#davout/davoust

[captainknell]

Happy birthday Marshal Davout! May 10, 1770

For his birthday I have a few excerpts and even a picture from Napoleon's Military Career by Montgomery B Gibbs. (In this book, the spelling of Davout is Davoust)

At Jena:

Davoust's plans were so well laid, and his generals and troops displayed such courage and skill, that Blucher, with 12,000 cavalry, had not the satisfaction of penetrating through a single company.

At Eylau:

At the moment when the Russians appeared to be the victors, Davoust's division, which had been manoeuvring since the beginning of the action to turn the left and gain the rear of the Russian line, now made its appearance on the field. The effect was sudden and demoralizing to the Russians; Serpallen was lost, the Russian left wing, and a portion of its centre were thrown into disorder, and forced to retire and change front.

In Russia, when the Kremlin was surrounded by flames:

"It was then," says Segur, " that we met the Prince of Eckmuhl (Davoust). This marshal, who had been wounded at the Moskowa, had desired to be carried back among the flames to rescue Napoleon, or to perish with him. He threw himself into his arms with transport; the Emperor received him kindly but with that composure which in danger he never lost for a moment."

[josefavomjaaga]

Napoleon and the rivalry of the marshals

This is translated from the second volume of a book called "Etudes sur Napoléon" by Elie de Baudus, a former aide-de-camp of Marshal Bessières. I'm only browsing some parts of it, as I do most of the time, but I can already say that, while these are not truly memoirs, there are some interesting descriptions and details in it. Elie seems to have become a royalist by the time he publishes the book, usually referring to Napoléon as "the usurper" and in general very critical of him.

This is a rather long excerpt about the marshals unwillingness to cooperate - and Napoleon encouraging this attitude.

Who would not believe that in an army led by a hand as firm as Napoleon's there was complete obedience, from the second lieutenant to the officers of the highest rank, all the way up to him himself? It was generally so, except among the first chiefs. At the very moment when the hatred of Barclay was causing discord in the Russian camp, our affairs were also suffering from the lack of agreement between two of our generals. The operations of the advance guard were hampered for several days by Marshal Davoust's reluctance to support the cavalry with his infantry. On 29 August, things had even been pushed so far on the part of the Marshal that, when I was at Murat's headquarters in the evening, I learned that the prince's officers had had great difficulty preventing him from going to see the Marshal with the intention of asking him to explain his conduct, sword in hand.

Surely would have been a sight to see: One infuriated King of Naples, all the feathers on his hat ruffled with anger, bursting into Davout's tent. And then probably having to wait for Davout to find his glasses so he could recognize his illustrious visitor.

It may also be interesting insofar as, while I’ve not read much about the Russian campaign, I had the impression that modern historians rather tend to agree with Davout (?). But for Baudus, this is not so much about who was right but a matter of obedience:

No one will approve of the course taken by Marshal Davoust in this circumstance; he was under the King's orders for everything that the infantry had to do to support the movements of the cavalry; his duty was to obey. In all cases, a feeling of devotion to the glory of the army should always have prevented him from taking any action likely to compromise the success of operations; the Marshal therefore set an example that was all the more deplorable because he was higher up in the military hierarchy. These discussions ceased when Napoleon placed the division of Compans entirely at the disposal of the King of Naples.

Implied: without truly settling the matter and without declaring either that Murat was factually in the wrong and his orders had been so bad no commander in his right mind would follow them, or that Davout had overstepped his boundaries with his disobedience. For Elie, the matter is clear:

The King was in the right, Davoust was in the wrong; it was not appropriate to agree with them both. Here there was no question of discussions between people of equal rank. Murat was king; he owed this high fortune to his talents, his valour, and above all to the advantage of being the brother-in-law of the emperor; the latter had to ensure that in Murat the august title with which he had clothed him was respected; if he did not do so, it was because such quarrels between the chiefs of his army did not displease him.

… and above all to the advantage of being the brother-in-law of the emperor …

Murat: Arrgh! You’re not helping, Elie!

