#hirobumi ito

[fogaminghub]

🌟 Ready for a challenge? Explore the mission A Vow of Steel in Rise of the Ronin! Fight alongside Hirobumi Ito and Aritomo Yamagata, test your skills against tough opponents, and experience a story filled with growth, respect, and determination! 

[rpmstudiosss]

I drew Ito from Rise of the Ronin using Ohioboss Satoyu as a reference

[talesofedo]

Another one of the November requests I'm catching up on: "Ito Hirobumi and Inoue Kaoru aboard the HMS Pegasus."

Ito Shunsuke (later Hirobumi) and Inoue Monta (later Kaoru) were two of the Choshu Five who secured passage to Europe at a time it was still illegal for them to travel outside of Japan. And yes, I know that in reality they were disguised as sailors and had cut off their topknots before leaving Japan.

[genkinahito]

In Her Room ひとりぼっちじゃない (2022) Director: Chihiro Ito [New York Asian Film Festival 2023] 2

In Her Room    ひとりぼっちじゃない 「Hitori Bocchi Janai」 Release Date: March 10th, 2023 Duration: 135 mins. Director: Chihiro Ito Writer: Chihiro Ito (Screenplay/Original Novel), Starring: Fumika Baba, Satoru Iguchi, Yuumi Kawai, Hirobumi Watanabe, Kazuyuki Aijima, Website IMDB In Her Room is veteran screenwriter Chihiro Ito’s debut film. It is based on a novel she wrote and is an impressive achievement…

[centrally-unplanned]

She doesn't even know Japan occupied Korea in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese war and ruled the country as a protectorate after that, with 1910 only demarcating its formal annexation into the Japanese Empire; you gotta turn her down -_-

[literary-illuminati]

2024 Book Review #41 – Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta

Almost everything I know about World War 2, I learned against my will through a poorly spent adolescence and reading people argue about it online. Living in Canada, Japan’s role in it is even more obscure, with the wars in the Pacific and China getting a fraction of a fraction of the official commemoration and pop culture interest of events in Europe. So I went into this book with a knowledge of only the vague generalities of Japanese politics in the ‘30s and ‘40s – from that baseline, this was a tremendously interesting and educational book, if at times more than a bit dry.

The book is a very finely detailed narrative of the internal deliberations within the Japanese government and the diplomatic negotiations with the USA through late 1940 and 1941, which ultimately culminate in the decision to attack Pearl Harbour and invade European colonies across the Pacific. It charts the (deeply dysfunctional) decision-making systems of the Imperial Japanese government and how bureaucratic politics, factional intrigue and positioning, and an endemic unwillingness to be the one to back down and eat your words, made a war with the USA first possible, then plausible, then seemingly inevitable. Throughout this, the book wears its thesis on its sleeve – that the war in the Pacific only ever seemed inevitable, that until the very last hour there was widespread understanding that the war would be near-unwinnable across the imperial government and military, but a broken political culture, the career suicide of being the one to endorse accepting American demands,, and a simple lack of courage or will among the doves, prevented anything from ever coming of it.

So I did know that Imperial Japan’s government had, let’s say, fundamental structural issues when I opened the book, but I really wasn’t aware of just how confused and byzantine the upper echelons of it were. Like if Brazil was about the executive committee – the army and navy ministries had entirely separate planning infrastructures from the actual general staffs, and all of them were basically silo’d off from the actual economic and industrial planning bureaucracy (despite the fact that the head of the Cabinet Planning Board was a retired general). All of which is important, because the real decisions of war and peace were made in liaison meetings with the prime minister, foreign minister, and both ministry and general staff of each branch – meetings which were often as not just opportunities for grandstanding and fighting over the budget. The surprise is less that they talked themselves into an unwinnable war and more that they decided on anything at all.

The issue, as Hotta frames it, is that there really wasn’t a single place the buck stopped – officially speaking, the civilian government and both branches of the military served the pleasure of the Emperor – whose theoretically absolute authority was contained by both his temperament and both custom and a whole court bureaucracy dedicated to making sure the prestige of the throne didn’t get mired in and discredited by the muck of politics. The entire Meiji Constitution was built around the presence of a clique of ‘imperial advisers’ who could borrow the emperor’s authority without being so restrained – but as your Ito Hirobumis and Yamagata Aritomos died off, no one with the same energy, authority and vision ever seems to have replaced them.

