Regency London, and far north into the Scottish Highlands, these stories will bring you wistful dreams of legendary and haunting romance. You’ve never before experienced a collection like this by some of the very best authors in Historical Romance. Authors in this anthology Meara Platt Chasity Bowlin Mary Wine Lexi Post Mary Lancaster Maeve Greyson Sofie Darling Mia Pride Elisa Braden Elizabeth Rose Lock your doors, light your candle, and settle down to this smashing collection of darkly-tinged romantic stories with unforgettable heroes and magnificent ladies. Romance has never been so daring… or so haunting!

618 pages, Kindle Edition

First published October 28, 2023

[greektrgcdy]

✉ this message will self-destruct in one minute. congratulations! you’ve been recruited to join ʙʀɪᴇʀ ᴀᴄᴀᴅᴇᴍʏ. it’s our honor to serve the greater good by educating the future of the intelligence community. if you accept, you’ll be transported to our campus to begin training. good luck, agent. no one said this was going to be easy. [ hi lexie! our tags aren’t working quite yet, may we please have a shoutout? we’re a new appless rp taking place at an academy for spies. thank you!! ]

[lovelydancers]

Senior Solo Results (Nuvo Long Beach 2019)

Senior Solos Top 10 (28):

10. (4) Vanessa Carroll (South Coast), Ella Hosseinpour (Bobbie’s), Zoe Imler (Dmitri Kulev), Shylah Bucher (Bobbie’s) 9. (2) Spencer Seebach (Bobbie’s), Mackenzie Auger (Project 21) 8. Lexi Massey (Evoke) 7. Olivia Buckhorn (K2 Studios) 6. (4) Dawson Walker (Prpject 21), Daviana Fletcher (K2 Studios), Jessalyn Ward (WDP), Kalea Escobosa (Studio Fusion) 5. (DJP) (7) Jessica Wicke (Studio Fusion), Michelle Siemienowski (Danceology), Sidney Klock (Danceology), Sky Pasqual (Danceoloyg), Valerie Chen (WDP), Miriya Lee (WDP), Robert Cornejo (WDP) 4. (DJP) (2) Ryann Christensen (Studio Fusion), Keely Meyers (WDP) 3. (DJP) (4) Macy Smith (WDP), Aaliyah Zolina (WDP), Irene Kim (WDP), Zack Sommer (Danceology) 2. (DJP) Ryan Maw (Danceology) 1. (DJP) (2) Madi Tanguay (WDP), Will Okajima (WDP)

556 DJP 557 HG 558 HG 560 HG 561 DJP 562 G 563 G 564 HG 565 HG 566 G 567 HG 568 G 569 DJP 570 HG 571 G 572 HG 573 G 574 HG 575 DJP 576 HS 578 G 580 DJP 581 HG 582 HG 583 HG 584 G 585 HG 586 DJP 587 HG 588 HG 589 DJP 590 HG 592 DJP 593 G 594 HG 595 HG 596 DJP 597 G 598 HG 599 DJP 600 HG 601 HG 602 HG 604 HG 605 G 606 HG 607 DJP 608 HG 609 DJP 610 G 611 HG 612 DJP 613 HG 614 G 615 DJP 616 G 617 HG 618 DJP 619 HG

[riederstravis]

INSURANCE-FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW-SUBROGATION-PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE

Pennsylvania State Police v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bushta), 2018 Pa. LEXIS 2582 (May 29, 2018) Todd, J.  In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether Appellant, the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), is entitled to subrogation of benefits that a trooper—who was injured in a motor vehicle accident—was eligible to receive under the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”)  against the trooper’s recovery from a third-party tortfeasor pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that PSP does not have a right of subrogation. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

The instant appeal involved the interplay between three Pennsylvania statutes—the WCA, the Heart and Lung Act, and the MVFRL.

On January 21, 2014, Claimant and his spouse entered into a Settlement and Indemnity Agreement and Release of all Claims (“Settlement Agreement”) with the tractor-trailer driver, the driver’s employer, and the other responsible parties (collectively, “third-party tortfeasors”) for $1,070.000.1 The Settlement Agreement provided, inter alia, that Claimant would “reimburse any lien holder, known or unknown, for any liens as a result of the ․ incident.” Claimant further acknowledged that he was “solely responsible for the payment of any medical bills, hospital liens, MedPay liens, worker[s’] compensation liens, attorney’s fees, taxes, withholding and all other fees, costs and expenses they have incurred as a result of the Accident.” Id. at 1 ¶ 6.