This was not the only occasion when it was easy to perceive this; he had already demonstrated it by not publicly showing any displeasure to Marshal Ney, with regard to the violent discussions which he had had with Marshals Soult and Masséna, in Spain and Portugal, when he was placed under their orders. It is easy to guess the reason for this: an intimate agreement between them would have given him cause for concern; there can therefore be no doubt that, as a matter of policy, he was opposed to the existence of such an understanding. An anecdote quoted by Mme de Staël in her book "Dix ans d'exil" gives a curious idea of Napoleon's views in this respect. After recounting a few details of her meeting and conversation with the emperor Alexander, this famous woman adds: "He also told me about the Machiavellian lessons that Napoleon had seen fit to give him. You see," he told her, "I take care to put my ministers and generals at odds with each other, so that they reveal to me the wrongs of each other. I maintain a continual jealousy around me through the way I treat people around me; one day one of them thinks he is preferred, the next day the other, and no one can ever be sure of my favour."

All this care had not been without result; the marshals almost all hated each other, especially those whose talents, high reputation and unquestionable ability placed them in the first rank. So whenever several of them found themselves together on the same point without being under the immediate orders of the master, their lack of understanding or their disobedience to the orders of the senior marshal often caused the most important and best combined operations to fail. Having adopted such a system, Napoleon should have carefully avoided creating embarrassments for himself on several points at once, as he had wisely done up until the time of his aggression against Spain. Moreover, this profound Italian finesse, used to divide the army leaders and applied to the French character, was a luxury; Napoleon could have relied on the satanic self-love on which it was based to bring about the state of affairs he desired in this respect; he could even, without inconvenience, have fought vigorously against this tendency to disobedience instead of encouraging it; there would always have been enough left to achieve his aim.

[northernmariette]

The Ideal Wife of the Napoleonic Era

Madame Campan, Marie-Antoinette’s former chambermaid, ran a very successful school for girls after the fall of the Monarchy. Among her pupils was the future wife of Marshal Davout, Aimée Leclerc. Teacher and pupil continued to write each other until Madame Campan’s death many years later. 

Shortly after Aimée’s marriage to Davout, Madame Campan writes her: 

Croyez-vous qu'un mari puisse jamais être infidèle quand il trouvera réuni dans sa femme de la grâce et de la simplicité dans les manières, du goût dans sa parure mais de la modestie dans la mise et de l'économie dans la dépense; quand elle aura veillé le matin aux plus petits détails d'ordre dans sa maison, inspecté jusqu'à la propreté qui y est nécessaire, et que le soir elle recevra ses amis avec empressement, égards et politesse; quand elle entretiendra son jugement par des lectures utiles, et partagera son temps entre l'aiguille et le crayon; quand elle n'aura jamais de caprices, connaîtra les prérogatives des hommes et se réservera seulement le droit modeste et aimable de la représentation? Il faudrait un être odieux pour n'être pas sûre de son bonheur.

Do you believe that any husband could ever be unfaithful when he finds united in his wife grace and simplicity in her manners, taste in her attire, but modesty in her appearance, and thriftiness in her expenditures; when in the morning she will have attended to the smallest details of tidiness in her home, inspected the cleanliness that is requisite within it, and when in the evening she will welcome her friends with eagerness, regard, and courtesy; when she will nurture her judgment through useful readings, and divide her time between the needle and the pencil; when she will never be temperamental, will be ever aware of the privileges of men, and will only retain the modest and amiable right of representation? It would take an odious being [as one’s husband] to be uncertain of her own happiness.

https://www.google.de/books/edition/Le_mar%C3%A9chal_Davout/WrkFAAAAQAAJ?hl=de&gbpv=1&dq=Marechal+Davoust+valse&pg=PA42&printsec=frontcover , p.143

So there you have it, the secret to wedded bliss for the wife during Napoleon’s time. One must be modestly but tastefully dressed, simple, thrifty, attentive to the smooth running of the household, a welcoming, courteous hostess, a reader of useful books (no novels!), occupying her free time with needlework and drawing, not given to temperamental demands, and ever mindful of men’s superior rights and of the need to make them look good. If you have all these qualities, only a monster will be unfaithful and cause you to be unhappy. The results are guaranteed!

But Madame Campan goes on to reassure Aimée that General Davout has an excellent reputation and is as far from being an odious being as can be conceived.

[histoireettralala]

“A full scale attack..”

