#but his competency and threat level are severely undermined

[knight--error]

Gosh, rewatching OUAT, I love what a cringefail loser Hook is. Man got Worf Effected straight out of the gate. He's introduced all cool and suave and capable, and he proceeds to be absolutely destroyed in every fight, ever. Good grief, he's 0 for 2 against Belle of all people; not to knock my girl Belle, but she's not what I would consider a front-line combatant.

What's the percentage breakdown of scenes ending with him being knocked out? 40%? What does his MRI look like? It can't be good. Did he become redeemed purely by the power of traumatic brain injury? How many times has this man been flung fully across a room? I think his ribs are dust held together by tenacity.

[liskantope]

I have a lot of mixed thoughts nowadays about the "threat to democracy" angle to Trump's potential re-presidency.

On the one hand, Trump has made it abundantly clear, from long before the period of the 2020 campaign season when he began priming his base to expect the election to be rigged against him, that he has a fundamentally antidemocratic mentality, that for him, the concept of "democracy" is what it means to a (not particularly bright) second-grader: a fancy word for something that in the US we say we value all the time but which doesn't mean anything of significance. He has instilled a similar mentality among his cult following, and it's eroding our collective sense of what it means to be the United States and our once robust underlying trust (across political ideologies) in our system of elections. It already culminated in the events of January 2021, which made our country an embarrassment to the world and suggests that more violence and strife is in our future as long as he's on the political scene (even if Harris wins in November, I'm dreading how the Trumpists are going to react).

For me on a gut level, the deepest pang of insult and disgust (among very many!) associated with Trump getting into the White House again comes from the idea that he's unqualified not only in his inability to competently handle object-level issues but on the meta level of having no respect whatsoever for democracy, which to me represents the error-correcting mechanism of supreme importance in any system and the primary feature that, uh, makes America great (and revolutionary, back in the 18th century).

But then, at the same time... let's say he wins again. Where does his disrespect for democracy lead, exactly?

Trump has very deliberately undermined trust among his base in elections, and this time around he'll do better with appointing people in crucial positions who will fix elections for him, but what will this mean, concretely? It seems to me that the worst I can conceive of, without inventing scenarios that go completely off the rails, is that Trump manages to find the energy and knowhow to fix the results of a number of 2026 midterm elections and then get through more legislation in the second half of his term than he would have and maybe this includes an abolishment of term limits so that he could run again and fix the results to win again. This does seem quite bad, but it's also pretty far-fetched that he'd actually be able to do all this (starting with doctoring the visible results of a great enough number of midterm races to make a real difference), and anyway, the damage done would be severely hampered by (1) the fact that he'll be getting into his 80's and seems quite likely to drop dead quite suddenly, and (2) his lack of actual focused ideological beliefs (like what's he actually going to try to accomplish with one or two more terms?) -- he's seeking to get back into the White House basically because campaigning is fun and power and attention feel good and it's a way of screwing around and keeping the law from catching up with him.

Maybe I'm lacking in imagination on this, and I do remember Sam Harris having someone on his podcast who described a very concrete scenario of Trump eroding democracy if back in power that sounded pretty scary the way it was spoken at the time, but I can't remember the details now. Meanwhile, the recent Supreme Court decision about presidential immunity seems murky and up to interpretation and like it would maybe require a pretty contrived situation to allow Trump to get away with something truly dictatorial.

I think it's good that Democrats are reminding voters over and over again how incredibly offensive Trump is with regard to his attitude towards our democratic ideals; it seems that a lot of Americans care about this (rightly) and it will help Trump get defeated. That said, I don't know that it does any favors to throw around such vague and dramatic phrases as "will destroy democracy" though. First of all, what does that mean? Secondly, to the extent that it exaggerates the situation, it sounds hysterical, which is something the other side can always capitalize on. I suspect it has, at least in that Trump himself has noticed on some level that he can use desperate and freaked-out-sounding rhetoric from the other side as fodder for trolling.

It really bothers me the way the anti-Trump side has completely taken the bait in moments like Trump's comments about how he'll be a dictator on day one only. It would be one thing to be upset and offended because Trump's cult has flaunted the democratic process and the perception of it in serious ways and so it's in extremely bad taste for him of all people to be flippant and joking about it. It's another thing to hear the "I'll be a dictator but only on day one" comment and conclude in a serious tone, "See? He just admitted right out that he wants to be a dictator!", as if we shouldn't all have the collective psychological intelligence to understand that speaking that way is a form of mischievous, irreverent, trolling-while-projecting-a-strongman humor that Trump has always specialized in (and is indeed what makes him so refreshing to so many people).

I'm similarly really annoyed at the reactions -- including from such smart and sensible commentators as David Pakman -- to Trump's recent remark to a Christian audience about going out and voting just this one time and then he'll "fix" it so they won't have to vote again. I heard that the first time, and it was fairly obvious to me that there were several more likely explanations as to what he meant in context apart from "I'm going to make myself dictator for life" -- the first one that came to my head was "the main reason why a lot of Christians vote is the abortion issue, and Trump is implying that he'll 'fix it', meaning get an amendment passed banning abortion everywhere". Then I saw in an clip from a Trump interview afterwards (I only saw this because it was played by David Pakman I think, though he professed not to understand any sense of what Trump was saying) that Trump's explanation for the remark had to do with Christians not voting in very large numbers. ("I know you don't always care enough to vote, but do it just this once and then you won't have to again" actually sounds very close to the usual line, popular on the liberal side, about "this is the most important election of our lives", with my own personal addition of "vote to resoundingly defeat MAGA so that maybe the each subsequent election won't continue to be the most important of our lives.") I found out today from Matt Lewis' weekly podcast episode with Bill Scher that the context of Trump being concerned about low Christian voter turnout was in fact plainly acknowledged in earlier parts of Trump's same speech, although Scher says that the oft-cited notion of Christians not voting is a myth. Trump's confident claims that he'll "fix everything" are characteristic of him (and one of his main recognized demagogic rhetorical faults he's ridiculed for!) and a much less athletic explanation for his comment than "I'll change the country so that there won't be any elections", a thing that he's never said or implied.

Of course, if Trump cared a shred about truly assuring people that he has no dictatorial inclinations, he would be careful not to make comments that could even remotely be interpreted as such, and one could argue that in that context his "vote for me now and I'll fix it so that you won't need to again" comment was offensive. I'm not sure whether he maybe even intended that comment to be misinterpreted by his opponents this way so as to rile them up, although I seriously doubt that he was being that clever. I just wish people would stop feeding the troll and walking right into the trap of interpreting as much as possible in terms of "destroying our democracy" and treating every remark Trump says as a way of taking the man much more seriously than he deserves, even while at the same time we could simultaneously call attention to the seriously threatening aspects of Trump and Trumpism.

[feelingbluepolitics]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/09/23/robert-kagan-constitutional-crisis/

Much of this article is trash, written by a mewling conservative trying to distinguish Republicon policies and Republicon ideology as beyond and separate from "trump precursors" for "the last 30 years." Try 60 years, or more. Go all the way back to them with their fury and screams over Social Security as an evil Communist plot.

Kagan is a Never-trumper attempting to sound reasonable despite being a mental conservative, who thinks -- much like poor, beleaguered Joe Manchin -- that Democrats "need to let good Republicons" help them save the country.

He's one of those types of fools who, when he speaks of officials with integrity, is alluding to Mr. Anti-vote Raffensperger, who is to voting like so many white male Republicons are to immigration -- none too happy about illegal or legal. His hero Raffensperger is also one of the leading architects of the Republicon rash of Jim Crow 2.0 laws which Kagan points to as a prime symptom of Nazi-type fascism threatening American right now...but logical consistency fares extremely poorly on the Right.

However, there are some useful points in this article. The criticism leveled toward the Right by a [pre-trump] insider is one. And the insistent urgency of our nation's crisis is another.

"The United States is heading into its greatest political and constitutional crisis since the Civil War, with a reasonable chance over the next three to four years of incidents of mass violence, a breakdown of federal authority, and the division of the country into warring red and blue enclaves. The warning signs may be obscured by the distractions of politics, the pandemic, the economy and global crises, and by wishful thinking and denial. But about these things there should be no doubt:

"First, [t]rump will be the Republican candidate for president in 2024. The hope and expectation that he would fade in visibility and influence have been delusional. He enjoys mammoth leads in the polls; he is building a massive campaign war chest; and at this moment the Democratic ticket looks vulnerable. Barring health problems, he is running. [Or legal problems. Or even better, in order to be a bit safer, both].

"Second, [t]rump and his Republican allies are actively preparing to ensure his victory by whatever means necessary. [t]rump’s charges of fraud in the 2020 election are now primarily aimed at establishing the predicate to challenge future election results that do not go his way. Some Republican candidates have already begun preparing to declare fraud in 2022, just as Larry Elder tried meekly to do in the California recall contest.

"Meanwhile, the amateurish 'stop the steal' efforts of 2020 have given way to an organized nationwide campaign to ensure that [t]rump and his supporters will have the control over state and local election officials that they lacked in 2020. Those recalcitrant Republican state officials who effectively saved the country from calamity by refusing to falsely declare fraud or to 'find' more votes for [t]rump are being systematically removed or hounded from office. Republican legislatures are giving themselves greater control over the election certification process. As of this spring, Republicans have proposed or passed measures in at least 16 states that would shift certain election authorities from the purview of the governor, secretary of state or other executive-branch officers to the legislature. An Arizona bill flatly states that the legislature may 'revoke the secretary of state’s issuance or certification of a presidential elector’s certificate of election' by a simple majority vote. Some state legislatures seek to impose criminal penalties on local election officials alleged to have committed 'technical infractions,' including obstructing the view of poll watchers.

"The stage is thus being set for chaos.

..."Most Americans — and all but a handful of politicians — have refused to take this possibility seriously enough to try to prevent it. As has so often been the case in other countries where fascist leaders arise, their would-be opponents are paralyzed in confusion and amazement at this charismatic authoritarian. They have followed the standard model of appeasement, which always begins with underestimation. The political and intellectual establishments in both parties have been underestimating [t]rump since he emerged on the scene in 2015. They underestimated the extent of his popularity and the strength of his hold on his followers; they underestimated his ability to take control of the Republican Party; and then they underestimated how far he was willing to go to retain power. The fact that he failed to overturn the 2020 election has reassured many that the American system remains secure, though it easily could have gone the other way — if Biden had not been safely ahead in all four states where the vote was close; if [t]rump had been more competent and more in control of the decision-makers in his administration, Congress and the states. As it was, [t]rump came close to bringing off a coup earlier this year...

..."Where does the Republican Party stand in all this? The party gave birth to and nurtured this movement; it bears full responsibility for establishing the conditions in which [t]rump could capture the loyalty of 90 percent of Republican voters. Republican leaders were more than happy to ride [t]rump’s coattails if it meant getting paid off with hundreds of conservative court appointments, including three Supreme Court justices; tax cuts; immigration restrictions; and deep reductions in regulations on business.

..."From the uneasy and sometimes contentious partnership during [t]rump’s four years in office, the party’s main if not sole purpose today is as the willing enabler of [t]rump’s efforts to game the electoral system to ensure his return to power.

..."With the party firmly under his thumb, [t]rump is now fighting the Biden administration on separate fronts. One is normal, legitimate political competition, where Republicans criticize Biden’s policies, feed and fight the culture wars, and in general behave like a typical hostile opposition.

"The other front is outside the bounds of constitutional and democratic competition and into the realm of illegal or extralegal efforts to undermine the electoral process. The two are intimately related, because the Republican Party has used its institutional power in the political sphere to shield [t]rump and his followers from the consequences of their illegal and extralegal activities in the lead-up to Jan. 6. Thus, Reps. Kevin McCarthy and Elise Stefanik, in their roles as party leaders, run interference for the [t]rump movement in the sphere of legitimate politics, while Republicans in lesser positions cheer on the Jan. 6 perpetrators, turning them into martyrs and heroes, and encouraging illegal acts in the future.

..."Even [t]rump opponents play along. Republicans such as Sens. Mitt Romney and Ben Sasse have condemned the events of Jan. 6, criticized [t]rump and even voted for his impeachment, but in other respects they continue to act as good Republicans and conservatives. On issues such as the filibuster, Romney and others insist on preserving 'regular order' and conducting political and legislative business as usual, even though they know that [t]rump’s lieutenants in their party are working to subvert the next presidential election.

"The result is that even these anti-[t]rump Republicans are enabling the insurrection. Revolutionary movements usually operate outside a society’s power structures. But the [t]rump movement also enjoys unprecedented influence within those structures. It dominates the coverage on several cable news networks, numerous conservative magazines, hundreds of talk radio stations and all kinds of online platforms. It has access to financing from rich individuals and the Republican National Committee’s donor pool. And, not least, it controls one of the country’s two national parties...

"The world will look very different in 14 months if, as seems likely, the Republican zombie party wins control of the House. At that point, with the political winds clearly blowing in his favor, [t]rump is all but certain to announce his candidacy, and social media constraints on his speech are likely to be lifted, since Facebook and Twitter would have a hard time justifying censoring his campaign. With his megaphone back, [t]rump would once again dominate news coverage, as outlets prove unable to resist covering him around the clock if only for financial reasons.

"But this time, [t]rump would have advantages that he lacked in 2016 and 2020, including more loyal officials in state and local governments; the Republicans in Congress; and the backing of GOP donors, think tanks and journals of opinion. And he will have the [t]rump movement, including many who are armed and ready to be activated, again. Who is going to stop him then?

..."[Republicons] have refused to work with Democrats to pass legislation limiting state legislatures’ ability to overturn the results of future elections, to ensure that the federal government continues to have some say when states try to limit voting rights, to provide federal protection to state and local election workers who face threats, and in general to make clear to the nation that a bipartisan majority in the Senate opposes the subversion of the popular will. Why?

[They, just like trump, want and intend to be in power at all costs.

..."We are already in a constitutional crisis. The destruction of democracy might not come until November 2024, but critical steps in that direction are happening now. In a little more than a year, it may become impossible to pass legislation to protect the electoral process in 2024. Now it is impossible only because anti-[t]rump Republicans, and even some Democrats, refuse to tinker with the filibuster. It is impossible because, despite all that has happened, some people still wish to be good Republicans [sic] even as they oppose [t]rump. These decisions will not wear well as the nation tumbles into full-blown crisis."

[theculturedmarxist]

The decade of socialist revolution begins

       3 January 2020  

The arrival of the New Year marks the beginning of a decade of intensifying class struggle and world socialist revolution.

In the future, when learned historians write about the upheavals of the Twenty-First Century, they will enumerate all the “obvious” signs that existed, as the 2020s began, of the revolutionary storm that was soon to sweep across the globe. The scholars—with a vast array of facts, documents, charts, web site and social media postings, and other forms of valuable digitalized information at their disposal—will describe the 2010s as a period characterized by an intractable economic, social, and political crisis of the world capitalist system.

They will note that by the beginning of the third decade of the century, history had arrived at precisely the situation foreseen theoretically by Karl Marx: “At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.”

What, in fact, were the principal characteristics of the last ten years?

