#ap4e

[inlovewithaspiderguy]

SOMEONE!IN FRENCH!COMMENTED!ON MY!MCR FRENCH FIC!THAT I POSTED!TWO HOURS AGO! AND!THEY SAID!THEY LOVE THE CONCEPT!

[atvbs]

i find it so funny that back in hs everyone always assumed i took honors spanish 4 and ap physics. they genuinely thought i was in the class and knew what they were talking abt and i. was never there. i never signed up for them. lol.

[daredevilwindypaws]

>:(

[toquepaulista]

Material Bioquímica de Alimentos- 6

Material Bioquímica de Alimentos- 6

3-web-bioquimica-dos-alimentos-gastronomia1.pdf Material Bioquímica de Alimentos – 3

[lonestarflight]

Apollo 4 Saturn V (CSM-101/AS-501) on the Crawler Transporter Vehicle was rolled out from the Vehicle Assembly Building and slowly (1 mph) moved to the launch pad at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The Apollo 4 mission was the first launch of the Saturn V launch vehicle. Objectives of the unmanned Apollo 4 test flight were to obtain flight information on launch vehicle and spacecraft structural integrity and compatibility, flight loads, stage separation, and subsystems operation including testing of restart of the S-IVB stage, and to evaluate the Apollo command module heat shield.

Date: August 26, 1967

NASA ID: 6757953, ap4-KSC-67PC-379HR, ap4-67-HC-547HR

source

United States. - National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Apollo 4 enroute to Pad A of Complex 39. 1967. State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory. <https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/328417>

[incorrectsmashbrosquotes]

https://youtu.be/doL8XsLTDOQ?si=aP4-tAcsffDBnk6B

They Modded Sonic into Mario Kart 8

This is my "They Did Surgery on a Grape".

"They modded sonic into Mario Kart 8".

[curiouscatalog]

Definitely not Walt Disney's version

From: The mirror. London : J. Limbird, 1826

AP4 .M5 v. 1

[mariacallous]

As much of the world was focused on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s high-profile visit to Moscow last month, it was lost to many observers that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was in Kyiv at the same time on an equally consequential visit. Making an unannounced trip to see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Kishida offered Japan’s solid support.

Three themes immediately stood out from the simultaneous presence of Xi in Moscow and Kishida in Kyiv. First, it pointed to East Asia’s active and growing role in shaping European security, perhaps for the first time since the medieval Mongol invasions. If China joins Iran in more actively supporting Russia in Ukraine, it would have profound implications for the course of the war—and the map of Eastern Europe. South Korea has emerged as a major weapons supplier to Poland, which is transforming into NATO’s most important military frontline state. The presence of the so-called AP4 (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) at NATO meetings is becoming routine.

Second, Kishida underlined that China’s view of the war in Ukraine is not necessarily the view in the rest of Asia.

And third, the parallel visits exposed the hollowness of Xi’s claims to be a neutral peacemaker in Ukraine. Even as some European leaders, like French President Emmanuel Macron, have hailed Xi as Europe’s savior who can mediate an end to Russia’s war, Kishida’s meeting with Zelensky served to highlight the one-sided nature of Beijing’s so-called peace initiative in Ukraine.

Traveling to Ukraine seems to have given a bounce to Kishida’s sagging ratings at home, but it also underlines the definitive break from decades of Japanese passivity on the world stage. Although it was perhaps coincidental that Kishida found himself in Kyiv at the same moment that Xi was in Moscow, his trip to Ukraine illustrated Japan’s emergence as a geopolitical actor to be reckoned with.

To be sure, the remaking of Japan as a key power in the security sphere began under the late Shinzo Abe, the former prime minister who undertook the onerous task of getting Japan to rethink its role in Asia and the world and shake off the political shackles of the past. Abe made much progress on revamping Japan’s national security policies during his two tenures as prime minister, from 2006 to 2007 and from 2012 to 2020.

