#if the trend of second most popular vote prevailing remains

[autisticlancemcclain]

wip wednesday 20‼️‼️‼️

poll is the same as last week, but there have been some updates!

lost at sea au: 1 2

and the red on my face (matches you) [ao3]: 1 2 3

orphan au: 1 2 3

the neighbour au: 1 2

flower crown au: 1 2

alien au: 1 2 3

JTTCOTE au: 1

the hana universe: 1 2

the applebees universe: 1 2 3

the loneliest series: 1 2 3 4

[schraubd]

Handicapping the Senate

It's less than six months from election day, so why not handicap the current state of the 2020 Senate races? I'm going to list the (competitive) races in order of likelihood to flip to the opposing party. 1. Alabama (Doug Jones - D):  You know that West Wing plot where the Democratic nominee in a super-Republican district dies before election day, and Sam Seaborn offers to run in the special election if the dead guy somehow ends up winning? And then every confluence of luck and God and good fortune smiled and the dead guy did win, forcing Sam into a congressional run doomed as soon as it began? That's kind of Doug Jones re-election campaign. Everything -- everything -- had to break in increasingly ludicrous fashion for a Democrat to win a Senate seat in Alabama, right down to his opponent being an actual pedophile. And it still was a 2 point race. This was a great victory, and Jones deserves to be showered with plaudits and praise for it. But it'd take another miracle for him to win in 2020, and I don't see it. The only bright spot is that former Auburn football coach Tommy Tuberville looks likely to best ex-Senator and former Trump AG Jeff Sessions to become the GOP nominee -- not because Tuberville is better, but because one of the few joys of the Trump era has been watching him repeatedly wreck the careers of his erstwhile friends. 2. Colorado (Cory Gardner - R): Colorado, like Nevada, is a state that seemed to go from red to light blue skipping entirely over purple in the process. Cory Gardner never got the memo, and has legislated like a GOP diehard for his entire first term -- never even gesturing at a pivot toward the Senator. The reward for his Trumpist loyalty is to be polling down double digits against Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper (doing the right thing running for Senate instead of a quixotic Presidential campaign). It's hard to see how he survives -- he ranks below Jones only because Colorado isn't so solidly blue that a Republican victory would require divine intervention. 3. Arizona (Martha McSally - R [special]): Every once in awhile, one comes across a politician who seems perfectly fine on paper, who doesn't seem to have any particular attributes that make her especially lovable or loathable, yet who voters for whatever reason just don't cotton to. Martha McSally seems to be one of those pols. She just lost a Senate race in 2018 to Kyrsten Sinema in a mild upset that presaged Arizona suddenly becoming a real Democratic target, then immediately got appointed to fill the shoes of departing Republican Senator Jon Kyl. Now she's polling down again to Mark Kelly (astronaut husband of shooting survivor and ex-Rep. Gabby Giffords), in a state where Biden is posting some very impressive numbers. Other politicians might be able to reverse the tide. But McSally just doesn't seem to vibe with the folks she needs to, and the trend lines aren't pulling her way. The most recent poll to drop in Arizona has her losing by a crushing 13 point margin. 4. Maine (Susan Collins - R): This would be among the sweetest fruits for me, and Sara Gideon has a very strong shot to take out Moderate Republican(tm) Susan Collins. Maine remains blue at the presidential level, and Collins once sky-high approvals have been in free fall as she's played loyal foot soldier to McConnell and Trump. Yet it's hard not to imagine she's stockpiled some good will from her (however tattered) reputation as a moderate, and Maine more so than anywhere in New England has some areas that are surprisingly Trump-friendly. This will be a real slugfest. 5. North Carolina (Thom Tillis - R): The "new south" -- educated, suburban, professional, racially diverse, and increasingly blue-friendly -- is creeping up and down the Atlantic coast. Virginia's already been taken over. Georgia an increasingly plum target. But the next domino most likely to fall is North Carolina -- still the palest shade of red leaning, but a place where Democratic fortunes appear to be waxing. Tillis has two other things cutting against him: he'll be sharing a ballot with wildly popular Democratic Governor Roy Cooper (who appears to be thrashing any GOP challengers), and a flood of bad press hitting his Senate colleague Richard Burr for allegedly dumping stock before the coronavirus news really broke. Democratic nominee Cal Cunningham is polling well here -- either moderately ahead or at worst tied. 6. Montana (Steve Daines - R): Governor Steve Bullock is another entry in the "thank you for abandoning a ridiculous POTUS bid and running for Senate instead" list, and he instantly turns this race into a real Democratic opportunity. Montana has been quietly getting more competitive over the past few years as the western half of the state and what passes for "cities" turn bluer, and Democratic Senator Jon Tester won a hotly contested 2018 Senate race by a close but not squeaky-thin 3.5% margin. Daines has the advantage of incumbency plus Trump's coattails, but Bullock is popular statewide. This has flown under the radar a bit, and I think Bullock's got a real shot. 7. Georgia (Kelly Loeffler - R [special]): This would place a lot higher if I was ordering based on "likelihood the incumbent loses". Loeffler, only recently appointed by Governor Brian Kemp, is abysmally unpopular in the Peach State, and right now she's polling fourth in a free-for-all election (behind fellow Republican Mac Collins and then two Democrats). The reasons are myriad -- Trump made it clear she was not his choice for the appointment, and she too has gotten into hot water over coronavirus-related trading -- but the end result is she's unlikely to even advance to the run-off. Unfortunately for Democrats, run-offs in Georgia have tended to sharply favor the GOP, so the most likely person to emerge from the scrum is Collins -- an even further-right Trump loyalist. There's also the alarming possibility that, in a highly fractured field, Loeffler manages to squeak into second and lock Democrats out entirely. Of course if that happens, Loeffler's only hope to prevail is to attract cross-over votes .... 8. Michigan (Gary Peters - D): Outside Alabama, this is by far the GOP's best chance for a 2020 Senate pickup. John James is a very strong candidate who ran a surprisingly close race against Debbie Stabenow in 2018, and he's back for a second crack at the Senate. Peters is not as well established as Stabenow was, and 2020 will likely not be as big a blue wave year as 2018 was. On the other hand, Democratic fortunes in Michigan seem to be on the rise, and Biden should perform better there than Clinton did in 2016. That's enough to make Peters the favorite, but not an overwhelming one. 9. Iowa (Joni Ernst - R): Once the ultimate bellwether, Iowa has seemingly been largely written off as a legitimate Democratic target, and for a long time Joni Ernst seemed to be coasting to re-election. But her numbers are surprisingly soft -- two polls this month have her deadlocked with her two most likely Democratic challengers -- and Democrats did win three of four Iowa House seats in 2018. She's definitely still the favorite, but an upset can't be written off. 10. Georgia (David Perdue - R): The other Georgia race, minus the particular "complexities" raised by Loeffler's unique unpopularity. That means most of the above analysis applies, but only more so for the Republicans. Georgia continues to creep towards purple status, but odds are it won't quite get there in 2020. 11. Kansas (Open [Pat Roberts] - R): Kris Kobach blew the Governor's race for the GOP in 2018, but that hasn't deterred him from seeking the Senate nod in 2020. It's possible he'll get it, and so it's possible he'll lose again. Democrats have rarely been competitive in the Sunflower State, but 2018 showed they had a heartbeat. Meanwhile, the state Republican Party has been in a state of near-civil war for years between (relative) moderates and true firebreathers. The latter camp had their man in the Governor's mansion in the form of Sam Brownback, and his experiment in scorched-earth conservative governance led the GOP to unprecedented unpopularity in a state they normally dominate in. 12. Kentucky (Mitch McConnell - R): I know I said Susan Collins would be the sweetest fruit, but if Mitch McConnell goes down I'll revise that assessment. It's unlikely -- Kentucky is blood red at the Presidential level, and McConnell has effectively infinite resources at his disposal. But Andy Beshear's win of the Governor's mansion showed that Democrats still can win statewide if the stars align, and McConnell, for all his power and sway, is actually very unpopular in his home state. A definite long shot, but not wholly out of range. via The Debate Link https://ift.tt/2AP3523

