#i think they both exist but r in separate dimensions in the same universe

[riotshotguns]

thinking way too hard about the remedyverse and how quantum break does (or rather doesn’t) fit into it and i feel fucking insane nobbody talk me orlook at me

[bonzos-number-1-fan]

TMAGP 8 Thoughts: Older Friends

Plenty of things to talk about here but very little reason for a preamble, so spoilers for episode 8 and TMA below the cut.

Okay, so first things first this one launches straight into the case. As incidents go this isn't particularly strange but does emphasise some reoccurring themes we've seen in prior statements. Notably there is a much bigger prevalence on altered spaces, and manifestations that don't neatly fit into Smirke's 14. As I may have mentioned in these posts before it seems like the Fears, or Fear equivalents, in TMP are much more capable of altering the physical world here. The current idea is that its because they're the TMA Fears in some capacity and the successful completion of "The Magnus Archives" dragged them into the physical reality of TMA and even though they were ejected from it they've maintained some capacity to influence the mundane world. Although it will be interesting to see if there emerges a clear separation between what's a manifestation of TMP's native entities (if they exist), and what's a manifestation of the TMA fears. With last episodes Hilltop escapade it's fairly hard to argue that they're not around in some form.

Alice and Gwen hate each other. More at eleven.

Okay, so this next bit will be the thing for this episode. Sam and Celia go visit Gerry to have a chat about the Magnus Institute. This isn't super surprising all in all. I've been expecting it for a few episodes. Gerry was in the same database Sam was that we got in the ARG. So the cameo is fun but not super important as far as new information goes from my PoV. Gerry does seem a lot more chipper this time around so that's always nice.

What I wasn't expecting, and what I doubt any one else was expecting, is a cameo from Gertrude. Her appearance is also much more interesting narratively. We don't know how close these universes really are to each other. Do alternate versions of the same character end up in similar places? Do they pursue similar goals? Because just from this episode, and some light conjecture about the nature of the multiverse, it's very plausible that Gertrude burned down the Institute in this universe. Gertrude and Gerry ended up close in TMA and have ended up close in TMP too. While she wasn't exactly parental in TMA she did at least get him away from his family there. It's not too much of an assumption to make that something similar has happened here. Connect that to the psychological testing the Institute was doing on children, and specifically Gerry, and it's not a big leap to assume that's why the Institute burned down. Different reasoning for it happening but the same cogs in the same machine. What's more interesting here than just that idea that she did the same thing in both universes is that this time she was successful. The reason she failed last time, Elias/Jonah, might not have been in play this time around.

It's also important to note that this could very well be the name and address Sam got emailed to him via John last episode.

The other big thing here is Georgie getting mentioned, specifically in context to her podcast, and more specifically in context to Celia's research into alternate dimensions and time travel. Because there are a few distinct possibilities here. However, I think the most likely one is that Georgie and Celia are both from TMA's universe and that they've gone through together for the same purposes. But it's hard to say too too much about it as of yet given how it's all left off. I think the stuff with the podcast and the like is probably part of establishing themselves in this universe rather than Celia looking into TMP Georgie and then guesting on the podcast. Who knows though.

DPHW Theory: 3366 is a pretty normal DPHW for this sort of thing. You've got some spooky cannibal types but they're more remarkable for what they're not than what they are and what they're not is normal.

CAT#R# Theory: CAT2RBC doesn't really mean anything more than any of the others. But at this point I do feel there should be enough to make a few stabs at what these things could mean. I haven't as of yet sat down to theorycraft so no new updates in this post but if I come up with something I'll post it in the next one, or in a standalone post if it's very compelling.

Header talk: Architecture (liminal) -/- hunger isn't super interesting on its own IMO. What is interesting is how it makes zero references to any of the monsters in this one. The incident is classified solely in respect to its architecture and not what inhabited said architecture. The mention of hunger is interesting to me, personally, because I've seen a few assertions that Hunger/Hunger is the more likely pick for the H in DPHW. I didn't think it tracked well before this but with hunger being used as a crosslink I think it's even less likely now.

This episode shows the limitations of the OIAR's methodology really well. The header is Architecture (liminal) -/- hunger, and doesn't mention anything about the uncannybals (like uncanny, i.e. the valley but they eat people). There are seemingly two distinct things, connected via a hunger, were happening here but you can only file it under one and we know that the section and subsection you choose dictates the DPHW so the spooky monsters don't appear to be a factor here at all which is why it's got a lower DP than you'd normally expect.

[flickeringart]

Satanism - a way to embrace Pluto?

My mind has been occupied with Pluto lately, the planet, god and symbol of “the hidden things”, the occult, the underworld, darkness, fate, rage, destruction, transformation, abduction, man’s primitive nature, life and death, power and powerlessness, fear, violation and fertility. There’s so much nuance to all planetary (archetypal) principles and there’s always more to explore. Pluto especially is a mysterious and threatening figure (force) in our lives and in the world at large. I have talked about it in previous posts, here / here and here… I’ve also explored the 8th house, which is the astrological house of Scorpio and Pluto here and here.

Many people understandably avoid anything that has to do with the darker elements of life and human nature until they are forced to deal with them. This is possibly why Pluto has been associated with violence because we are typically dragged into the depths; we don’t go there willingly. Some people, however, have lives that are marked by Pluto to such a degree that they can’t pretend that he doesn’t exist. By deciding to consciously accept him and embrace his influence it is possible to live a richer life. After all, Pluto is not only a god of destruction; he is also a god of riches. It seems to me, that the worship of Satan (as practiced by members of the Church of Satan) is very much in line with Pluto’s gifts and his riches. It’s an attempt to embrace the carnal nature. However, this Plutonian carnality is not as basic as it seems. It has its own intelligence, its own spirituality and its own laws. It seems to me that Pluto has to do with survival – psychological, emotional, spiritual and physical. He stands for survival and life at all levels of the being. As stated on the official website, “To us, Satan is the symbol that best suits the nature of we who are carnal by birth—people who feel no battles raging between our thoughts and feelings, we who do not embrace the concept of a soul imprisoned in a body. He represents pride, liberty, and individualism—qualities often defined as Evil by those who worship external deities, who feel there is a war between their minds and emotions.”

I think, that this philosophy attempts to treasure the whole (hu)man, to recognize his divinity even in his subjective thoughts and feelings. It’s an attempt to honor the darker aspects of human nature – anger, rage, and instinctual responses. It’s essentially to honor the earth, the dark void, and the merciless existence. Putting faith in external deities is robbing the individual of his divinity; it’s separating him from life. Christianity has, at least in part, made people think of Evil as an autonomous force (an external deity), corrupting good souls and creating fear and panic. By avoiding seeing reality as a whole, Christianity perpetuates fear instead of confronting it. As I understand it, Satanists don’t invest belief in any gods (symbolic of human drives and instincts) because they see that these mind-made constructs are part of their own psyche. Satanists place themselves at the center of their own subjective universe without seeking to befriend or worship mythical entities that are separate from them.

It seems to me though, from studying astrology, that there’s no way to escape deity. In the effort to not have any god, to place the self at the center, as is characteristic of the Church of Satan, one is in fact aligning or siding with an archetype. It’s impossible not to. I think this is made quite obvious when using astrology and analyzing natal charts. The archetypal energies are expressing themselves through and as the individuals.

In fact, let’s take a look at the chart of the founder of the Church of Satan, Anton Szandor LaVey. I would expect him to have a strong Pluto because of the emphasis on embracing the carnal side and the spiritual dimension of it. There’s also a big emphasis on being whole (a solar principle) through recognizing the totality of life, facing the strength and power within oneself and using the necessary tools to improve one’s own life. This would include consciously using symbols and images (like the image of Satan) in order to get the desired effect. If symbols are given autonomous power it’s a problem only if it puts the individual in a disempowered position. Personal integrity and liberty is also of utmost importance, which sounds rather Aquarian to me. Let’s have a look.

The chart of Anton Szandor LaVey, as found on astrotheme.com.

The Sun is in Aries, which is not surprising considering his strong faith in individuality, his initiative to start a “new religion”, to provide a contrasting influence, to place himself at the “center”, to go by no other rules than his own, to welcome opposition, the desire to be his own master and a leader of his own life. Aries as a sign is strongly linked to the warrior archetype, of fighting for what one believes in without compromise, to claim authority in spirit, to conquer, to place subjectivity over objectivity (because there’s no real difference from the perspective of Aries). Selfishness is the basis for existence; it is through honoring the self that one can honor other people’s independence. Mars, which is the planetary ruler of Aries, is concerned with personal strength and potency (note; Mars is sometimes referred to as the lower octave of Pluto). It seems like LaVey lived on his own terms, relying on his own natural instincts and gifts to get by in life. This is all very typical of Aries people, to live of off a self-generated optimism and conviction of one’s own ability. “The rules don’t apply to me” is the overall sentiment – the rules originated somewhere and that which originates from my own self is no less valuable or divine, even if it’s raw, ugly or imperfect it is still of “The Self”, the force that animates existence.