But few expected Kishida to build on Abe’s strategic legacy. Abe’s shoes were big to fill, and Kishida was widely viewed as weak. The Ukraine crisis, however, offered a huge opportunity that Kishida seized with both hands to radically reorient Japan. If Abe had to struggle to get his ideas accepted by the political class, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has heightened popular awareness of the fundamental changes in Japan’s security environment. That a major power armed with nuclear weapons could invade a neighbor with impunity, seeking to unilaterally change borders by force, shook Japan to the core. Kishida’s plans to double defense expenditure over the next five years; modernize the military to better deter North Korea, Russia, and China; and take on a larger regional security role have thus found less resistance.

Long viewed as passive and pacifist, Japanese foreign policy seemed to produce few strategic ideas of its own. Tokyo was happy to follow Washington’s lead while avoiding challenging Beijing. Over the last decade and a half, however, Japan has begun to develop new geopolitical approaches, promote them, and get them accepted by allies and partners.

None of Japan’s foreign-policy innovations are more important than the invention of “Indo-Pacific” as a geostrategic concept and the establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), both of which are now integral to Asian geopolitics. Abe first outlined both ideas in an address to the Indian Parliament in August 2007. It was one thing to frame new ideas in a speech—and entirely another to get others to see their merit.

The initial international response to both ideas was skepticism among Japan’s friends and outright hostility from Beijing. But Japan’s sheer persistence and a rising China’s growing assertiveness saw Tokyo’s Quad partners—Australia, India, and the United States—come around to accepting Abe’s ideas.

In late March, Kishida also traveled to India to offer an upgraded vision for the Indo-Pacific that outlined a range of ideas to strengthen the region’s security, and he presented a more ambitious Japanese contribution to realizing it. This includes joint military training, and cooperation on maritime security.

A third important innovation from Japan was to transcend the “hub and spokes” system that defined the postwar U.S.-led security order in Asia. While Japan attaches great significance to its bilateral alliance with the United States, it has recognized the importance of directly connecting the spokes. Japanese efforts to build bilateral strategic partnerships with other countries in the region complement Tokyo’s alliance with Washington and deepen the basis for regional security amid growing Chinese military power and diplomatic assertiveness, with its destabilizing impact on the region. The strongest of these new regional relationships are with Quad partners Australia and India, but ties to South Korea and the Philippines are strengthening as well.

A key goal of Japan’s regional strategy is to strengthen the defense infrastructure and capabilities of Indo-Pacific states. If the Abe administration sought to give Japan’s substantial overseas development assistance a strategic character, Kishida is now developing a framework for overseas security assistance. These new Japanese initiatives have full U.S. support, with Washington eager to see its allies and friends become stronger by collaborating with each other and making themselves more capable in coping with the challenge from Beijing.

Just as important as Japan’s role in developing a new security architecture for Asia are Tokyo’s efforts to tie Europe to the Asian security order. Similar to the way Abe’s Indo-Pacific concept imagined the strategic unity between the Indian and Pacific oceans, he also recognized the deep interconnection between security in Europe and Asia.

It was nearly five years ago that Abe was inviting Britain and France, Western Europe’s leading military powers, to contribute to Asian security. Abe understood that isolationist pressures on U.S. foreign policy—which became so visible during the presidency of Donald Trump—meant that Asia couldn’t rely solely on the United States for its future security. Abe looked beyond the region for further partners to manage Indo-Pacific security challenges.

Since then, many European powers, including France, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, have outlined Indo-Pacific strategies. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy issued by the Biden administration also underlines the need for allies and partners in Europe and Asia to work together.

One of Abe’s last acts before his life was cut short by an assassin was to raise the question of Washington’s extended deterrence in Asia and to call for a debate on deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in the region. So far, Kishida has rejected nuclear sharing with the United States, and he has repeated the Japanese commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. But the issue of a U.S. nuclear security commitment to Asia is unlikely to go away as China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal.

Underlying Japan’s new security vision is a clear recognition of the Chinese threat to Asia. Unlike many of its European peers who were or still are unwilling to come to terms with Russia’s or China’s aggressively revisionist ambitions, Tokyo has not let its massive economic exposure to Beijing get in the way of dealing with it. Proximity surely helped Tokyo perceive the problem clearly, but Japan had to overcome the inevitable constraints presented by the dangers of sharing a contested maritime frontier with China.