On February 4, 2014, PSP filed a petition to review compensation benefits pursuant to Section 771 of the WCA, asserting a right of subrogation against the proceeds of Claimant’s settlement with the third-party tortfeasors under Section 319 of the WCA. On November 19, 2014, Claimant entered into a signed stipulation (“Stipulation”) with PSP and PSP’s third-party administrator, Inservco Insurance Services, Inc. (“Inservco”). The Stipulation indicated, in pertinent part, that, between the date of Claimant’s injury on February 26, 2011 and the date he returned to work on June 3, 2012, Claimant had been paid $56,873.13 under the WCA.

By contrast, this case does involve the [MVFRL], and it prohibits a plaintiff from including as an element of damages payments received in the form of workers’ compensation or other “benefits paid or payable by a program ․ or other arrangement.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 720. This language “benefits paid or payable by a program” has been construed to include the program by which Heart and Lung benefits are paid. Fulmer [v. Pennsylvania State Police, 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 60, 647 A.2d 616, 618–19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) ]. Section 25(b) of Act 44 changed the Section 1720 paradigm only for workers’ compensation benefits, not Heart and Lung benefits. This means Claimant continued to be “precluded” from recovering the amount of benefits paid under the Heart and Lung Act from the responsible tortfeasors. 75 Pa.C.S. § 722. There can be no subrogation out of an award that does not include [workers’ compensation benefits]. Likewise, because the tort recovery cannot, as a matter of law, include a loss of wages covered by Heart and Lung benefits, Claimant did not receive a double recovery of lost wages or medical bills.

Payment of a claimant’s medical care and treatment is required under the Heart and Lung Act, and, regardless of the pricing schedule utilized, such payment constitutes a Heart and Lung benefit.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that all of the benefits Claimant received were Heart and Lung benefits, not WCA benefits. Thus, pursuant to the MVFRL, PSP does not have a right of subrogation against Claimant’s settlement with the third-party tortfeasors. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.

1.   f this amount, $200,000 was apportioned to the Claimant’s spouse’s loss of consortium claim. Further, the contingent fee agreement between Claimant, his spouse, and their personal injury attorneys, Powell Law, provided that the firm would receive 33 1/3 % of the recovery, and that Claimant would be responsible for the costs incurred in connection with the prosecution of the third-party claim, which totaled $18,723.68.

The post INSURANCE-FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW-SUBROGATION-PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE appeared first on Rieders, Travis, Humphrey, Waters & Dohrmann.

[newyorkprelawland-blog]

Smuggling Wildlife Across The U.S.

By Zack Choi, Syracuse University Class of 2018

March 4, 2018

A California 18 years old teenager, Luis Valencia, is sentenced to six months in jail for smuggling a Bengal cub from Mexico to San Diego, California.The prosecutors found that the teenager ran wildlife smuggling business and received thousands through trades. According to a 2016 fact sheet from Defenders of Wildlife, a Washington, D.C. based conservation organization, “Of the nearly 50,000 illegal shipments of wildlife and wildlife products seized at ports of entry from 2005 through 2014. This included nearly 55,000 live animals and three million pounds of wildlife products.” The problem farther extended many endangered species to extinction.The article called, “The International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade: Biological Genocide?”explains three main reasons for expansion of wildlife trafficking.First, surprisingly, the research has shown that wildlife protection legislation is low priority for most of the countries.Second, the society today still perceive animals and plants as to serve the needs of human beings.For centuries wildlife animals were used for human benefit.The habitus live has rooted into our society. Many smugglers easily get away without having to spend jail time or fine.Third, there are still criminals who use wildlife trafficking for financial benefits. The lack of care for wildlife and nature brought many animals to become extinct and endangered. What are the current law against smuggling wildlife across the United States?