Davout now received virtually all of his instructions directly from the Major General. He came to feel more and more that these orders were in bad taste, and that Berthier was endangering the opening operations of the campaign as he had in 1809. Davout had in fact lost all confidence in the man whom Napoleon had chosen as his second-in-command. At Marienburg “Davout expressed himself harshly, and event went so far as to accuse Berthier of incapacity or treachery.” The Emperor, in whose presence this quarrel took place, and who was well aware of Berthier’s lack of enthusiasm, tended to side with Davout whose ardent support of the campaign was well known to all. But Davout’s triumph over his old enemy was short-lived. Napoleon went on to Danzig the following morning where he was joined by his Major General. Here Davout’s enemies were able to gain the Emperor’s ear without the Marshal present to defend himself. They twisted his diligent preparations, his endless labor, and his enthusiasm, and used them against him. “’The marshal,’ they said, ‘wishes to have it thought that he has foreseen, arranged, and executed everything. Is the emperor, then, to be no more than a spectator of this expedition ? Must the glory of it devolve on Davoust [sic] ?’“ To which Napoleon exclaimed:” ‘One would think it was he who commanded the army.’“ Nor did his enemies stop short at this point. Once they realized they had the Emperor’s attention they launched a full scale attack on the absent Marshal. “ ‘Was it not Davoust [sic] who, after the victory of Jena, drew the emperor into Poland ? Is it not he who is now anxious for this new Polish war ? - He who already possesses such large property in that country, whose accurate and severe probity has won over the Poles, and who is suspected of aspiring to their throne ?’“

Thus is was that doubt was sown in the Emperor’s mind; doubt which was to deprive him of the advice and counsel of one of his best tactical commanders. One cannot be sure that it was pride and selfishness, as is implied by Davout’s apologists, which drove the wedge between the Marshal and his Emperor. But there is no question of Napoleon’s jealousy of his military glory. His reluctance to share with Davout their conquest of the Prussian army in the autumn of 1806, his refusal to grant Marshal Soult the title Duke of Austerlitz, gives evidence of Napoleon’s covetousness of these great victories. The conquest of Russia was to be his greatest military triumph. Davout was but one commander, one of his best to be sure - but nevertheless, merely one of many cogs in his war machine. Napoleon himself was quick to admit that his domination of Europe, and France itself, was based on his military achievements and reputation. He was in need of good generals, but he could not tolerate a rival within his own camp.

John G. Gallaher - The Iron Marshal, a Biography of Louis Nicolas Davout.

See: Comte P. de Ségur, History of the Expedition to Russia Undertaken by the Emperor Napoleon in the Year 1812. Gallaher advises us to read Ségur with caution, “as he is not always historically accurate”.

[josefavomjaaga]

The Grande Armée in 1812, Prussian view

Still reading up on old Prussian sources. These are some excerpts from "Tagebuch des Königlich Preußischen Armeekorps unter Befehl des General-Leutnants von York im Feldzuge von 1812" [Journal of the Royal Prussian Army Corps under Command of Lieutenant-General von York in the Campaign of 1812], written by General-Major von Seydlitz and published in 1823, so fairly close in time to the events. I was particularly interested in the remarks about Eugène de Beauharnais, but there are a few other intriguing comments, especially at the beginning. The first snippets are from before the campaign, summer 1812, when French and allied troops are gathering in Prussia.

Incidentally, it was new and interesting for the Prussian officer to hear unbiased and often sharp judgements about Napoleon and current circumstances from French officers during these marches of the French army. It was characteristic that the French spoke much more freely where only Prussians were present than when officers from other allies were also present at the gathering. [...] But they gave complete free rein to their speech when it came to expressing an opinion about their marshals and generals. Massena was then always "entêté" and Davoust would have been completely lost at Regensburg in 1809, without Guilleminot, then chief of his general staff, "ll alloit noyer toute l'armée et l'empire dans le Danube! [he was about to drown the entire army and the empire in the Danube!]" Napoleon is said to have exclaimed before he knew that Davoust was retreating backwards towards Abensberg to join the Bavarians. Soult alone was worth anything as far as strategy was concerned; the other marshals were merely good battle generals.

That’s interesting insofar as I understand the person Napoleon actually blamed for the troubles in 1809 was Berthier (while Davout had been the one warning early on). And Soult in summer 1812 felt that he was in utter disgrace, left alone in Spain with both Joseph and Jourdan, often enough being blamed for their miscalculations, begging for a short visit home for the third consecutive year now, while every chest of paintings he sent home was searched by French customs – not for musty old Spanish paintings, mind you, as no one was interested in them at the time, but for the treasures Soult supposedly acquired by the ton. (In the meantime his wife, when Soult sent two riding horses from Spain for his children, found that she had to sell two others because otherwise she couldn't afford the upkeep). Here, it seems the opinion in the army about those personalities was very different from that at court.

