#construall

[unopenablebox]

oh lmao it just occurred to me that plausibly one of the reasons people who know us separately react with exaggerated shock at the Reveal that 🌸 and i are, like, committed life partners, is not only the general surprise factor of "two people i know extensively who do not ever cross paths live together and knew each other for years before they even moved to this city", which, reasonably surprising

but because due to our shared noncommittal approach to "coming out" or "publicly articulating a stance on a personal gender" absolutely everyone who meets 🌸 immediately interprets their whole deal as "one of the gayest men they've ever met"

whereas i kind of halfheartedly use they/them pronouns and present in a way that means everyone is definitely interpreting me as some unknown member of the set "reasonably butch lesbian", "unconvincingly closeted trans man", or, unfortunately, "theyfab everyone will round down to 'bisexual woman who actually just dates men' due to the way theyfabness is configured in left spaces" and i usually encourage the former on account of how at least then they correctly understand me to be gay and it's easy to pitch

so i think possibly some of the time i am actually watching very nice sensitive straight leftists try not to perform disrespectful mental chess to figure out whether this mean we've both just been straight married the whole time, or if they're discovering new unsettling horizons of homosexuality that they're not prepared to contemplate

[genderandcriticaltheory]

Is the Marlboro Man the Only Alternative?

The present research shows that male responses to male models in advertising are influenced by their gender identity, self-construal [a person’s self-concept or self-view[1]], and the perceived gender identity of the model. The findings contribute to research on gender effects in marketing. We show that considering model gender identity in isolation only applies to masculine men. In contrast, the…

[notfreetoday]

The Importance of Amae in My Personal Weatherman

Masterlist || Language Analysis Part 1

I have seen a lot of discourse in the English-speaking fandom surrounding Segasaki's apparent dismissal or trivializing of Yoh's desire to pursue his manga, and most of it is negative. His comments about wanting Yoh to remain dependent on him, or that Yoh does not need to earn money are seen as patronizing or controlling at best and oppressive at worst. It appears that Segasaki does not understand nor respect Yoh's need for independence, and that is what strains their relationship.

But what if I asked you to consider that Segasaki's behaviour is actually an invitation to Yoh to reinforce their relationship? And what if I told you that Yoh's withdrawal from Segasaki constitutes a rejection of that invitation, and it is that rejection that strains their relationship instead?

Of course, the end result is the same - a strained relationship - and in reality there is never one side wholly responsible for this. The point of this is to simply challenge the cultural notion that a successful relationship is the coming together of two equally independent individuals, as opposed to the co-creation of a relationship formed by two interdependent individuals.

"If only you could stay drunk forever..." "It's okay to feel down again for me too you know" - Segasaki, Ep 4, Ep 5

This isn't about Segasaki wanting to keep Yoh is helpless and dependent on him, but about wanting Yoh to be able to be true to his feelings and express his own desire for affection honestly, without having to hide behind "I hate you" or rejection.

Or, let's try and talk about how Segasaki and Yoh reinforce their relationship through the use of amae (featuring a brief mention of tatemae/honne) who am I kidding this is not brief at all

First: Cultural Context

The way people conceptualize and make meaning of the Self differs between Western and East Asian cultures, and this plays into the differences we see in the basis for our self-esteem, the personal attributes that we value, and even what constitutes the behavior of a mature individual. Broadly speaking, Western cultures tend towards the Independent Self Construal (whereby the Self is a distinct entity separate from others) whereas East Asian cultures tend towards Interdependent Self-Construal (whereby the Self is connected to and defined by relationships with others). Thus, in the West, expressing one's individuality is very important for one's self-esteem, and being able to communicate clearly and confidently is valued and a sign of maturity. Conversely, in the East, one's ability to integrate and become a member of the group is prized, and contributes significantly to one's self esteem. In order to be seen as a mature individual, one must learn not only to read a social situation but also how to modify one's behavior in order to respond to the changing demands of that situation, with the ultimate goal being to maintain group harmony.

tl;dr - In East Asian culture, behaviors and attitudes that emphasize interdependence and promote group harmony actually play a big role in reinforcing relationships and one's membership towards the group.

Segasaki is an expert at this - his "public mode" that Yoh refers to actually shows us how good he is at social interactions. This is the Japanese concept of tatemae/honne (crudely translated as public self/private feelings) - which I could link to a bunch of articles for you, but I'm going to suggest you check out this 9 min street interview instead. At 6:41, one of the interviewees comments that another is sunao, or "honest" (we'll cover this later too) and at 6:49 specifically talks about how reading situations is important as an adult. Segasaki reads the room well, but most importantly, he reads Yoh well.

Yoh is not good at this, at all. In Ep 6, we see that he does not integrate well with the group, and he doesn't realize how he might appear to others when he stares and sketches from afar. Yoh does not read the room well because he doesn't pick up on social cues and does not adhere to social norms (I'll point these out in Ep 6's corrections). He cannot read Segasaki, and especially cannot read Segasaki's amae, or his attempts at reinforcing their relationship. Part of this is because his low self-esteem causes him to withdraw from Segasaki's affection as a means of self-protection, and so he valiantly tries to deny his feelings for Segasaki. As Man-san commented in Ep 4, Yoh is not sunao - he has difficulty with being true/honest about his feelings, even to himself.

Sunao is another term that usually pops up when talking about feelings/relationships. It can be used to describe one's relationship with oneself, as well as the relationship with another/group. With oneself, it is usually used to mean "being honest/truthful/straightforward/frank/open-minded about one's feelings". With another person/group, it is usually used to mean "to cooperate/listen/be obedient, or "to be humble/open-minded". In essence, the word encompasses an ideal virtue that is often taught from early childhood - that we should treat both ourselves and others with humility and honesty, because that is how we accept ourselves and stay in harmony with other. This is what becoming an adult, or gaining maturity, means (not gaining independence, as adulthood is often equated to in the West - do you see a running theme here 😂). Of course, that's actually really hard to do, so you'll often hear children (and immature adults too) chided for "not being sunao" (this can therefore sound patronizing if you're not careful). We'll revisit this in a little bit.

Second: What is Amae?

Amae is a key component in Japanese relationships, both intimate and non-intimate. It happens every day, in a variety of different interactions, between a variety of different people. But it is often seen as strange or weird, and those unfamiliar with the concept can feel uncomfortable with it. This stems from the difference in self-construal - because independence is tied so strongly to an individual's self-image in the West, it is very hard to fathom why behavior that emphasizes interdependence could be looked upon favorably. It is telling that every possible English translation of the word "amae" carries a negative connotation, when in Japanese it can be both negative or positive. The original subtitles translated it as "clingy", for example. Other common translations include "dependence", "to act like a child/infant", "to act helpless", "to act spoiled", "coquettish", "seeking indulgence", "being naive" etc.