The institutionalization of unending military conflict and the growing threat of nuclear world war

There was not a single day during the last decade when the United States was not at war. Military operations not only continued in Iraq and Afghanistan. New interventions were undertaken in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Ukraine. Even as 2020 is just getting under way, the murder of Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani, ordered by President Donald Trump, threatens all-out war between the United States and Iran, with incalculable consequences. The involvement of an American president in yet another targeted killing, followed by bloodthirsty boasting, testifies to the far-advanced derangement of the entire ruling elite.

Moreover, the adoption of a new strategic doctrine in 2018 signaled a vast escalation in the military operations of the United States. In his announcement of the new strategy, then defense secretary James Mattis declared: “We will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists that we are engaged in today, but great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.” The new doctrine revealed the essential purpose of what had previously been called the “War on Terror:” the attempt to maintain the hegemonic position of American imperialism.

The United States is determined to maintain this position, whatever the financial costs and the consequences in terms of human life. As the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states in its recently released Strategic Survey: “For its part, the US is not likely voluntarily, reluctantly or after some sort of battle, to pass any strategic baton to China.”

All the major imperialist powers escalated, during the past decade, their preparations for world war and nuclear conflict. The trillion-dollar military budget adopted in 2019 by the Trump administration, with the support of the Democratic Party, is a war budget. Germany, France, the UK, and all the imperialist countries are building up their armed forces. The targets of imperialism, including the ruling elites in Russia and China, alternate between threats of war and desperate efforts to forge some sort of agreement.

The institutions developed in the aftermath of World War II to prevent another global conflict are dysfunctional. The Strategic Survey writes:

The trends of 2018–19 have all confirmed the atomisation of international society. Neither ‘balance of power’ nor ‘international rules-based governance’ serve as ordering principles. International institutions have been marginalised. The diplomatic routine of meetings continues, yet the competing exertions of national efforts, too rarely coordinated with others, matter more—and most often they are erratic in both execution and consequence. 

The end of a “global rules-based order”—i.e., one dependent on the unchallengeable dominance of US imperialism—sets into motion a political logic that leads to war. As the Strategic Survey warns: “Law is made and sustained by politics. When law cannot settle disputes, they are shunted back to the political realm for resolution.” To understand the “realm” to which the IISS is referring, one must recall Clausewitz’s famous definition of war as politics by other means.

And what would a modern world war entail? The IISS calls attention to new plans for the use of nuclear weapons. “Meanwhile, the US and Russia are modernizing their arsenals and changing their doctrines in ways that facilitate their use, while the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir remains a potential flashpoint for the use of nuclear weapons.” The recklessness, bordering on insanity, that prevails among policy makers is indicated in the growing conviction that the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a feasible option. The IISS writes:

All that can be said with reasonable certainty is that a limited, regional nuclear exchange, under some circumstances, has severe global environmental effects. But under other circumstances, the effects could be minimal. [emphasis added] 

The movement toward a Third World War, which would threaten mankind with extinction, cannot be halted by humanitarian appeals. War arises out of the anarchy of capitalism and the obsolescence of the nation-state system. Therefore, it can be stopped only through the global struggle of the working class for socialism. 

The breakdown of democracy

The extreme aggravation of class tensions and the dynamic of imperialism are the real sources of the universal breakdown of democratic forms of rule. As Lenin wrote in the midst of World War I: “Imperialism is the epoch of finance capital and monopolies, which introduce everywhere the striving for domination, not for freedom. Whatever the political system the result of these tendencies is everywhere reaction and intensification of antagonisms in this field.”

Lenin’s analysis is being substantiated in the turn of the ruling elites, during the past decade, toward authoritarian and fascistic methods of rule. The rise to power of such criminal and even psychopathic personalities as Narendra Modi in India, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Donald Trump in the United States, and Boris Johnson in the UK is symptomatic of a systemic crisis of the entire capitalist system.

Seventy-five years after the collapse of the Third Reich, fascism is making a comeback in Germany. The Alternative für Deutschland, which is a haven for neo-Nazis, emerged during the past decade as the main opposition party. Its rise was facilitated by the Grand Coalition government, a corrupt media, and reactionary academics, who whitewash with impunity the crimes of Hitler’s regime. Similar processes are at work throughout Europe, where the fascist leaders of the 1930s and 1940s—Petain in France, Mussolini in Italy, Horthy in Hungary and Franco in Spain—are being remembered with nostalgia.

The decade saw the resurgence of anti-Semitic violence and the cultivation of Islamophobia and other forms of national chauvinism and racism. Concentration camps were constructed on the US border with Mexico to imprison refugees fleeing from Central and South America, and in Europe and North Africa as the frontline of the anti-immigrant policy of the EU.

There is no progressive tendency to be found within the capitalist parties. Even when confronted with a fascistic president, the Democratic Party refrains from opposition based on the defense of democratic rights. Employing the methods of a palace coup, the Democrats seek Trump’s impeachment only because he, in their view, has undermined the US campaign against Russia and the proxy war in Ukraine.

The attitude of the entire bourgeois political establishment to democratic rights is summed up in the horrific treatment of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and whistleblower Chelsea Manning. With the support of both the Democrats and Republicans, Assange remains confined in Belmarsh prison in London, awaiting extradition to the US. Manning has been imprisoned for nearly a year for refusing to testify before a grand jury called to indict Assange on further charges.

The persecution of Assange and Manning is aimed at criminalizing the conduct of constitutionally-protected journalistic activity. It is part of a broader suppression of dissent that includes the campaign of internet censorship and the jailing of the Maruti-Suzuki workers in India and other class-war prisoners.

The preparations for war, involving massive expenditures and requiring the accumulation of unprecedented levels of debt, snuff the air out of democracy. In the final analysis, the costs of war must be imposed upon the working people of the world. The burdens will encounter resistance by a population already incensed by decades of sacrifice. The response of the ruling elites will be the intensification of their efforts to suppress every form of popular dissent.

The degradation of the environment

The last decade was marked by the continued and increasingly rapid destruction of the environment. Scientists have issued ever more dire warnings that without urgent and far-reaching action on a global scale, the effects of global warming will be devastating and irreversible. The deadly inferno engulfing Australia, as the year ended, is only the latest horrific consequence of climate change.

In November, 11,000 scientists signed a statement published in the journal BioScience warning that “planet Earth is facing a climate emergency.” It noted that over the course of four decades of global climate negotiations, “with few exceptions, we have generally conducted business as usual and have largely failed to address this predicament…

The climate crisis has arrived and is accelerating faster than most scientists expected. It is more severe than anticipated, threatening natural ecosystems and the fate of humanity…. Especially worrisome, are potential irreversible climate tipping points and nature’s reinforcing feedbacks that could lead to a catastrophic ‘hothouse Earth,’ well beyond the control of humans. These climate chain reactions could cause significant disruptions to ecosystems, society, and economies, potentially making large areas of Earth uninhabitable. 

Earlier in the year, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported that 821 million people, who were already suffering from hunger, face starvation as agricultural regions are impacted by global warming. Hundreds of millions could lose access to fresh water, while many more will be affected by increasingly severe weather patterns: flooding, drought and hurricanes.

Climate change, and other manifestations of environmental degradation, are the product of a social and economic system that is incapable of organizing global production in a rational and scientific manner, on the basis of social need—including the need for a healthy environment—rather than the endless accumulation of personal wealth.

The aftermath of the 2008 crash and the crisis of capitalism

Underlying all other aspects of the social and political situation is the malignant growth of extreme social inequality—the inevitable and intended consequence of all the measures adopted by the ruling class following the economic and financial crisis of 2008.

Following the financial crash, which occurred on the eve of the 2010s, world governments and central banks opened the spigots. In the United States, the Bush and particularly the Obama administrations engineered the $700 billion bailout of the banks, followed by trillions of dollars in “quantitative easing” measures—that is, the purchase by the Federal Reserve of the worthless assets and securities held by financial institutions.

Overnight, the federal deficit of the American government was doubled. The assets of the Federal Reserve rose from under $2 trillion in November 2008 to $4.5 trillion in October 2014, and the figure remains at more than $4 trillion today. With a new $60 billion a month asset purchase program, initiated in late 2019, the balance sheet is expected to surpass post-crash highs by the middle of this year.

This policy has continued under Trump, with his massive corporate tax cuts and demands for further reductions in interest rates. The New York Times noted, in a January 1 article (“A Simple Investment Strategy That Worked in 2019: Buy Almost Anything”) that the value of almost all investment assets jumped sharply over the past year. The Nasdaq rose by 35 percent, the S&P 500 by 29 percent, commodities by 16 percent, US corporate bonds by 15 percent, and US Treasuries by 7 percent. “It was a remarkable across-the-board rally of a scale not seen in nearly a decade. The cause? Mostly a head-spinning reversal by the Federal Reserve, which went from planning to raise interest rates to cutting them and pumping fresh money into the financial markets.”

All the major capitalist powers have pursued similar measures. The allocation of unlimited credit and money printing—and this, in the final analysis, is what quantitative easing is—intensified the underlying crisis. In trying to rescue themselves, the ruling elites enshrined parasitism and raised social inequality to a level unknown in modern history.

Benefiting from the limitless infusion of money into the market, the fortunes of the financial elite rose during the past decade to astronomical heights. The 500 richest individuals in the world (0.000006 percent of the global population) now have a collective net worth of $5.9 trillion, up $1.2 trillion over the past year alone. This increase is more than the GDP (that is, the total value of all goods and services produced) of all but 15 countries in the world. In the US, the 400 richest individuals have more wealth than the bottom 64 percent, and the top 0.1 percent of the population have a larger share than at any time since 1929, immediately preceding the Great Depression.

The social catastrophe confronting masses of workers and youth throughout the world is the direct product of the policies employed to guarantee the accumulation of wealth by the corporate and financial elite.

The decline in life expectancy among workers in the US, the mass unemployment of workers and particularly young people throughout the world, the devastating austerity measures imposed on Greece and other countries, the intensification of exploitation to boost the profits of corporations—all this is the consequence of the policy pursued by the ruling elites.

The growth of the international working class and the global class struggle

The objective conditions for socialist revolution emerge out of the global crisis. The approach of social revolution has already been foreshadowed in the mass demonstrations and strikes that swept across the globe in 2019: in Mexico, Puerto Rico, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, France, Spain, Algeria, Britain, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Kenya, South Africa, India and Hong Kong. The United States, where the entire political structure is directed toward the suppression of class struggle, witnessed the first national strike by auto workers in more than forty years.

But the dominant and most revolutionary feature of the class struggle is its international character, rooted in the global character of modern-day capitalism. Moreover, the movement of the working class is a movement of the younger generation and, therefore, a movement that will shape the future.

Those under 30 now comprise over half the world’s population and over 65 percent of the population in the world’s fastest growing regions—Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. Each month in India, one million people turn 18. In the Middle East and North Africa, an estimated 27 million young people will enter the workforce in the next five years.

From 1980 to 2010, global industrial development added 1.2 billion people to the ranks of the working class, with hundreds of millions more in the decade since. Of this 1.2 billion, 900 million entered the working class in the developing world. Internationally, the percentage of the global labor force that can be classified as peasant declined from 44 percent in 1991 to 28 percent in 2018. Nearly one billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to join the working class in the coming decades. In China alone, 121 million people moved from “farm to factory” between 2000 and 2010, with millions more in the decade since.

It is not only Asia and Africa that have seen a growth in the working class population. In the advanced capitalist countries, large sections of those who would have previously considered themselves middle class have been proletarianized, while the wave of immigrants from Latin America to the United States and from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe has added millions to a highly diverse workforce.

From 2010 to 2019, the world’s urban population grew by one billion, creating a network of interconnected “megacities” that are both hives of economic productivity and social powder kegs, where inequality is a visible fact of daily life.

And these workers are connected with each other in a manner that is unprecedented in world history. The colossal advances in science, technology and communications, above all the rise of the internet and the proliferation of mobile devices, have allowed masses of people to bypass the fake news of the bourgeois media, which function as little more than mouthpieces for the state and intelligence agencies. More than half of the world’s population, 4.4 billion people, now have access to the internet. The average individual spends over two hours on social media each day, largely on handheld devices.

Workers and youth can now coordinate their protests and actions on a global scale, expressed in the international movement against climate change, the emergence of the “yellow vests” as a worldwide symbol of protest against inequality, and the solidarity of auto workers in the United States and Mexico.

These objective changes are producing major shifts in social consciousness on the central question of social inequality. The 2019 United Nations Human Development Report explains that in almost all countries, the percentage of people demanding greater equality increased from the 2000s to the 2010s by up to 50 percent. The report warned: “Surveys have revealed rising perceptions of inequality, rising preferences for greater equality and rising global inequality in subjective perceptions of well-being. All these trends should be bright red-flags.”

The role of revolutionary leadership

The growth of the working class and the emergence of class struggle on an international scale are the objective basis for revolution. However, the spontaneous struggles of workers and their instinctive striving for socialism are, by themselves, inadequate. The transformation of the class struggle into a conscious movement for socialism is a question of political leadership.

The past decade has provided a wealth of political experiences demonstrating, in the negative, the critical role of revolutionary leadership. The decade began with revolution, in the form of the monumental struggles of Egyptian workers and youth against the US-backed dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. In the absence of a revolutionary leadership, and with the assistance of disorientation introduced by the petty-bourgeois organizations, the masses were channeled behind different factions of the ruling class, culminating in the reestablishment of direct military dictatorship under the butcher of Cairo, al-Sisi.

All the alternatives to Marxism, concocted by the representatives of the affluent middle class, have been discredited: The “apolitical” and neo-anarchist Occupy Wall Street movement in the US in 2011 was revealed to be a middle-class movement whose call for a “party of the 99 percent” sought to subordinate the interests of the working class to those of the top 10 percent.

New forms of “left populism” were promoted in Europe, including Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain. Syriza came to power in 2015 and for four years implemented the dictates of the banks. Podemos is now a governing party, in coalition with the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), which is committed to a right-wing, pro-austerity program. The “Five-Star Movement,” presented as an anti-establishment insurgency, ended up in political alliance with the Italian neo-fascists. Corbynism, which peddled the illusion of a revival of the Labour Party as an instrument of anti-capitalist struggle, proved in the end to be synonymous with political cowardice and prostration before the ruling class. Were Sanders to make his way to the White House, his administration would prove no less impotent.

In Latin America, the “left” bourgeois nationalism that was part of the “Pink Tide”—Lulaism in Brazil, the “Bolivarian Revolution” of Chavez in Venezuela, and Evo Morales in Bolivia—has been shipwrecked by the crisis of world capitalism. Their own austerity and pro-corporate policies prepared the way for a sharp shift to the right, including the rise to power of Bolsonaro in Brazil and the US-backed military coup against Morales in 2019.

The trade unions, which have long served as mechanisms for the suppression of the class struggle, have been exposed as agents of the corporations and the state. In the United States, the struggles of auto workers have been waged in conflict with the corrupt executives of the UAW, under indictment or investigation for taking bribes from the companies and stealing workers’ dues money. The UAW, however, is only the clearest expression of a universal process.

