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guadalajaradispensas · 7 years ago

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1865 Films #168495 & #168494 (by/por Linda V.)

001 film #168495

002 OAH 2752 pt. 2

003 1950

004 1615

005 MEXICO OAH ROLLO 2752

006 SLATE

007 continua del rollo anterior

008 Andres Romo & Jacoba Gomez /Aguascalientes-Jalos/ tree image #14

016 Juan Flores & Ines de Arce /Zacoalco-Mexicalingo / dispensa de vanas

024 Jose de Jesus Quintero & Bruna Contreras /Mascota / tree img #24

027 Eusebio Curiel & Pastora Quintero /Mascota / tree #227

030 Miguel Romero & Refugio Cardenas /Etzatlan / tree #32

037 Vicente Padilla & Juana Ruvalcaba /San Juan / tree #40

042 Antonio Luna & Isabel Rosales /Tepic / dispensa de vagos

048 Francisco Ruiz de Velasco & Maria Macaria Perez /Arandas / trees #50

054 Esteban Jimenez & Estefana Larias /Tecalitlan

056 Jesus Castaneda & Hermenegilda Ramirez /Ixtlahuacan / trees #59

063 Pragedis Martin & Epitacia Gonzalez /Jalos / trees #68

069 Pedro de Leon & Eugenia Ibarra /Cocula /tree #72

075 Nicolas Romero & Ma Concepcion Guinchard /Teocaltiche-Aguascalientes /vanas

083 Jose Solorzano & Josefa Patino /Mexico-Jocotepec / vagos

089 Saturnino Meza & Demetria Diaz /Tomatlan / tree #89

094 Roberto Pelayo & Refugio Briseno /Ayutla / tree #96

098 Jose Gonzalez & Refugio Gonzalez /Tapalpa / tree #12

106 Crescencio Garcia & Pascuala Asencio /Zapopan / tree #110

111 Ricardo Rubio & Severa Escobedo /Cuquio / tree #116

117 Mariano de la Mora & Trinidad de la Mora /Tecalitlan / tree #118

125 Fernando Garcia & Ma Sostenes Pinedo /Totatiche / tree #125

130 Justo Gonzalez & Maria Gertrudes Serrano /Encarnacion / tree #134

137 Justo Gomez & Maria Ines Perez /San Juan / tree #138

141 Simon Lopez & Valeria Avalos /Ixtlan / tree #144

146 Antonio Gonzalez & Eulalia Santoscoy /Lagos-Ahualulco / vagedad militar

152 Geronimo Ulloa & Merced Silva /Colima / tree #156

158 Federico Cramer & Dolores Riebeling /Alemania-Guadalajara / vanas

164 Jesus Dominguez & Maura Gomez /Etzatlan-Guadalajara / vanas

169 Hermenegildo Lozano & Pascuala Sandoval /Guanajuato-Guadalajara

177 Celso Lozano & Emilia Hermosillo /Lagos / vanas

182 Blas Elizondo Perez & Josefa Sagredo Garcia Rojas /Aguascalientes-Espana

193 Desiderio Hernandez & Feliciana Hernandez /Guadalajara / tree # 198

202 Dolores Garcia & Margarita Castellanos /Zapopan-Zahuayo / tree #205

206 Juan Betancourt & Eulalia Macedo /Tomatlan /revalidacion tree #207

211 Sabino Cortez & Felipa Chavez /Tomatlan / tree #211

215 Nicomedes Lopez & acinta Hernandez /Lagos /tree #217

219 Jose Maria Jimenez & Juana Meza /Tomatlan /tree #219

223 Severiano Hernandez & Feliciana Melendres /Tomatlan /tree #223

229 Urbano Betancourt & Elena Betancourt /Tomatlan /tree #230

236 Francisco Andrade & Petronila Araiza /Tomatlan /tree #236

240 Juan Macedo & Sebastiana Betancourt /Tomatlan / tree #241

244 Carlos Agasini & Julia Romero /Guadalajara-Tepic / militar

250 Abundio Orosco & Francisca Becerra /Teocaltiche /tree #252

255 Atanacio Oropeza & Merced Gonzalez /Nochistlan /tree #258

262 Francisco Llamas & Bernardina Gutirrez /Nochistlan /tree #263

266 Miguel Diaz Naredo & Altagracia Pedroza/Zacatecas-Aguascalientes

273 Pedro de Alva & Maria Josefa Pedroza /Encarnacion /tree #280

282 Carlos Luna & Carlota Lara /Puebla-Guadalajara

287 Matias Castellanos & Hilaria Alvarez /Analco-Ocotlan /vago

297 Jesus Contreras & Ines Cervantes /Atoyac

306 Marcelino Diaz & Francisca Arrezola /Amacueca

312 Jose Maria Zepeda & Maria Trinidad Montoy /Tizapan /tree #314

320 Vicente Contreras & Petra Ibarra /Jocotepec-Mexico

326 Santiago Odiaga & Merced Santoscoy /Madrid-Guadalajara