Equally significant has been Japan’s decision to highlight the implications of Russian aggression against Ukraine. In arguing that “Ukraine is the future of Asia,” Kishida has pressed Japan and Asia to see the implications of a nuclear-armed power unilaterally changing the territorial status quo.

With its increasingly clear-eyed security policies, Japan is reminding the West—especially Europe, which had become geopolitically complacent in the decades after the Cold War—that coping with the challenges presented by China and Russia demands greater discipline. This includes a much needed strategic outreach to the global south, where Kishida has called on other G-7 countries to do more to address developing countries’ own concerns and priorities instead of projecting Western policies and preaching to them about how to run their affairs.

As it rises to become a major geopolitical actor in Asia and the world, Japan has become the unlikely actor persuading the West to rethink its strategic assumptions. As France’s Macron and other European leaders struggle to come to terms with the challenges presented by Russia and China, Japan has injected a much-needed sense of clarity to the strategic discourse in Europe and Asia.

[kaneninarananesaki]

さあ、野球だ野球だ　その２

ドリームオーダー、ジャイアンツのカードをシングル買いして大体揃えたところです。球団ごとに揃えて遊ぶレギュレーションの都合シングルが買いやすいのがありがたい、ゲームに参加する人間がこぞって買いたがるカードなんかは無限に高騰するけど12球団に分散されれば高くて1枚1000未満くらいに納まり、コレクション性の高いサイン入りなどは1万円近くで好きな人が買えばよいという構図のようだ。ようできとる。

NPB公式認可のゲームなので球団ロゴのスリーブやデッキケースが存在するのが良い、こういうのでいいんだこういうので。

ここでデッキを組むことが出来る。オーダー考えるだけでもぼちぼち楽しいので、こんなん無料でやらせてくれるのは太っ腹だ。

で、二つ組んできました。

428BY

2LCAE

無難に大城中軸のやーつと、3コス大城と3コス坂本を同居させたやーつ。

無難構成なら岡本3コスのほうがいい気が今してきた。個人的には大城坂本版のほうが好き、3コスの暴力と見せかけてAP4強振＋1の丸が長打を打つのが一番うれしい。勝てるかどうかは知らん、これはそういう楽しみでそういう遊びなんだ。グルーヴで理解してくれ、ついてこいここまで、ハレルヤ。

これより下は12球団味付け好き放題書くやつ、パリーグ編です。

オリックスバファローズː中

癖は無いが、組む上では色々悩ましい。

先発宮城は屈指の強さだけど中継ぎ宇田川はコスト問題で使いづらいし平野に繋げなくなる。継投を意識するなら東だけど能力的にキツいし手札枚数的に宇田川の能力が活きない気がする。

野手はDH森として、若月、頓宮、杉本がそのコストの��わ寄せを食う形になる。森のみで点取るのは流石に厳しいが杉本に注力するなら若月はコスト0、でも若月コスト1は捨て置くには破格の防御性能である。いっそ頓宮を3コスにして若月杉本を0コスにしたほうがたらればに惑わされずに済むか。ううむ、とにかく悩ましい。

ロッテː中

投手は能力で自動的に決定、野手はコストで自動的に決定。

小島が強いので言う事がない、益田に行く前に西村は挟むとして澤村を投げさすかは好みがでそう。実際の手札とランナーが出るリスクと相談してもろて。

佐藤都志也が小島と噛み合いまくってるので2コス。いいバッテリーだ。

基本的に貧打の香りが強いので井上は使いたいが使うと中村奨吾が使いづらく、友杉が1コスになって貧打が加速しそう。友杉は1番として優秀なうえに「ランナーが得点圏にいると強化」というチームコンセプトに噛み合っているのでもったいない、でもしょうがないよね、安田コス3がドローソースになってるから節約しにくいし、ネ。

ソフトバンクː難

1枚ずつそれぞれテキストは強いが、チームとして組んだ時噛み合わない

タイムの権利が増えると選手が強化される。が、野手はタイムの権利を行使すると強化され、投手はタイムの権利を貯めると強化される。俺はどうすればいいんだよ……母さんはいつもそうだ、あれをしろこれはするな、こうしろああしろ、俺はもうどうすればいいかわかんないんだよ。