A vast political and social differentiation has taken place between the working class and an international tendency of politics, the pseudo-left, which is based on sections of the affluent upper middle class who purvey the politics of racial, gender and sexual identity. The politics of the upper middle class seeks access to and a redistribution of some of the wealth sloshing about within the top 1 percent. They wallow in their obsessive fixation on the individual, as a means of leveraging “identity” into positions of power and privilege, while ignoring the social interests of the vast majority.

The tasks of the International Committee of the Fourth International

[reading-writing-revolution]

Last week, Trump all but greenlighted the ethnic cleansing of Kurds without an ounce of remorse. He normalizes dishonesty and valorizes cruelty. His letter to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminds us yet again that we have a president whose professional competence is at kindergarten level. Once a nation has lost its heart, mind and soul, it is very hard to get these things back.

Furthermore, Trump is an unprecedented threat to democratic institutions. Over the past few years, I’ve thought the progressive fears of incipient American fascism were vastly overblown. But, especially over the past month, Trump has worked overtime to validate those fears and to raise the horrifying specter of what he’ll be like if he is given a second term and is vindicated, unhinged and unwell.

In their book “How Democracies Die,” Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt argue that authoritarians undermine democracy in several ways. They reject the democratic rules of the game, the unwritten norms we rely upon to make the political system work. They deny the legitimacy of their political opponents, using extreme language to deny them standing as co-citizens. They tolerate or even encourage violence, threatening to take legal action against critics in rival parties.

Trump has been guilty of all three sins, and given a second term he will feel free to stomp where up until now he has merely tread.

[scripttorture]

So this might be a difficult question but I need to ask. You’ve mentioned torturers don’t necessarily have less empathy and can nice to people they like outside of torture. You’ve also mentioned torturers as very toxic even to each other when in the torturing environment. I’m writing a short scene that looks into torturer group from the POV one torturer. I want to show the toxic environment but also don’t want the characters to come across as without feeling or depth (1/2)

(2/2) because I want torturers to seem ‘normal’ rather than ‘stereotypical media sociopath’ (portrayed as someone who does bad things because they lack empathy for others.) Could I show carry levels of enthusiasm or a character being nice to another (but not nice to victim) without looking like I’m trying to make look ‘good’ or sympathetic? And without diminishing the toxic culture? My group is a subset of the police if that helps. I’m debating them failing to recruit MC into torturing.

Ithink you’d find the appendices in F Fanon’s TheWretched of the Earthvery helpful.

Inthem he discusses a handful of the cases he dealt with as a mentalhealth professional during and after the Franco-Algerian war. Amongthese cases are two torturers who were responding very differently.

Fanonconcluded that they were at different ‘stages’ of the sameharmful process. Personally I’m not convinced that the evidencewe’ve gathered since supports that conclusion. But regardless ofFanon’s theories his accounts of these two men are very interestingI think they help shed some light on what seems like an almostcontradictory set of statements: that torturers are not necessarilyawful to people they aren’t torturing and yet they’re so much ofa risk to each other.

Bothof the torturers Fanon treated were married but they had verydifferent home lives and I think that helps illustrate the point.

Onevery much gave the impression of loving his wife and having apositive relationship which was now under heavy strain due to hismental health problems. This distressed him.

Thesecond torturer was also an abuser who admitted to regularly beatinghis wife and children, including a very young baby. This only seemedto cause him distress in one particular incident when he ended upusing torture techniques he employed at ‘work’ on his wife.

I’mnot a psychologist and Fanon doesn’t give a diagnosis for either ofthese men. My impression from their accounts is that the firsttorturer had very depressive symptoms while the second torturerreported a lot of aggression and seemed to read every situation as apotential threat.

Nowit’s tempting to hence draw a conclusion based on symptoms atorturer experiences but I  think that’s getting ahead of theevidence. In the same way that concluding torturers and abusers‘must’ have low empathy is getting ahead of a the evidence.

It’sreally easy to other a person who does awful things. It’scomforting because it helps us convince ourselves that wewould never be capable of that. It reduces responsibility across theboard: our own by offering a reassuring platitude that exempts usfrom self reflection and the abusers’ by placing the blame on adisease rather than a person.

Mentalhealth problems can make people difficult to get along with (I know Ihave my moments) but they don’t make people monsters.

Socialstructures and reinforcement on the other hand can encourage horrificabuse. In the case of torturers that seems to be what we’re seeing.

Rejalidescribes the sub-cultures torturers create as divisive, highlycompetitive, hypermasculine and toxic. Which is a great descriptionbut doesn’t really conjure up an idea of what it’s like to be inone.

Ithink the main point to grasp when you’re writing a torturer’srelationship with other torturers is that torture is a zero sumgame.

Actualpolice work allows for multiple people to receive praise andcommendation for the work they do. Every piece of evidence andinformation is important so everyone’s contribution has thepotential to be rewarded.

Buttorturers only get rewarded/praised if they personally were the onetorturing the victim at the time there was false confession or‘believable’ lie. This creates a highly competitive environment.Acknowledgement and ‘success’ become much scarcer resources andtorturers are in direct competition with each other forthose resources.

There’sno team work. There’s nothing to foster a sense of unity exceptopposition to the way things are supposed to be done.

Atthe same time this ‘competition’ creates an intense pressure tobe more violent and do thingsthat are at least perceived to be ‘more brutal’. Someone’sworth at work is literally measured by how inventively violent theycan be.

Everyoneis actively competing to be seen as the most violent, leastcompassionate, aggressive, pumped up parody of masculinity they canpossibly by.

Torturersegg each other on. At the same time they can’t rely on each otherbecause they’re in competition and any hesitancy or sign of‘softer’ emotions is read as weak.

Atthe same time this isn’tthe atmosphere these people are spending 100% of their time in. Theseare ordinary people and when they clock off they’re often goinghome to families, partners, childhood friends. These people may haveno idea what they’re doing. They might be ‘supportive’. Theymight be opposed to torture.

Anotherinteresting account Fanon reports is that of a young French womanwhose father was a torturer during the Franco-Algerian war.

Shedescribes the complete breakdown of her relationship with her father.He never abused her or her family. She doesn’t really talk aboutany mental health symptoms on his part. Instead she talks about adeep and visceral negative reaction to torture. A sense of shame andbetrayal of the people she grew up around andthe hypocrisy of colonial society.

Shesaid she was relieved when he was killed.

Sowhere does that leave you?

Witha short scene I think it’s difficult to convey all the nuance youcould. These situations are often complex, though not in the way theytend to be presented as complex. Torture is not morally complex. Butthere are significant psychological and social complexitiessurrounding it.

It’sa difficult balance you’re trying to strike, especially if all youhave is one short scene.

Theeasiest way to deal with that is probably to give the scene itself(and indeed the torturers generally) more narrative space. But that’snot necessarily something that fits your story and that could resultin the torturers taking over more of the narrative then you’recomfortable with.

Ifyou think it couldwork in your particular story then I’d suggest showing the point ofview torturer as he is beforehe goes to work. That way you contrast the person he seems to bearound family or friends with the person he is around other torturersand victims.

Thereare several different ways you could handle that.

Ithink playing the family/friends as ignorant could work, but I thinkit might demand a greater contrast between the character at home andthe character as a torturer. A really big and sudden shift, played ina way readers don’t expect would undermine any sense that thischaracter is sympathetic.

Anotheroption is having the friends or family aware of what the torturerdoes and extremely concerned for the torturer.If they’re living in close quarters with this character or haveregular contact it would be impossible for them not to notice theeffect this has had on the torturer. It is noticeably anddramatically unhealthy. It’sprobably not helped by the way police generally tend to put in quitelong hours.

Soeven a character who thinks torture is ‘necessary’ or could bejustified might very well want to stop a torturer going to work. Andthat can easily be written in a way that conceals the true motivationfrom the reader until the torturer actually arrivesat work and their nature is revealed.

Somethinglike: ‘It’s so early and you barely slept last night.’

‘You’reworking so hard it’s killing you. Let someone else do it today.’

‘Pleasejust phone in sick. Can’t you see how this is effecting you?’

Allof these things could sound like a ‘normal’ hard-workingpoliceman in a particularly violent area. Writing this from thetorturer’s perspective, with them moved by this person’s concerneven while they’re dismissing it, also creates that impression. Itgives you a chance to show this character as a person withcompassionate feelings before showing them in an environment wherethey’re encouraged to crush those feelings.

Ascene like this could also be played out with a friend or familymember who feels rather like the torturer’s daughter Fanoninterviewed. The torturer might then reflect that they didn’t usedto be so cold and distant. The torturer might make some efforts atsocialising, normal things like asking about the other character’shobbies, their friends, hoping they have a good day-

Againthis establishes a sort of ‘normality’ and that the character iscapable of empathy before showing them in that toxic environmentabusing other people.

Ifyou feel like you need to stick to a single short scene then I thinkstressing the macho competitiveness between torturers is key toportraying that toxic environment. These people might be nominally onthe side but this isn’t a unit or a team. It’s a collection ofindividuals who occasionally close ranks but are very much competingagainst each other.

Idon’t think there’s necessarily anything wrong with leaving it atthat. Empathy doesn’t make people nice. You could construct thescene with the pov torturer reflecting on his competition, using hisempathy and judgement of theiremotional state (or mental health problems) in really nasty ways.

Seeingthat a colleague is showing obvious signs of anxiety and respondingby verbally punishing them for it isn’tlack of empathy. It’s having the empathy to judge another person’semotional distress and then responding to that judgement in a toxicway. A sentiment to the effect that this would be acceptable in a‘soft’ job but it isn’t here would be perfectly in keeping withthe kind of toxic sub culture torturers generally exist in.

Thefinal option I can think of in a short scene is to include a briefinteraction with a non-torturer who is not a victim for contrast.

Ina policing context- Well I keep thinking of Zootopia and OfficerClawhauser, the friendly, non-threatening, overweight cheetah manningthe reception desk.

Someonesweet and smiling who is neither a threat nor competition. The kindof a character a torturer could easily see as usefulbut less important than they are. They sit at the desk and greet thetorturer warmly every day. They tell the torturer if anyone has madeany breakthroughs the day before (ie ‘Oh so and so confessed lastnight’) and a little bit of what the others are up to (‘Officer Ais in the interview room with suspect B’).

Notethis character doesn’t necessarily have to be aware of torture intheir department. They might well be completely ignorant of it. Andthey’re removed enough from what the torturer sees as ‘actualpolice work’ to be completely non-threatening.

Asa result a torturer could easily and believably be pleasant andfriendly towards them. Then turn around and be utterly toxic towardscolleagues the torturer works with much more closely.

Itis difficult striking thissort of balance in a narrative. Choosean option you feel fits your story best and don’t be afraid ofrewriting the scene a few times to get it right.

Withdifficult scenes like this, where there’s a lot of elements tobalance, I think writing groups are incredibly useful. Gettingfeedback on the scenes from other writers (or just readers you trust)is a great way to find out if a scene is working, if the informationis all there and if the emotional tone is where you want it to be.

Don’tworry if you don’t get this scene right the first time. That’sOK. Stick with it. Commit to improving it until it’s the best itcan be.

You’llget there. :)

Disclaimer

[southeastasianists]

When Suharto resigned as Indonesia’s president in May 1998, the path was unsure. Would democratization be allowed to proceed?  Would violence be used to settle differences as it had previously in Indonesia’s history, to bloody effect? Twenty years later, Indonesia is a noisy democracy which has come back from several trips to the knife’s edge. This essay uses Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s approach to understanding democratic consolidation to evaluate Indonesia’s democracy twenty years after the overthrow of Suharto. 1 The paper shows that Indonesia has moved toward democratic consolidation in many areas—democracy has become the new normal, but serious challenges remain such as undemocratic civil society organizations, a threatened and in parts unprofessional press, reviled political parties, weaknesses in the rule of law, bureaucratic corruption, and economic inequality.

Prerequisite: Stateness

For Linz and Stepan, there is a pre-requisite to democratic consolidation: stateness. Since states experience democracy, without being a state, democracy is a non-starter. So, countries suffering significant separatist challenges struggle to consolidate democracy. As Indonesia democratized in 1998, many wondered whether the country would be able to hold together without an authoritarian strongman to keep the regions in check. Inter-communal violence in Ambon and Poso between Christians and Muslims raised the prospects of wider chaos early in the transition from authoritarian rule. So, too, did the long-running separatist conflict in Aceh. Democratization gave East Timor the opportunity to vote in an UN-supervised referendum on independence. But, as it turned out, despite the horrible violence, these were not harbingers of a wider challenge to Indonesia’s stateness. East Timor departed, but this did not challenge Indonesia existentially due to that territory’s distinct political history (it was invaded only in 1975). Peace deals in Ambon, Poso, and even Aceh calmed conflicts in those areas. Despite serious challenges to its territorial integrity, Indonesia has maintained its stateness.

Civil Society

Civil society is the arena, independent from the state, in which people organize into groups and associations. Indonesia’s civil society, in particular university students, contributed to the fall of President Suharto in 1998 through months of protests.  After the dictator had fallen, the Indonesian public remained engaged, organizing to support the country’s young democracy. New groups appeared; old organizations acquired new space. Indonesians came together to conduct voter education, monitor elections, promote human rights, and fight corruption. These groups supported new democratic norms.

Other groups formed, however, which did not support Indonesia’s evolving democracy, though they did take advantage of the new freedoms to organize. The Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) took it upon itself to enforce Islamic strictures, using force and intimidation to target celebrations of Christmas, drinking alcohol, LGBT citizens, and those perceived to be deviant Muslims. Terrorist groups, homegrown and with links to Al Qaeda and then ISIS, have also carried out attacks on targets including hotels, the stock exchange, religious sites, and night markets.

Front Pembela Islam has experienced success with its foray into politics, helping to prevent ethnic Chinese and Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok) from being re-elected in 2017.  FPI and other organizations orchestrated social media campaigns and protests designed to spread the message that non-indigenous non-Muslims should not be permitted to lead Indonesia’s majority Muslims. FPI further demanded Ahok’s prosecution for blasphemy, for which he was eventually sentenced to two years in jail.  While many may disagree with Ahok’s blunt style and neoliberal policies, the FPI’s attack on an Indonesian citizen’s right to hold office simply because of his ethnicity and religion undermined Indonesia’s democracy.

Indonesia’s press has exploded in the reform era, allowing a profusion of new voices to be heard.  However, press freedom is still under challenge in the country.  Indonesia ranked 124th of 180 nations in the Reporters without Borders Press Freedom Index in 2018. 2 Journalists have struggled to report in some areas of the country, especially Papua, West Papua, and Aceh.  Also, reporters experience and fear violence as a result of their reporting, particularly when concerned with conflict areas, religious extremists, and corruption.  Some members of the press are also part of the problem because they charge subjects for positive coverage, fail to fact-check, or display partisanship (many Indonesian politicians own their own media outlets).  “Fake news” is expected to play an important role in upcoming regional and national elections.