To no surprise, Pluto makes a square aspect to his Sun. He would’ve lived with the threat of his own destructive rage, his own inner violence and uncompromising desire. To him, it was probably difficult to consciously accept this side (the square aspect always represents a conflict) but he certainly tried to acknowledge his “darkness” through founding the Church of Satan. A person with a trine aspect between Sun-Pluto would not have been as motivated or pressed to bridge the gap between the self and the primitive and taboo because there wouldn’t have been anything to bridge. The square relationships between two planets usually motivate the individual to try to solve dilemma of conflicting principles within the psyche through external work. Squares usually force work in a very concrete fashion. When a person is serious about something, and is trying to make something happen it’s usually indicative of a square aspect within the personal chart. For example, I have a Neptune square Mercury aspect. I try to read and write and educate myself to some kind of higher state, some transcendent and elevated experience because the connection is not smooth between these planets. I try to articulate things properly in order to bridge the gap between personal mind and the nuance of collective feeling. I try to reflect the essence or feeling tone of energies through my writing.

The interesting thing about LaVey is that he truly took on the appearance of a devil – he was probably aware of the power of looks, the impact that certain clothing or symbols have. He was undoubtedly theatrical. Pluto in the 5th house might have something to do with this, as it’s the house of individual expression. The 5th house is all about personal creation; it’s the realm of children and play. In a sense, he was no different from a child dressing up in costumes and playing “the dark one”, which is probably why people mocked him for it. Even when Pluto is in the 5th house it is never light-hearted, he is all in, ruthlessly determined. Pluto placed in this house takes play seriously. He takes personal expression seriously. His creations are his and he should be at the center of them. The individual should be credited for his abilities, not the other way around, just as the individual shouldn’t be appreciated because his gifts are “of the gods”. They belong as much to the individual as it does to the deities. This is certainly the spirit of Pluto. He answers to no other god than himself and he sees life as it is, in its most vile forms, without flinching. Life is in all expressions, in the primitive as well as in the sophisticated. This is, in many ways, a deeply honest way to live. Another thing that catches my attention is the bi-quintiles Pluto makes to the MC (public image) and the AC (personal image/persona). The bi-quintile aspect is generally considered to say something about a certain talent or style, a mercurial quality or skill. He truly has the style of Pluto, both in his countenance and in his societal achievements. He looks dark and mysterious, preoccupied with the occult side of life. Perhaps he even had a certain talent for “magic”, at least he claimed to.

Satanists believe in indulgence (which doesn’t imply compulsion) over abstinence, primarily because there’s no belief in heaven or an after life. The individual is placed at the center of his own universe as his own master – through and through. Although many people would agree that self-mastery is a good thing, many also tend promote, in the same vein, that “people make mistakes” and that they “should be forgiven”. As I understand it, Satanism as a philosophy would state that mistakes are only mistakes if the self-mastered individual firmly believes it to be so in complete honesty and integrity. Self-deceit is considered to be a sin, unless of course it’s done intentionally - it would then not be a sin. Going along with roles that other people have cast one in is self-deceit – that is, for example, shouldering the role as a “sinner” because other people have imposed that label or role onto you is not indicative of self-respect, it’s a betrayal of your own reality. Notably, LaVey has an Aquarius Ascendant, Lilith in Aquarius in the 1st house and Uranus widely conjunct his Sun (both in the independent sign of Aries). He is definitely not a person to follow the herd – in fact “Herd Conformity” is one of the Cardinal Sins in Satanism. He leads life through the principle of being his own godhead, his own intellectual genius, and his own unique and separate individual, detached from the norms and conventions enough to go against them if he pleases. Aquarius is a sign that considers the map of life in an intellectual sense. This sign is also the sign of the progressive individual, someone who wants to make a difference on a larger scale. He certainly did, through constructing a thought-system that could benefit people. It’s no wonder that the first of the Nine Cardinal Sins (as found on the official website) is Stupidity. Of course it would be to an Aquarius Rising! “Think for yourself; don’t go along with everything you’re told” is the plea.

[nexusnickva]

Ultra Space Links the Main Series Pokémon Games with the Mystery Dungeon series

(This is just a theory I posted onto r/GameTheorists)

Given the scope of the series, it's no surprise the Pokémon has gotten it's fair share of spin-offs. From Pokémon Ranger, to PokéPark, to Pokkén Tournament, each spin-off has it's own unique vibes to it. Most of the games take place in either far away regions, such as Pokémon Ranger with Fiore or Pokkén Tournament with Ferrum, whereas others such as PokéPark exist in alternate universes separate from the main series. Because of that, you would expect that the Pokémon Mystery Dungeon subseries of games would fall into the same latter category, but there's something kind of amiss about it.

The Pokémon Mystery Dungeon games follow an isekai sort of formula. The basic premise is that the protagonist, a human, has been transported to a world inhabited only by Pokémon and transformed into one too. After meeting a partner Pokémon and most likely joining some sort of team, the protagonist must traverse various dungeons alongside their partner Pokémon in order to find a way back home. That all sounds well and good, but the thing that used to confuse me is that the Pokémon of the Mystery Dungeon world know about humans. They acknowledge humans, but only as fictional beings.

"Humans don't exist anywhere except in fairy tales, or that's what I always thought." - The Partner, Pokémon Mystery Dungeon: Gates to Infinity (I'm just gonna source the entire game's transcript here you can Ctrl + F it)

I always wondered how the Pokémon of the Mystery Dungeon world knew about humans if humans don't exist in there world, but I would write it off as a silly "Hee hoo, Pokémon fictional in real world, human fictional in Pokémon world" gaff. That was until a very crucial detail in the most popular games in the subseries hit me like a truck.

(MAJOR SPOILERS for Pokémon Mystery Dungeon: Explorers of Sky/Time/Darkness ahead)

So, in Pokémon Mystery Dungeon: Explorers of Sky/Time/Darkness, the big plot twist half way through the game is that the amnesiac protagonist who could only remember their name and that they were human is actually from a ruined future, fighting alongside their partner Pokémon Grovyle against the traitorous Dusknoir who used their amnesiac state to gain their trust and vilify Grovyle. That sounds pretty straight forward until the glaring issue becomes apparent. The protagonist is from the ruined future of the MYSTERY DUNGEON WORLD. When you go to the ruined future, there's no other humans in sight, and it's quite clearly a desolate version of the world you previously ventured through. Considering that there's no other humans anywhere, only very few Pokémon, it's unlikely that there's just a secret society of humans there. So how did the protagonist, a human, get to the Mystery Dungoen world? Well, that question remained unanswered for over 9 years until Generation 7 of Pokémon finally gave us enough hints to put together the puzzle.

Generation 7, Sun and Moon, introduced the concept of Ultra Space: a spatial realm that connects a bunch of alternate dimensions and worlds together. Ultra Space can be accessed by Ultra Wormholes, which are commonly opened by the Light Trio (Solgaleo, Lunala, and Necrozma) but can also occur naturally. Canonically, there have been cases of people falling into Ultra Wormholes (deemed as "Fallers") as well as cases where societies have been formed within Ultra Wormholes such is the case with Ultra Megalotropolis. Considering every Ultra Space area you visit in Ultra Sun and Ultra Moon contains at least one Pokémon and rarely humans, it's not out of the question that one world in Ultra Space was inhabited by Pokémon exclusively who wound up making themselves an entire society that would go on to become the world of Pokémon Mystery Dungeon. Perhaps the protagonist from the Explorers games was a "Faller" who never actually returned to the main series world. That's not all, however, as another bizarre connection between the main series games and Mystery Dungeon subseries exists.

In the aforementioned Pokémon Mystery Dungeon: Explorers of Sky/Time/Darkness games, in order to evolve a Nosepass, you require an item known as the Coronet Rock.

" A rock that radiates a peculiar energy, rumored only to exist on Mt. Coronet, a place that no one knows anything about. It allows certain kinds of Pokémon to evolve." - In-game item description

Notice that it directly refers to Mt. Coronet in the tool-tip. Mt. Coronet is not an area in Pokémon Mystery Dungeon. None of the Mystery Dungeon games allow you to go there. Why? Because Mt. Coronet is from the Sinnoh region of Pokémon Diamond, Pearl, and Platinum. The thing that strikes me as odd is the fact that they know what Mt. Coronet is, but don't know anything about it. This could be one of two things.