From A Multifaceted View of the Concept of Amae: Reconsidering the Indigenous Japanese Concept of Relatedness by Kazuko Y Behrens

*Note - the word "presumed" or "presumption" or "expectation" or "assumption" used in the above definition and in the rest of this post, can give the impression that all of amae is premeditated, which adds a calculative component to this concept. Whilst amae can indeed be used in a manipulative manner (benign or otherwise), it is not the case for every single situation, and often amae that seeks affection is often spontaneous and without thought, precisely because the situation allows for it to appear organically. This is the amae that Segasaki and Yoh most often exchange - so think of these assumptions and expectations as "unconscious/subconscious" thought processes.

Third: Amae Between Segasaki and Yoh

Yoh shows a lot of amae when he is drunk:

He whines, buries himself into Segasaki's embrace, refuses to move or let go of him, and keeps repeating "no". In these interactions, Yoh wants Segasaki's affection, but instead of asking, he does, well, this, and he presumes that Segasaki will indulge his behavior. Leaving to get some fresh air might not be as obvious - but it is a form of amae as well, because Man-san is his guest, not Segasaki's, and he shouldn't be leaving Segasaki to entertain her. The expectation that this is okay, and that neither of them will fault him for it, is what makes it amae.

Segasaki obviously enjoys indulging Yoh when Yoh does amae, because he recognises this as Yoh's request for affection from him. It's not that Segasaki enjoys Yoh in this drunk, helpless state; it's not even that Segasaki feels reassured by Yoh's requests for affection. Segasaki knows Yoh likes him, and recognizes that Yoh is struggling with those feelings. That Yoh is actually able to do amae to Segasaki is what delights him the most, because it is something that requires a lot of trust in Segasaki and a willingness to be vulnerable in front of him. This is how amae reinforces relationships - when a request for amae is granted, both the giver and the receiver experience pleasant feelings.

That said, an amae request can also be perceived negatively - if amae is excessive, or if the person responding feels they are obligated to do so. In Ep 5, Man-san chides Yoh for his amae - the fact that he expected to do well from the beginning, and became upset when he failed. He told her about his unemployment, presuming that she would comfort him, but alas.

Segasaki also does amae - but unfortunately Yoh misses many of his cues, and so neither of them really gain pleasant feelings from the interaction (ok so maybe Segasaki does, but I will argue that is more because Segasaki also enjoys it when Yoh obeys him - see @lutawolf's posts for the D/s perspective on this!).

Did you catch it? Segasaki wants Yoh to pass him the Soy Sauce, which, clearly, he is capable of getting himself. He tells Yoh to feed him, because he wants Yoh's affection. And the real kicker - he asked for curry, and expected Yoh to know he wanted pork. In all these interactions, Segasaki presumes that Yoh will indulge him and do for him things he can do himself perfectly well (and even better at that) - this is what makes this amae. But look at Yoh's reactions:

Yoh just stares between the Soy Sauce and Segasaki, between Segasaki and his food, and then just at Segasaki himself. He doesn't recognise any of this as amae, and in the case of feeding Segasaki makes the conclusion that this is somehow a new slave duty he's acquired. And therefore, he does not gain pleasant feelings from it.

In Ep 3 we see a turning point in Yoh's behaviour - his first (sober) attempt at amae (the argument in Ep 2 is debatable - it's not amae from Yoh's POV, but Segasaki responds as if it were, with a head pat and a "when you get drunk, you talk a lot don't you?").

Here, Yoh wants to express his desire for Segasaki's affection, but he can't bring himself to say it aloud. Instead, he dumps bedsheets on Segasaki's lap, as if the bigger the scene he makes the greater the intensity of his desire he can convey. It is the presumption that Segasaki will understand him that makes this amae. And then, we get this:

Not only a happy Segasaki and a sweetly shy Yoh, but also a Yoh who's emboldened by Segasaki's response, and who finally, for the first time, reciprocates touch, and considers the possibility that Segasaki might actually like him.

With every episode, Yoh gets more and more comfortable with doing amae towards Segasaki, because Segasaki picks up on his cues and always responds to them. In Ep 5, Yoh's amae comes out naturally, triggered by the stress of his unemployment, and we see it in all those moments he sounds and acts like a child, and as I mentioned, Segasaki spends the whole episode reassuring Yoh that his amae is welcomed, and that Segasaki likes responding to it. If you've been wondering why the relationship between Segasaki and Yoh can, at times, feel somewhat parental in nature - this is it. It's because Segasaki sees the contradiction between Yoh's childlike insistence that he does not like Segasaki and his desire for Segasaki's attention and affection, for what it really is - Yoh's struggle with accepting himself. When Yoh is able to be sunao, he does amae naturally, and Segasaki responds to him in kind.

Now, all we need is for Yoh to recognize when Segasaki does amae, which will likely happen soon, given that Yoh has grown with every episode.

As always, thank you for reading :))

[transmutationisms]

when you say “positive / negative right”, what do those mean?

thanks for the good posts :)

a negative right is a claim to protection from some sort of interference; a positive right is a claim that the other party has an obligation to act in some way beyond just refraining from causing harm. for example, the right to free speech is generally spoken about as a negative right: it guarantees me the freedom from state intervention into what i can say. a right to health, on the other hand, would be a positive claim that i should be guaranteed access to things like clean air and water, health care, sick leave, &c.

in practice this distinction is actually much messier than i'm making it sound, and most 'negative rights' are basically meaningless without positive interventions, except in the fantasyland of libertarian political discourse. for example, the united states prohibits one human being from enslaving another (a negative right to legal and bodily freedom) but simultaneously engages in, and permits, incarceration with & without forced and un(der)-compensated labour requirements. the state is not actually granting freedom, and slavery has only been outlawed on a very limited and technical basis. another example is the right to abortion, which, prior to the dobbs decision, was legal in the us on the basis of a 'right to privacy' as established in roe v wade—a freedom from specific interventions in one's medical decisions. however, for decades the actual right to abortion was eroded by the us's lack of universal health care and paid time off, and by laws that became progressively more restrictive in terms of when in a pregnancy abortions were allowed, what clinics had to do in order to be allowed to operate, and what requirements patients had to satisfy first (waiting periods, ultrasounds, &c). in practice this meant that fewer and fewer people could actually access abortion, despite having, technically, legal protection from government interference in its provision. even freedom of speech falls apart as a purely negative right, because, as i've said before, most enforcement of speech limitations actually happens via economic mechanisms like the threat of losing your job—meaning, the operative issue here is not usually whether the state can directly censor me but whether i risk starving to death if a corporation disliked what i said. in other words, what makes my speech vulnerable is the fact that i live in a society that does not guarantee me food, shelter, and basic necessities as positive rights.

negative rights appeal to liberals and other reactionaries because they're framed as maximising everybody's freedom: your actions are only constrained if they risk impinging on me. however, in actuality what this means is that a right defended on 'negative' grounds is basically incapable of redressing existing social and political inequities, and instead upholds or even exacerbates the power dynamics already in effect. i am actually not a huge fan of 'rights' as a legal framework period, and i think a well-defended 'positive right' is really moving beyond the construal of 'rights' and into a more materialist and socially contextualist framework, but that's a different post.