Political Society

In addition to civil society, democratic consolidation also occurs in the arena of political society; this is where citizens organize to contest for state power. After Suharto fell, hundreds of new political parties formed. Party and election laws have been refined over time to narrow the number of parties through requiring certain levels of national participation and support. Just 16 parties will be allowed to compete in elections in 2019, along with four parties only in Aceh. The effective number of parties, a measure used to assess parties’ weight in the political system, was 5.1 in 1999 and 8.9 in 2014, 3 so, though the overall number of parties has gone down, the number which matter has actually risen. Levels of support for each party vary from election to election.  Three different parties—Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Golkar, and Partai Demokrat—have topped the parliamentary polls in the four elections since Suharto’s fall.  Indonesia’s strong presidency is now directly elected, and only coalitions of a certain level of support may nominate candidates.  Direct presidential elections since 2004 have brought personalistic rather than institutional/party-based candidates to power.

Suharto’s Indonesia was highly centralized, but in the reform era, politics has been decentralized with greater power and authority available to local and regional levels of government. Likewise, these lower levels have been democratized with direct elections for mayors, regents, and governors.  When the opposition under Gerindra’s Prabowo Subianto tried to un-do direct regional elections in 2014, the attempt was reversed due to public pressure.  

Indonesians’ responses to pollsters show strong support for the country’s democratic elections.  In the International Foundation for Election Systems poll following the 2014 elections, 82% of Indonesians responded that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the voting process in the national parliamentary elections. 4 Problems with elections include the high cost of campaigns (for which elected officials need to get paid back and parties need to scrounge funds), candidates paying for votes, and inaccurate voter rolls. Despite these problems, election turnout remains high four elections in to Indonesia’s democratization (75% in 2014), suggesting strong public engagement. 5

While elections have become a regular piece of Indonesia’s democratic environment, parties have an image problem.  Early in the post-Suharto transition, public opinion poll respondents expressed affinity for one or another of the new political parties.  Today, though, “[c]itizen loyalty toward political parties is trending weak,” according to Saiful Mujani Research Center executive director Djayadi Hanan. 6 Reasons for this public disaffection include ambitious say-anything politicians, eat-at-the-trough-of-power coalition building, flamboyant corruption scandals, and the parties’ failures to build enduring institutions.

Rule of Law

Rule of law is another arena in which democratic consolidation occurs.  For democracy to be consolidated, everyone, including officers of the government, must be equal before the law. Rule of law has improved since the Suharto years when law was “just an ornament,” according to University of Indonesia law professor Hikmahanto Juwana. 7 However, significant problems remain.  The Rule of Law Index finds Indonesia 63rd of 113 countries in rule of law. 8The country’s weakest scores are in criminal justice and corruption.  Judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement are all notoriously corrupt.  According to Hikmahanto, reasons for weaknesses in rule of law are poor pay, weak human resources, and lack of prestige in study of the law. 9

State Bureaucracy

In addition to rule of law, a consolidated democracy also requires an effective state. Who will support the new democracy if it cannot effectively execute its duties? Early in the transition, Indonesia’s state appeared to wobble.  The country faced a kristal, total crisis: political changes, economic crash, communal violence, and terrorist onslaught.  However, Indonesia’s state survived.  Politics painstakingly built a new constitutional system. Elections in 2004 delivered a popular president who was believed able to deliver security, a key state function. The economy climbed from the doldrums of the financial crisis (shrinking 13.8% in 1998) to achieve growth rates of 4-6% annually in the 2000s, increasing public confidence.  Peace agreements were brokered in Ambon and Poso to calm the country’s inter-communal tensions.  Indonesia’s Detachment 88 anti-terrorist squad has successfully hunted and captured terrorists minimizing the threat to the new democracy.  The state has survived the kristal and delivered.

The state bureaucracy is, though, highly corrupt.  According to Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, Indonesia ranks 96th of 180 countries. 10  Politicians typically rail against corruption in campaigns but struggle to combat it (if they try at all) when in office. Poor pay means officials believe they need corruption to get by.  Parties need money to fight elections to stay in power, but their only seeming access to funds is through monetizing their control of the state, i.e., corruption.  Presidents need coalitions of parties to advance their agendas, meaning sometimes they must look away from corruption to protect their broader goals.  Corruption has been democratized as power and funds have passed down the political hierarchy to provinces, districts, and municipalities.  It often feels like Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission, deeply respected by Indonesians, is outmatched by its prey.

Economic Society

Democratic consolidation also happens in the arena of economic society. Democracy requires that all citizens have the economic capacity to influence the political process.  Excessive control of resources by any one entity (the state) or group (oligarchs) could make democratic consolidation problematic.

In Indonesia, high income inequality is the greatest challenge in economic society. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, has actually increased over the course of the reform era: from .30 in 2000 to .41 in 2013; 11 this is a significant and surprising fact. A democratization movement meant to spread political power has, at least in the short term, concentrated wealth more unequally.  The political system is loaded with millionaires and even billionaires bankrolling parties or putting themselves up as candidates. The high cost of campaigning in Indonesia’s media-saturated, poll-driven environment makes big money a plus for political candidates. But, an elite-run system is problematic for consolidation of Indonesia’s democracy.

Conclusion

Using Linz and Stepan’s lens to understand Indonesia’s democratic consolidation over the last twenty years highlights key aspects of the country’s journey.  Democracy has largely become the “only game in town,” the new normal. 12 Indonesia has survived challenges to its stateness, achieving Linz and Stepan’s pre-requisite for democratic consolidation. Civil society has expanded dramatically; press outlets have proliferated.  In political society, elections have become widely accepted, and participation is extensive.  The state has demonstrated effectiveness, particularly in the key areas of nurturing growth and establishing security.

But, the filter provided by Linz and Stepan’s framework enables us to see areas where consolidation is weak.  Not all civil society organizations take part in the new democratic ethos. Likewise, the press is under threat and parts sometimes unprofessional. The legitimacy of political parties is low, rule of law is weak, and economic inequality has increased since Suharto’s fall. The state bureaucracy remains highly corrupt.  Each of these weaknesses holds in it the possibility of un-doing Indonesia’s democracy if it contributes to delegitimizing the new normal.

Paige Johnson Tan, Ph.D Professor Department of Political Science Radford University, USA

References

Ahmad, Saidiman.  “Elektabilitas PDIP dan Jokowi Terus Menguat.” Saifulmujani.com. January 3, 2018. http://saifulmujani.com/blog/2018/01/03/elektabilitas-pdip-dan-jokowi-terus-menguat (accessed March 6, 2018). Gantan, Josua.  “Rule of Law Seen as Indonesia’s Achilles Heel.” Jakarta Globe, April 17, 2014 http://jakartaglobe.id/news/rule-law-seen-indonesias-achilles-heel/ (accessed May 7, 2018). IFES. Executive Summary on Indonesia Post-Election National Survey. June 2014.  http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/indonesia_national_public_opinion_poll_june_2014_2014_executive_summary_2.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018). Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Reporters without Borders. Press Freedom Index 2018.  https://rsf.org/en/ranking(accessed May 11, 2018). Thornley, Andrew. “Nine Takeaways from the Legislative Elections.” Elections in Indonesia. 2014.  Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IndonesiaElections.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018), pp. 6-7. Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index. 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017(accessed May 11, 2018). WJP.  World Justice Project. Rule of Law Index 2017-2018. Undated. http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#groups/IDN (accessed May 7, 2018). World Bank. “Indonesia’s Rising Divide.” December 7, 2015.  http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/12/08/indonesia-rising-divide(accessed May 7, 2018).

Notes:

Linz and Stepan 1996.

Reporters without Borders 2018.

These are the author’s calculations based on official election results.

IFES 2014, 1.

Thornley 2014, 7.

Ahmad 2018.

Gantan 2014.

WJP 2018.

Gantan 2014.

Transparency International 2017.

World Bank 2015.

Linz and Stepan 1996, 5.

[zdbztumble]

“Batman” Series Take

After chatting with @echidnapower and others about the DCAU, headcanons, rewrites, and the like, I remembered this little number I put together years ago - an outline for a hypothetical Batman series - a high budget animated series.

Some initial premises: it may seem repetitive, but I think TAS got it right with "Dark Deco." 30s dress and cars mixed with modern computers and TVs (which all have black and white screens) just worked for Batman's world, and if it ain't broke, don't fix it. I would push the architecture into a more overtly Gothic/Victorian style, with interiors taken from the late 50s/early 60s. I wouldn't mind a more "cartoony" character design either; I think a clean, simple, retro look to the characters mixed with very dark backgrounds and stories would make an interesting clash. The format would be hour-long, with 20 episodes a season and a TV-14 rating.

SEASON 1

On a foggy, drizzly, miserable evening, Bruce Wayne slips back into Gotham unnoticed after his many years away. Alfred picks him up, takes him to his parents' graves, and the obligatory flashback to the death of his parents is shown. This is as much of his origins as we'll ever see; Bruce's past, his travels, his training are to be left a mystery.

The Gotham Bruce has returned to has, for years, been under the total control of the Gotham Hold (an equivalent to the Five Families of New York), an alliance of the five major organized crime groups in town - the Falcone Empire, the Maroni Family, The Penguin's Flock, The Grissom Syndicate, and the Thorne Gang. The heads of these gangs are all public figures - Carmine Falcone and Carl Grissom relish their notoreity - but while Gothamites of all stripes have some awareness that the game is rigged, the true extent of the Hold's power and its true make-up is a complete mystery to the public and to most of law enforcement. Harvey Dent, fresh off his election victory, and Captain Gordon have put forward the most determined team trying to bust the Hold, but their efforts have been in vain. The judges and police commissioner they work with are openly corrupt. Of the three largest private companies headquartered in Gotham - Wayne Enterprises, Daggett Pharmaceuticals, and Shreck's Entertainment - two are in league with the Hold. 

Bruce and Dent have been friends since childhood, but while the friendship has survived Bruce's long absence, Dent doesn't turn to Bruce for support. Upon his return, Bruce Wayne comes off as a "goody goody," completely incorruptible, but with no social skills, no public presence, and no business sense. No one in Gotham notices or cares that he's back. But while some of that persona is unintentional and genuine, Bruce does get more serious behind closed doors. While he leaves Lucius Fox in the CEO chair that Fox has held since Thomas Wayne's death, Bruce asks him to do more for the city and to ramp up competition with their crooked rivals. He also starts pilfering various cancelled and untested technology projects, which Fox turns a blind eye to.

Batman makes his first appearance on the docks, making short work of some small-time drug dealers. They are associates of the Falcone Empire; applying his detective skills, Batman is able to trace them to the Empire's largest narcotics crew and takes down the whole lot of them as they attempt a big score. On a Halloween later dubbed "Nosferatu Night," he tracks down and assaults the bosses of all the Hold gangs and uses sonar technology to sick thousands of bats on each of them. This strike throws Gotham upside down and emboldens Dent and Gordon, who succeed in forcing out the corrupt commissioner and finding a judge to prosecute the captured Falcone crew. It is Dent who Batman first contacts in this series, though Gordon is soon brought in, and the trio concot a plan to expose the extent of the Hold's power and take down the biggest and most public of its gangs - the Falcones. 

Batman's methods let him uncover more than his legitimate partners ever could, and Gordon makes a turncoat of one of the captured Falcone soldiers. In a televised event analogous to the Valachi hearings, Dent uses the soldier as a mouthpiece to make public all of Batman's intel: each gang has its own primary racket, and various systems are set up to interconnect their interests. The Falcones make their living through narcotics and arms smuggling. The Maronis, once the one and only powerhouse in Gotham organized crime, have been cut down by their younger partners over the years and are now headed by a man, "Don Salvatore," who had hoped to escape his family's criminal past and reluctantly oversees his organization's gambling interests. The Penguin's Flock is a loose cabal of eight upper-crust figures who dabble in white collar crime, primarily counterfeiting, fencing of valuable antiques and artifacts, and high level political corruption. Their true leader is unknown, but Batman has observed all its members coming and going from the supposedly ruined Cobblepot estate. The Grissom Syndicate handles prostitution, with waste management as a very strong "front.” The Thornes control the unions of Gotham. There is also the Red Hood, the Hold's murder squad (made of one member per gang) so named for the unique outfit its members wear to avoid detection. Not even Batman could learn the names of the Red Hood's members, known only to the crime bosses.  Each gang has a set number of seats on the Hold's "board of directors," and they meet monthly to coordinate and plot new illicit business. The public notoriety drives the Hold underground, and Batman makes a spectacular raid on Carmine Falcone's home, making off with "The Roman's" ledger. Dent is able to use it to secure arrest warrants for the top administration of the Empire, and in the biggest trial Gotham has seen in decades, manages to put Carmine Falcone away for life.

The victory is short-lived, however. The soldier-turncoat is gunned down by the Red Hood as he is brought in to testify at a new trial. The first of the radical criminals make their appearance: Catwoman, who seems more interested in playing cat and mouse with Batman than in any of the things she steals. While Batman hunts down the Cat, Bruce meets Selina Kyle. They immediately form a bond, though Selina seems more interested in a flirtatious friendship than anything serious. When Batman finally catches Catwoman, she proves gracious in defeat, revealing where everything she stole is, though she eludes actual arrest. Selina abruptly stops seeing Bruce around the same time. Next is Ivy, who seduces Dent with a mind to kill him for prosecuting eco-terrorists. Batman stops her, but the affair strains Dent's relationship with his wife Gilda. Finally, Mr. Freeze assaults Daggett Pharmaceuticals, hoping to take revenge on the underlings who caused his condition and to force Roland Daggett to pay for research to save his wife. When Batman stops Freeze, he is able to convince him to put vengeance aside, orders Fox to set up a research lab for Freeze in prison, and for the rest of the series, Freeze is an ally to Batman.

The affair with Ivy is kept hidden from the public and the Hold, but it shakes up Dent's mental state. He begins to see a psychologist - none other than Jonathan Crane, who sees Dent on the side from his duties at Arkham Asylum. Dent is revealed to have a split personality, born from his efforts to suppress his rage after he accidentally killed his alcoholic father while trying to defend himself and his mother. Crane has lately cut deals with the Thorne Gang to get their men out of jailtime, and also engages in many twisted experiments concerning fear. He now wants to see what would happen if Gotham's greatest hero became its greatest public menace. He approaches the Thornes for aid, and without the approval of the Hold, they agree. Dent and Gilda are kidnapped; restrained, Dent sees Gilda murdered before his eyes. As The Scarecrow, Crane tortures Dent with fear toxins, what he knows about his past, and a face full of corrosive bleach. Batman learns of the kidnapping and rushes to the rescue, but is too late to save Dent or capture Scarecrow. When Dent recovers physically, his mind is gone. He becomes "Two-Face Dent," and with a flip of the coin, vows to take down the Hold by killing off all its members. He goes on a mass shooting spree, sending Gotham into a panic. Rupert Thorne manages to escape Two-Face's wrath, but is killed by the Red Hood for helping to bring this menace upon the Hold. Crane delights in his "experiment's" success, and Gordon and Bruce are left to deal with the loss of their friend.

