#brics conference

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

'Bank of BRICS doesn't impose conditions on member countries,' says Rousseff about loans to Rio Grande do Sul

Former Brazilian president and head of the NDB signed a letter of commitment to allocate US$ 1,075 billion

Vice President Geraldo Alckmin and the president of the New Development Bank (NDB, also known as Bank of BRICS), Dilma Rousseff, signed a letter of commitment on Tuesday (4) to allocate a total of US$ 1,075 billion, planned for this year in Brazil, to the state of Rio Grande do Sul, devastated by floods.

The announcement was made by Dilma on May 14. Alckmin is in Beijing, China, leading a delegation made up of six other Brazilian ministers (in addition to being vice president, Alckmin is also Minister of Development, Industry, Trade and Services) to take part in Cosban, the Sino-Brazilian High-Level Concertation and Cooperation Commission.

In a press conference with Alckmin at the Brazilian Embassy in Beijing, Dilma was asked about how free the state of Rio Grande do Sul is to allocate resources. The NDB president said that flexibility to allocate resources in case of disasters is essential.

''I went through three disasters [as president]. You're going to face risks in Rio Grande do Sul: there's the problem of removing waste, and cleaning up. You only start rebuilding after that. You have the problem of rebuilding streets, roads… 150 roads and bridges have been affected,” said Rousseff.

Continue reading.

[mariacallous]

On January 9, 2024, Swedish defense chief Gen. Micael Byden stood on a stage in Salen, Sweden, and gave a presentation intended to shock. Projecting a series of grisly images from the front lines of the Ukraine War, overlaid on a backdrop of snowy Swedish field, he asked: “Do you think this could be Sweden?”

Until February 2022, these questions would be unimaginable for a country that has maintained a careful 75-year strategy of peaceful nonalignment toward NATO. In a 2012 speech, the supreme commander of Sweden’s military at the time, Sverker Goranson, said that, in the event of an attack, “Sweden can survive for a week.” But at this recent Society and Defense Conference in Salen, leaders made it clear that the era of de-emphasizing defense was over. There, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson urged his citizens to prepare to defend themselves “with weapons in hand and our lives on the line.”

For Russia’s Scandinavian neighbors, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted a cool calculus of neutrality. Last year, Finland became NATO’s newest member, with Sweden likely soon to follow, pending approval from Hungary. These new northern alliances are shifting the geopolitical power balance, with Arctic NATO nations soon outnumbering Russia seven to one. And, just as the melting Arctic ice opens new resources and routes for global economic competition, it also exposes new defensive vulnerabilities.

Today, as Ukraine and its NATO allies push Russia into a corner, global leaders—together with Scandinavians themselves—are increasingly turning a troubled gaze north. They’re asking: How likely is escalation in colder climes?

“The increasing competition and militarization in the Arctic region … is worrying,” NATO military committee chair Adm. Rob Bauer said in an October 2023 speech at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland. “We must be prepared for military conflicts arising in the Arctic.”

“Low tensions in the High North”: so have global leaders and analysts referred to a post-Cold War period of relative polar stability. For the past several decades, bilateral and international agreements between Russia and other Arctic states have emphasized shared northern security as well as scientific and safety interests. But after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these arrangements quickly fell apart. In March 2022, the Arctic Council, a forum between the eight Arctic states, suspended talks. (In May 2023, it cautiously resumed but has yet to make Russia’s involvement clear.) In September 2023, Russia left the smaller Barents Euro-Arctic Council with Norway, Finland, and Sweden—saying the Scandinavian states had “paralyzed” cooperation. In February 2023, Russia amended its Arctic policy, emphasizing new alliances with other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) nations, particularly China. That month, it also suspended participation in New START, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia.

“There’s this post-Cold War political idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism,’ that the north is excepted from developments in global politics,” said Rasmus Bertelsen, the Barents chair in politics at the Arctic University in Tromso. “The problem is, it’s never been valid.”

Look a little closer at the past decades, Bertelsen said, and you’ll see a Russian Arctic strategy that closely follows its global agenda. In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference firmly rejected a U.S.-led, post-Cold War global order of stability. That same year, Russia launched its first cyberattack on Estonia and made a bold Arctic territorial claim by planting a Russian flag in the seabed below the North Pole. Putin has also concentrated militarization around the High North. Since 2014, the year Russia annexed Crimea, Russia has steadily grown a northern fleet of nuclear submarines, surface ships, missile facilities, air fleets, and radar stations. Today, Russia’s largest military base is on the Kola Peninsula, which borders Norway and Finland, where it is also testing new hypersonic missiles and a nuclear torpedo drone. Though about 80 percent of Russia’s northern land forces were deployed to Ukraine, its air and sea forces remain intact.