The teenager, Luis Valencia, violated the USCS § 545 when he smuggled in a Bengal cub to the United States land. The code states “Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or bring into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, knowing the same to have been imported into the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.” Even thoughit was just a cub, it is still considered as wildlife. The 16 USCS §3371 defines the term “fish or wildlife”-“as any wild animal, whether alive or dead, including without limitation any wild mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, fish, mollusk, crustacean…whether or not bred, hatched, or born in captivity, and includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof.”It is prohibited to bring any wildlife to the United States without proper documentation and process. The 16 U.S.C.S § 3372 prohibit any actions for any person who import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant in violation of any law,treaty or regulation of the United States.

The teenager can be charged for the illegal financial transaction and evade tax. Any financial transaction that represents unlawful activity such as illegal wildlife trade is violation of the 18 USCS §1956, which states “whoever, knowing that the property involved in financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with intent to engage in conduct constitutes shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” Additionally, he violated the 26 USCS § 7201 which states “any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law shall be fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the cost of prosecution.

There are many other cases that involve criminals smuggling wildlife into the United States. In the case of the United States v. Lawson 618 F. Supp. 2d 1251, the defendants flew to Thailand and purchased Rhesus Macaque, a monkey and attempted to smuggle the monkey to the United States by hiding it under one of the defendant’s clothing. The court found the defendants committed crime as a group. Since they violated the 18 USCS § 545, their appeal was denied. In the case of United States v. Stubbs, 11 F.3d 632, the criminal defendants were conviction charges arising out of the illegal importation of baby crocodiles into the United States.The defendants argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to increase their offense levels. The court affirmed defendants’ convictions based on the evidence of importing baby crocodiles into the United States. However, the court reversed the district court’s decision to increase defendants’ sentence. Many criminals take advantage of wildlife for their own profits. In order to prevent endangering wildlife such acts have been made. The Endangered Species Act was passed in 1973 to prohibit the “shipping, sales, or offer for sale, in interstate or foreign commerce, or any species listed as endangered or threatened under federal law.” Additionally, the Lacey Act allows to gain control of smuggling and illegal trade. Any person who violate Lacey Act can face civil fines, forfeiture from wildlife, fine, and incarceration. Regardless of these policies, it is important to inform people the importance of wildlife in our world.

________________________________________________________________

16 USCS § 3371

16 USCS § 3372

16 USCS § 1538

18 USCS § 545

18 USCS § 1956

26 USCS § 7201

ARTICLE: The International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade: Biological Genocide?, 6 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. &Pol'y 105

United States v. Lawson, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40754

United States v. Stubbs, 11 F.3d 632, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32258, 24 ELR 20245, 37 ERC (BNA) 2096

http://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/nation-world/national/article201180169.html

https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/wildlife-watch-wildlife-trafficking-reptiles-mexico-united-states/

Photo Credit: Drow male

[leeannclymer]

Blog Post: Mississippi: Benefits Awarded for Staph Infection Caused by Epidural Injections for Lumbar Injury

It is the province of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission to weigh the evidence—including expert medical testimony. Accordingly, where the Commission gave more weight to the employee’s medical expert—who opined that, more likely than not, the worker’s staph infection was causally connected to epidural injections the worker received as treatment for a work-related back injury—than it gave to the opposing opinion of the employer’s expert, the appellate court would not reweigh the evidence.

Thomas A. Robinson, J.D., the Feature National Columnist for the LexisNexis Workers’ Compensation eNewsletter, is the co-author of Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (LexisNexis).

LexisNexis Online Subscribers: Citations below link to Lexis Advance.

See Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC v. Scott, 2017 Miss. App. LEXIS 618 (Oct. 31, 2017)

See generally Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 130.05.

Source: Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the nation’s leading authority on workers’ compensation law

For a more detailed discussion of the case, see

Blog Post: Mississippi: Benefits Awarded for Staph Infection Caused by Epidural Injections for Lumbar Injury published first on http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/rss.aspx

[palebearwombat-blog]

Global Air Seeders Market 2017 - Case IH, , lexi-Coil, HOMAN, Great Plains, AGCO Corporation, Amity Technology

Qyresearchreports include new market research report Global Air Seeders Market Research Report 2017 to its huge collection of research reports.