[revolutionaryeye]

The youthquake that wasn't.

by Richard Seymour

Youthquake -- everybody jump up and down. Except, don't, because there is no youthquake. It didn't happen. There was no youth surge

.The British Election Study (BES) is by far the best source for electoral analysis. Its findings are generally more reliable than week-to-week polling. When it says that the detected 'surge' in young people voting was at most a minor bump, we must take it seriously. More than that, the BES says that the increase was highest among those aged 30-40, and that it was partially offset by a slight decrease of voting turnout among those under 21.

Parenthetically, the fact that the 'youth' vote is now considered everyone under 40 is, surely, emblematic of how socially constructed this category is. It cannot be a coincidence that this move is taking place just as conventional attributes of adulthood such as home ownership, marriage and childbirth, car ownership and so on, happen later and later in life, if at all. We should thus be on our guard when 'youth' is invoked as a self-explanatory factor in politics, as in the popular discourse about 'Millennials'. Because that is a sure sign that some garbled ideology is being smuggled into the conversation.

This is not to say that Corbynism didn't benefit from a surge of enthusiasm among younger voters. The BES study confirms that there was a redistribution of existing youth votes in favour of Labour. But the Corbynite strategy sought more than this. The strategy wasn't just to win back voters who defected to the Greens, the Liberals and the nationalist parties. It was also to pull people who have been excluded from the electoral system, back into it by giving them a more plausible political expression. That this has proved a more intractable problem than it initially had appeared should not be that surprising; we are more than familiar with the cultural and political atmospheres conducive to apolitical conservatism.

How do these findings change things, strategically, for Corbynism? Generational change is never a simple political story. I have argued this case before (see Against Austerity). Ipsos-Mori's survey of popular opinion through generations shows a certain liberalisation of attitudes. There is a decline of authority, a decline in old modes of racist, sexist and homophobic thinking. But this has taken place within a framework of social fragmentation, a rise in competitive and 'individualist' attitudes, and a decline in support for the welfare state. Nonetheless, because of class experiences of precarity, and because of the salience of war, oppression and identity among the issues facing younger people, they tended to be more open to the Left than the Right.

These are just trends; necessarily, they don't reflect total transformations. And of course, polls misrepresent opinion by making it appear to be more definite, and less ambivalent and conditional, than it always really is. Nonetheless, the trends seem real enough. And they can be attributed to two factors. First, neoliberal strategies have changed the everyday experience of the world. Second, social democracy gave up being social democratic, and adopted a Thatcherite representational terrain (or rather, as Stuart Hall argued, a double-shuffle wherein traditional Labour thematics were conjoined to neoliberal ideas. When that happened, millions of people just stopped voting.

One thing we should not underestimate in this context, is what Spinoza called the "sad passions". These are all the passions which, beginning in sadness, curdle into anger, envy, loathing, terror, self-hatred, spite, revenge, cruelty, poisoning us. They limit our capacity to be active in the world, and overwhelm the affections we might otherwise have. As Spinoza knew, these passions are very useful for tyrants, and eminently manipulable. They can be even more useful for neoliberal governmentality. The dangled rewards and incentives for servility, life-hatred, and competitive back-stabbing, serve to tangle up the libido, the hunger for life, in the complex of sad passions.

And the truth is, there aren't any immediate rewards on the other side. No one is going to give you a medal for joining a protest, and no one gets a monetised incentive to get the workplace organised. There might be some immediate gain from a strike, because if successful that directly affects relations of power in a way that protesting doesn't. But most of the time we have to labour slowly and patiently, for no immediate reward. The passing from sad to joyous passions, or rather the displacement of the sad passions from their dominant affective position, never comes with a pay-off. But that is to miss the point. As Spinoza put it: "It is slaves, not free men, who are given rewards for virtue."

Political change depends upon a change in the economy of affect. In the prevailing powerlessness and melancholia, fear and servility are obscured by moralisms. Subordination appears as duty, flexibility, or motivation, and people are left wondering why they don't feel particularly motivated. Exploitation appears as fun, a challenge, a game -- capitalism orders you to have fun -- and people are left wondering why they're miserable. These are moralisms whose distinctive register is the apprehension of guilt, since we never really feel as we're supposed to. That's exactly why counter-exhortations to be optimistic, cheerful, bullish, are totally ineffectual. They are moralisms of their own, and they create their own guilty shadow of despair.

Yet there are moments when this affective stalemate topples over into outrage, indignation, and permits the formation of what Frédéric Lordon calls a "new affective vector". And then the question is whether it will remain isolated, or encounter a larger process of "affective crystallisation". An this was always the question for Corbynism. It emerged, at first, within a radicalised minority of young people, and it clearly combined with sufficient other tendencies to win the Labour Party. But it was not clear, at first, whether it could go beyond that, and transform the national political culture. A chance encounter in the spring months of last year, an aleatory combination of elements, precipitated a new affective mixture.