“Earlier, Russia had an interest in seeming like a constructive partner, including in the Arctic,” said Andreas Osthagen, a senior fellow at the Arctic Institute in Oslo, Norway. “Just like in the rest of the world, that has deteriorated.”

Russia’s full-scale invasion came as a wake-up call to Scandinavian neighbors that have, for decades, resisted militaristic alliances. Suddenly, neutrality began to look a lot more like vulnerability. Finland had an especially stunning reversal: As recently as December 2021, 51 percent of Finns opposed joining NATO. Today, 78 percent support the membership. With this alliance comes the promise of U.S. military might. In 2023, Finland and Sweden both signed bilateral military agreements with the United States, permitting American personnel and weapons at dozens of bases, including nine in the Arctic. Norway, an active NATO member since its formation, already has several bases that permit U.S. personnel and weapons. Still, since the Cold War, Norway has followed a “reassurance” policy that limits NATO and its allies’ presence past the 28th longitudinal zone, close to Russia. Now, it’s unclear whether that policy will hold.

Since 2009, the Nordic Defense Cooperation has aligned Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland on national military policy. In 2022, Norway, Finland and Sweden announced an agreement to strengthen the alliance with a focus on the high North. Today, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are in ongoing talks about formally sharing their air forces. In March 2024, Norway will lead an expanded “Nordic response” exercise for these nations to test their coordinated defense plans. Michael Paul, a senior fellow in security policy at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, said that history will reveal this new Nordic alliance as “one of Putin’s greatest mistakes.”

“If the war in Ukraine has achieved anything, it’s to align the Nordics on security,” Paul said. “You want to divide your enemies, not unite them against you.”

Ferguson sees the U.S. Swedish and Finnish military bases as mutually beneficial: Where the U.S. has resources, it often lacks technical expertise in extreme conditions. These smaller nations, she said, have a lot to teach the United States military. And their alliance with NATO is, she said, a “game-changer.”

“We now have seven out of eight Arctic nations geopolitically aligned with highly capable militaries,” Ferguson said. “I don’t know if there is such a concentration of alignment and capabilities between nations anywhere else in the world.”

Still, Ferguson emphasized that this is all in the name of deterrence. And experts agree that a full-scale northern conflict is unlikely. Paradoxically, Paul noted, Russia’s sheer military capacity and economic resources that increase Arctic tensions also deter real escalation. In the north, Russia simply has too much to lose: The immense territorial mass and extensive fossil fuel resources both stand as major claims to its identity as a global superpower. And unlike the cases of Ukraine and Crimea, Putin has never publicly imagined reclaiming Finland, which declared independence from Russia in 1917, nor has he spoken about accessing the Atlantic through Norway. Paul said that the Kremlin has an interest in maintaining a “low level of tension” in the north.

For now, that has meant hybrid warfare: “gray zone” tactics that are harder to trace or attribute. For instance, in November 2023, after a massive surge of asylum-seekers prompted Finland to become the first neighbor to close its border to Russia, Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo called the move “instrumentalized immigration”; that is, retaliation for joining NATO. (Russia denied the charge.)

At sea, potential aggression is even harder to trace. In April 2021 and January 2022, fiber-optic cables connecting the Svalbard archipelago to the Norwegian mainland was mysteriously severed. Later, vessel-tracking data revealed, in both instances, that Russian fishing boats had passed repeatedly over the cables prior to the damage. In October 2023, a Chinese container ship called the Newnew Polar Bear damaged a Baltic gas pipeline before entering Russian waters. According to the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation, a severed anchor likely belonging to the ship caused the damage, but experts still dispute whether the damage was intentional. Proving malicious intent is extremely difficult, and investigations are ongoing.

“It’s one of the major questions being asked right now: How do we defend against attacks on subsea critical infrastructure?” said Marisol Maddox, a senior Arctic analyst at the Polar Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. “There hasn’t been a single instance of serious consequences. At this point, the lesson that Russia is learning is that they can get away with it.”

Intentional or not, the effects of such infrastructure damage can be extensive and long-lasting: For example, the fiber-optic cable damaged in April 2021 wasn’t identified and repaired until November of that year. Luckily, one other subsea cable remained to keep the lights on in Svalbard. But absent that redundancy, thousands of people could have been left stranded without power for months. In the event of an explicit conflict, Maddox said, those kinds of vulnerabilities are extremely worrying.

In highly militarized zones, mistakes may carry the highest risk. To Osthagen, “miscalculation and misinterpretation” are the “greatest security risk in the North Atlantic Arctic.” In this region, Russia and NATO both conduct frequent military exercises, rehearsing mobilization of their forces and fleets. These routine rehearsals are especially necessary in colder climates, which require cold-resilient equipment and technology. (Notably, Osthagen emphasized, Russia has simulated direct attacks on its neighbors, whereas NATO has strictly simulated defensive strategies.) But these are complicated operations, often testing people and procedures for the first time. All it takes is one accidentally discharged firearm, one crossed signal, for rehearsal to open a military theater. Typically, such exercises are clearly communicated and coordinated across borders. But more recently, this communication has suffered.