332 Juan NepomucenoGaray & Francisca Arana /Tonala /tree #337

341 Felix Ramirez & Benita Moreno /San Juan /tree #342

345 Macario Lopez & Agtanacia de Jesus Vergara /Zapopan

348 Fernando Telles & Maria del Refugio Valdivia /Bolanos

351 Jesus Bueno & Benancia Gutierrez /Tepic /vanas

357 Doroteo Martinez & Francisca Juarez /Calvillo /tree #358

363 blank page

364 FIN

365 168494

366 OAH 2751 pt 1

367 SLATE

368 PRINCIPIO

369 Fernando Lara & Tranquilina Venegas /Tepic /vago

374 Clemente Naranjo & Leonarda Hernandez/Tepic-Cocula

382 Pedro Chavez & Eleuteria Barbosa /Tamazula /trees #382

388 Remigio Sarabia & Antonia Flores /Sinaloa -Aguascalientes-Guad

394 Antonio de la Mora & Silveria de la Mora /Tecolotlan

401 Expediente Archivados /Guadalajara

408 Expedientes matrimoniales arcivados 1866 -names of couples-

410 Diferentes negocios civiles-different names & dates

419 Varios expedientes

422 Victor Hernandez & Casimira Rivera /Ixtlan /trees #425

427 Pedro Esparza & Placida Hernandez /Ixtlan /tree #430

432 Vicente Gomez & Macedonia Delgado /Adobes

435 Constantino de Lengerke & Josefa Ramos /ultramar

441 Instrucciones para edificar un templo en Tepatitlan

443 Luis Iberri & Josefa Narvez /Tepic-San Juan

449 Caso de Primitivo Aguinaga y Manuel Castellanos /Mexico

451 letters written by Arzobispo de Guadalajara Pedro Espinoza,

Obispo Juan Francisco Escalante y Pedro Loza, Arsobispo de Sonora

457 Nicolas Cruz & Leandra Aguirre /Tomatlan /tree #457

463 Sixto Gomez & Gabriela Ysac /San Juan /tree #464

467 Feliciano Suarez & Tomasa Rodriguez /Tonala /tree #470

478 Raymundo Ibarra & Ma Bernae Godines /Chapala-Ocotlan /tree #481

484 Filomeno Vargas & Mercedes Goonzalez /Yahualica /trees #484

488 Miguel Arredondo & Cruz Zepeda /Mazamitla /tree #490

495 Marcos Gonzalez & Salvadora Franco /Tepatitlan /tree #494

498 Jose Maria preciado & Juana Mendoza /Purificacion /tree #501

503 Hermenegildo Martin & Marina Gonzalez /San Miguel el Alto /tree #507

508 Francisco Hernandez & Juana Martin /San Miguel el Alto /tree #511

513 Crescencio Ramirez & Ursula Ruiz /Aguascalientes /trees #514

517 Eustaquio Ramirez & Segunda Ruiz /Arandas /tree #521

524 Juan Gutierrez & Donaciana Zamores /Lagos /tree #526

531 Liborio G Tayedo & Luisa Macias /Ixtlan

539 Curz Saucedo & Maria Isabel Escobedo /Aguascalientes-Huejuquilla

543 Antonio Perezchica & Petra Figueroa /Calvillo /tree #544

548 Manuel Placencia & Salome Perez/Teocaltiche /tree #550

553 Marcelo Gonzalez & Mercedes Martinez /Yahualica /trees #553

558 Hilario Gonzalez & Petra Barba /Jalos /tree #564

565 Aquilino Uribe & Ambrosia Pelayo /Ejutla /tree #567

569 Estevan Valverde & Juana azo /Cotija-Tamazula

577 Jose Trinidad Magana & Agapita Macias /Tamazula

585 Magdaleno Hernandez & Felipa Torres /Tepatitlan

592 Doroteo Agredano & Presentacion Rodriguez /Cuquio/tree #597

598 Antonio Martinez & Mariana Campos /Aguascalientes /tree #603

605 Paulino Gonzalez & Rosalia Becerra /Guadalajara

610 Ildefonso Larraza & Refugio Perez Verdia /Espana-Guadalajara

618 Pantaleon Garcia & Lucia Jimenez /Mexticacan-Ojuelos/trees#620

623 Jose Sandoval & Francisca Medrano /Cuquio-Analco /vagos

627 Atanacio Santillan & Casimira Martinez /Rincon de Romos/tree #630

634 Crisanto Guillen & Mariana Delgadillo /Yahualica-Cuquio

648 Cipriano Belauzaraan & Josefa Avila /Guanajuato-Zacatecas-

Aguascalientes /tree #653

656 Andres Romo & Jacoba Gomez /Aguascaientes /tree #661

664 Juan Flores & Ines de Arce /Mexicalingo /vanas

667 CONTINUA EN EL ROLLO SIGUIENTE

668 MEXICO OAH ROLLO 2751 FIN

669 END OF ROLL

#1865

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rainy-days-everyday · 7 years ago

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LOS HÉROES CAÍDOS DE ABRIL.