[literaryvein-reblogs]

Writing Notes: Beyond East & West Differences of Personality

The work by Markus and Kitayama (1991) has had a major effect on social, personality and developmental psychology and raised awareness for cultural considerations in psychology.

Despite the positive impact, there has been limited empirical support for independent and interdependent self-construals (Matsumoto, 1999) with some studies reporting contradictory findings.

Vignoles' & Colleagues Study

Recent research conducted by 71 researchers, across 33 countries and encompassing 55 cultural groups challenged the dichotomous view first proposed by Markus and Kitayama.

The researchers conducted a series of studies (Vignoles et al., 2016) that examined a single dimension of Independent/Interdependent, Western cultures as wholly independent, the relationship between individualist and collectivist cultures and Independent/Interdependent self-construals, as well as the role of religious heritage and socioeconomic development of cultures. 

Using data from over 7,000 adults, the authors identified:

7 dimensions that encompass both independent and interdependent self-construals

Difference

Connection

Self-Direction

Self-Reliance

Consistency

Self-Expression

Self-Interest

At the level of the individual, these 7 dimensions represent the different ways that we see ourselves (perception) and our relationships with other people.

The dimensions can also represent cultural norms about self that are reinforced and maintained by cultural practices and social structures.

Result & Implications

When the researchers tested the 7-dimension model, their results contradicted many long-held beliefs about independent, individualistic, interdependent and collectivist cultures.

First, Western cultures scored above average on five of the dimensions but were below average on the dimensions self-reliance and consistency.

Thus, the common view that Western cultures are wholly independent was not supported.

Latin American cultures had scores very similar to Western cultures on the difference and self-expression dimensions but scored higher on consistency and self-interest which also challenged the common view of Latin America as wholly interdependent.

The economically poorest samples in the study scored highest on self-interest and were negatively associated with individualism, whereas Western cultures scored high on commitment to others which challenges the view that rich Western cultures are selfish.

Religious heritage was also an important variable in the study. Muslim and Catholic samples had very distinct dimension profiles that showed high scores for consistency. This may be related to the tenets of both faiths that salvation is related to behaviors so behaving consistently �� across different situations and settings would be important.

The results of Vignoles and colleagues demonstrated that self, whether measured at the individual level or cultural level, is NOT binary.

Note

Independence and interdependence is a complex interaction of heritage, socioeconomic development, settlement patterns, and ecological contexts.

By moving away from a dichotomous view of self, psychologists have an opportunity to expand our understanding of self and its relationship to culture.

Sources: 1 2 ⚜ Writing Notes & References

[probablyasocialecologist]

In reading​ and annotating the writings of Améry, Levi and others I was trying somehow to mitigate the oppressive sense of wrongness I felt after being exposed to Israel’s bleak construal of the Shoah, and the certificates of high moral merit bestowed on the country by its Western allies. I was looking for reassurance from people who had known, in their own frail bodies, the monstrous terror visited on millions by a supposedly civilised European nation-state, and who had resolved to be on perpetual guard against the deformation of the Shoah’s meaning and the abuse of its memory. Despite its increasing reservations about Israel, a political and media class in the West has ceaselessly euphemised the stark facts of military occupation and unchecked annexation by ethnonational demagogues: Israel, the chorus goes, has the right, as the Middle East’s only democracy, to defend itself, especially from genocidal brutes. As a result, the victims of Israeli barbarity in Gaza today cannot even secure straightforward recognition of their ordeal from Western elites, let alone relief. In recent months, billions of people around the world have witnessed an extraordinary onslaught whose victims, as Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, an Irish lawyer who is South Africa’s representative at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, put it, ‘are broadcasting their own destruction in real time in the desperate, so far vain, hope that the world might do something’. But the world, or more specifically the West, doesn’t do anything. Worse, the liquidation of Gaza, though outlined and broadcast by its perpetrators, is daily obfuscated, if not denied, by the instruments of the West’s military and cultural hegemony: from the US president claiming that Palestinians are liars and European politicians intoning that Israel has a right to defend itself to the prestigious news outlets deploying the passive voice while relating the massacres carried out in Gaza. We find ourselves in an unprecedented situation. Never before have so many witnessed an industrial-scale slaughter in real time. Yet the prevailing callousness, timidity and censorship disallows, even mocks, our shock and grief. Many of us who have seen some of the images and videos coming out of Gaza – those visions from hell of corpses twisted together and buried in mass graves, the smaller corpses held by grieving parents, or laid on the ground in neat rows – have been quietly going mad over the last few months. Every day is poisoned by the awareness that while we go about our lives hundreds of ordinary people like ourselves are being murdered, or being forced to witness the murder of their children.

[brieandpinotgris]

construal

laying prone making love to the ceiling every voice in my head chanting something latin in unison I don't speak latin but that never mattered before the sign reading insufficient human involvement detected appeared across my retinas flashing glitter bomb countdown I'm inside out and rearranging my limbs for aesthetic reasons carving runes in the lampshades impossible to say whether I'm world-eater or world-eaten sticking to plans and guns like a strip of toilet paper to wet shoes one two buckle.

[horsesource]

hi! I just came across your post about autism and found it so interesting... where can I learn more about “autism emerging out of psychosis”, as you put it? x

Thank you, it is something interesting to me that I care about

"Autism emerging out of psychosis" can be meant in two different ways. The article Autism: Schizo of Postmodern Capital by Hans Skott-Myhre and Christina Taylor addresses both of these. if you don't have familiarity with some of the psychoanalytic and philosophical arguments about mental symptom production, I still think it's very much worth reading.