“Paradoxically, after February 2022, the tension and fear of something happening has increased, whereas the potential for dialogue has disappeared,” Osthagen said. “This is the most troubling aspect of all.”

And where does this warfare, hybrid or explicit, end? In the worst case, the current war in Ukraine could conclude with a northern strike. Russia has 11 submarines capable of launching long-range nuclear weapons; eight of them reside in the Kola Peninsula. For this reason alone, the Arctic carries a particular weight for global leaders who must consider escalation to its absolute hypothetical end.

Even so, Paul emphasized that Arctic conflict of any form still remains counter to Russia’s interests and is less likely than in other parts of the world. Still, he cautioned against assuming that Putin will behave rationally. If backed into a corner, as NATO expands and Ukrainian troops advance, it is impossible to know how he will respond. But a fact remains that Arctic nations won’t easily forget: The remainder of his military might centers on the north.

“Putin made a big mistake in Ukraine,” Paul said. “He could make another in the Arctic.”

[witekspicsbanknotes]

CHINA - 100 YUAN - commemorative note about BRICS conference in 2017 (+ uv light features).

[beardedmrbean]

Germany's top diplomat Annalena Baerbock on Thursday said it was only natural to suspect the Kremlin's involvement in the presumed death of Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin , referring to a pattern of "unclarified fatalities in Russia."

Prigozhin was on a private jet that crashed in Russia on Wednesday, Wagner-linked media said.

Russian aviation authorities also said the Wagner Group leader was on the flight, with state media saying all people on board were killed.

"It is no accident that the world immediately looks at the Kremlin when a disgraced former confidant of Putin suddenly, literally falls from the sky two months after he attempted a mutiny," said Annalena Baerbock, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

What did Baerbock say?

Speaking during a press conference with the Kyrgyz foreign minister, Baerbock listed different ways Putin's adversaries have died in the past.

"We know this pattern in Putin's Russia: deaths, dubious suicides, falls from windows, all which remain unclarified — that underlines a dictatorial power system that is built on violence," the German foreign minister said.

The Wagner Group was heavily involved in Russia's fight in Ukraine before Prigozhin's short-lived mutiny in June.

The mercenary group is also present in various active conflicts in Africa, where the emerging economies bloc BRICS, of which Russia is a member, announced on Thursday inviting new members including two African countries.

"We must fear that Russia, with or without Wagner, will continue with its cynical game not only in Ukraine but above all in Africa," Baerbock said.

"And we must not forget that Prigozhin and Wagner are responsible for horrendous crimes against the Ukrainian people and in one country after the next in Africa."

Other reactions to Prigozhin's presumed death

Putin on Thursday offered his condolences to the families of all the crash victims.

"First of all I want to express words of sincere condolences to the families of all the victims," Putin said, describing Prigozhin as a man who made serious mistakes but "achieved results."

France has said that there was justifiable speculation about the causes of the plane crash that allegedly killed Prigozhin.

 "We don't yet know the circumstances of this crash. We can have some reasonable doubts," government spokesman Olivier Veran told France 2 television.

Prigozhin was "the man who did Putin's dirty work. What he has done is inseparable from the policies of Putin, who gave him the responsibility to carry out abuses as the head of Wagner," he said.

An adviser to Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told Germany's mass-circulation Bild newspaper that Prigozhin's death was predictable. 

"Prigozhin signed his own death warrant the moment he stopped 200 kilometers from Moscow," Mykhailo Podolyak told the newspaper on Wednesday night.

Meanwhile, President Zelenskyy denied that Kyiv had anything to do with the crash.

"Everyone knows who was involved," Zelenskyy said.

United States President Joe Biden expressed a similar sentiment.  "I don't know for a fact what happened, but I'm not surprised," he said.

While Russia expert Stefan Meister agreed that the death came as no surprise, he downplayed the possibility of the Wagner Group staging an uprising against the Kremlin.

"This is a private army working for money," Meister was quoted by the German DPA news agency as saying.

[ndtvnews5]

Chandrayaan-3 spacecraft lands on moon in ‘victory cry’ of new India

Bengaluru, August 23 (Reuters) – On Wednesday, an Indian spacecraft successfully landed on the moon, a huge milestone for India’s space exploration ambitions and aspirations to position itself as a space power, coming just a few days after a Russian lander was destroyed in an accident.

As the Indian tricolor flag was seen fluttering joyfully during its descent, Prime Minister Narendra Modi exclaimed, “This is a declaration of victory for a new India,” coinciding with hisinvolvement in the BRICS conference held in South Africa. Read More

[sutrala]

(NaturalNews) Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov has announced a major condition that will apply to all countries that are interested in joining the...