SEASON 2

A few months have passed. Two-Face has continued his shooting spree, driving all of organized crime further underground. He has claimed several Thorne soldiers, an entire Falcone crew, and the Falcone acting boss. The next in line for that job, Angelo Falcone, finds the Hold falling apart. He and the Penguin (who finally reveals himself to his fellow mobsters via speaker phone) both conclude that the strongest Hold gang could take advantage of their situation and absorb the others, and so the two begin a race to conquest. Their most visible battlefield is in their support for competing factions in the Thorne Gang; underboss Lew Moxon is backed by the Falcones, while lieutenant Vasily Kosov has the support of the Penguins. Angelo also adopts the guise of Holiday and starts killing off the biggest threats to his Empire in the other gangs. The Holiday guise is a risk; after the Two-Face fiasco, the Hold has voted to cut all ties to the "freaks." Not only has Angelo become a freak, he has kept in contact with Crane. And while he and the Penguin duke it out, sister Sofia and aunt Carla work within the Empire to undermine his reign.

Meanwhile, Gordon and Batman have soldiered on without Dent. The new DA, Janice Holder, is unfriendly towards Batman (and, as a social friend of Angelo Falcone, is lax if not openly corrupt when it comes to the Hold). Nevertheless, Gordon and Bats do have their successes. Gordon has put together a loyal team (Bullock, Montoya, John Blake, O' Hara). Selina abruptly reappears, and she and Bruce start casually dating. And Batman has an ace in the hole - Salvatore Maroni. After the Two-Face fiasco, the reluctant godfather has had enough. He won't testify for the police or the law, but he will talk to Batman. Among the nuggets he gives up is the identity of all the Red Hood assassins, as well as the leaders of the hit squad - Joe Chill and "Glasgow Jack," who have only been seen before this as chauffeurs and, in Jack's case, a popular stand-up at Underworld nightclubs. Based on Maroni's tips and Batman's own work, the Grissom Syndicate becomes the next prime target in the Hold for law enforcement. Tipped off by a mole, Grissom tries to avoid Carmine Falcone's fate. He resigns as head of his Syndicate, names Jack as his successor, and goes into hiding. Jack is unpopular as a boss in the Syndicate and in the entire Hold, not because he is too greedy, but because he frightens them. Ever since Batman first appeared, Jack has grown more and more wild - and he was barely in control to begin with. Since the Red Hood will not betray their boss, the Hold recruits Grissom gunmen to take Jack and his crew out as they inspect a chemical plant they operate as a front, Axis. Tipped off, the Red Hood all don their standard disguise and ambush their attackers. Batman and the police try to break up the fight and bring Jack to justice, but in the end, two are captured, two slip out, and another is accidentally knocked into a vat of chemicals by Batman. Jack and Joe Chill are not accounted for.

While Maroni's testimony is helpful, Batman has no respect for him. He is horrified when Maroni turns up at a Wayne fundraiser as a guest of Leslie Thompkins. It is revealed  that Salvatore's father Luigi was a patient of Thompkins, was also a reluctant mobster who tried to reform before the Falcones started a mob war, and had his life saved by Thomas Wayne. Dr. Wayne and Luigi became friends in spite of themselves. Salvatore is also Thompkins' patient and has kept a correspondence with Alfred started by his father. Bruce develops a reluctant respect for the godfather, and just in time. The Hold has found out that Maroni talked to the Batman, and kidnaps his two sons to try and force him to come forward and reveal what he told. Instead, Batman and Maroni blaze into where the boys are being kept and save them. Maroni officially cooperates with law enforcement, convinces several of his top men to do the same, and is deported to Sicily, where he takes up his dream job as a writer.

The testimony of the Maroni defectors opens up the entire Hold to prosecution, and Batman and Gordon are hopeful for a successful strike against them, despite distractions from new "freaks" (Man-Bat) and Catwoman's return. But a few weeks after the incident at Axis, a radio message announces that Grissom will meet his death at the hands of the Joker. The prediction comes true, down to the minute. Several more members of the Syndicate meet a similar end before the targets become random civilians. The deaths are all caused by "the Joker's Patented Smylex Venom," which Batman is able to synthesise an antidote for, but no one can predict when or where the deaths will come. The Joker makes his first public appearance in a deadly parade that leaves one of the busiest streets of Gotham in ruins, courtesy of Mr. J and his Red Triangle Circus Gang. It is implied (but never confirmed) that the Joker is either Jack or Joe Chill, and whichever he isn't is the Ringleader character of the Circus Gang. The Ringleader is the Number 3 man in  the group; Number 2 is Harley Quinn, who has Dini's origin but met Joker outside of an institution.

The Joker keeps up his reign of terror, always evading the law and Batman. His antics are destroying organized crime. After Grissom's death, what remains of his gang is absorbed by the Penguins; what was left of the Maronis was absorbed by the Falcones. They continue to fight each other through the Thornes. Angelo Falcone hires Crane to take out the Joker. Crane gets his chance when the Joker breaks into Arkham. As Scarecrow, Crane tries his fear gas on the Joker; it has no effect. In response, the Joker gases Scarecrow, and all of Arkham, with a laughing gas, and sets them all loose on Gotham. When Sofia Gigante gets wind of her brother's failed plan and Holiday guise, she puts a contract on his head; on the 4th of July, Angelo takes them both out in a suicide strike, leaving his top man as the boss of the Empire. In the Thorne Gang, Kosov kills Moxon and agrees to serve under the Penguin. Batman exposes the Penguin as Oswald Cobblepot at some point in the season, but he is able to remain an obscure figure to the public. Two-Face, with a flip of the coin, plans a bombing of the Cobblepot estate, but the Penguin escapes to an underground lair. He and the new Falcone boss make peace, and the streamlined Hold plots its future in a Gotham where the criminal scene is dominated by the freaks.

Batman and Gordon rush to control this situation. Batman targets the Joker himself, getting unexpected help from Catwoman. In the end, the Joker falls from a building and his body can't be found (the Joker's appearances would follow in the vein of his earliest comics; he appears to have died, but you're never sure). While most of the inmates of Arkham (and Scarecrow) remain loose, Gordon manages to scatter them, capture most of the Circus Gang (Harley and the Ringleader get away), and Two-Face. He is promoted to commissioner.

SEASON 3

The most episodic season, featuring encounters with classic Batman foes. A proper confrontation with Scarecrow, a proper confrontation with Penguin, Riddler, Harley and Ivy, Mad Hatter (with Tweedledee and Tweedledum as henchmen, naturally), two more rounds with the Joker, King Tut (who is more Catwoman's foe than Batman's), Clayface, Two-Face's escape from Arkham, and Croc. Catwoman gets into hijinks throughout, and we (but not Batman) are privy to her darker side. 

I've always wanted to see a Batman story that went something like this: Gotham hits a calm spell, and while Gordon spends the extra time with his family, Bruce has no clue what to do with himself. 

Throughout, Bruce and Selina get more serious. Eventually, her identity is revealed, with the twist that it's Bruce instead of Batman who discovers it; he doesn't take her in right away, not knowing how to take it. The season finale is an adaptation of the Mad Monk story, forcing Batman to accept the existence of the truly supernatural.

SEASON 4

It opens with a trip to Metropolis on the trail of some of Penguin's smugglers, a "World's Finest" episode. When Bruce gets back to Gotham, Selina has left town under mysterious circumstances. However, a woman named Talia who Bruce meets at a ball keeps his mind off of Selina. Talia appears to be the daughter of a visiting diplomat, and as she and Bruce fall in love, she puts pressure on Bruce to become a more public figure, to use his wealth and influence for philanthropic causes. Lucius Fox has encouraged similar goals. This leads to Bruce having an experience based on the "Ghosts" segment of "Haunted Knights." This experience causes him to question his image of his father and his commitment to his persona. This also causes him, when he next faces the Joker, to make an offer similar to that at the end of "Killing Joke;" the Joker refuses, but agrees to go to Arkham "for a nice long vacation." Meanwhile, a few more notables from the Rogue's Gallery make their appearances;  Solomon Grundy, Ventriloquist, and Hugo Strange.

Strange, as it turns out, is in the employ of the diplomat, who is of course Ra's al Ghul. Together, they deduce Batman's true identity. After the obligatory test of his "rescue" of Talia, Ra's wants Bruce as his successor and Talia's husband. When Bruce refuses on both counts, Ra's and Strange attempt to frame Batman for various crimes; they eventually succeed, Gordon the only one keeping the faith. Batman flees Gotham and the country on the trail of Ra's and Strange. He eventually learns of Ra's immortality through the Pits, that there are only a very few Lazurus Pits left, and that Ra's plans to detonate them to wipe out humanity, courtesy of Strange's technology. However, Ra's has misled Strange about his intentions. When Strange learns of the double-cross (courtesy of Batman), he engineers a controlled destruction of the Pits, preventing mass destruction and robbing Ra's of his immortality. When there is only one Pit left (the one their headquarters is built on), Ra's stabs Strange, and he and Batman have their classic duel. Ra's seems to have the upper hand, but in his last moments of life, Strange draws a gun and puts a bullet in Ra's head. As the headquarters begins to collapse (Strange had set it to blow), Talia throws herself into the fire rather than go with Batman.

As Batman, badly injured, flies back to Gotham, the military is scrambled to shoot him down. He is still not cleared of false charges. Alfred has been working on exonerating him, and sends his evidence to Gordon, but Gordon can't spread the news in time to stop Batman from being blown out of the sky. He staggers out of the wreckage, only to be shot into the water by soldiers. He barely makes it back to Wayne Manor. As Alfred pieces him back together, Bruce decides to give up the cape and cowl and honour his vow another way.

SEASON 5

We open six months into "The Year of the Dark Knight's Rest." Bruce and Alfred have closed Wayne Manor and moved into a penthouse in the city. Bruce has taken Talia's and Fox's advice, becoming a public philanthropist and more involved in his family’s company. However, he is still Batman at heart, and his unsatisfied desire - his need - for the cape and cowl is taking a toll on his state of mind. He has also been diagnosed with the early stages of Type 2 diabetes. In the Batman's absence, Gordon has generally managed, though morale in law enforcement has sunk and morale in crime has risen. The Penguin has turned over his criminal interests to underlings (ostensibly; in fact, they are front bosses still answering to him) and set himself up as a legitimate figure. Though he had been known as a crime lord, the public never knew the extent of his misdeeds, and he enjoys a wonderful reputation and a greater degree of political influence than ever before. Many of the freaks have been released (or escaped) from Arkham, and have carved up the city into spheres of influence, where their particular brand of crime dominates. The Joker breaks out of Arkham and goes on a rampage to try and lure out Batman, but when he never appears, the Joker gives up and goes back to Arkham. The damage caused is another weight on Bruce’s psyche.

A year on from his “retirement,” Bruce attends a charity circus, headlined by the Flying Graysons. Another member of the circus is Bane. Imported as an enforcer for the Falcones, he has gone undercover in the circus to ensure that they pay their protection money. When they stop, Bane enlists a crew to cause an accident for the Graysons, leaving 13-year old Dick an orphan. Bruce gives the boy a home and, seeing the effect the loss of his parents has had on Dick, finally takes back up the mantle. He tracks down the hoods, who finger Bane. When facing Bane, Batman is faced with just how much of his edge he's lost, and almost has his back broken when Dick (who found the cave and stowed away in the Batmobile) saves his life. Together, they bring down Bane, and Batman realises Dick's drive. Reopening Wayne Manor, he offers to train Dick, and Robin is born.

Batman and Robin spend the rest of the season bringing down mobsters and encountering notables from the Rogue's Gallery. Along the way, they encounter Barbara Gordon. Wheelchair bound from childhood in this continuity, she deduces their identities and offers her computer services; Oracle is born. Selina returns to Gotham, with nothing to say about her absence. She starts going out as Catwoman again, and Batman dutifully goes after her, though it soon becomes clear that she is handing out wealth she aquired during her time away, not stealing it. During one encounter, they say certain lines to each other; in their first meeting out of costume, they repeat the lines, and Selina learns Bruce's identity. They get together, and Catwoman becomes (a distant) part of the Bat-family.

SEASON 6

Two years have passed. Batman, Robin, and Oracle are a seasoned trinity of crime-fighters. Bruce and Selina have maintained their relationship, and Catwoman assists on a case-by-case basis. Bruce is as close to happy as it's possible for him to be. Most of the radical criminals are in Arkham, or well-contained.

But the Bat-family is faced with a new kind of foe. The Penguin, as a legitimate figure, has formed closer partnerships with Shreck and Daggett. They have successfully funded a mayor, forced Gordon out of office, bought most of the city councilmen, and gotten massive deregulation passed. They've destroyed the environment and preyed on the populace, and all of it legal, since the start of Season 5. Because this was done over a long span of time, and because the radical criminals are still so visible, no one has really stopped to notice. Batman's new strategy is one of espionage; with Catwoman and Oracle's help, he uncovers the full extent of what has been done, and through viral messages, turns public opinion against Penguin and his allies. Meanwhile, Bruce redoubles Wayne Enterprises' efforts to compete with Daggett and Shreck.

It isn't all corporate espionage and stealth campaigning, though; there are still crooks to fight. The beginnings of the the Royal Flush Gang pop up, and Hush arrives on the scene. This version of Hush has a grudge against Bruce and Harvey Dent, who was with them on that fateful day at camp. He kidnaps Bruce and Two-Face, but the experience reawakens Harvey and his free will. He stops Hush without killing him, frees Bruce, and checks himself in to Arkham (I figure at least one version of Harvey should have a happy ending).

Things begin to turn south towards the end, however. The Joker breaks out of Arkham and kidnaps Robin on his first night going solo. Batman, Catwoman, and Oracle search for weeks, without leads, when a massive explosion rocks the Axis Chemical ruins. Robin is found, hideously scarred and barely alive. When his fate is pronounced "uncertain" by ICU, Batman tears through the underworld, demanding leads on the Joker. He finally tracks him down to a ruined carnival, where he sees Harley kill the Ringleader for perceived disloyalty. When Batman finds the Joker, he is treated to footage of Dick's torture, and the Joker reveals that the Boy Wonder was eventually coerced into revealing everything he knew about Bruce. It is implied (but not confirmed) that the Joker knows something about the deaths of the Waynes. Batman attacks, and it becomes clear that the Joker's whole plan in torturing Robin was to drive Batman to kill him. He comes very close, but in the end, just cannot do it. When he refuses, the Joker goes on the attack, hoping to force a murder in self-defense. In the end, the Joker ends up killing himself. His last words: this isn't funny.

Harley is taken to Arkham. After a few months, Dick has recovered physically. Emotionally, there is some work to be done, but he wants to take up the costume again. When Bruce refuses, the two argue, and Dick ends up stealing the Robin costume and running away. Bruce does not go after him.

Even with Dick's departure, the strategy against the Penguin works; his mayor is recalled, Gordon is reappointed, and regulations are restored. The Penguin is arrested on evidence of his past criminal deeds, and Daggett falls under investigation. But Shreck weasels his way out of trouble. When his secretary finds out about a certain scheme, he hires Black Mask to kill her. That secretary was a good friend of Selina's. She tracks down Black Mask, and the fight ends with Mask and Shreck in a precarious position. Catwoman lets them die, and becomes wanted for murder. When Batman confronts her about it, he appears to talk her into coming home with him. However, she sees him reach for handcuffs. She swipes him across the face and skips town again. The deception causes friction with Alfred and Oracle, and Bruce gives up on any love life.