Autism, as word, quite literally came into existence as a symptom of schizophrenia. By that I mean, when Eugen Bleuler coined the terms "schizophrenia" and "autism", he used "autism" not as a separate diagnosis but to demarcate a symptom of schizophrenia (a turning "inward", a withdrawal of symbolic exchange, catatonia). Schizophrenia characterized by autism was considered as particularly "extreme", more hopeless than the symptomatic relentless verbosity typically associated with schizophrenia. It's common to attribute this initial "misunderstanding" of autism connected to schizophrenia as an unfortunate lack of diagnostic clarity, later resolved when autism had its own diagnostic territory staked out. I disagree; autism has always been incredibly slippery (it went from construal as an excess of fantasy, an extreme retreat into an incredibly imaginative inner world, to being written as the polar opposite, as flat literality, as a deficiency or aberrance of imaginative capacity, as a paucity of inner world; Asperger's was subsumed by Autism Spectrum Disorder in 2012 which made things even fuzzier (exactly what sort of person are we supposed to imagine when we hear "autistic"?); the influx of speaking, "late diagnosed" autistic individuals is resulting in a drastic rewriting of the popular understanding of autism, etc) and it is much more fruitful imo to track historical fluctuations rather than assume autism is on its way to being nailed down conceptually once and for all

But of course, autism and schizophrenia are more than diagnostic categories. They are subjective processes, they are ways of being in the world through body and language.

As I mentioned in the post you referred to, post-Fordism, the development of communicative technologies and financial capitalism radically changed the nature of labor/the relations of production and consumption. With this change came both deliberate and unintentional production of radically different subjectivities. Communicative prowess, imaginative capacity, personality appeal, ability to cope with intense instability and competition...all of these became economic resources in a way that they were not in an era dominated by factory production. Which brings me to the 2nd article I'm linking, Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Visual Culture and the Acceleration of Identity Formation/Dissolution written by the CEO of Buzzfeed.

Although Buzzfeed CEO never once mentions autism, he does describe an unintended consequence of minds saturated by a psychotic, ever-accelerating barrage of information and representation:

“These media-savvy youth consume the accelerated visual culture of late capitalism, yet do not develop ego formations that result in consumer shopping. It is as if the light and sound from the television is sufficient to satiate their desire. Actual products become superfluous ­­as the media itself is the final object of consumption."

If endless identity/self consumption and production is compelled by a structurally psychotic market economy, perhaps what cannot be captured economically is a subjectivity that is not consuming representations for its formation, improvement, or dissolution, but sheerly for "light and sound". A subjectivity unconcerned with legitimizing its subjectivity. Tell a speaking autistic "you don't look autistic" and we will predictably give you 1000 reasons why we have autism coursing through our veins, we will assert "I Am autistic" until blue in the face, we will provide paperwork and professionals to vouch for our autism, we will produce tiktoks about the dangers of the invalidation of autism. Tell a nonspeaking autistic "you don't look autistic" and chances are they're listening to the sound of a voice or the sound of a bird

[onecornerface]

Should we avoid talking about race? Some ideas

I recently saw a comment which basically said drug reformists shouldn’t talk about race and racism too much, since this topic is so divisive. I’ve long had mixed feelings toward this sort of view. There is a real problem in a lot of race discourse. However, I think the solution is to develop knowledge and skills of why and when to talk about race (and why and when not to), and to become good at how we talk about race.

(I’ll be using “race” and “racism” roughly interchangeably in this post. I assume race will typically be significant (when it is) because racism is significant. And I assume that racism is, in some important sense, conceptually prior to race.)

(My concern here is mainly the idea of avoiding race in drug policy discourse. However, some aspects of my post will apply more generally as well. Also, by "taboo" I mean basically avoiding a topic, and encouraging other people to avoid a topic. This can come in different kinds and degrees, which I haven't much delved into here.)

There are a few ways to interpret the “race is divisive” claim. On one construal, the problem is that there are a lot of racists who will be alienated by any talk of race (for racist reasons), and that we should try not to alienate them. I actually think effective coalitions do need some degree of tolerance toward some amount of bad ideas or prejudice among its members, or prospective members—but there is the question of how much is too much. How much tolerance should we express toward bad ideas and attitudes, and how bad do they need to be? If we’re supposed to simply maximize recruitment of explicit racists into the drug reform movement, and never challenge their racism, then that’s a recipe for a serious rise in racism within the movement—a disaster that would probably sabotage the movement, as well as render it unworthy of victory.

A healthy movement needs to appeal to and recruit people who are imperfect—but also aim to make them better. If we’re being divisive by excluding unrepentant white supremacists from the movement, then that’s a point in favor of being divisive.

Some responses to the “race discourse is too divisive” line seem to stop there. However, I think there are more reasonable and nuanced versions of the “race discourse is too divisive” position which need more careful attention.

I think race is a topic that often is divisive in bad ways, and it is often discussed poorly—even when all participants are more-or-less progressive and opposed to anything they’d recognize as white supremacism. When race is brought up, many people are quick to weigh in on it—often with views and arguments that are poorly thought out, and even more poorly expressed. Race is a magnet for poor-quality discourse. This is likely especially the case for white people, but is also often the case for people of all races. (For analysis of some of the poor ways white people often talk about race, see Liam Bright’s “White Psychodrama.”) People can easily misunderstand one another, get angry at one another, and weaken coalitions which can’t survive the ensuing disagreements. One way to avert this problem may be to avoid talking much about race.

Sometimes this avoidance may not be very costly, compared to the poor-quality race-discourse that would otherwise happen. Race-discourse can be poor-quality in many ways. For one, race-discourse is often hostage to empirically questionable theories, such as popular oversimplistic interpretations of implicit bias. Sometimes high-quality race-discourse may require sophisticated theories and frameworks and arguments, which very few people have access to.

Applying the concern to drug policy, another problem is when people are oversimplistic in their normative analysis of what’s wrong with the drug war. Some progressives appear to talk as if racism is the only or main problem with drug prohibition. For instance, some arguments for decriminalization emphasize the racial disparities in arrest above all else. But this can’t be correct. Drug prohibition would still be terrible even if it were able to target drug users of all races equally. If the police drastically escalated how many white people they arrested for drug crimes, then some of the popular concerns about the drug war’s racial disparities would go out the window—but this would be worse, not better.

Progressives also sometimes criticize the history of the drug war in oversimplistic ways—such as by mistakenly believing the 1980s anti-crack laws were only motivated by racist white politicians, and failing to recognize the complex role of black anti-drug advocates among political leaders and the black general public.

If we talk about race in drug policy discourse, it needs to be done in a better way, and in light of more normatively and empirically adequate analysis. But this can only be done by talking about race—not by avoiding talk of race.

I’m also not necessarily averse to the idea that there are some topics which we should avoid talking about much in some political advocacy contexts, in order to maintain coalitions and good discursive environments and efficient activism, even when these topics are somewhat important in themselves. Not every topic, and not even every important topic, can be discussed at all times. There is reason to self-consciously maintain and promote some priorities of topics, and sometimes the “divisiveness” of a given topic can be a legitimate reason to discourage bringing it up or emphasizing it.