A) The inhabitants of the PMD world heard about Mt. Coronet via Fallers and coined the name "Coronet Rock" after this mysterious, other-worldly place.

or

B) The PMD world is an alternate version of the main game's world in the same way that the Ultra Ruin in an alternate future version of Hau'oli City from Alola and Mt. Coronet actually exists there.

Both potential answers still point to the Mystery Dungeon world being connected to the main series world via Ultra Space.

One last thing that isn't necessarily evidence, but it's a neat thing that may potentially be a hint at what my theory proposes. Canonically, Ultra Wormholes were discovered by a man named Mohn, husband of Lusamine of the Aether Foundation and father to Lillie and Gladion. Gladion in particular is the main rival of Pokémon Sun and Moon and has a bizarre connection to the Pokémon Mystery Dungeon series. Both his encounter and battle themes are guitar remixes of the Run Away, Fugitives theme from the original Pokémon Mystery Dungeon games, Red Rescue Team and Blue Rescue Team. The main series games have never really gone out of their way to reference the Mystery Dungeon series, so it's quite interesting that the son of the man who discovered Ultra Space has a guitar remix of one of the most pivotal songs from the original Pokémon Mystery Dungeon as his theme.

So yeah, that's pretty much it. I know that not all of my evidence is necessarily damning, but I feel like there's enough there to have a fun time discussing it. That's what making these posts is all about; proposing fun new ways to think about some of our favorite games, considering things you didn't think possible, and mainly just getting to talk about the things we enjoy. After all... it's just a theory.

A GAME THEORY!

I will never get tired of ending theories with that.

[captainextremis]

So, I’ve had time to think about the DOOM Eternal trailer since Bethesda released it back at E3, and one thing that struck me as odd was Doomguy’s armor:

If you look closely, you’ll notice his bicep is left uncovered, and the armor is lacking some of the runic details and looks much “cleaner,” if you could call it that. That means it’s the Doom Marine armor, from the original two games, and yet, the helmet shape seems to be in the general shape of the Praetorian armor from DOOM 4, if not a fusion of the Doom Marine and Praetorian helmet. On top of that, the Super Shotgun looks different, but that’s most likely just because they needed to make it look fresh as hell for the new game.

And yet, trustedreviews.com has this to say about what we know about the game thus far:

“A direct sequel,” it says.

Now, this could only be a “direct sequel” in name only, but I doubt it, which lends the question:

If this is a sequel, why does Doomslayer look different? If it’s supposed to be a sequel, shouldn’t he have the Praetorian armor? Well, to answer that, we have to answer who the Doomslayer is. Which means you get two theories for one!

So first off, in DOOM 4, we are told we play as “the Doomslayer,” to skip over a bunch of dialogue. It’s heavily implied the Doomslayer is the same Doom Marine from the first two games, Final DOOM, and DOOM 64. How do we know? In DOOM 64, Doomguy decides to remain in hell to stop every last demon from breaching the walls to the physical universe, and we know that this is the same Doomguy from DOOM 1 and 2. The Helix stones in Hell describe the Doomslayer as a warrior who has “traveled through dimensions and eons” slaughtering the legions of Hell, and the in-game UAC team that recovered his sarcophagus codenames him “DOOM Marine,” which I don’t find as a coincidence. Not only that, but we see the Doomslayer doing this:

...Showing that he’s not just a mindless killing machine. He has a sense of humor. A sense of empathy. He has humanness to him. This is right in line with his backstory from DOOM 1, where it’s stated he’s been sent to Mars as punishment for beating the shit out of a superior officer when he refused to fire on innocent civilians.

However, the game strongly implies that the Doomslayer is a Knight Sentinel, a leader of mystical knights from the realm of Argent d’Nur. Hell coveted the power of the Wraiths, and constantly tried to seize control of the realm to claim their power for themselves, but were constantly foiled by the Knight Sentinels. After one war, however, one of the Night Sentinels lost his son, and a Hell Priest named Deag Grav saw him grieving and decided to exploit the hell out of it. He offered the traitorous Sentinel his only son back if he led him to the Wraiths, which the Sentinel did, which also makes no sense. I mean, even if Hell had brought his kid back the way he wanted, they’d still be under Hell’s control, right? Huge lack of foresight on the Sentinel’s part. Anyway, long story short, Deag Grav corrupts the Wraiths so they start producing Argent energy, Hell invades, everyone dies.

Except the Traitor. Because he honored his end of the deal, the hell priests brought his son back...as the Icon of Sin. What a kick in the dick.

Now angry beyond belief and wracked with guilt, the Night Sentinel goes on a murder spree across all nine Circles...seventeen levels...six hundred and sixty six realms…? I don’t know if they based this off of Judeo-Christian hell or not, sue me. Anyway, Night Sentinel dude goes beating the shit out of demons for some amount of time. As you’ve seen, both backstories of both protagonists could possibly the backstory for the Doomslayer, but which one is it? Well, that’s simple.

It’s both. At the same time.

Hear me out on this, ‘cause here’s where the speculation comes in: let’s say both Doomguy and the Traitor are staying in Hell, killing demons. We don’t know how big Hell really is, but I’d imagine the two of them have to figure out the other one exists at some point, right? They have eons, after all. Maybe they met by pure happenstance. Maybe one discovered the other resting and attacked, thinking they were a new demon, but quickly figured out they were not even close. Maybe one discovered a bunch of mangled demon corpses and specifically remembered not killing them, so they follow the trail of gore to see the other one kicking ass and taking names. Either way, the two of these two legends meet, and they quickly bond over their tragic pasts and their mutual hatred of demons, and they both quickly forge an alliance in the fires of Hell.

Now, at this point, the Seraphim mentioned in DOOM 4 comes down and is all like, “You two are bros now? Okay, cool. Here’s some divine powers’n’shit to help you kill more shit,” and the Seraphim grants either the Night Sentinel or Doomguy (or both) their supernatural killing power. It doesn’t really matter, but after that, I have two theories:

Either the Seraphim fuses the two warriors right then and there, or some time afterward, they fuse together body, mind, and soul due to the paranormal properties of Hell. Either way, they cease to be Doomguy and the Night Sentinel, and are reborn as “the Doomslayer,” and with two souls combined, they are sharing a metric fuckton of anger between them in one body. That anger’s gotta get let out on something, though.

The new Doomslayer proceeds to go on such a mortifying killing spree that the Lord of Hell/Lucifer/Satan/the Devil is shitting himself just thinking about how much destruction Doomslayer could cause if he got to his seat of power, so he sends armies, platoon, legions of demons to kill him. Doomslayer ends up flattening all of them instead, so the big boss releases The Titan, a demon so fuckmassive it would take at least ten-thousand cyberdemons standing on each others’ heads to get up to its eye level, and tells it to sic Doomslayer; Doomslayer kills the thing with his bare hands (or whatever you believe is equally as awesome). With all options for outright eradicating Doomslayer thrown out the fucking window, the Lord of Hell has his armies seal Doomslayer away in Kadingir Sanctum instead. Cue the events of DOOM 4, and its ending. I highly believe Doomslayer got sent back to Hell, and is now more thoroughly pissed off than ever, which means as soon as he sees an open portal to Earth, he runs his ass right though so he can find Samuel and use the tin can’s chassis as a toilet.

Except he finds demons. Hordes upon hordes of demons, most likely brought to Earth by Samuel harvesting more Argent Energy and/or Olivia Pierce’s failed deal to invade Mars (again, thanks to Doomslayer). Either way, he’s back on Earth, and he’s ready to r i p  a n d  t e a r some more demons apart.

So back to the original point...why the different armor, then? Well, this is more rampant speculation, but I think, at some point between DOOM 4 and DOOM Eternal, Doomslayer actually manages to become un-fused. For some reason, Doomguy and the Night Sentinel split apart from each other, most likely due to the Applied Phlebotinum of Earth being dragged into Hell. It could be any number of reasons, really, but the important thing is that Doomguy and Night Sentinel-guy separate their bodies and souls. What Night Sentinel would be doing in the game, I dunno, but I’m guessing DOOM Eternal’s gonna be an adaptation of DOOM 2, and if that’s the case…

Doomguy’s gonna be able to kill everything demonic on the planet with nothing more than skull-splitting, mountain-flattening, earth-shattering RAGE.