If I were commander, said a general of his marshal, he would not be marshal. More profound was the reply of another to the opinion voiced by a Prussian that Napoleon would probably make Prince Eugène King of Poland. "Napoleon has studied history best of all of us, and he knows quite well that Caesar was once the lieutenant of Pompey."

No comment there. But this does echo some remarks in Caulaincourt’s and Hortense’s memoirs. (I still feel that, if Napoleon had lived long enough to see his son grow up, there might have been some family troubles as soon as Naps senior fully understood that Naps junior would one day sit in his place.)

There is another remark about Eugène in a footnote, about him joining the army for the Russian campaign:

Initially, Napoleon seems to have had a different purpose in mind for Prince Eugene, perhaps the throne of Poland. He sent for him to come to Paris in a hurry shortly before his departure from Saint Cloud, but in the meantime he may already have grown tired of the idea, for the Prince learned only ordinary things on his arrival. It will be remembered here what was quoted above as a statement on this subject by a French general.

To my knowledge, in 1812 Napoleon ahd the idea of making Eugène governor of Paris in Napoleon’s absence. Maybe having a trusted second-in-command in Paris at the time would have been useful when it came to the Malet conspiracy. But I guess the word "trusted" is key here…

Now we are already into the campaign, at Vilna, when the first attempts to cut off the Russian army and force them into battle have failed:

Napoleon made three essential mistakes on his departure from Vilna. The first was that he began to shroud his plans for the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Poland, so loudly promised earlier, in mystery. The second was that he continued to base the provision of his army solely on requisition, without regard to people or locality. [...] The third and most important mistake, however, was that he left the Duke of Bassano [Maret] as his deputy in Vilna, instead of choosing a commander like Prince Eugene or even Marshal Davoust, the latter of course not loved in Poland, but nevertheless respected and feared. Only an imposing firm hand could bring coherence and strength to the affairs of a nation whose former Imperial Assemblies had become proverbial.

I have no clue what this refers to but it sounds interesting. I do know that Napoleon was quite wary of Polish nobility and their rivalries.

Only such a man, in whose hands both the highest military and the highest civilian authority might be united, would have had the necessary military understanding and would have found the most expedient means to ensure in due course the establishment of military posts and magazines on the army's lines of operations, and only such a man, recognising the advantage of having the inner line of operations in his possession, would at last, at the turn of events in Moscow, have quickly rallied the corps left behind and to the side, and with united force would have attacked and overthrown Wittgenstein and Tormassov one after the other.

Somehow, the last part makes me think a lot more of Davout than of Eugène 😊.

This may be a coincidence, but there’s two points that I find concur with Caulaincourt’s memoirs (interestingly, because I do think Caulaincourt is often not the most trustworthy source, and he was clearly biased towards the Beauharnais): the praise for Eugène and the dislike for Maret. I’m not sure if there is a connection, however.

[murillo-enthusiast]

Bory is not actually going to open the basket prematurely. But, he is going to place his ear against the basket, possibly getting bonked into a few times, and then he is going to verbally advance a theory as he sits up and exclaims, absurdly loudly,

Bory: Have you imprinted on Monsieur Davout? Are you longing for… daddy Davout?

He is then going to write “PAPA DAVOUST?” in large letters in his sketchbook and circle it a few times.

Some plaisantin left a concerningly large, mysterious...sentient bird egg at my porch. I am SLIGHTLY panicking and MAY require assistance.

[josefavomjaaga]

Ansbach, 1806

Translated from »Denkwürdiger und nützlicher rheinischer antiquarius [...]«. A chevalier von Lang gives a description of the days in 1806 when Frenchmen under Bernadotte were quartered in Ansbach. Bernadotte hosted several balls and invited up to 500 military officers, including some from other corps.

I once saw four marshals there at the same time: Bernadotte, a towering dark man; Mortier, even taller, with a long stiff braid and a spiritless shield-guard figure; Lefebvre, an old Alsatian gaiter servant, with his wife, the former regimental laundress, and Davoust, a small, bald, unassuming man who could not get enough of waltzing. Of all of them, Davoust was the most modest and quietest in his cantonnement, and at that time nothing less than a tyrant, as he was later to be known in Hamburg, presumably in the urge of quite different circumstances.

Davout, letting loose on the dance floor. Just as we know him 😁.

[northernmariette]

Davout, the Dragoon, and the Sheep.