However, any such principle needs to be calibrated to the importance of the topic, and the costs of tabooing the topic. Race is objectively very important, including to drug policy analysis and reform, and there needs to be high-quality integration of race-discourse and drug policy discourse to recognize this importance. Racism is a major component of drug prohibition, in at least three ways—its causes (e.g. why drugs were criminalized), its structure (e.g. which drugs are illegal and in what ways), and its outcomes (e.g. how people of color are far more criminalized than white people, even for the same actions). If we taboo talking about race, we put many aspects of drug policy off-limits to discussion. This is very costly to the quality of the resulting analysis.

There are other costs as well. A taboo on race-discourse, in effect, creates racial discrimination within the movement—concerning whose testimony and experience will be considered legitimate to discuss, respect, support, and learn from. Many nonwhite drug users have long been targeted by the drug war in overtly or subtly racist ways, and have a lot to say about what they’ve been through. Surely they should be permitted to discuss their experiences every bit as much as a white drug user. Making race off-limits would prohibit many nonwhite testimonies while allowing white testimonies—thus making nonwhite drug users a second-class group, even in what is supposed to be a movement of liberation for them. This is perverse and unjust.

The notion that “We shouldn’t talk about race, because it’s too divisive” also seems self-defeating. Yes, talking about race is often divisive. But then, the view that we shouldn’t talk about race is also divisive! Many people, rightly or wrongly, think we should talk about race. Why should the people who will be alienated by race-discourse get a veto over the interests of people who will be alienated by tabooing race-discourse?

Relatedly, once people have started talking about race (for better or for worse), then you can no longer get people to stop talking about race by saying “Talking about race is too divisive.” Such a statement, if you make one, will then just be one more divisive statement about race. And it will likely incite people to start a hostile debate—the very thing which the race-discourse taboo was supposed to prevent. A taboo on race-discourse may only be effective in conditions where not much race-discourse has started already.

Also, there may be some antiracism advocates who want to taboo talking about drugs, on the grounds that drugs-discourse is too divisive. I haven’t seen this, but it seems plausible that there are some people who hold this view. (I speculate, even if this used to be common, it may be rare today. Michelle Alexander’s “The New Jim Crow” and a few other popular antiracism-oriented critiques of the drug war probably helped normalize drugs-discourse among antiracism advocates.) Yet surely, at least by the lights of drug reformists, such a view should be rejected.

There may also be a collective action problem of discourse ethics and strategy, in this vicinity. Liam Bright argues that there are problems with trying to enforce “message discipline.” See his post “There Will Be No Message Discipline.” A taboo on race discourse may be a problematic form of message discipline, and thus suffer from the problems Bright raises.

There is another weird irony in the notion that we shouldn’t talk about race because it’s too “divisive.” This seems quite close to the stereotypical woke leftwinger who insists we shouldn’t talk about XYZ (even though XYZ is important) on the grounds that XYZ is too “offensive.”

I thought left-wing political correctness was bad, on the grounds that it bars people from making true and epistemically-justified assertions about important topics, for the sake of merely not-offending some potential audience of oversensitive people? I actually agree that some left-wing political correctness is bad in this way. But then, this also means that tabooing an important topic such as race, in order to avoid offending oversensitive people, may be bad for similar reasons.

I note that there are at least two possible views which can lead someone to oppose talking about race. One view is the notion that race/racism is objectively not very important. The other view is the notion that race/racism IS objectively very important, but that we shouldn’t discuss it anyway, since discussing it is too divisive.

In addition to the anti-nonwhite discriminatory element I noted earlier, the race-discourse taboo has another potentially pernicious element. It can easily be used by someone who really holds the “racism is not important” view, so as to pretend to hold the “racism is important but too divisive” view. This seems costly as well.

So, what should we do? Maybe we should be cautious not to talk about race unless we have good reasons to talk about it, and have something worthwhile to say about it. This seems a reasonable presumption. However, this presumption would also apply to many sensitive topics, not only race. Moreover, it is defeasible, when someone has valuable things to say on the topic, or has a good enough chance of saying something valuable. Placing too much weight on a presumption against race-discourse may also prevent many important contributions from making their way into the conversation—which in turn will impoverish our common knowledge about race, at potentially severe cost. On the epistemic benefits of norms favoring speech on potentially upsetting topics, see Hrishikesh Joshi’s book Why It’s OK to Speak Your Mind.

There may be room for good-faith disagreements on the role of racism in drug policy injustice. Some libertarians think government overreach and authoritarianism are more the core problems of drug prohibition, and that the racism element is more secondary. Some leftists may make reasonable “class-first” arguments that a lot of what we construe as racism, or even a lot of the badness of drug prohibition more broadly, is more an aspect of class oppression. Arguably, we should discuss class more and discuss racism less (or even drug policy less), simply because class has more explanatory value and/or class-based interventions may have more promise in activism. I’m not convinced this is true, but it is at least a more defensible notion than saying either that racism isn't important, or that racism is important but that we shouldn’t talk about it.

[the-feminist-philosopher]

"The category of 'sex' is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault has called a 'regulatory ideal.' In this sense, then, sex not only functions as a norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces the body it governs, that is, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce— demarcate, circulate, differentiate — the bodies it controls. Thus, 'sex' is a regulatory ideal whose materialization is compelled, and this materialization takes place (or fails to take place) through certain highly regulated practices. In other words, 'sex' is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize 'sex' and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms."

"[T]here will be no way to understand 'gender' as a cultural construct which is imposed upon the surface of matter, understood either as 'the body' or its given sex. Rather, once 'sex' itself is understood in its normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable apart from the materialization of that regulatory norm. 'Sex' is, thus, not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the 'one' becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility."

"At stake in such a reformulation of the materiality of bodies will be the following: ... (3) the construal of 'sex' no longer as a bodily given on which the construct of gender is artificially imposed, but as a cultural norm which governs the materialization of bodies..."

"To 'concede' the undeniability of 'sex' or its 'materiality' is always to concede some version of 'sex,' some formation of 'materiality.' Is the discourse in and through which that concession occurs - and, yes, that concession invariably does occur - not itself formative of the very phenomenon -that it concedes? To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body."

Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex.'

[teaxch]

A Tumblr user has posted an opinion that's almost universally agreed on and uncontroversial as though it's an actual take, like "contrary to popular belief, it's actually okay for fictional characters to experience challenges."

Is this Tumblr user:

A) So wrapped up in some niche discourse that they've managed to locate and argue with the handful of people on earth who don't think it's okay for fictional characters to experience challenges.