So you had momentous policy decisions presented as suggestions to the emperor who could agree and thus turn them into inviolable commands, and understood by the emperor as settled policy who would provide an apolitical rubber-stamp on. Which, combined with institutional cultures that strongly encouraged being a good soldier and not undercutting or hurting the image of your faction, led to a lot of people quietly waiting for someone else to stand up and make a scene for them (or just staying silent and wishing them well when they actually did).

Now, this is all perhaps a bit too convenient for many of the people involved – doubtless anyone sitting down and writing their memoirs in 1946 would feel like exaggerating their qualms about the war as much as they could possibly get away with. I feel like Hotta probably takes those post-war memoirs and interviews too much at face value in terms of people’s unstated inner feeling – but on the other hand, the bureaucratic records and participants’ notes preserved from the pivotal meetings themselves do seem to show a great deal of hesitation and factional doubletalk. Most surprisingly to me was the fact that Tojo (who I had the very vague impression was the closest thing to a Japanese Hitler/Mussolini there was) was actually chosen to lead a peace cabinet and find some 11th hour way to avert the war. Which in retrospect was an obviously terrible decision, but it was one he at least initially tried to follow through on.

If the book has a singular villain, it’s actually no Tojo (who is portrayed as, roughly, replacement-rate bad) but Prince Konoe, the prime minister who actually presided over Japan’s invasion of China abroad and slide into a militarized police state at home, who led the empire to the very brink of war with the United States before getting cold feet and resigning at the last possible moment to avoid the responsibility of either starting the war or of infuriating the military and destroying his own credibility by backing down and acceding to America’s demands. He’s portrayed as, not causing, but exacerbating

every one of Japan’s structural political issues through a mixture of cowardice and excellent survival instincts – he carefully avoided fights he might lose, even when that meant letting his foreign minister continue to sabotage negotiations he supported while he arranged support to cleanly remove him (let alone really pushing back on the army). At the same time, the initiatives he did commit were all things inspired by his deep fascination with Nazi Germany – the dissolution of partisan political parties and creation of an (aspirationally, anyway) totalitarian Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the creation of a real militarized police state, the heavy-handed efforts to create a more pure and patriotic culture. He’s hardly to blame for all of that, of course, but given that he was a civilian politician initially elected to curb military influence, his governments sure as hell didn’t help anything (and it is I suppose just memorably ironic that he’s the guy on the spot for many of the most military-dictatorship-e aspects of Japanese government).

One of the most striking things about the book is actually not even part of the main narrative but just the background context of how badly off Japan was even before they attacked the United States. I knew the invasion of China hadn’t exactly been going great, but ‘widespread rationing in major cities, tearing up wrought iron fencing in the nicest districts of the capital to use in war industry’ goes so much further than I had any sense of. The second Sino-Japanese War was the quintessential imperial adventure and war of choice, and also just literally beyond the material abilities of the state of Japan to sustain in conjunction with normal civilian life. You see how the American embargo on scrap metal and petroleum was seen as nearly an act of war in its own right. You also wonder even more how anyone could possibly have convinced themselves that an army that was already struggling to keep its soldiers fed could possibly win an entirely new war with the greatest industrial power on earth. Explaining which is of course the whole point of the book (they didn’t, in large part, but convinced themselves the Americans wouldn’t have the stomach for it and agree to a favourable peace quickly, or that Germany would conquer the UK and USSR and impose mediation on Japan’s terms, or-).

When trying to understand the decision-making process, I’m honestly reminded of nothing so much as the obsession with ‘credibility’ you see among many American foreign policy hands in the modern day. The idea that once something had been committed to – the (largely only extant on paper) alliance with Nazi Germany, the creation of a collaborator government in China to ‘negotiate’ with, the occupation of southern Vietnam – then, even if you agreed it hadn’t worked out and had probably been a terrible decision to begin with, reversing course without some sort of face-saving agreement or concession on the other side would shatter any image of strength and invite everyone else the world over to grab at what you have. The same applies just as much to internal politics, where admitting that your branch couldn’t see a way to victory in the proposed war was seen as basically surrendering the viciously fought over budget, no matter the actual opinions of your experts – the book includes anecdotes about both fleet admirals and the senior field marshal China privately tearing their respective superiors in Tokyo a (polite) new one for the bellicosity they did not believe themselves capable of following through on, but of course none of these sentiments were ever shared with anyone who might use them against the army/navy.