SERIES FINALE MOVIE

It is 20 years in the future. Gotham is not quite as futuristic as in "Batman Beyond," but it is on its way (it has a retro-futuristic look, with Gothic touches of course). This "New Gotham" barely hides the ruins of the old; not long ago, a massive hurricane struck, crippling the city. It has just gotten back on its feet. Dick Grayson has gone through the Teen Titans and Nightwing phases of his career, married Starfire, and is running for mayor of Gotham. Barbara Gordon has replaced her father as police commissioner. They are in a similar spot to Dent and Jim at the start of the series: organized crime is again ruling the streets. Supplanting the Falcones and the Penguins as the major force in the underworld is the Jokerz. They operate in several large groups, loosely involved with each other but all paying homage to Harley Quinn as the queenpin. Harley has clung to the delusional belief that "Puddin" will come back for her, and her inner circle has taken on a cultlike atmosphere. The biggest corporation in town is DagShreck Power, an amalgam of the old Daggett and Shreck businesses bought and controlled by the unscrupulous Derek Powers.

The Jokerz and Powers pose a problem beyond what Barbara and Dick can manage alone; they need Batman. But Barbara has not spoken to Bruce for years over some mysterious falling-out. Dick and Bruce are still estranged. And Bruce himself is not up to the task anymore. Years as Batman and advancing diabetes have taken their toll on his body. Technology enables him to patrol the entire city still, but in hand-to-hand combat he can only manage for short periods of time. While his mind is as sharp as ever, he is limited in what his detective work can accomplish, not having a partnership with the police anymore. As Bruce, he has lost touch with his company. Fox's replacements have not done well, and there is immense pressure to sell the company to Powers, something Bruce seems prepared to do. He spends his days being pieced together and cared for by Alfred and playing dice with Harvey, who has fully recovered and lives a quiet, anonymous life in the city.

Though Alfred hides it well from Bruce, he is feeling his age, and soon is on his deathbed. He tells Bruce that the has planned his funeral, that certain people will be there, and that he wants Bruce to try and make amends with these people. When the funeral arrives, Bruce meets several mourners, including Don Salvatore Maroni, whose sons have become honest and effective businessmen at Wayne Enterprises. But the people Bruce is expected to make up with are Dick, Barbara, and Selina Kyle. Selina and Barbara remain cold to his (admittedly feeble) efforts, but Dick, encouraged by Starfire, agrees to try to patch things up. Also at the funeral are members of Bruce's mom's family - the McGinnis family. Bruce's cousin Warren, an employee of Powers, asks Bruce to give his wayward son Terry a job. Bruce initially refuses, seeing Terry as a punk, but he later observes him defending his brother from bullying cousins. Knowing he'll have trouble living alone in his condition, he agrees to take Terry on as an attendant and chauffeur.

Terry, a 17-year old ex-punk with a healthy social life, is initially bummed about the job, but starts to have a better view of Bruce when he observes "the old man" outmaneuver Powers and the traitors in his own company, appointing Maroni's sons as the new heads of Wayne Enterprises and retaining ownership. As they make their way home, they are attacked by some Jokerz, and Bruce again impresses Terry by fending them off. The fight drains Bruce, and he has to be rushed home. While preparing to go home, Terry finds a bat in the grandfather clock, and uncovers the Batcave. Bruce throws him out.Terry and his father fight over his losing the job; when Terry comes home after the fight, his father is dead. A note written right before his death indicates Warren knew something about Powers and the Jokerz, but he was unable to finish writing it before being killed. Terry goes to Bruce, who does not offer or refuse help. When he leaves to take his medicine, Terry steals the suit and jet, intent on getting Powers. Bruce takes control of them and brings them home. He tells Terry that what he uncovered is the first piece of a puzzle, and that he is willing to train him so that they can solve it together.

Over the next few weeks, this is just what they do. Bruce gets more involved in the company to have opportunities to meet with Powers, while Terry is given the batsuit and allowed to spy on Powers and the Jokerz (but nothing else). Terry is a fast study on detective work and logic, being a fan of Sherlock Holmes, but is unrefined in physical combat, and Bruce is limited in what he can teach him. After a time, Terry wants to be allowed out on a full night. When Bruce refuses, he takes off anyway. He takes on a gang of Jokerz, gets in way over his head, and barely makes it out alive. Meanwhile, an attempt is made on Bruce's life; Powers wants him out of the way. All the stress of the night results in a heated argument in the cave, culminating in Bruce having a diabetic stroke. During his recovery, Dick, Barbara, and Selina all come to visit, and they all (more or less) reconcile. Dick and Barbara remain skeptical of Terry, though Dick is more open to the idea of a new Batman. Selina and Bruce find they still have feelings for each other, and Selina moves in to Wayne Manor to help take care of him. Being in much better condition than Bruce, she is the one to train Terry in martial arts, and in whip work; this Batman has a bit more of Zorro in him than usual.

Together, the three of them uncover the plot: Powers has been smuggling in equipment for the Jokerz. While he thinks it will be used to extract ransom, it is actually meant by Harley to fulfill an old "master joke" the Joker had drawn up years ago (a variation on "Joker: Last Laugh.") When push comes to shove, Bruce is both afraid for Terry and reluctant to give up the mantle, refuses to let Terry fight, and instead passes the information on to Barbara and Dick. But when a Jokerz mole passes along word, the pair are attacked and hospitalized. Starfire is injured too, leaving the Bat-family as the city's best line of defense. Bruce eventually relents; he and Terry both don the cape and cowl (with Selina as Catwoman) and take on their enemies. Powers is turned into Blight and escapes, most of the Jokerz leadership is rounded up, the plan is foiled, and Harley dies (the Joker didn't want anyone doing this "gag" but him; he found a way from beyond the grave to kill anyone who tried). In the conflict, both Batmen show their stuff, but Terry ends up having to save Bruce.

As they start to recover, Dick and Barbara concede that Terry is worthy of the mantle, though it is clear he needs more training. Barbara agrees to tolerate his presence on the condition that Bruce permanently gives up the cowl. Bruce agrees, but can't resist one last "flight." While patrolling the city, he spies a couple and their son being held at gunpoint in Crime Alley. He swoops in to help, and he does scare off the gunman (and the couple), but he takes a fatal bullet wound. With his last  strength, he makes it back to the cave and extracts a promise from Selina to finish Terry's training. Two funerals are held; one in public, one for the Bat-family, who bury Bruce in the cave. Terry prepares for his first solo flight. Batman lives on.

[orbemnews]

A Graying China May Have to Put Off Retirement. Workers Aren’t Happy. For Meng Shan, a 48-year-old urban management worker in the Chinese city of Nanchang, retirement can’t come soon enough. Mr. Meng, who is the equivalent of a low-level, unarmed law-enforcement official, often has to chase down unlicensed street vendors, a task he finds physically and emotionally taxing. Pay is low. Retirement, even on a meager government pension, would finally offer a break. So Mr. Meng was dismayed when the Chinese government said it would raise the mandatory retirement age, which is currently 60 for men. He wondered how much longer his body could handle the work, and whether his employer would dump him before he became eligible for a pension. “To tell the truth,” he said of the government’s announcement, “this is extremely unfriendly to us low-level workers.” China said last month that it would “gradually delay the legal retirement age” over the next five years, in an attempt to address one of the country’s most pressing issues. Its rapidly aging population means a shrinking labor force. State pension funds are at risk of running out. And China has some of the lowest retirement ages in the world: 50 for blue-collar female workers, 55 for white-collar female workers, and 60 for most men. The idea, though, is deeply unpopular. The government has yet to release details of its plan, but older workers have already decried being cheated of their promised timelines, while young people worry that competition for jobs, already fierce, will intensify. And workers with blue-collar or physically demanding jobs like Mr. Meng’s, who still make up the majority of China’s labor force, say they’ll be worn down, left unemployed or both. The announcement was made during the annual meeting of the national legislature, and afterward retirement-related topics trended for days on Chinese social media, racking up hundreds of millions of views and critical comments. Around the world, raising the retirement age has emerged as one of the thorniest challenges a government can take on. Russia’s attempt to do so in 2018 led to President Vladimir V. Putin’s lowest approval ratings in years. Mr. Putin eventually pushed the plan through but granted concessions, a rare move for him. A pension reform plan in France prompted a prolonged transportation strike last year, forcing the government to shelve the proposal. The Chinese government itself abandoned a previous effort to raise retirement ages in 2015, in the face of a similar outcry. This time, it seems determined to follow through. But it has also acknowledged the backlash. Officials appear to be treading gingerly, leaving the details vague for now but suggesting that the threshold would be raised by just a few months each year. “They’ve been talking about it for a long time,” said Albert Francis Park, an economics professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology who has studied China’s retirement system. “They’ll have to really exercise quite a bit of resolve to push it through.” China has been hurtling toward a retirement age crisis for years. The current standards were set in the 1950s, when the average citizen was expected to live until only his or her early 40s. But as the country has swiftly modernized, life expectancy has reached nearly 77 years, according to World Bank data. Birthrates have also plummeted, leaving China’s population distinctly top-heavy. More than 300 million people, about one-fifth of the population, are expected to be over 60 by 2025, according to the government. The result is what experts call a serious threat to China’s continued economic growth and ability to compete. In Japan and many European nations, residents become eligible for pensions at 65 or later. At a recent news conference, You Jun, the deputy minister of human resources and social security, said China risked a “waste of human resources.” Today in Business Updated  April 26, 2021, 6:10 p.m. ET The backlash has underscored a host of other anxieties in Chinese society about issues such as job security, the social safety net and income inequality. The hypercompetitive environment that defines many white-collar workplaces in China is already grinding on Naomi Chen, a 29-year-old financial analyst in Shanghai. She has often discussed with friends her wish to retire early to escape the pressure, even if it means living more modestly. The government’s announcement only confirmed that desire. China already struggles to provide enough well-paid white-collar jobs for its ballooning ranks of university graduates. With fewer retirees, Ms. Chen worries, she would be left working just as hard but with less prospect of a payoff. “Getting promoted will definitely be slower, because the people above me won’t retire,” she said. In reality, older workers may suffer more. China has modernized so quickly that they tend to be much less skilled or educated than their younger counterparts, making some employers reluctant to retain them, Professor Park said. In several industries, including tech, 35 is seen as the age ceiling for being hired. Delaying retirement also risks undermining another major government priority: encouraging couples to have more children, to slow the aging of the population. In part because of inadequate child-care resources, the vast majority of Chinese rely on grandparents to be the primary caretakers for their children. Now, social media users are asking what will happen if the older generation is still working. Lu Xia, 26, said the prospect of later retirement made it impossible to consider having a second child. More children would eventually mean more grandchildren to care for, even as she was expected to keep working. “With delayed retirement, it’s hard to imagine what we’ll have to face by the time that we are grandparents,” said Ms. Lu, who lives in the city of Yangquan, southwest of Beijing. Unless China increases support for child care, new parents may leave the work force or postpone childbirth until their parents retire, exacerbating the labor shortage, Feng Jin, an economist at Fudan University, told a state-backed labor publication. Still, experts maintain that the cost of inaction would be too high. A 2019 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences predicted that the country’s main pension fund would run out by 2035, in part because of the dwindling work force. That has alarmed some young people, who wonder where their own pensions will come from if nothing changes. “I think this is pretty fair,” Wang Guohua, a 29-year-old blogger in Hebei Province, said of pushing back retirement ages. “If people are still alive but there’s no more money, that will affect social stability.” Mr. Wang added that he did not see the appeal of retiring at 60, given how much life expectancy had increased: “You won’t have anything to do.” Indeed, Bian Jianfu, who retired recently from his job as a manager at a state-owned enterprise in Sichuan Province, said he would not have minded working a few years longer. His pension would have increased, too. Mr. Bian receives about $1,000 a month, more than double the average for urban retirees. He praised the government for consistently raising pension payments over the past decade though some experts have acknowledged the strain that doing so has added to the system. “The Chinese government treats retirees very well,” he said. But that security is unevenly distributed, and it is likely to remain so even if the government shores up its pension funds. Mr. Meng, the urban management worker, is paid about $460 a month, one-tenth of which he pays toward pension and basic medical insurance funds. When he finally retires, he expects to draw $120 to $150 a month. He acknowledged that it was barely enough to live on. But he said he could make it work — even if he was now increasingly unsure when the date would come. “All I can do is hold on,” Mr. Meng said. “Keep holding on until I’ve reached the right age.” Source link Orbem News #Arent #China #Graying #Happy #put #retirement #Workers

[gamechuibrahim]

The Prosperity Party is a threat to multinational federalism

Ethiopia is in the throes of a dreadful civil war. It is a culmination of more than two years of pissing-match between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali and the leaders of the Tigray regional state. The war is being fought in the backdrop of an ideological conflict and competing visions for the future of Ethiopia.

Since he was swept to power in 2018, Abiy has made no secret of his disdain for federalism and nostalgia for the centralized and assimilationist days of the unitary state. On the other hand, his opponents in Tigray have positioned themselves as the only buffer standing in the way of Abiy and his highly centralized vision for the country.

To understand Abiy’s anti-federalist views, consider his recent parliamentary speech in which he touted the democratic merits of a unitary state. Unsurprisingly, his comments raised many eyebrows. Why did the leader of a multinational federation even bother to defend the accommodationist quality of a unitary system? Was it a Freudian slip or a subliminal message?

Abiy has continually repudiated and at times trivialized the mounting demands for statehood in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR). For example, he has suggested that the demand for statehood is simply a desire by local elites for more V8 vehicles rather than a genuine demand for autonomy or self-rule.

He has also tried to coerce zonal representatives to delay their formal request to the House Federation for statehood until a comprehensive political roadmap is devised and decided upon. When Sidama became the 10th member of the federation, following a historic referendum, neither Abiy nor his office extended a congratulatory message to the Sidama people.

The diversity challenge

Ethiopia has followed a unitary state system ever since the polity took its current shape through the conquest of Menelik II at the turn of the 20th century. Multinational federalism was adopted in 1995 to accommodate a century-old ‘diversity challenge.’ For the first time, it recognized and at least in theory celebrated ethnic diversity. To codify these changes, the constitution established nine regional states based on ethno-linguistic identity and granted significant autonomous power over regional matters to the constituent parts. It also enshrined the powers and principles of shared rule.

Ethnic groups became sovereign entities and the building blocks of the new arrangement. They were also given the right to co-govern and take their due share in the national cake. Pointedly, Article 39(3) of the constitution recognized the unconditional rights of ethnic groups to have an ‘equitable representation’ in the federal government

However, if we draw a balance sheet of the last 27 years, the principles and rules of federalism have been honored in the breach. While the country was constitutionally a federal state, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) snatched self-rule and compromised shared rule through its practice of democratic centralism. (Democratic centralism is a Leninist organizational principle in which a centrally decided policy is binding on all members.) Hence, the constitutional rights and powers of ethnic groups were short-circuited by a party dogma. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant partner in the wobbly coalition, employed this tactic to offset its numeric minority and held an unquestioned hegemonic power.