先発中継ぎは現環境だと全員バニラ、マジかよ。最終回にノコノコ現れるオスナは「あーあー！タイム3枚以上なら本気出せるのになー！」とか言ってる。お前が登板するのに既に1枚消費するし、野手も消費するし、俺はもうどうすればいいかわかんないんだよ本当に。

甲斐の手札リフレッシュは激強、デッキのリフレッシュにもつながるし、でもこれもタイムカード使うんだ。もう心が壊れそうだ。

柳田の能力もシンプル暴力で強い、でもこれもタイムカード使うんだ。素の能力が強いので、シチュエーション次第で、非常手段として。

近藤は素でミート強振どっちもダイス＋1でチャンスで強化かつタイムカード消費しない、ありがとう近藤健介、鷹のオアシス。

もうこんな感じなので2コス今宮でタイムを集めるしかない、さらに柳町を加えてタイムを集める動きにするかは好み、でもでも正直そこまでするのはただ勝つよりも難しいと思う。多分回れば必要以上の大量得点、回らなければシケ、みたいな感じになる。

楽天ː難

ピーキーなバニラ投手陣と、無難すぎるバニラ野手陣

先発陣はお説教です。「相手サポートが2枚なら強化」ってなんで発動のトリガーが完全に相手にあるんじゃい、それでいて手札も則本5枚、早川4枚って救いはないのですか？どうしても使いたいなら坊主めくり上等の覚悟で。

という訳で先発は田中将大より他なし、中継ぎ伊藤は信頼できる。抑え則本が別カードで存在する（先発則本と同じ試合で使えない）のは面白いけど渡辺共々パンチに欠ける。ここに私は松井裕樹の亡霊を見た。

捕手太田と安田はどちらも強力なので、ここDHにして両3積みすれば坊主めくりにも耐えうるかもしれない。責任は取らない、そういう遊びと思って組んでくれ。

これをやるなら浅村に決めてもらうしかないので、あとは0コスAP5の民で埋めるしかない、あえて捕手ケチって伊藤裕季也に託したり？小郷使ったり？根本的な貧打は解消されまい、そういう細かいことをしてもどうしようもないほどに浅村栄斗がなんとかするしかないと思う。

西武ː中

投手陣はどう組んでも鉄壁、ただしとにかく点が取れない。

今井-1コス水上-増田

平良-2コス水上-増田

どっちでもいい、初心者向けの今井先発か、ゲームとして面白そうな平良先発か、実在選手としてどっちが好きかで決めてもいい。何選んだってどっちも強いよ。源田もゲッツー持ちだし、柘植の捕手能力も高い。

が、貧打。どうしようもなく、貧打。個人的には中日より厳しい。おかしいな、ちょっと前まで山賊打線とかやってた筈なのに。

ポジションの都合3コス源田確定、ここでケチると一生点が入らないので外崎3コス確定、AP6の選手は今のところ皆無、コストの都合AP4が結構入ってくる。どうすんだこれ、源田覚醒で出塁？ゲッツーも取りたいんじゃなかったっけ？カード足りないよ……。もし仮に西武デッキを使ってる対戦を見る機会があって、西武が得点したならあなたの贔屓がどこであれ「地平を駆ける獅子を見た」を歌って万歳三唱しましょう。それくらいの偉業なんです。

日ハムː難

戦術カードを適度に廃棄してアドバンテージを取っていく。

限られた条件下で効果が微増する戦術カードを大量に使用することでアドバンテージを取っていく、条件に見合わない戦術カードは廃棄することで強化される選手につぎ込める。展開を完全に読み切れればこれほど強力な構成はない、問題は展開を完全に読み切れることなどないということ。

「戦術カードを使用した場合」をトリガーにしてるならバカスカ使用し、「戦術カードを廃棄した場合」をトリガーにしてるならじゃんじゃか廃棄していく、テキストの言いなりになってると手札がカッツカツになるので松本剛の効果で事故を回避していく、松本剛の効果のトリガー？いやだな、当然戦術カードの廃棄に決まってるじゃあないですか。先発はまさしくこの二律背反をどう解釈するかという選択になっている。「使用」で強化される加藤か、「廃棄」で強化される上原か。