Meddle not with a man’s pet rabbit, for you do not know how much he may enjoy your screams.

Alternately, Doomslayer is gone entirely and we’re just playing as a normal (lol, “normal”) Doom Marine, hence the armor difference. But that’s no fucking fun, is it? 

[biointernet]

Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia is sensitive experience

Qualia and Time Perception

Qualia

Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences

Qualia is qualities of awareness

Qualia is sensitive experience See also: Time perception and Sense of Time, The Hourglass of Emotions, Time Travel Management What it feels like, experimentally, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. Likewise for hearing a musical note played by a piano and hearing the same musical note played by a tuba. The qualia of these experiences are what give each of them its characteristic "feel" and also what distinguish them from one another. Qualia have traditionally been thought to be intrinsic qualities of experience that are directly available to introspection. However, some philosophers offer theories of qualia that deny one or both of those features. Qualia, standard psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy term:  The word Qualia refers to the range of ways in which experience presents itself. Experiences can be richly colored or bare and monochromatic, they can be spatial and kinesthetic or devoid of geometry and directions, they can be flavorfully blended or felt as coming from mutually unintelligible dimensions, and so on. Classic qualia examples include things like the redness of red, the tartness of lime, and the glow of bodily warmth. However, qualia extends into categories far beyond the classic examples, beyond the wildest of our common-sense conceptions. There are modes of experience as altogether different from everything we have ever experienced as vision qualia is different from sound qualia. Qualia and Time Sense

Philosophy of perception

The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data, in particular how they relate to beliefs about, or knowledge of, the world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism—the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived—is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. More about Philosophy of perception on Wiki.

Philosophy is like Sex - you can get some exciting results, but it is not why you will do it Why do you FEEL pain or pleasure? Do plants have emotions? How is possible that some people do not understand other’s emotions? Emotions seem to be everywhere, giving meaning to all events of our lives. They are the backbone of social activities as well as they drive the cognitive processes of several living entities. Several animals, including humans, have emotions. Do machine can have emotions? Qualia and Time Sense

Sense data

Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. For instance, sense data theorists say that, upon viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image is red and round. The mental image is an example of a “sense datum.” Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either because they believe that perception gives us direct awareness of physical phenomena, rather than mere mental images, or because they believe that the mental phenomena involved in perception do not have the properties that appear to us (for instance, I might have a visual experience representing a red, round tomato, but my experience is not itself red or round). Defenders of sense data have argued, among other things, that sense data are required to explain such phenomena as perspectival variation, illusion, and hallucination. Critics of sense data have objected to the theory's commitment to mind-body dualism, the problems it raises for our knowledge of the external world, its difficulty in locating sense data in physical space, and its apparent commitment to the existence of objects with indeterminate properties.

What Are Sense Data?

1.1. The Standard Conception On the most common conception, sense data (singular: “sense datum”) have three defining characteristics:  Sense data are the kind of thing we are directly aware of in perception,Sense data are dependent on the mind, andSense data have the properties that perceptually appear to us. More about Sense data on the website Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here. Qualia and Time Sense

Deepak Chopra about Qualia

Deepak Chopra explores and explains ways of describing our subjective experiences - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and emotions.* Qualia is a term used to describe these subjective experiences, how can we use these qualitative units to describe experience? And what is the relationship between consciousness and experience? Deepak addresses these and other facets of experience. (See on YouTube)

MHC Exhibitions

Exhibitions:Beauty Bio NetHourglass and CardsArt GlassMHC Dead Sea CollectionThe Full History of Time3DHM ExhibitionHourglass Figure Sophia Loren Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia ain’t in the head

ALEX BYRNE Massachusetts Institute of Technology MICHAEL TYE The University of Texas at Austin Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different addition of some relatively innocuous assumptions, they are inconsistent. Take color as an example. Consider Bill and Ben, ordinary humans who are enjoying color experiences with different qualia. Let x be a (possible) duplicate of Bill, and let y be a (possible) duplicate of Ben. Given a specific externalist theory of content (which need not be reductive), with some ingenuity we can plausibly construct different environments for each, such that the theory predicts that x and y’s color experiences have the same content; so, by (weak) intentionalism, they have the same qualia. By qualia internalism, x’s experience has the same qualia as Bill’s, and y’s experience has the same qualia as Ben’s, so x’s and y’s experiences differ in qualia; contradiction. Alternatively, since an intentionalist about color qualia will typically endorse the converse thesis that the color content of an experience supervenes on its color qualia, we can start with a pair of duplicates x* and y* in different environments and use content externalism to argue that their experiences differ in content. Since x* and y* are duplicates, their experiences have the same qualia; by the converse intentionalist thesis, their experiences have the same content. So: content externalism and intentionalism (jointly, ‘‘externalist inten- tionalism’’) naturally lead to qualia externalism. And what’s wrong with that? Isn’t the doctrine of qualia internalism the last bastion of a widely discredited Cartesian conception of the mind? Not according to many philosophers, who view qualia externalism with the same incredulity that greeted Churchland-style eliminativism. Qualia externalism, they think, is an absurd thesis, accepted by a handful of philosophers with too much respect for philosophical theory and not enough common sense. To his credit, Adam Pautz (2006) does not rest his opposition to qualia externalism on this kind of ‘‘intuition’’. He attempts to provide an argument against the principal motivation for it, namely externalist intentionalism. Moreover, the argument purports to be in significant degree empirical, drawing on results from a variety of disciplines, including psychophysics and neuroscience. The orthodox response to our quasi-inconsistent triad is to deny inten- tionalism, not content externalism. Interestingly, Pautz takes the other option, and embraces content internalism. So far, we have not mentioned the issue of reductive physicalism, which looms large in Pautz’s presentation. In our view, bringing in inevitably controversial reductive theses of the ‘‘awareness relation’’ at the start just makes it harder to see what is going on. Accordingly, we will initially set out Pautz’s argument against externalist intentionalism while ignoring the various reductive proposals that Pautz discusses. After having explained why Pautz’s argument fails, we then turn (in section 2) to the entirely separate issue of whether there is some relatively compact wide physicalistic account of the awareness relation. Full text here. Qualia and Time Sense

New Times

Sundial watch Object #336 Vintage postal envelope The Hourglass of Emotions Wham! – Last Christmas Time Machine How to dress an hourglass figure Time of Life #335 Flow away MHC Flikr Time synonyms Cyclocosmia hourglass spider

What is it, Time of Life? Qualia and Time Sense

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia

David J. Chalmers Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 ] 1 The principle of organizational invariance It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper. To put the issue differently, even once it is accepted that experience arises from physical systems, the question remains open: in virtue of what sort of physical properties does conscious experience arise? Some property that brains can possess will presumably be among them, but it is far from clear just what the relevant properties are. Some have suggested biochemical properties; some have suggested quantum-mechanical properties; many have professed uncertainty. A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates. In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a principle of organizational invariance, holding that experience is invariant across systems with the same fine-grained functional organization. More precisely, the principle states that given any system that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. A full specification of a system's fine-grained functional organization will fully determine any conscious experiences that arise. To clarify this, we must first clarify the notion of functional organization. This is best understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction between the components of a system, and perhaps between these components and external inputs and outputs. A functional organization is determined by specifying (1) a number of abstract components, (2) for each component, a number of different possible states, and (3) a system of dependency relations, specifying how the states of each component depends on the previous states of all components and on inputs to the system, and how outputs from the system depend on previous component states. Beyond specifying their number and their dependency relations, the nature of the components and the states is left unspecified. A physical system realizes a given functional organization when the system can be divided into an appropriate number of physical components each with the appropriate number of possible states, such that the causal dependency relations between the components of the system, inputs, and outputs precisely reflect the dependency relations given in the specification of the functional organization. A given functional organization can be realized by diverse physical systems. For example, the organization realized by the brain at the neural level might in principle be realized by a silicon system. A physical system has functional organization at many different levels, depending on how finely we individuate its parts and on how finely we divide the states of those parts. At a coarse level, for instance, it is likely that the two hemispheres of the brain can be seen as realizing a simple two-component organization, if we choose appropriate interdependent states of the hemispheres. It is generally more useful to view cognitive systems at a finer level, however. For our purposes I will always focus on a level of organization fine enough to determine the behavioral capacities and dispositions of a cognitive system. This is the role of the "fine enough grain" clause in the statement of the organizational invariance principle; the level of organization relevant to the application of the principle is one fine enough to determine a system's behavioral dispositions. In the brain, it is likely that the neural level suffices, although a coarser level might also work. For the purposes of illustration I will generally focus on the neural level of organization of the brain, but the arguments generalize. Strictly speaking, for the purposes of the invariance principle we must require that for two systems to share their functional organization, they must be in corresponding states at the time in question; if not for this requirement, my sleeping twin might count as sharing my organization, but he certainly does not share my experiences. When two systems share their organization at a fine enough grain (including the requirement that they be in corresponding states), I will say that they are functionally isomorphic systems, or that they are functional isomorphs. The invariance principle holds that any functional isomorph of a conscious system has experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the original system. Full text about Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia here. Qualia and Time Sense The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences (@Harvard Science of Psychedelics Club) Andrés Gómez Emilsson from the Qualia Research Institute presents about the Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences. At a high-level, this video presents an algorithmic reduction of DMT phenomenology which imports concepts from hyperbolic geometry and dynamic systems theory in order to explain the "weirder than weird" hallucinations one can have on this drug. Andrés describes what different levels of DMT intoxication feel like in light of a model in which experience has both variable geometric curvature and information content. The benefit of this model cashes out in a novel approach to design DMT experiences in order to maximize specific desired benefits. Qualia and Time Sense