The book is very much a narrative of the highest levels of government, idea of mass sentiment and popular opinion are only really incidentally addressed. Which does make it come as a shock every time it’s mentioned that a particular negotiation was carried out in secret because someone got spooked by an ultranationalist assassination attempt the day before. I entirely believe that no one wanted to say as much, but I can’t help but feel that people’s unwillingness to forthrightly oppose further war owed something to all the radical actors floating around in the junior ranks of the officer corps who more than willing to take ‘decisive, heroic action’ against anyone in government trying to stab the war effort in the back. Which is something that the ever-increasing number of war dead in China (with attendant patriotic unwillingness to let them die ‘for nothing) and the way everyone kept trying to rally the public to the war effort with ever-more militaristic public rhetoric assuredly only made worse.

That same rhetoric also played its part in destroying the possibility of negotiations with the United States. The story of those negotiations runs throughout the book, and is basically one misunderstanding and failure to communicate after another. It at times verges on comedy. Just complete failure to model the political situation and diplomatic logic of the other party, on both sides (combined with a great and increasing degree of wishful thinking that e.g. letting the military occupy southern French Indochina as a concession for their buy-in on further negotiations would be fine with the Americans. A belief held on exactly zero evidence whatsoever). The United States government was actually quite keen to avoid a war in the pacific if possible, as FDR did his best to get entangled in Europe and effectively start an undeclared naval war with Germany – but the negotiating stance hardened as Japan seemed more and more aggressive and unreliable, which coincided exactly with Japan’s government taking the possibility of war seriously enough to actually try to negotiate. It’s the same old story of offering concessions and understanding that might have been agreed to a few months beforehand, but were now totally unacceptable. In the end, everyone pinned their hopes on a face-to-face diplomatic summit with FDR in Juneau, where sweeping concessions could be agreed to and the government’s credibility staked on somewhere the hardliners could not physically interfere with. The Americans, meanwhile, wanted some solid framework for what the agreement would be before the summit occurred, and so it never did.

After the war, it was apparently the general sentiment that the whole nation was responsible for the war with the United States – which is to say that no individual person deserved any special or specific blame. Hotta’s stated aim with the book is to show how that’s bullshit, how war was entirely avoidable, and it was only do to these small cliques of specific, named individuals that it began. The hardliners like Osami Nagano, but just as much the cowards, careerists and factional partisans like Konoe, Tojo, and (keeper of the Privy Seal) Kido. Having read it I, at least, am convinced.

[freesiablooming]

Imagine, back in the 1800s, an enslaved person, let's all them "A", assasinated a slave trader to free fellow enslaved people. Do you think descendants of A should feel sorry for the slave trader?

Imagine, back in 1943, a Jewish person, Let's call them "B", who was sent to a camp, assassinated a nazi officer to free other Jewish people from the camp. Do you think Jewish people nowadays should not be proud of B in fear of hurting german people's feelings?

Now explain to me why Japanese people are canceling Han So Hee and calling her "anti japan" because she posted a picture of An Jung-geun, a korean independent activist who assasinated the colonizer ito hirobumi?

[thekimonogallery]

A picture postcard of Gifu Kanazuen's courtesan journey... Before the war, Kanazuen was located in what is now Nishiyanagase, and was a big geisha district with Asanoya, where Hirobumi Ito played. Although it is monochrome, it reminds me of the gorgeous appearance of Oiran. It must have taken a lot of effort and skill to walk in these clogs. Text by Ryohei Masawaki

[centrally-unplanned]

to get the most on-brand one for you I can think of out of the way - VOR for Itō Hirobumi?

Man, all of these really do need essays, I alas lack the spoons/time for that now, so it will just be some thoughts. Ito Hirobumi is a great case! For those who don't know, one of the 'founding fathers' of the Meiji Restoration and Japan's first and longest-serving Prime Minister.