The research report on the global Air Seeders market looks into current and historical values to present projections for vital market indicators. It studies regional as well as key domestic markets to present a satisfactory picture about the growth of the global market for Air Seeders over the forecast period.

The report is compiled in a chapter-wise layout with each chapter systematically divided into sub-sections for easy browsing. The annex section provides the feasibility and profitability analysis of new ventures and new investments in the Air Seeders market in the upcoming years.

To Get Sample Copy of Report visit @ http://www.qyresearchreports.com/sample/sample.php?rep_id=1132720&type=E

The introductory part of the report includes terms and terminologies, conventions, and notations that are relevant in the context of Air Seeders market. This is followed by a discussion on industry statutes, industry chain structures, and industry growth policies that are in the purview of the Air Seeders market. Demand and supply logistics, production capacity, product pricing and profit, and import/export behavior are the key parameters that have been studied across regional markets of Air Seeders.

In this report, standard analytical tools are used to assess market attractiveness of new investments in the Air Seeders market. Included in the report is a SWOT analysis of key players in the market and insights into their winning strategies and competitive hierarchy in the global market for Air Seeders. The results obtained using industry-centric analytical tools help to understand the developments in the Air Seeders market right from historical years to the end of the forecast period that market players can leverage for gainful opportunities.

Check Discount @ http://www.qyresearchreports.com/sample/sample.php?rep_id=1132720&type=D

Table of Contents

4 Global Air Seeders Supply (Production), Consumption, Export, Import by Region (2012-2017) 4.1 Global Air Seeders Consumption by Region (2012-2017) 4.2 North America Air Seeders Production, Consumption, Export, Import (2012-2017) 4.3 Europe Air Seeders Production, Consumption, Export, Import (2012-2017) 4.4 China Air Seeders Production, Consumption, Export, Import (2012-2017)

5 Global Air Seeders Production, Revenue (Value), Price Trend by Type 5.1 Global Air Seeders Production and Market Share by Type (2012-2017) 5.2 Global Air Seeders Revenue and Market Share by Type (2012-2017) 5.3 Global Air Seeders Price by Type (2012-2017) 5.4 Global Air Seeders Production Growth by Type (2012-2017)

6 Global Air Seeders Market Analysis by Application 6.1 Global Air Seeders Consumption and Market Share by Application (2012-2017) 6.2 Global Air Seeders Consumption Growth Rate by Application (2012-2017) 6.3 Market Drivers and Opportunities 6.3.1 Potential Applications 6.3.2 Emerging Markets/Countries

Browse Complete Report with TOC @ http://www.qyresearchreports.com/report/global-air-seeders-market-research-report-2017.htm

List of Tables and Figures

Figure North America Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) and Growth Rate (2012-2022) Figure Europe Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) and Growth Rate (2012-2022) Figure China Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) and Growth Rate (2012-2022) Figure Japan Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) and Growth Rate (2012-2022) Figure Southeast Asia Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) and Growth Rate (2012-2022) Figure India Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) and Growth Rate (2012-2022) Figure Global Air Seeders Revenue (Million USD) Status and Outlook (2012-2022) Figure Global Air Seeders Capacity, Production (Units) Status and Outlook (2012-2022) Figure Global Air Seeders Major Players Product Capacity (Units) (2012-2017) Table Global Air Seeders Capacity (Units) of Key Manufacturers (2012-2017)

About Us QYReseachReports.com delivers the latest strategic market intelligence to build a successful business footprint in China. Our syndicated and customized research reports provide companies with vital background information of the market and in-depth analysis on the Chinese trade and investment framework, which directly affects their business operations. Reports from QYReseachReports.com feature valuable recommendations on how to navigate in the extremely unpredictable yet highly attractive Chinese market.

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[nancyedimick]

Washington Post editorial calls for universities to ‘make crystal clear that racist … speech [is] off-limits’

From the editorial:

Two-bit provocations such as hanging nooses on campuses play on emotions made raw in the wake of a presidential campaign that featured the vilification of minorities and barely veiled race-baiting. For university administrators, the challenge is to address that legitimate pain with sensitivity and make crystal clear that racist signs, symbols and speech are off-limits.