Alejandro Tomás Hernandez (Ciudad Belen) 19 años

Alvaro Manuel Conrado Dávila (Managua) 15 años

Álvaro Gómez (Masaya) 23 años

Alvis Molina (Managua) 35 años

Ángel Eduardo Gahona (Bluefields) 42 años

Ángel Reyes (Managua) 16 años

Apolonio Díaz (León)

Axel Bonilla (León) 27 años

Bismarck Badilla (Estelí)

Bismarck Chavarria (managua)

Carlos Aguilar (Siuna) 26 años

Carlos bonilla (managua) 17 años

Carlos Flores (managua) 19 años

Carlos Miranda (managua) 19 años

Carlos López (masaya) 42 años

Carlos Solis (León)

Celso Díaz (mateare) 19 años

César Castillo (esteli) 42 años

Christiam cadenas (León) 23 años

Danny Rivas (managua) 25 años

Darwin Medrano (managua) 22 años

Darwin Urbina (managua) 29 años

Eduardo Sánchez (managua) 27 años

Edwin Gómez (managua) 33 años

Eliécer aguirre (sebaco) 20 años

Erick Cubillo (managua) 36 años

Ezequiel Hernandez (siuna) 41 años

Francisco Rodríguez (managua) 33 años

Francisco sobalvarro (sebaco) 24 años

Franco Valdivia (esteli) 24 años

Gerald campos (managua) 28 años

Gerardo Castillo (managua) 42 años

Hammer Garcia (tipitapa) 19 años

Harlinton López (managua) 18 años

Henry Arauz (matagalpa)

Heriberto Rodríguez (masaya) 45 años

Hilton Manzanares (leon) 33 años

Holman Zeledón (matagalpa) 26 años

Humberto Parrales (managua) 40 años

Ismael Pérez (managua) 32 años

Jaime Reyes (herido desde 9 de Mayo)

Jairo Hernández (masaya) 23 años

Javier Munguia (managua) 19 años

Jayson chavarria (ticuantepe) 24 años

Jerson Flores (managua) 25 años

Jesner Rivas (managua) 16 años

Jimmy Paiz (leon) 53 años

Jimmy Parajon (managua) 35 años

Jonathan Valerio (managua) 20 años

Jorge Palacios (Boaco)

José Abraham Amador (masaya) 17 años

José Bone Díaz (managua) 30 años

José Israel cuadra (managua) 49 años

José David morales (managua) 34 años

José Andrés Pérez (tipitapa) 33 años

José Alfonso Ramírez (managua) 30 años

José Daniel sanchez (ciudad sandino) 33 años

José David Oviedo (Managua)

José Urroz (matagalpa) 29 años

Juan Carlos López (ciudad sandino) 24 años

Juana aguilar (managua) 19 años

Keller Pérez Duarte (Managua)

Kevin Dávila (managua) 23 años

Kevin rivas (managua) 19 años

Kevin valle (managua) 18 años

Lesther Martínez (managua)

Lester vindell picado (managua) 37 años

Lester Flores (managua) 19 años

Luis Arias (León)

Luis Ramón Cruz (chinandega) 30 años

Lilliam Martínez (boaco) 18 años

Manuel Antonio Montes (managua) 44 años

Manuel de Jesús Chavez (León)

Marco Antonio Samorio (managua) 30 años

Marlon Manases (managua) 20 años

Marlon Orozco (Managua)

Michael Cruz (managua) 30 años

Moroni López (managua) 22 años

Nelson Téllez (managua) 35 años

Nesken Velásquez (mateare) 27 años

Noel calderon (managua) 19 años

Orlando Francisco Pérez (Esteli) 23 años

Ramón Rodríguez (managua) 43 años

Richard Edmundo Pavón (tipitapa) 17 años

Roberto Carlos garcia (managua) 40 años

Rudy Chávez (Managua)

Wilder Reyes (matagalpa) 36 años

Yader Castillo (Ciudad Belén)

Yamil Obregón (rio San juan) 47 años.

NICARAGUA LLORA AZUL Y BLANCO !💔🇳🇮

#aph nicaragua #nicaragua #te #quiero #libre #libertad #expresion #heroes #represión #queserindatumadre #que se rinda tu madre #sosnicaragua #los #de #abril2018 #venezuela #no #estas #sola

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sofakingmanyrecords · 7 years ago