Principia Qualia

Blueprint for a new science

v1 Michael Edward Johnson Qualia Research Institute Special thanks1 to Dr. Randal Koene, whose mentorship, feedback, and conversations about brains helped make this research happen. To Dr. Radhika Dirks, for feedback & editing, physics expertise, encouragement, and wisdom. To Andres Gomez Emilsson, who saw the full problem, rolled up his sleeves, and worked on it. And to my family & Lili Mao. Thanks also to Giego Caleiro, Scott Jackisch, Romeo Stevens, Anthony Rudd, Stephen Frey, Adam Safron, Joshua Vogelstein, Duncan Wilson, Mark Lippman, Emily Crotteau, Eli Tyre, Andrew Lapinski-Barker, Allan Herman-Pool, Anatoly Karlin, Alex Alekseyenko, and Leopold Haller for offering helpful feedback on drafts along the way. 1 Except as noted the views herein are my own, and the above acknowledgements of contribution do not imply endorsements of my positions. 2 collaborative meetings with Dr. Koene. ​The background arguments about brains and IIT were significantly aided by an extensive series of Abstract: Philosophers have been wondering about the nature of consciousness (what it feels like to have subjective experience) and qualia (individual components of subjective experience) for as long as philosophy has existed. Advancements in physics and neuroscience have informed and constrained this mystery, but have not solved it. What would a ​systematic​ solution to the mystery of consciousness look like? Part I begins with grounding this topic by considering a concrete question: what makes some conscious experiences more pleasant than others? We first review what’s known about the neuroscience of pain & pleasure, find the current state of knowledge narrow, inconsistent, and often circular, and conclude we must look elsewhere for a systematic framework (Sections I & II). We then review the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and several variants of IIT, and find each of them promising, yet also underdeveloped and flawed (Sections III-V). We then take a step back and distill what kind of problem consciousness ​is​. Importantly, we offer eight sub-problems whose solutions would, in aggregate, constitute a ​complete theory of consciousness (Section VI). Armed with this framework, in Part II we return to the subject of pain & pleasure (valence) and offer some assumptions, distinctions, and heuristics to clarify and constrain the problem (Sections VII-IX). Of particular interest, we then offer a specific hypothesis on what valence ​is​ (Section X) and several novel empirical predictions which follow from this (Section XI). Part III finishes with discussion of how this general approach may inform open problems in neuroscience, and the prospects for building a new science of qualia (Sections XII & XIII). Lastly, we identify further research threads within this framework (Appendices A-F). Introduction: Some experiences feel better than others, and this informs and undergirds everything about the human condition. But why-- what ​makes​ some experiences better than others? This question has been a recurring puzzle, posed in various forms by e.g., Epicurus, Shakespeare, Jeremy Bentham, and affective neuroscience. But despite literal millennia of research, we know an embarrassingly small amount about the mechanisms and metaphysics behind it, and there’s little agreement on even what a proper answer should ​look​ like. We can call this the problem of ​valence​. I believe there’s a ​rigorous, crisp, ​and relatively ​simple​ solution to this puzzle, but there’s a lot of theoretical scaffolding that needs to be put in place first. Part 1 reviews what is known and the leading quantitative hypotheses about valence, qualia and consciousness, with a focus on affective neuroscience and IIT. I end this section by summarizing and synthesizing a framework for understanding consciousness research in terms of modular, granular sub-problems. Part 2 directly addresses valence as a sub-problem in consciousness research, offers a hypothesis as to what valence ​is​, and suggests specific empirical tests of the hypothesis. In Part 3 we discuss further predictions, implications, practical applications and current relevance. Finally, in the appendices we describe how to grow this approach into a ​formal science of qualia​. Readers with a strong grasp of the literature on valence and on IIT, or those wanting to quickly get to the heart of the argument, should feel free to jump to Section VI. Contents Part I - Review Why some things feel better than others: the view from neu​roscience Clarifying the Problem of Valence The ​Integrated Information Theory​ of consciousness (IIT) Critiques of IIT Alternative versions of IIT: Perceptronium and FIIH Summary and synthesis: eight problems for a new science of consciousness Part II - Valence Three principles for a mathematical derivation of valence Distinctions in qualia: charting the explanation space for valence Summary of heuristics for reverse-engineering the pattern for valence A simple hypothesis about valence Testing this hypothesis today Part III - Discussion Taking Stock Closing thoughts Appendices A-F Part I - Review I. Why some things feel better than others: the view from neuroscience Affective neuroscience has been very effective at illuminating the dynamics and correlations of how valenceworksinthehumanbrain,ona​practical​level,andwhatvalenceis​not,​ ona​metaphysical​level. This is ​useful​ yet not ​philosophically rigorous​, and this trend is likely to continue. Full text Principia Qualia here Qualia and Time Sense

State of the Qualia, Fall 2019

Qualia Research Institute’s inaugural newsletter. What is QRI trying to do? Our long-term vision is to end suffering. To destroy hell, and to build tools for exploring all the bright futures which come after. To take the Buddha’s vision of 2600 years ago, support it with advanced theory and technology, and make it real for all creatures. Our medium-term goal is to build a ‘full-stack’ approach to the mind and brain, centered around emotional valence. Critically, better philosophy should lead to better neuroscience, and better neuroscience should lead to better neurotechnology. We’re skeptical of any philosophical approaches that don’t try to “pay rent” by building empirically useful things. Our short-term deliverables are to refine our tools for evaluating EEG readings of emotionally-intense states (e.g. 5-MeO-DMT), build a hardware platform for non-invasive precision brain stimulation, and release an updated version of our full-stack theory of brain dynamics (‘neural annealing’). We think we’re on track for all of these goals. On one level this is a huge claim- but as Archimedes said, “Give me a place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the world.” We think we have that lever, and we’re building a place to stand. More Qualia References, Links and Bibliography Block, N. 1999. ‘‘Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness’’. Philosophical Topics 26 (1&2): 39–70. Bradley, P., and M. Tye. 2001. ‘‘Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves’’. Journal of Philosophy 98: 469–87. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2003. ‘‘Color Realism and Color Science’’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 3–21. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2004. ‘‘Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism’’. Journal of Philosophy 101: 37–43. Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers (expanded edition). Indianapolis: Hackett. Lewis, D. 1984. ‘‘Putnam’s Paradox’’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 221–36. Mollon, J. D. 1997. ‘‘‘‘. . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone’’: Some Perceptual Themes 1946–1996’’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A: 859–78. Pautz, A. 2006. ‘‘Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism’’. Nouˆs 40: 205–40. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tye, M. 2006. ‘‘The Puzzle of True Blue’’. Analysis 66. Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ‘‘Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components?’’ In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell. Block, N. (1978) Troubles with functionalism. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed.) `Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. Harvard University Press, 1980 Block, N. (1990) Inverted earth. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed J. Tomberlin. Ridgeview Block, N. (1995) “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-247 Block, N. (2002) “The Harder Problem of Consciousness”, The Journal of Philosophy XCIX, No. 8, August 2002, 1-35 Byrne, A., (2001) "Intentionalism Defended", Philosophical Review 110, Chalmers, David, 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press: New York Dennett, D. (1988) `Quining Qualia.' In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press: Oxford Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Little Brown: New York Harman, G. (1982) “Conceptual Role Semantics” The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Horgan, T. (1984) `Jackson on physical information and qualia'. Philosophical Quarterly Jackson, F. (1986) `What Mary didn't know.' Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-95 Jackson, F. (1993) `Armchair metaphysics'. In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Levine, J. (1993) `On leaving out what it is like.' In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Loar, B. (1990) `Phenomenal properties.' In J. Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Ridgeview. Lycan, W. (1996) Consciousness and Experience MIT Press: Cambridge McGinn, C. (1991) The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell Nida-Rümelin, M. 1996. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82:145-57. Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (6), 1-21. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press: Oxford Peacocke, C. (1989) `No resting place: a critical notice of The View from Nowhere', The Philosophical Review 98, 65-82. Perry, J. (2001), Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, MIT Press: Cambridge Rey, G. (1993) `Sensational Sentences Switched'. Philosophical Studies 70, 1: Shoemaker, S. (1975) `Functionalism and qualia.' Philosophical Studies 27: 291-315. Shoemaker, S. (1981) `Absent qualia are impossible--a reply to Block'. The Philosophical Review 90,4:581-599 Sturgeon, S. (1994) “The Epistemic View of Subjectivity” The Journal of Philosophy XCI, 5, 1994 Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content, MIT Press: Cambridge Van Gulick, R. (1993) Understanding the phenomenal mind: are we all just armadillos? In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) White, S. L. (1986): `Curse of the qualia', Synthese 68: 333-368. White, S. L (1995) `Color and the narrow contents of experience' Philosophical Topics 23 Block, N. (1981). Troubles with functionalism. In (Block, ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 111-27. Horgan, T. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 453-69. Pylyshyn, Z. (1980). The `causal power' of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 442-4. Savitt, S. (1982). Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 342-3. Searle, J.R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-57. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-81. https://www.qualiaresearchinstitute.org https://www.iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Qualia and Time Sense