B) Involved in some online discourse where they've developed and internalized such a bad-faith construal of someone else's argument that they think that "it's okay for fictional characters to experience challenges" is a meaningful salvo in the debate.

[meinlibraryofalex]

Construal level theory: The space between

The link between climate change and how we perceive distance

"Construal level theory is a social psychology term that says distance is linked to whether thinking is more abstract or concrete. When the distance (in the case of your trip, temporal distance) is further off, humans tend to think in more abstract ways."

"This theory is starting to turn more heads, specifically around climate change. Some see it as a way to frame society’s reluctance to act on a future that seems too distant to be really real (though this year, that future seemed a lot more like the present.)"

"Construal level theory is a way to better understand why some humans have taken action against climate change and why others haven’t. If the full effects of a warming planet won’t play out for another 30 years, it’s harder for humans to think about it all in clear detail, so the theory would go, meaning concrete steps would be more difficult to devise."

"Construal level theory doesn’t hold up well when we think about how humans’ stable views change and the varying levels of relevance people can feel. It also doesn’t consider politics, which affects even those who are experiencing climate change first-hand."

[notfreetoday]

My Personal Weatherman Language Masterlist

[Last Updated 23rd Oct]

Disclaimer: Everyone translates differently for different audiences. This is not meant to disrespect the official translation team in any way because they are subbing for a more general audience and have different pressures, so please don't come at me or them for our different priorities. That said, I'm happy to discuss MY translation choices so please feel free to drop in about any line.

Subtitle Corrections

Including nuances + cultural tidbits

EP 1 || EP 2 || EP 3 || EP 4 || EP 5 || EP 6 || EP 7 || EP 8

Segasaki x Yoh - Language Analysis

Series looking at how the dynamic between Segasaki and Yoh is reflected in the way they speak - specifically, in the way they address each other, and the style shifting, or speech level shifts that they both demonstrate with each other.

Part 1

- What are Speech Levels & Why Shift?

- Segasaki x Yoh: Vertical & Horizontal Distance

aka power dynamics expressed linguistically

Part 2

- Segasaki x Yoh: Shifts in Emotion and Acknowledging Roles

aka reading between (spoken) lines

Part 3 [In Progress]

- Segasaki x Yoh: In the Presence of "Polite Company"

aka Segasaki's "face off" with Man-san

Part 4 [In Progress]

- Segasaki x Yoh: Addressing One Another

aka a look into the various ways to say "you"

Cultural Tidbits

The Importance of Amae in My Personal Weatherman

- Cultural Differences: Independent vs Interdependent Self-Construal

- What is Amae?

- (Briefly - what is sunao, tatemae/honne?)

MPW Timeline (Best Guess)

[transmutationisms]

I would love to hear more of your thoughts on House & its relation to the detective genre ! I think that house (completely accidentally and very badly) stumbles into a good critique of how doctors & medical structures view addicts & disabled people, with house being a horrible hegemonic mr malpractice to his patients frequently yet half is series is unironically just about all the injustice/mistreatment he faces because his doctor colleagues can’t see him as a person but only as a problem to be solved/rehabbed/therapized/institutionalized/treated like a child with stolen candy/treated like a criminal. and then it also randomly takes an incredibly pro MAID stance. which isn’t really part of this but I just remembered how batshit insane that show was. and then chase killed a dictator and I feel like the show was squarely on his side for that one. Anyway. Do you have thoughts? I really like house.

ok here's my house md take. like a lot of medical dramas, the show essentially relies for its dramatic appeal on the construal of patients as gross, weird, and stupid—rubes who are too uneducated and self-serving in their petty lies to solve their own bodies, and thus need the intervention of house to fix them. this is standard for the genre, although slightly meaner on house than on some other examples (cf. grey's or even the older and soapier generation of these shows). i don't even think house committing malpractice is all that new; it's relatively common as a plot point that positions the noble rule-breaking doctor as someone who 'does what needs to be done' and skirts the bureaucratic red tape to follow their own superior judgment. what makes house more interesting is that from the get-go, house himself is both a doctor and an unwilling patient. in itself this isn't a tension that's new to the medical soap (injuring a major character is pretty par for the course) but house's particular interactions with the ruling biomedical epistemology are, as you point out, characterised by hostility and resistance, and the show frequently either sides with house, or at least leaves it somewhat up to the viewer to decide whether house is right to resist the pathologisation that cuddy and wilson try to impose on him.

this is kind of a tricky line to walk for 7 seasons or however long the show is. my recollection is there are episodes, for example, where it's very clear that house's pain is physical, and the writers use this to morally justify his vicodin use. this is obviously not a full-throated defence of opioid users, but it is at least pointing to a position on chronic pain that allows for the possibility that for some people, long-term use of drugs with a high addiction potential and side effects is legitimately the best thing. but, this messaging is also undercut by the fact that it's primetime television, they need to make drama, and there are definitely also episodes where house is framed as potentially lying about his pain, or at least mistaking a somatic problem for a physical one, which the writers often (not always, but often) present as evidence that actually, house shouldn't be trusted to make his own decisions about drug use, and ideally should be 'de-toxed' and probably sent to cbt or whatever. of course all of these considerations are also contextualised by the fact that house is, again, not just a patient but a doctor: his right and ability to make these types of calls for himself is, it's suggested, a result of his having attained medical education and credentials. the patients who come to be treated by him are seldom, if ever, given this same level of consideration or presumed to have sufficient self-awareness to make their own medical decisions. this isn't to say they're portrayed entirely unsympathetically, but ultimately the narrative engine of the show relies on house being the smartest guy in the room (though ofc, sometimes tragically 'held back by his addiction').

so, although there are moments on the show that genuinely transgress some of the norms of the med-drama genre, i have never agreed with people who thought that the show as a whole was presenting any sustained critique of the medical system, the treatment of chronic pain/disability, or the power-imbalanced doctor-patient relationship. ultimately all authority on house md is supposed to emanate from the physician, or the physician's superiors (cuddy as a 'check' on house, though sometimes a failed one! again because of the need to generate drama for like 140 episodes), and at its most radical the show is really only capable of presenting house himself as an out-of-control aberration whose existence strains the existing system rather than being produced by it.

this is where i think the comparison to the cop show genre becomes more clarifying. house md never made a secret of being an interpolation of the detective genre, specifically sherlock holmes. however, i'm not sure i've ever really seen writing on the show that analyses what effect this actually has on house. like police, doctors are tasked with maintaining certain social norms; the dichotomy between policing and medicine isn't even a solid line, as criminality is frequently rhetorically construed as a pathology in itself and medical authorities can and do have recourse to carceral systems in order to discipline and confine recalcitrant patients, the 'criminally insane', addicts, and so forth. (policing has historically also been understood in a more expansive sense than how we use the word today; our understanding of the medical/public health system as separate from police authority is arguably more to do with university credentialling than the actual exercise of social and political power).