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As a man who sells vintage vinyl for a livelihood, you don’t often see me buying CD’s but I was trolling the web for the first Possum Dixon LP and 7" singles I don’t have for a non fuck-you price and I came across this CD, which has songs I’ve never heard. So I bought it for a fair price. Then I found out my new business HP computer burns in FLAC and I was amused, and did it. I’m not against digital. I grew up on CD. My dad bought a CD player in 1985, when I was 4, but I grew to love vinyl because my dad had a lot of it, took good care of it, and I found it cheap in used stores in the 90’s. It’s weird, my favorite band ever is the Dead Milkmen and I first saw them on Beavis and Butthead in the summer of 1994 and I got into Possum Dixon via my mom in 1993 when she off-handedly mentioned to me one Saturday morning that the end credits of The Chipmunks cartoon reminded her of “Watch That Girl Destroy Me” and I was like “Yeah?” and when the cartoons went to shit at 11am I found my dad’s CD of their first album and it blew my 12 year old mind. What is interesting is Possum Dixon opened for The Dead Milkmen in 1994. Yet, I didn’t find this out till years later. I would have loved to see a show of that tour. While I have seen the Milkmen 3.5 times since Dave Blood died, I never got to see Possum Dixon ever. However, I did become pen pals with Joe Jack Talcum and Dave Blood of the Dead Milkmen and Robert O'Sullivan of Possum Dixon in 1996. While Dave is dead, and I only marvel at O'Sullivan’s keyboard noise anymore, I continue to be in touch with Joe Jack to this day and made the acquaintance of Rob Zabrecky after Possum Dixon guitarist Celso Chavez died in 2012. I am grateful that each has spent a moment getting to know me in some way, as their music has meant so much to me, and I know a thing or two about great music.

#possum dixon #dead milkmen #cd #compact disc #vinyl #punk #indie #rob zabrecky #joe jack talcum #dave blood

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portalmunicipiosbaianos-blog · 6 years ago

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Venezuela: para além da crise atual

A conjuntura da geopolítica na América Latina mudou radicalmente de configuração ao longo dos últimos anos. O quadro que se apresentava francamente favorável a políticas desenvolvimentistas desde o início do novo milênio começa a se transformar a partir da segunda década da nova era. Uma das principais referências desse movimento em direção a mudanças mais profundas nas sociedades do continente sul-americano foi, sem dúvida alguma, a Venezuela sob a presidência de Hugo Chavez. Tanto que os líderes que se opunham ao modelo elitista e de subserviência aos Estados Unidos passaram a ser rotulados de “bolivarianos”, em referência ao conceito da Revolução Bolivariana proposta pelo líder venezuelano. O quadro se fechava com as eleições de Lula no Brasil, Evo Morales na Bolívia, Nestor Kirchner na Argentina, Rafael Correa no Equador, Tabaré Vazquez no Uruguay, Michelle Bachelet no Chile e Fernando Lugo no Paraguai.

Pouco a pouco, no entanto, o cenário vai se dirigindo para soluções políticas de natureza cada vez mais conservadora. Em março de 2010, Sebastián Pìñera vence as eleições no Chile em uma disputa com Michelle Bachelet. Em junho de 2012, as forças direitistas conseguem aprovar um impeachment sem nenhuma base legal no interior do parlamento paraguaio, provocando a saída do Presidente Lugo. Em março de 2013 ocorre o falecimento do Presidente Hugo Chavez da Venezuela. Ao longo de 2016 tem lugar o impeachment de Dilma Roussef e também o afastamento de forma ilegal de alguém que havia sido legitimamente eleita pela maioria da população. Em abril de 2017, Lenin Moreno é eleito Presidente do Equador como sucessor de Rafael Correa, mas rapidamente rompe com o antecessor e com sua política progressista. Logo depois, em outubro de 2017, o conservador Mauricio Macri vence as eleições na Argentina, pondo fim ao ciclo de 3 mandatos com a marca do casal Kirchner. No início de 2018, Piñera volta a vencer Bachelet. E para fechar esse triste recuo reacionário, no final do ano Bolsonaro se elege no Brasil.

Mas, afinal, Paulo, o que é que tudo isso tem a ver com a situação atual da Venezuela? Ora, uma das principais causas da profunda crise que atravessa o nosso vizinho do norte é a sua dimensão econômica. A verdade é que os líderes políticos daquele país perderam uma oportunidade histórica de ouro para consolidar, de uma vez por todas, as mudanças que foram sendo implementadas aos poucos desde a primeira vitória de Chavez em dezembro de 1998. Apesar de todas as transformações expressivas que foram levadas a cabo ao longo dessas duas décadas, o ponto fulcral permaneceu praticamente inalterado. E aqui eu me refiro ao potencial estratégico oferecido pela exploração das incomensuráveis reservas petrolíferas. Os sucessivos governos de Chavez - e depois os anos de Maduro na Presidência - não ousaram encarar o problema da dependência da dinâmica da economia e da sociedade venezuelanas em relação ao chamado ouro negro.

· A doença holandesa e a onda conservadora na América do Sul.