If the call was simply to punish threats of violence — racist or otherwise — I’d be all for that; and some of the time, nooses might be seen as threats. But the editorial isn’t limited to that: It calls for administrators to punish “racist … speech” generally. (I assume the editorial must mean punishment, since it’s hard to see what else would “make crystal clear” that the speech is “off-limits.”) This is an editorial, the product of carefully considered labor on the part of a group of people, not an extemporaneous remark; when it says “racist … speech” (especially right after a sentence talking about political advocacy during a presidential campaign), I assume it means what it’s saying.

And the editorial’s proposal is an awful idea. At public universities, it would violate the First Amendment; at private universities, it would violate many of the universities’ stated commitments to open debate, as well as basic principles of academic freedom.

1. The Supreme Court has made “crystal clear” that the government may not discriminate based on viewpoint, even in limited public fora such as university open spaces (or for that matter even university programs for funding student speech). Lower courts have consistently struck down campus speech codes aimed at supposedly bigoted speech. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Michigan Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (6th Cir. 1995); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316-17, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 237-38, 250 (3d Cir. 2010); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.3d 386, 388-89, 391, 393 (4th Cir. 1993); College Republicans v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010-11, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 870-72 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Booher v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404, *28-*31 (E.D. Ky. 1998); UWM Post, Inc. v. Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165-66, 1173, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856, 864-66 (E.D. Mich. 1989). And in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), the Court gave students’ freedom to “express any viewpoint they wish — including a discriminatory one” as an example of “this Court’s tradition of protect[ing] the freedom to express the thought that we hate” (quotation marks omitted). There is no First Amendment exception for “hate speech” or “racist signs, symbols and speech.”

2. And beyond their unconstitutionality, bans on “racist … speech” would, of course, extend far beyond just threats or even epithets. Many substantive claims may be easily labeled racist, in the sense of being generalizations that express a negative claim about a racial group, whether they are claims about blacks being criminals, whites being an oppressor race, Hispanic immigration being bad for the country (ethnicity is generally treated much like race in legal rules and university policies), and so on. And of course many other claims are routinely labeled racist as well, even if they focus not on race but on religion (condemnation of Islam is routinely labeled “racist”), immigration (calls to deport illegal aliens, or otherwise limit immigration, are routinely labeled “racist” even if they call for broad enforcement of the law), foreign nations (harsh condemnation of Israel is often labeled anti-Semitic, in the sense of being hostile to Jews as an ethnic group) and so on. Some such advocacy may be motivated by racial or ethnic hostility, while some might not be; but all such advocacy that runs against university administrators’ political views would be deterred when “university administrators” “make crystal clear” that “racist … speech” — racist in the views of whatever disciplinary committee is making decisions — is “off-limits.”

The Post has long benefited from strong First Amendment protection and has long defended it. It’s a shame that it is affirmatively calling for viewpoint-based speech suppression here.

Thanks to Hans Bader for the pointer.

Originally Found On: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/11/washington-post-editorial-calls-for-universities-to-make-crystal-clear-that-racist-speech-is-off-limits/

[jazzstarrlight]

Testing a few things in my sketchbook. #SerialDesignationN and Lexi. Thoughts?

[wolfandpravato]

Washington Post editorial calls for universities to ‘make crystal clear that racist … speech [is] off-limits’

From the editorial:

Two-bit provocations such as hanging nooses on campuses play on emotions made raw in the wake of a presidential campaign that featured the vilification of minorities and barely veiled race-baiting. For university administrators, the challenge is to address that legitimate pain with sensitivity and make crystal clear that racist signs, symbols and speech are off-limits.

If the call was simply to punish threats of violence — racist or otherwise — I’d be all for that; and some of the time, nooses might be seen as threats. But the editorial isn’t limited to that: It calls for administrators to punish “racist … speech” generally. (I assume the editorial must mean punishment, since it’s hard to see what else would “make crystal clear” that the speech is “off-limits.”) This is an editorial, the product of carefully considered labor on the part of a group of people, not an extemporaneous remark; when it says “racist … speech” (especially right after a sentence talking about political advocacy during a presidential campaign), I assume it means what it’s saying.

And the editorial’s proposal is an awful idea. At public universities, it would violate the First Amendment; at private universities, it would violate many of the universities’ stated commitments to open debate, as well as basic principles of academic freedom.