There are reasons to think that this was the likely beginning of a longer political sequence, not the culmination. And so there is no reason to buy back into the shopsoiled, empiricist cliches of political scientists -- viz. that non-voters don't vote, and young people are apolitical morons. The culture of mandatory hopelessness always depended for its power on certain accomplished facts. Well, 2017 is now an accomplished fact of its own, and it changes the terrain. As The Carpenters sang, so evocatively, we've only just begun.....

Source:- https://www.patreon.com/posts/youthquake-that-16670109

Revolutionary Eye:- “ an aleatory combination of elements” be damned!

People have sustained themselves through decades,never giving in,educating and fighting as best they could,often isolated,often looked on as political relics but always conscious that a discontent and sense of social justice lay buried,to be uncovered, because class struggle can never truly disappear and can and will burst forth and we will start to feel our strength again and that class consciousness is on the rise is for those reasons and not some accidental combination of elements.

[ericvick]

Biden on Brink of Defeating Trump With Few States Left to Report

(Bloomberg) — Joe Biden stood on the brink of claiming the presidency from Donald Trump on Thursday, with a handful of states expecting to complete their vote counts despite Republicans opening legal fights to stop counting in at least two states.

Biden held 264 Electoral College votes out of the 270 needed to win the White House, according to the Associated Press. Trump has 214.

Biden needs only to win an additional outstanding state, such as Nevada where he is leading, or Georgia, where his campaign believes absentee votes will push him over the top.

The former vice president said he expects to prevail. “I’m not here to declare that we’ve won, but I am here to report that when the count is finished, we believe we will be the winners,” he told reporters in Wilmington, Delaware.

His remarks came Wednesday afternoon after he scored a victory over Trump in Wisconsin, closing off one of the president’s best routes to re-election.

Trump raged on Twitter about the increasing votes for Biden, and stoked rage among his most ardent supporters with the unfounded allegation that fraud kept him from winning. His campaign said it is suing in Pennsylvania and Michigan to halt vote counts that have been trending toward Biden.

Trump falsely declared victory in Pennsylvania, one of the five states that has yet to be called by the Associated Press. The president was ahead in the state by 383,000 votes but Pennsylvania officials said more than a million ballots still have to be counted.

To win the Electoral College vote, he would have to win all the battleground states that have not yet been called.

Biden’s Wisconsin and Michigan victories reverse two of Trump’s upsets in 2016, when he defeated Hillary Clinton.

Trump’s campaign said it would demand a recount in Wisconsin, where the candidates were less than 1 percentage point apart.

The president tweeted throughout the day, casting doubt on the count of mail-in ballots, which were heavily Democratic, after the Election Day in-person votes were counted, which leaned Republican.

“How come every time they count Mail-In ballot dumps they are so devastating in their percentage and power of destruction,” the president said on Twitter. Another tweet mused about his leads “magically” disappearing in states run by Democratic governors.

Bill Stepien, Trump’s campaign manager, insisted the president was headed for re-election and that the campaign was readying its lawyers to challenge results in some states.

The unresolved outcome — due to an unusually large number of mail-in ballots because of the coronavirus — risks stoking tensions further in the U.S., beset by an economic downturn and the raging virus.

Biden campaign manager Jen O’Malley Dillon said in a statement early Wednesday that Trump’s remarks were “outrageous, unprecedented and incorrect” and “a naked effort to take away the democratic rights of American citizens.”

In Nevada, where tallying was halted until Thursday, Biden was clinging to a lead of almost 8,000 votes. In the nationwide popular vote, he leads by roughly 3 million.

There were few surprises among states where the Associated Press announced winners, with Republican and Democratic states generally falling in line, despite expectations for several upsets.

Trump won Florida, a crucial prize in the race for the White House that closed off Biden’s hopes for an early knockout. The president also won Texas, which Democrats had hoped might flip and entirely reshape the electoral map.

Trump won Ohio and Biden won Minnesota, states that each candidate had sought to take from the other but wound up politically unchanged from 2016.

Trump still holds small leads in North Carolina and Georgia, though there are votes outstanding in each. Trump won both states in 2016. But his lead in Georgia was narrowing Wednesday evening.

Biden won Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska’s Second Congressional District, Minnesota, Hawaii, California, Oregon, Washington, Colorado, New York, Virginia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Mexico, Delaware, District of Columbia and New Hampshire, according to the AP.

Trump won Nebraska’s other four Electoral College votes, Ohio, Florida, Texas, Iowa, Idaho, Kansas, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, West Virginia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Missouri.

Story continues

Nebraska is one of only two states, with Maine, that award an Electoral College vote to the winner of each congressional district. Trump won two districts and Biden won one. Trump won the state overall, giving him Nebraska’s two remaining Electoral College votes.

Trump won Maine’s Second Congressional District and Biden won the first, plus the state’s two at-large electoral votes.

Even if Democrats yet claim the White House, a wave of support they hoped would also give them control of both chambers of Congress may fall short.

Democrats would need to win three of the five Senate seats still undecided to leave the Senate with a 50-50 split, which would give control to the party in the White House.

Biden’s lead appears to be thanks to holding onto Latino and African-American voters in numbers similar to what Clinton had four years ago. And he narrowed Trump’s margin among White voters, voter surveys from the AP show.

Trump had a 12-point lead among White voters in Tuesday’s election. Network exit polls four years ago showed him with a 20-point advantage among those voters. Biden led among Latino voters 30 points, Black voters by 82 points, and women by 12 points.

(Michael Bloomberg, the founder and majority owner of Bloomberg LP, the parent company of Bloomberg News, provided $100 million in support of Biden and his running mate Kamala Harris in Florida, half of that from his Independence USA PAC.)

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[ericfruits]

Donald Trump could still stage a comeback (again)

Our election model Donald Trump could still stage a comeback (again)

The newest polls and economic data have shored up the president’s odds, though they remain worse than in 2016

Sep 10th 2020

WASHINGTON, DC

EVERY FOUR years, political journalists and prognosticators deem America’s presidential contest the “election of the century”. By definition, each cannot be. But at the risk of causing readers’ eyes to roll backwards, the stakes really do appear higher than usual this time round. In early June The Economist published its own statistical forecasting model for this November’s presidential contest to guide such handicapping. Back then, it gave Mr Trump at best a one-in-five chance of winning a second term. But by July, as unrest and the coronavirus ravaged the nation, his odds had slumped to as low as one-in-ten. There they stayed until the middle of August. Now, our model shows Mr Trump has clawed back a sizeable chunk of support.