Esse tipo de fenômeno já era conhecido há bastante tempo e ganhou até um nome especial nos estudos econômicos. Foi apelidado de “doença holandesa” em razão do que havia ocorrido com a economia daquele país europeu a partir da descoberta de reservas de petróleo e gás no final da década de 1950. O risco está associado ao fato de países que contam com as vantagens trazidas pelas condições da natureza se contentarem com a renda auferida pela exploração e exportação das chamadas “commodities”. Tais formações sociais vivem um período (que pode inclusive ser longo, do ponto de vista histórico) usufruindo daquilo que os modelos econômicos chamam de “renda extraordinária” e não se propõem a avançar em termos de novos paradigmas tecnológicos e produtivos. Assim dá-se uma espécie de acomodação numa certa zona de conforto e as consequências dessa decisão equivocada só serão sentidos muito mais à frente, gerações depois do período considerado

A Venezuela não ousou se valer das ondas de altas nos preços do petróleo para romper essa dependência no futuro. Era necessário e possível se apropriar de sua condição de uma das maiores nações exportadoras do globo para internalizar esse impressionante volume de recursos derivados das exportações. Esse seria o caminho para criar uma sólida rede interna de indústrias produtivas. Mas o caminho adotado foi outro. Os rendimentos socialmente apropriados pela ilusão em relação às vantagens imediatas oferecidas pelo modelo da “doença holandesa” não forçou a constituição de uma rede de tecido social de novo tipo. Essa trilha seria essencial de ser iniciada, justamente com o intuito de superar a dependência com relação às importações da grande maioria dos bens de consumo da sua população.

Esse, aliás, sempre foi o alerta e a razão de ser dos economistas e pensadores das diferentes correntes desenvolvimentistas. Desde os fundadores da CEPAL como Celso Furtado e Raul Prebisch até os mais contemporâneos, o foco nunca deixou de mencionar a preocupação em se criarem os meios para que os países da região conseguissem romper o perverso ciclo da dependência das importações e internalizar a capacidade de produção industrial.

· A ilusão com a economia do petróleo.

O fato é que tudo roda bonitinho enquanto as receitas advindas das exportações do petróleo ou de qualquer outro tipo de produto primário, sempre de baixíssimo valor agregado, vão oferecendo saldos positivos nas contas externas. E o ciclo da pujança interna da economia venezuelana acompanha exatamente o ciclo das cotações do barril do petróleo no mercado internacional. Pra termos uma ideia, quando Chavez assumiu em 1999 o barril do petróleo estava cotado a US$ 10. Quase 10 depois, ele chegou a US$ 140 em meados de 2009. Assim, entre 2000 e 2008, por exemplo,o PIB do país cresceu a uma média de 4,2% ao ano. Se pegarmos o quinquênio 2004-8, a taxa foi quase chinesa: uma média anual de 10%.

No entanto, uma das consequências da crise internacional de 2008 foi a queda no preço das “commodities”, inclusive do petróleo. Com isso, o preço do barril cai bastante e sai dos US$ 140 para 40 dólares. E isso afeta diretamente a capacidade da economia interna da Venezuela. Como tudo gira em torno do consumo de bens importados com o lastro da exportação do óleo, percebe-se uma mudança no padrão de vida e na inflação. Além de uma piora nas contas externas do país, em razão da diminuição das receitas de exportação.

Depois da morte de Chavez, a partir de meados de 2014, observa-se nova queda brusca na cotação do petróleo. Ela sai de US$ 100 e chega a 30 dólares no início de 2016. Esse já é um período de aprofundamento das dificuldades econômicas na Venezuela, com o surgimento do chamado problema de duplo déficit: fiscal e externo. A inflação volta a ser um problema sério, principalmente em função da desvalorização cambial e do déficit a ser financiado com emissão de moeda nacional. No quadriênio 2014-2017 a queda média do PIB foi de 8%. Esse é, com toda a certeza, um dos fatores que explicam as dificuldades políticas e sociais enfrentadas por Maduro atualmente.

Não foi por falta de recomendações que o regime deixou de solucionar essa dependência do padrão de importações para satisfazer as necessidades da economia nacional e da maioria de sua população. O mais adequado teria sido utilizar as folgas no balanço comercial, originado do excesso das exportações de petróleo, para direcionar ao investimento agregado. Isso significa construir uma base sólida de capacidade industrial internalizada. O objetivo seria não mais depender completamente das importações para satisfazer tais necessidades.

· Derrotar a oposição golpista e construir um novo modelo.

É óbvio que a prioridade zero no momento atual é denunciar todas as tentativas de intervenção militar na Venezuela e impedir que a nova tentativa da oposição golpista seja exitosa. Apesar da crise interna de múltiplas facetas, Maduro foi eleito para a presidência do país e a maioria da população não deseja de seu país volte à condição de mero fantoche em mãos dos interesses econômicos e geopolíticos dos Estados Unidos.

As elites venezuelanas nunca aceitaram as mudanças propostas pelo bolivarianismo. Assim como ocorre com as oligarquias das demais nações do continente. São os conhecidos modelos secularmente mantidos às custas da exploração do povo trabalhador e que sempre mantiveram regimes excludentes e altamente desiguais. Mas o exemplo Venezuela demonstra que é fundamental superar a ilusão oferecida pelos atrativos da doença holandesa.