ミート選択時、強振選択時とそれぞれ効果的に使用できるタイミングが限られる戦術カードをコンセプトとしているだけに、現状デッキにどの戦術カードが何枚含まれるのか、廃棄する順番、相手の読みを加味した判断が他球団の普通のプレイングの上に追加される。完全に読み切った上で展開することが出来たなら盤面の制圧は元よりアドレナリンがすごそう。

12球団好き勝手書いてみた。あなたの好きな球団はどんな感じだったかな？パリーグに易なくなっちゃったね、しょうがないね。

ドリームオーダーは全国の気の利いたカードショップ、あるいはローソン、ないしスタートデッキは少なくともアマゾンで購入可能です。始まったばかりのカードゲーム、好きな球団があるなら、飛び込むならたぶん今。

[atvbs]

seeing the awakening in that list always reminds me of ap4 and how upset i was when covid hit

[frontporchconsign]

Check out this listing I just added to my Poshmark closet: Victorias Secret Pajama Pants Womens Pink White Striped Wide Leg Size M.

[christophe76460]

HEUREUX CELUI QUI LIT.

Apocalypse 1:3.

Il s'agit de la première des sept << Béatitudes >> ou bénédictions que nous trouvons dans l'Apocalypse.

Elle est donnée à ceux qui lisent ou entendent ce qui est écrit dans ce livre, et qui lui obéissent. Nous trouvons les six autres bénédictions dans les passages suivants: Ap14:13;. 16:15;. 19:9;. 20:6;. 22:7, 14;. Lu11:28.

Le fait que les croyants doivent garder les commandements de l'Apocalypse montre qu'il s'agit d'un livre pratique qui contient des instructions morales et non une simple prophétie sur l'avenir. Nous devrions donc lire non seulement pour comprendre le plan future de Dieu pour le monde et son peuple, mais aussi pour apprendre et appliquer les grands principes spirituels. Avant tout, il devrait nous rapprocher de Jésus-Christ dans la foi, l'espérance et l'amour.

***AUX SEPT ÉGLISES Ap1:4. l'Apocalypse s'adresse aux sept Églises d'Asie( situées à l'ouest de la Turquie actuelle). Chaque église particulière était composée de diverses assemblées. Ces églises ont probablement été sélectionnées, parce qu'elles représentaient la totalité des communautés chrétiennes de cette époque, puisque le mot << sept >> représente un tout.

Ce qui leur a été dit est valable pour toute l'Eglise actuelle. Autrement dit, les sept églises représentent toutes les assemblées à travers les âges. Quant aux << sept Esprits >> ils symbolisent peut-etre la perfection du ministère du Saint-Esprit a l'égard de l''Eglise Ap4:5;. 5:6;. Es11:2-3.

***Il VIENT Ap1:7, le but principal du livre de l'Apocalypse est de décrire le triomphe du royaume de Dieu lorsque Christ reviendra l'établir sur la terre ; les évènements de la fin des temps qui accompagneront cette venue sont également exposés Da7:13;. Mt24:29-30. Il présente une eschatologie de victoire pour les fidèles et enseigne que l'histoire se terminera par le jugement du système de satan dans ce monde chapitre 17 et 18 et par le règne éternel de Christ.

[lonestarflight]

Early morning view of Apollo 4 (CSM-017/SA-501) on Launch Complex 39A, Kennedy Space Center, prior to launch later that day. This was the first launch of the Saturn V.

Date: November 9, 1967

NASA ID: Ap4-S67-50531, S67-50531, 67-50531

[almonddirge]

Hey so does anyone happen to understand Genshin math?

I was trying to do a meme build for my Wanderer to get his attack super high for a screenshot but something isn’t adding up?