His nationwide deficit in vote-intentions versus Mr Biden has shrunk from ten points at its peak to just eight on September 9th. And in the key states of Florida and Pennsylvania—the two most likely to provide Mr Trump or Mr Biden with their 270th electoral vote—the president’s deficit has narrowed even more. Sunshine-state voters favoured Mr Biden by eight points at his peak in July. Now, they prefer him by just four. One high-quality pollster, Marist, has the candidates level in Florida (though more polls are surely needed to determine whether this is an outlier). In Pennsylvania, Mr Trump has risen from a nine-point deficit to a six-point one.

Other election indicators have also been good for the president of late. Our index of economic growth—which combines annual change in eight different indicators, from the unemployment rate to real personal income and manufacturing output—has been improving steadily since July. The August jobs report, which recorded a nearly two percentage-point drop in unemployment, contributed to a positive trend.

Mr Trump’s job-approval ratings have also gone up. In early August we calculated that 15 percentage points more Americans disapproved of the job he was doing as president than approved of it. By September his popularity had improved a bit, to just an 11-point deficit. Taken together, these economic and political variables alone suggest the president will lose the popular vote by five points; up from a negative-six-point projection two months ago.

Right now the most likely outcome of the election is still that Mr Trump loses. Our election-forecasting model projects that he will fall about 70 electoral votes shy of winning, though there is enough uncertainty in the election to suggest he could still prevail. We predict a relatively low (but by no means impossible) one-in-seven (14%) chance of a Trump victory. For context, our model would have given him nearly twice the chance (37%) at this point in 2016. Because of Mr Trump’s deficit in swing-state polls and the virus-stricken economy, he will have a tough slog to get a second term—despite voters’ marginally improving evaluations of his candidacy.■

Dig deeper: Read the best of our 2020 campaign coverage and our presidential-election forecast, then sign up for Checks and Balance, our weekly newsletter and podcast on American politics.

This article appeared in the United States section of the print edition under the headline "One trot closer"

https://ift.tt/3ijkX5U

[teachanarchy]

Political parties on the far right are today enjoying a surge of support and access to government power that they have not experienced since their heyday in the 1930s.

This phenomenon is particularly striking in Europe, where massive migration, sluggish economic growth, and terrorism have stirred up zealous nationalism and Islamophobia, but it resonates through large areas of the world including the Asia-Pacific. In France, the National Front―founded in 1972 by former Nazi collaborators and other rightists employing anti-Semitic and racist appeals―has tried to soften its image somewhat under the recent leadership of Marine Le Pen. Nevertheless, Le Pen’s current campaign for the French presidency, in which she is one of two leading candidates facing a runoff, includes speeches delivered against a screen filled with immigrants committing crimes, jihadists plotting savage attacks, and European Union (EU) bureaucrats destroying French jobs, while she assails multiculturalism and promises to “restore order.” In Germany, the Alternative for Germany party, established three years ago, won up to 25 percent of the vote in state elections in March 2016. Led by Frauke Petry, the party calls for sealing the EU’s borders (by shooting migrants, if necessary), forcing the migrants who remain to adopt traditional German culture, and thoroughly rejecting Islam, including a ban on constructing mosques. According to the party platform, “Islam does not belong in Germany.”

Elsewhere in Europe, the story is much the same. In Britain, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), led until recently by Nigel Farage, arose from obscurity to become the nation’s third largest party. Focused on drastically reducing immigration and championing nationalism (including pulling Britain out of the EU), UKIP absorbed the constituency of neo-fascist groups and successfully led the struggle for Brexit. In the Netherlands, a hotly-contested parliamentary election in March 2017 saw the far right Party for Freedom emerge as the nation’s second largest political party. Calling for recording the ethnicity of all Dutch citizens and closing all Islamic schools, the party is headed by Geert Wilders, who has been tried twice in that country for inciting hatred and discrimination against Muslims. In Italy, the Northern League (so-named because it originally pledged to liberate industrious Italian workers in the north from subsidizing lazy Italians in the south), demands drastic curbs on immigration and removal of Italy from the Eurozone. Its leader, Matteo Salvini, contends that Islam is “incompatible” with Western society.

Other European parties of the far right include Hungary’s Jobbik (the country’s third-largest party, which is vehemently hostile to immigration, the EU, and homosexuality), the Sweden Democrats (now vying for second place among Sweden’s parties, with roots in the white supremacist movement and a platform of heavily restricting immigration and opposing the EU), Austria’s Freedom Party (which, founded decades ago by Nazis, nearly won two recent 2016 presidential elections, vigorously opposes immigration, and proclaims “yes to families rather than gender madness”), and the People’s Party-Our Slovakia (which supports leaving the EU and the Eurozone and whose leader has argued that “even one immigrant is one too many”).

Only one of these rising parties is usually referred to as fascist: Greece’s Golden Dawn. Exploiting Greece’s economic crisis and, especially, hatred of refugees and other migrants, Golden Dawn has promoted virulent nationalism emphasizing the supposed racial superiority of Greeks to emerge as Greece’s third-largest party. Golden Dawn spokesman, Elias Kasidiaris, is known for sporting a swastika on his shoulder and for reading passages in parliament from the anti-Semitic hoax, the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” The party also employs a swastika-like flag, as well as gangs of black-shirted thugs who beat up immigrants. Party leaders, in fact, are on trial for numerous crimes, including violent attacks upon migrants.

Greece’s Golden Dawn

Other far right parties in Europe, although striving for greater respectability, also provide reminders of 1920s- and 1930s-style fascism. Addressing a Northern League rally, Italy’s bombastic Salvini wore a black shirt while supporters waved neo-Nazi symbols and photos of Benito Mussolini. In Hungary, Jobbik’s platform includes a call to “stop hushing up such taboo issues” as “Zionist Israel’s efforts to dominate Hungary and the world.” Meanwhile, the leaders of Alternative for Germany have revived words once employed by the Nazis. In January 2017, one leader created a scandal when, addressing a party youth gathering, he criticized Germany’s commemoration of Holocaust crimes. That same month, speaking at a rightwing gathering in Germany, Wilders used the occasion to lament that “blonde” Europeans were becoming “strangers in their own countries.”