Superada a crise atual e derrotada a obsessão putschista de Guaidó e seus apoiadores, seria essencial que a Venezuela debatesse de forma ampla algumas mudanças nesse sistema de dependência excessiva do petróleo que ali se consolidou há décadas. Isso significa romper com esse pacto neo-colonial, em que as opções econômicas estratégicas e geradoras de alto valor agregado estão sempre localizadas no exterior.

Fonte: Por Paulo Kliass, em Carta Maior

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political-affairs · 12 years ago

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Nicolas Maduro win Venezuela Presidential Elections

Celso Amorim and Nicolas Maduro

Nicolas Maduro, won a razor-thin victory in Sunday's special presidential election, edging the opposition's leader by only about 300,000 votes, electoral officials announced.

Maduro's stunningly close victory over Henrique Capriles came after a campaign in which the winner promised to carry on Chavez's self-proclaimed socialist revolution while the challenger's main message was that Chavez's 14-year regime put Venezuela on the road to ruin.

Maduro, acting president since Chavez's death, held a double-digit advantage in opinion polls just two weeks ago, but electoral officials said he got just 50.7 percent of the votes to 49.1 percent for Capriles with nearly all ballots counted.

Chavistas set off fireworks and blasted car horns as they cruised downtown Caracas in jubilation.

At Capriles' campaign headquarters, people hung their heads quietly as the results were announced by an electoral council stacked with government loyalists. Many started crying; others just stared at TV screens in disbelief.

"I can't believe this. This can't be happening. The votes should all be recounted to be 100 percent sure who won," said Jenny Morales, 26, a volunteer who handed out posters and leaflets during the campaign.

The mood lightened after another electoral council director, Vicente Diaz, proposed an audit of the vote.

There was no immediate word from Capriles, but Maduro addressed a crowd from the presidential palace after winning a six-year term. In a booming voice, he called his victory further proof that Chavez "continues to be invincible, that he continues to win battles."

He said that Capriles had called him before the results were announced to suggest a "pact" and that Maduro refused.

Maduro, a longtime foreign minister to Chavez, rode a wave of sympathy for the charismatic leader to victory, pinning his hopes on the immense loyalty for his boss among millions of poor beneficiaries of government largesse and the powerful state apparatus that Chavez skillfully consolidated.

Capriles' main campaign weapon was to simply emphasize "the incompetence of the state" in handling the world's largest oil reserves.

Analyst David Smilde at the Washington Office on Latin America think tank predicted the victory would prove pyrrhic and make Maduro extremely vulnerable.

"It will make people in his coalition think that perhaps he is not the one to lead the revolution forward," Smilde said.

In a hint of discontent within Chavista ranks, National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, who many consider Maduro's main rival, expressed dismay at the tight outcome.

He tweeted: "The results oblige us to make a profound self-criticism. It's contradictory that the poor sectors of the population vote for their longtime exploiters."

Millions of Venezuelans were lifted out of poverty under Chavez, but many also believe his government not only squandered, but plundered, much of the $1 trillion in oil revenues during his tenure.

Venezuelans are afflicted by chronic power outages, crumbling infrastructure, unfinished public works projects, double-digit inflation, food and medicine shortages, and rampant crime — one of the world's highest homicide and kidnapping rates — that the opposition said worsened after Chavez succumbed March 5 to cancer.

"This is a result in which the 'official winner' appears as the biggest loser," said Amherst College political scientist Javier Corrales. "The 'official loser' — the opposition — emerges even stronger than it did six months ago. These are very delicate situations in any political system, especially when there is so much mistrust of institutions."

Turnout was 78 percent, down from just over 80 percent in the October election that Chavez won by a nearly 11-point margin.

#Washington Office on Latin America #Venezuela #Nicolás Maduro #Maduro #Henrique Capriles Radonski #Diosdado Cabello #Chavez #Caracas

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newsnigeria · 6 years ago

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Check out New Post published on Ọmọ Oòduà

New Post has been published on http://ooduarere.com/news-from-nigeria/world-news/insights-on-the-iran/

Insights on the Iran deal, BRICS and Venezuela

by Pepe Escobar (cross-posted with The Asia Times by special agreement with the author)

An exclusive interview with former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim on how BRICS came into being, how the nuclear deal was done with Tehran and how the South dealt with Chavez

Brazil is once again in the eye of a political hurricane, after President Jair Bolsonaro’s appearance at Davos and explosive revelations directly linking his clan to a criminal organization in Rio de Janeiro.

With his administration barely a month old, Bolsonaro is already being seen as expendable to the elites that propelled him to power – from the powerful agribusiness lobby to the financial system and the military.

The new game among the elites of a major actor in the Global South, BRICS member and eighth biggest economy in the world consists of shaping a scenario capable of rescuing one the great frontiers where global capitalism is expanding from total irrelevancy.

That includes the possibility of a “soft coup”, with the Bolsonaro clan sidelined by the Brazilian military rallying around the vice-president, General Hamilton Mourao.

Under these circumstances, a conversation with former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim is more than sobering. Amorim is universally recognized as one of the top diplomats of the young 21st century, a symbol of the recent past, under President Lula, when Brazil was at the top of its game as a resource-rich continental nation actively projecting power as a BRICS leader.