Q,Q,Q - Quality, Quantity, Qualia (soon)

See also:

Time symbolism

Time is… The Full History of Time Time in physics and time Science Symbolism of Melencolia I by Albrecht Dürer Time and Text

DADA Time

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The Hourglass Figure:

MHC Exhibitions: Hourglass Figure Sophia Loren by Adam PierceHourglass Figure Marilyn Monroe About Hourglass Body or Hourglass Figure Hourglass body measurements – body shape online calculator Hourglass Figure Celebrities on MHC Hourglass Figure, the movie MHC hourglass figure workout by Marten Sport Hourglass Figure Department on MHC Virtual Museum Qualia and Time Sense. See also: Time perception and Sense of Time, The Hourglass of Emotions, Time Travel Management Q,Q,Q - Qualia, Quality, Quantity Read the full article

[mathematicalrosebudthorn]

15 jan 2018

Rose:

Obstruction theory of cocycles: if we want to extend a section over an (n+1)-skeleton already defined on the n-skeleton, we do so cell by cell; over each cell our bundle is contractible so such a section, which is defined on the cell boundary (an n-sphere), defines a homomorphism from (n+1)-chains to pi_n(F) where F is the fiber (since we can identify all the fibers together over the cell). Thus we have a map in C^(n+1) (B, pi_n(F)) ie an (n+1)-cochain with coefficients in pi_n(F) where we take an (n+1)-chain and map it to f composed with its attaching map, where f is the map of interest.

Some notes from surgery: every sphere is stably parallelizable (identify the trivial line bundle with its normal bundle in R^n+1). Every homotopy sphere is stably parallelizable (a big argument using all the heavy guns of a-top).

We’re interested in using surgery to kill off elements in the p-th homotopy group of a space, given dimension n, with p < n/2 (p less than half the dimension). To do so, we need to be able to find a bona fide embedding f: S^p x D^n-p -> M where f represents our given p-th homotopy element.

There are two separate lemmas that allow for this. One is less general:

Lemma 1: if M is stably parallelizable and p < q (ie p < n/2) then there exists such an embedding representing our p-th homotopy element.

More generally, lemma 2: if p < q then there exists such an embedding iff the pull-back wrt f_0: S^p -> M of the tangent bundle is trivial.

Both utilize the following additional lemma: if E is a rank k vb over a rank n complex B, with n < k (ie rank of E  > dim of B) then E is stably trivial iff trivial.

Proof: one direction is clear. Assume E is stably trivial. We first have a classifying map f from B to BSO(n). But we have that BSO(n) fits into a fibration: S^n -> BSO(n) -> BSO(n+1) as BSO(n) x S^infinity is homotopic to the universal sphere bundle of BSO(n+1). Thus we have a classifying map from B to BSO(n+1) that classifies E + trivial = trivial. So this map is nullhomotopic. But f is a lift to BSO(n) from B, of the prior classifying map to BSO(n+1) from B, and so the homotopy also lifts. Since the homotopy is to a point on the base space, the lifted homotopy takes f to a map into the fiber S^n. But n < k. So f is nullhomotopic so E is actually trivial.

Proofs of the above lemmas follow:

1: by a theorem of Whitney we can find an embedding f_0: S^p -> M representing our p-th homotopy element. But now we have that TS^p + NS^p = TM|S^p but TM|S^p is stably parallelizable as a restriction of a stably parallelizable manifold. Moreover TS^p is stably trivial as a sphere. So adding a trivial bundle to each side gives NS^p + trivial = trivial, but rank NS^p = q > p (since p < q) so by the above lemma, NS^p itself is trivial. Then we identify it with a tubular neighborhood and that gives us our embedding.

2: again the embedding of just f_0: S^p -> M exists by Whitney. If the embedding extends to S^p x D^n-p -> M then we identify the normal bundle of S^p with this tubular neighborhood so that the normal bundle is trivial. Then f_0*(TM) = TM|S^p = TS^p + trivial and again by stably parallelizability of S^p, we have that the pullback is trivial.

Conversely, if the pullback is trivial, then by the same equation we have that TS^p + NS^p = trivial. Add a trivial bundle. Then by stable parallelizability, NS^p + trivial = trivial. Again by the lemma NS^p is trivial and we identify it with a tubular neighborhood.

Thorn:

Still have to think as to why this above construction actually gives a cocycle. Griffiths & Morgan & Sasha have a proof but I am interested in Dennis’s wallet picture. Reconcile the obstruction theory of cohomology with the geometric meaning of characteristic classes.

Why M # -M bounds a contractible manifold (the construction is hard to visualize properly but the idea seems to be that we just forcibly reverse orientation on one end of M x I very carefully). 

Bud:

What a cocycle is! How far we’ve come

[biointernet]

Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia and Time Sense

Qualia is sensitive experience

Qualia and Time Perception

Qualia

Qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences

Qualia is qualities of awareness

Qualia is sensitive experience See also: Time perception and Sense of Time, The Hourglass of Emotions, Time Travel Management What it feels like, experimentally, to see a red rose is different from what it feels like to see a yellow rose. Likewise for hearing a musical note played by a piano and hearing the same musical note played by a tuba. The qualia of these experiences are what give each of them its characteristic "feel" and also what distinguish them from one another. Qualia have traditionally been thought to be intrinsic qualities of experience that are directly available to introspection. However, some philosophers offer theories of qualia that deny one or both of those features. Qualia, standard psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy term:  The word Qualia refers to the range of ways in which experience presents itself. Experiences can be richly colored or bare and monochromatic, they can be spatial and kinesthetic or devoid of geometry and directions, they can be flavorfully blended or felt as coming from mutually unintelligible dimensions, and so on. Classic qualia examples include things like the redness of red, the tartness of lime, and the glow of bodily warmth. However, qualia extends into categories far beyond the classic examples, beyond the wildest of our common-sense conceptions. There are modes of experience as altogether different from everything we have ever experienced as vision qualia is different from sound qualia. Qualia and Time Sense

Philosophy of perception

The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data, in particular how they relate to beliefs about, or knowledge of, the world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts, which assume that perceptions of objects, and knowledge or beliefs about them, are aspects of an individual's mind, and externalist accounts, which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism—the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived—is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. More about Philosophy of perception on Wiki.

Philosophy is like Sex - you can get some exciting results, but it is not why you will do it Why do you FEEL pain or pleasure? Do plants have emotions? How is possible that some people do not understand other’s emotions? Emotions seem to be everywhere, giving meaning to all events of our lives. They are the backbone of social activities as well as they drive the cognitive processes of several living entities. Several animals, including humans, have emotions. Do machine can have emotions? Qualia and Time Sense

Sense data

Sense data are the alleged mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. For instance, sense data theorists say that, upon viewing a tomato in normal conditions, one forms an image of the tomato in one's mind. This image is red and round. The mental image is an example of a “sense datum.” Many philosophers have rejected the notion of sense data, either because they believe that perception gives us direct awareness of physical phenomena, rather than mere mental images, or because they believe that the mental phenomena involved in perception do not have the properties that appear to us (for instance, I might have a visual experience representing a red, round tomato, but my experience is not itself red or round). Defenders of sense data have argued, among other things, that sense data are required to explain such phenomena as perspectival variation, illusion, and hallucination. Critics of sense data have objected to the theory's commitment to mind-body dualism, the problems it raises for our knowledge of the external world, its difficulty in locating sense data in physical space, and its apparent commitment to the existence of objects with indeterminate properties.