1. The Supreme Court has made “crystal clear” that the government may not discriminate based on viewpoint, even in limited public fora such as university open spaces (or for that matter even university programs for funding student speech). Lower courts have consistently struck down campus speech codes aimed at supposedly bigoted speech. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Michigan Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (6th Cir. 1995); DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316-17, 320 (3d Cir. 2008); McCauley v. Univ. of V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 237-38, 250 (3d Cir. 2010); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.3d 386, 388-89, 391, 393 (4th Cir. 1993); College Republicans v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010-11, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 870-72 (N.D. Tex. 2004); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 373 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Booher v. Bd. of Regents of N. Ky. Univ., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11404, *28-*31 (E.D. Ky. 1998); UWM Post, Inc. v. Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165-66, 1173, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856, 864-66 (E.D. Mich. 1989). And in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), the Court gave students’ freedom to “express any viewpoint they wish — including a discriminatory one” as an example of “this Court’s tradition of protect[ing] the freedom to express the thought that we hate” (quotation marks omitted). There is no First Amendment exception for “hate speech” or “racist signs, symbols and speech.”

2. And beyond their unconstitutionality, bans on “racist … speech” would, of course, extend far beyond just threats or even epithets. Many substantive claims may be easily labeled racist, in the sense of being generalizations that express a negative claim about a racial group, whether they are claims about blacks being criminals, whites being an oppressor race, Hispanic immigration being bad for the country (ethnicity is generally treated much like race in legal rules and university policies), and so on. And of course many other claims are routinely labeled racist as well, even if they focus not on race but on religion (condemnation of Islam is routinely labeled “racist”), immigration (calls to deport illegal aliens, or otherwise limit immigration, are routinely labeled “racist” even if they call for broad enforcement of the law), foreign nations (harsh condemnation of Israel is often labeled anti-Semitic, in the sense of being hostile to Jews as an ethnic group) and so on. Some such advocacy may be motivated by racial or ethnic hostility, while some might not be; but all such advocacy that runs against university administrators’ political views would be deterred when “university administrators” “make crystal clear” that “racist … speech” — racist in the views of whatever disciplinary committee is making decisions — is “off-limits.”

The Post has long benefited from strong First Amendment protection and has long defended it. It’s a shame that it is affirmatively calling for viewpoint-based speech suppression here.

Thanks to Hans Bader for the pointer.

Originally Found On: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/11/washington-post-editorial-calls-for-universities-to-make-crystal-clear-that-racist-speech-is-off-limits/

[riederstravis]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-RELIGION-FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE-DENIAL OF BENEFITS TO A CHURCH BECAUSE IT IS A CHURCH

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4061 (S. Ct. June 26, 2017).  The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center is a Missouri preschool and daycare center. Originally established as a nonprofit organization, the Center later merged with Trinity Lutheran Church and now operates under its auspices on church property. Among the facilities at the Center is a playground, which has a coarse pea gravel surface beneath much of the play equipment. In 2012, the Center sought to replace a large portion of the pea gravel with a pour-in-place rubber surface by participating in Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program. The program, run by the State’s Department of Natural Resources, offers reimbursement grants to qualifying nonprofit organizations that install playground surfaces made from recycled tires. The Department had a strict and express policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity. Pursuant to that policy, the Department denied the Center’s application. In a letter rejecting that application, the Department explained that under Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, the Department could not provide financial assistance directly to a church. The Department ultimately awarded 14 grants as part of the 2012 program. Although the Center ranked fifth out of the 44 applicants, it did not receive a grant because it is a church.

Trinity Lutheran sued in Federal District Court, alleging that the Department’s failure to approve its application violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court dismissed the suit. The Free Exercise Clause, the court stated, prohibits the government from outlawing or restricting the exercise of a religious practice, but it generally does not prohibit withholding an affirmative benefit on account of religion. The District Court likened the case before it to Lockev. Davey, 540 U. S. 712 , where this Court upheld against a free exercise challenge a State’s decision not to fund degrees in devotional theology as part of a scholarship program. The District Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the State to make funds available under the Scrap Tire Program to Trinity Lutheran. A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The fact that the State could award a scrap tire grant to Trinity Lutheran without running afoul of the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution, the court ruled, did not mean that the Free Exercise Clause compelled the State to disregard the broader antiestablishment principle reflected in its own Constitution.