[raisboneza]

Global South Countries Break With West on Ukraine Summit Final Declaration

Key Global South countries attending the Ukraine “peace” conference in Switzerland in June 2024 refused to sign the joint communique issued at the end of the two-day summit. Many of them underlined the need for Russian participation in any such initiatives for them to be credible. Countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Mexico, as well as BRICS members India, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi…

[naija247new]

Switzerland Hosts BRICS-Led Peace Summit on Ukraine Conflict

Story: This weekend marks a critical juncture in Swiss diplomacy as the country hosts a pivotal peace conference at the Bürgenstock resort in central Switzerland. Delegates from 90 countries, including several heads of state, are convening for a two-day summit aimed at laying the groundwork for a multi-stage international effort to resolve the Ukraine conflict peacefully. The Swiss government…

[head-post]

Turkey wants to join BRICS instead of EU

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and expressed the desire to join BRICS.

The ministers met on Tuesday, June 4, in Beijing. At a joint press conference, Fidan stated that Turkey sought to expand its economic ties and saw BRICS to challenge the dominant structures of global governance led by the United States and Europe. He assessed BRICS as a valuable alternative to the European Union to improve economic prospects.

Certainly, we would like to become a member of BRICS. So we’ll see how it goes this year.

Turkey is currently in a customs union with the European Union. The country is also exploring new opportunities for co-operation with partners such as the BRICS. Despite efforts to join the EU nearly four decades ago, Turkey has faced obstacles on a variety of issues. Fidan argued that BRICS offered significant potential and could serve as a “good alternative” to the European Union.

During his visit, Fidan also reaffirmed Turkey’s support for China’s territorial integrity.

Turkey supports China’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty.

His trip includes plans to visit the cities of Urumqi and Kashgar in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

According to Reuters, Russia welcomed the news of Turkey’s desire to become part of the BRICS group of countries, which included Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Turkey’s inclusion would be on the agenda of the organisation’s next summit.

Read more HERE

[andronetalks]

Russia proposes global space monitoring system to track both “natural and artificial” threats at BRICS conference

Strange Sounds May 31, 2024 Russia has floated the idea of creating a global space monitoring system to provide early warning about celestial threats, Yury Borisov, the head of Russian space agency Roscosmos, has revealed. The proposal was made during a two-day summit of the space agency chiefs of the BRICS member states in Moscow, Borisov told RT on the sidelines of the event on Friday. The…

[allthebrazilianpolitics]

Assessing Brazil’s Potential to Act as a Peace Enabler in the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict

The result of the 2022 presidential elections in Brazil was celebrated domestically and overseas by those who were looking forward to Brazil’s return to the international stage after the country’s isolation under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. The narrow victory of the Workers’ Party candidate, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, and his January 2023 inauguration, coincided with a particularly auspicious moment for Brazil’s international engagement: the country was occupying a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (it left the Council at the end of December 2023) and the country was also due to occupy the presidency of the G-20 (for 2024) and serve as the host of the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP 30), to be held in the Amazonian city of Belém in 2025.

Brazil’s return to the global stage, its participation in groups such as the G-20, the G-77, IBSA (India Brazil, South Africa Dialogue), and BRICS, combined with the characteristic of being one of the few countries in the world with diplomatic relations with all United Nations member states also meant that Brazil could play a role regarding the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. For Brazil, the challenges in playing a more active role regarding the conflict include both domestic and international dimensions. At the domestic level, one of the biggest challenges is achieving economic development and reducing social inequalities in a country that, according to the World Inequality Lab, is one of the most socially unequal countries in the world. Given the magnitude of this challenge, Lula has been criticised for giving too much priority to presidential diplomacy in his first year in government and travelling abroad several times.

Internationally, the competing issues that hold back Brazil in developing a more active role in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict are related to the need to address issues close to home. These include: 1) the rivalry between Venezuela and Guyana on the Brazilian border, as Brazilian mediation credentials could be more useful regarding neighboring countries, and 2) the need to balance the bilateral relationship with Argentina, as right-wing President Jair Milei has explicitly criticised President Lula and expressed an interest in obtaining global partner status with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, President Lula is working to persuade Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega, a historical ally of the Workers’ Party, to ease the repressive measures against the opposition. Meanwhile, the ongoing security challenge in Haiti, where Brazil held the command of the military component of the UN mission (MINUSTAH) for 14 years (2004-2017), also highlights regional demands for Brazil’s engagement.

Additionally, recent international events have also captured the attention of Brazilian authorities, with a potential for domestic repercussions. Brazil’s condemnation of Israel’s military actions in Gaza may become a focal point in domestic political debate, potentially undermining Lula, as Bolsonaro and other right-wing politicians in Brazil remain close allies of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Looking ahead to the 2024 and 2025 domestic elections, conservative religious groups, particularly among the fast-growing neo-pentecostal communities, have explicitly endorsed Israeli policies, further complicating the situation.