I had the pleasure of meeting Ambassador Amorim, who is also the author of ‘Acting Globally: Memoirs of Brazil’s Assertive Foreign Policy’ in Sao Paulo. Here are some highlights of our conversation – from the birth of BRICS to the current Venezuela crisis.

BRICS – the most important group in the drive towards a multipolar world – is a very dirty word in Washington. How did it all start?

I had met [British economist] Jim O’Neill a few times, who first talked about BRIC, which was not yet a group and nobody saw as a group. This may sound pretentious, but it’s a curious story. I told him, ‘It is you that invented the BRICS, right?’ He said, ‘Yes, of course, I’m very proud of it’. Then I replied, ‘Yes, but I’m the one who made it happen’. Well, it was not exactly me – under the Lula government and all that it entails. The first action in terms of creating the BRIC group – still without an “S” – came from Sergey Lavrov, in a meeting we had in New York in 2006. They had the RIC [Russia, India, China], but they did not hold many summits. And we had IBAS [India, Brazil, South Africa]. Both China and Russia were always trying to get into IBAS. There was the idea that these were three great democracies, each one in a continent and in a major developing country – so the Russians and Chinese might have thought, ‘we also want to get in, why not, because we are not democracies?’ IBAS was also present in the commercial G-20 at the WTO, and IBAS had similar ideas about reform of the UN Security Council; so the geopolitical interests were not the same.

Then Lavrov proposed BRIC as a forum, I think maybe to find some more equilibrium inside the RIC. I always talked in terms of BRICS, so one day he asked me ‘Why do you say BRICS?’ and I replied, “because it’s plural, in Portuguese’, so in a sense, we were already anticipating the entry of South Africa.

We first agreed we would have a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Lavrov and I already had something more substantial, the Indians and the Chinese just read a speech, so it looked like there would not be a consequential follow-up. Next year we met at the Brazilian UN mission, outside of the UN, and decided to do it later out of New York. Lavrov then offered Yekaterinburg, where we had the first ministerial meeting in 2008, and then next year the first presidential summit, also in Yekaterinburg, and in Brazil in 2010. It was here that the idea of BRIC was expanded into BRICS – through a dinner that concluded IBAS and inaugurated BRICS.

At the time, did you think about expanding to other top emerging economies, such as Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, Iran?

IBAS was born on the second day of President Lula’s government [in January 2003], out of an idea to create a group of developing countries, around seven or eight. I thought a larger group would be very complicated, based on my experience – how to coordinate positions and engage in concrete projects. For instance, Egypt would have to be a member.

When did you start to seriously discuss practical steps towards the emergence of a multipolar world – such as trade in members’ currencies? Was it in 2010?

In 2010 certainly, we had the idea of trade using each member’s currency, not yet the idea – that happened under the Dilma government – of the BRICS bank. But we were already talking about the coordination of our development banks. The concept of multipolarity, the Russians may have been the first to outline it. What I do remember about the use of the concept was by the French, especially when there were serious divergences about the attack on Iraq.

Former French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin insisted on it.

Villepin, yes, but even Hubert Vedrine [foreign minister under Jacques Chirac from 1997-2002] before him, who came up with the concept of ‘hyperpower’. So the ones who spread the concept were the French, and we adhered to it, among developing countries. The French, when they talked about the expansion of the UN Security Council, they said they were in favor regarding Germany and Japan, but also ‘three great nations of the South’, Brazil included.

The Lula government started in January 2003. Geopolitics at the time was conditioned by the war on terror. We were already expecting the invasion of Iraq. How did you, in the first days of January 2003, knowing that Dick Cheney and the neocons were about to turn the Middle East upside down, with direct and indirect repercussions on the Global South, how did you start conceiving a multi-vector Brazilian foreign policy? Which were the priorities?

I think neither President Lula nor myself used the term “multipolar” – even though the concept was already on the table. We wanted to have good relations with the US but also with the largest developing countries. When we started the greatest problems were the Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA], so we had to look for other partners; the WTO and negotiations in the Doha round; and Iraq. The combination of all these led Brazil to get closer to India and South Africa, to a great extent via the WTO, and because of Iraq, we got closer to Russia, Germany and France. When President Lula went to Davos…

That was Lula’s first Davos, right?

Yes, but first he went to the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre [in Brazil], then he went to Davos. The message was the search for an equilibrium; to do business, of course, but based on the idea of democratic social change.

Were you discussing Iraq in detail with Russia, Germany and France?

Yes, we were, with Schroeder in Germany and Chirac, as well as Villepin at the Security Council. And there was a fourth problem: Venezuela. Lula had already talked about it with Chavez. During the inauguration of President Gutierrez of Ecuador, Lula’s first foreign trip, on January 15, Lula proposed, in a meeting in a room full of presidents, the creation of the Friends of Venezuela Group, at a moment when the crisis was acute, even though the country was not as debilitated as today.

Already in January 2003 was there neocon pressure on Brazil in relation to Venezuela?