As Meiji "revolutionary" is VOR is very high - he is one of the "Chosu five" who were (illegally!) sent to study abroad in the United Kingdom as youths, which pivoted him from a reactionary to someone, awed by Britain's power, committed to modernizing and westernizing Japan. While that process was inevitable, it being done on Japan's terms was far from inevitable - many wanted to resist western systems & norms. He also had several unique relationships with westerners that paved the way for foreign expertise on everything from railways to bureaucratic design. So in 1871 in particular, when he was building ministries for the new government and eventually became the Minister of Public Works in 1873, he was building a modernized, western systems that many others would not have wanted to build, or not known how to build. Japan's transition in the 1870's would have been notably messier without him.

Later on as Prime Minister his VOR declines. He adopts "consensus centrism" as his modus operandi, privileging stability over reform in the retrenchment era of the 1880's. Not a bad decision, but it was also not nearly as contested, he was making decisions others would have made. And he fails to anticipate the rise of political parties, suffering defeats later at the hand of the Kenseito faction that honestly better leaders would have seen coming. He was a ministry man first, politician second in some ways.

He did play a notable role in the resolution of the 1885 Qing-Japan crisis over Korea - after a failed, Japanese-sponsored coup in 1884 that China helped crush, de-facto war in Korea existed between the two factions which his personal intervention quashed with the Convention of Tientsin that normalized relations for the next decade. From my understanding, this was something he very much championed, with other factions in the government being muddled or bellicose, and it came from his experience as the tax minister understanding that Japan's economic growth was being driving by a complex import-export supply chain around textiles and raw materials with China, which Japan did not want to disrupt. This moment is a high VOR moment for him imo, way better to wait for a decade.

Certainly would love to know more, you ideally truly do go case in these scenarios.

[shinjihi]

朝鮮の植民地と、属国の歴史 【朝鮮半島の統治国の歴史】

朝鮮の植民地と、属国の歴史 【朝鮮半島の統治国の歴史】 紀元前108年～220年：漢（植民地） 221年～245年：魏（植民地） 108年～313年：晋（植民地） 314年～676年：晋宋梁陳隋唐（属国） 690年～900年：渤海（属国） 1126年～1234年：金（属国） 1259年～1356年：モンゴル（属国） 1392年～1637年：明（属国） 1637年～1897年：清（属国） 1897年：下関条約により清の属国から開放される 1903年：ロシア朝鮮半島を南下。日本の尽力によりロシアの属国化を回避 1905年～1910年：日本（保護国） 1909年：早期併合に慎重であった伊藤博文内閣総理大臣が安 重根（アン・ジュングン）に暗殺される 1910年～1945年：日本（併合） 1945年～1948年：アメリカ（非独立） 1948年：大韓民国成立（アメリカ軍による朝鮮統治によって国家基盤が形成され成立） 1948年：軍事独裁政権誕生 1948年：済州島4.3事件 3万人虐殺 1950年：朝鮮戦争 400万人殺し合い 1950年：保導連盟事件 30万人虐殺 1951年：国民防衛軍事件 10万人虐殺 1951年：居昌事件 8500人虐殺 1979年：軍出身の大統領政権誕生 1980年：光州事件 600人虐殺 1993年：初の文民政権誕生 History of the colonies in Korea, and the history of the vassal states [History of the ruling countries of the Korean Peninsula]. 108 - 220 B.C.: Han Dynasty (colony) 221 - 245: Wei (colony) 108-313 B.C.: Jin (colony) 314-676: Jin Song Liang Chen Sui Tang (vassal state) 690-900: Balhae (vassal state) 1126-1234: Jin (vassal state) 1259-1356: Mongolia (vassal state) 1392-1637: Ming (vassal state) 1637-1897: Qing dynasty (belonged to China) 1897: Liberated from the Qing by the Treaty of Shimonoseki 1903: Russia moves south across the Korean peninsula. Avoids becoming a vassal state of Russia through the efforts of Japan 1905-1910: Japan (protectorate) 1909: Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito, who was cautious about early annexation, is assassinated by Jung-geun Ahn. 1910-1945: Japan (annexed) 1945-1948: U.S. (non-independent) 1948: Establishment of the Republic of Korea (the foundation of the nation is laid by the U.S. military rule of Korea) 1948: Military dictatorship established 1948: Jeju Island 4.3 Incident: Massacre of 30,000 people 1950: Korean War: 4 million people killed 1950: Hodo Incident: 300,000 people massacred 1951: National Defense Force Incident: 100,000 people massacred 1951: Geochang Incident, massacre of 8,500 people 1979: Birth of military-born presidential administration 1980: Gwangju Incident: Massacre of 600 people 1993: First civilian government 한국의 식민지 역사와 속국의 역사[한반도 지배국의 역사]. 기원전 108 - 220년: 한나라(식민지) 221 - 245: 위(식민지) 기원전 108-313년: 진(식민지) 314-676: Jin Song Liang Chen Sui Tang(속국) 690-900: 발해(속국) 1126-1234: 진(가신국) 1259-1356: 몽골(속국) 1392-1637: 명나라(속국) 1637-1897: 청나라(중국에 속함) 1897년: 시모노세키 조약으로 청나라로부터 해방 1903년: 러시아가 한반도를 가로질러 남쪽으로 이동합니다. 일본의 노력으로 러시아의 속국이 되는 것을 피함 1905-1910: 일본(보호국) 1909년: 조기 합병을 경계했던 총리 이토 히로부미가 안중근에 의해 암살됨. 1910-1945: 일본(병합) 1945-1948: 미국(비독립) 1948년 대한민국 건국(미군정으로 건국의 기틀 마련) 1948년: 군사 독재 정권 수립 1948년: 제주도 4.3사변: 3만 명 학살 1950: 한국 전쟁: 400만 명 사망 1950년 호도사변 30만명 학살 1951년: 국방군 사변: 10만 명 학살 1951년 거창사변, 8,500명 학살 1979년: 군부 태생의 대통��� 행정부 탄생 1980년: 광주사변: 600명 학살 1993: 최초의 민간 정부