He has 4012 attack to start with. I used a Guoba chili from Xiangling (+10% attack), a Bennett burst (994 base attack + talent 12 with constellations), Thrilling Tales switch (+48% attack), and pyro swirl triggering his AP4 talent (+30% attack) but—

It seems like it should be much higher? Does anyone have any insight I’m terrible at math

[agtv7004]

(유럽엔 나토, 한국엔 유엔사 전력 제공국. 다국적 군사기구로.. AP4 포함 18개국, 동아시아 판 나토, 지금 다져야.. [레지스탕스TV, 정광용TV]에서)

[mariacallous]

NATO’s annual summit last week in Vilnius, Lithuania, was significant beyond discussions about Russia, Ukraine’s membership, and NATO’s future. The leaders from NATO’s four Asia-Pacific partners (loosely called the “Asia-Pacific Four” or “AP4”)—South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—also participated in their second consecutive NATO summit.

Their attendance followed last year’s meeting in Madrid, during which NATO adopted its new Strategic Concept (the first since 2010), including China for the first time. It called Beijing a “systemic challenge” to Euro-Atlantic security, in tandem with the Madrid declaration, which described China as a systemic competitor. This year’s Vilnius communique stated that NATO is taking steps to protect against China’s “coercive tactics” and called on Beijing to play a “constructive role” as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine—something that Beijing has shown little sign of doing so far.

The time is ripe for the NATO-AP4 partnership to become a critical linchpin for global security and stability. It is a critical link that connects three regions: North America, Europe, and the Indo-Pacific. Last year, there was enough political impetus to lay the foundation at the Madrid summit with a consensus that security is global and inseparable.

Capitalizing on the NATO-AP4 partnership could send a strong deterrence message to all three authoritarian regimes in possession of nuclear weapons—China, North Korea, and Russia. It can be a linchpin that not only brings the three regions together on shared challenges but knits together the United States’ patchwork of different regional security systems into a global security architecture of networked alliances and partnerships.

The NATO-AP4 partnership is an underappreciated entity whose history dates back to the early 1990s, first with Japan, after the fall of the Soviet Union. Until recently, NATO’s conception of “Asia” was primarily Central Asia as well as its cooperative missions in Afghanistan with both Central Asian and some Asia-Pacific countries after the 9/11 attacks. The four AP4 countries are officially “partners across the globe” of NATO and have begun to transition into the alliance’s new Individually Tailored Partnership Program. NATO is rightfully strengthening bilateral relations with individual countries in the Indo-Pacific. But it should also focus on multilateral cooperation with them.

The United States has long maintained a multilateral security system in Europe and a series of bilateral alliances (“hub and spokes”) in Asia that have largely been dealt with separately. But the evolving global security landscape in which a crisis in Europe affects the Indo-Pacific, and vice versa, requires a comprehensive and integrated approach. Russia’s war on Ukraine has resulted in inflation, food shortages, and disruptions in global supply chains while likely emboldening and providing tips for Beijing’s and Pyongyang’s own strategic calculations.

NATO for its part would be able to broaden its political-military network and contribute to Indo-Pacific security in practical ways, and its AP4 partners would become members of a global security community of like-minded countries that support one another across multiple domains. In these ways, NATO could also become the first forum in which hard security issues are discussed at a global level.

To be clear, NATO’s priority and top preoccupation will likely always be Russia and defending the North Atlantic region against all threats. It is unlikely to expand into a global alliance that commits to defending Asian countries militarily or get involved in a conflict militarily (unless perhaps North Korea or China struck the U.S. homeland). But with NATO’s recent recognition of the threat from Beijing and Pyongyang, there are opportunities for it to do far more than just dialoguing with Indo-Pacific countries for cultural education or putting forward rhetoric about a united front, important as those goals also are.

Since the 2022 Madrid summit, NATO and its AP4 partners have ramped up high-level political discussions and amplified rhetoric about solidarity to defend the rules-based international order. During his visit to Tokyo this January, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stressed: “What is happening in Europe today could happen in East Asia tomorrow. So we must remain united and firm.” He expressed interest in opening up NATO’s first liaison office in Asia in Tokyo (although France has expressed objection). The Vilnius communique reportedly omitted language about such plans in the final round of talks.

All of these movements and aspirations are headed in the right direction. But more can and should be done to translate talk into practical action that conforms to the framework of NATO’s priorities, outlined in its 2022 Strategic Concept, while staying true to the alliance’s statutes.