I think they did not know how to deal with Lula and the new government. But they were very strong on Venezuela – especially [US diplomat] Roger Noriega. And yet they saw Brazil was proposing something and accepted it. Fidel was against it, but Chavez, in the end, was convinced by Lula. And this is also relevant for today. Lula said it in so many words; this is not a Friends of Chavez group, it’s a Friends of Venezuela group. So this must also include the United States, Spain and Portugal – under conservative administrations. That was a way to escape from the OAS [Organisation of American States] and its penchant for the Monroe doctrine [the US policy of opposing European colonialism in the Americas].

I used to talk to Colin Powell quite frequently – and not to receive instructions. There were many issues he wanted to know about, and he trusted Brazil. He had a notion of the importance of Brazil, our capacity for dialogue.

Switching to the Obama era, tell us about the role of Brazil, alongside Turkey, in the Iran nuclear negotiation, when you clinched a deal in Tehran in less than 24 hours, only for it to be smashed by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton the next day.

It was a long process, followed by 19 hours of negotiations, the Iranians tried to reopen one of the issues, both Lula and Erdogan refused. What facilitated our role as mediators was that the US had its hands full in the Middle East. I already had contacts with Javier Solana, then a sort of Foreign Affairs Minister of the EU, and also [Egyptian diplomat] ElBaradei, from my time at the UN. Obama, in a meeting of the G-8 + 5 in Italy, during a bilateral with us, he said three things: ‘I extended my hand and they did not answer’; ‘We need to solve the nuclear dossier’; ‘And I need friends to say what I cannot say’. What we did in the end, because we thought it was the right thing to do, with a lot of work and facing hardships, was exactly what the Americans wanted. One month before the deal I thought it would not happen. But then we received a letter from Obama, and to my greatest surprise, that was a reiteration of the same initial three points.

Hillary always had a different position. I foresaw her reaction as a possibility. We talked on the phone, in Madrid, when I was coming back from Iran, and I said, ‘Look, in Brazil we have this expression, ‘I didn’t read it, and I didn’t like it’. She did not want a deal. In a phone call before my trip, she was adding some other points of discussion and I said, ‘Hillary, this is a trust-building agreement. And these points that you mention were not in the letter delivered by your own President’. I’m not exaggerating, what followed was a silence lasting half a minute. So I thought; did she read the letter? Or she read it, and because they are a great power they can do what they want, and we have to take it, and adapt to it?

So what about China and Russia accepting the American line – no deal, more sanctions?

I know the sweeteners that made them accept it – concessions on the sanctions front. But geopolitically…

What’s your informed hypothesis?

There are two. This was a problem they did not solve. Who’s part of the global directory? The five permanent members of the Security Council. Now we have two developing countries, who are not even part of the Security Council, and they solve it? By coincidence, both were non-permanent members of the Security Council at the time. The other thing is whenever we are discussing a nuclear issue, the five get closer, because they are all nuclear powers.

What’s your insider view, as a statesman, of Vladimir Putin, demonized 24/7 in the US as a major existential threat to the West?

The first time I saw Putin face to face was when he received three nations from the Group of Rio, and the main topic of discussion was Iraq. That was before the invasion in March 2003. What most impressed me was his great knowledge of the dossiers – something you usually don’t expect from presidents. He’s extremely sharp, very intelligent, obviously cares for Russian interests but at the same time pays attention to the balance of power. A very realist politician. I don’t see him as a great idealist. He’s like a 19th-century politician, very conscious geopolitically.

Now, in the South American chessboard, regarding the Venezuelan crisis, we are seeing a direct confrontation between the four major poles of Eurasia – Russia, China, Iran, Turkey – against the US. And with another BRICS member, Brazil, siding against Russia and China.

In a multipolar world, we now have a huge test, because Brazil presides over the BRICS in 2019. How is Brazil going to be seen inside BRICS? There used to be an atmosphere of trust inside BRICS.

I’ve got to say that based on my experience at the Security Council, when I was ambassador, during the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso [from 1995 to 2003], the Russians and the Chinese gave immense weight to respect for national sovereignty. In terms of international law, they always stress non-intervention. I hope we won’t have a confrontation like Vietnam in our region. But when President Trump says that all options are on the table, he’s obviously accepting a military solution. This is very dangerous. I see a very sound Brazilian position coming from General Mourao [the Brazilian vice-president]. And yet the Foreign Ministry says Brazil will support politically and economically a government that does not exist – so that already means intervention.

On a personal level, in the drive towards multipolarity, what is the most important story in the world for the next 10 or 20 years? What is the issue that drives you the most?

I think that the fundamental theme is psychological – and also civilizational. It’s respect for The Other – and the acceptance of alterity. And this also concerns international relations. We need to understand that the common good is part of our well-being. This reflects on individual attitudes, in internal attitudes in politics, and in international relations. Look at the current, violent attack on multilateralism. We should see that it’s better to work multilaterally than capitulate to the law of the jungle.

#BRICS

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