I’m reading a book written by Marshal Davout’s daughter. This is no “Mommie Dearest” kind of book: never has a more perfect being walked the Earth, according to its author. 

Davout’s daughter is particularly irked, it seems, with her father’s reputation for severity and mirthlessness. She emphasizes again and again how sociable he was, how much he enjoyed jokes and parties and all-round good cheer. She relates this anecdote, which is, in fact, funny, although Davout was not the actually the funny one:

“To preserve order, the Marshal imposed a very strict discipline within his army corps, both for the benefit of his troops, who were admirably maintained, and out of integrity. One day, while riding his horse, he spotted in a field a soldier who had a peculiar appearance. It was a dragoon concealing on him a sheep he had just stolen. The Marshal, having had the dragoon taken to him, began to announce the punishment that awaited him. The unfortunate sheep, which was bleating pitifully, prevented Davout from being heard clearly. The dragoon, striking it on the head, exclaimed: "Quiet, sheep! Let the Marshal speak!" The Marechal laughed, [...] and the words of the accused saved the guilty not from the death penalty, which was only a threat, but from a trial.”

My translation, from https://www.google.de/books/edition/Le_mar%C3%A9chal_Davout/WrkFAAAAQAAJ?hl=de&gbpv=1&dq=Marechal+Davoust+valse&pg=PA42&printsec=frontcover, pp.66-67.

[histoireettralala]

An exception to the rule

It had now been more than five weeks since the French army had crossed the Niemen. The heat, dust, bad roads, and shortage of supplies of every kind had taken their toll. The artillery and supply trains were unable to keep pace with the infantry, so that even those supplies which were moving with the army frequently were not up with the troops when they were needed. This resulted in additional hardships for the men. It became almost impossible to prevent marauding and pillaging, which always lead directly to a weakening of discipline. The Emperor was no longer sure exactly what his effective striking force was at any given time. Stragglers and deserters roamed the countryside. The sick and wounded further depleted the ranks.

Davout’s I Corps - and to some extent, Eugène’s IV Corps- were exceptions to the general rule. “As we marched from Orsha to Liady”, wrote Ségur, “the first corps, that of Davoust [sic], was distinguished by the order and harmony which prevailed in its divisions. The fine appearance of the troops, the care with which they were supplied, and the attention that was paid to make them careful of their provisions, which the improvident soldier is apt to waste; lastly, the strength of these divisions, the happy result of this severe discipline, all caused them to be acknowledged as the model of the whole army.” The Baron de Marbot also gives testimony to the fine condition of the I Corps. “Davout’s corps was, however, for a long time a fortunate exception to this rule, “ Marbot wrote concerning the poor condition of the army as a whole, “since that marshal, who was no less great as an administrator than as a leader, had organized before the passage of the Niemen huge trains of small carts to follow the army. These carts, filled with biscuits, salted meats, and vegetables, were drawn by oxen, a certain number of which were slaughtered every evening. This while assuring a supply of provisions, had a great effect in keeping the soldiers in their ranks.”

John G. Gallaher - The Iron Marshal, a Biography of Louis Nicolas Davout

[histoireettralala]

Laure vs Aimée

In the spring of 1805, Madame Davout was attached to the household of Madame Mère, the Emperor’s mother. The assignement was not at all to her liking, and she immediately wrote her husband that she intended to refuse the position. She believed that she had ample reason in that she was once again pregnant and her general health was poor; in fact her health had not been good for the past several years. However, there was more to her refusal than her health. She was disappointed at not being attached to the household of the Empress, which would have been a higher honor even if turned down for reasons of health. In her Mémoires, Madame Junot wrote the following: “The Maréchale Davoust [sic] formed a member of the court of Madame Mère. But her pretensions were more elevated, and she was disappointed in not having been named a lady of honour to the Empress. She professed ill health, and gave in her resignation before my arrival at Paris.” There was no friendship between Madame Davout and Madame Junot, whose husband never received a marshal’s baton and who was considerably beneath the Princess of Eckmühl in the social structure at the time she wrote. But there was undoubtedly truth in her words. What Madame Junot did not see fit to mention, although it was rapidly becoming common knowledge, was that Madame Davout had lost most of the affection for the Bonaparte family which she had once had and did not wish to be a lady in waiting to any member of the royal family. Such service would require her to spend long periods of time at court, which she wished to avoid as much as possible.

John G. Gallaher - The Iron Marshal, a Biography of Louis Nicolas Davout