Held: The Department’s policy violated the rights of Trinity Lutheran under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by denying the Church an otherwise available public benefit on account of its religious status.

The court answered that it would be a violation of the church’s rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 3. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources offers state grants to help public and private schools, nonprofit daycare centers, and other nonprofit entities purchase rubber playground surfaces made from recycled tires. Trinity Lutheran Church applied for such a grant for its preschool and daycare center and would have received one, but for the fact that Trinity Lutheran is a church. The Department had a policy of categorically disqualifying churches and other religious organizations from receiving grants under its playground resurfacing program. The question presented is whether the Department’s policy violated the rights of Trinity Lutheran under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The parties agree that the Establishment Clause of that Amendment does not prevent Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program. That does not, however, answer the question under the Free Exercise Clause, because we have recognized that there is “play in the joints” between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels. Locke, 540 U. S., at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Free Exercise Clause “protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment” and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target the religious for “special disabilities” based on their “religious status.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533, 542 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that basic principle, this Court has repeatedly confirmed that denying a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest “of the highest order.” McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 628 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972)).

The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. If the cases just described make one thing clear, it is that such a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny. Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546. This conclusion is unremarkable in light of our prior decisions.

The State has pursued its preferred policy to the point of expressly denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely because of its religious character. Under our precedents, that goes too far. The Department’s policy violates the Free Exercise Clause.

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[leeannclymer]

Blog Post: California: Union Activities and Employment

In Mason v. S.E.I.U. Local 721, 2016 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 618 (Lexis Advance), the WCAB, reversing the WCJ in a split panel opinion, held that the applicant who worked for the County of Los Angeles, Department of Children and Family Services and was member of a S.E.I.U. Local 721 was acting as an employee of S.E.I.U. Local 721 at the time she suffered an injury to her left upper extremity, when the applicant’s injury occurred during her participation in a union rally on 12/10/2013.

(Citations link to LEXIS ADVANCE only.)

Relying on the holding in Jones v. W.C.A.B. (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 124, 97 Cal. Rptr. 554, 36 Cal. Comp. Cases 563, the WCAB panel majority concluded that Labor Code § 3357 was applicable to the applicant while she participated in the rally, and found employment based on the facts that the applicant was rendering service for “another,” specifically her union, during the rally. Furthermore, the union provided the applicant with transportation, food and water while at the rally, and that the services and goods provided by the union were akin to economic substitutes for wages offered in Jones and constituted compensation in exchange for services performed.

Commissioner Razo, dissenting, would not extend the ruling in Jones applicable to picketers, to the applicant here because, contrary to the worker in Jones, the applicant did not participate in the executive functions of a union, the applicant’s participation in the union rally was voluntary and not mandatory, the applicant would not have been penalized for failure to participate in the rally, and the applicant’s union was not on strike during rally.

Commentary:

The majority’s reliance on Jones in this case is interesting. As pointed out by the dissent, the alleged employee in Jones was not only a member, but a past president, shop steward and served on the executive board of the union. In Jones, the employee received clear financial benefits from his union participation and it was the union that assigned the picket duty. In Mason, a union member voluntarily attended a union rally where free food and water were provided.

The majority’s broad interpretation of what constitutes “employment” in this context may have adverse implications for membership groups, specifically unions, which organize rallies and other “group events” as a manner of getting their message out. Quite simply, if a union is going to have to purchase workers’ compensation insurance for every volunteer needed to put on an event, the cost of the event will become cost prohibitive.

Thus, while Ms. Mason may have been found to be an employee of SEIU local 721 as a result of her participation in this rally, the true impact of the panel’s decision in Mason may be that unions like Local 721 decide to no longer hold rallies. In the absence of rallies, the union’s voice may be lessened and, as a consequence, the union’s bargaining position may be weakened. In short, while Ms. Mason may have been determined to be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, she may, in the long run, lose other valuable wage and employment benefits for which she was attending the rally.

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Blog Post: California: Union Activities and Employment published first on http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/workers-compensation/rss.aspx