Brazil may also face conflicting issues related to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. For instance, as the host of the G-20, Brazil may welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin to the high-level summit in Rio de Janeiro in November 2024. However, since Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, representatives of the Ukrainian-Brazilian community have urged Brazil’s Minister of Justice to arrest Putin if he enters the country. According to the media, Brazilian officials prepared a document which legally sustains the justification for not arresting Putin in his visit for the G-20 summit, based largely on the fact that Russia withdrew its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016.

Continue reading.

[mariacallous]

Under a simpler and more stable global order, the United States would likely be concentrating its efforts on building an international coalition to counter China. But conflict and instability around the globe—first in Ukraine, and now the Gaza Strip, in particular—are dividing U.S. attention, diplomatic bandwidth, and military resources. Washington’s virtually unconditional support for Israel in its war against Hamas has generated global outrage—and cast China in a comparatively favorable light.

China has certainly taken advantage of this anti-American sentiment and is using it as an opening to position itself as a constructive player in the Middle East and broader global south, following its successful brokering of a breakthrough deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran last March. After taking over the rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council last November, China’s U.N. ambassador declared that addressing the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians was the body’s top priority. Later that month, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its own peace plan, calling for an immediate cease-fire and affirming the need for a two-state solution.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated these points at an extraordinary virtual summit of BRICS—the economic bloc then comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—convened in November to address the situation in the Middle East. And earlier this month, China called for an international peace conference to determine a “binding roadmap” for determining the future of the Palestinian people.

China’s engagement with this war can be understood as part of a broader strategy to displace U.S. diplomatic hegemony by promoting multilateralism that is both resistant to Western dominance and susceptible to Chinese influence. Part of this strategy is rhetorical: Chinese officials tout their commitment to mutual respect and so-called win-win cooperation, contrasted against the United States and other Western powers whose dealings they characterize—implicitly or explicitly—as unilateral and bullying.

But China is also taking substantive action at an institutional level. This involves both joining and forming multilateral forums that exclude the United States, including the decades-old Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which focuses on security and counterterrorism in Central and South Asia, the recently expanded BRICS group, and Beijing’s newly established Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative.

This strategy also involves challenging the United States in shared multilateral forums. In the U.N., China has repeatedly criticized the United States for vetoing two Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire in Gaza. China also vetoed a U.S.-sponsored resolution that condemned Hamas for the Oct. 7 attack against Israel (which China itself has refrained from doing) and called for the immediate release of all hostages as well as “humanitarian pauses” to let in aid.

Thus far, China has stood only to gain from its own and other countries’ efforts to address the Gaza crisis through multilateral institutions. It can now credibly claim to have amplified non-Western calls for a cease-fire, humanitarian relief, and a two-state solution while taking the United States to task for obstructing them.

However, the recent charge of genocide brought forth against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the U.N.’s principal judicial body, complicates Beijing’s calculus. The case was lodged in late December by South Africa—a BRICS country and a key player in a region that China views as critical to its economic and geopolitical agenda.

Although the ICJ typically takes years to reach a verdict, it may issue “provisional measures” to prevent further potential crimes within a matter of days or weeks, as South Africa has requested.

The problem for China is that it, too, stands accused of genocide and crimes against humanity for its treatment of the Uyghurs and other minorities in the province of Xinjiang. If momentum builds behind the Israel case, it could also spur new multilateral action on Xinjiang, especially if South Africa is seen as having improved its international standing by initiating the proceedings.

Simply put, the more China elevates the forums responsible for resolving conflicts and protecting vulnerable populations, and the louder it trumpets its own leadership in the process, the greater the diplomatic cost will be to silence or ignore collective calls to hold China accountable for human rights violations in the future.

Importantly, no state has formally lodged genocide allegations against China with the ICJ. The United States and several of its allies have independently claimed that China has committed genocide against the Uyghurs, and the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights concluded in August 2022 that China had committed serious human rights violations that “may constitute… crimes against humanity.”

However, in October of that year, a majority of the U.N. Human Rights Council voted against or abstained from voting for a proposal to even discuss the findings of that report.

China vehemently denies these accusations and has persuaded representatives from many states—including numerous Muslim-majority ones in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—to endorse its policies in Xinjiang. In any event, although China is a party to the 1948 Genocide Convention, it does not accept compulsory jurisdiction of the court—nor do France, Russia, or the United States, for their part—and can also take comfort in the fact that the ICJ lacks an independent enforcement mechanism, relying instead on the U.N. Security Council (where China has veto power) to determine the practical effect of any verdict or provisional measures.

Still, China is skeptical of any procedure that could be cited as precedent by an external body to try to constrain its behavior on internal matters, or any decision that could serve as a model for galvanizing global opposition against Beijing. Just last October, China’s U.N. ambassador reiterated his country’s opposition to “politicizing human rights,” including on “Xinjiang- and Hong Kong-related issues.”