What Are Sense Data?

1.1. The Standard Conception On the most common conception, sense data (singular: “sense datum”) have three defining characteristics:  Sense data are the kind of thing we are directly aware of in perception,Sense data are dependent on the mind, andSense data have the properties that perceptually appear to us. More about Sense data on the website Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here. Qualia and Time Sense

Deepak Chopra about Qualia

Deepak Chopra explores and explains ways of describing our subjective experiences - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and emotions.* Qualia is a term used to describe these subjective experiences, how can we use these qualitative units to describe experience? And what is the relationship between consciousness and experience? Deepak addresses these and other facets of experience. (See on YouTube)

MHC Exhibitions

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Qualia ain’t in the head

ALEX BYRNE Massachusetts Institute of Technology MICHAEL TYE The University of Texas at Austin Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different addition of some relatively innocuous assumptions, they are inconsistent. Take color as an example. Consider Bill and Ben, ordinary humans who are enjoying color experiences with different qualia. Let x be a (possible) duplicate of Bill, and let y be a (possible) duplicate of Ben. Given a specific externalist theory of content (which need not be reductive), with some ingenuity we can plausibly construct different environments for each, such that the theory predicts that x and y’s color experiences have the same content; so, by (weak) intentionalism, they have the same qualia. By qualia internalism, x’s experience has the same qualia as Bill’s, and y’s experience has the same qualia as Ben’s, so x’s and y’s experiences differ in qualia; contradiction. Alternatively, since an intentionalist about color qualia will typically endorse the converse thesis that the color content of an experience supervenes on its color qualia, we can start with a pair of duplicates x* and y* in different environments and use content externalism to argue that their experiences differ in content. Since x* and y* are duplicates, their experiences have the same qualia; by the converse intentionalist thesis, their experiences have the same content. So: content externalism and intentionalism (jointly, ‘‘externalist inten- tionalism’’) naturally lead to qualia externalism. And what’s wrong with that? Isn’t the doctrine of qualia internalism the last bastion of a widely discredited Cartesian conception of the mind? Not according to many philosophers, who view qualia externalism with the same incredulity that greeted Churchland-style eliminativism. Qualia externalism, they think, is an absurd thesis, accepted by a handful of philosophers with too much respect for philosophical theory and not enough common sense. To his credit, Adam Pautz (2006) does not rest his opposition to qualia externalism on this kind of ‘‘intuition’’. He attempts to provide an argument against the principal motivation for it, namely externalist intentionalism. Moreover, the argument purports to be in significant degree empirical, drawing on results from a variety of disciplines, including psychophysics and neuroscience. The orthodox response to our quasi-inconsistent triad is to deny inten- tionalism, not content externalism. Interestingly, Pautz takes the other option, and embraces content internalism. So far, we have not mentioned the issue of reductive physicalism, which looms large in Pautz’s presentation. In our view, bringing in inevitably controversial reductive theses of the ‘‘awareness relation’’ at the start just makes it harder to see what is going on. Accordingly, we will initially set out Pautz’s argument against externalist intentionalism while ignoring the various reductive proposals that Pautz discusses. After having explained why Pautz’s argument fails, we then turn (in section 2) to the entirely separate issue of whether there is some relatively compact wide physicalistic account of the awareness relation. Full text here. Qualia and Time Sense

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What is it, Time of Life? Qualia and Time Sense

Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia

David J. Chalmers Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 ] 1 The principle of organizational invariance It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper. To put the issue differently, even once it is accepted that experience arises from physical systems, the question remains open: in virtue of what sort of physical properties does conscious experience arise? Some property that brains can possess will presumably be among them, but it is far from clear just what the relevant properties are. Some have suggested biochemical properties; some have suggested quantum-mechanical properties; many have professed uncertainty. A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates. In this paper I defend this view. Specifically, I defend a principle of organizational invariance, holding that experience is invariant across systems with the same fine-grained functional organization. More precisely, the principle states that given any system that has conscious experiences, then any system that has the same functional organization at a fine enough grain will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. A full specification of a system's fine-grained functional organization will fully determine any conscious experiences that arise. To clarify this, we must first clarify the notion of functional organization. This is best understood as the abstract pattern of causal interaction between the components of a system, and perhaps between these components and external inputs and outputs. A functional organization is determined by specifying (1) a number of abstract components, (2) for each component, a number of different possible states, and (3) a system of dependency relations, specifying how the states of each component depends on the previous states of all components and on inputs to the system, and how outputs from the system depend on previous component states. Beyond specifying their number and their dependency relations, the nature of the components and the states is left unspecified. A physical system realizes a given functional organization when the system can be divided into an appropriate number of physical components each with the appropriate number of possible states, such that the causal dependency relations between the components of the system, inputs, and outputs precisely reflect the dependency relations given in the specification of the functional organization. A given functional organization can be realized by diverse physical systems. For example, the organization realized by the brain at the neural level might in principle be realized by a silicon system. A physical system has functional organization at many different levels, depending on how finely we individuate its parts and on how finely we divide the states of those parts. At a coarse level, for instance, it is likely that the two hemispheres of the brain can be seen as realizing a simple two-component organization, if we choose appropriate interdependent states of the hemispheres. It is generally more useful to view cognitive systems at a finer level, however. For our purposes I will always focus on a level of organization fine enough to determine the behavioral capacities and dispositions of a cognitive system. This is the role of the "fine enough grain" clause in the statement of the organizational invariance principle; the level of organization relevant to the application of the principle is one fine enough to determine a system's behavioral dispositions. In the brain, it is likely that the neural level suffices, although a coarser level might also work. For the purposes of illustration I will generally focus on the neural level of organization of the brain, but the arguments generalize. Strictly speaking, for the purposes of the invariance principle we must require that for two systems to share their functional organization, they must be in corresponding states at the time in question; if not for this requirement, my sleeping twin might count as sharing my organization, but he certainly does not share my experiences. When two systems share their organization at a fine enough grain (including the requirement that they be in corresponding states), I will say that they are functionally isomorphic systems, or that they are functional isomorphs. The invariance principle holds that any functional isomorph of a conscious system has experiences that are qualitatively identical to those of the original system. Full text about Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia here. Qualia and Time Sense The Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences (@Harvard Science of Psychedelics Club) Andrés Gómez Emilsson from the Qualia Research Institute presents about the Hyperbolic Geometry of DMT Experiences. At a high-level, this video presents an algorithmic reduction of DMT phenomenology which imports concepts from hyperbolic geometry and dynamic systems theory in order to explain the "weirder than weird" hallucinations one can have on this drug. Andrés describes what different levels of DMT intoxication feel like in light of a model in which experience has both variable geometric curvature and information content. The benefit of this model cashes out in a novel approach to design DMT experiences in order to maximize specific desired benefits. Qualia and Time Sense