That is why TPLF met opposition and resistance at every turn. A 2014 Addis Ababa Master Plan rekindled sustained Oromo protests sealing TPLF’s fate. At its core, the Oromo protests were a demand for the respect of regional autonomy over development and urban planning. The protest eventually expanded to other states, most crucially to the Amhara region, and grew to include demands for regime change. The protesters sought to end TPLF’s authoritarian rule and establish a fair, just, federal, and democratic order.

The four-year-long protest movement precipitated TPLF’s demise and paved the way for the rise to power of Oromo and Amhara reformists inside the EPRDF. The upheaval culminated in the selection of Abiy Ahmed as the prime minister.

Abiy wasted no time to disband the EPRDF and haphazardly rebrand it as Prosperity Party (PP). Initially, PP vowed to build on the achievements of the EPRDF and rectify its political and economic shortcomings. Abiy quickly made an about-face as his electoral chances dwindled under the new party tag.

Regressive ideological shift

PP is progressively drifting toward the right by embracing a dangerous and divisive narrative. The party’s Medemer ideology has been billed as an indigenous philosophical solution to Ethiopia’s problems. But a closer examination reveals that it is institutional engineering based on a simplistic and distorted reading of history. It applies a reductionist and revisionist approach to unpack the many contradictions of Ethiopia. For example, it purports to dismiss ethno-national movements as ‘elitist instrumentalism’ rather than a genuine quest for recognition and inclusion.

While it grudgingly accepts the existence of national oppression in imperial Ethiopia, Medemer dismisses the last 50 years’ efforts to accommodate ethnic diversity as a national disaster. In short, Medemer is predicated on restoring the homogenization and centralization legacy of pre-1991 Ethiopia.

While disastrous humanitarian and human rights violations were committed over the last 50 years, this period also saw relentless efforts and sacrifices to remake Ethiopia as a multicultural and multinational polity. Both the class revolution and the adoption of federalism had brought about positive changes in managing diversity. Hence, a political ideology that casts this period in a bad historical light could not be considered as a solution to manage diversity.

Some of the prime minister’s surrogates do not even hide PP’s ultimate objective. For example, earlier this year, Abiy’s senior advisor Daniel Kibret underscored that the main task of PP is to finish the nation-building process initiated by Menelik II. So far, neither the party nor the prime minister has denounced and distanced themselves from that outrageous remark. It could only be interpreted as tacit approval of the statement. Abiy’s latest speech is thus in keeping with the deliberate effort to slowly but surely chip away at the federal project. It is under this context that Abiy and TPLF are now engaged in an omnious conflict that could destablize the entire Horn of Africa.

A unitary structure and policy

Several comparative studies have shown that a party structure can significantly affect federalism. While an autonomist party system enhances the principles of self-rule, a unitary party weakens regional autonomy. The impact of PP on federalism is more pronounced for two reasons. First, PP is a ruling party that controls the federal government and all regional states except Tigray. Second, and most importantly, PP is a hegemonic political party. Under EPRDF, Ethiopia effectively became a one-party state. And every function and sector of government has been impacted by the unrestrained party-state fusion. That is also why a shift in party policies and structures carries serious political repercussions for the body politics.

Besides the ideological backsliding, PP’s organizational structure also undermines the multinational federal arrangement. A cursory reading of PP documents reveals that it is a unitary party. Unlike EPRDF which was a coalition of institutionally autonomous regional political parties, PP was established as a single national entity without leaving any room for regional and institutional autonomy. All meaningful and consequential party policies and decisions are made at the center by the highest party echelon. Local branches are merely there to execute what has been decided at the center. For example, there is no Oromia or Somali Prosperity Party but a Prosperity Party branch in Oromia and Somali regions. The branches do not necessarily represent the interests of the local people other than having PP presence at the regional level.

In other words, the organization makeup of PP undermines constitutionally sanctified state autonomy by reducing the regional party branch into an instrument of central leadership. Worryingly, the leadership of the branch offices (including the administrators of the regional states) is made accountable to the federal Central Committee. Even if the so-called ‘affiliates’ (Agar) parties were brought into the fold, upgrading affiliates to PP members came at the cost of losing relative local autonomy. Thus, concerning regional self-rule, if EPRDF’s democratic centralism was akin to indirect rule, PP’s organizational structure resembles a direct rule

Furthermore, membership in PP is individual-based without any ethnic affiliation. Meaning, its members do not represent a group but themselves as individuals. This defies one of the essential requirements of multinational federalism that calls for the existence of an autonomous local party that protects and advances local interests.

In characteristic PP self-contradiction and doublespeak, the party claims that the composition of its party Council and Central Committee is based on population size. Whether this refers to ethnicity or residence is not clear. Since membership is an individual-based – without ethnic affiliation or linguistic proficiency – the population size clause may refer to residency. This is contrary to multinational federalism which requires ethnic representation in shared-rule institutions.

Such a unitary structure could also negatively affect the constitutional requirement of equitable ethnic representation at the federal level. How does a person who joined the party in an individual capacity represent an ethnic group? Since ethnicity or language is not a requirement for membership, there is a likelihood that PP branches could be dominated by members of different linguistic groups, eschewing ethnic quota and representation.

Dismantle or Democratize?

Reversing Ethiopia’s federal system let alone the multinational version risks disintegration. It is highly unlikely to reset the clock on multinational federalism easily without risking the country’s territorial integrity and unity. Ethiopia should not go far to discern the danger of rollbacking federalism. The dissolution and concomitant political ramifications of the Eritrean federation is a glaring lesson. The seeds for Eritrean secession were sown during the dissolution of the federation act. If PP attempts to dismantle federalism, the specter of more Eritrea-like scenarios won’t be far-fetched. Not only a risk of secession but it could also lead to bloody communal violence. Localized and spontaneous pogrom would be commonplace as seceding entities would engage in downward homogenization and ethnic purification.

But democratization and further institutionalization can work and perhaps save Ethiopia from the abyss. Multinational federalism and constitutional dispensation while lacking original democratic legitimacy, over time, have earned a redeemed legitimacy as attested by wider support among Ethiopian people.

Today, except for the so-called pan-Ethiopianist forces and urban-based elites, multinational federalism enjoys widespread acceptance and support. As a recent Afro Barometer survey shows 61 percent (had it not been for a methodological flaw of the survey, the support rate could have been higher) of Ethiopians support the continuity of the federalism system. Hence, the way forward is to democratize and ensure institutional autonomy and complement it with a robust minority protection regime.

PP’s ideological and institutional drift away from multinational federalism and Abiy Ahmed’s stubborn refusal to change tack will only escalate the already tense political atmosphere in Ethiopia. It has already engendered a civil war in Tigray, bringing the country one step closer to a failed state with devastating national and regional ramifications.

By: BAHAR OUMER

[khalilhumam]

Bonding over Beijing

New Post has been published on http://khalilhumam.com/bonding-over-beijing/

Bonding over Beijing

By Erik Brattberg, Torrey Taussig Over the past few years, China’s rise has become a top priority in Washington and in many European capitals—and a big-ticket item on the wider transatlantic agenda. This development has created both new opportunities and challenges for transatlantic relations. Many Europeans who were already concerned about the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia see the Trump administration’s preoccupation with countering China’s rise as representative of a bipartisan US strategic shift away from Europe and toward prioritizing great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. While Europe’s own outlook on China has also hardened recently—turning more skeptical and increasingly sharing many of the same American concerns—the United States and Europe have so far not been able to capitalize on this convergence by building anything resembling a coherent agenda to address jointly shared challenges from China. This task will be among the most pressing on the transatlantic agenda over the next four years, regardless of whether Donald Trump is reelected on November 3, or Joe Biden becomes the next US president. But the outcome of the US election will certainly have consequences. While a second Trump administration would likely continue its hard-line approach toward China and unilateral approach toward Europe, room for a more strategic and broader transatlantic dialogue on China policy is possible under Biden. A Biden administration would likely attempt to renew the transatlantic partnership as part of a global effort to attempt to rebuild alliances and partnerships that have fallen into disrepair during the Trump administration.

Trump’s Unilateralism

Since Trump entered office, his administration has doubled down on a hardnosed approach toward China—albeit one frequently lacking in consistency, strategic focus, or careful execution. Underpinning Trump’s China policy is a view among many in the US national security community that a more competitive approach toward Beijing was long overdue. Both the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy frame the central strategic challenge confronting the US in terms of great power competition and label China a revisionist power (though it is uncertain whether Trump himself agrees with this assessment). The lion’s share of the Trump administration’s focus has been on unilateral actions against China on trade, technology access, and intellectual property theft. More recently, COVID-19 has sharpened the Trump administration’s criticism of China, making it even more ideologically loaded and nationalist. President Trump consistently refers to the coronavirus pandemic as the “China virus” and has beefed up anti-China rhetoric because he believes it will play well politically in the upcoming election and deflect blame away from his own administration’s ineffective handling of the pandemic at home. The recent pledge between US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and EU High Representative Josep Borrell to establish new EU-US China dialogue offers hope for a more joined-up approach. However, Trump’s engagement with Europe on matters related to China has underperformed, notwithstanding productive working level cooperation on issues such as 5G and investment screening. Much of the blame for the lack of effective transatlantic coordination to date falls squarely on Trump himself. Viewing the EU as an economic competitor and a “foe,” Trump has explicitly rebuffed European overtures to join forces on addressing shared concerns about China’s market-distorting practices (such as during French President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Washington in April 2018). In addition to his euroskeptical attitude, Trump’s erratic leadership, mixed messages, and numerous counter-productive policies have in turn contributed to undermining European trust in his administration’s leadership. Especially damaging is Trump’s trade policy toward Europe, which includes section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, repeated threat of imposing auto tariffs, and an overreliance on extraterritorial sanctions. The Trump administration’s approach to multilateral cooperation—highlighted through its preferences for bilateral trade talks with Beijing, repeated moves to undermine the World Trade Organization (WTO), and withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN Human Rights Council—has also been self-defeating and has given China a stronger voice at the table. Further adding to Europe’s hesitance about aligning itself too closely with the US is also the increasingly ideological undertones in the Trump administration’s approach to competing with China.

Europe’s disunity

Of course, Europeans too have fallen short. In particular, persistent disunity among EU member states on the exact nature of the China challenge and an overarching desire to maintain strong economic ties have hindered an effective common EU response. This disunity is driven not only by southern and eastern European states that may be more reliant on Chinese investment, but also from economically strong countries such as Germany. There are several examples of how EU member states have failed to take the necessary measures to strengthen their defenses against Chinese economic and technological influence: over half of the EU member states have endorsed the Belt and Road Initiative, only 14 member states have functioning investment screening mechanisms, and countries are pursuing various approaches to the role of Huawei in 5G networks. Officials at the EU level have also acted inconsistently, at times pushing back against Beijing’s human rights abuses and policies in Hong Kong and at other times watering down EU reports of Chinese disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Should Trump be reelected, Europeans should be ready for an even more tumultuous four years. As Sino-American tensions rise in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, intensifying the trend toward economic and technological decoupling, European countries will increasingly face tough choices. A second Trump administration would likely continue its hardline approach toward China, as Washington and Beijing appear primed to continue their tit-for-tat retaliatory actions to cut off access to one another’s technologies and economies, with Europe increasingly caught in the middle. A Trump administration would also likely continue its current competitive and divisive approach toward Europe, thereby limiting room for broad transatlantic cooperation on China policy despite shared grievances. Cooperation with the US will still be possible in certain areas, such as bolstering technologic defenses and standards, strengthening supply chains, and rebalancing trade, but transatlantic trust will remain very low and be plagued by disagreements in other areas.

Restoring Transatlantic Trust

China would remain a top US priority under a Biden administration. The strong bipartisan consensus in Washington on the issue means that, regardless of administration, more continuity is expected on issues such as 5G and technology decoupling, curtailing Chinese investments, and the continued focus on strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. The different starting-point for a Biden administration is that Washington would look to reengage with its allies and partners in Europe on a less competitive and divisive platform. Rather than seeing Europe as a competitor, Biden would view the EU as an integral partner for shaping a joint approach toward China. By defusing EU-US tensions and restoring transatlantic trust, Biden would likely be able to carry out more effective diplomatic engagement with European counterparts compared to the Trump administration’s heavy-handed unilateral approach. Moreover, by righting trade and sanctions policies, and easing political tensions on key issues such as climate change, a more fruitful agenda on shaping global standards on Artificial Intelligence (AI), semiconductors, or green tech might also be within reach. Another welcome departure from Trump as seen by Europeans would be on the issue of multilateralism. While a Biden administration is unlikely to blindly embrace multilateralism, his administration would likely engage on multilateral reform initiatives, with a particular focus on WTO rules reform. Given Biden’s strong climate agenda, the administration could also work with Europe to hold China accountable to the climate targets that agreed to as a signatory to the Paris Climate Accords and would put a stronger emphasis on human rights (an issue that Trump has downplayed). Biden has also pledged to convene a summit of democracies and may be keen to take up the United Kingdom’s recent idea of establishing a D-10 of leading democracies in North America, Europe, and Asia. Finally, Biden would likely take a less ideological view of China, preferring to see Beijing as a “serious competitor” but not necessarily as an opponent—mirroring the EU’s view of China as a systemic rival, a competitor, and a partner. This would make it easier for Europeans to work with Washington on China issues, as Europe shares many of the US concerns but is afraid of getting pulled into a confrontational agenda between the two superpowers. Of course, not everything would be smooth sailing even under a Biden administration. The EU and the US will continue to have differences on many issues—including on defense spending, data protection, and export controls. Biden’s expected heavy focus on human rights might also give rise to new tensions with Europe should the US actively push for more sanctions against Chinese human rights violators or new technological restrictions that Europe is unwilling to make.

The “China Factor” After 2021

Regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election in November, how to address the rise of China and Beijing’s growing assertiveness post-COVID-19 will be one of the dominant issues in transatlantic relations under the next administration. Even if Trump is reelected and the overall transatlantic agenda remains fraught, Europe has no choice but to continue engaging with Washington on a shared China agenda. Although there will be limits to what such an agenda can realistically achieve, there will still be some opportunities for cooperation on technology and trade issues in particular, given longstanding concerns from Washington and key European capitals about Beijing’s behavior. In contrast, the prospect of a Biden administration will offer some early opportunities for alignment on holding China accountable to climate and trade standards while developing a broader strategic dialogue on China. Yet this also assumes greater European openness to engaging in a robust dialogue with Washington as well as continued efforts to forge a common European strategy toward China including on the dicier foreign policy issues such as Hong Kong and Taiwan or human rights in Xinjiang. The outstanding question is then whether the EU is really ready to hit the ground running on such a joint agenda should Biden enter the White House in January. The “China factor” will be a permanent fixture on the 21st-century transatlantic agenda. And despite their many differences and disagreements, the transatlantic partners must capitalize on the reality that they have far more in common with each other than the other way around.

[armeniaitn]

Russia and Iran's Dangerous Energy Gambit in the Caucasus

New Post has been published on https://armenia.in-the.news/economy/russia-and-irans-dangerous-energy-gambit-in-the-caucasus-51945-24-08-2020/

Russia and Iran's Dangerous Energy Gambit in the Caucasus

Map via Wikimedia Commons

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,708, August 25, 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: There are signs that the current escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, far from being incidental to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is driven by Russia’s and Iran’s economic warfare against a competing state and the need to return Europe to dependency on their oil and gas in light of US sanctions. Armenia benefits from the bellicose activity thanks to a sophisticated information warfare campaign in a heated US election year that has been unmatched thus far by Azerbaijan. But Baku can still turn its underdog position around by pursuing an assertive and affirmative policy against aggressors on military, political, media, and legal fronts.