In this context, there are striking parallels between Israel’s case and that of Myanmar. In November 2019, amid international outrage at Myanmar’s treatment of its Rohingya minority, Gambia brought a charge of genocide to the ICJ. In January 2020, the court issued provisional measures ordering the Myanmar government to protect the Rohingya while the case proceeded. However, the following month, China (together with Vietnam, a rotating member of the Security Council at the time) blocked a vote on a joint statement by the Security Council.

This is far from an isolated incident. In 2021, for instance, China blocked a Security Council statement condemning the military coup in Myanmar that year. More recently, it unusually blocked a U.S. effort to post an online broadcast of a March 2023 Security Council discussion of the human rights situation in North Korea.

Of course, self-interested manipulation of U.N. procedures is hardly unique to China, and the United States has been widely condemned for what many member states view as its selective diplomatic sheltering for Israel.

But the ICJ case against Israel is particularly notable because it crystallizes the tension between the two roles that China aims to play on the international stage: the champion of multilateralism, standing up against the United States; and the defender of sovereignty, trumpeting the right of states to handle domestic problems—especially when it comes to terrorism and security—without foreign interference.

Chinese officials have so far remained quiet on Israel’s case. At a press briefing earlier this month, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning acknowledged the case and stated that the Chinese “oppose any action that violates the international law and urge parties to the conflict to earnestly implement relevant resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, reach an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire and stop the collective punishment against the people of Gaza.”

China’s response to any provisional measures imposed by the ICJ on Israel on Friday will be an important indicator of how it will reconcile this tension. Precedent and the continued sensitivity of the Xinjiang issue suggest that Beijing may determine that its safest bet is to veto any binding resolution that the U.N. Security Council might issue to enforce an ICJ ruling.

On the other hand, Beijing’s unprecedented embrace of multilateralism means that stymying U.N. action will leave it more vulnerable than ever to charges of hypocrisy. Ironically, however, as long as China can count on a veto by the United States against any efforts to coerce Israeli restraint, it may be able to keep playing both roles.

[wikiuntamed]

Five steps of Wikipedia for Tuesday, 23rd April 2024

Welcome, benvenuto, ongi etorri, bonvenon 🤗 Five steps of Wikipedia from "Raphaël Castoriano" to "2010 Nuclear Security Summit". 🪜👣

Start page 👣🏁: Raphaël Castoriano "Raphaël Castoriano is an artist, art advisor and founder & creative director of Kreëmart...."

Step 1️⃣ 👣: Brazil "Brazil, officially the Federative Republic of Brazil, is the largest and easternmost country in South America and in Latin America. Brazil is the world's fifth-largest country by area and the seventh most populous. Its capital is Brasília, and its most populous city is São Paulo. The federation is..."

Image

Step 2️⃣ 👣: 12th BRICS summit "The 2020 BRICS summit was the twelfth annual BRICS summit, an international relations conference attended by the heads of state or heads of government of the five member states Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The meeting was originally scheduled to take place in Saint Petersburg from..."

Step 3️⃣ 👣: 1st BRIC summit "The inaugural BRIC summit took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia on June 16, 2009. The four heads of government from the BRIC countries attended...."

Image licensed under CC BY 4.0? by Presidential Press and Information Office

Step 4️⃣ 👣: 2nd BRIC summit "The 2010 BRIC summit took place in Brasília, Brazil on April 16, 2010. This was the second BRIC summit after Yekaterinburg in 2009. The meeting took place between the four heads of government from the BRIC states following bilateral meetings in the prior days...."

Image by Chafis

Step 5️⃣ 👣: 2010 Nuclear Security Summit "The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was a summit held in Washington, D.C., on April 12 and 13, 2010. The Summit focused on how to better safeguard weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to prevent nuclear terrorism...."

Image licensed under CC BY 4.0? by Пресс-служба Президента России

[thxnews]