[jilted-love]

Someone really argued with me that what happened to ORV's webtoon and e-book is not censorship. Bruh, 4 biggest glaring censorship happened when these things changed, some context completely erased:

"Korean Empire Invader" is Ito Hirobumi. A fascist Japanese prime minister.

He was the constellation supporter of Yamamoto Hajime who had a stigma called "colonization" .

Ito was assassinated by An Junggeun, a Korean activist who is the constellation supporter of Lee Boksoon called "Harbin Sniper".

If that censorship of Korean history is not enough, they gave the arc a Japanese culture of youkai versus omyouji. So basically in order to make it palatable to Japanese fans, history got redacted and Japanese influence was inserted in it. It's like Japan is invading again. How badly do you know about history and literature to deny censorhip that happened with that just because the anti Japan arc stayed?

Censorship is gross and Japan takes all the blame for that because they can't deal with their history. They can't respect the countries they bastardized.

[coreancitizen]

Kim Go Eun stars in “Hero” as Joseon’s final court lady Seol Hee, who witnesses the death of the last empress, Empress Myeong Sung. As an informant for the independence army, Seol Hee is a strong character who gathers key information about Japan to actively support the independence movement. To avenge the nation, Seol Hee hides her identity to approach Ito Hirobumi and covertly carry out her secret mission.

[arytha]

OHH... now that im reading it i understand but im also a little :/ that they changed the ito hirobumi stuff. which means kdj's not asking for ryu gwan-sun/nation's independence activist. kind of changes the whole confrontation....

[cauchesque]

the uncanny resemblance to a real shit texan bar suggests some modern day ito hirobumi came back from that grim land with a desire to bring bad beer and worse music home with him

[genkinahito]

An Interview with Chihiro Ito, Director of In Her Room ひとりぼっちじゃない (2022) [New York Asian Film Festival 2023]

In Her Room is veteran screenwriter Chihiro Ito’s debut film. It is based on a novel she wrote and is an impressive achievement in style as it gives a refreshing cinematic spin on a familiar story of a jealous lover learning to let go. That is how my review opens and the rest of the writing is dedicated to describing how this fine film works so brilliantly because it comes from a writer/director…

[loonytrickster]

Ahn Jung-geun - Korean Independence Activist (안중근) [Korean History 57]

In this video, I will discuss the life and achievements of Ahn Jung-geun (1879-1910), a Korean independence activist who dedicated his life to making Korea independent from Imperial Japan. He is most famous for his assassination of Ito Hirobumi 伊藤 博文, an important Japanese politician. Ito Hirobumi was the first prime-minister of Japan and the first resident-general of Korea. This event is…