so, if we want to be serious about the portrayal of medicine in popular culture (i am always serious about this) then we're necessarily talking about broader systems of power, social control, and discipline, and doubly so on a show like house that is explicitly inspired by detective fiction. this is where house md is most ideologically objectionable to me: as with the trope of the cop who breaks all the rules, house is basically positioned in one of two ways throughout the show. either he's a lone genius who alone is willing to achieve noble ends (cure) through distasteful means (breaking into patients' homes, berating them, performing risky interventions on them, &c), or—and this is rarer on house but does happen—he's portrayed as genuinely crossing an ethical line, in which case he's a kind of monstrous aberration from the normal, ethical functioning of the medical system, often represented metonymously by the objections that cuddy, wilson, or house's underlings raise. in both of these cases, as with copaganda, the function is ultimately to reinforce the idea that doctors, though occasionally capable of human error, are prima facie wiser than their patients, looking out for their patients' best interests, and performing noble social roles as healers. house, ofc, is very rarely willing to admit that he has any underlying ethical motivations, though much of the show is driven by the flashes where he is revealed to 'secretly' care about another person (often wilson) and anyway, the construction of an ethical society in which all individual actors are motivated solely by selfish interests is a very established rhetorical move for those interested in defending liberal capitalist societies (cf. charles darwin, thomas malthus, adam smith, &c).

because of television's need to generate profit via audience engagement, house md always relied on a certain level of shock or at least provocation in order to sustain itself. so, there are certain aberrations from the more overtly doctor-valorising medical dramas, like the suggestion (sometimes tongue-in-cheek) that house was better at his job when he was mildly high on opioids. this was, for the reasons outlined above, never a serious entry into political critique, but it was at least refreshing in a certain way as a departure from, eg, the portrayal of addiction and drug use that we see on grey's, which is completely limited to the medicalised AA narrative of 'recovery' as a battle against the malevolent intervention of an external chemical agent. which is to say that although house md is ultimately reactionary in the way we should expect from an american tv show, it did at least dabble in a certain level of caustic iconoclasm that allowed limited departures from the genre conventions. even with what was ultimately a pretty solid vindication of the anti-opioid narrative, the show does stand out in my mind as one of the few very popular presentations of any kind of alternative stance on chronic drug use. that it's usually put in house's own mouth means it is occasionally legitimated by his epistemological authority as a physician, though ofc ultimately this authority is challenged not through a critique of the medical system, but by presenting house as individually and aberrantly licentious, undisciplined, and insane—and his chronic pain/disability are both a justification for this, and a shorthand for conveying it.

[buggie-hagen]

Getting Stress off my Chest

(this was primarily in an email to a trusted colleague)

I'm just ranting about my experience attending the conference clergy gathering this week Monday through Wednesday. Especially with the bishop's talk, it was a bad experience. Basically we are talking about the need for the church to "change" to keep up with the times (last six words are my own construal of what they mean by change). I admit we are in trouble as far as clergy shortage is concerned. But this synod is promoting solutions to this problem I don't think are actually Lutheran. And its not just the bishop. It's many of my colleagues. And these solutions are being touted as "returning to the original mission of Jesus/what the early church did and we have since corrupted." (sounds Mormon to me). Such solutions to "the church is changing/needs to change" include divorcing the Church from the gathering around the word and sacraments. After all, they would say, millennials and younger don't like going to church. But we can sometimes get them on board for our works of mercy and build communities around that. All this while "we are faithful to do this." Also, bishop disdained that in the council of bishops there are still those who speak against virtual communion. (you already know how I feel about that, I don't like it). The other solution to the clergy shortage is "giving preaching and sacraments" back into the hands and authority of the laity. I acknowledge, that the word and sacraments belong to all the baptized. But I also acknowledge that the institution of ministry with the ordained clergy is in fact a divine institution, and not merely a human invention. But for people like the ones I've encountered, they don't think that way. They will say "we don't believe in magic hands." I agree, we don't! They will say  "we've only done the ordained ministry for the sake of good order. but it doesn't have to be that way." And, I agree ordained ministers are there for good order. But it is also by divine order. So they cite an example of a parish in the synod who has gone a long time without pastors and so they got a group of laity to take classes on preaching and presiding and they are fully functional without a pastor, supposedly. Now they have a part-time pastor because they can't afford a full time pastor. But since they have this group of trained laity they can cover the half of the Sundays the part-time pastor won't be able to do. But they could also survive without a pastor. This is propagandized to be an excellent model and solution for this church that the wider church should accept. And we are "doing the new thing that God is doing" and "the Spirit is in this."

  Now I get it, with a shortage of clergy and the looks of things getting worse, we are in a dire situation. Especially in some communities. Even whole synods, honestly. But, I don't buy the "democratizing" of the pulpit. I think there must be another approach that maintains an ordained ministry. And this may also be just what my bishop thinks, but he also envisions a future where instead of the "circuit" model of the past where it does depend on the location of the ordained minister, that the ordained minister serves as a "seminary" for select lay leaders within a particular string or grouping of parishes. Almost a coaching role. He calls it a "mini-bishop." And these lay leaders would assume the primary role of preaching and administration of the sacraments. Maybe I would be more on board for it if these select lay leaders were simply ordained. (even though this model would be severely lacking for proper theological education, imho. on the other hand, our seminaries have been very weak in proper theological education for at least a generation if not more...so I can't really claim too much on that front). 

  Another conversation that just urks me is the discussion around the Canaanite woman that came up. One of my colleagues brought it up, starting with how much he likes the Gospel of John. How John presents a very God-like Jesus. (I would argue that John presents Jesus as both very human and very God). But my colleague proceeded to act like he was providing profound insights by saying, "But if we are to insist on the humanity  of Jesus" it is best to read the Canaanite woman interaction as "Jesus learning what his mission is. That he didn't in fact, know everything." And while I agree with the humanity of Jesus not knowing everything, I think Jesus knew precisely what he was doing with the Canaanite woman. And that Jesus was not "doing a racism" in that interaction. I like how ****** said on social media:

If you think the Syrophonecian woman's accomplishment was simply to get Jesus to re-examine his prejudices you're only about halfway there (and you're much further back if you feel the need to try and get Jesus off the hook here). She's not just grappling with the short falls of the "human" Jesus. She's actually tossing a hand grenade in the heart of the law and taking hold of Jesus right on his divine lapels.