Principia Qualia

Blueprint for a new science

v1 Michael Edward Johnson Qualia Research Institute Special thanks1 to Dr. Randal Koene, whose mentorship, feedback, and conversations about brains helped make this research happen. To Dr. Radhika Dirks, for feedback & editing, physics expertise, encouragement, and wisdom. To Andres Gomez Emilsson, who saw the full problem, rolled up his sleeves, and worked on it. And to my family & Lili Mao. Thanks also to Giego Caleiro, Scott Jackisch, Romeo Stevens, Anthony Rudd, Stephen Frey, Adam Safron, Joshua Vogelstein, Duncan Wilson, Mark Lippman, Emily Crotteau, Eli Tyre, Andrew Lapinski-Barker, Allan Herman-Pool, Anatoly Karlin, Alex Alekseyenko, and Leopold Haller for offering helpful feedback on drafts along the way. 1 Except as noted the views herein are my own, and the above acknowledgements of contribution do not imply endorsements of my positions. 2 collaborative meetings with Dr. Koene. ​The background arguments about brains and IIT were significantly aided by an extensive series of Abstract: Philosophers have been wondering about the nature of consciousness (what it feels like to have subjective experience) and qualia (individual components of subjective experience) for as long as philosophy has existed. Advancements in physics and neuroscience have informed and constrained this mystery, but have not solved it. What would a ​systematic​ solution to the mystery of consciousness look like? Part I begins with grounding this topic by considering a concrete question: what makes some conscious experiences more pleasant than others? We first review what’s known about the neuroscience of pain & pleasure, find the current state of knowledge narrow, inconsistent, and often circular, and conclude we must look elsewhere for a systematic framework (Sections I & II). We then review the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and several variants of IIT, and find each of them promising, yet also underdeveloped and flawed (Sections III-V). We then take a step back and distill what kind of problem consciousness ​is​. Importantly, we offer eight sub-problems whose solutions would, in aggregate, constitute a ​complete theory of consciousness (Section VI). Armed with this framework, in Part II we return to the subject of pain & pleasure (valence) and offer some assumptions, distinctions, and heuristics to clarify and constrain the problem (Sections VII-IX). Of particular interest, we then offer a specific hypothesis on what valence ​is​ (Section X) and several novel empirical predictions which follow from this (Section XI). Part III finishes with discussion of how this general approach may inform open problems in neuroscience, and the prospects for building a new science of qualia (Sections XII & XIII). Lastly, we identify further research threads within this framework (Appendices A-F). Introduction: Some experiences feel better than others, and this informs and undergirds everything about the human condition. But why-- what ​makes​ some experiences better than others? This question has been a recurring puzzle, posed in various forms by e.g., Epicurus, Shakespeare, Jeremy Bentham, and affective neuroscience. But despite literal millennia of research, we know an embarrassingly small amount about the mechanisms and metaphysics behind it, and there’s little agreement on even what a proper answer should ​look​ like. We can call this the problem of ​valence​. I believe there’s a ​rigorous, crisp, ​and relatively ​simple​ solution to this puzzle, but there’s a lot of theoretical scaffolding that needs to be put in place first. Part 1 reviews what is known and the leading quantitative hypotheses about valence, qualia and consciousness, with a focus on affective neuroscience and IIT. I end this section by summarizing and synthesizing a framework for understanding consciousness research in terms of modular, granular sub-problems. Part 2 directly addresses valence as a sub-problem in consciousness research, offers a hypothesis as to what valence ​is​, and suggests specific empirical tests of the hypothesis. In Part 3 we discuss further predictions, implications, practical applications and current relevance. Finally, in the appendices we describe how to grow this approach into a ​formal science of qualia​. Readers with a strong grasp of the literature on valence and on IIT, or those wanting to quickly get to the heart of the argument, should feel free to jump to Section VI. Contents Part I - Review Why some things feel better than others: the view from neu​roscience Clarifying the Problem of Valence The ​Integrated Information Theory​ of consciousness (IIT) Critiques of IIT Alternative versions of IIT: Perceptronium and FIIH Summary and synthesis: eight problems for a new science of consciousness Part II - Valence Three principles for a mathematical derivation of valence Distinctions in qualia: charting the explanation space for valence Summary of heuristics for reverse-engineering the pattern for valence A simple hypothesis about valence Testing this hypothesis today Part III - Discussion Taking Stock Closing thoughts Appendices A-F Part I - Review I. Why some things feel better than others: the view from neuroscience Affective neuroscience has been very effective at illuminating the dynamics and correlations of how valenceworksinthehumanbrain,ona​practical​level,andwhatvalenceis​not,​ ona​metaphysical​level. This is ​useful​ yet not ​philosophically rigorous​, and this trend is likely to continue. Full text Principia Qualia here Qualia and Time Sense

State of the Qualia, Fall 2019

Qualia Research Institute’s inaugural newsletter. What is QRI trying to do? Our long-term vision is to end suffering. To destroy hell, and to build tools for exploring all the bright futures which come after. To take the Buddha’s vision of 2600 years ago, support it with advanced theory and technology, and make it real for all creatures. Our medium-term goal is to build a ‘full-stack’ approach to the mind and brain, centered around emotional valence. Critically, better philosophy should lead to better neuroscience, and better neuroscience should lead to better neurotechnology. We’re skeptical of any philosophical approaches that don’t try to “pay rent” by building empirically useful things. Our short-term deliverables are to refine our tools for evaluating EEG readings of emotionally-intense states (e.g. 5-MeO-DMT), build a hardware platform for non-invasive precision brain stimulation, and release an updated version of our full-stack theory of brain dynamics (‘neural annealing’). We think we’re on track for all of these goals. On one level this is a huge claim- but as Archimedes said, “Give me a place to stand, and a lever long enough, and I will move the world.” We think we have that lever, and we’re building a place to stand. More Qualia References, Links and Bibliography Block, N. 1999. ‘‘Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness’’. Philosophical Topics 26 (1&2): 39–70. Bradley, P., and M. Tye. 2001. ‘‘Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves’’. Journal of Philosophy 98: 469–87. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2003. ‘‘Color Realism and Color Science’’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 3–21. Byrne, A., and D. R. Hilbert. 2004. ‘‘Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism’’. Journal of Philosophy 101: 37–43. Hardin, C. L. 1993. Color for Philosophers (expanded edition). Indianapolis: Hackett. Lewis, D. 1984. ‘‘Putnam’s Paradox’’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 221–36. Mollon, J. D. 1997. ‘‘‘‘. . . On the Basis of Velocity Clues Alone’’: Some Perceptual Themes 1946–1996’’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 50A: 859–78. Pautz, A. 2006. ‘‘Sensory Awareness Is not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism’’. Nouˆs 40: 205–40. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tye, M. 2006. ‘‘The Puzzle of True Blue’’. Analysis 66. Williamson, T. Forthcoming. ‘‘Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components?’’ In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell. Block, N. (1978) Troubles with functionalism. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed.) `Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol 1. Harvard University Press, 1980 Block, N. (1990) Inverted earth. In Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed J. Tomberlin. Ridgeview Block, N. (1995) “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-247 Block, N. (2002) “The Harder Problem of Consciousness”, The Journal of Philosophy XCIX, No. 8, August 2002, 1-35 Byrne, A., (2001) "Intentionalism Defended", Philosophical Review 110, Chalmers, David, 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press: New York Dennett, D. (1988) `Quining Qualia.' In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds) Consciousness in Contemporary Society. Oxford University Press: Oxford Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Little Brown: New York Harman, G. (1982) “Conceptual Role Semantics” The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Horgan, T. (1984) `Jackson on physical information and qualia'. Philosophical Quarterly Jackson, F. (1986) `What Mary didn't know.' Journal of Philosophy 83: 291-95 Jackson, F. (1993) `Armchair metaphysics'. In J. O'Leary-Hawthorne and M. Michael (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Levine, J. (1993) `On leaving out what it is like.' In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) Lewis, D. 1990. What experience teaches. In (W. Lycan, ed) Mind and Cognition. Blackwell Loar, B. (1990) `Phenomenal properties.' In J. Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Ridgeview. Lycan, W. (1996) Consciousness and Experience MIT Press: Cambridge McGinn, C. (1991) The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell Nida-Rümelin, M. 1996. Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82:145-57. Palmer, S. 1999. Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 (6), 1-21. Papineau, D. (2002) Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford University Press: Oxford Peacocke, C. (1989) `No resting place: a critical notice of The View from Nowhere', The Philosophical Review 98, 65-82. Perry, J. (2001), Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, MIT Press: Cambridge Rey, G. (1993) `Sensational Sentences Switched'. Philosophical Studies 70, 1: Shoemaker, S. (1975) `Functionalism and qualia.' Philosophical Studies 27: 291-315. Shoemaker, S. (1981) `Absent qualia are impossible--a reply to Block'. The Philosophical Review 90,4:581-599 Sturgeon, S. (1994) “The Epistemic View of Subjectivity” The Journal of Philosophy XCI, 5, 1994 Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness, Color and Content, MIT Press: Cambridge Van Gulick, R. (1993) Understanding the phenomenal mind: are we all just armadillos? In Davies and Humphreys (1993a) White, S. L. (1986): `Curse of the qualia', Synthese 68: 333-368. White, S. L (1995) `Color and the narrow contents of experience' Philosophical Topics 23 Block, N. (1981). Troubles with functionalism. In (Block, ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 111-27. Horgan, T. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 453-69. Pylyshyn, Z. (1980). The `causal power' of machines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 442-4. Savitt, S. (1982). Searle's demon and the brain simulator reply. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5, 342-3. Searle, J.R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-57. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Shoemaker, S. (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 357-81. https://www.qualiaresearchinstitute.org https://www.iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ https://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/

Qualia and Time Sense

Q,Q,Q - Quality, Quantity, Qualia (soon)

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