Asian politicians similarly play on popular fears and hatreds in their successful efforts to move their countries rightward. In India, the BJP, a Hindu nationalist party with a past that included violent attacks upon the nation’s Muslim minority, grew substantially and captured control of parliament. Led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP opposes Muslim immigration, supports a program of social and economic conservatism, and trumpets the slogan “India First.” In the Philippines, where the government had long fought Muslim separatists on the island of Mindanao, Rodrigo Duterte, who gained fame and popularity for his ruthless “war on drugs,” was elected president in May 2016. By the following January, the death toll from his extrajudicial killings reached 6,200 people. Responding to EU criticism of his human rights record, Duterte replied in his characteristic “strongman” style: “Fuck you!” In Japan, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, leading the misnamed Liberal Democratic Party, strengthened the party’s grip on power by repeatedly transmitting rightwing nationalist signals, which appealed to people who rejected criticism of Japan’s role in World War II and possessed an image of a traditional, pure, authoritarian nation, uncontaminated by Western liberalism. Abe has sought to eliminate Article 9, the peace provision of Japan’s Constitution while expanding the role of the Japanese military in support of US campaigns throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Around the globe, the same trend is in evidence. In the United States, of course, Donald Trump won a startling victory in his run for the presidency, employing attacks on Mexican migrants, Islamophobia, calls for law and order, and promises to “make America great again.” The Republican Party, moving rightward for years before Trump captured the party nomination, quickly embraced this agenda. In Russia, Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party solidified their grip upon power, with Putin telling parliament that social and religious conservatism provided the only ways to keep Russia and the world from slipping into “chaotic darkness.” Defending “traditional values,” Putin attacked multiculturalism, aligned himself with the Orthodox Church, promoted a mystical, authoritarian nationalism, and fostered a government crackdown on Russia’s Muslims.

Although these parties and leaders of the far right have some differences, they also share some key characteristics. Uninterested in challenging economic and social inequality, they develop their popular appeal by flaunting extreme nationalism, hostility to immigrants and minorities, a disdain for multiculturalism, and, in most cases, a call to return to “traditional values.”

Not surprisingly, then, they usually get on very well. Responding to Donald Trump’s election, a spokesman for Golden Dawn praised it as a victory for “clean ethnic states.” He added: “A great global change is starting, which will continue with nationalists prevailing.” In January 2017, three of the top stars of the rising far right―Le Pen, Petry, and Wilders―shared the platform at a rightwing conference in Germany, at which they promised a new day for Europe. That same month, Abe paid a very friendly visit to Duterte, spending a weekend at his Philippines home.

Europe’s far right parties have been particularly enthusiastic about Putin. Unlike most other European political groupings, they applauded his war against Georgia and military meddling in Ukraine. When Putin invited representatives of their parties to observe the referendum to have Russia annex Crimea, they dutifully attended the event, after which France’s National Front, Britain’s UKIP, Austria’s Freedom Party, and Italy’s Northern League endorsed its legitimacy. Hailing Russia’s president as a true patriot, Le Pen lauded him as a defender of “the Christian heritage of European civilization.” Farage, asked which world leader he most admired, responded without hesitation: Putin! The leader of Austria’s Freedom Party, Heinz-Christian Strache, praised Putin as a “pure democrat.” Indeed, Europe’s far right parties blame the EU and NATO for the crisis in the Ukraine, support lifting EU sanctions on Russia, and back Russia’s military intervention in Syria. In the European parliament, their representatives vote in favor of Russian interests nearly all the time.

In turn, Russia’s president has assisted these parties in their struggle for power. In 2014, the National Front received an 11 million euro loan from a Russian bank to help finance its successful municipal election campaign. During the current French presidential campaign, the National Front applied for a substantially larger Russian bank loan, Russian media outlets are working hard for Le Pen, and Putin has received her in Moscow with the kind of buildup usually accorded a head of state. In Germany, Russian media and social networks played up a false story of an alleged gang rape of a 13-year old girl by migrants, prompting tens of thousands of Germans to take to the streets in protest and generating startling electoral gains by Alternative for Germany. That party has denied allegations that Russia is providing it with funding, but not the possibility that Russia is behind the mysterious appearance of millions of copies of its campaign newspaper and thousands of its election signs. Meanwhile, the youth group of Alternative for Germany has forged an alliance with Putin’s United Russia party.

The story is much the same in other nations. In Austria, the Freedom Party appears to be receiving Russian financial assistance through a thinly veiled intermediary, a prominent Russian oligarch. Russian cooperation with Austria’s far right became official in December 2016, when the United Russia party signed a cooperation agreement with the Freedom Party. In Britain, the Russian government, despite formal statements of neutrality, clearly sided with UKIP’s Brexit campaign. Enamored of Farage, it provided him with frequent guest appearances on Russia Today and, following passage of the Brexit referendum, even offered him his own show on that state-funded network. In the Netherlands, Russia’s disinformation and propaganda arms have worked to assist Wilders and his Party for Freedom by trumpeting false news stories.

The relationship between Duterte and Putin seems to be exceptionally warm. The two world leaders met for the first time at a November 2016 international conference in Lima, Peru, and Duterte was reportedly “starstruck” by the Russian leader. In conversations with reporters, the Filipino president went on at length about Putin’s smiles and laughter. “It’s something that you feel,” he said, “because his laugh is big.” According to Duterte, the Russian president repeatedly invited him to visit Russia, and Duterte finally promised to do so after Putin promised to present him, when he visited, with a gun. “I like Putin,” Duterte told the press. “We have similarities.” Feeling “like we’ve known each other for so long,” they had immediately become “fast friends.” This instant camaraderie with Putin contrasted sharply with Duterte’s relationship with U.S. President Barack Obama, whom he referred to on numerous occasions as the “son of a whore.”

Putin, in turn, was quick to offer Russian support for the Duterte regime. In early January, after a four-day visit to the Philippines, a senior Russian naval officer announced in a media interview that the Russian Navy stood ready to help the island nation fight terrorism. “The problem here is terrorism,” he said, “and we will show you what we can do.” Reiterating Moscow’s backing, the Russian ambassador stated that Russia was willing to provide sophisticated arms to Duterte’s government, including light weapons, submarines, and helicopters. According to Filipino government officials, their nation was “open to cooperating with the Russian Ministry of Defense through education and training exchanges on counter-terrorism operations.”

No one, however, has inspired the rising far right more than Donald Trump. As early as March 2016, Salvini was enthusiastic about the U.S. business magnate, and in late April he traveled to Pennsylvania to participate in a Trump rally. Here he held a “Trump: Make America Great Again” sign and afterward had a 20-minute meeting with the Republican presidential front-runner that consummated their alliance. Farage took part in Trump’s presidential campaign that August in Mississippi, where he shared the rally platform with him and lauded him before the cheering crowd. In October 2016, Golden Dawn endorsed Trump on the floor of the Greek parliament, hailing the “patriotic wind” sweeping through Europe and North America. Furthermore, if U.S. intelligence agencies are correct, Vladimir Putin set Russian covert operations in motion to help secure Trump’s political triumph.