Jews considered themselves God's elect. Their scriptures actually backed them up on this. And though the law proscribed a basic kindness to resident aliens and foreigners it did not cover them with promises. It certainly did not cover Jews mixing themselves with gentiles. This was the whole point. "Holiness" meant "separateness" in order to preserve the unique identity of God's people. The need to do this was probably felt more acutely as the Jews lived as a people under Roman occupation. Jesus is not just having a moment of casual racism here. He's actually giving a rabbinic ruling that is well in the bounds of the law that even his most open and liberal fellow rabbis would assent to.

"Fine then" she says. "Do this for me outside the law. I'm not too proud to keep asking." And at that moment Jesus relents and does the healing. Holiness at that moment transforms from an identity that God's people keep to the absolute boundlessness of what Israel's God can accomplish. The prophets talked about that day and here in the little child in this woman's arms here it was. The working of God leaving the limits of the law and the gospel springing out like an animal let out of a cage.

The Syrophonecian woman didn't make Jesus a better person. She didn't just aim to tug on his heartstrings. She claimed his benefits of restoration, healing, and boundless life. Don't insult her by putting her faith in a more modern box of the law. She is a champion of the gospel.

And, I like *******'s comment on that:

I'll go somewhere perhaps uncomfortably topical with this - if this is interpreted as Jesus finding a new and better law (a not-racist one), the only conclusion can be that the law of Moses is racist. Which is to say, Judaism is racism. And lots of Christians going *exactly* there got us to a very very ugly place.

To uphold the goodness of the law, we have to distinguish it from the Gospel as something entirely different. There are very serious real-world consequences to not doing so.

And, *****'s further comment:

I'm talking about one of the deep and ugly roots of Christian antisemitism, which is offense at the particularity of the law and the election of Israel. Instead of distinguishing law and gospel properly, the most common Christian approach has been to take Jesus as giving a new and better law - better because more universal (and so not 'racist'). But that can only mean the law of Moses is defective, bad, racist, and Jesus needs this gentile woman to help him get over it. So this approach means that a certain kind of antisemitism is pretty much required of Christians - and we love Jesus because he stops being so Jewish. You can see the problem.

Distinguishing law and gospel means that what Jesus gives this woman is well and truly apart from the law, and so it leaves the law intact. It's not defective. It just isn't what was supposed to elect her - Jesus does that.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Anyway, there were many other topics that came up. And I find it all very frustrating. Especially that I appear to be the only one not nodding his head along with it all. And, it grows a bitterness in my heart, which I think is dangerous. So please pray that I may be patient, gentle, kind, but also when necessary stand my ground firmly and courageously. Another colleague that I have a connection to is *****, and he also assured me that I'm not bonkers for where I am in contending with these things. He said, "kool aid drinkers, all of 'em." ha. These conversations make me despair for the church. But on the other hand, I'm thinking it is a curse and a blessing that the ELCA is shrinking. A curse that because we have as a community been unfaithful and not good stewards of what has been entrusted to us. And a blessing, because this unfaithfulness will be minimized in the wider culture, hopefully. I will remain ELCA because this is the only place I can be. I am deeply appreciative that God has preserved voices like yours, ****** (an ordinary parish pastor that is not boomer or older), and *******, among others. I do fear for the future of the ELCA, but then I suppose that fear should really be given to God whom I can trust with my fear, rather than with an institution. But I exist here because it is the only place I can exist--I don't have other options like others may have. I also remain in the ELCA because our constitution maintains a proper, orthodox confession of faith. I admit in practice we aren't very consistent with it, but what denomination is? I think even very conservative denominations betray the simple confession of faith in practice. But if we were to abandon our confession in the future and truly make room for unorthodox, heretical teachings in our constitution....I suppose I would either find a way to survive under the corruption of the institution, or maybe convince my parish of the time to go independent. Or, maybe abandon ministry all together. But then, what would I do? Be homeless? Frightful things. I pray to God that it never comes to that.

  Sorry for the long complicated unnecessary email. But I find keeping these things to myself to fester is not good for my heart. I hope when and if and God willing that I end up at this ******* parish that I have more collegial support (not being so remote, and if there are like-minded colleagues near there, I know some anyway).

I hope you and your family are doing well. This weekend I will preach Matthew 25:1-13. It will also be a good time because there will be a baptism for a teenage girl--she's like 16. She's a neighbor kid of one of my families. Prior to this summer she had no connection to the church. What was the impetus for her to come to church was the death of a mutual neighbor kid of 9 years old by suicide. God seems to have given ***** a new heart and faith since then. She was previously completely unchurched, her parents know nothing of Christianity. But she has asked for baptism, and I've taught her a bit, and we are due for the baptism this Sunday. I hope and pray that God keep and preserve her in faith all her life.

[homonationalist]

A remarkable thing about [The Lord of the Rings], given Tolkien’s omnipotence as creator and narrator, is that he achieves his effects almost entirely through the evocation of negative associations rather than through the citation of actual deeds. The reader finishes LTR “knowing” that the orcs are evil, but I suggest the average person would be hard-pressed to come up with a substantive list of evil acts they have committed. It is an underlining of the point I made earlier: because ontology recapitulates physiology, the orcs merely have to be to be evil—they do not actually have to do anything. We “know” the orcs are evil because they are black, ugly, slant-eyed, misshapen, simian, savages, etc., and such creatures are, circularly, what evil is. The conclusion is independent of— indeed positively refractory to—any factual basis. Consider the following incidents from the many skirmishes and battles of Middle-Earth. Two prisoners are tortured for information and then killed; one is skinned and nailed to a tree, the other is beheaded and which sets its victims on fire, sticks to them so they cannot get rid of it, and eventually burns them alive (TH, 102–3). A policy is announced of killing the enemy’s children on sight (TT, 83). Those killed in battle are not given a decent burial; rather, their bodies are desecrated, thrown into a mass grave, and burned (TT, 44). Finally, and most importantly of all, the enemy are never allowed to surrender, but are always hunted down and killed in cold blood (TH, 289–90; TI, 44, 79, 187, 191; RK, 151, 318). The brutal savagery of the murderous orcs? Not at all; these are, in fact, the recorded actions of the Western Allies, war crimes under any reasonable construal of the term. The orcs’ atrocities, by contrast, are almost always subjunctive—what they would do, if they had the chance. But of course, they never get the chance, because they are always massacred in time. We see here the classic cognitive schizophrenia of the West’s encounter with the non-West: the savages have to be savagely killed before they can demonstrate their savagery, but, of course, this killing is completely different.

Charles W. Mills from "The Wretched of Middle‐Earth: An Orkish Manifesto" (2022)