First, NATO should host regular Track 1 and Track 1.5 dialogues on deterrence and other key security topics to deepen all three regions’ respective situational awareness about one another’s immediate security threats, experiences, and deterrence targets as well as their understanding of different regional contexts. Deterrence should feature prominently on their agenda because it is one of NATO’s core tasks and each region faces adversaries whose incentives to use nuclear weapons could originate from non-nuclear domains, while advanced weapons risk blurring the line between nuclear and conventional capabilities.

Decision-making during a crisis has become more difficult, and the chances of miscalculation have increased, particularly amid great-power competition in a multipolar nuclear era. In the conventional military domain, questions continue to loom as to whether China might one day invade or blockade Taiwan.

East Asian countries could draw on relevant experiences from NATO, including deterrence measures, practices, and consultative mechanisms to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence in Asia—particularly the reassurance component of Washington’s defense commitment to its Asian allies. A common understanding of the security lexicon is also necessary because basic terms such as nuclear-sharing and arms control have been used in some Northeast Asian countries with varying definitions and different perceptions of them.

The three regions should devise and practice joint plans for crisis response and management that expand and deepen the existing political dialogues held between the North Atlantic Council and NATO’s AP4. A coordinated response among NATO, the AP4, and the European Union that is aligned with United States across multiple domains (military and nonmilitary) is important in dealing with threats from Beijing—or any potential crisis in Asia. Political, policy, and military officials should be involved in drawing up and implementing these plans.

At the very least, political and military officials from the three regions could conduct tabletop exercises together on scenarios—including a crisis in Taiwan, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the South China Sea—that result from a failure in deterrence. Practicing these scenarios is important to minimize disarray when a crisis happens and to prevent adversaries from driving wedges among the allies. Having a basic plan would also manage expectations and provide predictability and a supportive role for member states in NATO (and the EU) in crisis response scenarios.

For example, some NATO or EU member states, including Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, have recently been deploying naval and other military assets to the Indo-Pacific to symbolize solidarity in defending a rules-based international order. What happens if a crisis occurs while any one of them is there for a routine drill? What would these ships and aircraft do? Some European lawmakers recently told me that those military assets would “run back home.” That might be the politically and legally realistic reaction. But while NATO members would not engage militarily in a response outside the Euro-Atlantic region, the mission and message of solidarity would instantly crumble and hand adversaries an opportunity to divide them.

Therefore, like-minded allies and partners need to discuss at least a basic conception of their supporting roles, bearing in mind that there could be numerous possibilities for a crisis scenario. NATO could assist in economic and political ways or even provide military support in similar forms that some AP4 countries have to Ukraine. After all, the Indo-Pacific countries that have supported Ukraine expect Europe to do the same if a crisis happens in Asia.

U.S. allies and partners from all three regions could also deepen joint and combined military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. These could be stand-alone drills or held on the sidelines of existing multinational military exercises, such as those hosted by Australia (Talisman Sabre). Such drills could be conducted using carefully imagined hypothetical scenarios and targets to minimize misperceptions by Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow, but the skills that are practiced would be transferrable to a real-life situation if and when warranted.

Finally, the United States could initiate a process to appoint an Indo-Pacific coordinator at NATO or a Pacific-Atlantic coordinator in Washington—perhaps someone who understands all three regions and deterrence. It would also be prudent to coordinate NATO-AP4 meetings with other minilateral groupings—such as the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—to prevent duplicating initiatives while working closely with the Indo-Pacific point persons in each capital.

North American, European, and Indo-Pacific allies and partners should practice readiness together and build habits of tri-regional cooperation sooner than later. But there certainly are road bumps for this vision of the way forward. Undoubtedly, budget, resources, and consensus would be among the top hurdles in devising and coordinating action plans or practicing joint drills. More fundamentally, the AP4 is not a formal grouping on its own, and NATO so far cooperates only bilaterally with those countries. The AP4 countries have not yet aligned on a common agenda as a group, and the Japan-South Korea relationship is bumpy. For these reasons, it would be understandable if some NATO members are still hesitant about the alliance formalizing initiatives with the AP4.

Despite all these challenges, practical first steps should still be taken. The stakes are too high to wait until after a conflict or crisis occurs in the Indo-Pacific.