Naturally, Trump’s election victory sent a surge of euphoria through the far right. From France, Le Pen lauded it as “a sign of hope,” showing “that people are taking their future back.” Farage, addressing a victory party near the White House, declared: “Brexit was great, but Trump becoming the president of the USA is Brexit plus, plus, plus.” Farage, in fact, was the first British politician to meet with Trump after the latter’s election. He posed for photographs with the president-elect in the gold-plated elevator of Trump Tower. Exhilarated by Trump’s election, the leaders of Alternative for Germany immediately dispatched a congratulatory telegram to him. At a celebration in Munich, a party leader told the cheering crowd that what Trump had done in the United States, their party would do in Germany. “America First is coming to Deutschland,” he boomed, with the crowd erupting in thunderous applause.

French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen

As might be expected, Trump’s executive orders banning refugees and other immigrants from predominantly Muslim nations sent parties of the far right into ecstasy. In Greece, thousands of Golden Dawn supporters surged into the streets, carrying torches and waving their Nazi-like flags. “Well done,” President Trump, exulted Wilders; “it’s the only way to stay safe and free.” In a National Front rally brimming with nationalist fervor, Le Pen declared that Americans had “kept faith with their national interest,” while National Front supporters shouted joyously: “This is our country!” Trump’s action was also lauded by the Northern League, Alternative for Germany, and the whole panoply of ultra-right parties. Although government officials of most nations condemned Trump’s immigrant ban, India’s prime minister conspicuously refrained from any criticism, while India’s foreign secretary argued that the world should not “demonize” Trump.

Viewing Trump as a kindred spirit, as well as the leader of the world’s most powerful nation, the parties of the far right are keen on cementing an alliance with him. Upon Trump’s election, Alternative for Germany informed him that it was a “natural ally” at his side. Farage was so eager to court Trump that he met with him three times during the first weeks of Trump’s presidency. Salvini told the rightwing Breitbart News that his party shared many of the policies of the new administration and was a logical ally. “On many issues,” the Italian leader said, “we see eye-to-eye with President Trump and we look forward to partnering with his administration.” Arguing that “a direct channel with the new American president is crucial,” Salvini promised to quickly establish “direct, serious, non-mediated contact” with the Trump administration.

Asia’s rightwing politicians are just as anxious to become collaborators with Trump. Only a week after Trump’s election victory, Abe flew to the United States to have a personal meeting with the president-elect at Trump Tower. Japan’s prime minister thereby became the only world leader to meet with Trump in the months before his inauguration. In late March 2017, Duterte told a meeting of Filipinos in Myanmar that, although he had previously told Obama to “go to hell,” “President Trump and I are okay,” and “I can assure him also of our friendship and cooperation.” Although Duterte said he was not yet ready for a formal military alliance with the United States, he was prepared to “give all, whatever it is,” to be allied with the Trump administration.

But what is the attitude of Trump and his circle toward these leaders of the far right? Apparently, it is quite favorable. When Trump, during his campaign for the presidency, first spoke with Salvini, he told him: “Matteo, I hope you become prime minister of Italy soon.” Moreover, Trump, as a fan of Farage and keen supporter of Brexit, has not only met with Farage on numerous occasions, but has publicly declared that the rightwing leader would make a good British ambassador to the United States. Only two days before the first round of the French presidential election, Trump offered a tacit endorsement of Le Pen, stating that, when it came to “what’s been going on in France,” she was the “strongest” candidate.

Trump has also displayed a remarkable affection for rightwing politicians in power. Political observers have been struck by Trump’s consistent admiration for Vladimir Putin, whom Trump

has praised for his “strong control” over Russia. “He’s been a leader,” said Trump, “far more than our president has been.” So intertwined have Trump and his associates been with Russian officialdom that the FBI is conducting a criminal investigation of collusion between Trump campaign officials and the Russian government during the U.S. presidential election campaign.

Similarly, Trump has been a strong fan of India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi. During his presidential campaign, the U.S. corporate tycoon told a Hindu-American gathering that, if he was elected, “we would be best friends.” Praising Modi as a very energetic leader with whom he hoped to work, he predicted that they were “going to have a phenomenal future together.” Modi was one of the first national leaders that Trump phoned upon becoming president. According to a White House statement, Trump said that he considered India a “true friend and partner in addressing challenges around the world,” and was looking forward to welcoming Modi to the United States later in the year. In turn, Modi said that he had had a “warm conversation” with Trump, and that the pair had “agreed to work closely in the coming days.”

Trump has also been remarkably cozy with other rightwing Asian leaders. According to Duterte, Trump―during a December 2016 phone conversation with him―endorsed the Filipino president’s murderous campaign against drug users and dealers, telling Duterte that he was handling it the “right way.” In February 2017, Abe flew to the United States for another meeting with Trump, this time at the White House, where he was greeted by America’s president with a hug. Then they and their families flew off to Florida, where Trump and Abe played golf at one of his lavish resorts while their wives toured the area. Trump announced that the two men had a “great time” together, topping it off with a “high-five.”

Some of Trump’s aides have been even more outspoken in praising parties and leaders of the far right. For years, Steve Bannon―who managed the final portion of Trump’s election campaign and who is now the president’s top political strategist―ran Breitbart, a far right news service that he described as “the platform for the alt-right.” Under his leadership, Breitbart worked assiduously to provide favorable publicity for UKIP, Alternative for Germany, the Party for Freedom, and other rightwing parties. Farage recalled that “when Bannon opened up the Breitbart office in London and began to give the arguments that I was making . . . a very, very big audience,” this turned the tide for Brexit. Consequently, Farage publicly offered “a personal thank you and tribute to Steve Bannon for having the foresightedness of doing that with Breitbart,” for which he was “extremely grateful.”

And the project continues. In November 2016, after Breitbart announced plans to expand to Berlin and Paris, Reuters―citing sources “close to Bannon”―reported that “the aim is to help elect right-wing politicians in the two countries.”

Bannon’s alliance with the far right is not merely a marriage of convenience, but is based on a deep-seated nationalist ideology and love of power that he shares with it. “I think strong countries and strong nationalist movements in countries make strong neighbors,” Bannon told an audience of conservative religious activists in 2014. These were “the building blocks that built Western Europe and the United States, and I think it’s what can see us forward.”