After Armenia’s attack on Azerbaijan’s borders on July 12, a flurry of speculative articles appeared that contained obvious disinformation intended to portray what had happened as either a continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, an extension of Armenian-Turkish tensions, or part of a larger proxy conflict between Turkey and Russia, which is present in Syria and Libya and has most recently divided NATO.

At first glance, the chain of events that led to the current conflict seems straightforward. Armenia attacked Azerbaijani positions without warning, putting at risk civilians residing in the Tovuz area. At least 11 members of the military and one elderly civilian were killed.

Armenia then proceeded to boast about having taken out a general for the first time ever while simultaneously claiming it had been provoked. Several other senior Azerbaijani officers were also killed, which points to a premeditated attack, not an act of spontaneous violence. Indeed, this development calls into question the narrative that the current escalation is just the latest in a series of skirmishes arising from Armenia’s illegal occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become a protracted crisis due to a combination of ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis from both Armenia and the occupied territories, the turning of over a million Azerbaijanis into refugees and IDPs, the turning of Armenia into a virtually monoethnic state, and the destruction of cultural heritage.

The last major escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict took place in 2016, when Azerbaijan reclaimed the strategic village of Çocuq Mərcanlı. As residents of the liberated village and elsewhere along the ceasefire line can attest, unprovoked violations are a part of daily life. Armenian snipers targeting civilians have wounded or killed many and forced many others to vacate their houses.

But this most recent attack was not launched from the occupied region, but rather along the international border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in close proximity to geopolitically essential oil pipelines.

Azerbaijan’s ambassador to the US Elin Suleymanov warned that Israel’s oil supply could be endangered due to these border clashes. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline “provides Israel with 40% of its oil,” but also ensures that Russia and Iran cannot monopolize delivery to Europe and Israel from the Caspian region. Azerbaijan, already a top competitor to Russia and Iran in supplying European energy needs, is about to bypass Armenia and Russia to become a significant supplier of gas to southern Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor, which is scheduled to be fully operational by year end.

The diversification of Europe’s LNG sources undermines Russian and Iranian political power, which is premised on the threat of leaving Europe out in the cold. Their positions were already precarious when the US ended all oil trade waivers for the Islamic Republic last year. It only just lifted waivers on Russia’s construction of the Nordstrom II pipeline (initially sanctioned in December 2019). Circumventing US sanctions is a matter of survival for these regimes.

Iran in particular has faced economic devastation due to Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign. Tehran, already more dependent on Beijing as a result of a recently concluded 25-year trade deal, has essentially rented out the oil fields in Ahwaz to China.

For Armenia, the new escalation has potentially favorable military and political ramifications. Armenia is part of a military bloc known as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The current conflict may be an attempt to draw Azerbaijan into a bigger conflagration with CSTO members, who are pledged to protect one another. According to Fariz Ismailzade, Vice Rector of the ADA University, the likelihood that this gambit will succeed is diminished by Azerbaijan’s good relations with two CSTO member states: Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Armenian lobbyists are trying to gain a political advantage by portraying the crisis as a standoff with Turkey (a position to which Turkey lends credence by offering to arm Azerbaijan) as well as with France (a member of the OSCE Minsk Group, which focuses on finding a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) and various other NATO members.

In the US, ANCA, a well-organized and politically influential Armenian lobby group, has been playing up the perception of the inseparability of the two Turkic countries in the public mind and taking advantage of general American ignorance of historical and political realities. It is attempting to tie Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Ottoman past and current neo-Ottoman ambitions. In addition, ANCA has manipulated various ethnic and religious biases in pursuit of political support, even attacking Israel’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan George Deek, who is Christian.

ANCA also seeks to benefit politically from a heated US presidential election year. It anticipates a more favorable outlook in Washington in the event that the Democrats prevail in November and is now planting the seeds of anti-Azerbaijan action, such as a proposed bill that would freeze all military sales to that country. The proposing of such a bill required a provocation, such as an act of war, which is why ANCA has been at the forefront of creating the perception that Azerbaijan struck first.

This is not a one-off event. ANCA cultivates relationships with both members of Congress and figures in the think tank world, constantly pushing the idea of “Artsakh,” a fake republic in the otherwise empty occupied territories that is unrecognized by anyone except Russia. ANCA creates layers of legal fictions via continuous unilateral actions such as repeated requests for large humanitarian packages from Congress for the ersatz entity, tying these requests to aid for Armenia proper.

There are red flags pointing to the planned and strategic nature of this operation. Indeed, in retrospect, there were warning signs, such as Iran’s growing presence in the vicinity and more direct assistance to Armenia for weeks prior to the attack. A few weeks prior to that, Iran and Armenia reinstated a visa-free regime, perhaps contributing to Armenia’s poor handling of COVID-19. In June, Russia and Armenia were engaging in talks about running biological labs, a convenient cover for bringing Russian biological weapons close to Azerbaijan, a development that would threaten all of the Caucasus and should concern the US.

Armenia and Russia are also interested in developing joint military forces. Not only is Russia completely running the show, but it is increasingly erasing any semblance of Armenia’s independence and asserting its own military presence in the region in a manner that can only be described as menacing. All these factors independently of each other should have been causes for concern, but their all occurring at once when the US is struggling with internal crises and a beleaguered foreign policy in a hotly contested election year points to a premeditated operation designed to help advance a political agenda.

Azerbaijan’s information warfare against Armenia has been partially successful, such as its display of sophisticated Israeli drones that Armenia, with mixed results, has tried to claim credit for downing. On the political front, however, the outcome so far has been largely driven by ANCA’s organized campaign.

Azerbaijan should respond to these attacks through a combination of methods. First, it should strive to become a “country brand,” like Singapore, by diversifying its economy away from oil dependency, becoming a hi-tech hub for the region, and building investor confidence through joint ventures and the expansion of electronic government services. Ismail Rustamov, the representative of Azerbaijani society in the US, has suggested steps focused on investor confidence to help overcome perceptions of business risks.

Azerbaijan should form a closer joint defense relationship with the US, benefiting from joint training and insights from experienced field operatives and officers. Additionally, greater resources need to be marshalled for information warfare and the political aspect of the battle being waged, including supporting professional media to counter disinformation, building personal and long-term relationships with public officials at all levels, and, most importantly, vigorously pursuing legislative and legal relief in US, European, and international bodies. Armenian officials responsible for human rights abuses should be sanctioned. Only when Azerbaijan shows its willingness to combat fake news while broadening outreach efforts—while passionately and rightfully combating attacks on its physical sovereignty and territorial integrity—will its allies fully support the verity of its claims and understand the global and geopolitical stakes of siding with or giving a pass to Armenia’s aggression.

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Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York. She has written extensively on geopolitics and US foreign policy for a variety of American, Israeli, and other international publications.

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Coronavirus Worsens U.S.-China Ties and Bolsters Hawks in Washington

BEIJING — Tariffs and the trade war. Espionage and Huawei. Hong Kong, Taiwan and the South China Sea. Now a spiraling epidemic has become the latest and potentially most divisive issue driving apart the United States and China. For the fiercest critics of China within the Trump administration, the global panic over the new coronavirus has provided a new opening to denounce the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which they say cannot be trusted to disclose what it knows or properly manage the outbreak. But if the hard-liners were hoping for a united, anti-China message coming from Washington, that goal has been undermined by their own leader. President Trump has publicly commended President Xi Jinping’s handling of the crisis and even called for greater commercial ties, including the sale of jet engines to China. “Look,’’ Mr. Trump said on Tuesday, “I know this: President Xi loves the people of China, he loves his country, and he’s doing a very good job with a very, very tough situation.” It has become a staple of the Trump administration: sending mixed messages that reflect a good-cop-bad-cop tactic, a real internal disagreement over policy or simply the caprice of the president. But overall, the most hawkish voices on China have managed to dominate the conversation, lashing out at Beijing as it reels from one challenge after another — a trade war with Washington, protests in Hong Kong and now the struggle to contain the coronavirus. Mr. Trump’s conciliatory comments this week might be an effort to defuse tensions and keep the U.S. economy and stock market humming as he faces re-election. That approach is backed by a pro-trade faction led by Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin that advocates close ties between the world’s two largest economies. Whether it is because of the assertiveness of the hard-liners, the ambiguities fueled by the competing messages or Beijing’s policies, the relationship between the United States and China has become so strained and unpredictable that even the need for a united effort to address a global health crisis has not overcome the suspicions that have increasingly taken root on both sides. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the administration’s most vocal China critic, on Tuesday took the country to task for a failure to be open and transparent when the coronavirus hit, saying, “It took us too long to get the medical experts into country. We wish that could have happened more quickly.” The China hawks say privately that they see the virus weakening the party’s legitimacy and further separating the two countries. “You are starting to walk back a couple of decades of diplomatic relations,” said Carl Minzner, a professor of Chinese law and politics at Fordham University. The growing friction, he said, “has its own immutable logic that is dragging both countries backward.” New flash points emerge by the day. On Wednesday, China announced that it was expelling three Wall Street Journal reporters in what it said was retaliation for a headline on an opinion essay. The expulsions occurred a day after the U.S. State Department announced that it would treat China’s main state news media organizations operating in the United States as arms of the Chinese government. All three reporters had worked on topics deemed sensitive by Chinese officials. Updated Feb. 10, 2020 What is a Coronavirus? It is a novel virus named for the crown-like spikes that protrude from its surface. The coronavirus can infect both animals and people, and can cause a range of respiratory illnesses from the common cold to more dangerous conditions like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS. How contagious is the virus? According to preliminary research, it seems moderately infectious, similar to SARS, and is possibly transmitted through the air. Scientists have estimated that each infected person could spread it to somewhere between 1.5 and 3.5 people without effective containment measures. How worried should I be? While the virus is a serious public health concern, the risk to most people outside China remains very low, and seasonal flu is a more immediate threat. Who is working to contain the virus? World Health Organization officials have praised China’s aggressive response to the virus by closing transportation, schools and markets. This week, a team of experts from the W.H.O. arrived in Beijing to offer assistance. What if I’m traveling? The United States and Australia are temporarily denying entry to noncitizens who recently traveled to China and several airlines have canceled flights. How do I keep myself and others safe? Washing your hands frequently is the most important thing you can do, along with staying at home when you’re sick. The coronavirus epidemic has coincided with recent aggressive moves by Washington that have left many officials in China fuming over what they view as an effort to weaken the Communist Party’s leadership. Those have included criminal cases filed against Chinese military personnel over the 2017 hacking of Equifax, and accusations that Chinese agencies appeared involved in efforts to get hold of research at Harvard University and Boston University. The United States has also leveled accusations of racketeering against Huawei, the telecommunications company whose equipment, officials in Washington have repeatedly warned, could be used by the Chinese government for eavesdropping efforts on a global scale. The Trump administration’s most hawkish officials have seized on the coronavirus epidemic to bolster their arguments that the United States needs to make a more fundamental break with China. Mr. Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, said it was “a wake up call” to avoid relying on Chinese production of medicines and other medical supplies. The commerce secretary, Wilbur Ross, said the public health crisis could even lure back manufacturing jobs to the United States. Allies of the administration in Congress, and even some officials speaking privately, have repeated the fringe theory — dismissed by scientists — that Chinese laboratories, not a wholesale food market in Wuhan, might have been the true source of the epidemic and that it started earlier than Beijing has said. The officials assert that China at a minimum had obfuscated the fact that the epidemic began sooner than acknowledged and was then covered up. In China, officials see such statements and actions as evidence of mounting anti-Chinese sentiment, even racism. They also accused the United States of stoking international panic when it withdrew diplomats from a consulate in Wuhan and evacuated its citizens. Although other countries have since followed suit, China’s foreign ministry accused Washington of setting a bad example. “It is a political decision in the final analysis,” said Jia Qingguo, an associate dean at Peking University’s School of International Relations. “It’s time for international cooperation,” he said, “but these people just try to sow hatred, to try to split people up for their own political purposes.” There have been a few signs of cooperation during the crisis. The U.S. State Department said it had delivered 18 tons of donated medical supplies to China and announced that it was prepared to give $100 million to China and other nations. And Beijing, for its part, has not fully unleashed anti-American vitriol. “Unlike with the Hong Kong protests or trade war, the Chinese government has not blamed the United States for the ongoing crisis, and has even cracked down on online commentary calling the virus a U.S.-made biological weapon,” said Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of government at Cornell University. From the start, the Trump administration has been divided between a pro-trade faction that favors strong business relations with China and a national security faction that promotes the idea of “decoupling” the two economies. Despite starting a damaging trade war with China, Mr. Trump has tended to side with the pro-trade faction led by Mr. Mnuchin. Senior officials advocating aggressive policies regularly criticize the trade proponents in private. They blame Mr. Mnuchin, a former Goldman Sachs executive, for blocking efforts to impose sanctions on Chinese officials for the mass detentions of Muslims. They also say pro-business officials are too eager to allow American companies to sell components to Chinese enterprises, especially in the high-tech sector. Since the two nations reached a truce to the trade war in December, China hawks in the Trump administration have seen an opening to push through tougher actions and policies, ones that were criticized earlier by Mr. Mnuchin and his allies for potentially jeopardizing the trade talks. Mr. Pompeo has delivered scathing remarks about the dangers posed by China. He told the National Governors Association on Feb. 8 that China was seeking to exert overt and covert influence from state capitals all the way down to community school boards. He followed that with another speech at the Munich Security Conference this past weekend, declaring that “the West is winning.” On trips this month to Europe, Central Asia and Africa, Mr. Pompeo has told governments to beware of China. His Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, retorted in Munich that the West should “eschew the subconscious belief in the superiority of its civilizations and abandon its prejudices and anxieties regarding China.” The actions and rhetoric coming during the coronavirus epidemic have made the sting even sharper in China. Chinese officials bristled when the State Department raised its travel alert for China to the highest level — “do not travel.” Meanwhile, American officials fumed over China’s unwillingness to allow in teams of international health experts, doctors and scientists. In early January, the United States pressed Chinese officials to allow into Wuhan experts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. China ignored the request. Mr. Trump himself pressed the issue in a phone call with Mr. Xi on Feb. 6, administration officials said. Only last Friday did the Chinese government relent and allow two American experts to join an international team. Administration officials say China continues to hide significant facts about the epidemic, its origins and its scale. One official said it was important to get American experts to the outbreak’s epicenter to collect reliable data on things like transmission and morbidity rates. There are already signs that the mutual recriminations could profoundly affect international cooperation — from trade to security to scientific research — as well as popular opinion in both countries. “The level of trust in the relationship is now cratering,” said Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Issues like global pandemics and other issues that fundamentally impact the security of both countries,” he said, “are going to be very difficult to work through given the levels of distrust and disharmony on both sides.” Steven Lee Myers reported from Beijing, and Edward Wong from Washington. Claire Fu contributed research from Beijing. Read the full article