Diplomacy in the Spotlight: Munich Conference Unveils Global Strategies

A Deep Dive into the High-Stakes World of International Relations

The Munich Security Conference served as a pivotal platform for high-level discussions among global leaders, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar leading the charge. Their collective presence underscored the urgency and complexity of today's geopolitical landscape, addressing everything from the Ukraine crisis to the nuanced U.S.-China relationship, and the strategic autonomy of nations like India.   Defending Sovereignty and Promoting Multilateral Cooperation Annalena Baerbock set the tone by emphasizing the paramount importance of defending international law in the face of aggression, using Ukraine as a prime example. The conversation underscored a unanimous commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity, principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Moreover, Baerbock argued for a multifaceted approach to diplomacy, one that balances resoluteness with respect for the diverse perspectives within the international community. This, she noted, is crucial for fostering unity and ensuring that countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa feel valued and understood within global discourse.   The Balancing Act: U.S.-China Relations Antony Blinken's remarks on the U.S.-China dynamic highlighted a key theme of the conference: the delicate balance between competition and cooperation. Blinken advocated for responsible management of the strategic rivalry, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks not to force allies into a binary choice but to offer them beneficial partnerships. His dialogue with China on issues like fentanyl demonstrates a path forward where mutual interests align, showcasing a pragmatic approach to diplomacy where cooperation and competition can coexist.   India's Strategic Positioning and the Role of Middle Powers Subrahmanyam Jaishankar provided insightful commentary on India's unique stance in global affairs. By highlighting India's "multiple-choice mindset" in diplomacy, Jaishankar defended the country's right to pursue a diversified foreign policy. This perspective sheds light on the evolving role of middle powers in the international system, which increasingly seek to chart their own courses amid the dominant U.S.-China narrative. Furthermore, Jaishankar's defense of India's policies, including its continued engagement with Russia, underscores the nuanced reality of modern international relations, where strategic interests often require balancing competing priorities.   The Impact of Middle Powers and Emerging Alliances The conversation further delved into the significance of groups like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in providing alternative platforms for global dialogue and cooperation. Jaishankar's remarks highlighted the growing influence of middle powers in shaping international norms and fostering new alliances. This trend points to a more multipolar world where the traditional dominance of Western-led institutions is increasingly complemented by diverse voices and perspectives. The enthusiastic response to expanding BRICS membership reflects a broad desire for more inclusive and representative global governance structures.  

Overview of the Communications

The extensive discussions at the Munich Security Conference provide a comprehensive overview of the intricate web of global diplomacy. The leaders' dialogue reflected a shared understanding of the pressing need to uphold international norms while recognizing the diverse interests and strategic calculations that shape global affairs. From Germany's emphasis on collective defense of sovereignty to the U.S.'s nuanced approach to China and India's assertion of strategic autonomy, the conference painted a vivid picture of a world at a crossroads. Moreover, the evolving nature of international relations, characterized by the rise of middle powers and the strategic repositioning of established powers, underscores the importance of flexibility, dialogue, and cooperation. As the world faces unprecedented challenges, the insights from Munich offer valuable lessons in navigating the complexities of global diplomacy. The conference not only highlighted the ongoing geopolitical shifts but also reaffirmed the enduring value of multilateralism and strategic partnerships in forging a more stable and just international order.   Sources: THX News & US Department of State. Read the full article

[spacenutspod]