Sometimes, the Trump administration’s intense nationalism seems built on a very unsavory past. Bannon, who wrote Trump’s “America First” inaugural address, is an admirer of a nationalist rightwinger, Charles Maurras, a vicious anti-Semite and supporter of France’s World War II Nazi-dominated regime who, after the war, was sentenced to life imprisonment as a collaborator. Sebastian Gorka, a Hungarian immigrant who worked for Bannon at Breitbart and, like Bannon, is now a White House advisor, was recently named by officers of a quasi-Nazi Hungarian nationalist group as a sworn member of their organization. Although Gorka denied this allegation, he did wear its medal to a Trump inaugural ball and did add a “v” middle initial to his name, a practice that comports with the group’s traditions.

Other Republican officeholders have also displayed an affinity with Europe’s far right politics. In March 2017, U.S. Representative Steve King publicly praised Geert Wilders, who, in his latest anti-immigrant tirade, had referred to Moroccans as “scum.” “Wilders understands that culture and demographics are our destiny,” King declared, with admiration. “We can’t restore our civilization with somebody else’s babies.” In September 2016, he posted online a photo of Wilders and himself, warning of “cultural suicide by demographic transformation.”

Although numerous public officials condemned King’s latest racist broadside, White House press secretary Sean Spicer refused to comment on it. Trump was also silent on King’s remarks. But, back in 2014, when Trump had campaigned for the Iowa congressman’s election, he called King a “special guy, a smart person, with really the right views on almost everything.” With their ideologies so in sync, said Trump, “we don’t have to compare notes.”

In this fashion, then, political forces around the world have been drawing together in recent years into a far right international. Although its future remains uncertain, especially if Putin and Trump come to a parting of the ways, it certainly has plenty of political momentum at present. “Long live Trump, long live Putin, long live Le Pen, and long live the League,” exulted the Northern League’s Salvini in early 2017. “Finally, we have an international alliance.”

This is an expanded version of an article that was originally published by the History News Network.

[mikemortgage]

Rachel Notley, Jason Kenney channel glories of past premiers in battle for Alberta’s economic soul

CALGARY — Jason Kenney, running to be Alberta’s next premier, is lunching on a salad at the Blackfoot Diner, a popular truck stop eatery just outside Calgary’s downtown, but offering red-meat economic policy proposals to his base in historically conservative Alberta.

While the province’s demographics and leanings are changing, and some of his United Conservative Party’s social policy proposals have met with staunch opposition and protests, his core economic promises of reducing corporate taxes, eliminating carbon taxes, and reducing regulatory timelines to encourage new investment are finding some currency as the economy sputters.

He is no ideologue, he says, highlighting that he agrees with his rivals in the NDP on “the strategic importance” of petrochemical diversification and he doesn’t want to “upset the apple cart” of gas-to-plastics projects in the province.

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“I think we’ve demonstrated in my support for the federal acquisition of (the Trans Mountain pipeline) and oil curtailment that we aren’t going to be taking some kind narrowly rigid, ideological position on these questions,” Kenney said. “We’re prepared to be pragmatic.”

Kenney, 50, and Rachel Notley, the NDP’s popular 54-year-old leader running for a second term, agree on little else.

Edmonton-born Notley’s economic platform is focused on “a more directed, strategic approach” to investments and infrastructure in the province, centred on expanding the petrochemical subsidy program.

Oakville, Ont.-born Kenney’s economic platform has centered on cutting costs for the private sector and free markets.

Peter Lougheed served as Alberta’s premier from 1971 to 1985.

The contrasting styles have drawn comparisons with economic platforms of two popular former Progressive Conservative premiers — with pundits noting that Notley is channelling Peter Lougheed’s government-directed spending, and Kenney is inspired by the market-oriented policies of Ralph Klein.

Ralph Klein served as Alberta’s premier from 1992 to 2006.

“You couldn’t ask for more diametrically opposed economic policies,” according to Duane Bratt, Mount Royal University political science professor.

To be fair, both the UCP and NDP have invited comparisons with Alberta’s popular past premiers on themselves. Notley has specifically referenced Lougheed in campaign speeches and Kenney has spoken of restoring the “Alberta Advantage” of low taxes championed by Klein.

The election on April 16 will determine which of the past premier’s economic visions will prevail. Unemployment stands at 7.3 per cent, real GDP growth will languish at 0.5 per cent in 2019, according to TD Bank Group forecast, and debt is estimated to be 80 per cent higher to $64.1 billion next year from 2014/15 levels. The way out of the morass isn’t all that clear given delays on all three active export pipeline projects. What’s clear is the province’s economy has not recovered to pre-2014 levels — both Kenney and Notley agree on this, too — and the electorate is seeking to vote on policies that can deliver a speedier rebound.

***

A week before calling an election, Notley stood in a southeast Calgary industrial fabrication yard against a backdrop of pipes to announce $70 million in royalty credits for an early stage, $600-million petrochemical plant proposal from Inter Pipeline Ltd. to produce acrylic acid, used to make plastic products.

The petrochemical diversification program has proven to be one of the NDP’s most popular economic policies. Days after the writ dropped, Notley said she would double the incentives available through it from $3.6 billion in total credits to $7 billion if re-elected.

“The more value add that we have in Alberta, the more we hedge against the price of the feedstock commodity going down,” Notley said in an interview, adding that she believes $7 billion in credits could attract $75 billion in spending on projects.

Alberta NDP Leader Rachel Notley makes a campaign stop in Edmonton Alta. on Wednesday, March 20, 2019.

The province’s petrochemical program is one in a series of examples of the NDP focusing on “strategic investments” in industrial infrastructure that Notley says will pay for itself and return money to taxpayers. She has also pledged $1.3 billion to expand the province’s industrial highway network.

Given these promises, and what she invested in during her first term, Mount Royal University’s Bratt said Notley truly is “an heir to the mantle of Lougheed.”

In her first term, Notley formed a liquefied natural gas investment team to study the potential of Alberta supporting a project off the West Coast to lift local natural gas prices. Her government also announced a controversial plan to spend $3.7 billion buying railway cars to move crude oil out of the province amid steep discounts for domestic heavy oil.

“With all of these things that we’ve done so far, they all have a return on investment to Albertans in terms of the impact on the economy writ large and none of these things that we’ve invested in doesn’t pay for itself in terms of our own revenue,” Notley said.

Despite attempts to diversify the province’s oil and gas economy, Notley has been sharply criticized by economists for tabling a budget update right before the election that showed non-renewable resource revenues “appears quite important to the government’s deficit reduction plan,” according to a report from National Bank Financial.

“Fact is, over the coming six years, resource royalties are expected to outgrow the remaining revenue pie by a margin of 3:1,” the report from March 22 states.

Despite the big-ticket spending, Notley says her government still plans to balance its budget as planned in 2023, even with the promises made in this election campaign.

Regardless of whether there’s a return on investment, the level of spending has opened Notley and the NDP up to criticism that Alberta’s debt is on track to hit $96 billion by 2024.

Debt ratings agencies downgraded the province’s ballooning debt at multiple points after successive budgets showed rising debt in a period of low oil prices.

Even though the province announced a lower-than-expected deficit for the current fiscal year, ratings agency DBRS kept its “negative trend” tag on the province given Alberta’s continued dependence on resource revenue amid higher spending, leading “debt-to-GDP forecast to reach approximately 20 per cent” by the end of this month.

DBRS cut Alberta’s credit rating one notch to AA in 2017, and said “Alberta’s fiscal outlook remains the weakest among all provinces, risks remain tilted to the downside.” The agency held its rating steady after the province’s 2018 budget.

Kenney believes the $3.7-billion oil-by-rail purchase is “the single largest expenditure in Alberta’s fiscal history” and vowed to scrap the deal if elected. “It’s a responsibility that belongs to the private sector and under the right market conditions, they’ll move more oil by rail,” he said.

UCP leader Jason Kenney says he would scrap Alberta’s $3.7-billion oil-by-rail deal if elected.

Notley says Kenney’s promise to shred the deal is “ridiculous” and would end up costing taxpayers money and also “extend and expand” the need for oil producers in the province to curtail their production given a lack of new export pipelines.

But several executives in the energy sector have told the Financial Post, on condition of anonymity, they are concerned about cancelling the railway contracts and fear it would lead to another period of punishingly high discounts for Canadian oil.

“The industry is not unified on that proposal but we look at it as an insurance policy,” Explorers and Producers Association of Canada president Tristan Goodman said of the oil-by-rail deal. “We think we need an insurance policy involving rail.”

Energy investor Ninepoint Partners’ Eric Nuttall believes Kenney would back down from scrapping the crude-by-rail deal “despite what is being said on the campaign trail.”

“I appreciate his ‘free markets’ angle but this is one issue where, given how much of it has been screwed up by multiple levels of government, the risk/reward merits the continued involvement of the Alberta government into 2020,” Nuttall said. “It’s not a risk worth taking.”

Most economists and energy executives in Calgary are upbeat about other aspects of Kenney’s economic platform.

While Goodman wouldn’t comment on specific policy measures, the small- and mid-sized oil and gas producers he represents are looking for improvements on fiscal issues like taxes, on regulatory burdens and on new pipelines.

Research done by the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy has formed the basis for much of the UCP’s economic policies so far.

The UCP asked School of Public Policy research director on tax and economic growth Bev Dahlby to study its plan to cut the corporate tax rate from 12 per cent to 8 per cent. Dahlby found it would lead to 6.5 per cent higher real GDP growth.

However, the school’s experts declined to comment for this piece over concerns they’d be seen as endorsing the party.

Given where the UCP is polling in Calgary, Kenney may not need an endorsement.

In the course of 30 minutes at the Blackfoot Diner, Kenney was interrupted by supporters wishing him well three times — a reflection of the UCP currently polling at 51.4 per cent support in the city, close to 17 points ahead of the NDP.

UCP leader Jason Kenney speaks at a campaign rally in Edmonton, Tuesday, March 19, 2019.

Kenney rolled out his platform before the writ dropped, announcing plans for cancelling the carbon tax, cutting corporate taxes and rolling back regulations.

“The fundamental difference I have with the NDP is that they seem to think the only way to diversify or get the economy going is to pick a handful of winners and losers. Our view is to get the fundamentals right,” Kenney said.

For her part, Notley doesn’t believe corporate tax cuts are an inefficient way to attract investment “particularly in a place like ours where we are already a very competitive province relative to other provinces around investment.”

“I don’t think, in the oil and gas sector anyway, it’s a particularly helpful strategy and I think a more directed, strategic approach will work better,” she said.

Interestingly, the corporate tax cuts espoused by Kenney could have a larger effect on investments in petrochemical projects than on upstream oil and gas producers.

“What investment are we talking about?” asked ARC Energy Research Institute executive director Peter Tertzakian. “Corporate tax cuts benefit midstream and downstream companies more than the upstream industry.”

Outside of the oilsands, few exploration and production companies have high corporate tax burdens because they reinvest all or most of their earnings into new production, said Tertzakian, who is one of the top energy economists in the country, and was a member of Notley’s oil and gas royalty review panel.

Kenney plans to announce additional policies about speeding up regulatory approvals at the Alberta Energy Regulator later in the campaign. “I want to meet or beat Texas when it comes to timelines and approvals and I truly believe we can do that without reducing health or safety standards,” he said.

Kenney, who was a prominent cabinet member of Stephen Harper’s federal government, has also promised to appoint a minister responsible for cutting red tape.

The former federal minister is looking to replicate “the experience of the (Gordon) Campbell Liberal government of B.C., which successfully reduced by 41 per cent the regulatory burden of the British Columbia economy, making them something of a model for North America.”

Experts in B.C. say, however, believe the Campbell government drew its inspiration from a neighbour.

“I wouldn’t know why the antecedence in Alberta wouldn’t be closer to home,” said University of British Columbia political science professor Alan Tupper of the deregulation drive. The Campbell government’s deregulation effort in British Columbia was “very influenced” by the Klein government in Alberta a decade earlier, and also by the Mike Harris government in Ontario, Tupper said.

Comparisons between Notley and Lougheed and between Kenney and Klein seem very accurate, but are also deeply ironic, Mount Royal University’s Bratt said.

Lougheed’s “fiercest critic” was Grant Notley, Rachel’s father, and at that time the NDP’s lone member in the legislature. Kenney, meanwhile, was a “thorn in Klein’s side” in the 1990s when Klein was in the premier’s office and Kenney was with the Canadian Taxpayers Federation.

Now Notley and Kenney are trying to channel Albertans’ fond memories of both former premiers, both deceased, as they seek the province’s highest office.

“The memory of Lougheed — it’s an older memory but it’s a less divisive memory than the memory of Klein,” Bratt said.

• Email: gmorgan@nationalpost.com | Twitter: geoffreymorgan

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