Through the Artemis Program, NASA intends to send astronauts back to the Moon for the first time since the Apollo Era. But this time, they intend to stay and establish a lunar base and other infrastructure by the end of the decade that will allow for a “sustained program of lunar exploration and development.” To accomplish this, NASA is enlisting the help of fellow space agencies, commercial partners, and academic institutions to create the necessary mission elements – these range from the launch systems, spacecraft, and human landing systems to the delivery of payloads.With NASA funding, a team of engineers from the University of Arizona College of Engineering (UA-CE) is developing autonomous robot networks to build sandbag shelters for NASA astronauts on the Moon. The designs are inspired by cathedral termite mounds, which are native to Africa and northern Australia’s desert regions. Their work was the subject of a paper presented at the American Astronautical Society Guidance, Navigation, and Control (AAS GNC) Conference, which took place from February 1st to 7th in Littleton and Breckinridge, Colorado. The team was led by Associate Professor Jekan Thanga of the UA-CE Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering, who is also the head of the Space and Terrestrial Robotic Exploration (SpaceTREx) Laboratory and the NASA-supported Asteroid Science, Technology and Exploration Research Organized by Inclusive eDucation Systems (ASTEROIDS) Laboratory. He and his team are partnering with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Canadian space robotics company MDA to create the LUNAR-BRIC consortium, which is developing the technology for the Artemis Program.Illustration of NASA astronauts and the elements of the Lunar Base Camp around the Moon’s south pole. Credit: NASAPer the Artemis Program, NASA will land astronauts around the lunar south pole with the Artemis III mission, currently scheduled for 2026/27. By the end of the decade, they plan to build the infrastructure for long-duration stays, like the Lunar Gateway and the Artemis Base Camp. The latter element consists of a Foundation Lunar Habitat (FLH), the Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV), and a Habitation Mobility Platform (HMB). However, they will also need semi-permanent safe shelters while they search for optimal locations to build permanent habitats.Consistent with NASA’s vision for future space exploration, a key element in this plan is to leverage local resources for building materials and resources – a process known as In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU). For their concept, Thanga and his team investigated whether sandbags filled with lunar regolith could be used instead of traditional building materials to build lunar infrastructure. This includes housing, warehouses, control towers, robot facilities, landing pads, and blast walls to protect lunar buildings as spacecraft conduct takeoffs and landings.Thanga was first inspired by a YouTube video showing the work of Iranian-born American architect Nader Khalili, best known for designing structures that incorporate unconventional building materials. This includes his development of SuperAdobe sandbag construction to create structures for the developing world and emergency situations. During the 1980s, the late architect proposed building sandbag structures on the Moon and other extraterrestrial locations. Thanga incorporated the concept of insect “skyscrapers” into Khalili’s ideas, specifically the tall-standing cathedral termite mounds.These mounds are common in African and Australian deserts and are important in regulating the subterranean nest environment. As Thanga described in a UA College of Engineering News release:“In the case of the termites, it’s very relevant to our off-world challenges. The extreme desert environments the termites face are analogous to lunar conditions. Importantly, this whole approach doesn’t rely on water. Most of the moon is bone-dry desert. Learning about that helped direct me toward distributed systems for construction.”UA aerospace engineering students (from left) Min Seok Kang, Athip Thirupathi Raj, Chad Jordan Cantin, Sivaperuman Muniyasamy, and Korbin Aydin Hansen display a smart sandbag structure. Credit: University of Arizona College of EngineeringThanga has long been interested in applying insect social systems to distributed robot networks where machines are organized by swarm intelligence to work cooperatively without human intervention. In their system, the robots embed sensors and electronics in sandbags, fill them with lunar regolith, and then use these to assemble the structures in place. Some sensors provide location data to help the robots place the sandbags, while others provide communication capabilities and environmental information to warn of potential dangers.These include moonquakes, which result from heating and cooling during every lunar day and night (which last 14 days each). The temperature swings during this cycle are also a potential hazard, ranging from -183 to 107 °C (-298 to 224 °F) between day and night. Because the Moon is an airless environment, there’s also the threat of micro-meteors that bombard the surface at an average speed of 96,560 km/h (60,000 mph). The lack of an atmosphere (and a magnetosphere) also means the lunar surface is exposed to considerably more solar radiation and cosmic rays. These buildings meet NASA’s requirements for the Artemis Program by reducing the amount of material that must be transported to the Moon while protecting the harsh lunar environment. NASA has granted Thanga and his team $500,000 for lunar surface projects through the agency’s Space Technology Artemis Research program (M-STAR), part of the Minority University Research and Education Project (MUREP). NASA has also provided $1 million annually for UA student research projects over the last five years through a MUREP Institutional Research Opportunity (MIRO). Said Thanga:“The goal is to raise the participation of underrepresented groups in aerospace. And these are hands-on, student-centric projects. This lab offers me the exact environment – it’s startup culture. I’m leading a team and working with multidisciplinary people. I’m glad I’m here.”Thanga and Sivaperuman Muniyasamy, an aerospace engineering doctoral student and first author on the paper describing the technology, presented their idea during a classified session of the AAS GNC. “By publishing the paper at the conference, we’re gaining feedback from other experts that really helps us move forward,” said Muniyasamy. “It’s no accident this team has an academic partner, a commercial partner, and a government agency,” Thanga added. “Given the challenges, part of the path is for us to collaborate.”Artist’s impression of a lunar mining facility harvesting resources from the Moon’s surface. Credit: NASA/Pat Rawlings Beyond the team’s plans for lunar habitats, the LUNAR-BRIC consortium plans to produce many concepts that will support the creation of a space economy. In addition to leading a team of eight undergraduate and master’s students working on lunar surface projects, Muniyasamy plans to launch a space mining company after completing his Ph.D. As he noted, NASA plans to build facilities for long-term habitation and industry within a few years of the successful landing of Artemis III that will enable (among other things) environmentally responsible lunar and asteroid mining. Thanga and his student team worked with the university commercialization arm (Tech Launch Arizona) to file patents on the robotic system and the distributed computer processing networks that link the proposed structures and robots. Further Reading: The University of ArizonaThe post Engineers Design Habitats for the Moon Inspired by Terminite Mounds appeared first on Universe Today.

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#Yemen

We urge the international community to strongly condemn the attack on Yemen carried out by a group of countries without a UN mandate. We share the concerns expressed by our partners in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, and call for increased international efforts to prevent further escalation of the situation.

We believe that this undertaking by the forces of the illegal "coalition" poses a direct threat to global peace and security. Based on this understanding, we have called for an immediate convening of the Security Council, where we will voice our principled assessment of these unlawful actions.

#Ukraine

In reality, Washington, London, and Brussels have nurtured an aggressive nationalist and essentially neo-Nazi dictatorship in Ukraine whose sole objective, openly expressed, is to bring a "strategic defeat" to Russia. Western countries can no longer deny that Ukraine itself has been brought to ruin as a result of these policies. However, this has yet to be officially acknowledged.

Naturally, we cannot allow such a source of threat to the security of our country and our citizens to exist near our borders.